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Last month, Russian President Vladimir Putin made his fourth visit to China since President Xi Jinping became top party leader in 2012. During this latest meeting, the two countries inked more than 30 deals, including an oil supply contract, and issued numerous joint statements, one of which criticized the United States for its plans to deploy missile defense systems on the Korean Peninsula and in the Balkans. Chinese state media speculate that this year’s China-Russia joint naval exercises, held annually since 2005, will likely be led by the South China Sea Fleet, reinforcing a general perception in China and elsewhere that U.S. policies are pushing Chinese leaders to consolidate ties with Russia.

On July 26, the John L. Thornton China Center at Brookings hosted a discussion on the U.S.-China-Russia trilateral relationship, the shape and scope of which carries far-reaching consequences for international order and global economic growth. Brookings President Strobe Talbott, who served as deputy secretary of state and ambassador-at-large on the new independent states following the Soviet breakup, provided an introduction. A panel of experts—J. Stapleton Roy, Fiona Hill, Yun Sun, and Cheng Li—discussed the current and historical dynamics at play, including expectations and recommendations for the future.

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• Is the United States losing China to Russia?

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• Is the United States losing China to Russia?

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• Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

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• 20160726_china_russia_us_transcript

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The failed coup in Turkey on July 15 to 16, organized by factions within the Turkish military in an attempt to overthrow the government of President Erdoğan, represents both a victory and a new trial for Turkish democracy. Although the Turkish citizenry brought the country back from the brink of anarchy and civil war, many analysts see last week’s events as a consequence of the political instability and discord that has been mounting for years as Erdoğan has consolidated powers, marginalized the opposition, and redefined Turkey’s democracy. How will the president react in the aftermath of the coup? Will the democratic backsliding intensify, or can the thwarted coup offer new opportunity for reconciling the deeply-polarized nation?

The upheaval and political instability in Turkey also holds significant implications for Turkey’s foreign policy and the fate of a neighboring region already in turmoil from the war in Syria and insecurity in Iraq. The West desperately needs a stable, democratic, and predictable partner in its NATO-ally Turkey to address the many challenges besetting the region and to fight the Islamic State (or ISIS). How will recent events affect regional stability and Turkey’s cooperation with the West on security issues, including the resettlement of Syrian refugees? What does the failed coup mean for the coalition against ISIS engagement in Syria?

On July 20, the Foreign Policy program (FP) at Brookings hosted a panel discussion to consider these questions and other domestic and international consequences of the coup attempt in Turkey. Brookings Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on the United States and Europe Fiona Hill introduced and moderated a wide-ranging conversation featuring FP Senior Fellows Shadi Hamid, Kemal Kirişci, Michael O'Hanlon, and Ömer Taşpınar.

After the discussion, the speakers took questions from the audience.

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• Turkey coup attempt was a shock
• Institutional collapse of Turkey unprecedented
• Disaster averted in failed Turkey coup
• Incirlik Air Base not irreplaceable
• Turkey after the coup attempt: Implications for Turkish democracy, foreign policy, and the future of the Syrian War

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• Turkey after the coup attempt: Implications for Turkish democracy, foreign policy, and the future of the Syrian War

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• Transcript (.pdf)

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• 20160720_turkey_coup_transcript

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On July 20 and 21, defense ministers from several nations will gather in Washington, D.C. at the invitation of U.S. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter. The meeting will bring together representatives from countries working to confront and defeat the Islamic State (or ISIL). French Defense Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian will be among those at the summit discussing how to accelerate long-term efforts to fight ISIL in Iraq and Syria. The close relationship between France and the United States has provided a solid base for security cooperation for decades, and in recent years, France has become one of America’s strongest allies in fighting terrorism and a prominent member of the international coalition to defeat ISIL.

On July 20, the Foreign Policy program at Brookings hosted Minister Le Drian for a discussion on French and U.S. cooperation as the two countries face multiple transnational security threats. Since becoming France’s defense minister in 2012, Le Drian has had to address numerous new security crises emerging from Africa, the Middle East, and within Europe itself. France faced horrific terrorist attacks on its own soil in January and November 2015 and remains under a state of emergency with its armed forces playing an active role in maintaining security both at home and abroad. Le Drian recently authored “Qui est l’ennemi?” (“Who is the enemy?”, Editions du Cerf, May 2016), defining a comprehensive strategy to address numerous current threats.

Join the conversation on Twitter using #USFrance

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• Introduction and featured speaker
• Discussion
• Introduction et conférencier invité
• Débat

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• Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

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• 20160720_france_defense_transcript

Fiona Hill, director of the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings and a senior fellow in Foreign Policy, discusses the decision of a majority of voters in Britain to leave the E.U. and the consequences of Brexit for the country’s economy, politics, position as a world power, and implications for its citizens.

Show Notes

Mr. Putin (New and Expanded)

The "greatest catastrophe" of the 21st century?

Brexit and the dissolution of the U.K. Brexit—in or out? Implications of the United Kingdom’s referendum on EU membership

EU: how to decide (Anand Menon)

Thanks to audio engineer and producer Zack Kulzer, with editing help from Mark Hoelscher, plus thanks to Carisa Nietsche, Bill Finan, Jessica Pavone, Eric Abalahin, Rebecca Viser, and our intern Sara Abdel-Rahim.

Subscribe to the Brookings Cafeteria on iTunes, listen in all the usual places, and send feedback email to BCP@Brookings.edu 

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In a close referendum last week, voters in the United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union, setting off financial and political shockwaves in Europe and around the world. British PM David Cameron has resigned, while Scotland has renewed calls for another independence referendum, global stock markets lost nearly $2 trillion on Friday, and the British pound is at a 30-year low. Many view the British referendum as commentary not only on economic and immigration trends in the UK, but as a possible forecast of the broader wave of anti-globalization and nationalistic political movements in the U.S. and Europe.

On June 29, Brookings hosted a discussion of the immediate fallout and medium- to long-term consequences of Britain’s departure from the EU. Panelists addressed how the process of exiting the EU might unfold, effects on the U.S.-U.K. and U.S.-EU security and trade relationships, on global development, and the future of the EU project.

Join the conversation on Twitter using #Brexit.

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• Brexit sends shockwaves: What now?

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• Brexit sends shockwaves: What now?

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• Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

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• 20160629_brexit_transcript

Twenty-five years ago, in March 1991, shaken by the fall of the Berlin Wall and the rise of nationalist-separatist movements in the Soviet Baltic and Caucasus republics, Mikhail Gorbachev held a historic referendum. He proposed the creation of a new union treaty to save the USSR. The gambit failed. Although a majority of the Soviet population voted yes, some key republics refused to participate. And so began the dissolution of the USSR, the event that current Russian President Vladimir Putin has called the “greatest geopolitical catastrophe” of the 20th century.

Today, in the wake of the referendum on leaving the European Union, British Prime Minister David Cameron seems to have put the United Kingdom on a similar, potentially catastrophic, path. Like the fall of the wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the fallout from Brexit could have momentous consequences. The U.K. is of course not the USSR, but there are historic links between Britain and Russia and structural parallels that are worth bearing in mind as the U.K. and the EU work out their divorce, and British leaders figure out what to do next, domestically and internationally.

A quick Russian history recap

The British and Russian empires formed at around the same time and frequently interacted. Queen Elizabeth I was pen pals with Ivan the Terrible. The union of the Scottish and English parliaments in 1707 that set the United Kingdom on its imperial trajectory coincided with the 1709 battle of Poltava, in which Peter the Great ousted the Swedes from the lands of modern Ukraine and began the consolidation of the Russian empire. The Russian imperial and British royal families intermarried, even as they jockeyed for influence in Central Asia and Afghanistan in the 19th century. The last Czar and his wife were respectively a distant cousin and granddaughter of British Queen Victoria. The Irish Easter Uprising and the Russian Revolution were both sparked by problems at home, imperial overstretch, and the shock of the World War I. 

Like the fall of the wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the fallout from Brexit could have momentous consequences.

Since the end of the Cold War, the U.K. and Russia have both had difficulty figuring out their post-imperial identities and roles. The U.K. in 2016 looks structurally a lot like the USSR in 1991, and England’s current identity crisis is reminiscent of Russia’s in the 1990s. After Gorbachev’s referendum failed to shore up the union, the Soviet Union was undermined by an attempted coup (in August 1991) and then dismantled by its national elites. In early December 1991, Boris Yeltsin, the flamboyant head of the Russian Federation, holed up in a hut deep in the Belarusian woods with the leaders of Ukraine and Belarus and conspired to replace the USSR with a new Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). With Gorbachev and the Soviet Union gone by the end of December, the hangover set in. Boris Yeltsin was the first to rue the consequences of his actions. The CIS never gained traction as the basis for a new union led by Russia. 

The Ukrainians, Belarussians, and everyone else gained new states and new identities and used the CIS as a mechanism for divorce. Russians lost an empire, their geopolitical anchor, and their identity as the first among equals in the USSR. The Russian Federation was a rump state. And although ethnic Russians were 80 percent of the population, the forces of disintegration continued. Tatars, Chechens, and other indigenous peoples of the Russian Federation, with their own histories, seized or agitated for independence. Ethnic Russians were “left behind” in other republics. Historic territories were lost. Instead of presiding over a period of Russian independence, Boris Yeltsin muddled through a decade of economic collapse and political humiliation.

Separating the U.K. from Europe...could be as wrenching as pulling apart the USSR.

Is Britain laying the same trap?

Another Boris, the U.K.’s Boris Johnson, the former mayor of London and main political opponent of David Cameron, risks doing the same if he becomes U.K. prime minister in the next few months. Separating the U.K. from Europe institutionally, politically, and economically could be as wrenching as pulling apart the USSR. People will be left behind—EU citizens in the U.K., U.K. citizens in the EU––and will have to make hard choices about who they are, and where they want to live and work. The British pound has already plummeted. The prognoses for short- to medium-term economic dislocation have ranged from gloomy to dire. The U.K is a multi-ethnic state, with degrees of devolved power to its constituent parts, and deep political divides at the elite and popular levels. Scotland and Northern Ireland, along with Gibraltar (a contested territory with Spain), clearly voted to stay in the European Union. The prospect of a new Scottish referendum on independence, questions about the fate of the Irish peace process, and the format for continuing Gibraltar’s relationship with Spain, will all complicate the EU-U.K. divorce proceedings. 

Like Russia and the Russians, England and the English are in the throes of an identity crisis.

Like Russia and the Russians, England and the English are in the throes of an identity crisis. England is not ethnically homogeneous. In addition to hundreds of thousands of Irish citizens living in England, there are many more English people with Irish as well as Scottish ancestry––David Cameron’s name gives away his Scottish antecedents––as well as those with origins in the colonies of the old British empire. And there are the EU citizens who have drawn so much ire in the Brexit debate. 

As in the case of the USSR and Russia where all roads led (and still lead) to Moscow, London dominates the U.K.’s population, politics, and economics. London is a global city that is as much a magnet for international migration as a center of finance and business. London voted to remain in Europe. The rest of England, London’s far flung, neglected, and resentful hinterland, voted to leave the EU—and perhaps also to leave London. At the end of the divorce process, without careful attention from politicians in London, England could find itself the rump successor state to the United Kingdom. If so, another great imperial state will have consigned itself to the “dust heap of history” by tying its future to a referendum. 

There are lots of ways for Syria to go wrong for Russia. Analysts have tended to focus on Moscow’s military shortcomings in that theater, wondering if Syria will become Russia’s Vietnam. They’ve also pointed to Russia’s deep economic troubles—exacerbated, of course, by very low oil prices—which call into question its ability to pay for the military campaign over time.

One of the understudied aspects of Russia’s involvement in the Syrian conflict is the ramifications it could have for the Russian government’s relations with Muslims back at home. Moscow is now home to the largest Muslim community of any city in Europe (with between 1.5 and 2 million Muslims out of a population of around 13 million, although illegal immigration has distorted many of the figures). Russian President Vladimir Putin and other leaders have consciously avoided choosing sides in the Sunni-Shiite divide in the Middle East—recognizing that doing so could provoke a backlash among Russian Muslims.

The rise of an extremist, Salafi- or Wahhabi-inspired, religious state in Syria—an Islamic caliphate established either by the Islamic State or by any religiously-based extremist group in the region—could pose a significant problem for Russia. That’s both because of how it’s likely to behave toward other states in the region (including key Russian partners like Israel, Egypt, and Iran) and because of what it could inspire in Mother Russia, where efforts by militant groups to create their own “caliphate” or “emirate” in the North Caucasus have created headaches for Moscow since the early 2000s. 

Islam and Russia go way back

Russia is a Muslim state. Islam is arguably older than Christianity in traditional Russian territory––with Muslim communities first appearing in southeastern Russia in the 8th century. It is firmly established as the dominant religion among the Tatars of the Volga region and the diverse peoples of the Russian North Caucasus. These indigenous Sunni Muslims have their own unique heritage, history, and religious experience. The Tatars launched a reformist movement in the 19th century that later morphed into ideas of “Euro-Islam,” a progressive credo that could coexist, and even compete, with Russian Orthodoxy and other Christian denominations. Sufi movements, rooted in private forms of belief and practice, similarly prevailed in the Russian North Caucasus after the late 18th century. 

Before the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1980s, when Central Asia and the South Caucasus were also part of the state, the USSR’s demography was in flux. The “ethnic” Muslim share of the population was rising as a result of high birthrates in Central Asia, while the Slavic, primarily Orthodox, populations of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine were declining from high mortality and low birthrates. Since the dissolution of the USSR, Russia’s nominal Muslim population has swelled with labor migration from Central Asia and Azerbaijan, which has brought more Shiite Muslims into the mix, in the case of Azeri immigrants. As in other countries, Russia has also had its share of converts to Islam as the population rediscovered religion in the 1990s and 2000s after the enforced atheism of the Soviet period came to an end.

The foreign fighter problem

The Kremlin cannot afford the rise of any group that fuses religion and politics, and has outside allegiances that might encourage opposition to the Russian state among its Muslim populations. The religious wars in the Middle East are not a side show for Russia. Thousands of foreign fighters have flocked to Syria from Russia, as well as from Central Asia and the South Caucasus, all attracted by the extreme messages of ISIS and other groups.

Extremist groups have been active in Russia since the Chechen wars of the 1990s and 2000s. A recent Reuters report reveals how Russia allowed—and even encouraged—militants and radicals from the North Caucasus to go and fight in Syria in 2013, in an effort to divert them away from potential domestic terrorist attacks ahead of the February 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics. The Kremlin now worries that these and other fighters will return from Syria and further radicalize and inflame the situation in the North Caucasus and elsewhere in Russia. Putin intends to eliminate the fighters, in place, before they have an opportunity to come back home.

Putin also knows a thing or two about extremists from his time in the KGB, as well as his reading of Russian history. As a result, he does little to distinguish among them. For Putin, an extremist is an extremist—no matter what name he or she adopts. Indeed, Russian revolutionaries in the 19th and 20th centuries wrote the playbook for fusing ideology with terror and brutality; and Putin has recently become very critical of that revolutionary approach––moving even to criticize Soviet founder and Bolshevik Party leader Vladimir Lenin for destroying the Russian state and empire one hundred years ago in the Russian Revolution of 1917. For Putin, anyone whose views and ideas can become the base for violence in opposition to the legal, legitimate state (and its leader) is an extremist who must be countered. Syria is a crucial front in holding the line.

The long haul

With this in mind, we can be sure that Putin sees Russia in for the long haul in Syria. Recent signs that Russia may be creating a new army base in Palmyra to complement its bases in Latakia and Tarsus, underscore this point. Having watched the United States returning to its old battlegrounds in both Afghanistan and Iraq to head off new extremist threats, Putin will want to prepare contingencies and keep his options open. 

The fight with extremists is only beginning for Russia in Syria, now that Moscow has bolstered the position of Bashar Assad and the secular Alawite regime. For Putin and for Russia, Syria is the focal point of international action, and the current arena for diplomatic as well as military interaction with the United States, but it is also a critical element for Putin in his efforts to maintain control of the homefront.

Event Information

On June 23, voters in the United Kingdom will go to the polls for a referendum on the country’s membership in the European Union. As one of the EU’s largest and wealthiest member states, Britain’s exit, or “Brexit”, would not only alter the U.K.’s institutional, political, and economic relationships, but would also send shock waves across the entire continent and beyond, with a possible Brexit fundamentally reshaping transatlantic relations.

On May 6, the Center on the United States and Europe (CUSE) at Brookings, in cooperation with the Heinrich Böll Stiftung North America, the UK in a Changing Europe Initiative based at King's College London, and Wilton Park USA, will host a discussion to assess the range of implications that could result from the United Kingdom’s referendum. 

After each panel, the participants will take questions from the audience.

Join the conversation on Twitter using #UKReferendum

Audio

• Brexit—in or out? Implications of the United Kingdom’s referendum on EU membership

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• Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

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• 20160506_uk_eu_brexit_transcript