Summary

• Following the territorial defeat of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in northeastern Syria, the Kurdish-led autonomous administration in the region is now grappling with the task of quickly dealing with thousands of the group’s detained members while bringing justice to their victims. To that end, local authorities are focusing on the use of counterterrorism laws and courts to charge captured ISIS members and determine their guilt accordingly.
• The piecemeal approach to justice is deeply flawed, and raises particular concerns about due process. No precise instruments exist to determine the personal responsibility of ISIS individuals for specific crimes, or for their role in war crimes committed by the group. In any event, the scale of the crimes and the number of victims – as well as severe shortages of resources and workers – make dispensation of justice extremely difficult through the traditional legal system.
• Not all detained ISIS members receive prison sentences. Individuals who did not hold senior roles in the group’s apparatus and are not accused of ‘major’ crimes (in practice, largely defined as fighting for ISIS and murder) are being released under limited reconciliation deals with tribal leaders. But the involvement of local community leaders in those efforts is not enough to ensure positive results. Many victims are upset at seeing ISIS members walk free without even admitting their guilt publicly or apologizing for the pain they caused.
• To overcome the limitations of the current, counterterrorism-focused framework, a ‘transitional justice’ approach could provide judicial and non-judicial instruments to establish accountability for ISIS crimes and reduce community resistance to the reintegration of group members. A combination of non-judicial mechanisms such as truth commissions, missing persons’ committees, and reparations and victim-healing programmes could play a vital role in providing ISIS victims with a sense of justice while contributing to peacebuilding and stability.
• Ignoring the urgency of developing a long-term plan to serve justice and contribute to community healing will almost certainly allow ISIS to continue to prevent the recovery and development of northeastern Syria. This, in turn, risks undermining the stability of the country and the region at large.

Islamic State videos have often been associated with savage violence and beheadings. An in-depth scrutiny however reveals another striking feature: that female bodies are absent, blurred or mute. Examining a few Islamic State videos in depth, the article suggests that the invisibility of women in tandem with the ostentatious visibility of male bodies enable gendered and embodied spectators to indulge in homoerotic as well as heterosexual imaginaries. In contrast to studies on visual security and online radicalization which assert that images affect an audience, this article focuses on the interaction between video and audience and argues that spectators are not only rational and emotional but embodied and gendered as well. Islamic State videos do not only attract western foreign fighters through religious–ideological rhetoric or emotional impact but also through gendered forms of pleasure and desire that enable carnal imagination and identification. The article probes the analytical purchase of carnal aesthetics and spectatorship.

In 2017 Trump expressed pity for the ‘beautiful babies’ killed in a gas attack on Khan Shaykhun in Syria before launching airstrikes against President Assad's regime. Images of suffering children in world politics are often used as a synecdoche for a broader conflict or disaster. Injured, suffering, or dead; the ways in which images of children circulate in global public discourse must be critically examined to uncover the assumptions that operate in these environments. This article explores reactions to images of children by representatives and leaders of states to trace the interconnected affective and political dimensions of these images. In contrast to attending to the expected empathetic responses prompted by images of children, this article particularly focuses on when such images prompt bellicose foreign policy decision-making. In doing this, the article forwards a way of thinking about images as contentious affective objects in international relations. The ways in which images of children's bodies and suffering are strategically deployed by politicians deserves closer scrutiny to uncover the visual politics of childhood inherent in these moments of international politics and policy-making.

Images are central to social media communication. Billions of images are shared across different social media platforms every day: photos, cartoons, GIFs and short video clips are exchanged by users, facilitating or framing discourse on participatory sites such as Twitter, Facebook and Instagram. Many of these images depict events of extreme violence, which circulate uninhibited by the conventional constraints associated with traditional news media censorship. A question arises here as to how such images mobilize public and policy-making responses to atrocities. This article examines the political dynamics of violent social media images. I argue that the particular qualities of social media can play an important role in how the digital visibility of horrific violence influences policy-making as a response to such atrocities. There is an important connection between the properties of social media platforms that allow user images to reach a global audience in real time and the emotional responses that this level of circulation generates. In turn, the pressure created by events made globally visible through the circulation of violent images and the audience responses to those images puts governments in a position where they are forced to act, which has significant implications for policy-making.

World politics generates a long list of anxiety-inspiring scenarios that threaten to unravel everyday life with sudden and violent destruction. From total war and the concentration camps, through nuclear firestorms, global pandemics and climate disaster, the diabolical violence of the recent past and conceivable future is the stuff of nightmares. Yet International Relations scholars and practitioners are often criticized for being disconnected from the human realities of international calamity. The challenge for both is to engage world politics in a way that foregrounds the human consequences of extreme violence and depravation. In this article, we explore these difficult experiences through popular culture representations of the apocalypse, a subject of intense interest for researchers in a discipline where global destruction is a distinct possibility. However, we take a different route by engaging the apocalypse through the horror genre, the one place where human suffering is explicitly accentuated. We argue that the horror genre is at once an access point for ethical engagement with the human consequences of extreme violence and a complex terrain where dark imaginings can be politically loaded, culturally specific and ethically ambiguous.

This article sets out to bring sound and music to the field of visual studies in International Relations. It argues that IR largely has approached the visual field as if it was without sound; neglecting how audial landscapes frame and direct our interpretation of moving imagery. Sound and music contribute to making imagery intelligible to us, we ‘hear the pictures’ often without noticing. The audial can for instance articulate a visual absence, or blast visual signs, bring out certain emotional stages or subjects’ inner life. Audial frames steer us in distinct directions, they can mute the cries of the wounded in war, or amplify the sounds of joy of soldiers shooting in the air. To bring the audial and the visual analytically and empirically together, the article therefore proposes four key analytical themes: 1) the audial–visual frame, 2) point of view/point of audition, 3) modes of audio-visual synchronization and 4) aesthetics moods. These are applied to a study of ‘war music videos’ in Iraq and Syria made and circulated by Shi'a militias currently fighting there. Such war music videos, it is suggested, are not just artefacts of popular culture, but have become integral parts of how warfare is practiced today, and one that is shared by soldiers in the US and Europe. War music videos are performing war, just as they shape how war is known by spectators and participants alike.

Political leaders, policy-makers and academics routinely refer to development as an objective process of social change through the use of technical, value-free terms. Images of poverty and inequality are regularly presented as evidence of a world that exists ‘out there’ where development unfolds. This way of seeing reflects the value of scientific forms of knowledge but also sits in tension with the normative foundations of development that take European modernization and industrialization as the benchmark for comparison. The role images play in this process is often overlooked. This article argues that a dominant mode of visuality based on a Cartesian separation between subject and object, underpinning the ascendance of European hegemony and colonialism, aligns with the core premises of orthodox development discourse. An example of how visual representations of development matter is presented through images of Africa–China relations in western media sources. Using widely circulated images depicting China's impact on African development in western news media sources as an example of why visual politics matters for policy-making, the article examines how images play a role in legitimizing development planning by rendering associated forms of epistemological and structural violence ‘invisible to the viewer’.

When powerful liberal democratic states are found to be complicit in extreme violations of human rights, how do they respond and why do they respond as they do? Drawing on the example of the United Kingdom's complicity in torture since 9/11, this article demonstrates how reluctant the UK has been to permit a full reckoning with its torturous past. We demonstrate that successive UK governments engaged in various forms of denial, obfuscation and attempts to obstruct investigation and avoid accountability. The net effect of their responses has been to deny the victims redress, through adequate judicial processes, and to deny the public adequate state accountability. These responses are not simply aimed at shielding from prosecution the perpetrators and those who have oversight of them, nor preventing political embarrassment. The various forms of denial and obstruction are also designed to ensure that collusion can continue uninterrupted. A core concern of intelligence officials and ministers has been to prevent any process that would lead to a comprehensive prohibition on involvement in operations where torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment are a real possibility. The door remains wide open, and deliberately so, for British involvement in torture.

For decades ‘youth bulge’ theory has dominated understandings of youth in mainstream International Relations. Youth bulge theory has also become part of some public media analyses, mainstream political rhetoric, and even officially enshrined in the foreign policy of some states. Through the ‘youth bulge’ lens, youth—especially males—have been presented as current or future perpetrators of violence. However, this article argues that the youth bulge thesis postulated in mainstream IR is based on flawed theoretical assumptions. In particular, supporters of youth bulge theory fail to engage with existing research by feminist IR scholars and thus take on a biological essentialist approach. This has led to theoretical and practical misunderstandings of the roles youth play in relation to conflict, peace and security. These partial and biased understandings have also resulted in less effective policy-making. In critically reflecting on the ‘youth bulge’ thesis, this article argues that applying gender analysis is crucial to understanding the involvement of young people in general—and young men in particular—in conflict. Doing so will contribute to advancing more accurate analysis in scholarship and policy-making.

This article uses the 2019 Eurovision Song Contest (ESC) that took place in Tel Aviv to explore how cultural mega-events serve both as political arenas and as tools for identity construction, negotiation and contestation. These processes of identity politics are all conducted across national–subnational–international–transnational levels. The hosting of mega-events fleshes out these multiple processes in a very strong manner. We first discuss the politics of hosting mega-events in general. We then examine the identity politics associated more specifically with the Eurovision Song Contest, before examining in depth the complex forms of identity politics emerging around the competition following the 2018 Israeli victory. We suggest that it is important to study together the multiple processes—domestic, international and transnational—of identity politics that take place around the competition, as they interact with each other. Consequently, we follow the various stakeholders involved at these different levels and their interactions. We examine the internal identity negotiation process in Israel surrounding the event, the critical actors debating how to use the stage to challenge the liberal, western, ‘normal’ identity Israel hoped to project in the contest and how other stakeholders (participating states, national broadcasting agencies, participating artists) reacted to them, and finally we examine the behaviour of the institution in charge, the European Broadcasting Union, and national governments. We contribute to the study of mega-events as fields of contestation, to the understanding of the complex, multilevel nature of national identity construction, negotiation and contestation in the current era, and more broadly to the role that popular culture plays in this context.

It is becoming widely accepted that we have transitioned, or are now transitioning, from an international liberal order to a different reality. Whether that reality is different solely in terms of power dynamics, or also in terms of values and institutions, is up for discussion. The growing body of literature on ‘post-liberalism’ is used as an entry-point for this article, which aims to explore how the post-liberal transition applies to cyberspace. We explore how power dynamics are evolving in cyberspace, as well as how established norms, values and institutions are contested. The article then looks at the emergence of cyber diplomacy as a consequence and response to the post-liberal transition. As it will be argued, if cyberspace was a creation of the liberal order, cyber-diplomacy is a post-liberal world practice. What role it plays in shaping a new order or building bridges between different political visions, and what it means for the future of cyberspace, will constitute key points of discussion.

The liberal international order (LIO) is in crisis. Numerous publications, debates and events have time and again made it clear that we are in the midst of a grand transformation of world order. While most contributions focus on either what is slowly dying (the LIO) or what might come next (China, multipolarity, chaos?), there is less analytical engagement with what lies in between those two phases of world order. Under the assumption that this period could last years or even decades, a set of analytical tools to understand this interregnum is urgently needed. This article proposes an analytical framework that builds on Gramscian concepts of crisis that will help us understand the current crisis of the LIO in a more systematic way. It addresses a gap in the literature on changing world order by elaborating three Gramsci-inspired crisis characteristics—processuality, organicity and morbidity—that sketch the current crisis landscape in a systematic way. Building on this framework, the article suggests different empirical entry points to the study of the crisis of the LIO and calls for a research agenda that takes this crisis seriously as a distinct period of changing world orders.

While China and Russia's general policies towards the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) are similar, the two reveal nuanced differences in addressing specific emergencies. Both express support for the first two pillars of R2P while resisting coercive intervention under its aegis, as they share anxieties of domestic political security and concerns about their international image. Nonetheless, addressing cases like the Syrian crisis, Russian statements are more assertive and even aggressive while Chinese ones are usually vague and reactive. This article highlights the two states’ different tones through computer-assisted text analyses. It argues that diplomatic styles reflect Russian and Chinese perceptions of their own place in the evolving international order. Experiences in past decades create divergent reference points and status prospects for them, which leads to their different strategies in signalling Great Power status. As Beijing is optimistic about its status-rising prospects, it exercises more self-restraint in order to avoid external containments and is reluctant to act as an independent ‘spoiler’. Meanwhile, Moscow interprets its Great Power status more from a frame of ‘loss’ and therefore is inclined to adopt a sterner approach to signal its status. Although their policies complement each other on many occasions, there is nothing akin to a Sino–Russian ‘bloc’.

This special section brings together diverse spaces and modes of visuality through specific, sustained attention to the various types of violence depicted. In doing so, these articles draw out a concern for the visual constitution of violence in global politics, and its emotional and political consequences. Individually and collectively, the contributions highlight the ways in which policy-makers and researchers are daily confronted by violent images that influence how complex political problems are seen and consequently understood. Paying attention to the power of the visuality of violence is necessary to understand how certain kinds of policy responses to direct and indirect violence unfold.

On its third anniversary, South Sudan is teetering on the brink of humanitarian disaster. Without urgent action, some parts of the country face famine as a result of conflict, a poor harvest and high, pre-existing levels of malnutrition and poverty. If all this sounds eerily familiar, it should. In July 2011 similar conditions saw famine strike in Somalia, just as South Sudan gained its independence. It is estimated that more than a quarter of a million people died during this catastrophe, most of them children.

The situation in South Sudan shows the lessons of 2011 have not been learned. Early warnings of disaster in Somalia accumulated for almost a year before famine was eventually declared by the UN. The threat was first explicitly raised by the Famine Early-Warning Systems Network (FEWSNET) in March 2011 and again in May. Yet the humanitarian system remained dormant. Had donors and agencies intervened early, they could have prevented the downward spiral into destitution and starvation. The reasons why early warnings did not lead to early action were documented in a major Chatham House report that concluded with numerous recommendations for how programmes, funding and decision-making should be reformed to avoid such a failure ever happening again.

Fast forward to 2014 and head 1,000 miles west, and little seems to have changed. FEWSNET warned of famine in South Sudan in early May, yet official UN data reveals no subsequent increase in funding. If anything, contributions to the South Sudan emergency appeal appear to have slowed, with April, May and June showing markedly less being received than in previous months. With the lean season (when food insecurity peaks) now well underway, the appeal is less than half-funded.

Experience shows that the thing most likely to mobilize emergency funding is not early warning but media coverage, which can lead to pressure from publics for donor governments to act. News of the situation in South Sudan has been muted, however. According to Google Trends, there was no increase in the number of headlines on South Sudan following the famine warning in May for example. Three years ago in Somalia, it was not until famine was declared that the crisis caught the global media’s attention and donors finally responded. By then it was, by definition, too late to avert catastrophe.

Despite these alarming similarities, it is not inevitable that South Sudan will mark its third anniversary with famine. Like all complex forecasts, famine early warnings do not deal in certainties. And, although the window of opportunity for preventive action has probably closed by now and the challenge of reaching communities in the midst of conflict is huge, it is still possible for humanitarian actors to mitigate the worst-case scenario with a concerted and coordinated push to distribute aid and scale-up emergency infant nutrition programmes in the worst-affected areas. But even if famine is avoided, communities in South Sudan will be left weaker, poorer and more vulnerable to the next crisis. The risk will remain. 

To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback

Increasing agricultural productivity and adapting farming to climate change are central to Africa’s development prospects. There are important opportunities to enhance yields and increase resilience through the adoption of improved crop varieties. In some cases, biotechnology, and in particular genetic modification (GM), offers advantages over conventional plant-breeding approaches. Accordingly there are a various projects under way to develop new GM varieties for African farmers, ranging from drought-resistant maize to varieties of cassava, banana, sorghum, cowpea and sweet potato with resistance to pests and disease.

In addition to government funds, these projects have also attracted the support of influential donor agencies and philanthropic foundations. However, despite the expenditure of considerable resources, the potential of GM in Africa is not being realized. So far no GM trait developed for African farmers has been put to use.

Multiple barriers inhibit the development and adoption of pro-poor GM varieties in Africa. On the demand side, farmers may be reluctant to adopt GM varieties owing to a lack of export opportunities and distrust of the technology among local consumers. Farmers may also be concerned about exploitation by transnational seed companies (despite the fact that development of new GM technologies in Africa is dominated by the public sector). On the supply side, donor funding struggles to match the long timescales of research and development, while incentives among research scientists may be poorly aligned with farmer outcomes. Non-existent, poorly functioning or overly punitive regulatory regimes discourage investment.

The most important barriers – such as regulatory constraints, consumer distrust and weak farmer demand – must be understood in the context of wider social and political dynamics surrounding GM, typified by misinformation, polarized public discourse, and dysfunctional and opportunistic politics. The result is most GM projects becoming ‘stuck’ at the field trial stage without ever progressing to release. This ‘convenient deadlock’ of continual field trials allows governments to manage political risks by effectively balancing the demands of pro-GM and anti-GM lobbies – proponents of GM have a pipeline of technologies, while opponents are appeased by the failure of any to gain approval. The disabling socio-political environment for GM development in Africa greatly reduces the efficacy of investment in this technology.

This has two important implications. First, technology development needs to be located within a wider project of transformation that engages key actors – most notably politicians, policy-makers and farmers – as stakeholders from the outset, and includes strategies to address multiple demand- and supply-side barriers. Second, successful adoption is more likely in countries with less disabling political conditions, characterized by lower levels of consumer distrust and opposition, genuine farmer demand and demonstrable commitment from government. Focusing efforts and resources on a small number of ‘best bet’ countries will also allow donors and technology providers to support more ambitious, transformational projects led by national governments.

Disputes between international companies and national governments commonly arise in the extractive industry where high expectations from producer countries often run alongside emotive issues of ‘ownership’ and ‘exploitation’. In 2013, Chatham House published the report Conflict and Coexistence in the Extractives Industries, examining the rising occurrence of long-running and expensive company-government disputes. Continuing the conversation, the speakers will share their personal insights regarding doing business in Africa's oil and gas sector and preparing for crisis situations. They will outline why they believe the effective management of any crisis is critical to achieving an early settlement and why arbitration is the best formal mechanism for resolving disputes in Africa. They will also discuss what the preconditions of success are, and how companies must adjust to new commercial and political realities when engaging with national companies. 

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

Governments are increasingly using public procurement policy to promote the use of legal and sustainable timber, thereby helping to reduce deforestation and illegal logging and encouraging sustainable forestry. 

At least 26 countries, mostly in the EU, currently possess some form of timber procurement policy at central government level. Although some have been implemented more recently than others and all tend to vary in their design, the evidence suggests that they are having a positive effect on increasing market share for verified legal and sustainable timber. Although government purchasing accounts for only a limited share of the market, the evidence also suggests that these timber procurement policies are having a broader impact on consumer markets, partly through their impact on suppliers and partly through the signals they send to the market. 

These policies are also relatively straightforward to introduce: many countries already possess some form of green procurement policy, and criteria for legal and sustainable timber can easily be tailored to fit. In general no new legislation is needed, though the more comprehensive policies benefit from training and advice to government purchasers. 

The gradual spread of the EU Green Procurement Policy programme, and commitments by an increasing number of private companies to eliminate deforestation from their supply chains are likely to encourage further uptake of procurement policies for sustainable timber. Timber procurement can also provide valuable lessons to governments when developing sustainable procurement policies for other products associated with deforestation, such as palm oil. 

This meeting will focus on standards for NGOs wishing to submit 'substantiated concerns' in the EUTR context, and best practice in cooperation with enforcement agents in forest producer countries. The workshop will be attended by representatives from EU member states as well as officials from the US and Australia.  

This workshop is the next in a series of EUTR/Lacey/Australian ILPA enforcement workshops co-organized by Chatham House and Forest Trends. Please note this event will be held in Rome.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

Disputes over resources are a persistent challenge to international peace and security. Natural resources (such as oil, natural gas, minerals, timber and water) are a major source of national income for many countries and, alongside land, are essential to the livelihoods of many millions of people. There is a growing recognition among researchers and decision-makers that in many fragile states disputes over these resources have fed into, and underpinned, violent conflict and instability. 

Although international engagement in national resource disputes is not always desirable or feasible, where it is necessary and possible to support, supplement (or even substitute) national dispute resolution processes it is important to think through the parameters of such action: Who gets involved? With what financial resources? When does an intervention begin? How do they act? 

This one-day roundtable will bring together around 30 experts from policy, academia and business to discuss these questions and more.

The event will be held under the Chatham House Rule. Attendance is by invitation only.

In 2012, Kenya joined the swathe of East African countries with recent significant oil and gas discoveries. Long-established as a regional leader in terms of economic growth, foreign investment and technological innovation, Kenya's leaders are now assessing how to establish an effective policy framework to manage oil revenues while at the same time managing the expectations of its citizens.  

At this event, the panel will discuss how transparency and accountability can be strengthened as Kenya moves to become an oil-producing nation. This event will mark the UK launch of a report by the Kenyan Civil Society Platform on Oil and Gas, entitled Setting the Agenda for the Development of Kenya's Oil and Gas Resources.

LIVE STREAM: This event will be live streamed. The live stream will be made available at 12:00 BST on Wednesday 8 October 2014.

THIS EVENT IS NOW FULL AND REGISTRATION IS CLOSED.

This paper is part of a broader Chatham House study which assesses the global response to illegal logging and the related trade.

The Indonesian government has taken a number of important steps to tackle illegal logging and the associated trade, most notably with the ratification of the Indonesia–EU FLEGT voluntary partnership agreement in 2014. The process of negotiating this agreement has contributed to the introduction of a national timber legality verification system (SVLK), clarification of the relevant legal framework and significantly improved engagement with stakeholders in the forest sector. There have also been important developments in recognizing indigenous peoples’ tenure rights to forest land and resources.

However, implementation and enforcement challenges remain. In particular, progress is hampered by a poorly functioning decentralized governance system, persistent corruption and insufficient transparency of information.

The private sector has responded positively, with growing awareness of the issue of illegal logging. While uptake of voluntary legality verification has recently declined, with the need for this now circumvented by the introduction of the SVLK, the area of forest certified as being managed sustainably increased in 2012.

An analysis of data on timber production and consumption suggests that illegal logging has decreased since 2000, and the findings of the expert perceptions survey tend to confirm this for the period 2010 to 2013. In part, these findings reflect a shift towards plantations and away from natural forest harvesting. However, legal ambiguity over the permitting process for forest conversion may mean that levels of illegality are higher than these data suggest.

Building on the government’s response to illegal logging will require effective implementation of the SVLK including addressing identified shortcomings. Improved land-use planning to support effective control and monitoring of forest conversion is also needed. Increased resources and training for enforcement officials are required, while efforts to tackle corruption in the sector should be stepped up. The government should clarify the rights of indigenous peoples through concrete actions such as developing clear processes for mapping and registering their land claims.

This paper is part of a broader Chatham House study which assesses the global response to illegal logging and the related trade.

The Brazilian government has made slow progress in tackling illegal logging and associated trade since the previous Chatham House assessment, in 2010. Illegality, corruption and fraud remain widespread in the forest sector, despite a relatively strong legal framework. Considerable efforts have been made to improve law enforcement in the sector but these have been hampered by poor coordination between the relevant government agencies, limited resources and inadequate penalties. At the same time, attempts to involve a range of stakeholders in policy discussions and decision-making have stalled.

The private sector’s response to illegal logging is perceived to be weak, despite the reasonably high uptake of sustainability certification schemes. Initiatives are under way aimed at promoting a legal and sustainable market for timber within Brazil, with the engagement of the private sector. However, such undertakings are modest given that the majority of the country’s timber production is consumed domestically.

Considerable investment in systems to monitor timber and revenue flows is required to tackle fraud, while the regulation of sawmills needs to be tightened to reduce the scope for the laundering of illegal timber. The imposition of appropriate sanctions and ensuring the collection of financial penalties could help to fill the gap in resources that is impeding effective enforcement.

Clarification of the regulatory framework is needed – in particular, those regulations related to the fiscal regime for the forest sector – as is the simplification of the processes for approving forest management plans. The latter is a priority if smallholders are to be able to engage in legal and sustainable forest management. An extensive programme of outreach and training is a prerequisite for ensuring such engagement. Finally, efforts to promote legal timber on the domestic market should be intensified and expanded.

This paper is part of a broader Chatham House study which assesses the global response to illegal logging and the related trade. 

The Ghanaian government has taken a number of important steps to reduce illegal logging and related trade, most notably with the signing of the Ghana–EU voluntary partnership agreement in 2009. This agreement has prompted improved multi-stakeholder dialogue within the sector as well as a process of legal reform. Considerable effort has also been put into the development of a timber legality assurance system, which has been successfully piloted. However, a number of enforcement and administrative challenges remain, particularly in relation to tenure and land and resource rights, as well as broader governance challenges including corruption.

Awareness of the issue of illegal logging has improved among the private sector, and the area of natural forest that is verified as legally compliant has increased considerably in recent years. However illegal practices remain widespread in the country. Illegal chainsaw milling is prevalent, predominantly supplying the domestic market. Illegality is also an issue in supply chains for export, albeit at a lower level. Trade data discrepancies indicate that illegal trade is a problem, in particular for tropical logs, and there is a lack of clarity over the legality of many logging permits.

A key challenge for the country is its declining resource base. The forest sector has shrunk considerably over the last 15 years as a result of this, and the situation looks set to worsen. Wood-balance estimates indicate that timber consumption considerably exceeds sustainable harvesting levels. 

In order to make further progress in tackling illegal logging, the process of legal reform and efforts to improve enforcement need to continue. Priorities include: a review of fiscal policies for the sector; improvements to land administration; completion of the conversion process of logging rights; and implementation of the legality assurance system across the country. Efforts must also continue to address the challenge of illegal chainsaw milling, which will require a range of approaches from legal reform to developing alternative livelihood strategies. 

This paper is part of a broader Chatham House study which assesses the global response to illegal logging and the related trade. 

The government of Lao PDR has taken a number of steps to reduce illegal logging and associated trade. Most notably, it has made progress towards negotiations with the EU on a voluntary partnership agreement (VPA). This has prompted the establishment of a multi-stakeholder steering committee and a technical working group and the revision of several land and forestry laws to include provisions related to the Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) Action Plan.

However, significant implementation and enforcement challenges remain. The legal framework is unclear and, at times, contradictory. Implementation by central and local governments is inconsistent, and internal mechanisms to oversee government decisions are limited. Moreover, enforcement capacity is weak and there is a lack of transparency. The available evidence suggests that illegal practices are widespread in the forest sector.

Awareness of the issue of illegal logging has improved, including in the private sector. The area of natural forest certified under the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) scheme has been gradually increasing in recent years. However, a key challenge for the Lao forest sector is pressure on forest resources from agricultural plantations, mineral extraction and infrastructure development.

In order to make further progress in tackling illegal logging, the government should push ahead with preparations for the VPA negotiations, ensuring that the lead agencies are appropriately engaged and resourced to implement a credible dialogue process. Data on the allocation and management of forest resources should be systematically collected and made available to the public in order to enable effective forest monitoring. In addition, accountability mechanisms, including anti-corruption strategies, should be clearly defined and implemented by all relevant ministries to ensure that forest resources are exploited legally and for the benefit of the country. 

This paper is part of a broader Chatham House study which assesses illegal logging and the associated trade. 

The Japanese government has continued to engage on the issue of illegal logging and related trade, but its approach remains focused on ‘soft’, voluntary measures rather than establishing legally binding requirements. It has been actively promoting the country’s legality verification system, known as the goho-wood system, and this is helping to raise awareness of the issue of illegal logging in Japan. However, the system is not only voluntary but has serious design weaknesses which limit its ability to eliminate illegal products from Japan’s market.

While the number of companies registered as goho-wood suppliers has increased, this may be occurring at the expense of sustainability certification, which is more demanding and expensive. The number of companies in Japan with FSC chain-of-custody certification remains low.

Japan’s imports of timber-sector products at high risk of illegality are estimated to have declined significantly since the start of the century, though levelling off since 2010, while imports of high-risk paper-sector products are estimated to have gradually increased over this period. Levels of high-risk imports remain significantly above those of the other consumer countries reviewed. These are currently estimated to comprise 12 per cent and seven per cent of total timber- and paper-sector products respectively.

It is recommended that the government develop further legislation to control imports of illegal products, including a requirement for risk assessment and mitigation as well as third-party monitoring. Such legislation would also help support the government’s policy to promote the domestic timber industry. Until such legislation is passed, Japanese industry should implement more robust risk assessment and mitigation procedures.

This paper is part of a broader Chatham House study which assesses illegal logging and the associated trade. 

The French government has been engaged on the issue of illegal logging and the related trade: the government played an active part in the development of the EU Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) Action Plan and has been supporting the negotiation and implementation of voluntary partnership agreements (VPAs) in producer countries.

The government has also been actively promoting the production and consumption of sustainable timber, providing funding for forest-management related projects in producer countries and establishing the National Group on Tropical Forests to facilitate a multi-stakeholder dialogue on forest policy. Media coverage of illegal logging has increased considerably since 2007, indicating greater awareness of the issue among the general public.

This response, as well as increased sourcing of sustainably certified products by the private sector, is thought to have been a factor in the decline in imports into France of timber-sector products likely to be illegal. The proportion of timber-sector imports at high risk of illegality is currently estimated to be two per cent. The proportion of highly processed products such as furniture has grown significantly, as has the share coming from China, with a parallel decline in imports of logs and sawnwood from central and West Africa.

However, there remain a number of areas for improvement by the government. In particular, with legislation now in place to implement the EUTR, this should be rigorously enforced and sufficient resources put in place to enable this. Furthermore, the effectiveness of the sanctions regime should be monitored. The planned review of the public procurement policy should be undertaken, and monitoring of its implementation should also be introduced.

This paper is part of a broader Chatham House study which assesses illegal logging and the associated trade.

The United Kingdom has shown a strong response to the problem of illegal logging and related trade; of the five consumer countries studied, it scored highest in the assessment of laws, regulations and policies related to this issue.

The government played an active part in the development of the EU’s FLEGT Action Plan and has subsequently been supporting the negotiation and implementation of voluntary partnership agreements with producer countries. The government has also been providing a significant amount of funding, through the Forest Governance, Markets and Trade Programme, to initiatives aimed at tackling the trade in illegal timber and improving forest governance.

The private sector in the UK has also been proactive, as reflected in the increase in the number of companies with chain-of-custody certification and in the amount of certified wood-based products on the UK market. A high level of media coverage of illegal logging also indicates that there is widespread awareness of this issue.

This response is thought to be partly responsible for the decline in imports into the UK of timber-sector products likely to be illegal, currently estimated to comprise three per cent of the total. However, there has been a significant shift in the types and sources of high-risk products coming into the UK, reflecting changes in the global timber industry: a growing proportion is coming from China and comprises more highly processed products such as furniture.

While the UK has been one of the most proactive European countries in addressing illegal logging and the related trade, further action could be taken. Cooperation with the Chinese government and its private sector would be beneficial. Systematic monitoring of the UK’s timber procurement policy is also required, and the efforts made to date to enforce the EUTR will need to be maintained.

This paper is part of a broader Chatham House study which assesses illegal logging and the associated trade. 

Efforts to tackle the problem of illegal logging and related trade have continued in the United States; the Lacey Act amendments in 2008 have influenced behaviour within the industry and high-profile enforcement cases have increased awareness of the issue. 

The impact of the Lacey Act on levels of illegal imports into the US is uncertain. The proportion of imports of high-risk timber-sector products is estimated to have declined since 2010, while that of paper-sector products has stayed at about the same level: in 2013, high-risk imports were estimated to comprise five per cent and two per cent of the totals respectively. However, there has been a significant shift in the types and sources of high-risk products coming into the country, reflecting changes in the global timber industry: a growing proportion is coming from China and comprises more highly processed products such as furniture.

Though the Lacey Act is an important piece of legislation for tackling the trade in illegal timber, several implementation and enforcement challenges have arisen since the amendments were enacted, in particular the interpretation of ‘due care’. Improvements to the procedure for processing import declaration forms are also required to ensure effective enforcement of the act. In order to effectively tackle illegal logging and the related trade, the US government should also continue to encourage its trading partners to strengthen their forest governance.

This paper is part of a broader Chatham House study which assesses illegal logging and the associated trade. 

The Netherlands has shown a strong response to the problem of illegal logging and related trade: the government played an active part in the development of the EU’s FLEGT Action Plan, and has been supporting the negotiation and implementation of Voluntary Partnership Agreements with producer countries.

The government has also been promoting the production and consumption of sustainable timber. It has a comprehensive procurement policy, established the Sustainable Trade Initiative and helped to launch the European Sustainable Tropical Timber Coalition.

As a result both of these government actions and of promotion by the private sector, there is a high proportion of certified wood-based products on the Dutch market as well as a large number of companies with chain-of-custody certification. A high level of media coverage on the issue of illegal logging also indicates that there is widespread awareness of this issue.

This response is thought to be partly responsible for the decline in imports into the Netherlands of timber-sector products likely to be illegal, currently estimated to comprise two per cent of the total. However, there has been a significant shift in the types and sources of high-risk products coming into the country, reflecting changes in the global timber industry: a growing proportion is coming from China and comprises more highly processed products such as furniture.

While the Netherlands has been one of the most proactive European countries in addressing illegal logging and the related trade, further action could be taken. A key challenge will be effective enforcement of the EU Timber Regulation given the Netherlands’ role as a major conduit for timber to the rest of Europe. Systematic monitoring of its timber procurement policy is also required.

This paper accompanies a series of Chatham House assessments on China, France, Japan, the Netherlands, the UK, the US and Vietnam and provides details on how the estimates of the level of illegality of imports of wood-based products into those countries were derived. The assessments are part of a research project that monitored levels of illegal logging and related trade in selected consumer, producer and processing countries in order to evaluate the effectiveness of efforts to tackle this problem.

The paper describes the methodology for estimating the levels of wood-based products at high risk of illegality that are being imported into consumer and processing countries. The methodology was developed in order to provide quantitative estimates of the scale of such imports and to assess how they have changed over time. The figures adopted for the assessments are based on the best available evidence; but, given the challenges of quantifying levels of illegal logging and the limited information available for some countries, they should not be regarded as definitive. Rather, they indicate the likely levels of illegality and, perhaps more important, how they may have changed over time.

At the end of November amidst much speculation, OPEC kept its formal production level of 30 million barrels per day in what appears to be an oversupplied market. This controversial decision was taken because cutting production would cede market share to the growing production flooding out of the US. The immediate result was a significant fall in oil prices.

The 'official' logic behind the decision was twofold. First, it was contended that weak demand was temporary because of slow economic growth and would recover next year. Second, the argument went, lower prices would close high-cost production from the shale technology revolution. In other words, current prices were too low and the market, allowed to operate, would rectify this.  Many (rightly) saw this decision as a significant landmark in global oil markets. In effect, OPEC had ceded any semblance of control over the market and prices, instead launching the oil price onto a sea governed by market forces.

Those with knowledge of oil market history will see this as a very dangerous gamble based on two serious misconceptions. After the oil shocks of the 1970s, the market was in a similar position as now. Demand was falling and non-OPEC supply was rising. In response, to defend prices, OPEC (but effectively Saudi Arabia) cut production because the fall in demand was seen as temporary as a result of global recession and would shortly recover. It did not. Then when the oil price eventually collapsed in 1986, the OPEC view was that lower prices would quickly reverse as they would shut in high-cost production, specifically in the North Sea. These views in the 1980s were conceptual mistakes, still relevant today and likely to undermine OPEC’s current strategy. The mistakes are a failure to understand the difference between an income effect and a price effect on demand and the failure to understand the difference between a break-even price (what investors consider when deciding whether to invest in new producing capacity) and a shut-in price (what existing operators consider will cover variable costs and if not, will stop production from existing wells.).

While some of the fall in demand in the 1980s was because of the recession (an income effect), some was due to genuine demand destruction as the result of much higher prices (a price effect). Recession-induced lower demand reverses itself when the global economy recovers, but demand destruction is permanent. Today, part of the fall in oil demand is because oil prices have inexorably risen (from $32.40 in 2002 to $108.66 in constant 2013 dollars). Furthermore, many sources of recent oil demand growth, notably China and India, have been moving from subsidized domestic oil prices to higher border-based prices. OPEC’s expectations of quickly recovering demand may be optimistic as they were in the early 1980s.

OPEC is hoping lower break-even prices will reduce shale production.  Various estimates for the US shale break-even price have been bandied around (usually in the realm of $60-$80 per barrel). Most are far too high, because they ignore the fact that the recent boom in shale operations has grossly inflated project costs. If investment in new capacity slows, then project costs − and hence the break-even price − will fall.

However, in terms of OPEC’s current strategy, the break-even price is the wrong metric. What matters in the next few years is the shut-in price.  After the 1986 price collapse, a number of stripper wells in US (with high variable costs) did close, but the loss of production was minimal. North Sea production, which had been OPEC’s prime target, was hardly affected and actually increased in 1987. The current level of shut-in price for shale oil is again debatable, but almost certainly is well below $40 per barrel. Thus it will be some time before existing shale oil production falls, even if prices stay low.

Should the oil price fall towards variable costs, threatening shale supply, it will be the OPEC producers who must blink first. They will then try to take back control of the market, if they can.

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This paper is part of a broader Chatham House study which assesses illegal logging and the associated trade. The Chinese government has made notable progress in its efforts to tackle illegal logging and the associated trade. This has included the development of a draft national timber legality verification system (TLVS) and its active engagement with a number of consumer countries. The government’s plans to establish bilateral trade agreements with producer countries are also encouraging, although no formalized commitments have yet been made. Reflecting the growing awareness of the impact of Chinese companies overseas, the government has also been developing further guidance to promote sustainable forest products trade and investment.

The private sector is also taking action, with continued growth in the uptake of chain-of-custody (CoC) certification. Industry associations have been promoting legal and sustainable sourcing, and they will have an important role to play in testing the draft TLVS.

These steps are likely to have had an impact on the volume of illegal wood-based products being imported into China. However, trade data discrepancies and analysis of trade flows both indicate that illegal trade remains a significant problem. While imports of high-risk products are estimated to have declined since 2000, these are reckoned to comprise 17 per cent of the total by volume in 2013. This proportion is high compared with other timber-importing countries examined in this assessment.

In order to build on its response to illegal logging and related trade, the Chinese government should establish binding regulations and stringent controls on the import and export of illegal wood-based products. The draft TLVS should be further developed, including through pilot projects with timber-exporting countries and effective consultation with industry, civil society and other consumer-country governments. The government’s procurement policy should be strengthened through the clarification of its legality and sustainability requirements, the inclusion of a wider range of products within its scope, and the development of a robust mechanism to monitor compliance. 

Increased training for the private sector on due diligence, market regulations and legality requirements in consumer countries is required to stimulate further action by industry, and the work to elaborate further guidelines for companies operating overseas in the forest products trade should be continued. Awareness-raising initiatives for Chinese consumers should also be extended, in order to increase demand for verified legal wood-based products.

This paper is part of a broader Chatham House study which assesses illegal logging and the associated trade. 

The Vietnamese government has made some progress towards tackling illegal logging and the associated trade. It has negotiated a voluntary partnership agreement (VPA) with the EU, a process that has prompted a review of relevant legislation and improved the government’s engagement with civil society. In addition, it has signed agreements with Lao PDR and Cambodia in which it has committed to coordination on forest management and trade. However, there has been little progress in policy reform, and there is still no legislation regulating illegal timber imports.

There is a high level of awareness of illegal logging and associated trade within the private sector: Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) chain-of-custody (CoC) certification has increased rapidly, particularly in the furniture sector. But efforts are hampered by poor access to third-party verified raw material.

Both trade data discrepancies and analysis of trade flows indicate that illegal trade remains a serious problem. The volume of imports of wood-based products at a high risk of illegality is estimated to have increased since 2000, while its share in the volume of total imports of wood-based products gradually declined until 2009 and then increased slightly: they are estimated to have comprised 18 per cent of the total by volume in 2013.

In order to build on its response to illegal logging and related trade, the government should establish a legal responsibility for Vietnamese importers to ensure that their timber sources are legal. Furthermore, to increase domestic demand for legal products, it should establish a public procurement policy requiring the use of verified legal products. Within the framework of the VPA, broad and effective multi-stakeholder engagement will be vital to ensure that a robust timber legality assurance system is developed. In addition, proactive partnerships should be forged with high-risk supply countries to establish legality criteria and indicators that reflect the full scope of the relevant legislation in those countries.

The discovery of valuable natural resources such as hydrocarbons or minerals in conflict-affected states or disputed regions can be a double-edged sword. While economic growth may help overcome conflict and consolidate peace, much of the academic literature links the economic, social and environmental impacts of resource development with an increased risk of violent conflict between or within fragile states. 

Recently however, the role of business in advancing peace has emerged as a topic of increasing discussion in academia and in forums such as the UN Global Compact. Resource development has also become a key objective for donor development strategies in fragile states such as Afghanistan, Somalia and Myanmar, on the assumption that extractive sector development can contribute to stability and security. 

This event will gather key stakeholders from business and policy to investigate if and where natural resource development has contributed to peace-building, built cooperation among stakeholders or helped to resolve, rather than exacerbate, tensions. If so, it will endeavour to draw out common, replicable lessons of what made these developments successful from a peace-building perspective.

The event will be held under the Chatham House Rule.