Beijing briefing: China bets on warmer EU relations The World Today mhiggins.drupal 30 January 2023

With the Sino-US Xi relationship cooling, Xi Jinping is sending a new diplomatic team to Europe – but his ties to Putin may mean slow progress, writes Yu Jie.

It has been a momentous year for Beijing. Twelve months after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, its relations with the West have become more strained than ever. And after President Xi Jinping secured an unprecedented third term in office at the 20th Party Congress, the country has embarked on a chaotic exit from the Covid lockdown amid hopes the economy will rebound quickly.

Some are already asking if Beijing will set a course correction in its diplomatic priorities to spare itself some of the setbacks it incurred in 2022. But when it comes to foreign affairs, China’s priorities rarely change. 

The Chinese leadership seeks to create a stable external environment to allow its domestic economic development. This conservative maxim was adopted in the 1980s by Deng Xiaoping, and President Xi is likely to follow it as a time-honoured recipe for diplomatic reconciliation.

China’s awkward position

Beijing’s close relationship with Moscow and its failure to oppose Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have put China in an awkward position. Xi and his colleagues have begun to realize that cooperation with Russia comes with substantial limits to avoid undermining China’s own political priorities and longer-term economic interests.

Interestingly, pundits interpreted the omission of ‘pursuing new types of great power relations’ in the 20th Party Congress report as an acceptance by the party leadership that its fraught relationship with advanced developed nations is likely to remain, with little prospect of improvement in the short term.

Chinese diplomatic literature has always presented Russia as a great power, but the abandonment of such terms signals that Beijing is keen to put clear daylight between itself and Vladimir Putin, although international commentators may argue this is not enough and nothing has changed.

There has been little sign of China using its influence to help resolve the Ukraine conflict. Facing, as it feels it now does, a ‘collective West’ and not the Americans alone, Beijing has concluded there are few reasons not to move closer to Russia.

But a reset would appear necessary if China is to tackle its domestic economic woes. So far, Beijing’s main political tactic has been to reassure European countries that it is willing to use its ties with Russia to restrain Putin from entertaining the deployment of nuclear weapons. That was the message conveyed during the visit of Olaf Scholz, the German Chancellor, and it will be said again when both President Emmanuel Macron of France and Giorgia Meloni, Italy’s prime minister, each visit later this year.

Economically, China has traditionally relied on its relationships with the European Union and the United States to support innovation and growth. So, a perceived isolation from ‘a collective West’ is not an attractive option given Xi’s hopes of achieving a robust economic rebound after dropping the country’s ‘zero-covid’ policy. A precarious bilateral tie with the US has already reduced Beijing’s choice of partners and consumers. Worsening Sino-US relations and a tightening of access to overseas markets for Chinese companies have prompted Beijing not only to reconsider the country’s sources of economic growth but to reconfigure its approach to foreign affairs.

China is making a renewed push to strengthen ties with the Global South, which does not see the war in Ukraine as black and white as the West does. Such a move is only possible because five decades of engagement with the ‘collective West’ has allowed China to emerge from poverty and become a global economic powerhouse.

A new diplomatic team

In an attempt to reset the tone of China’s relations with the EU, its largest trading partner, Xi has formed a new diplomatic team headed by Qin Gang, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, who is returning from his post in Washington as ambassador to the US and who has a background in European affairs. Achieving warmer relations will be easier said than done, however, as China has maintained its ‘neutrality’ at Russia’s aggression since February 2022.

Review: The Cultural Revolution still haunts China The World Today mhiggins.drupal 30 January 2023

Tania Branigan’s searching ‘Red Memory’ reveals the costs to Chinese society of not addressing that upheaval’s lingering injustices, writes Nathan Law.

Red Memory: Living, Remembering and Forgetting China’s Cultural Revolution
Tania Branigan, Faber, £20

The Cultural Revolution, a decade-long socio-political upheaval initiated by Chairman Mao Zedong in 1966, caused as many as two million deaths and reshaped China. Under the influence of Mao’s personality cult, an entire nation was mobilized to purge the ‘reactionary elements’ in society and the Chinese Communist Party through public denunciation and demolition of traditional heritages.

Children turned on their parents; pupils murdered their teachers, and those who survived the summary public trials were often banished – as a young Xi Jinping himself was, living in a cave for seven years, after his father fell from favour.

Impossible moral choices

In her engaging and sensitive narrative account of the revolution’s upheaval and its consequences, Tania Branigan, the Guardian’s China correspondent between 2008 and 2015, speaks to some of those who survived those terrible years, considers their impossible moral choices and explores the far-reaching legacy of the revolution in present-day China.

Mao urged the party to cleanse itself of its ‘class enemies’: ‘capitalists’ such as landowners and shopkeepers, but also artists, farmers and university professors. Often their family members were tainted by association and persecuted. Branigan captures the awful sense of intimate betrayal and tragedy nowhere more than in the testimony of Zhang Hongbing, a lawyer turned zealous Red Guard.

Zhang denounced his mother, a hospital worker, as a ‘counter-revolutionary’ because her father owned land. She was eventually executed but not before her son struck her twice during her arrest to show his party loyalty. ‘What I did to my mother was worse even than to an animal,’ the remorseful Zhang tells Branigan.

Zhang points out that his actions were far from uncommon: ‘The whole country was doing it.’ This unreconciled sense of betrayal and fear still blights China: ‘Our society is ethically hollow. If we trace these problems to their roots, we are likely to find them in the Cultural Revolution,’ one survivor is quoted as writing.

Branigan encapsulates the difficulties around reconciliation and remembering in the story of Song Binbin. As a schoolgirl in 1966, she and two classmates were the first to pin up a poster attacking teachers for urging students to focus on their work instead of the revolution. Song’s classmates then beat the school vice principal Bian Zhongyun to death in the playground. The case was never properly investigated, and the death was dismissed as an accident.

The pain of remembering

In 2014, Song apologized publicly for the poster and expressed a sense of guilt for not intervening on Bian’s behalf. But Bian’s widower rejected the apology. Song did not speak to Branigan herself, instead allowing her friends to speak in her defence. ‘They had spoken of truth and reconciliation, but not once of justice. Every remark brought them towards closure, not accountability,’ Branigan writes.

The inability to come to terms with the past pervades the book, most of whose interviewees express feelings of resentment, fear and shame about the Cultural Revolution. I sensed the same emotions when, as a boy, I talked to a neighbour in Hong Kong who was then in his 70s. He escaped from China in the late 1960s due to political and economic strains. He simply nodded and fell silent when I asked him to elaborate.

As Branigan writes: ‘Most Cultural Revolution survivors had learnt to bend with the will of the time; not only to do as they were told but to imply that doing so was their own idea. It was better – safer – to stay silent or lie.’

This collective trauma is exacerbated by official unwillingness to address the past. The Cultural Revolution warrants no more than a few paragraphs in official textbooks with no mention of the suffering it unleashed. Documents of the period that might tarnish the CCP remain unavailable; any attempts to interrogate the Cultural Revolution are condemned as ‘historical nihilism’ by the party.

China is attempting a precarious balancing act Expert comment NCapeling 9 March 2023

In its efforts to maintain ties with both Russia and Europe, China is having to wade through conflicting interests and rapidly changing sentiments.

Precisely how far China will go in supporting Russia has been one of the most important questions of the war in Ukraine.

On 20 February, US secretary of state Antony Blinken warned China may soon provide arms (‘lethal support’) to Moscow. But then, on 24 February – the anniversary of Russia’s invasion – China released a position paper calling for a political settlement to end the conflict, tellingly omitting any mention of its ‘no-limits partnership’ with Russia.

China’s goal was to present itself as a neutral mediator. In fact, Beijing’s ties with Russia remain unchanged, even if this relationship has grown more exasperating for Chinese diplomats over the past year.

Their job is to continue striking a delicate balance, a task that is becoming increasingly difficult as Russian president Vladimir Putin doubles down on nuclear brinkmanship and reckless rhetoric.

Staying out of the Ukraine war

With Putin extolling the law of the jungle in its most brutal form, China must be careful not to involve itself too much in the conflict. After all, Russia is clearly losing, and China has high hopes of repairing ties with major European economies.

But Putin is of course keen to signal that China has his back. That is why he recently rolled out the red carpet for China’s top diplomat Wang Yi and then alluded to an (unconfirmed) upcoming visit by Chinese president Xi Jinping.

Such diplomatic developments allow him to present China’s ambivalent position as, in fact, an endorsement of the invasion. While the costs of aligning with Russia could easily outweigh the benefits for China, one must remember that China’s reasons for maintaining good relations with the Kremlin go beyond the war in Ukraine.

For starters, the two countries share a 2,672-mile (4,300-kilometer) border – roughly equivalent to the width of Europe – and the frontier’s exact location was not even finally settled until the beginning of this century, after generations of negotiations that included some 2,000 meetings.

Yet to this day, the spectre of the Sino-Soviet split in the 1950s and 1960s looms large on both sides and it is not likely to be exorcised anytime soon. With China focused on moves by the US and its allies in East Asia and the Indo-Pacific, it simply cannot afford sabre-rattling or unrest on its other borders.

Moreover, unlike the collective West, China’s foreign policy has always been shaped by interests rather than by values. Even with respect to Russia, the two countries’ bond is based mainly on shared resentment of US hegemony. By deepening their bilateral cooperation in recent years, they have been able to achieve a level of great-power status with which to counterbalance America.

But Putin’s misadventure in Ukraine has forced Xi and China’s newly minted Politburo to manage a new set of economic, financial, and political risks.

Russia’s war has left the West more firmly united than it has been in years. As China’s relations with the US have reached new lows, Chinese leaders want to avoid also alienating the European Union (EU), which is one of the country’s biggest trading partners.

This is why Xi and Chinese diplomats have been so careful not to accept the Kremlin’s talking points in full. Being isolated from the ‘collective West’ is not an attractive option for China, given its hopes of achieving a robust economic rebound after years of the zero-COVID policy.

Balancing Europe with the Global South

In seeking to keep diplomatic and trade channels open, China’s main tactic has been to reassure European countries that it will use its own ties with Russia to restrain Putin from deploying nuclear weapons.

At the same time, China is making a renewed push to strengthen its ties with the Global South where many countries do not see the war in Ukraine in the same stark moral terms as the West does.

The emphasis on energy and food security in China’s recent position paper may have struck a chord with developing countries that have been reeling from the war’s negative knock-on effects on their economies.

Beijing briefing: China aims for tech self-reliance The World Today mhiggins.drupal 28 March 2023

Xi Jinping’s new appointments are tasked with a technology led recovery, but they face a daunting task to restore growth, writes Yu Jie.

The three-day state visit to Moscow by President Xi Jinping in March may have eclipsed the National People’s Congress in Beijing a fortnight earlier, but as Xi seeks to establish a new global order with China at its centre, the political events in the Great Hall of People provide an important insight into the country’s longer-term economic plans.

While a new cohort of cabinet members was appointed to sit on the State Council for the next five years, much of the attention remains on China’s economic stimulus plan to enable a rapid post-Covid recovery, as well as proposals to restructure central government.

Mountainous task

Three aspects of this year’s Congress deserve deeper scrutiny: Li Qiang’s confirmation as premier to succeed Li Keqiang’s decade-long subdued tenure under Xi; the extent to which Xi’s new cabinet sheds light on China’s economic and scientific self-reliance; and the unveiling of a major restructuring of central government administration in sectors such as finance and science.

China’s new premier initially faces the mountainous task of restoring growth and market confidence. During a press conference much shorter than his predecessor would hold, Li Qiang praised China’s private business sector and repeated the words ‘China remains open to foreign business’ to address the growing anxieties among foreigners and Chinese private entrepreneurs.

Beside the daunting task of economic recovery, Li Qiang faces another big challenge. Unlike his predecessors, he has never worked as a vice premier and overseen ministries under the State Council. The test for him will be to pursue a sound economic recovery plan while coordinating numerous central government agencies. He will also need to regulate relations among provincial heads who have a tendency to argue endlessly over the distribution of public finances.

Even though Xi is secure in his third term, his involvement in shaping and implementing macro-economic policies is keenly felt. Li Qiang made explicit the State Council under his leadership will be the chief implementor of all policies approved by the president. This is a less equal working partnership with Xi than his predecessors on the State Council enjoyed in the past.

Beijing published its official plan to restructure its central government administration announcing planned cuts of 5 per cent of its civil service. The newly established Central Commission on Finance intends to deal with systemic financial risks and to coordinate the financial regulatory bodies, central bank and Ministry of Finance. This is seen to reflect the Chinese leadership’s growing concern with the poor performance of local government loans and debt as well of the volatility of the property market, all of which threaten huge uncertainty for the economy.

As well as reorganizing the financial sector, Xi’s intention to pursue an integrated national strategy combining economic and scientific self-reliance has led to significant appointments following the Congress. As a starter, a new Central Commission for Science under the party leadership has been established. This commission will focus on providing a renewed impetus to accelerate China’s drive to achieve ‘scientific reliance’ and to ease the choke points in the economy, such as the supply chain for semiconductors.

It remains unclear who will head this new commission or who will be on it, however, as scant detail has been made public. It is seen as a direct response to the tough measures adopted by the United States designed to dent China’s ambitions of technology supremacy.

Departure from the past

New appointees to the Politburo come with substantial backgrounds in science as well as a solid track record of running state-owned enterprises. This is a departure from the past.

Instead of inserting financial specialists, Xi appointed two scientists, Liu Guozhong and Zhang Guoqing, as the vice premiers overseeing science, education and industrial policies. This signals that Xi intends to prioritize science and innovation during his third term. The appointment of technocrats to the State Council is seen as a move to strengthen innovation and prepare the Chinese economy, political system and society for potential external shocks.

India-China relations: Is the Quad the answer? Interview NCapeling 28 March 2023

The threat of China’s military aggression is being felt across the world, but this is a phenomenon India has been contending with for decades.

India’s border with China became the site of tense conflict in 2020, which led to India reinvesting in the Quad. Arzan Tarapore discusses key issues from his International Affairs article, such as how India is responding to increased aggression at the border and how a reinvigorated Quad may hold answers to balancing China in the Indo-Pacific.

What have India-China relations been like in the past?

Relations between India and China have varied over the decades. In the years following World War Two there was some hope they would find common cause in their international outlooks but that was quite quickly extinguished with their border war of 1962.

Since then, the two countries have oscillated between detente and tension. It took decades for them to normalize their relations and slowly build trust through several confidence-building agreements.

More recently it seemed the two countries were both willing to set aside their border dispute in order to profit from their burgeoning economic relationship – as, for both, there is no question development and economic growth is the primary national objective.

The question has been the extent to which their unresolved sovereignty and security issues undermine those goals as, at the same time, they both began paying more attention to the security of their territorial claims.

China in particular matched its explosive economic growth with startling military modernization and assertiveness. Its long-standing military doctrine and terrain advantages means it relies heavily on quality military infrastructure on the Tibetan plateau and it has accelerated the pace of those infrastructure upgrades and expansion.

In the 2010s, India belatedly began to improve its own transport infrastructure near the border, which threatened to reduce China’s military advantages. The earlier quiet on the border began to crack and China began launching border incursions with increasing frequency and scale.

This was a dynamic, iterative process, with incursions prompting India to accelerate its infrastructure development, which in turn probably prompted more incursions by China.

What happened around 2020 to change their relationship?

The cycle of competitive security policies on the border reached a tipping point in 2020 with Chinese incursions at multiple points simultaneously in Ladakh, apparently designed to establish a new status quo on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) separating Indian and Chinese-controlled territory.

The Indian political leadership played down the incursions but both Indian and Chinese militaries rushed to reinforce their positions near the border. They held multiple rounds of military talks which made halting progress.

On 15 June 2020, a skirmish resulted in the loss of 20 Indian troops, and an unknown number of Chinese troops. In the weeks that followed, both sides further reinforced their positions in a scramble to gain positional advantage.

How has India responded to China’s increasing military might?

The Indian government’s response to the Chinese landgrab was to threaten the entire bilateral relationship. In a reversal of decades of policy, it argued China had demolished the painstakingly constructed confidence-building measures on the border, and so the relationship could not continue as normal until the border crisis was resolved.

It imposed new restrictions on Chinese investment in India – even as overall trade continued to increase – and adopted a more assertive diplomatic posture.

Strategically, the 2020 border crisis had two major effects. First, it reinforced the Indian proclivity to see its northern borders as the primary threat to Indian national security.

India has heavily reinforced the border, reassigning some major formations and making numerous new investments in military capability to manage the threat. The significance of this however is that, in the context of budget scarcity, these military improvements come at the cost of potential increases in India’s capability in the Indian Ocean region – ultimately a more consequential zone of competition in the Indo-Pacific.

The Indian government may yet change course and reallocate resources for power projection but, at this stage, I see no evidence of that.

The second major strategic effect of the crisis was to unleash Indian cooperation with its partners, especially the US and the reinvigorated Quad grouping of Australia, India, Japan and the US.

India has generally avoided formal international alliances, and the Quad was in hiatus for years – why has India invested in it now?

India had always been mindful not to embrace external partners too closely so as to maintain its freedom of action and to not provoke a Chinese reaction. But since the Ladakh crisis, New Delhi has a newfound willingness to work more closely with the US, Japan, and Australia – because it calculates correctly that these partnerships enhance its freedom to act, and that China has already adopted the aggressive posture India feared.

It is important to note however that the border crisis was not the only driver of India’s strategic adjustment. The crisis coincided with the COVID-19 pandemic which highlighted to India the ineffectiveness of existing international institutional arrangements.

For New Delhi, then, the twin crises of Ladakh and the pandemic stressed the need for new international arrangements, and the Quad offered the best combination of agility and capability to meet the most pressing challenges of the Indo-Pacific region.

What do the Quad partners hope to achieve in their renewed partnership?

Beginning in 2021, the Quad assumed far greater significance. The first national leader summits happened – which have since continued at regular intervals – and its members have all agreed to a continually expanding agenda of work.

It seeks to provide international public goods, and everything from climate action to telecommunications regulations. Critically, it has limited its security role to some niche and relatively unprovocative areas, such as humanitarian assistance and maritime domain awareness – issues which benefit the Indo-Pacific as a whole and do not intensify security competition. It has certainly eschewed military cooperation.

Interestingly, the four Quad countries have also separately accelerated their military cooperation, bilaterally, trilaterally, and even quadrilaterally. But that cooperation lies outside the formal mechanisms of the Quad.

What impact will these Quad actions have on Chinese aggression and the Indo-Pacific region?

This Quad approach, which I call ‘zone balancing’ in my article, is specifically designed to build the capacity and resilience of regional states, and to not inflame dyadic security competition.

The relatively uncompetitive character of these activities helps to deflate Chinese claims that the Quad is an antagonistic new bloc, and to ameliorate southeast Asian states’ concerns over the potential intensification of strategic competition.

But the Quad’s agenda is not fixed and not bounded. It has expanded year on year and may continue to extend into new areas. This gives it a degree of flexibility and coercive leverage as Beijing cannot be confident about the Quad’s future direction.

This slate of activities has a lot of utility in building the Quad’s regional legitimacy and habits of cooperation among its members. But it conspicuously does not address the region’s most pressing security challenges.

It is not, in its current form, equipped to manage the challenge of territorial disputes or aggression. So the Quad will not address India’s unresolved border dispute with China, potential crises over Taiwan, or the South China Sea.

I would argue, however, that the four members of the Quad have unparalleled advantages of capacity and geography. With further military cooperation, even outside the formal structures of the Quad, they have the potential to deter Chinese aggression, but that remains subject to their political preferences.

Will other countries in different parts of the world adopt similar balancing strategies?

Zone balancing could be an attractive strategy for other countries which want to either avoid the costs of hard military balancing, or to not provoke their rivals.

It has been used in the past – such as the Marshall Plan during the early Cold War – and I would not be surprised if other countries competing with China, or even China itself, use it.

Chinese supply chains could tip the balance in Ukraine Expert comment NCapeling 29 March 2023

Disrupting supply chains of critical minerals to those supporting Ukraine could give China a key advantage in its wider international trade competition.

Direct military intervention from China into the war on Ukraine, with Chinese troops and airmen appearing at the front line, would be highly escalatory and highly unlikely.

Equipping Russia with weapons and equipment is much more likely – if indeed it hasn’t already happened – and considering the West is supplying armaments to Ukraine, a joust with western technologies would be an interesting development to follow.

But if Chinese weapons underperform in the heat of battle, this may have implications for the current situation with Taiwan and the US, as a poor outcome on the Ukraine front could give the West more confidence over the tensions in the South China Sea. And the use of Chinese weapons in Ukraine would also be a feast for Western technical intelligence to capture.

Creating economic disruption

A much more likely development for China is to put in place export controls on critical minerals for Western powers supplying arms to Ukraine. This is a significant lever which China has used before during its fishing dispute with Japan in 2010 when hi-tech industrial production in Japan was affected by shortages of China-sourced critical minerals. Once normal supplies were resumed, Japan started to stockpile critical mineral reserves.

In October 2020, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) passed a new statute enabling – when necessary – restriction of critical mineral supplies to third party nations intending to use them for defence and security applications, adding a ‘versatile weapon to Beijing’s arsenal’ in its trade competition with the US.

That legal control has been applied to Lockheed Martin production of Taiwan-bound F-35s and it applies not only to critical minerals mined on the Chinese mainland, but also to Chinese-controlled enterprises within international supply chains, of which there are many.

Responding to any such restrictions by opening up new mines and setting up new supply chains can take more than a decade, so the countries involved may need to start stockpiling critical materials as Japan has been doing since 2010.

Commodity markets also need to be ready for some interesting price wobbles – a persistent problem in critical minerals extractives investment as is overcoming environmental, social, and governance (ESG) challenges in this new game of global supplies.

In addition, those markets include the London Metal Exchange, now owned by Hong Kong Exchanges & Clearing whose biggest shareholder is the Hong Kong government which is struggling to operate with complete independence from Beijing.

Splitting the West’s consensus

By extending the thinking on China’s potential to throttle global critical mineral supply chains and the ensuing latency of extraction from new mining resources, progress to the Paris Agreement 2050 goals on climate change will inevitably be affected.

Given there are no supply chain assurance mechanisms, such as distributed ledger technologies, in place within global mining supply chains, a key issue to overcome would be how the West assures China that critical mineral supplies are not destined for military applications.

But if China’s default position becomes a total refusal to supply client nations unless end-to-end assurances can be achieved to prove non-military use, the West’s aspirations regarding the Paris 2050 goals will certainly be put in jeopardy, or even made unachievable.

Water, Ecosystems and Energy in South Asia: Making Cross-Border Collaboration Work Research paper sysadmin 29 June 2016

A new paper sets out the factors that have made previous cross-border projects in South Asia successful, arguing that cooperation around water is feasible despite the region’s political differences and economic assymetries.

• The countries of South Asia share some of the world’s major river basins – the Ganga (or Ganges), the Brahmaputra and the Indus. These rivers and their tributaries flow through seven countries, support more than 1 billion people, irrigate millions of hectares of land and are of cultural importance to many of those who rely on them.
• River management presents common challenges across the region. These include physical factors such as droughts, flooding, cyclones and climate change, as well political and institutional factors impeding the development of solutions and policies to improve resource management and reduce vulnerability. Water is increasingly seen as a source of competition, with population growth, industrialization and urbanization exacerbating the pressures on supply.
• Although South Asian examples of regional cooperation in general are limited, there is a clear positive trend. In areas such as disaster response and cross-border power trading, regional and bilateral engagement is beginning to take place. Multilateral official arrangements exist for trade and other economic issues, but there is none on water or ecosystems. However, as the benefits from cooperation become proven, its desirability is likely to gradually enter mainstream policy thinking on water issues.
• This research paper sets out the factors that have enabled cooperation, and the processes adopted, in previous successful cross-border projects. It focuses on four categories of cooperation: development of early-warning systems for natural disasters, in particular floods; protection of cross-border ecosystems; sharing of learning, through the showcasing of innovative approaches in one country that can be adopted by others; and power trading, in particular the development of hydropower in Bhutan and its export to India.
• The paper argues that cooperation around water in South Asia is feasible despite political differences and economic asymmetries. Different forms of collective action, and common understanding of both the threats and the shared benefits from cooperation, are required to foster more partnerships within the river basin states.

The Critical Transition: China’s Priorities for 2021 Research paper sysadmin 31 January 2017

This paper sets out the core issues for the Xi leadership, and focuses on what these might mean for the UK, particularly in the post-Brexit world and with the election of Donald Trump as US president.

In 2017 Xi Jinping will complete his first full five-year term as China’s leader. Towards the end of the year, in autumn, the country is due to hold its 19th Party Congress. This major meeting usually marks the moment when the Communist Party of China (CPC) assesses its performance over the previous five years, sets out political goals for the coming five-year period and makes new appointments.

Xi Jinping’s leadership has been characterized by a number of significant domestic and international policy strategies. China’s economic growth rate is slowing, and the country’s economy is undergoing major restructuring. Export-led manufacturing growth and capital investment in fixed assets are now being replaced by consumer-led and service-dominated expansion. Meanwhile, the role of the CPC has been rearticulated with a major anti-corruption struggle since 2013 that has sought to clear away a raft of different networks and senior officials and connected business people. Xi has proved a more communicative, more populist and more nationalistic leader than his predecessors. He is also crafting an image of himself as a more visionary leader.

Internationally, China is striving for a relevance and role that it has never had before. Its reach is felt in international organizations, regionally, and through its economic and resource needs. It has a role in global affairs that embraces places once considered on its periphery, such as Latin America, the Arctic and Antarctic Circles, and the Middle East. Its impact in Asia is particularly striking, marked by activity in the South China Sea, and a new kind of relationship with Russia, India and the US. The major Belt and Road Initiative, in particular, has started to outline a new expansiveness in China’s relations with the outside world, despite the largely abstract nature of its overall shape and form at the moment.

The themes and viewpoints in this collection of essays are particularly geared towards those with an interest in policy engagement with China. While setting out the core issues for the Xi leadership, it also focuses on what these might mean for the UK, particularly in the post-Brexit world and with the election of Donald Trump as US president. As the UK seeks a new kind of relationship with a rapidly changing China, this group of expert opinions maps out the key markers in the run up to 2021, when China is due to celebrate achieving the first of its centennial goals: the delivery of middle-income status and a moderately prosperous society.

Brexit: Implications for EU–China Relations Research paper sysadmin 10 May 2017

For Beijing, the EU–China relationship will take priority over UK–China ties – with China’s relative focus on Germany becoming even more significant.

Summary

• The extent of current UK relations with China means that Brexit will notably reduce the scale and diversity of overall EU–China economic and commercial interactions. But the impact will vary across different areas.
• In policy terms, liberal voices on economic policy towards China will be somewhat weaker among the post-Brexit EU27. Brexit will not be the most important factor determining the future level of strategic coherence in EU policy towards China.
• The impact on post-Brexit EU27 trade with China will be felt both in the volume of trade and its composition. Following Brexit the EU will no longer be China’s largest trading partner.
• There will be some relative shift in Chinese investment in Europe away from the UK, though over time the impact of Europe-wide policy approaches to Chinese investment will have more impact than Brexit per se.
• EU–China educational exchanges will be weakened after Brexit, but inbound Chinese tourism will be less affected by Brexit.
• By 2025, the EU will have compensated for Brexit’s impact in some areas, but much depends on the EU’s own trajectory over the next decade.
• For Beijing, the EU–China relationship will take priority over UK–China ties. Within the EU, China’s relative focus on Germany will be even more significant.

A Digital India Must Embrace the Circular Economy Expert comment sysadmin 15 January 2018

A growing amount of e-waste should draw attention to the broader sustainability of a digital society.

The latest Global E-Waste Monitor places India as one of the highest contributors to global e-waste, generating over 2 million metric tonnes in 2016. Posing serious health and environmental risks, growing e-waste represents the hidden cost of increasingly digital lives in an information society.

With just 33 per cent of the population owning a smart phone, India already has the second largest number of smart phone users in the world, nearly 4 times that of the United States. The amount of e-waste generated will exponentially increase in the coming decade as the cost of consumer electronics decline, middle-class incomes rise, and the frequency at which devices are discarded increases.

As governance instruments are increasingly digitized and industry re-repositions itself to leverage Industry 4.0 solutions, the generation of e-waste will become a byproduct of institutional choices rather than consumer consumption and behaviour alone.

India is already a leader in the management and recycling of e-waste. But over 90 per cent is managed in the unorganized sector by small businesses and individual entrepreneurs, typically from low-income marginalized communities, and often women. E-waste contains various toxic substances such as mercury and lead, prolonged exposure to which can lead to major health problems.

Almost 80 per cent of e-waste workers in India suffer from respiratory ailments due to improper standards and nearly 500,000 children are engaged in e-waste collection without adequate protection and safeguards. The bulk of the dirty and dangerous work supporting India’s march towards an increasingly digital society is done by those who have the least access to technology gains. Government regulations for the management of e-waste, on the other hand, are becoming more relaxed, presumably as a result of industry pressure. To streamline e-waste management, the government notified Electronic Waste Rules in 2011, based on the concept of extended producer responsibility (EPR).

EPR makes manufacturers of electronic products responsible for the end-of-life management of their products, including setting up collection centres. By shifting the burden to manufacturers, the EPR framework, in theory, creates incentives for more environmentally friendly design. But the impact of EPR rules on manufacturers has been minimal, at best. The recently released Draft Notification (2017) by the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change further relaxes the EPR rule by reducing the e-waste collection targets for industries.

While the efficiency and productivity gains of Digital India are to be welcomed, growing e-waste should draw attention to the broader sustainability of a digital society. Data centres, for example, are one the largest contributors to global warming, contributing a similar amount to global greenhouse emissions as the aviation industry.

This amount is expected to triple in the next decade. In many ways, the sustainability challenge is a ‘wicked problem’ – where possible solutions create a new set of additional challenges and the choice between available alternatives is largely about competing values.

For example, data centres powered by renewable sources of energy such as solar provide a greener alternative, but will also create new forms of e-waste in the form of photovoltaic cells and panels. An unverified estimate suggests that India’s projected solar capacity of 100 gigawatts by 2022 will create 7.76 million tonnes of e-waste. Without adequate and preemptive consideration of how this waste should be disposed and recycled, renewable energy solutions can create new negative externalities.

For Digital India to be sustainable, we need to develop anticipatory knowledge for preemptive solutions. It is an opportune moment to think of the broader architecture of a digital society, one that avoids getting locked into unsustainable models of production and consumption, as is the case with many industrialized economies.

The argument that such considerations are premature for India, given high levels of poverty and unemployment, are misplaced. Enquiries into the sustainability of Digital India are no less urgent than the need for sustained job-creating economic growth. These issues should not be addressed in a sequential or linear manner, but in parallel, or else we will be only partially aware of available choices and their consequences, creating new forms of technological and economic lock-ins.

The value-based choice demanded by the ‘wicked problem’ at hand is one that embraces the idea of a circular economy — one that departs from the linear economic growth model predicated on ‘take, make, dispose’ to embrace a growth model based on creating closed loops of production, consumption and re-use. A circular economy model is built on the idea of designing out waste and pollution; keeping products and materials in use; and regenerating natural systems. In many ways, India is already a leader in the circular economy.

Alongside, the management of e-waste and other forms of recycling, high levels of repair and reuse are distinctly observable. A number of reports note that the informal waste management sector in India works better than systems in many industrialized economies.

A circular economy vision for Digital India would include organizing informal waste management systems, including safety and social protection initiatives for workers; revising and tightening existent e-waste rules for increased accountability by manufacturers both in terms of durable design and responsible disposal; green data centres; and building future smart cities with a view towards energy and water efficiency, among others.

A recent report by the Ellen McArthur Foundation and the World Economic Forum also estimates that a circular economy path to development could bring India annual benefits of $624 billion by 2050. Greenhouse gas emissions could also be 44 per cent lower in 2050, compared with current development path.

Unsurprisingly, Nordic countries are leading the way in promoting the idea of a circular economy. Sweden recently announced tax breaks for repair related activities and Finland hosted the first global conference on the circular economy earlier this year. The circular economy provides an opportunity for India to capitalize and leverage an already existing culture of circular activities, and promote it as a policy agenda that will create new forms of employment while facilitating sustainable environmental management.

This article was originally published in the Indian Express.

India Budget 2018: Who are the Biggest Winners and Losers? Expert comment sysadmin 2 February 2018

Any claims to boost farmers’ prospects will inevitably be seen as political, coming ahead of a series of key elections. But this budget recognises India’s most pressing concerns - and seeks to address them.

In 2016 India’s prime minister, Narendra Modi, pledged to double farmers’ incomes by 2022. While the pledge may have been aspirational, reliant on good weather as much as government policy, the 2018/19 budget demonstrates the depth of the government’s commitment to the agriculture sector.

There’s clearly a political edge to any moves to bolster agriculture: any solace to rural India will be described as political opportunism until most people in India are not engaged directly or indirectly in the agricultural sector.

And with a number of state elections coming up this year and a general election next – suggestions that it will be brought forward have increased in volume since the budget – a politically-astute budget is unsurprising. At the same time, there is a real sense of crisis in Indian agriculture which the budget is attempting to ameliorate.

Significant hike in infrastructure spending

The budget – which has Keynesian undertones – announces both direct and indirect support for rural India; it increases significantly the price at which the government purchases agricultural produce, and offers a range of further support through initiatives in areas such as irrigation. Furthermore, there is a significant hike in spending on infrastructure – roads, railways, ports and waterways – with a major allocation for rural infrastructure.

While government spending on infrastructure had been growing, the 2018/19 budget appears to accept that innovative funding models to fund rural projects are unlikely to work – instead, rural highways will have to be funded from overall taxation, as is generally the norm.

The other bold initiative focuses on healthcare. One hundred million poor families (so around half a billion Indians in total) will receive up to Rs500,000 for medical care under a health insurance programme. Given the correlation between ill health and poverty, this should have implications for the economy as well as healthcare itself. At the moment poverty effectively excludes many Indians from private healthcare.

Education too received a boost, with several proposals including teacher training. There have long been concerns over the quality of Indian education. In particular, even where schools exist physically, teachers themselves are absent.

As is often the case with India, the question will be in the implementation. While there are bound to be hiccups, the current Indian government does appear to realise the need for on-the-ground, visible change.

The recent state election in Gujarat demonstrated that while the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is clearly favourite to win another term, it is not invulnerable. If the changes do not reach the “last mile”, then they will accrue neither the economic nor the political benefits.

The downsides? Increased taxes will raise inflation, potentially exacerbated by sustained government borrowing; a 20% rise in customs duty will affect imports of mobile phones (though benefit domestic producers and encourage other foreign firms to set up manufacturing plants in India) and some of the revenue projections appear optimistic.

On balance though, this is a budget that recognises the most pressing challenges which India faces, and attempts to provide solutions to them.

This article was originally published in The Independent.

Managing Risks Along the Belt and Road 27 March 2018 — 8:30AM TO 11:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 5 March 2018 Chatham House, London

China’s ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ offers potential benefits in connectivity, infrastructure and trade, through significantly increased Chinese engagement across many different countries. However, many of these countries face internal tensions and have relatively underdeveloped market structures, legal systems and governance frameworks. While Belt and Road investments can make positive contributions in host countries, there is also the potential for these investments to exacerbate tensions and risks.

This roundtable, held in partnership with the Security & Crisis Management International Centre (Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences-UNITO), will seek to examine risk management along the Belt and Road, differentiating between roles that can be played by public sector and private sector actors.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

Belt and Road Is Not a (Completely) Closed Shop Expert comment sysadmin 22 March 2018

Though the infrastructure initiative will continue to be led in many places by Chinese investment, where there are benefits of scale, effectiveness and risk management, outside participation will be welcome.

First announced in 2013, President Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative promises, at a minimum, to improve infrastructure and connectivity between China and the rest of Eurasia. Any bold plan to finance infrastructure on a large-scale across so many low-income economies deserves a sympathetic ear and a positive reception. But many wonder how large the role can be for non-Chinese players in what is clearly an initiative of the Chinese government.

So far, Chinese state and policy banks account for the overwhelming majority of the financing – and this money then flows to Chinese enterprises, mainly state-owned. One study found that 89% of the work went to Chinese contractors on China-funded projects.

Yet, recently in Paris, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said the Belt and Road was a ‘sunshine initiative’ that was open and for all to benefit from. He declared that there were to be ‘no backroom deals. There is openness and transparency.’ The Belt and Road Initiative will ‘respect international rules’ and ‘will run according to market rules’.

There are some notable instances of Belt and Road projects changing to conform more to international rules as they develop. For example, work on the Belgrade–Budapest high speed rail link originally ran into problems. Contracts were allegedly awarded to Chinese companies without following the EU-mandated competitive procurement processes. Now, the most recent round of contracts is to be awarded by tender.

Such a switch perhaps does not herald the unrestricted ‘market rules’ that Wang speaks of, but it does highlight that China is willing to turn Belt and Road towards openness in certain instances. These will be cases where it clearly brings benefits for China – but also where private sector players can be convinced of good commercial returns. These benefits are most likely to lie in three areas: scale and access, effectiveness and risk management.

Mutual benefits

Firstly, scale and access. Belt and Road can achieve greater scale if additional financing comes in alongside the current Chinese state and policy bank lending. This can come both by working together with multilateral institutions and with private sector institutions. This will in turn require defining projects or structuring financing with attractive risk-return trade-offs. In some cases, this will be feasible – in others not.

Getting bigger also necessitates initiating meaningful Belt and Road activity in more countries. As the Belgrade–Budapest rail experience has shown, approaches vary in terms of competitive tendering requirements and consideration of non-Chinese bidders. An approach that works in, say, Tajikistan, may not be effective in Poland. This is a pragmatic recognition of context that is quite separate from debates on what the ‘right’ approach to these standards should be. Both these elements suggest that a more open Belt and Road will be a larger and more far-reaching one.

Secondly, effectiveness. Despite extensive experience building infrastructure within China, many Chinese companies are much less familiar operating outside of China. Western, Japanese and Korean companies can bring their own experience to the table and help the success of these projects. By doing so, they also put competitive pressure on Chinese companies to improve and upgrade, while providing opportunities to learn. This in turn creates a stronger, more productive Chinese economy.

Beyond physical hardware, the ‘software’ is also critical to success. Again foreign companies have much to contribute. Areas such as maintenance, training, legal and accounting services are all in demand. Indeed, many such British and other companies are already actively engaged in working on projects with Chinese companies to help in these areas.

Finally, risk management. Beyond the usual project management risk of large projects, Belt and Road brings additional challenges. Many countries have weak governance, internal divisions and security issues, all within distinctively different cultures and traditions. Chinese companies with little experience of local conditions will struggle. Going it alone may provide what is an illusion of control, but exposure to social and political dynamics can rebound on China in unexpected ways.

Cooperating with others who have a history of in-country experience is a way to manage these risks. Examples would include British and Chinese cooperation both at company and governmental level in engaging in particular African countries, in partnership with the relevant country government.

Mixed system

Mechanisms that encourage competitive choices and restrain corruption are positive, but mechanisms that slow decision-making to a crawl also prevent countries from getting benefits of infrastructure projects. Conversely, continuing along the current path of Chinese-led investment does have some clear attractions in certain settings, at least to those directly involved. It combines the ability of Chinese policy banks to provide large-scale funding in even high-risk environments with the relevant experience and production capacity of Chinese state-owned businesses. It allows for government-to-government deals, pragmatic negotiations and all-encompassing accords, at times out of the public eye. In many cases, it is hard to make a commercial case for the investments.

But in cases where there is mutual benefit, engagement and will, there will be a role for international partnerships.

Arguments Over Innovation Capacity Miss How Much the US and China Are Intertwined Expert comment sysadmin 30 May 2018

Most discussions of current US–China trade tensions fundamentally misrepresent the globalized nature of innovation.

Among the many issues at play in the ongoing economic and trade tensions between the US and China are questions of technological capability and innovation.

Two of the main complaints in the US Section 301 report were that American companies have been forced to transfer technology to China and been the subject of cyber espionage. The presentation of the issues in this report has been disputed, but behind it lies concern in the US that Chinese innovative and technological capability is catching up with that in the US, thanks partly to the support of state policies set out in the Made in China 2025 initiative.

One important feature of the package of measures announced by the US last month is that it was designed to contain China’s technological development as much as to reduce the trade deficit, even though the latter has been the focus of President Donald Trump’s rhetoric.

(Some have cast doubt on this picture of Chinese innovation, suggesting that China is more of a ‘fat tech dragon’ whose massive inputs into research and development do not translate into real innovative capacity.)

The problem with the debate comparing Chinese and American technological capability is that it misunderstands or misrepresents the globalized nature of innovation in today’s world.

Contrary to the economic nationalist rhetoric emanating mainly from Washington, and to a lesser extent from Beijing, the US and China are not two separate economies competing for economic hegemony. As part of the globalization of manufacturing and production over the last 40 years and the more recent globalization of consumption, the shape and structure of innovation has also changed.

As we argue in a new paper, the key to understanding this is to think of innovation as being carried out through global or transnational networks linking economic actors, not within separated economies. What the recent phase of globalization has demonstrated is that innovation is achieved most effectively and efficiently when those engaged in innovation are connected not just within national borders but across them.

China has become integrated into these global innovation networks in ways which reflect its relative strengths and weaknesses in research and development. China’s extensive manufacturing ecosystem has enabled its companies to perform well in production-related and efficiency-driven innovation. Moreover the rapid growth in its large and dynamic consumer market provides fertile ground for consumer-related innovation by Chinese and foreign-invested enterprises alike. The rapidly increasing talent pool in China also provides additional human capital for innovation and technology.

Apart from the increased emphasis by Chinese enterprises on innovation, multinationals have also been stepping up their research and development (R&D) efforts in China. These now consitute a significant part of China’s R&D landscape, and are an increasingly important part of the global innovation by multinationals.

Things are of course changing. China’s overall innovation capacity is improving, and there are concerns in both in the US and Europe that Chinese policy is moving backwards towards the promotion of ‘indigenous innovation’ – or self-reliant innovation – and away from openness. In other words, we may be seeing a more ‘techno-nationalist’ China as well as a protectionist US.

China has also been criticized for inadequate protection of intellectual property rights, though the establishment of special courts for such disputes marks a commitment to improve – and the rights of Chinese companies increasingly need protection too.

As the benefits of globalization increasingly come under question, and with some degree of nationalist political pressure in both the West and China, it is not going to be possible – or politically desirable – to do away with national borders when it comes to innovation. But at the same time, the extent to which businesses and consumers have globalized means that fully ‘indigenous’ innovation is not possible, even if it were politically desirable.

EU-China innovation relations, as well as those between Washington and Beijing, therefore need careful management. But both Americans and Europeans should have more confidence in their innovation capability, given the relative strengths and weaknesses of Chinese innovation.

Americans and Europeans should acknowledge and promote the opportunities that come from globally networked innovation processes. Taking advantage of the comparative advantage of all the players in these networks means working with China as an innovation partner.

China: End of the Reform Era 20 July 2018 — 12:30PM TO 1:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 30 May 2018 Chatham House, London

The speaker will argue that China’s reform era is ending, and that core factors which characterized it - including political stability, ideological openness and rapid economic growth - are unravelling.

Since the 1990s, Beijing’s leaders have firmly rejected any fundamental reform of their authoritarian one-party political system, even as a decades-long boom has reshaped China’s economy and society. On the surface, their efforts have been a success, but Carl Minzner says a closer look at China’s reform era reveals a different truth.

He outlines how over the past three decades, a frozen political system has fuelled both the rise of entrenched interests within the Communist Party and the systematic underdevelopment of institutions of governance among state and society at large. Economic gaps have widened, social unrest has worsened and ideological polarization has deepened.

The speaker will discuss how China’s leaders are attempting to address these looming challenges, including institutional reforms and a shift back towards single-man rule. The speaker will also consider the question of regime stability given that China’s era of ‘reform and opening up’ is ending and there is now a renewed uncertainty over Beijing’s future.

THIS EVENT IS NOW FULL AND REGISTRATION HAS CLOSED.

Managing Risk to Build a Better Belt and Road Expert comment sysadmin 4 July 2018

Risk management is a key part of economic development. China could use some simple principles for managing risk to improve the prospects of its flagship infrastructure initiative.

One of the original motivating forces for China’s Belt and Road Initiative is risk management: the aim being to use infrastructure to drive economic development, so improving political stability and creating a favorable impression of China in countries bordering China and beyond.

Yet these investments themselves are inherently risky: large-scale, debt-financed, long-term infrastructure projects in countries that often have weak governance, undefined or poorly-executed rule of law and corruption. China has experience managing infrastructure risks within its borders in its own ways, but it has much less experience overseas.

And, while well-executed investments can enhance stability, the same investments, executed poorly, can create their own backlash in countries that see costs exceed benefits. This increases rather than reduces risks – not just the risks of defaulting on loans, but also the risk of damage to physical assets, loss of life and deteriorating relations with China.

Moreover, China states its desire for greater private sector and non-Chinese involvement in Belt and Road. This will be needed if China is to realize some of its larger ambitions for the initiative. But companies seek attractive returns – adjusted for risk. It is the perceived and actual riskiness of projects that makes commercial involvement a challenge. Focusing on the risk rather than return may be the better place to start to attract partners alongside Chinese institutions.

The risks on the Belt and Road

Overall, these risks fall into four categories.

The first and most critical issues are when projects cannot even get initial funding. Concerns about compliance, corruption and project governance combined with high costs and low revenues mean that the numbers simply do not add up. Working on any of these dimensions to improve them means more projects will get off the ground.

Secondly, there are the familiar risks during construction – budget overruns, unforeseen design issues and work delays, all commonplace in such challenging operating environments. Alongside these are risks to personnel caused by internal tensions and security challenges.

Thirdly, once completed, financial and non-financial risks remain. At its simplest, revenues may fall short and the project debt cannot be repaid. A series of other factors may reduce willingness to pay: difficulties in enforcing penalties against non-repayment; fiscal pressures elsewhere in the budget; popular resistance to sending money to overseas financiers. And the completed projects and individuals operating them often remain at risk to local political tensions and security challenges.

Finally, throughout the whole process, projects risk stirring up resentment and hostility rather building stability through economic growth. Incumbent governments may make project commitments that fit their own interests rather than those of the country – or at least are perceived to do so. Sri Lanka and Malaysia offer current examples. The way in which projects are implemented can compound the problem – for example, if promised job creation among local contractors does not happen or local ethnic rivalries are not taken into account.

Approaches to risk

How then to address these risks? Some simple principles about risk management highlight avenues to explore and institutions to get involved.

First, what can actions be taken to mitigate or reduce the risks and who is best-placed to do this?

Secondly, who is best-placed to bear and accept risks that cannot be reduced at an economical cost? Should the risk be diversified across many different parties so that each bears only a portion of the risk or rather concentrated and held by those who are knowledgeable on the specifics of the risk?

Thirdly, for those who end up bearing the remaining risk, how large is it and what actions are needed now to protect against future loss?

The myriad of risks along the Belt and Road suggests a myriad of risk solutions and participants. Putting that all together is in itself a skill and will not happen of its own accord. It requires active planning and structuring of which partners to involve where in a way that makes sense for all involved. Three areas stand out.

Successful construction is more than an engineering exercise. It requires positive engagement with local communities; credible, active communication of the benefits that the project brings; and protection of the people and equipment involved in the work. Doing this well means understanding the specific situation on the ground in often remote regions and acting accordingly.

Donor agencies, NGOs, other multinationals and provincial and national governments all have experience to bring to the table. Chinese contractors have demonstrated success in rapid, low-cost implementation and are learning about how to work in a wide range of countries. This is, though, an opportunity to draw on the experience of contractors from other countries, local subcontractors and the experience of multilateral organizations.

Financing is at core about the risk/return-based allocation of capital. The raison d’etre of the insurance sector is risk management. Multilateral institutions have a complementary role to play alongside private sector financial institutions. Drawing on this experience can play an important role in making investment projects economically attractive and bankable.

The opportunity to match the investment portfolios of long-term institutional investors with the long-term financing needs of infrastructure has long been a topic of discussion: the Belt and Road provides a new menu of projects. These approaches all thrive on verifiable data, standardization and transparency clarity and standardization.

Not all projects will fit these requirements, but some will. And in all cases, drawing on sector- and country-specific risk management experience from banks and insurers can reduce risks.

Government can be thought of as the ultimate back-stop, a risk manager for its people across the entire risk spectrum. Actions that strengthen the capacity of all governments involved to assess and address risk mean more effective risk management, greater success and the avoidance of ‘debt traps’.

Examples include sharing experience between countries; multilateral or bilateral support with the assessment of financial burden and debt terms; support to strengthen governance and oversight of project implementation; and approaches that ensure the involvement of affected local populations. Making use of dispute resolution procedures that are accepted by the key participants reduces risk all round.

Countries, businesses and individuals grow through the judicious taking of risks. But unnecessary risk-taking is wasted effort. Belt and Road projects will be most effective when those best-placed to tackle risks and opportunities are encouraged to do so.

Mobile Ecosystems as a Driver of Innovation and Growth in the Asia-Pacific 19 September 2018 — 12:30PM TO 3:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 18 September 2018 Chatham House, London

China Needs to Make the Belt and Road Initiative More Transparent and Predictable Expert comment sysadmin 29 April 2019

The global infrastructure project must move beyond mish-mash of opaque bilateral deals

As China welcomes dozens of world leaders to Beijing for its second Belt and Road forum, it has one simple aim: relaunching President Xi Jinping’s controversial global infrastructure drive.

Since it began five years ago, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has sunk hundreds of billions into port, railway and power projects stretching from south-east Asia to central Europe. But its path has been bumpy, drawing sharp criticism over the ruinous debts that some countries have racked up amid Chinese largesse.

Xi will stress sustainable financing and transparency this week, amid the usual talk of ‘win win’ cooperation. Yet BRI’s problems are structural, not presentational. For any pledges to be meaningful, China must move beyond its present mish-mash of opaque, bilateral deals.

After bad headlines last year, BRI has in fact enjoyed a good run in recent weeks. Malaysia announced it would resume a previously cancelled high-speed rail project, while Italy’s decision to join up last month marked a further European incursion. Indeed, if attendance is any guide to success, BRI looks in fine fettle. The first forum in 2017 attracted 29 world leaders. China says 37 will turn up this week. Phillip Hammond, UK chancellor, arrives hunting deals too, just a day after news that Chinese technology group Huawei will be allowed to help build 5G networks in Britain.

Even so, three interlinked problems remain at the heart of President Xi’s pet project, all of which must be addressed if BRI is to move beyond the pitfalls that have damaged its reputation.

The first and most obvious is debt. Critics allege that China ‘traps’ its BRI partners financially, often pointing to a debt-for-equity deal that handed China control of a port in Sri Lanka. These claims are exaggerated — few other projects have ended up this way. Yet poorer nations from Laos to Tajikistan are still signing up to vastly expensive Chinese schemes that offer poor value for money while straining their public finances.

The second problem is transparency. Despite its grand scale there is still no reliable list of BRI projects, no disclosure of the lending standards China follows, nor even the amount China has invested. Beijing claims more than $1 trillion; independent estimates suggest perhaps a few hundred billion. Either way, it will be hard for China to convince doubters on debts until it is open about the criteria it uses in deciding who to lend to and why.

BRI’s third and most important challenge is its muddled organization. Despite BRI’s image as a centrally run mega-project, China has allowed many deals to be struck locally, via a mix of state-backed companies, public sector banks and freewheeling regional governments. And it is here that the problems began.

Infrastructure deals are notoriously complex, especially for transnational projects like high-speed rail. Renegotiations are common, even for experienced bodies like the World Bank. Yet BRI has repeatedly seen terms negotiated behind closed doors, in countries such as Malaysia and Pakistan, come unstuck in the face of public outcry.

Rather than seeking to trap others with debt, China’s central government more often has to step in to fix dubious projects agreed by underlings lower down the chain.

These negotiations go one of two ways. Either China’s partners complain and win terms, as was true in Malaysia and in Myanmar over a multibillion-dollar deep-sea port. Or, as in the case of Sri Lanka, the renegotiations go in China’s favour, but at the cost of accusations of debt trickery. In both cases China looks bad.

Speaking last year, Xi responded to criticism of BRI by describing it as ‘an open platform for cooperation’. Yet, so far, he has proved resistant to the step that would deliver on that vision — namely turning BRI into an institution with open standards and international partners.

The reasons for his reluctance are obvious. Ending BRI’s reliance on loose bilateral deals would limit Beijing’s room for geopolitical manoeuvre. Yet what might be lost in political flexibility could easily be gained in economic credibility, while avoiding some of the painful renegotiations that have dogged many BRI projects.

At a time when China’s economy is slowing and its current account surplus is shrinking, formalising and institutionalising, BRI could also help avoid wasting scarce public resources on white elephant projects. China even has an easy template in the form of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the Beijing-based institution that has won plaudits for its project quality and openness since it started in 2016.

Whichever model is chosen, a dose of Chinese-style central planning is called for, along with more openness. Without it, the oddly chaotic and decentralised model pioneered in BRI’s first five years is unlikely to help the project thrive over the next five.

This article was originally published in the Financial Times.

How Women are Transforming Indonesia Interview sysadmin 20 May 2019

In a series exploring women in international affairs, Isabel Dunstan speaks to Gitika Bhardwaj about the rise of the women’s movement in Indonesia.

Southeast Asia has one of the highest records of gender-based violence in the world and Indonesia was recently ranked as the second most dangerous place for women in the Asia-Pacific. What is the state of women’s rights and gender equality in Indonesia?

It is true that Indonesia has high rates of violence against women, however, it’s difficult to know the realities of women’s experiences because in the past the data has been somewhat unreliable. This has been due to reasons such as a lack of reporting mechanisms available to survivors of violence and the fact that discussing sexual violence is a taboo and, if reported, can result in stigmatization which limits the number of survivors who have come forward.

However, the first reliable nationwide survey on gendered violence in Indonesia was conducted in 2017 by the Indonesian Ministry of Women and Child Protection and the United Nations Population Fund. Interestingly, it showed that Indonesia’s rates of violence against women are on par with the global rate which is that 1 in 3 women are affected by sexual violence in their lifetime.

It’s therefore difficult to generalize that Indonesia is an unsafe place for women because it’s an extremely diverse country. There is a growing middle class while there is pervasive poverty. There is religious diversity where the eastern-most province of Aceh is the only province in the country where Sharia law is enforced, whereas in the western-most province of West Papua, the dominant religion is Christianity and the ways of life are completely different.

Nevertheless, violence against women is high in Indonesia and can happen in all places – rich or poor, east or west – and has different manifestations from street harassment and trafficking to domestic violence and workplace harassment.

In some parts of the country there are high rates of child marriage too and, according to UNICEF, 14 per cent of girls in Indonesia are married by the time they turn 18 which is shocking when we think about how child marriage limits girls’ access to education and makes them more vulnerable to sexual violence and therefore restricts their futures.

Child marriage is high in Indonesia in part due to rooted gender norms, low levels of education and discriminating legislation, such as the marriage law, which states that, although it is legal to marry at 21, girls can marry at 16 and boys can marry at 19 with parental consent. But this can be even lower meaning parents could get their daughters married at as young as 13. So the law is fundamentally unfair between girls and boys and the women’s movement in Indonesia has been fighting extremely hard to reform legislation that discriminates against women and girls.

From the country’s first female president, Megawati Sukarnoputri​, to incumbent finance minister Sri Mulyani Indrawati – who was voted ‘Best Minister in the World’ in 2018 – and maritime​ and fisheries minister Susi Pudjiastuti – who has become notorious for her tough stance against illegal fishing activities – how are women progressing in Indonesian politics?

Indonesia has come a long way since becoming a democracy in 1998. Before that, the second president and dictator, Suharto, ruled the country for almost 32 years and increased the inequality gap between men and women during his reign.

Since the fall of Suharto, however, gender equality is explicitly enshrined in Indonesia’s constitution and the country has ratified the Convention on the Elimination of Violence Against Women.

The country has also been undergoing a process of democratization which has involved slowly decentralizing its power. This means that greater authority has been distributed to the 34 provincial governments outside of the capital of Jakarta.

Furthermore, to aid gender equality, a quota system requiring political parties to be made up of 30 per cent women has been put in place, although remnants of Suharto’s old system of cronyism remain, limiting the impact of the quotas translating to more women in provincial parliaments.

But the defining approach to furthering gender equality in Indonesia has been through gender mainstreaming and gender-responsive budgeting which can be seen throughout provincial administrations in the country.

This means there is the intention to ensure infrastructure, health and education outcomes include results that address specific gender equality gaps. The challenge for effective gender mainstreaming, however, is the political will to translate the approach into well-resourced programmes from one province to another.

Nevertheless, we have just seen Indonesia go through the most incredible presidential and legislative elections last month – won by the current president, Joko Widodo, who has often been called the ‘Barack Obama of Southeast Asia’ and whose existing cabinet has the highest number of women in the country’s history. This is not simply a matter of filling seats in the cabinet with women – such as the wives and sisters of male politicians – because it’s required by law. But, rather, there are some incredible female political figures who are there because they are strong, smart and capable.

You’ve rightly mentioned Minister of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, Susi Pudjiastuti, who is a fabulous role model for a lot of women particularly women who have not had tertiary education because she entered politics through an unorthodox route.

Then there’s Minister of Finance, Sri Mulyani Indrawati, who is also the former leader of the World Bank and is such an inspiration to a lot of women who are looking to work in public life because of her experience as well as her work to include gender mainstreaming in state budgets.

There is also Minister of Women’s Empowerment and Child Protection, Yohana Susana Yembise, who is a Papuan woman, as well as many more female public figures.

The Indo-Pacific: Geostrategic Perspectives 2019-24 – Workshop 2 24 September 2019 — 9:00AM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 4 September 2019 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

The roundtable brought together stakeholders within the UK strategic and policymaking communities to explore British perceptions of evolving strategic shifts in the Indo-Pacific until 2024.

The roundtable took place at Chatham House in London. The report below contains a summary of the discussions.

Read a summary

The Indo-Pacific: Geostrategic Perspectives 2019-20 – Workshop 1 11 September 2019 — 10:00AM TO 2:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 4 September 2019 East-West Center, 1819 L St., NW, Suite 600, Washington, DC 20036, USA

The roundtable brought together stakeholders within the US strategic and policymaking communities to explore American perceptions of evolving strategic shifts in the Indo-Pacific until 2024. The roundtable was organized in cooperation with, and was held at, the East-West Center in Washington D.C.

The report below contains a summary of the discussions and an essay by Satu Limaye, Vice President and Director of the East-West Center in Washington, DC.

Read a summary report and essay

Development Prospects in the Asia-Pacific: The Role of the Asian Development Bank 25 September 2019 — 12:30PM TO 1:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 4 September 2019 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

The speaker will discuss development prospects in the Asia-Pacific and their implications for Europe and the UK. He will outline prospects for the region’s growth, the impact of the current US-China trade conflict as well as other challenges faced by the region. He will also discuss the future role of the Asian Development Bank and how it plans to support the further development of the region.

The Indo-Pacific: Geostrategic Perspectives to 2024 - Workshop 3 17 October 2019 — 9:30AM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 14 October 2019 Institut Francais des Relations Internationales, 27 rue de la Procession, 75740 Paris Cedex 15, France

The roundtable brought together stakeholders within the French strategic and policymaking community to explore French perceptions of evolving strategic shifts in the Indo-Pacific until 2024. The roundtable was organized in cooperation with, and was held at, the Institut français des relations internationals in Paris.

The report below contains a summary of the discussions and an essay by Céline Pajon, Research Fellow, Center for Asian Studies, Institut français des relations internationals.

Read a summary and essay

International Arbitration: Exploring India’s Potential 15 November 2019 — 9:30AM TO 5:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 17 October 2019 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

As India’s economic clout grows, so does its aspiration to become a favoured arbitration destination in a globalized world dominated by foreign investments flows and cross border transactions. India’s bid to enhance its status as an arbitration destination depends largely on the suitability of its legal environment in meeting the demands of an increasingly sophisticated approach to disputed resolution. This conference will assess these, and other related, issues.

To register your interest in attending this event, please contact Nisha Ramdas by phone +91 9650977833 or by e-mail nisha@globaldialoguereview.com.

The Indo-Pacific: Geostrategic Outlook to 2024 - Workshop 4 26 November 2019 — 9:30AM TO 12:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 9 January 2020 Gateway House, Stevens Street, Colaba

The roundtable brought together stakeholders within India’s strategic and policymaking communities to explore Indian perceptions of evolving strategic shifts in the Indo-Pacific until 2024. The roundtable was organized in cooperation with, and was held at, Gateway House in Mumbai.

The report below contains a summary of the discussions and an essay by the International Security Studies Programme at Gateway House.

Read a summary and essay

Network Power in the Asia-Pacific: Making Sense of the New Regionalism and Opportunities for Cooperation 7 February 2020 — 9:45AM TO 5:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 17 January 2020 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

The Asia-Pacific region continues to increase in geopolitical and geoeconomic importance. The rise of China and tensions with the US are affecting bilateral relationships and traditional alliances in the region. Whether seen from the perspective of the Quad – Australia, India, Japan and the US – or the Indo-Pacific concept embraced by a wide range of countries but with no shared consensus on scope and objectives or with ASEAN who insists on the importance of its own centrality, the region is redefining and reconceptualising itself.

With a diverse range of initiatives – including the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) – there are a plethora of regional agreements and institutional groupings that add further complexity.

As the Bretton Woods architecture continues to be dominated by Western powers, China is also spearheading parallel governance initiatives such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the Belt and Road Initiative and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as a means of enhancing its geopolitical and geoeconomic influence.

This one-day conference will focus on how such networks and alliances have been built, and sustained, in the Asia-Pacific region. In order to understand how new regional initiatives might open up opportunities for new forms of international cooperation, the conference will focus on the themes of cyber-technology and innovation, sustainable development and mitigating the impacts of climate change and new infrastructure initiatives. It will assess whether there is a zero-sum conflict between competing networks and agendas or whether a common approach can be developed.

The Indo-Pacific: Geostrategic Outlook From Now to 2024 - Workshop 5 18 February 2020 — 12:00PM TO 4:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 17 February 2020 Langafonua Centre

The roundtable brought together stakeholders within Tonga’s strategic and policymaking communities to explore Tongan perceptions of evolving strategic shifts in the Indo-Pacific until 2024. The roundtable took place in Nuku’alofa and was co-hosted by the Royal Oceania Institute in Tonga.

The report below contains a summary of the discussions and an essay by Lady Fane Fakafanua, Director of Operations at the Royal Oceania Institute.

Read a summary and essay

Virtual Roundtable: The Economic Implications of COVID-19 on Asia 2 April 2020 — 11:00AM TO 12:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 27 March 2020 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

The COVID-19 pandemic is likely to have a damaging economic impact on Asia, potentially the most serious since the financial crisis two decades ago. While early estimates suggest that a recession is inevitable, differing countries in Asia are generally deploying modest fiscal and monetary measures. This is true even in China, compared with the ‘whatever it takes’ approach pursued by Europe and America.

How effective will these measures be in reviving growth and in easing the pain, particularly on the poor in developing countries in Asia? Is Asia witnessing a sudden but temporary halt in economic activity rather than a prolonged slowdown? At this virtual roundtable, the speakers will consider the likelihood of a recovery for trade in the region and will explore what lessons can be learned from countries like Singapore, who seem to be successfully managing the health and economic aspects of COVID-19.

This event is online only. After registering, you will receive a follow-up confirmation email with details of how to join the webinar.

Webinar: Is It All Over For Globalization? 15 April 2020 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 8 April 2020

The coronavirus pandemic has led many to predict the end of globalization. Confronted with unprecedented social and economic challenges, countries are prioritizing their own citizens. Now, more than ever, international cooperation is necessary but, amidst the rise of nationalist-populist governments, global partnerships are absent or faltering. And as economies grind to a halt, so does international commerce — particularly in trade-dependent Asia, a region whose rise drove the period of ‘hyper-globalization’ which preceded the global financial crisis.

Yet there are other possible futures too. The level of scientific collaboration and information-sharing now underway in search of a vaccine is unprecedented, and after a hesitant beginning the major powers have woken up to the importance of concerted economic stimuli. The virus may in some ways have the paradoxical result of bringing countries together, not driving them apart. Rather than causing its demise, it could help begin a new period in which globalization is not as deep, but at least is better managed and more equitable? Could this be the catalyst for a new coming together at home and abroad?

In this webinar, speakers debate what impact the COVID-19 pandemic will have on the future of globalization, both in Asia and around the world.

China's Evolving Economic Relations with North Africa: Before and After COVID-19 10 September 2020 — 12:00PM TO 1:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 20 August 2020 Online

China’s economic presence across North Africa has grown in recent years. The global power has forged close economic relationships with Egypt and Algeria, while also continuing to develop ties with Morocco and Tunisia.

Beijing, which views the region as a geostrategic intersection between Mediterranean, Middle East, and Africa, has primarily focused its efforts on developing bilateral relations, while also working within the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and the China–Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF).

All countries of the region have agreed to participate in China’s Belt and Road initiative (BRI), which has raised concerns among Western powers. As North African countries grapple with fiscal constraints as part of the fallout from COVID-19 (and the oil price drop for hydrocarbon exporters such as Algeria), it is yet to be seen whether China’s ambitions and relations within the region will continue to develop at the same pace going forward.

In this webinar, organized by Chatham House’s MENA and Asia-Pacific Programmes, experts will discuss the evolving economic relationship between China and North African states, and explore the impact of China’s pandemic diplomacy across the region.

How asymmetric are economic relations between China and North African states? Which sectors are most important, and what are the prospects for China to develop the region’s digital and healthcare infrastructure? Will China’s increasing economic interests necessitate an increasing political and security engagement? Should North African states be wary of Chinese loans? What is the public opinion of China’s economic presence in North Africa? Have Chinese ‘soft power’ efforts helped to bolster economic (and political) ties? What will be the likely fallout of COVID-19 on BRI and infrastructure projects in the region?

You can express your interest in attending by following this link. You will receive a Zoom confirmation email should your registration be successful. Alternatively, you can watch the event live on the MENA Programme Facebook page.

Policy for Recovery in Africa: Rethinking Energy Solutions for Universal Electricity Access 10 December 2020 — 5:00PM TO 6:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 20 November 2020 Online

Approximately three quarters of Africa’s population do not have access to clean cooking fuel and face costs to their health. Speakers explore policy opportunities to bridge this gap, the key barriers that remain and the transformative potential of energy transition in delivering sustainable access for all.

Speakers explore policy opportunities to bridge the energy access gap, the key barriers that remain and the transformative potential of energy transition in delivering sustainable access for all.

African countries face an uphill battle as they confront the shocks of the coronavirus pandemic, seeking recovery in the context of global socio-economic difficulty and fragmented geopolitics.

With deficits in terms of governance, public health systems, social protection, and basic service delivery presenting challenges even before the outbreak, careful analysis and creative evidence-based policy solutions, as well as emphasis on implementation, will be crucial if Africa is to progress towards the SDGs and Agenda 2063.

The Policy for Recovery in Africa series brings together expert speakers and decision makers to examine and exchange on key challenges, potential solutions, and approaches for implementation.

The energy access gap in Africa presents one of the most serious obstacles to the long-term pandemic recovery effort, with almost half of the continent’s population estimated to still lack access to electricity, creating a negative annual GDP impact estimated to be over 25 billion USD.

The Indo-Pacific: Geostrategic Perspectives until 2024 – Japanese perceptions 24 February 2020 — 9:00AM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 22 March 2021 Chatham House

The roundtable brought together stakeholders within Japan’s strategic and policymaking communities to explore Japanese perceptions of evolving strategic shifts in the Indo-Pacific until 2024. The roundtable took place in Tokyo and was organized in partnership with the Indo-Pacific Studies Group.

The report below contains a summary of the discussions and an essay by Hiroki Sekine, Visiting Fellow, Asia-Pacific Programme, Chatham House.

Read a summary and essay

Nancy Pelosi in Taiwan: What lies ahead for China and the US? Expert comment GBhardwaj 3 August 2022

Chatham House experts examine the implications for Taiwan, China and the United States of Nancy Pelosi’s visit to the island.

China’s fading ties with Washington?

Dr Yu Jie

US House Speaker, Nancy Pelosi’s, visit to Taiwan has plunged China-US relations into a new low as the reservoir of trust forged between the two sides over the last 40 years appears to be almost exhausted.

However, her move will likely not result in the full-scale crisis across the Taiwan strait that some hawkish voices in both Beijing and Washington believe. Instead, Beijing will most likely offer a combination of military posturing toward the US navy and economic sanctions on Taiwanese agricultural and manufacturing products in order to send a clear bellwether to any future potential visits by high-level Western political figures.

Neither Beijing nor Washington has declared a willingness to change the current status quo as the present impasse benefits both governments – but for different reasons. For China, the best approach is to reach a military and economic capability that prevents US engagement with Taiwan without the use of force. For the US, the strategic ambiguity under the Taiwan Relations Act remains an effective card to counter China’s growing military influence in the Indo-Pacific and keep itself relevant within the region as a security guarantor. Yet, both sides have decided to kick the issue of Taiwan’s status down the road, believing that time is ultimately on their side.

Despite a chorus of nationalistic rhetoric, China will be careful not to stumble into an accidental conflict which risks colossal damage on all fronts. Chinese President, Xi Jinping, must weigh all of the options before him as Beijing cannot afford to be perceived as unilaterally seeking to change what it agreed with the US back in 1979 when ties were re-established. If that happens, it will provoke the US political establishment to reach a unanimous agreement to change its ‘One China Policy’ and, ahead of the 20th Communist Party Congress where Xi is expected to be crowned for a historic third term, the last thing he wants is an unnecessary conflict with Taiwan.

The road to escalation?

Dr Bill Hayton

Beijing has chosen to take issue over Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in a way that it did not do for other recent US Congressional visits to the island. Several high-ranking US senators visited in April and May this year yet none of these visits triggered the prospect of a cross-strait crisis. So why has Beijing chosen to turn Pelosi’s visit into a stand-off?

Pelosi’s visit is part of a performance in which both actors – the US and China – are playing primarily for their domestic audiences. This comes at a time when ruling circles in Beijing are preparing for the five-yearly Communist Party Congress. Amid a slowing economy and successive COVID-19 variants, Xi Jinping cannot afford to look weak as he prepares the ground for his third term of office. Meanwhile, the US, represented either by President Joe Biden or House Speaker Pelosi, cannot back down at this point without looking weak itself.

Both sides have moved military assets into strategic positions near Taiwan to demonstrate their resolve. Neither side wants confrontation yet neither wishes to be humiliated. Currently, Pelosi’s visit, amid posturing by China, will make the US appear strong, but the consequences are likely to play out over a longer period. Xi Jinping will need to appear to have recaptured the initiative between now and the congress in the autumn when the risk of an incident will be at its greatest.

Taiwan controls several isolated islands that could be pressured by Chinese forces in the event of a future crisis. The Kinmen and Matsu archipelagos lie just a few miles off the coast of the mainland and have been at the centre of previous confrontations. There are also two other points of concern. Pratas Island – known as Dongsha – sits halfway between Taiwan and Hong Kong. Itu Aba – known as Taiping – is the largest of the Spratly Islands in the centre of the South China Sea. All would be vulnerable to an attack by the People’s Liberation Army, the principal military force of China, and the armed wing of the Chinese Communist Party.

A military confrontation between China and the US over Taiwan, or further south in the South China Sea, would have major impacts on regional and global trade. An estimated $300 billion worth of trade passes through the area every month. Japan and South Korea depend heavily on flows of oil and gas through the sea. Exports from Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines would also be heavily affected by disruptions to shipping, increased insurance costs and interruptions in inflows of raw materials. The impact on a world economy already suffering major disruption because of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the lingering effects of COVID-19 would indeed be stark.

Is a shift in US policy on the cards?

Dr Leslie Vinjamuri

Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan will undoubtedly be seen as a provocation by Beijing – even if it should not be. Pelosi’s trip to the Indo-Pacific, which also includes visits to Singapore, Malaysia, South Korea and Japan, comes at a time of growing tension between the US and China in the region.

It also comes at a time when the divide among Washington’s foreign policy elite is growing, with some arguing that it is time to abandon the country’s policy of ‘strategic ambiguity’, where it refrains from stating how it would react were China to openly and deliberately attack Taiwan. Indeed, recent statements by President Joe Biden have raised questions about whether the US is set to make a policy change. But, since both its ‘One China Policy’ and policy of strategic ambiguity have been largely successful, it would be wise for the US to maintain them.

During her visit, Pelosi is likely to reaffirm the US’ high regard for Taiwan’s democracy and embrace the language of shared values. She has embraced Biden’s framing of international relations as a contest between democracies and autocracies. This alone will continue to exacerbate tensions. It would be a mistake, though, to signal a major policy change away from strategic ambiguity and towards strategic clarity on Taiwan’s status. Even if the US decides later to embrace a policy shift of this size, such a message should be carefully considered and communicated clearly, and not by chance.

Congress has an important role to play but President Joe Biden and his national security team should make the final decision on US policy towards Taiwan. Getting the signals right in international politics is a key part of deterrence and, especially in East Asia, deterring both China and Taiwan’s ambitions is essential. 

Increasing insecurity in the region?

Dr John Nilsson-Wright and Ben Bland

Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan has provoked mixed responses from US allies across Asia.

For Japanese policymakers, the Taiwan issue is connected to the wider issue of regional security. Fears that a military conflict over the island will inevitably draw Japanese self-defense forces into a shooting war with China – a development that is neither formally mandated under the terms of the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty nor necessarily constitutionally sanctioned – explains the concerns in Tokyo.

While the Japanese government of Prime Minister Fumio Kishida is increasingly worried about China’s growing military presence in the East and South China Seas, Japan’s heavy trade dependence on China and the country’s economic and security vulnerabilities make it imperative to avoid any further escalation of tensions.

Given Tokyo’s non-recognition policy towards Taiwan, Japanese ties with Taipei are handled informally by politicians of the governing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), rather than at cabinet or foreign ministry level, and in recent weeks and months there has been an increase in visits by cross party delegations from Japan.

The death of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe as removed from public life a vocal advocate in support of enhanced ties between Tokyo and Taipei, but with public opinion in Japan increasingly tilting in an anti-Chinese direction, and with younger politicians favouring a more combative approach towards Beijing, there is a risk that the government will face pressure at home to toughen its language on Taiwan. Bolstering deterrence through increased military cooperation among allies, along with a graduated increase in defence spending, is the best way of limiting risk over Taiwan.

Nevertheless, privately, many officials in Tokyo are likely to have viewed the Pelosi visit as an unhelpful intervention and will be puzzled and perhaps frustrated by the apparent inability of the Biden administration to persuade the US Speaker of the House of Representatives to cancel her visit.

In South Korea, the government of President Yoon Suk-yeol, faces similar pressures to Japan, given the heavy dependence of the South Korean economy on China for trade and investment opportunities.

Pelosi’s visit to the region will strikingly not include meetings with either the president or Foreign Minister Park Jin. With Yoon on vacation and Park attending the ASEAN Regional Forum meeting in Cambodia, the absence of high profile engagements for Pelosi might seem to be a purely practical matter, but Seoul may also be seeking to avoid antagonizing Beijing at a time when the Chinese government is seeking to pressure South Korea not to enhance alliance coordination with the United States and Japan or to expand its commitment to the controversial Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) missile defence system.

As in Japan, public opinion in South Korea is increasingly anti-Chinese, but the logic of regional economic and security uncertainty, requires the Yoon government to avoid getting trapped in a worsening stand-off with Beijing.

What are the lasting impacts of the AUKUS agreement? Interview LJefferson 15 August 2022

Drawing on their International Affairs article, Jamal Barnes and Samuel Makinda outline the effect of AUKUS on Australia-France relations and the liberal order.

Almost a year after the surprise announcement of the AUKUS treaty, its full diplomatic implications are still being understood. The security cooperation agreement between Australia, the US and the UK caused outrage in France and was a notable source of discord between states that see themselves as defenders of the liberal international order.

In this interview Jamal Barnes and Samuel Makinda discuss their recent article in International Affairs and assess the effect of the agreement on relationships between its signatories and France and the EU, the potential for reconciliation in the treaty’s aftermath, as well as the implications it has for trust in world politics.  

What was the AUKUS treaty and why did Australia sign it?

The AUKUS treaty is an agreement between Australia, the US and the UK. Signed in 2021, it facilitates cooperation on security issues in the Indo-Pacific between the three countries – specifically, it concerns the sharing of ‘military capabilities and critical technologies, such as cyber, artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, and undersea domains’.

A key aspect is that Australia will purchase nuclear-fuelled submarines from either the US or UK. Australia decided to purchase nuclear-powered submarines – and reneged on its 2016 agreement to purchase French-built diesel-propelled submarines – because it believed that the French-made submarines were no longer fit for purpose.

However, the agreement is about more than submarines. Although Australia, the UK and US argue that AUKUS is designed to defend the rules-based international order and help ‘preserve security and stability in the Indo-Pacific’, AUKUS has been largely seen as a response to the rise of China and its military activities in the region. The AUKUS agreement reflects the increased attention that the US, UK and Australia are paying to the Indo-Pacific and their commitment to constraining China’s exercise of power in the region.

What were the effects of the AUKUS treaty on relations between Australia and France?

It led to a serious diplomatic rift. Australian officials, including former Prime Minister Morrison, had visited President Macron in France and told him nothing about AUKUS. Morrison had assured Macron in June 2021 while former Australian foreign and defence ministers had assured their French counterparts that Australia was fully committed to the purchase of French submarines just two weeks before the announcement of AUKUS.

When French officials found out about AUKUS on the day it was announced on 15 September 2021, they declared publicly that they had been betrayed and stabbed in the back. Not only had France built its relationship with Australia on trust, but its relationship was more than just about submarines. It was designed to be central to France’s 50-year engagement strategy in the Indo-Pacific. However, France was not only left out of talks but was also betrayed by a country it considered a close ally.

France responded by temporarily recalling its ambassador and stated that it would ‘redefine’ its relationship with Australia. It did not say that it would not work with Australia, but rather downgraded its relationship to one where it would only do so on a case-by-case basis.

In your article you mention that the AUKUS treaty was seen as a betrayal of trust by France in particular. Why use the word ‘betrayal’?

The word betrayal is accurate because Australia’s actions went beyond simply cancelling a business contract. Australia breached France’s trust. Not all agreements involve trust. Some are driven by self-interest while others are simply legal contracts. When these agreements are broken, the usual response is feelings of disappointment and a belief that one party is unreliable and has not lived up to its end of the agreement.

However, when diplomatic partnerships involve trust, they often contain an emotional element. A key element of trust is that one party makes itself vulnerable to another in the expectation that neither party will take advantage. When that trust is breached, the response is different from a breach of contract.

It involves feelings of betrayal as deeper emotional factors are involved. This could be seen in President Macron’s anger, and his and other French officials’ willingness to publicly call Prime Minister Morrison a liar who had stabbed France in the back. If the previous France-Australia agreement was simply a legal contract, it would have been difficult to explain the emotional element of this diplomatic fallout.

How did the signing of the AUKUS treaty affect wider relations between members of AUKUS and EU member states?

The EU, like France, felt betrayed by the AUKUS announcement. Despite being a key ally of the US, Australia, and the UK, it was left out of AUKUS discussions, and was not aware of the agreement until it was announced in the media.

What made this worse was that the EU was in the process of announcing its Indo-Pacific strategy, which was characterized as ‘maybe one of the [EU’s] most important geopolitical documents’ by High Representative for Foreign and Security Affairs, Josep Borrell. For the EU, this was the latest in a long line of recent policy betrayals that had left it uncertain if it could trust key allies on important issues. The result was greater calls from within the EU to more forcefully pursue ‘strategic autonomy’, meaning a more assertive and independent EU foreign policy.

Do betrayals of trust affect the health of the liberal international order?

Yes, they can. While it is common for leaders in liberal democracies to lie to their own people, lying to the leaders of other countries can have serious repercussions for the norms, rules and institutions of international society. A key aspect of international society is the ‘presumption of trust’ that facilitates legal compliance and diplomatic cooperation.

Without this presumption it is difficult for states to engage in long term partnerships or have confidence that diplomatic agreements will be upheld. In our article, we highlight how Australia’s violation of a particular norm, that agreements must be kept, has undermined this presumption of trust. This norm not only helps build trust between states, but also contributes to the maintenance of international order by helping to support the presumption of trust in international society.

Nuclear proliferation in a fragmenting world 13 September 2022 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 5 September 2022 Online

Where does the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) stand in 2022?

With the war in Ukraine and China–US tensions rising, the threat of a nuclear arms race has never been as high since the Cold War.

Global efforts to control the appropriation and use of nuclear weapons are strained with the war in Ukraine, US–Russia and US–China tension, Iran on the nuclear threshold, instability in Pakistan and the ongoing threat from North Korea.

The Review Conference of the NPT that took place in New York this August sought to deal with the multiple nuclear threats, but new missile technology such as hypersonic glide vehicles and torpedoes are not covered by a treaty.

Russia and the US are in a development phase for a host of new technologies and delivery systems, especially after both withdrew from various arms-control treaties in the 2000s and 2010s. Now the nuclear stockpile is growing again and major superpowers are adopting confrontational geostrategic positions.

As the world’s established orders and system fragment, there is a possibility the nine countries with confirmed nuclear weapons could grow. Events in Ukraine highlight the need for a new, modern agreement on nuclear weapons control, needed today more than ever.

The panel of experts discuss key questions including:

• What did ‘RevCon’ in New York tell us about the adoption or update to the NPT?

• Will the war in Ukraine deter or prevent any agreement between nations or does nuclear weapons control represent an area of potential multilateral harmony?

• Are we likely to see a new arms race akin to the Cold War? Where does China fit into this race?

• How has technology changed the arms control landscape?

 As with all Chatham House member events, questions from members drive the conversation.

Why the UN matters for Britain Interview LJefferson 6 September 2022

In the fourth of a series of interviews with Queen Elizabeth II Academy faculty, Jeremy Greenstock argues that the UN is still important in a polarized world.

For many people looking at the United Nations (UN) today, the institution (and the world) appears to be at an inflection point and the UN seems ill-equipped to meet these challenges. From your vantage point, how does this period look in relative terms? 

I think for an institution like the UN founded on principles and compromises laid down in 1945, the passage of time is bound to be difficult because society changes quicker than an institution can reform. We can talk about reform later, but the UN has challenges. Where do these challenges come from? I see them coming from a crisis in governance, in governments around the world.

The UN is a forum of member states, and the member states carry their national labels at the UN and follow their national interests at the UN. And almost all governments are suffering huge challenges, not just from the circumstances of geopolitics, but from the expectations of their own people, which they find difficult to meet.

The UN is a servant in that sense, of governments, and so what happens at the UN reflects what is happening in and between governments. We need to keep that in perspective. The UN still retains a tremendous value as a forum. It is a natural forum for governments to talk before they shoot, which was not there in previous eras, and that has had a significant effect since 1945 in reducing the incidence of war between states, particularly between the largest states.

It has obviously been more difficult to deal with local and regional conflicts, but the kind of confrontation that threatens to escalate into a global war has been severely restricted by the UN. The habit of talking at the UN General Assembly (UNGA), artificial as it may seem, is an extremely important part of the avoidance of conflict in the modern age.  

There is a deep scepticism about the UN. Many people think there is a lot of talking but that the real action takes place elsewhere. What is the value of the UN?  

Well, there are two aspects to this. One is the fact that leaders must give their reasons for their policymaking to an international public. This has a force in today’s digital world where most people have access to a megaphone of some kind. The legitimacy of what governments do is exposed at the UNGA.

Secondly, alongside the open meetings and the publicized speeches, there are countless side meetings that go on, and it is an opportunity for leaders to test each other out, and to have private words that may differ from the public words they have to produce for their own followers in their own capitals.

It is an opportunity for personal diplomacy which is highly valuable, and which might not otherwise happen, particularly between leaders who have very serious differences. And I think that the testing of the legitimacy of policy in both the public and the private spheres is an important aspect of international diplomacy that the UNGA provides an opportunity for.  

At the UNGA, states are called to account before the UN, and this can expose hypocrisies. But sometimes there are fundamental clashes over interests and also over values. How would you characterize the UN’s handling of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine?

It is a different audience at the UN from the audience that they have back in their capitals or in their own groups of like-minded people. They must justify themselves in different ways, and there are a whole host of inconsistencies in foreign policy that get exposed at the UN when people must explain themselves in public.

A lot of member states around the world have not condemned the Russian invasion of Ukraine; yet underneath their non-condemnation is a general regret because Russia has broken a huge taboo of the UN Charter, which is the sacrosanctity of independent sovereign territories in Article 2.7.

And that article is valuable to member states who feel threatened by more powerful member states. Russia, as a permanent member, has ridden roughshod over sovereign independence. China and India will have equivocal feelings about that, but they can’t say so in public because they want some of the West’s hypocrisies and inconsistencies exposed, and because they find the approach of sanctions very unpalatable.

Sanctions are unpopular, and the use of sanctions has become a major weapon of non-war by the United States in particular. So, the Russian invasion is unpopular, but the approach of the West is also unpopular for not better looking after the interests of emerging economies and lower-income states, particularly on climate change, but also on economic development.

So, a whole host of different considerations come into play over Ukraine at the UNGA.

How do you think the UN could be best repurposed or reformed?  

It is terribly difficult, because if you open the UN Charter for one reason, you are opening it up to a host of demands from member states for other reforms. And remember that no reform of the Charter can happen without a 2/3 majority at the General Assembly, and that is an effective blocker, because you will always find more people opposing a particular reform that supporting it.

So, I think formal reform remains a bit of a dream in the circumstances of a polarized world. I want to divert discussions about UN reform into areas where the Secretary General has a competence without needing a vote from member states.

I am talking about improvement in methodologies, in the meritocracy of appointments, in the day-to-day workings of the UN. It looks unambitious on a large-scale basis, but just improving the competence of the UN and its agencies will ensure the relevance of the UN to people’s material interests in terms of human rights, refugees, food distribution, and children, and all the other things that the agencies look after.

So, I would prefer to concentrate reform energy into competence reforms, management reforms, rather than reforms of the Charter. 

This takes us to the question of the permanent members of the Security Council, and especially the US and the UK. You have experienced first-hand America’s ambivalence towards the UN. How much has this undercut the UN’s relevance?

I was frequently disappointed by the approach of the US to issues of policy at the UN. The US finds it very difficult as a nation to move beyond the primacy of its own domestic public opinion.

That perspective – that we have democracy at home, but we will not, as Americans, allow international democracy – is regarded around the world as an untenable position for the superpower. And I think it is more than untenable, it is against the US’s long-term interests to demand such national exceptionalism.

That exceptionalism is extremely unpopular, and the US’s extraterritorial reach is very unpopular. That loss of legitimacy around the world is affecting American interests, in the Middle East, over Afghanistan, over the reaction to the Russian invasion of Ukraine; America losing the argument with international public opinion has a material effect on American power, influence and interests.

Has America paid the price for asserting its exceptionalism? From your perspective, representing the UK, arguably the closest ally of the US and one with a permanent seat on the Security Council, how did you manage this?

Well, I had a long experience of that in my job in Baghdad. Yes, the UK normally supports the US in international forums because our interests coincide. In foreign policy, interests are more important than values, and sometimes you have to make compromises and shade your values in order to get results and to avoid conflict.

I found myself taking up the US’ arguments and trying to deliver them as the UK, because the US was more unpopular than the UK and we could act more subtly. The US was more unpopular than the UK because the UK – and a lot of the time France – tried a lot harder than other permanent members to work for the common interest of UN members.

There were times I argued publicly against the US at the Security Council because their logic was incompatible with a multilateral approach, over the International Criminal Court for instance, or over some approaches to the Middle East. I would take a different view, not just because I didn’t want to seem like a constant puppet of the US, but because I thought the logic that they were following was constraining for them, and the counter-productiveness washed off on us.

Here, I want to make an important point. You won’t get governments coming together to form a multilateral approach with all the compromises that this entails unless they are confident of their position at home. They can’t otherwise explain those compromises to their domestic public opinion. If governments are insecure at home, they won’t pursue a multilateral approach because of that insecurity.

The UK is seeking to define a new global role for itself. It has been one of the most influential states at the UN. Do you see this changing?

I don’t think the change of leader makes a terrific difference for the UK in the UN because there is cross-party parliamentary agreement that the UN is important.

I was disappointed that the UK did not take the UN more seriously at a political level except when it badly needed it at a particular moment. At an official level, there was plenty of support from London, but I don’t think that politicians ever gave much priority to the health of the UN.

In conversation with Ursula Burns 27 September 2022 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 15 September 2022 Chatham House and Online

Ursula Burns and Fred P. Hochberg share insights on American business and corporate life.

In the next of our conversations with CEOs, Ursula Burns, former CEO of the Xerox corporation, joins Fred P. Hochberg, former chairman of the Export-Import Bank of the United States, to share her insights on American business and corporate life.

Drawing from her recent book, Where You Are is not Who You Are, Burns will offer her reflections on the challenges leadership faces in a corporate world with rapidly changing technology and creating a diverse work environment. Hochberg and Burns will also discuss her views on racial and economic justice, as well as prospects for future business and economic growth.

Interview: Nicole Hemmer The World Today rescobales.drupal 27 September 2022

The political historian talks to Mike Higgins about how Donald Trump has transformed the US midterm elections and the Republican party’s lurch further right.

Partisans: The Conservative Revolutionaries Who Remade American Politics in the 1990s
Nicole Hemmer, Basic Books, $18.99

In Partisans, you argue that the American political far right had been preparing the conditions for Donald Trump for 25 years and ‘the puzzle pieces snapped into place’ when he was nominated in 2016. What did you mean by that?

There were changes happening in plain sight over a quarter of a century. Such as the rise of presidential candidates who had never held elected office but who had a following in conservative media and cable news more broadly. There was also a turn towards pessimism, to connections with extreme groups and to procedural extremism in the Republican Party, such as the impeachment of Bill Clinton over what most Americans agreed was a small indiscretion.

All that accelerates in the 2000s and 2010s to the point where if you look back from Trump’s election, he suddenly seems eligible in a way that I don’t think he was in 2015 during his ascendancy.

 How did the end of the Cold War open the door for the hard right in the early 1990s?

The Cold War is so important to making sense of conservative politics in the United States because it sat at the core of American conservatism for 50 years. Opposition to Soviet communism held together the conservative coalition. It brought together religious conservatives who talked about the atheistic Soviet Union with the libertarians who were fearful of a big state.

The Cold War forced conservatives to talk in a language of freedom and democracy because that was the way that the US was different from the Soviet Union. Ronald Reagan, in particular, was a master of this. It had real implications for domestic policy. Reagan embraced free trade and talked about immigration and diversity as things that were great for America.

And then the Cold War ends, and you have politicians like Pat Buchanan [a former White House Communications Director] who had been beating the Reagan line for years, coming out and saying: ‘You know what? Immigration is bad and immigrants are bad. They are harmful for the United States. Free Trade is bad. We need to have more protectionist economy and build Fortress America. And, by the way, democracy might not actually be the best form of government for our country. The Marine Corps and IBM are better run than the federal government, and those are autocratic governed institutions.’

It allowed a resurgence of a right-wing politics that the US hadn’t seen since the 1930s and 1940s. It would become a powerful political movement within conservatism that we ultimately see taking over the Republican Party by the 2010s.

 What was it that allowed far-right figures such as Rush Limbaugh to take advantage of the transformation of the media in the 1990s?

Part of what they saw in it was interactivity. We tend to associate that with the internet and with the rise of social media, but call-in national radio and cable TV gave people an opportunity to have their voices heard.

The most popular TV show on CNN was Larry King Live, a call-in show. That interactivity fed into this idea that a frustrated populace suddenly had a voice, and it was easy to play on that sense of frustration. Also, the right was innovative because they had been focused on alternative media for decades.

So, as you get new formats in the 1990s like political talk radio and cable news, conservatives were already in that space looking for ways to get their message across.

Also, journalistic objectivity in the 1990s became getting a voice from the right and a voice from the left, which opened the door for a new generation of conservative pundits such as TV hosts Laura Ingraham and Ann Coulter. You have these incentives drawing the right into this new media and all of these conservatives in the base who are looking for right-wing voices.

There are hearings into the January 6, 2021, Capitol invasion and an FBI investigation into the alleged presence of confidential papers at Trump’s residence Mar-a-Lago. Are we about to witness the insurgent far right within the Republican Party being brought to account legally?

There has been more accountability than I anticipated at the beginning of the Trump presidency. Some innovative legal techniques are being used successfully, such as sedition and conspiracy charges against some of the Capitol rioters.

Steve Bannon, one of Trump’s chief advisers in the 2016 campaign, has been charged with money laundering, conspiracy and fraud during the Trump presidency. Will that accountability lead to a fundamental transformation of right-wing politics in the US? I wouldn’t bet on that.

How is the radicalism of the Republican party shaping the upcoming mid-term elections?

The real radicalism in the Republican Party now is its willingness to use both procedural mechanisms but also mob violence to get the electoral outcomes that it wants – something that we saw with the insurrection on January 6, 2021.

That makes the mid-terms an existential election if Republicans are able to vote in candidates who are running on a platform of throwing out election results if Republicans don’t win. That is a real challenge to the future of American democracy.

As long as the political system is organized around one party that respects the rules of democracy and one party that fights against them, each election is going to be existential. It will make mid-term elections have the weight that the 2016 and 2020 presidential elections had.

Did the far right misunderstand the electorate when it comes to abortion, considering the strong reaction to the Dobbs ruling?

I think that is exactly right, and it’s fascinating. A major turn happens in American politics between the 1980s and the 1990s, especially on the right. Ronald Reagan built these broad coalitions. He was winning landslide elections, and building this ‘big tent’ party that would bring in people who didn’t identify as Republicans or conservatives.

By the time you get to the 1990s, you have this idea of the Rino – politicians who are ‘Republican in name only’. You had to be purer and purer when it came to your right-wing politics. And the Republican Party grew a lot more unpopular. It has lost elections because of the extremism of its candidates, but it has still been able to win democratic elections without majorities, something we saw in 2000 and 2016.

The outcome of it all is exactly what you are seeing right now, that in many ways the conservative movement has got something it wanted for half a century, which is the overturning of Roe v Wade – something that energized its space for a very long time. Now that the dog has caught the fire truck, it is looking around and saying: ‘Oh, people do not like this.’

August’s referendum in Kansas that upheld the right to abortion mobilized lots of voters who normally wouldn’t have come out for an off-year election.

As you get more stories of 10-year-old rape victims who have to go to a different state to get an abortion, or stories of women who have high-risk pregnancies not able to get medical care because of these new extremist laws, that really does mobilize a population who understand what is at stake.

It is not just their access to abortion, but to reproductive healthcare more broadly. Not everywhere, but in some places that is going to change the dynamics of these mid-term races.

Why America’s midterm elections matter for the world The World Today mhiggins.drupal 28 September 2022

The outcome could threaten the fight against climate change and the future of democracy itself, warns Leslie Vinjamuri.

As the November 8 midterm elections in the United States approach, the sense of urgency among the Democrats and Republicans is escalating. Early voter turnout is on track to surpass the 2018 midterms, when a record 122 million Americans voted ahead of election day. The midterms – when congressional, state and local seats are determined – used to pass almost unnoticed, especially outside the US.

Since 2018, though, they have become a matter of global concern. The 2022 midterm elections will be the first major elections in the US since the January 6 insurrection at the US Capitol. As such, they will be the first real litmus test for the continued relevance of Donald Trump and Trumpism.

For both parties, winning is more important than ever and it is not only a matter of policy. Today, a majority of members of both parties – 72 per cent of Republicans and 63 per cent of Democrats – see those belonging to the opposing party as immoral, according to a Pew Research Center poll in September, representing a significant rise since 2016.

In many states, the midterms will have a direct impact on the 2024 presidential elections, influencing who decides how voting takes place, how votes are counted and, especially, who controls the certification of election results.

Given this context, the stakes in elections are especially high. The winners will have the upper hand not only in defining many procedural rules but also the values that constitute the nation, such as on abortion rights, education and healthcare.

Republicans and Democrats align on most key foreign policy

Though foreign policy will bear a strong resemblance to its former self even if Republicans gain a majority in the House of Representatives, as many anticipate, the outcome of the elections on US global influence could impact efforts to combat climate change and to support the defence of Ukraine.

The Republican Party has become known for its embrace of climate deniers and the radicalized anti-immigrant rhetoric of many of its party’s most established figures. The failure to address rampant gun violence – and, instead, to defend a historically suspect interpretation of the right to bear arms – and the push for a national abortion ban mean that the party is imposing a version of America onto itself that is out-of-step with virtually all other rich democratic countries.

The choices voters make in November are likely to shape the values that come to the fore in the US, and with this the affinity that America’s closest partners feel for it.

Domestic policy is likely to be more heavily affected by the elections. A Republican majority in the House would stall progress on President Joe Biden’s domestic agenda and undercut his ability to raise the taxes he needs to pay for his spending plans. The drive to hold the former President Trump accountable will also be affected by the choices voters make in November.

A Republican majority in the House would spell an end to congressional investigations of Donald Trump. Instead, Republicans would use their electoral gains to launch their investigations into the Democrats.

One anti-Trump Republican on the January 6 committee investigating the storming of the Capitol building last year warned of a vengeful and obstructive turn against Biden from his Republican colleagues if they took the House. ‘They’re going to demand an impeachment vote on President Biden every week,’ said congressman Adam Kinzinger. It is under this shadow that the January 6 Committee is pressing ahead to finish its proceedings and publish its report.

On foreign policy, the parties are more aligned than divided on most of the key issues. Their differences are a matter of diplomacy, which matters, and degree. Support for Ukraine has had bipartisan backing, but in recent weeks the issue has become politicized. Some congressional Republicans are more hawkish than their Democratic counterparts in their ambition to support Ukraine. Yet, the congressman set to be Speaker of the House if Republicans gain a majority, Kevin McCarthy, is leading an effort to exercise far stronger oversight of any additional funds for Ukraine.

Ultimately, though, the president and his advisers maintain considerable control over foreign policy.  

Bipartisan support for a tougher stance on China was consolidated under Trump. He mobilized US voters by blaming China for the loss of manufacturing jobs. Later he held China responsible for the outbreak of Covid and for covering it up. China’s crackdown on democracy in Hong Kong, its assertiveness in the South China Seas, tensions over Taiwan and reports of human rights abuse against the Uighur in Xinjiang have cemented a bipartisan consensus on America’s China policy. But a more empowered Republican base looks likely to lead to a more ideologically driven anti-China rhetoric. 

The ground has also shifted over Russia. During President Trump’s tenure, Republican attitudes towards Vladimir Putin softened. But the Russian president’s aggressive invasion of Ukraine has entrenched American opposition to him and bolstered support for NATO.

Democrats and Republicans are also more aligned on policy towards Iran today than they were before Trump abandoned the Iran Deal negotiating the Middle Eastern country’s nuclear programme. On some contentious issues, such as immigration reform, progress is already stalled and that is unlikely to change.

US climate change policy may depend on the results

The upshot of all this is that the president is unlikely to make radical changes to US foreign policy regardless of the results of the midterms. The most important exception to this is climate change, which continues to be the unwanted stepchild of the Republican Party. Domestic infighting in the US would inevitably detract even further from the bold policy that is needed.

Republicans are unlikely to get the two-thirds majority needed to pass legislation that would undermine President Biden’s climate bill. Republican control of House committees, however, would add more politically driven oversight of any climate spending, including what has already been authorized by the Inflation Reduction Act. 

Policy convergence and clear executive authority cannot mitigate the sheer disruption that would be unleashed if the Republicans were to gain majorities in both the Senate and the House, however. For the rest of the world, and especially within Europe, this would send warning signs about the future trajectory of US foreign policy commitments and set off alarm bells that an ‘America First’ president might return to the White House after 2024.

A Republican majority in the House with a Democratic majority in the Senate would be disruptive, if less so, but would probably spell the end of business as usual, unsettling people, states and markets. All of this is unfolding at a time when many of the world’s rich democracies face internal divisions, rising inequality and populist challenges at home and so are ill-equipped to lead.

Democracies face a trust deficit. This is especially apparent in the US where only 43 per cent of Americans have trust in US institutions, according to the 2022 Edelman Trust Barometer.

Internal threats to democracy also unsettle the promise of US global leadership at a time when concerted and determined leadership is needed to maintain a strong and united response to Russia, and to tackle global food insecurity and the energy, climate and debt crises. In addition, the failure to lead a global response that can help developing countries is feeding a trust deficit between rich and poor countries.

The midterms will reveal a greater truth about the future of the Republican Party. Even more so, it will reveal the values held by the American electorate. In the run-up to the 2020 US presidential elections, Europeans frequently said that they would not give Americans a pass if they voted for Donald Trump twice – and indeed only 17 per cent of those in European Union countries would have cast a vote for Trump if they could.

A Republican midterm victory in both the Senate and the House of Representatives would have ripple effects across the Atlantic at a time when the threat from Russia has intensified.

The US is judged around the world for what it does, but also for who it is. The perception that democracy is failing in America creates a permissive environment for aspiring autocrats. At a time when democracy has been in decline around the world for more than 15 years, it is essential that the US fix its own democracy and that it demonstrates to the rest of the world that democracy can deliver.

The midterms will signal to the world what Americans value, sending a message about what it can expect from the US.

This article was updated on October 31, 2022 to reflect developments such as early voting turnout, and the impact of the midterms on the 2024 presidential election, support for Ukraine and climate change spending.

International relations: The ‘how not to’ guide Expert comment NCapeling 11 October 2022

A centenary special issue of International Affairs explores past foreign policy failures to help policymakers avoid future catastrophes.

Policy decisions in international relations frequently have a long-lasting effect on the world order, shaping the lives of millions. Often acting under pressure and severe time constraints, decision-makers must rely on their own experience and the best expertise available. And so, despite many striving for a more peaceful and prosperous world, policy failures are all too common.

The second of International Affairs’ centenary special issues – devised and guest-edited by Amrita Narlikar and Daniel W. Drezner – is a ‘how not to guide’ for international relations. Focusing on historic failures, 14 experts examine what went wrong, and how policy practitioners and researchers can get it right together.

Between theory and outcome fall two ‘shadows’: one of decision-makers not taking advantage of sound academic policy advice – in some cases ignoring it because they think they already know best – and a second of bias in academic analyses and researchers simply erring, or erring on the side of their own self-importance. Between these two, there lies a joint path toward better policies.

The special issue provides policymakers with cautionary lessons, transforming well-known cases into a guide of what not to do in international politics. Building on that, the collection also suggests ways forward, including borrowing the medical Hippocratic Oath of ‘do no harm’, which in international relations serves as a cautionary warning against action merely for action’s sake, and then going decidedly beyond this minimum requirement.

A series of comics also accompanies the articles, produced in collaboration with Sequential Potential comics.

In their introduction, Drezner and Narlikar draw out four overarching factors which increase the likelihood of foreign policy failure – these are a focus on short-term successes, underestimating the power of narratives, hubris, and technocratic bubbles. If academics and policymakers can work together with these careful considerations, perhaps mistakes can avoid being repeated.

Richard Toye examines three pivotal moments in the UK’s history – the Munich crisis of 1938, the Suez crisis and war of 1956, and the Iraq war of 2003. He finds that in these cases the failures were over-determined, a consequence of Britain’s relative decline rather than its cause.

Daniel W. Drezner reviews two high profile failures of sanction use – United Nations (UN) sanctions on Iraq during the two Gulf wars, and the US re-imposition of sanctions on Iran in 2018. In both cases the main goals were not achieved and the costs were great. Drezner highlights ten ‘do’s and don’ts’ for sanctions as a result.

Amrita Narlikar shows how the World Trade Organization (WTO) has become an almost perfect example of how not to negotiate, even when taking into account recent limited successes. She identifies three broad categories of bargaining failures and explores the impact of narratives on the course of events, giving a clear list of do’s and don’ts for international negotiation.

Harold James also looks at three historic moments, the financial crises in 1931, 1997, and 2008. While responses to the crises initially looked successful, ironically in each case the drive to avoid past mistakes opened the door for the next crisis.

Cecilia Emma Sottilotta considers recent disasters in the European Union (EU) – the eurozone crisis and COVID-19 pandemic – and recommends for policymakers to find a middle ground between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism in crisis situations.

The growth of Chinese influence is a key issue in international relations today. Various articles in the special issue explain how not to deal with a rising China, coming from different angles. Exploring the US-China relationship, Janice Gross Stein is critical of the narrative around US decline and Chinese growth. The world should look beyond GDP as an indicator of a country’s growth and pay attention to strategic choices made by leaders in both states.

Joseph S. Nye Jr also provides a US perspective, arguing that while some historic analogies are misleading, the US should contemplate the cautionary narrative of sleepwalking into World War One when thinking about its relationship with China.

Amitabh Mattoo gives a south Asian view, asserting there is a need to understand Chinese policies in the region. Through examining China’s relations with India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka he concludes that because China is adopting aggressive policies in the region, states must start cooperating with like-minded allies.

Yuen Foong Khong answers two questions in his paper tackling which ‘how not to’s’ are relevant when learning from history, and whether policymakers are aware of them. His research points to four things to avoid, which he then applies to how the Cold War analogy is used to understand contemporary US-China relations.

On the theme of foreign interference, Igor Istomin looks at the Soviet support for Mao Zedong’s Communist Party in the 1920s to 1940s. He argues strongly against interfering with major powers, as short-term gains cannot last.

From Iraq and Afghanistan to Somalia and the Balkans, there have been many failed interventions by the West since the end of the Cold War. Stephanie Carvin asserts the overreliance on automated weaponry has allowed supposedly ‘easy wars’ to turn into ‘forever wars’ – and this is not likely to stop.

Why burning biomass is not zero-carbon Explainer Video NCapeling 17 October 2022

Short animation explaining why burning biomass produces more carbon dioxide per unit of energy generated than almost all fossil fuels.

The climate emergency requires countries to transition away from fossil fuels, but it is important to be careful about the alternative energy sources chosen.

In particular, concern is growing over the use of biomass for energy, which is generated when wood or other plant material is burnt to generate heat and electricity. Many governments treat biomass energy as zero-carbon at the point of combustion, and subsidize it in the same way as renewables such as solar or wind, resulting in a large increase in the use of biomass for energy in the UK and the European Union (EU) over the past 15 years.

The treatment of biomass as zero-carbon in policy frameworks rests on the argument that biomass emissions will be reabsorbed by forest growth, particularly from trees planted to replace those cut down to burn.

But growing trees to maturity takes many years and, depending on the feedstock used, biomass burning increases global warming for decades to centuries. This is called the ‘carbon payback period’ – the time it takes for carbon dioxide levels to return to what they would have been if biomass had not been used.

New research from Chatham House and the Woodwell Climate Research Center calculated the real climate impact of burning US wood pellets in the UK and EU. In 2019, according to this analysis, US-sourced pellets burned for energy in the UK were responsible for between 13 million and 16 million tonnes of carbon dioxide, equivalent to the annual greenhouse gas emissions from 6-7 million passenger vehicles.

But because biomass is treated as zero-carbon, almost none of these emissions were included in the UK’s national greenhouse gas reports. And the removal of forest carbon from US forests is not included accurately in US reports, either.

Transatlantic Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific

This project aims to recommend ways for the US, UK and EU member-states to work together more effectively to achieve shared aims in the Indo-Pacific.

This project is Phase II of a wider research collaboration with the Royal United Services Institute: “An Evolving Transatlantic Agenda to Meet the Challenge of China in the Indo-Pacific”. The work is funded by the Carnegie Corporation of New York.

Through interviews with policymakers and workshops, the project will:

• Identify specific areas of policy convergence and divergence;
• Establish practical recommendations for how the US, UK and EU member-states can better align and coordinate their activities in the Indo-Pacific.

The project is led at Chatham House by the Asia-Pacific Programme, working with the Global Economy and Finance Programme and the Europe Programme.

The researchers are Ben Bland (project lead), Dr Yu Jie, Dr Gareth Price, Marianne Schneider-Petsinger, and Alice Billon-Galland.

The project builds on research from Phase I, a Transatlantic Dialogue on China, which explored how transatlantic partners are responding to China’s rise and its effects in the Indo-Pacific.

US midterms: What to expect? Expert comment LJefferson 4 November 2022

The 2022 midterms have a heightened importance with long-term implications for the future of American democracy.

US voters will head to the polls on 8 November 2022 to cast their ballots for the midterm elections, which will see 35 of 100 Senate seats and all 435 seats in the House of Representatives up for re-election.

Midterm elections serve as a benchmark on voter’s approval of the sitting president’s party, but following a turbulent 2020 presidential election, with claims of a stolen election and voter fraud, the midterms have taken on a heightened importance with the processes and results having long-term implications for the future of democracy in the US.

When will we see results?

While many US voters expect to see results the night of an election, the complex voting process in the US often makes it difficult to ascertain the success of candidates in certain states after the polls close.

In Arizona, state laws allow 20 days for election officials to certify results while Nevada allows for additional time to count mail-in ballots following election day. Pennsylvania state laws prevent mail-in ballots from being counted before 7am on election day and the combined effect of counting in-person and mail-in ballots simultaneously, as well as the need to present votes to a state canvassing board could delay official results for weeks, and votes will not be officially certified by the state until 28 November.

In Georgia, the presence of a third-party candidate may lead to a run-off election if neither the Democrat or Republican contender receives over 50 per cent of the vote, which would take place on 6 December with results expected soon after.

Delays in determining election results may bolster claims made by Republican candidates that election results were fraudulent, especially if races are tight, as delays  counting mail-in ballots might cause results to differ over time. Early results favouring Republican candidates may also differ from the final tally as more mail-in ballots get counted, creating a ‘red mirage’, as the majority of Republican voters are expected to vote in-person, as seen in 2020.

In the vast majority of elections since World War II, the president’s party has often lost seats in the first midterm elections after taking office. While there have been exceptions and instances of the sitting party avoiding major losses during wartime, such as after the Gulf War and the 9/11 attacks, it’s unlikely Russia’s war in Ukraine will create the same rally around the flag effect.

Issues influencing voters

There are signs that US support for Ukraine on both sides of the aisle is starting to waver, as evidenced by the now recalled letter by the House Democratic Progressive Caucus pushing for a ceasefire and Republican House Leader, Kevin McCarthy’s recent comments about limiting US financial support for Ukraine.

US voters in general are more concerned with domestic issues rather than foreign policy, and both Democrats and Republicans have shaped their messaging around issues that will resonate with voters in key battleground states, with Democrats focusing heavily on abortion and reproductive rights and Republicans pushing the issues of crime and safety.

Democrats are hoping their focus on reproductive rights will motivate a higher turnout at the polls and have likely been encouraged by a recent referendum in Kansas where voters chose to protect abortion rights in the traditionally conservative state. In 2020, 52 per cent of the electorate in the swing state of Pennsylvania were female, and while not a huge majority, the difference could be enough to push the Democrats ahead.

Though the issue of abortion has gained more focus among Democratic voters, with 75 per cent of registered Democrats saying the issue was very important, 92 per cent of Republican voters rank the economy as their top issue.

The Senate race in Wisconsin, for example, was initially considered one of the Democrat’s most likely prospects for unseating an incumbent Republican senator, following US President Joe Biden’s win in the state in 2020.

Despite heavy fundraising from the Democratic party and a campaign visit by former US president Barack Obama, incumbent Senator Ron Johnson is now four points ahead of Democrat contender, Lieutenant Governor Mandela Barnes. A potential victory by Johnson, who has accused Barnes of being soft on crime and has shaped his messaging around growing the economy, may indicate whether  Democrats need to reshape their messaging ahead of the 2024 presidential election.

Threats of political violence

The risk of political violence in the US has increased in recent years, with many key officials under threat, as evidenced by the recent attack on US Speaker of the House, Nancy Pelosi’s, husband. A bulletin sent out by US agencies, including the Department of Homeland Security and the FBI, warned of attacks against not only political figures in the US, but also of attacks at locations like polling places, ballot box locations and voter registration sites.

The myth of a stolen election

Electoral integrity in 2022 has become especially significant, with over 300 candidates who believe the 2020 election was stolen up for election in various races across the United States.

The role of governors, secretaries of states and attorneys general (state officials charged with approving election results) has become a key issue in 2022. Proposals to give state legislatures the ability to certify election results, a role typically occupied by state officials, have already been made in Wisconsin, Pennsylvania and Arizona, all of which have Republican legislature majorities.

While these measures have not been successful thus far, a number of election deniers who would have the ability to influence how election results are certified are on the ballot for 2022. In Arizona, for example, Republican candidate for governor, Kari Lakes, and for attorney general, Abe Hamadeh have both been endorsed by Trump and have also supported his claims that the 2020 elections were fraudulent.

The Republican candidate for Arizona secretary of state, Mark Finchem publicly made calls to decertify Arizona’s electors, and was placed at receiving 49 per cent of votes in a poll conducted by CNN in early October. If Republicans are successful in both the state governor and secretary of state races, the role of the attorney general in certifying the election results in a state Biden closely won in 2020 becomes ever more crucial given their ability to govern how elections are run in the state, as well as their ability to challenge certification in court.

Director's briefing: What next for America? 17 November 2022 — 8:00AM TO 9:15AM Anonymous (not verified) 7 November 2022 Chatham House

Chatham House’s Director of the US and America’s Programme discusses what is next for America following one of the most contentious midterms races to date.

Hosted by Bronwen Maddox, Director, Chatham House, this Director’s Briefing is an opportunity to digest the outcomes of the US Midterm elections with Chatham House’s Director of the US and Americas Programme, Dr Leslie Vinjamuri. 

Arguably one of the most contentious midterm races to date, this election has key implications for the rest of the world also. At this event, Dr Leslie Vinjamuri and Bronwen Maddox will discuss the crucial themes coming out of the election and the key issues on voters’ minds. What impact will the results have on US foreign policy more broadly? What might the outcome of the election signal about Trumpism? And how confident can we be about the strength of US democracy?

This event is only open to Chatham House Partners and Major Corporate Members as well as selected giving circles of Chatham House. If you would like to attend, please RSVP to Linda Bedford at RSVP@chathamhouse.org.

America’s vote shows a desire for stability and calm Expert comment NCapeling 11 November 2022

Joe Biden has presided over the best midterm election results by a party in power in two decades, but the future for the Republican Party leadership is now uncertain.

For a president continually struggling with low approval ratings, the midterms provided a stunning result as the widely anticipated Republican red wave failed to materialize.

Although Democrats look set to lose their majority in the House, it is by a much smaller margin than either history or today’s pollsters anticipated. Democrats have maintained their majority in the Senate, a result that was confirmed four days after election day when Senator Catherine Cortez Masto won reelection. The final Senate seat will be decided by a 6 December run-off in the state of Georgia. 

The midterm elections were not good for the Republican party but were especially bad for Donald Trump who has until now managed to defy expectations and maintain his grip on the party even after his 2020 defeat at the polls.

Trump managed to win the presidency once but he lost the popular vote twice and at no stage during his time in office did his approval ratings go above 40 per cent. Now, after six years of the most divisive and disruptive leadership the US has ever seen, he has presided over the worst midterm results a party out of power has suffered in two decades.

Trump’s influence is on the wane

Many of the candidates endorsed by the former president – including in battleground states such as Pennsylvania and Arizona – lost. In Georgia, the Republican governor and Trump GOP rival won, despite Trump’s opposition, and the candidate he endorsed for the US Senate has come up short of the 50 per cent needed to get over the line in the first round.

Trump’s nemesis, Ron DeSantis, the Republican governor of Florida, won a second four-year term in a landslide. Trump is suffering attacks from his own party and many loyal media supporters, such as Fox News, the New York Post, and the Wall Street Journal. None of this bodes well for the prospect of Trump leading the party through the 2024 presidential election.

After six years of chaos, this upset has been delivered with remarkably little chaos and, so far, no violence in a win for democracy and stability in the US which will reverberate beyond the US shores.

The system has worked, with multiple elections held across all 50 states. Hotly contested seats were decided peacefully even when the margins were thin. The midterm elections were also a win for democracy. In every battleground state, election deniers that were nominated to run for offices that would control state election systems, including in the 2024 presidential elections, have been defeated.

For a country with a polarized electorate and a radical Republican leader who has continued to spread disinformation and sought to rile his base, this election has been surprisingly normal.

This means the debate about the future of America’s international leadership is postponed. Biden is still in the saddle and, instead of a battle for control inside the Democratic party, it is the Republicans who look set to descend into internal conflict and recrimination.

The unofficial contest to win the Republican nomination for president has already begun. Donald Trump has signalled loudly that he plans to run. If he does, it could impact Republican prospects in the 6 December runoff for the final seat in the Senate. DeSantis may also run and could be followed by several aspiring Republican candidates. A disrupted party facing a period of significant change seems likely. 

Inflation and the economy proved key factors

As always, foreign policy barely featured in the elections but the result promises a period of continuity. Instead of facing dangerous sniping on Ukraine from an emboldened Republican House leadership, the Biden administration looks set to hold to its Ukraine policy.

Biden’s increasingly hard-line policy on China will continue to be qualified by a clear-headed determination – however hard – to cooperate on climate. Trade policy will remain stuck, as will US policy in the developing world.

Exit polls show Democrats were motivated to vote by the reversal of Roe vs Wade and the restrictions on abortion rights that followed, while Republicans voted against inflation.

But Democrats at the national level continually failed to effectively communicate the positive impacts of Biden’s legislative agenda for ordinary Americans, or to deliver a clear economic message.

The national leadership veered from abortion rights to the Inflation Reduction Act, to the future of democracy in the US – all of which proved too complicated to cut through.

The state level shows a more complex picture because inflation and the economy – which could have swept Republicans to victory – were blunted by dogged local campaigning from Democrats who knew their voters and spoke to the cost-of-living concerns which were top of their minds.

Next steps for EU-US cooperation on trade and technology 8 December 2022 — 3:00PM TO 4:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 21 November 2022 Online

How can the EU and US increase cooperation on AI, semi-conductors and funding information communication technology services?

On trade and technology policy, the EU and the US are making meaningful progress towards cooperation while at the same time navigating tensions. As senior officials meet on 5 December for the third meeting of the Trade and Technology Council (TTC), both sides have vowed to move towards concrete results. But can the US and EU increase cooperation on artificial intelligence, semiconductors, and funding information communication technology services? 

This event draws on insights from a forthcoming Briefing Paper by Marianne Schneider-Petsinger that explores next steps for US-EU cooperation on trade and technology, which is part of a project supported by the Hanns Seidel Foundation. 

Why technology does not make easy wars Interview LJefferson 28 November 2022

Stephanie Carvin explains why technology does not overcome the challenges of war.

The invasion of Ukraine has demonstrated that many of the assumptions held about the role of technology in contemporary warfare are flawed. The lesson that technology cannot overcome the challenges of warfare is one that the West has also yet to learn, despite a series of failed interventions since the end of the Cold War.

In a wide-ranging conversation, Isabel Muttreja sat down with Stephanie Carvin to talk about her contribution to the September 2022 issue of International Affairs on ‘how not to war’. They discuss the US’ over-reliance on technology and why ‘easy wars’ become ‘forever wars.’

You argue in your article that the US overly relies on technology in war. When did this start?

I don’t necessarily think the US is exceptional. I think all states have tried in some ways to use technologies. One of the key arguments in the article is that the US is an enlightenment country, and part of the enlightenment is a belief in rationality and science and that you can better things through the application of science.

I think that there is this particular scientific approach or embracing of technology, in the American and in fact larger Western tradition on technology as a way to save lives. There is a strange humanitarian impulse that often underlies this use of technology.

We are seeing a quest to try and get perfect information. The idea is that if you have perfect information, you are going to be able to dominate the battlefield, and that’s proven itself to be false. I’m not even sure you can ever get perfect information.

But it underlines this modern approach, that if you can have all the information that’s out there, crunch it into some kind of algorithm, that you can then target discriminately, proportionately, reduce the level of casualties, and reduce the level of unnecessary damage. And that’s a kind of liberal tradition. You are trying to have your cake and eat it too.

You talk about the US being an ultimately liberal state, but they have been involved in a lot of wars over the last 10–20 years. Is that a contradiction?

I hope it is. But I think it goes back to the enlightenment nature of the United States, which is that the US sees itself as a shining city on a hill that has to protect itself at all costs. Liberals abhor tyranny, and they abhor unnecessary deaths. But I think that the idea is that if you threaten us, we see ourselves as embodying these values, therefore, we have to protect ourselves.

There’s a tendency to not really recognize the kind of insurgencies that we’ve seen in Iraq and Afghanistan, or even Vietnam, as war. We don’t really see that as a kind of armed conflict, even though, arguably, that has been the dominant mode of conflict for some time. They even used to call it ‘military operations other than warfare’. We tend to still think of war as great power competition or as the Second World War.

My first book was on prisoners of war in the American tradition. What often determined the treatment of people as prisoners of war was if the United States recognized their form of warfare. There’s a racial element here too that I don’t want to dismiss.

So, for example, the US war in the Philippines at the start of the 20th century: They went in, won a very quick victory over the Spanish and effectively took over the Philippines. And then they had a long insurgency for two years with the native Filipinos who didn’t want US domination. While they gave the Spanish all the prisoner of war rights, they didn’t give them to the Filipinos.

This is because they recognized the form of conflict that the Spanish engaged in, but the Indigenous way of warfare was not recognized. The West has struggled to culturally understand the way other people fight. And that’s when the laws of war conventions have broken down between, say, the United States, the West, and other states.

You talk in your article about the US entering ‘easy wars’ and ending up with ‘forever wars’ – what does this mean?

There’s an allure to this high-tech version of warfare, that it can solve a lot of problems, but it’s an illusion. It is ultimately a bit of a false promise.

The idea that machines are going to replace humans is fundamentally untrue. We are seeing this to a certain extent right now, even in the Russia/Ukraine war. This is very much a battle of machines and soldiers. One of the themes of this issue of International Affairs is hubris. The idea that things that appear to be quick wins often tend to be long-term losses. And that’s exactly what this article is talking about.

‘Forever wars’ is not my favourite term, but it’s this concept that what was promised to be an easy war, a high technology-driven conflict, where you can go in, use some surgically precise weapons, take care of the problem, eliminate your opponent and then extract yourself from a situation, has actually turned into a quagmire.

The limits of technology become apparent within a few months as well as the fact of the messy business of state-building, or the fact that insurgencies and political movements don’t just disintegrate at the show of some high-tech, sophisticated weaponry. It just tends to mean that these wars do go on for a long time, and you have to eventually extricate yourself, but there’s no clean way to do this. We saw this of course with Afghanistan, and to a large extent Iraq.

We get distracted by the shiny object. We see this promise, we see this vision of a kind of warfare that for some may have great appeal.  There are new super weapons, whether it be cyber information warfare or artificial intelligence. Everyone wants to be ahead of the curve, right?

Are these lessons on technology and ‘easy wars’ applicable to other countries?

I think what we’ve learned about the Russian military is that there’s a lot more at the heart of it. Part of the problem Russia is experiencing is that its capabilities were not what it thought they were. It’s clear that Vladimir Putin was enamoured with a lot of the ideas, like that the Russian military was increasingly high-tech and that they had these hypersonic missiles.

They also had very powerful cyber weapons amongst other things. Putin, too, seems to have been caught up in this idea that he could have had a 72-hour special military operation, which would have taken Kyiv. Clearly, that hasn’t happened. Once again, we see the underestimation of the human factor.

World in brief: Biden seeks to win over African leaders The World Today mhiggins.drupal 29 November 2022

At the US-Africa Leaders Summit, Washington will need to go beyond strategic geopolitical interest to compete with China’s offer, says James Orr.

African heads of state will join President Joe Biden in Washington in mid-December to take part in the second United States-Africa Leaders Summit. Some 50 African leaders will travel to the US capital for the two-day conference, which starts on December 13. 

Senior policymakers say  talks will focus on economic engagement, human rights, food security and climate, with an emphasis on partnerships that demonstrate an intention to go beyond strategic geo-political interest. President Biden has said he hopes to ‘reinforce the US-Africa commitment to democracy; mitigate the impact of Covid, respond to the climate crisis and amplify diaspora ties’. The White House will seek to offer reassurance to African governments concerned by a perceived cooling in relations with the US.

Africa’s cooling relations with the US 

‘As trite as it might sound, the key objective of this conference should really be to enhance trust between African leaders and the United States,’ said Gilbert Kaplan, a former under-secretary at the US Department of Commerce.  ‘I was in Africa in 2018 leading the President’s Advisory Council on Doing Business in Africa and the foreign minister of Ethiopia said to me: “Well you’re here but are you really here?” What he meant was: is the United States really committed to a long-term, strong relationship with the African continent or is it just a drive-through and a hello without making major commitments?’

The first summit was held by President Barack Obama in 2014. Addressing the inaugural conference, he spoke of the ‘blood of Africa’ that ran through his veins and how ‘the bonds between our countries are deeply personal’. Today, however, a succession of abstentions or no votes from African states over United Nations resolutions on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine points to a growing misalignment in the relationship. This is indicative of expanding Chinese and Russian influence on the continent, say analysts.

‘Africa is faced with some of the biggest governance challenges on the globe,’ said Kah Walla, president of the Cameroon People’s Party and the first woman in the nation’s history to run as a presidential candidate in 2011. ‘We need government that is functional, competent and innovative, and what we are getting instead is the US and a global international system that is supporting [via financial aid] autocratic and dysfunctional governments. We can’t continue in this way.’

Africa’s 54 nation states span six time zones and the continent’s population of 1.4 billion is on course to make up a quarter of the global population by 2050. It boasts the youngest demographic in the world, a potentially huge labour resource for private sector investors seeking to expand in manufacturing and processing, for example. The current median age in Africa is 18.8 years, compared with a global median age of 30.

In July this year, the US provided nearly $1.3 billion in humanitarian assistance to help stave off hunger due to drought in the Horn of Africa. Since June 2019, the US, under its Prosper Africa programme, has also helped close some 800 export and investment deals across 45 African nations with an estimated value of $50 billion.

The US is losing out to China in Africa

Meanwhile, China surpassed the US as Africa’s largest trade partner in 2009, with total bilateral trade reaching more than $254 billion in 2021, a 35 per cent rise on 2020.

‘Despite Africa’s tremendous economic potential, the US has lost substantial ground to traditional and emerging partners, especially China,’ Landry Signé, a member of the World Economic Forum’s Regional Action Group for Africa, told a Senate subcommittee on Africa last year. ‘While recent trends indicate that the US engagement with the region has fallen, it has not and should not cede its relationship with the region to other powers.’

Critical elections and the future of American politics 14 December 2022 — 9:00AM TO 10:15AM Anonymous (not verified) 8 December 2022 Chatham House

This event explores whether the United States is undergoing a critical change in the composition of the Republican and Democratic parties.

Drawing on current and historical events, Paul E. Peterson joins us to examine whether the United States is undergoing a critical change in the composition of the Republican and Democratic parties.

Key questions to consider include:

• What factors might be driving such an evolution within both parties?

• How could these dynamics affect the balance of power in Washington and in states?

This event is co-hosted with the Centre on US Politics at UCL, and the US and Americas programme at Chatham House would like to thank the British Association for American Studies for their generous support of this event.

Reflections at 100: Women in international affairs Audio MVieira 19 December 2022

How have women contributed to international relations?

The last episode of Reflections at 100, marking the centenary of International Affairs, looks at women’s contributions to international thought.

Isabel and Krisztina speak to Dr Katharina Rietzler about women’s contributions to the journal and international relations, especially in the UK. Then, Krisztina speaks to Professor Barbara Savage about Black women’s contributions to international relations in the US. To wrap up this episode, Leah de Haan sheds light on Chatham House’s Equality, Diversity and Inclusion (EDI) initiative and Jo Hills shares their thoughts about putting together the archive collections.   

Reflections at 100 is a mini-series accompanying the journal’s centenary Archive Collections. The collections bring together articles from our archive which speak to the past, present and future of current affairs issues. In each podcast episode, we speak to contributors from a specific collection and explore what the research tells us about policy-making today. 

Explore the Archive Collection freely until the end of December 2022, including Katharina’s introduction: 100 years of women in International Affairs.

International Affairs was started at Chatham House in 1922 to communicate research to members who could not attend in person. Over the last 100 years it has transformed into a journal that publishes academically rigorous and policy relevant research. It is published for Chatham House by Oxford University Press. Read the latest issue here.