South Africa’s 2019 Election: Polling Data and Party Prospects 13 March 2019 — 12:30PM TO 1:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 7 March 2019 Chatham House, London

On 8 May 2019, South Africans will vote in their sixth national election. Incumbent President Cyril Ramaphosa is leading his ANC party campaign, which promises inclusive economic growth and social transformation, including through a sustainable land reform programme. However, public frustrations with the party’s record of service delivery and government corruption after 25 years in power could threaten the ANC’s electoral dominance especially in urban areas.

At this meeting, Professor David Everatt, head of the Wits School of Governance and political pollster, will present polling data and discuss the prospects and strategies of the main parties and their leaders ahead of the May election.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

South Africa After the Elections: Balancing Domestic and International Policy Priorities 16 May 2019 — 1:30PM TO 2:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 9 May 2019 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

The government that emerges from the 8 May election in South Africa faces immediate domestic and international foreign policy demands. Attracting Foreign Direct Investment to stimulate job growth, accelerating anti-corruption and good governance efforts are at the forefront of the new government’s agenda.

International ambitions will be upgraded such as UN security council reform, maximizing South Africa’s G20, BRICS and IBSA membership and preparing for South Africa’s chairmanship of the African Union (AU) in 2020.

At this meeting, the speakers – Moeletsi Mbeki, deputy chairman of SAIIA and author with Nobantu Mbeki of A Manifesto for Social Change: How to Save South Africa, and Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, chief executive of SAIIA and currently co-editing a volume on A South African Foreign Policy for the 2020s which will be published in 2019 – will reflect on the election and discuss the new government’s domestic and international policy agenda. The meeting will be chaired by Ann Grant, former British High Commissioner to South Africa (2000-05) with past experience working for Oxfam, Standard Chartered Bank and Tullow Oil.

Ramaphosa Must Act Fast With New Mandate in South Africa Expert comment sysadmin 23 May 2019

In the wake of South Africa’s election, political constraints will ebb momentarily. The president should seize the opportunity to deliver meaningful change.

On 25 May, Cyril Ramaphosa will be inaugurated as president of South Africa, having dragged the African National Congress (ANC) over the line in the 8 May election. The ANC gained a 57 per cent majority, its lowest vote since 1994, its status as national liberator deeply eroded by successive corruption scandals. Only Ramaphosa’s personal popularity stopped it haemorrhaging more support.

His sustained action against corrupt public servants and promises of job-creating economic growth has attracted support from beyond the ANC’s base, including a significant minority of white voters, and generated significant international goodwill. Ramaphosa now has a short window of opportunity to reset social democracy in South Africa before the political cycle of municipal, party and national elections from 2021 to 2024 forces his attention back to party politics.

Defining ‘Ramaphosa-ism’

But personal popularity is fickle, and goodwill alone will not turn around the ailing economy. To attract investment and keep the electorate on side, Ramaphosa’s government needs to move beyond pragmatic crisis responses and articulate a clear, shared vision for how market intervention can allow the economy to grow while simultaneously delivering social transformation.

Growth will be hard to achieve in the short term. The economy is expected to grow 1.2% in 2019 and 1.5% in 2020, according to the IMF. Consumer confidence remains subdued, and a decade of declining GDP per capita and increasing inequality has put a strain on households. A ‘fiscal stimulus’ in 2018 delivered very little new government spending, and over the past 10 years, the government wage bill has increased three times higher than the rate of inflation.

Eskom, the state electricity provider, has debts equating to the GDP of Latvia and is not the only state-owned enterprise (SOE) that has required bailing out by the government. There are plans to break up Eskom into three separate entities but calls for deeper reform – or even privatization – are growing.

The president’s responses to these challenges will go a long way to defining ‘Ramaphosa-ism’ and the role of government in pursuing equitable economy growth.

Economic expectations under Ramaphosa

Ramaphosa was a champion of the introduction of a minimum wage and a proponent of the National Development Plan, which relies on growth to drive job creation. His support for land reform is an individual conviction as much as it is a party line, although his views are softer than many in the party, with state-owned land being the initial target.

Investor uncertainty on land tenure and regulations in mining will need to be addressed through passing key pieces of legislation on land reform and the revised Mining and Petroleum Resources Development Act.

Where Ramaphosa differs from his predecessors is his links with business. Thabo Mbeki enjoyed a relationship of mutual respect with business; this disintegrated under Jacob Zuma. Ramaphosa, however, is part of South Africa’s business community, having founded the Shanduka Group, with investments in multiple sectors including retail, telecoms and extractives, and served as chairman of MTN and Bidvest. As president, he has surrounded himself with close economic advisers from business and banking.

In the short term, anti-corruption measures and competent appointments will ease investor woes. In the long term, there is a need to improve the ease of doing business, including labour market reforms, and to make South Africa a more competitive business environment by reducing the hold of large conglomerates on the economy. Ramaphosa may also make greater use of public-private partnerships for large projects.

Political constraints

Ramaphosa faces few immediate political challenges. The ANC is still deeply divided, but although Ramaphosa does not enjoy the ideological support of the entire party, his opponents are leaderless post-Zuma, and have been unable to offer a coherent alternative. ANC Secretary General Ace Magashule has fallen into the role of interim figurehead of this faction, and allegations of corruption would make it difficult for him to aspire to national leadership.

The need to avoid splits before the election meant Ramaphosa had to make concessions, and his first cabinet in February 2018 included opponents and those accused of corruption or incompetence, such as Malusi Gigaba and Bathabile Dlamini. Such concessions to political opponents are unlikely to continue after the election.

Meanwhile, opposition parties made some advances in the election, but where Zuma was an easy target, they are still grappling with how to confront Ramaphosa. The party with the biggest gains was the Economic Freedom Fighters, whose increase of just over 4 points from the last election gave it 11 per cent of the vote this time. They will likely continue to be an effective disruptor. Ramaphosa may also be challenged by trade unions on his reforms, notably over any break-up of SOEs.

But the biggest and most immediate external political challenge for Ramaphosa will be rebuilding trust between government and society, in a context where social protest has become an alternative form of political participation. A turnout of 65 per cent may be considered normal in Western democracies but is a notable drop for a country as politicized as South Africa, driven by frustration and a sense of exclusion as much as apathy. Turnout by young people was even lower.

Achieving the vision

South Africa has all the platforms it needs to project its renewal and attract vital external investment – it is a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, it will take over as chair of the African Union in 2020, it is a member of BRICS and it is the only African member of the G20. But in the recent past, it has struggled to tell a coherent story about its vision for the future and offer to the world.

In the immediate wake of the election, internal and external political constraints will ebb. Ramaphosa must act fast to deliver results before the election cycle starts again. To attract much needed investment stimulus, he will not only need to articulate and market his vision for South Africa, but also outline how he plans to achieve it.

Mine Action in Angola: Clearing the Legacies of Conflict to Harness the Potential of Peace Other resource sysadmin 14 June 2019

This publication draws on and updates the briefing note published following a meeting of the All- Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) on Angola on 26 April 2017. It also incorporates insights from a Chatham House Africa Programme conference session on the legacies of the Angolan Civil War, held on 23 March 2018; and draws on the Africa Programme’s research into conservation-driven development models in Southern Africa.

Almost two decades after the end of its civil war, Angola remains one of the most heavily landmine-contaminated countries in the world. The Angolan government has committed to clearing its landmines by 2025, and there is constructive collaboration between the government and mine clearing agencies in this endeavour, but the target will be achievable only if a decline in funding from international donors is reversed. International funding for mine clearance in Angola fell by more than 80 per cent between 2005 and 2017, and this sharp drop in external support has compounded the impact on domestic funding for national clearance efforts as a result of the downturn in prices for Angola’s main export commodities.

The national mine action agency, the Comissão Nacional Intersectorial de Desminagem e Assistência Humanitária (CNIDAH), is supported by the Mines Advisory Group (MAG), Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) and the HALO Trust. By 2017, 15 years after the end of the civil war, these organizations had collectively helped clear 56 per cent of known landmine-contaminated land. State-led demining has focused principally on clearing areas designated for infrastructure projects. Now, it is critical that humanitarian demining in largely agricultural and conservation areas is prioritized to bring to an end the daily threat to Angola’s rural poor – as well as to the country’s livestock and wildlife – of injury or death as a result of landmine accidents.

Angola has some of the world’s most important remaining wilderness, including the tributary system for the unique Okavango Delta, and the country has the potential to host one of the most diverse wildlife populations on the continent. However, the presence of landmines and other remnants of the civil war render large areas of the country unsafe both for wildlife and for the local people, whose ability to derive a sustainable livelihood from their natural environment is fundamental to its protection.

Wildlife and tourism provide important economic opportunities for diversification beyond an oil-dominated economy. Critically, Angola’s economic diversification and development objectives can only be achieved if the landmines that prohibit access to land for agriculture, mining, tourism and wildlife are cleared.

There are economic opportunities for released land in the most heavily mined provinces of Cuando Cubango and Moxico. Already, some new funding for mine action in Angola, if upscaled or matched by international donors, could be transformative for its people, and for the conservation of the region’s vital biodiversity.

Zimbabwe Futures 2030: Sector Priorities for Policy Implementation 4 June 2019 — 9:00AM TO 5:15PM Anonymous (not verified) 21 June 2019 Harare, Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe Futures 2030: Policy Priorities for Industrialization, Agri-Business and Tourism 6 June 2019 — 9:30AM TO 1:15PM Anonymous (not verified) 21 June 2019 Bulawayo, Zimbabwe

Hope, Peace and Reconciliation: Pope Francis in Mozambique Expert comment sysadmin 4 September 2019

A papal visit will highlight the importance of the recently signed peace agreement between the government and opposition.

Pope Francis’ visit to Mozambique on 4–6 September comes at a critical political moment. The theme for the papal Africa trip (which also includes Madagascar and Mauritius) is ‘pilgrim of hope, peace and reconciliation’. This is especially relevant for Mozambique, as this is the first week of the official campaign for Mozambique’s sixth national elections on 15 October.

It is also the one-month anniversary of the Maputo Accords for Peace and Reconciliation between the government and the armed opposition, RENAMO (and the fifth anniversary of the previous such agreement in 2014).

What is unusual is that the pope accepted to visit Mozambique just after a peace accord and in the run-up to national elections. Something similar has happened only once, when Pope John Paul II visited Angola in June 1992 (following the Bicesse Accords) prior to the country’s first ever national elections in September. Unfortunately Pope John Paul’s preaching of reconciliation and pluralism failed and civil war resumed some months later, following rejection of the preliminary election results. Angola’s civil war only finally ended a decade later in 2002.

The last papal visit to Mozambique was also by Pope John Paul II in 1988, when civil war was still ongoing, and the country was still a single party state. Despite the war, massive congregations attended and RENAMO reached local ceasefires and agreements to maintain electricity supply to honour the visit. Some of the seeds for the Rome peace process were laid during this trip – especially as it also represented a formal reconciliation of FRELIMO, the ruling party, with the Catholic Church.

This papal visit to Mozambique is equally anticipated, as was highlighted several times during speeches at the 6 August peace agreement signing in Maputo. When I was in Maputo last month, sales of papal-pictured capulanas (a Mozambican sarong) were brisk and Mozambican television carried countdown clocks on many programmes for the touchdown of Pope Francis on national soil.

The Catholic Church has played an instrumental role in promoting peace in Mozambique over the years. The 1977–92 civil war ended through negotiations hosted at the Sant’ Egidio lay community in Rome, and the current Archbishop of Bologna, Dom Matteo Zuppi (who led the Sant’ Egido negotiations in 1992 and is soon to be made a cardinal) was an official witness to 6 August accords signing.

When targeted armed conflict resumed in 2013, faith groups once more re-engaged and in 2016 Sant’ Egidio once more co-led mediation efforts, less successfully than in 1991–92. Sant’ Egidio (including during a presidential visit to Rome in July) contributed to convincing the Vatican that this papal visit should occur before the October elections.

President Filipe Nyusi anxiously wanted this visit to occur before the elections. He is seeking re-election for his second and final term and a papal visit should help win some votes. His party, FRELIMO, is also worried about securing a majority in the national assembly, as it has been weakened by patchy delivery of services and ongoing high-level corruption scandals.

This year, President Nyusi’s priorities have been to show that he can attract international investment (such as Andarko’s recently announced final investment decision on its gas project), a peace agreement with RENAMO (the August agreements) and a papal visit, so a successful trip would complete his goals.

The pope’s ‘hope, peace and reconciliation’ message of his visit is important. Twice previously, the FRELIMO-led government and RENAMO have reached definitive agreements, in Rome (1992) and Maputo (2014), but failed to fully end bloodshed. This new August 2019 agreement is the third attempt, and if it is to last, it will require political goodwill, compromise and an acceptance of more inclusive national politics by both parties.

There are two immediate threats to this agreement. The first is the forthcoming 15 October elections and their conduct could make or break it. Accepting reconciliation and greater pluralism underpins this agreement, but RENAMO expects to increase its share of the parliamentary vote and win a majority in some provinces (and therefore indirectly elect their choice for governor).

A second threat is the ‘Military Junta’, a RENAMO splinter group that claims to be 500 strong, but probably accounts for 80 armed persons. It rejects the 6 August agreement and warns that it could disrupt the elections. This group has asked for mediation, and hopefully can be accommodated in a side deal to the main one agreed in August, which already provides for the reintegration of over 5,000 RENAMO supporters and combatants.

A recent Chatham House research paper on elite bargains in Mozambique concluded that the October elections will be the first immediate test of the August agreement. If the elections pass without significant electoral manipulation or violence and this August deal sticks on the third attempt, the domestic focus should then move onto poverty reduction, combating inequality, education and solving the new security crisis with Islamic militants in Cabo Delgado province.

Zimbabwe Futures 2030: A Vision for Inclusive Long-Term Economic Recovery 10 October 2019 — 10:00AM TO 12:15PM Anonymous (not verified) 5 September 2019 Harare, Zimbabwe

In its Vision 2030, the government of Zimbabwe committed itself to facilitating an open market and stable economy through strategies such as the Transitional Stabilization Programme (TSP) and new industrialization policy. The private sector is pivotal to these objectives and creating an environment conducive to inclusive and job-creating economic growth. Economic growth can only be achieved with a conducive policy environment and government support to underpin markets with provision of public goods, entrepreneurial incentives and protect contract enforcement and dispute resolution mechanisms.

This event will launch a new Chatham House Africa Programme publication on Zimbabwe’s Vision 2030. The paper is the culmination of an inclusive research process that has drawn on senior private sector expertise, civil society, academics, technocratic elements of government and other experts to develop policy recommendations that will support inclusive economic growth in Zimbabwe.

This event is held in partnership with the Zimbabwe Business Club and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS). It is supported by KAS and the Dulverton Trust.

Zimbabwe After Mugabe Expert comment sysadmin 12 September 2019

He was the founding father of modern Zimbabwe, but he leaves behind a contested legacy and a country at a crossroads.

Robert Mugabe’s death at age 95, after nearly 60 years at the helm of Zimbabwe’s liberation and post-independence politics, is a momentous occasion. Mugabe was the founding father of modern Zimbabwe, with all its stunning successes and grievous failures. As he moves into national legend, contestations over his legacy demonstrate that, in death as in life, the man known as Gushungo (from his family lineage) still continues to polarize opinion.

His failings are well known, including the mass murders of more than 30,000 civilians in Matabeleland during the 1980s Gukurahundi campaigns, and the killings and torture of opposition activists in the 2000s and 2010s.

The land reform process, although necessary, was handled in a haphazard way, contributing to the economic crash and 2008’s ‘year zero’, when Zimbabwe was plagued with a worthless currency, no food in the shops, unsafe drinking water and the spread of cholera and typhoid.

Nevertheless, Mugabe is genuinely mourned by millions in Zimbabwe and beyond. Partly this is for what he achieved in building Zimbabwe’s education, health and economy, and for giving land – however haphazardly – to millions of Zimbabweans.

But it was his assertion of black and African identity and pride which made Mugabe connect with millions. I grew up in Ian Smith’s Rhodesia, where being a black African was, by law, a cardinal sin and, at times, a capital offence. Mugabe helped to make being black not just acceptable but also a cause for celebration.

What now for the country?

Mugabe continues to shape Zimbabwe’s politics. Emmerson Mnangagwa’s government has tried to differentiate itself from Mugabe’s administrations, avoiding his radical and ideologically driven language and policies. But Zimbabwe’s military, which played a critical role in Mugabe’s 2017 removal, remains influential over government policy.

Mnangagwa wants to be seen as a moderate, accessible for regular meetings with private sector and international investors through the Presidential Advisory Commission, the Tripartite Negotiating Forum, investment meetings and other forums.

Politically, Zimbabwe’s bipartisan Parliamentary Portfolio Committees have emerged over the past year as key institutions able to effectively hold the government and other institutions to account. Contentious Mugabe-era legislation such as the Public Order and Security Act has been revised in line with Zimbabwe’s constitution. And the ongoing multiparty dialogue is a useful start towards a much-needed national political dialogue.

Through its Transitional Stabilization Programme, the Mnangagwa administration has outlined an ambitious economic reform agenda. There has been some progress; in January, the government reported a $113 million budget surplus, and publicly available audits of state-owned enterprises by Public Auditor Mildred Chiri have exposed the rot at the heart of institutions such as the National Social Security Authority.

The government has streamlined bureaucracy and legislation to improve Zimbabwe’s business climate; and the newly empowered Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission has begun probing some high-profile fraud cases.

Zimbabwe’s global re-engagement with international financial institutions, a process which had stalled in Mugabe’s later years, is now making some progress, with Zimbabwe joining the Staff Monitored Programme with the IMF in mid-2019. The introduction of a new currency in February was designed to end the chaos of multiple US-dollar exchange rates and the dominance of the black market, but has had limited results.

Hardship

But the Mnangagwa administration’s attempts to stabilize the Zimbabwean economy have also included deep cuts in government spending, and the resulting austerity has brought severe hardship for ordinary Zimbabweans. Massive fuel, power and water shortages and the sky-rocketing cost of living are all reminiscent of the Mugabe era, damaging the credibility of the government’s promise of an economic dividend.

Shortages have also hit tourism, which had rebounded in recent years, and the new national currency initiative has pushed inflation to an official 180%. Violent urban protests took place in 2018 and 2019.

While government is right to commit to reforms, and has taken steps, such as cost-of-living allowances, to help mitigate the worst impacts, many Zimbabweans view the official ‘austerity for prosperity’ message with deep scepticism, and the current state of the economy has encouraged more young Zimbabweans to leave the country. Government and the business community need to prioritize people over statistics, and put social protection, anti-poverty programmes and economic democracy at the forefront of economic reform.

Getting public services working again will also require a broad national economic consensus and could look to capitalize on diaspora-led initiatives in education, agriculture, health and other sectors.

But this will require the opposition Movement for Democratic Change to recognize Mnangagwa’s legitimacy in return for substantive talks between government and the opposition and strengthened outreach to Zimbabwe’s nearly 5-million strong global diaspora, many in the United Kingdom, unsure of what tomorrow will bring, and an increasingly troubled South Africa.

The future

Robert Mugabe’s funeral will bring together the great and the good, not just from Zimbabwe but from all over the world. Robert Mugabe was always a voice and never an echo, and his passing, as with those of other Zimbabwean change-makers of all races and backgrounds, is an opportunity to reflect on the legacy of the liberation era.

But more importantly, it is also an opportunity to think about what lies ahead. Zimbabweans have proved to be resilient and innovative; but it will require a collective effort and a national re-engagement to ensure that Zimbabwe’s future is not its past. And with Mugabe now gone, the Zimbabwe government must prove that it can and will do better.

Economic Recovery and Anticorruption in South Africa: Assessing Progress on the Reform Agenda 4 December 2019 — 3:00PM TO 4:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 25 November 2019 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

South Africa has significant economic potential based on its resource endowment, quality human capital and well-developed infrastructure compared to the region. However, the country’s economic growth rate has not topped 2 per cent since 2013, and in 2018, was below 1 per cent. This has put a strain on citizens and communities in a country that still suffers from structural inequality, poverty and high unemployment. Economic recovery and anti-corruption were the central pillars of President Cyril Ramaphosa’s 2019 electoral campaign and he has set an investment target of $100 billion. However, voters and investors alike are demanding faster and more visible progress from the country’s enigmatic leader who has a reputation for caution and calculation.

At this event, Professor Nick Binedell will discuss the progress of and opposition to the president’s economic reform agenda and the opportunities for international investment to support long term inclusive and sustainable growth in South Africa.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

Can Liberation Movements Really Rid Southern Africa of Corruption? Expert comment sysadmin 16 December 2019

Southern Africa’s national liberation movements have survived ‘end of decade’ elections across the region. Combating corruption has been at the heart of many of the campaigns, but the question is can they succeed?

Swapo’s victory in Namibia two weeks ago was the last in a series of recent ‘end of decade’ elections that have returned dominant parties to power across Southern Africa. However, the “enduring appeal of liberation” is wearing thin.

Experiences across the region show that if governments are to deliver on their electoral promises, they must empower institutions, actively promote a culture of accountability and transparency within their party ranks and pursue economic reforms that untangle the web of party-state-business alliances. Such actions are critical for the survival of national liberation movements as the dominant force in the politics of Southern Africa – but will be difficult to implement.

Avoid political factionalism

South Africa, Botswana, Angola and Zimbabwe all saw new presidents take over just before elections. All used the rhetoric of anti-corruption to distance themselves from the tainted image of their predecessors. But acting on this requires a shift in mind-set in parties that have always preferred to deal with their problems behind closed doors. High profile adversaries from past regimes make tempting targets but could also drive party divisions.

In Angola, the transition of power was safeguarded by an agreement that former president José Eduardo dos Santos would be immune from prosecution. But this week his son faced corruption charges before the country’s supreme court, a high-profile example of a wave of anti-corruption cases across Southern Africa, driven by dominant parties wary of their future.

The allegations against José Filemino De Sousa Dos Santos, nickname ‘Zenu’, include a $500-million fraud involving the country’s central bank. Pressure is also mounting on Zenu’s sister Isabel — once prominent in Angola, she is now absent from public life.

Other leaders have had to tread more carefully. Immunity was a luxury Cyril Ramaphosa was neither willing nor politically able to grant Jacob Zuma in South Africa. Reliant on a few close allies at the top of the party, Ramaphosa lacks foot soldiers at the grassroots level, and his campaign against corruption within the ANC has faced persistent opposition.

Rebuilding institutions and empowering authorities takes time, and with few high-profile cases to point to, people are getting restless. This is also the case in Zimbabwe, where a worsening economic situation has left policy reformers politically isolated.

Party, state, and business

Long term incumbency has blurred the distinction between the party and the state. Liberation movements have created vast party-linked business empires. Political allegiance grants access to economic resources through appointments to lucrative positions in state-owned enterprises, preferential bids for tenders and licenses, and direct access to decision makers.

In Angola, this was fuelled by oil revenues. In South Africa, state capture flourished in an environment where the ANC and its constituent elements had significant power on the panels that chose leaders for state-owned enterprises (SOEs). In Namibia, an Icelandic fishing company paid backhanders to officials for fishing rights in what has become known as the ‘Fishrot’ scandal. Zanu-PF officials’ access to preferential foreign exchange rates present them with lucrative opportunities in Zimbabwe.

Ending this bureaucratic rent seeking goes beyond appointing ‘clean’ officials, which has been central to the anti-corruption campaigns in Angola and South Africa. Governments must also allow scrutiny of the state and empower those institutions designed for that role, such as the National Prosecuting Authority and the Public Protector in South Africa. Zimbabwe’s auditor general has published an in-depth report of the state of corruption in the country’s SOEs.

Companies must also be held to account for their role in aiding, and at worst directly benefitting, from state graft. International businesses have actively sought to benefit from corruption. They are now starting to face the consequences. A former Credit Suisse banker has pleaded guilty in the US over handling alleged kickbacks in Mozambique’s $2-billion “tuna bond” scandal. Global banks and consultancies continue to feel the squeeze for their complicity in state capture in South Africa.

Competition and pluralism

National liberation movements may only have a limited window within which to act. Across the region civil society campaigns and investigative journalists have shed light on some of the worst abuses of power. Anti-corruption campaigns are starting to bite. The state will continue to play a central role in Southern African economies, an important arbiter of economic transformation able to balance the region’s highly unequal and resource-dependent economies.

But opposition, civil society and the media are also critical for the progression towards democratic competition and pluralism in Southern Africa. Parliaments remain vital for holding rulers to account. Long used to unchallenged dominance, liberation movements have significant adjustments to make to rise to the challenge of a new era.

This article was originally published in the Mail and Guardian.

Angola's Business Promise: Evaluating the Progress of Privatization and Other Economic Reforms 21 January 2020 — 2:30PM TO 3:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 16 January 2020 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Minister Nunes Júnior will discuss the progress of the Angolan government’s economic stabilization plans and business reform agenda including the privatization of some state-owned enterprises. These reforms could expand Angola’s exports beyond oil and stimulate new industries and more inclusive economic growth.

THIS EVENT IS NOW FULL AND REGISTRATION HAS CLOSED.

Southern Africa

Research focuses on policies for inclusive and diversified economic growth tackling inequality, consolidating democracy, and adapting to environmental change.

Zimbabwe is developing long-term economic reform and international re-engagement, while South Africa remains a major regional hub for international political and commercial relations. Youth perspectives on the country’s future and prospects for higher educational reform are also a major focus of our research.

Mozambique’s peace process is vital to regional progress as is the ongoing work on sustainable development and job creation through bio-diversity conservation and regional political co-operation.

Our research interest areas in this region also include resource governance and extractive industries.

POSTPONED: Pursuing Economic Reform and Growth in South Africa: the view from the African National Congress 18 March 2020 — 10:30AM TO 11:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 3 March 2020 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

The government of South Africa is pursuing a programme of reform to revitalize the economy, strengthen institutions and combat corruption. The State of the Nation Address (SONA) on 13 February and the budget speech of 26 February represent the most significant articulation of the government’s economic strategy. Central to this is the government’s plans for the energy sector, which is fundamental for reviving the economy, and the reform of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs). But questions remain about possible divergence of the approach taken by government ministers from the policy position of the ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC), and what this might mean for the sustainability and progress of reform.

At this event, Paul Mashatile, Treasurer General of the ANC, will discuss the party’s assessment of reform efforts to date and priorities for delivering on inclusive growth.

PLEASE NOTE THIS EVENT IS POSTPONED UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.

COVID-19 in South Africa: Leadership, Resilience and Inequality Expert comment sysadmin 7 May 2020

In a world looking for leadership, South Africa’s president Cyril Ramaphosa has been remarkable. One year after he carried the time-worn ANC through a national election, South Africans are crying out for more.

In the COVID-19 crisis so far, Cyril Ramaphosa has been widely praised for displaying the decisive leadership so many hoped for when they cast their ballot for him in May 2019. Buttressed by others such as health minister Dr Zweli Mkhize, and on a simple objective to prevent transmission, South Africa has been a lesson to the world. Act fast. Act hard.

Former president Thabo Mbeki’s disastrous response to the HIV crisis cast a long shadow over his legacy, and Ramaphosa has taken note. South Africa has had one of the tightest lockdowns in the world. No exercise. No cigarettes. No alcohol.

The lockdown was imposed when the country had only around 1,000 recorded cases and just two deaths. As a result, transmission from returning travellers has not yet led to an exponential infection rate within the community. The government’s swift reaction has bought much needed time with the peak now seemingly delayed to September or October.

Continental and national leadership

Ramaphosa has also emerged as a key focal point for Africa-wide responses. As current chair of the African Union (AU) he leads the continental engagement with the World Health Organization (WHO), and the various international finance institutions, while South African officials are working with the AU and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) on a push for African debt restructuring.

He has also been active in trouble shooting to unlock external assistance to the continent, including from China and Russia. Appointing special envoys is typical of his boardroom-honed leadership style.

International and regional partnerships are vital for resilience and the arrival of 217 Cuban doctors to South Africa is strongly reminiscent of the liberationist solidarity of the Cold War era. And regional economies remain dependent on South Africa to protect their own vulnerable citizens. Following the 2008 financial crisis, it was South Africa’s regional trading relationships that remained robust, while trade with its main global partners in China and the US dropped.

Despite the plaudits, Ramaphosa remains vulnerable to challenge at home, notably around his failure to stimulate South Africa’s moribund economy. On the eve of lockdown, Moody’s joined its peers Standard and Poor’s and Fitch in giving South Africa a below investment grade credit rating. The move was a long time coming. Long mooted economic reforms were slow to materialise, and South Africa had fallen into recession.

Ramaphosa depends on a small core of close advisors and allies, initially united in apparent opposition to the kleptocratic rule of President Jacob Zuma and the deep patronage networks he created within both the party and the state. But this allegiance is being tested by economic reality. Support within the party was already drifting prior to the crisis.

Disagreements are not just technocratic – there are big ideological questions in play around the role of the state in the economy, the level of intervention, and its affordability, with key government figures sceptical of rapid market reforms. Energy minister and former union stalwart Gwede Mantashe is wary of job losses, and minister of public enterprises Pravin Gordhan protective of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Before coronavirus hit, Ramaphosa seemed content to allow these policy disputes to play themselves out with little decisive intervention.

Slow progress on reform, against worsening economic performance, left Ramaphosa and his allies exposed. In January the president missed the UK’s African Investment Summit in order to assert control over a party meeting at which it was expected his detractors would seek to remove Gordhan.

COVID-19 has sharpened thinking

As the independently assertive - and eminently quotable - pro-market reformist finance minister Tito Mboweni stated, ‘you can’t eat ideology’. Accelerated reform and restructuring is required if the government turns to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for assistance.

For the first time, Gordhan has been forced to deny a bailout to beleaguered state airline South African Airways (SAA), and the government’s lockdown bailout of R500 billion has been applauded by business. Much like the fiscal stimulus and recovery plan of 2018, it relies on smart spending, targeting sectors with high multiplier effects. It also includes significant reserve bank loans.

But it has been criticised for not doing enough to help the most vulnerable. There is considerable fear of what could happen when the virus takes hold in South Africa’s townships and informal settlements where social distancing is almost impossible, basic toilet facilities are shared, and HIV and TB rates high.

There are mounting concerns of the humanitarian cost of a prolonged lockdown, and the government has been faster than others in implementing a tiered lockdown system, trying to get people back to work and keep the economy afloat.

South Africa has been criticized by the UN for the use of lethal force by security forces in enforcing lockdown and, in a society plagued by corruption, there are fears legislation to stop the spread of false information could be used to restrict legitimate reporting on the virus response or other issues.

COVID-19 shines a spotlight on societies’ fault-lines worldwide. South Africa is often touted as having one of the highest levels of inequality in the world but, in a globalized economy, these divisions are international as much as they are local.

Resilience comes from within, but also depends on regional and global trading and financial systems. South Africans and international partners have long recognised Ramaphosa’s leadership qualities as an impressive voice for the global south.

But he must also be an advocate for South Africa’s poor. This crisis could accelerate implementation of his landmark pro-poor National Health Insurance and Universal Health Care programmes. Or the hit of COVID-19 on top of South Africa’s existing economic woes could see them derailed entirely. Ramaphosa must push through economic reforms at the same time as managing COVID-19 and rebuilding trust in his government.

Webinar: South Africa's Economic Recovery Beyond COVID-19 27 May 2020 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 18 May 2020

Webinar: Finding Solutions to Insecurity in Cabo Delgado 16 June 2020 — 3:00PM TO 4:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 9 June 2020

Mozambique’s Peace and National Reconciliation Agreement: One Year On 6 August 2020 — 2:30PM TO 4:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 29 July 2020 Online

August 6, 2020 marks one year since the Peace and National Reconciliation Agreement was signed in Maputo. The agreement, signed by the President of Mozambique Filipe Nyusi and RENAMO leader Ossufo Momade, and witnessed by regional and international political and religious leaders, ended the return to conflict that started in 2013.

It also paved the way for Mozambique’s national elections in October 2019. Since the agreement, the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) won a landslide victory in the elections, weakening RENAMO, and a splinter group has conducted targeted armed violence in Manica and Sofala provinces. Yet, the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) process has made progress.

At this event, senior figures reflect on the peace agreement and the key factors of its success. The event also draws upon insights from the authors of recent publications on the latest peace agreement in the context of longer term trends of democratization and peace-building in Mozambique.

A Chatham House Africa Programme research paper published in August 2019, Prospects for a Sustainable Elite Bargain in Mozambique: Third Time Lucky?, examined how the deal was achieved. The Portuguese version includes the full text of the peace accord. Read the research paper in Portuguese or English here.

South Africa's Economic Outlook 20 August 2020 — 12:00PM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 11 August 2020 Online

South Africa’s long mooted economic reforms have been slow to materialize. The economy had fallen into recession even before the COVID-19 pandemic, and had been stripped of its international investment grade rating. The reserve bank is now forecasting a contraction in GDP of over seven percent for 2020.

There are significant questions around the role of the state in the economy, the level of intervention, and its affordability, with key government figures sceptical of rapid market reforms. The mandate and independence of the South African Reserve Bank has also been a subject of public debate. The IMF has approved a US$4.3 billion emergency financial assistance package to help mitigate the health and economic shock to the country. But it has also made clear that there is a pressing need to ensure debt sustainability and implement structural reforms to support recovery and achieve sustainable and inclusive growth.

At this event, Lesetja Kganyago, the governor of the South African Reserve Bank (SARB), gives his assessment of the expected trajectory of the South African economy in the short and medium term. He discusses the IMF package and the implications for economic reform, and the role of the reserve bank in delivering sustainable and inclusive growth.

Zimbabwe's Economy During the Coronavirus Pandemic and Beyond 8 September 2020 — 10:00AM TO 11:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 26 August 2020

COVID-19 has had a devastating effect on Zimbabwe’s already floundering economy. Important foreign currency earning industries have virtually stopped, and across the country livelihoods are at risk and an increasing number of people are reliant on government grants.

Businesses are having to become more flexible but are constrained by a weak policy environment and lack of confidence in the economy. Since 2017, the government has been pursuing an economic reform agenda and Transitional Stabilization Programme (TSP), which was scheduled for completion by the end of 2020. The deepening challenges highlight the need to accelerate economic reform and build confidence in order to achieve sustainable and inclusive growth.

At this webinar, speakers discuss the measures that government, businesses, and individuals are adopting in response to the COVID-19 economic challenge, and the policies required for recovery.

Read a meeting summary

This webinar is held in partnership with the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung.

South Africa's Economic Reform and Employment in the Context of the Coronavirus Pandemic 3 September 2020 — 3:00PM TO 4:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 26 August 2020 Online

President of COSATU, Zingiswa Losi, discusses the organization’s priorities for protecting jobs and workers, and working with other stakeholders to build a sustainable post-pandemic economy.

Employment in South Africa fell by an estimated 18 per cent between February and April 2020. The measures imposed to control the spread of COVID-19 suffocated an already weak economy and unemployment has hit a new high.

The stated aims of the government’s economic reform plans include the support of job creation in labour intensive industries, but the reform of the state and rebalancing of the economy and fiscus could lead to further job losses in state agencies and enterprises.

Protecting jobs while ensuring the health and safety of workers are dual priorities, and require the joint commitment and ‘social compact’ of labour, business and government.

Zimbabwe’s Economic Governance and Regional Integration 17 November 2020 — 12:00PM TO 1:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 6 November 2020 Online

Panellists discuss policy and governance for long-term economic prosperity in Zimbabwe, reflecting on the role of institutional change and regional integration in the context of the shocks caused by the coronavirus pandemic.

At this virtual event, panellists and participants will discuss policy and governance for long-term economic prosperity in Zimbabwe, reflecting on the role of institutional change and regional integration.

The government of Zimbabwe has emphasized its commitment to economic reform and its ambition to achieve upper-middle-income status by 2030, but there are considerable challenges to overcome.

The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated existing economic fragility. Improving the business climate to attract international private-sector investment will be contingent on clear, consistent and coherent policy and implementation, including targeting abuse and corruption.

Zimbabwe has, in recent years, successfully strengthened its regional trade integration, although some trade frictions remain. This is an important factor not only for catalysing economic growth in Zimbabwe, but for supporting regional prosperity and post-COVID recovery.

This webinar is the second in a series of events held in partnership with the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung on Zimbabwe’s economic reform and recovery.

Read a meeting summary

This event will also be broadcast live on the Africa Programme Facebook page.

South Africa’s foreign policy: Reflections on the United Nations Security Council and the African Union 20 January 2021 — 2:00PM TO 3:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 8 January 2021 Online

HE Dr Naledi Pandor, South Africa’s Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, discusses South Africa’s role in pursuing its regional and global goals.

To receive joining instructions, please finalise your registration by clicking the link below. Once you have registered you will receive a confirmation email from Zoom, which will include the unique joining link you will need to attend.

In 2019-2020, South Africa served its third term as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, seeking to strengthen its role as a bridge-builder and further justify a more permanent role for the country and continent on the body.

In February 2021, South Africa will also conclude its time as Chair of the African Union, having used its tenure to promote peace and security issues, including closer cooperation with the UNSC, and advance regional economic integration.

South Africa took up these roles at a time of global and regional upheaval. As COVID-19 tested countries’ commitment to cooperation over isolation, South Africa coordinated regional responses to address the challenges of stressed public health systems, vaccine strategies, and economic stimulus and debt support across Africa.

Its leadership has been further tested by ongoing and emerging insecurity in the Sahel, and in Cabo Delgado in neighbouring Mozambique. The crux of its regional strategy remains squaring the circle between promoting regional economic cooperation while protecting its own domestic economic priorities.

At this event, HE Dr Naledi Pandor, Minister of International Relations and Cooperation of the Republic of South Africa, reflects on the country’s two years on the UNSC and one year of chairing the AU, and discuss South Africa’s role in pursuing regional and global goals.

This event will also be broadcast live on the Chatham House Africa Programme’s Facebook page.

Read event transcript. 

Inclusion, agency and influence: The role of women in Zimbabwe’s economy 8 July 2021 — 3:00PM TO 4:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 2 July 2021 Online

Speakers discuss the changing role of women in Zimbabwe’s economic structures and the priorities for promoting greater economic inclusion, agency and influence of women.

Zimbabwe’s National Development Strategy of 2021-2025 highlights the importance of gender sensitivity in policymaking and of women’s economic participation in attaining the government’s Vision 2030.

However, women have been among the worst affected groups by the devastating effects that COVID-19 has had on Zimbabwe’s already floundering economy, which has exacerbated the challenges they face in economic life, such as access to credit, financial services and social security.

Leveraging existing structures such as women’s groups, micro-finance facilities, education and training, and national gender mechanisms, as well as supporting wider financial and digital inclusion in Zimbabwe, is central for the country’s sustained economic recovery.

This event also focuses on the differing impacts of COVID-19 on women’s economic activities across various sectors, as well as along rural-urban and formal-informal economy lines.

Read a meeting summary

This webinar is part of a series of events in partnership with the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung on Zimbabwe’s economic recovery and reform.

This event will also be broadcast live on the Africa Programme Facebook page.

Angola Forum 2021: Policy options to support economic recovery in Angola 7 October 2021 — 2:00PM TO 5:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 22 September 2021 Online

Speakers discuss policy options to support economic recovery in Angola as the country transitions away from a state-led oil economy to a private-sector-led growth model.

The government of Angola has made some progress on a range of policies targeting macroeconomic stability and structural reform. However, the country has been suffering from a recurring economic recession for six consecutive years, with the last positive annual GDP growth rate posted in 2015 at 0.9 per cent.

The national budget remains dependent on oil revenue, leaving the country highly exposed to volatile oil prices particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic. While revenues collapsed, increased spending was needed to respond to the health crisis and estimates of Angola’s debt spike range from 130 to 150 per cent of its GDP by the close of 2020.

At this virtual Angola Forum, speakers discuss policy options to support economic recovery in Angola as the country transitions away from a state-led oil economy to a private-sector-led growth model.

The Forum launches the English translation of the Angola Economic Report 2019-20 by the Centro de Estudos de Investigação (CEIC) of the Catholic University of Angola in partnership with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS), and the findings of Afrobarometer’s first ever survey in Angola, Ovilongwa – Estudos de Opinião Pública, which interviewed 2,400 adult Angolans and sampled individual perceptions on democracy and economic reform in Angola.

This event will be held in English and Portuguese with simultaneous interpretation.

The Forum will also be broadcast live on the Africa Programme Facebook page.

Zambia’s political and economic reform and recovery 5 November 2021 — 11:30AM TO 12:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 2 November 2021 Chatham House and Online

At this event, HE Hakainde Hichilema, president of the Republic of Zambia, discusses his vision for Zambia’s development and long-term political and economic reform and recovery.

Zambia’s new administration, following the general elections of August 2021, faces a daunting challenge of reversing economic contraction, lowering income-eroding inflation, and addressing the unsustainable national debt.

The country has been one of the few to seek debt restructuring under the G20’s new Common Framework for Debt Treatments, and its immediate priorities include a prospective agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Young Zambians are eager for jobs and improved living standards. But the government’s ambition to create more jobs and achieve middle-income status will depend on both attracting new investment into its copper sector and pursuing a programme of economic diversification supporting growth beyond the mining industry.

Addressing these economic concerns will also need to be supported by a programme of political reform and rehabilitation of citizens’ trust in the state.

South Africa’s ANC party policy conference 2022: Outcomes and prospects 10 August 2022 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 4 August 2022 Online

Paul Mashatile, Treasurer-General of the African National Congress (ANC), discusses the outcomes of the 6th ANC Policy Conference 2022.

The African National Congress (ANC) recently concluded its 6th National Policy Conference in Johannesburg, in the year that the ANC has declared ‘The Year of Unity and Renewal to Defend and Advance South Africa’s Democratic Gains’. The conference was a precursor to the party’s 55th National Elective Conference to be held in December.

The conference has come less than a year after municipal polls in which the ANC garnered less than 50 per cent of votes, its lowest since 1994. Many believe internal factionalism is impeding party reform and hampering its ability to address unemployment and entrenched inequality.

At this webinar, Paul Mashatile, Treasurer-General of the ANC, will discuss the outcomes of the ANC Policy Conference 2022, including measures to accelerate inclusive growth, job creation and a just energy transition.

This event will also be broadcast live on the Chatham House Africa Programme’s Facebook page.

Angola forum 2022: Prospects for Angola's social and economic future 15 December 2022 — 1:00PM TO 4:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 28 November 2022 Online

At this online Angola forum, experts will discuss Angola’s social and economic future, and what to expect from 2023.

At this virtual Angola Forum, speakers will discuss Angola’s social and economic future and what to expect from 2023.

Angola experienced positive economic momentum in 2022 allowing it to exit its six-year recession, with the economy taking centre stage in the August national multiparty elections. Increased oil prices and high levels of production have driven Angola’s economic growth and improved macroeconomic conditions, as well as helping the country to reduce its public debt to 56.5 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (down from 79.7 per cent in 2021).

However, a global economic downturn in 2023, with increased inflation, means Angola’s re-elected MPLA government will need to focus on job creation, greater economic inclusivity and diversifying away from an oil-led economy. It will also require Angola to navigate its international partnerships more effectively in this era of heightened geopolitical rivalries.  

At this online Angola forum, experts will discuss Angola’s social and economic future and what to expect from 2023. Speakers will reflect on the social and economic trends seen in 2021-22 and explore election trends, human rights and international relations.

This Angola Forum is supported by the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung.

Russia and Eurasia

Research on the former Soviet region explores geopolitics of various states, the domestic, foreign and security policy of Russia, and the conflict in Ukraine.

Key projects currently include examining Russia’s military mobilization, Ukraine’s reforms, the foreign policy of smaller states such as Armenia, oligarchy, and broader inter-state relations.

The Russia and Eurasia programme at Chatham House is a globally recognised focal point for analysis on how developments in this region impact on other states and institutions. 

The World in Brief: European Court of Justice The World Today Anonymous (not verified) 29 July 2021

EU brings members into line over fundamental rights

The European Union has had a challenging start to the summer trying to uphold the rule of law and avoid democratic regression in its member states.

On July 14, the Polish constitutional court ruled that the country did not have to comply with the measures imposed by the European Court of Justice against its controversial judicial reforms, citing that these measures were not in line with the Polish constitution.

The ruling Law and Justice Party, known as PiS, has introduced extensive changes to the judiciary since coming to power six years ago. In 2018, the government appointed new judges and set up a disciplinary chamber for the Supreme Court, which was given a temporary suspension by the European Court of Justice in an interim decision last year.

PiS reasoned that the changes were necessary to eliminate corruption stemming from the communist era, but critics say it merely allows the government to punish judges it regards as disloyal. Under the disciplinary system, Polish judges can have sanctions imposed on them for their judgments in the lower courts or if they refer cases to EU courts for preliminary rulings.

In the day following the Polish top court’s decision, the stand-off worsened when the European Court of Justice ruled that the disciplinary chamber undermines judicial independence and violates EU law. It ordered its immediate suspension and reiterated that the EU has primacy over national law – a vital condition countries agree to when joining the EU.

Didier Reynders, the European justice commissioner, sent a letter to Warsaw with an August 16 deadline for an answer on whether Poland would comply with the ruling. If the EU does not receive a satisfactory answer, it will impose financial sanctions on the state.

The former communist country, which joined the EU in 2004, is one of the bloc’s success stories. Its economy has boomed, and most people hold favourable views about the union – less than a handful of other member states have greater support for EU membership.

A recent survey by the Bertelsmann Stiftung showed that ‘although only 35 per cent of Poles are satisfied with the democracy in their own country, a full 70 per cent express positive views on the state of democracy in the EU’. These figures feed into a larger picture of many Europeans welcoming the EU as a supervisory agent that is capable of intervening when individual states falter.

Recently, however, the EU has had to step up its efforts as members express anger over the gradual dismantling of fundamental rights under populist governments, not only in Poland.

The persistent backsliding in Viktor Orbán’s Hungary has led to concerns in the EU parliament, which is putting pressure on the European Commission to do more to protect the EU’s values and legal order.

In a simultaneous battle in July, the commission launched legal action against Poland and Hungary, challenging anti-LGBTQ laws in those countries. It was triggered by a decision of more than 100 Polish regions to pass resolutions declaring themselves free of ‘LGBTQ ideology’, and a recently adopted law in Hungary banning any depiction of LGBTQ people on television or in books for under-18s.

An annual report on the rule of law in the union, released by the commission in July, singled out the two countries for their non-compliance. The report, the second of its kind, is a new tool to address concerns that the union was not scrutinizing democratic backsliding within its own bloc. Critics were quick to point out, however, that there is no mention of enforcement actions.

At the start of the year the EU vowed to be tougher in upholding democracy with a new regulation that lets it withhold money from member states that breach the rule of law. The EU has already delayed approving spending plans for Hungary and Poland as part of the €800 billion pandemic recovery fund.

As the European Parliament calls for the commission to reduce budget allocations to those that undermine democratic rights, Poland and Hungary could see the new mechanism put to the test this autumn.

The future of Europe post-Brexit 28 September 2021 — 5:00PM TO 6:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 17 August 2021 Online

In conversation with Michel Barnier, Chief Brexit Negotiator, European Union (2016-2019).

Drawing on the diary he kept during the 1600 days of complex and acrimonious Brexit negotiations, Michel Barnier explores the political and practical implications for Europe post-Brexit.

Britain’s departure from the European Union has been a long and difficult journey. Many questions remain about what future lies ahead for the UK and EU and the relations between them.

• To what extent were UK negotiating positions shaped by politics within the ruling Conservative government? How did domestic politics in EU member states shape EU positions? What were key turning points in the negotiations?
• What are the hopes and expectations for bilateral relations between the UK and EU states?
• What is the scope for UK – EU cooperation on transatlantic issues and relations with China

This event forms part of Chatham House’s ongoing work on Effective Multilateralism.

Read a transcript.

As with all Chatham House member events, questions from members drive the conversation. Attending this event and watching the full event video is for Chatham House members only. Not a member? Find out more.

Russia and 9/11: Roads not taken Expert comment NCapeling 9 September 2021

Many Russia watchers recall the fleeting moment 20 years ago when the country could have moved away from a path of confrontation with the US.

On 12 September 2001, Russian president Vladimir Putin was the first foreign leader to call George W. Bush to express his condolences – and to offer him support.

Just the previous year, Putin had said Russia joining NATO was a possibility and it suited Russia to draw parallels between the terrorist attacks on the US and its own ‘anti-terrorist’ campaign in Chechnya at the time.

Even though much of the Russian commentary about 9/11 professed empathy rather than sympathy, in their eyes the US was both a victim – as Russia likes to see itself – and ‘had it coming’ while Russia was blameless.

At that time, many in the West were still tempted by the idea Putin’s Russia might develop in a liberal direction, and Putin himself wanted to be seen as constructive especially after Chechnya. He may also have also assumed that, if Russia joined the international alliance, it would be as a co-leader with the US.

An offer which was never stated

Whether he was sincere in his condolences or not, Putin was of course not offering something for nothing – but then few countries ever do. Although less than one-tenth into his time in control of Russia (so far), Putin was still feeling his way but was not a naive president having already been through the controversial sinking of the Kursk submarine.

His first move was to facilitate access to bases in Central Asia for the US campaign in Afghanistan – vital initially but less so later. Apparently, this offer was against the wishes of many of his senior military commanders – although the extent to which it was in his gift to grant such access is questionable.

The quid pro quo, unstated and only dawning on Washington much later, was for the US to keep out of what Russia saw – and still sees – as its backyard. Putin probably misjudged that the US would have neither the inclination nor the capacity to be in that region for anything other than supply chain purposes. And he hoped America now needed Russia after the humiliations of the 1990s.

Common interests could once have been the basis of a partnership with Russia; but to Moscow that meant a partnership of equals which recognized the Kremlin’s self-declared right to conduct out-of-area operations. But the US took a different view and, with nothing written down and no memorandum ever signed, the ensuing disappointment for Russia was gradual but inexorable.

A purely practical reason for declining the ‘offer’ was that, despite its own illusions, Russia had little to bring to the table which was useful and could be offered on acceptable terms. Subsequent initiatives – from specific joint terrorism initiatives to a ‘grand reset’ – could not narrow differences to the point where the character of the relationship changed.

The Northern Distribution Network for supplying US forces in Afghanistan – Russia’s most practical contribution to the notional common cause – took almost a decade to be established and was plagued by problems which often come with a dependence on Russian goodwill.

The Kremlin also had the pleasure of watching US hubris lead to failure in Iraq. And, although knowing the US intervention in Afghanistan would never end well, even Russia could not have foreseen the scale of the defeat and humiliation of chaotic withdrawal.

US achievements with Russia’s neighbours

When it comes to Russia’s post 9/11 ‘offer’ and subsequent expectations, many of the other newly independent countries might never have achieved what they have over the past 20 years if the US had agreed – tacitly or otherwise – to sit back and accept Moscow’s droit de regard over them.

From the Kremlin’s perspective, these states were Russia’s ‘kith and kin’ but it underestimated US willingness to support smaller states over a ‘great power’ – especially as George H.W. Bush pleaded to those states not to go too far too fast. Albeit uneven, most have benefitted from US support for their own independence as well as practical assistance to strengthen their institutions and diversify external relationships.

The three Baltic states consolidated their democracies while their economies, which severed many ties with Russia early, are flourishing and prosperous in contrast to those still in the Russian orbit. They are not only members of NATO and the European Union (EU) but have on occasion been moral leaders as in the case of Lithuania facing down both Belarus and China.

Ukraine has undergone two revolutions in attempting to follow the paths of the Baltic states that continues today. After many false starts Moldova has undergone a similar change recently but at the ballot box not on the streets, to give itself another shot at the prize of true democracy and international acceptance.

Georgia conducted the most radical governance reforms seen in the region after its own revolution although it has taken a few steps backwards of late. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have strengthened their independence since then and adjusted their modus vivendi with Russia to their advantage. Putin would hardly be able to give the same assurances about use of bases there today – and indeed reportedly brushed off a request by Biden to use them in the current withdrawal.

Only a minority of formerly Soviet republics have made no progress whatsoever at the governmental level – Belarus and Turkmenistan for sure, perhaps Azerbaijan and Tajikistan too depending on the criteria.

The roads not taken

America’s failure was not so much rejecting Russia’s offer of partnership but failing to pay sufficient attention to it because Russia was still regarded as weak despite being relatively strong in its immediate neighbourhood.

The question of whether it was worth alienating Russia is a moral one. Refusing to sign the Paris Charter – which recognizes the right of independent states to form their own alliances – would have been a further betrayal of people who have long been subjected to their future being decided by stronger powers around them. But Russia may have chosen a path of confrontation anyway as, for the Kremlin, suzerainty over its former republics is considered an entitlement which comes with being a great power.

Although impossible to conclusively prove, all previous frameworks of Russian assumptions and habits of Russian behaviour indicate Moscow would have pocketed the deal and simply moved on anyway. It certainly seems likely that Russia’s other outrages and offenses over the years – from the murders of Litvinenko and Skripal in the UK to the manipulation of information and elections – would still have occurred even if a shabby deal had been made over the heads of the new states on Russia’s borders.

The atrocity of 9/11 was really an opportunity for Russia, a genuine potential turning point and a chance to create a new relationship with the outside world – but its expectations were unrealistic. Russia blew it with demands at the time that could not be met – and rightly were not met. The US rarely receives credit for withstanding Russian blandishments at a moment when its own aura of strength had been so cruelly and effectively punctured by the most brazen of attacks.

Europe's strategic choices 2021 4 November 2021 TO 5 November 2021 — 8:00AM TO 5:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 21 September 2021 Ritz Carlton Berlin

The 2021 conference will consider how Europe can navigate its political, economic and security challenges, in the context of the lasting effects of the coronavirus pandemic and an increasingly competitive geopolitical environment.

Registration is a two step process and you will receive a link to register on the conference virtually in advance. Please email if you wish to attend in-person.

The Eighth Annual Europe’s Strategic Choices conference, jointly developed and hosted by Chatham House, the Institute for Security Policy at the University of Kiel and the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, aims to understand the complex set of challenges facing Europe in the areas of security, economic competitiveness, trade, technology, and global influence.

Set against the backdrop of a Europe emerging gradually from the COVID-19 pandemic, this annual forum brings together policymakers, and representatives from business, civil society and academia, to explore how European countries can best respond, individually and collectively to their common challenges in an increasingly competitive geopolitical environment.

The conference will be hosted in hybrid format to enable speakers and participants to join in person and allow others to engage virtually via the Conference Plus digital platform. This format ensures we can connect with a geographically diverse audience whilst incorporating important elements of in person engagement in accordance with German Federal government guidelines.

Memory politics: the challenge of commemoration in post-Soviet Eastern Europe and the Caucasus 5 October 2021 — 1:00PM TO 2:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 21 September 2021 Online

This event explores how to address memory and commemoration in the former Soviet states, considering their role in political processes and violent conflict. 

How the past is remembered and commemorated plays a large role – perhaps too large – in contemporary political debates and in how conflicts are negotiated.

Perceptions of history influence people’s actions and are used to judge or dismiss the actions of others. Nowhere is this more so than in the political, territorial and social debates and disputes across the former Soviet Union.
 
This event examines how to address the problems caused by entrenched memory debates – and proposes a framework for ‘ethical political commemoration’ for use across historical enquiry, political processes, and conflict transformation initiatives.

The speakers explore the topic through the context of Turkey and the Armenian genocide, as well as more broadly through their own experiences in conflict transformation and peace processes.

Q&A: Maria Kolesnikova The World Today rescobales.drupal 29 September 2021

The jailed Belarusian opposition activist says: ‘It’s worth it’

Earlier this month, the Belarusian opposition activists, Maria Kolesnikova and Maxim Znak, were sentenced to long prison terms on charges of conspiring to seize power and crimes against national security. Both Kolesnikova, a prominent musician, and Znak, a lawyer, are supporters of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, who ran against President Alexander Lukashenka in last year’s election and is now in exile in Lithuania. European Union countries have called for all political detainees, including Kolesnikova, to be released, but so far these calls have fallen on deaf ears. Alistair Burnett interviewed Maria Kolesnikova.

What is your response to the verdict and the 11-year sentence handed down to you?

My conscience is clear. We didn’t break the law. We followed the law at all the stages of the electoral campaign.

After the verdict, we applauded when the judges left the courtroom. They fulfilled their despicable role in this historical process – now this decision is on their conscience.

It is impossible to take the court and the verdict in any way seriously. This is not a verdict on Maxim and me but on the authorities themselves, on the system itself.

It is evidence not only of a legal default, but of a system-wide default. I feel sorry for those who did not understand what happened and did not learn history’s lessons.

Your trial was held behind closed doors and you were charged with conspiring to seize power and crimes against national security. What can you tell us about the prosecution’s case against you?

If there had been any evidence against us, the trial would have been open.

The very existence of accusations like this denies people the potential to participate in election campaigning and in political activity generally. It also prohibits public criticism of the authorities.

Such a judgment and verdict is a Pandora’s box with far-reaching negative consequences.

After the crackdown over last year’s protests and now your sentencing, what is the state of the opposition within Belarus?

I am in prison, so it is hard for me to judge objectively people’s attempts to fight for their freedom and basic human rights. According to what I see on TV, as well as the mood of those few people I have had a chance to talk to, I can say that the authorities are scared by the people’s activism.

They understand that though they can put down protests, they can’t change people’s mindsets. I see the fear in their eyes. I also believe that even those outside of Belarus can do a lot, and it’s important to continue opposition activity both inside and outside the country.

Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya has been visiting European countries and the United States to maintain their support. Has international pressure, including from human rights groups, had any effect on the Lukashenka government?

I will use this opportunity to say hi to Sviatlana: ‘You are amazing. Keep it up.’

I’m sure Lukashenka is scared. He turned from a person who meets presidents to talk about Ukraine into an outcast no one wants to shake hands with.

It is traumatic for him, but the fear will pass. He will get used to it.

That is why it’s important to think about the next step, to understand what American and European partners are ready to offer Lukashenka in return for him to change course. If they aren’t ready to offer him anything – it’s important to know how long they are ready to maintain the pressure.

It concerns Russia as well. Maybe they simply don’t understand that Lukashenka and his government are in a bad way.

To what extent do you believe the futures of the Lukashenka and Russian President Vladimir Putin are now intertwined?

Lukashenka is a famous manipulator. Almost 30 years in power has made his self-preservation instincts automatic. It’s a tactical choice. There’s nothing behind it besides the willingness to stay in power till he dies.

But a trapped person is a dangerous and unreliable partner. It won’t remain like this for a long time. His partners will sooner or later face unpleasant surprises.

What can the international community do?

Hundreds of political prisoners, thousands in exile, tens of thousands arrested, fined, subjected to violence, and the media and businesses are being destroyed. The authorities are at war with their own people and leading the country into an abyss.

The support of the international community is very important for Belarusians. We need to look for an opportunity to start a dialogue, both within the country and with international partners.

Why did last year’s protests last as long as they did? Was it the relative youth of the protesters; the use of social media; the prominence of women; and did COVID restrictions play any part?

For me, the protests aren’t the main thing. The transformation of Belarusian society is the most important thing.

Most Belarusians decided what they want to see in their county: Belarus as a free, democratic, sovereign country. And the current authorities aren’t able to provide that.

Regarding new technology, of course, it gives more opportunities for people to organize, however, social media users are still the minority in Belarus. Everything happened on a deeper level after being built up over time through people’s real-life experience.

Throughout the campaign, I have been surprised by the fact that most of the activists are middle-aged people from different professions. There were plenty of women who expressed their objection first.

Through the situation with COVID, we gained a new experience of solidarity and mutual assistance, so when the government turned against the people, we realized then how many we were.

Looking back now at the protests, would you do anything differently and have you learned lessons for the future?

We definitely have more appreciation for what we already have. We appreciate our amazing journalists, our civil society, and private businesses. And, of course, our upcoming victory.

What could we have done differently? We could have been more consistent in terms of our willingness to resolve the crisis quickly and painlessly for the country. We were calling for dialogue in August, and then we had this unfortunate period of ultimatums that damaged both sides.

The situation is different now, and everything is more complicated. The moment has gone, and I don’t think that negotiation or national dialogue in the form we expected a year ago is possible anymore.

We had to make very hard choices many times, but the most important thing is that we never deviated from our principles and values - the fairness of the law, kindness, respect and love. I believe it is the only right way.

How can you now achieve your goal of removing President Lukashenka from power?

To be a politician in Belarus nowadays means to be in prison. In this way, I can contribute to the common endeavor. It’s not our objective, though.

Our objective is a country free of current and future forms of authoritarianism.

How to free the country? On the one hand, we all have to maintain our effort, cohesion and solidarity. We should try not to lose that. On the other hand, we should focus on limiting the political space for the government. We should show that the system will have to deal with us, the Belarusians.

Thirdly, we have to think about the future of Belarus. We have to dream about it, believe in it and stay active. Everything is up to us.

You were a musician before becoming active in politics. Has music shaped your approach to political activism and have you had the chance to continue playing in detention?

The artistic path shapes the personality. Of course, teamwork, looking for unusual solutions, and the ability to stay concentrated and work for a long time in critical situations, as well as performing in public, is what I’ve been learning my whole life as a musician.

Management of contemporary art projects and partnerships with businesses, like with Viktar Babaryka, the former presidential candidate, for example, gave me even more experience.

I miss music a lot, but in Belarusian prisons, even books aren’t really allowed. I don’t have an opportunity to play.

Do you have any regrets about your decision to become involved in opposition politics?

I consider my decision to participate in the campaign the most important and responsible one of my life. I knew it would be hard, but the future of the nation is at stake. So it’s worth it. My love for Belarus and Belarusian people didn’t allow me to stay aloof.

Director’s breakfast briefing: Shifts in European foreign policy since 9/11 14 October 2021 — 8:00AM TO 9:15AM Anonymous (not verified) 4 October 2021 Chatham House

Former MI6 chief, Sir Alex Younger, discusses shifts in European foreign policy since 9/11.

Former MI6 chief Sir Alex Younger, discusses shifts in European foreign policy since 9/11.

The dramatic events surrounding the withdrawal from Afghanistan demonstrates a profound shift in European security priorities since the beginning of the ‘war on terror’. Against the backdrop of the 20th anniversary of 9/11, former MI6 chief, Sir Alex Younger, discusses recent shifts in European foreign policy.

How has the focus on counterterrorism changed over the last two decades particularly in light of new and evolving strategic challenges? Why were many long-term objectives in Afghanistan left unachieved? Has the threat of terrorism changed across Europe? How has cooperation between security and intelligence services across the world changed particularly across the Atlantic? And, 20 years on, is the ‘war on terror’ really over?

This event is only open to Chatham House Partners and Major Corporate Members as well as selected giving circles of Chatham House. If you would like to attend, please RSVP to Linda Bedford at RSVP@chathamhouse.org.

Undercurrents: Europe's far-right educational institutions Audio bhorton.drupal 8 October 2021

In Hungary, France and Spain, new political movements from the far-right are attempting to reshape their education systems.

Under the supportive eye of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, the recently established National University of Public Service seeks to embed nationalist illiberal values in a new generation of Hungarian students. Meanwhile in France and Spain, far-right public figure Marion Maréchal has turned away from the electoral politics of the Front Nationale to set up a new conservative research institute, ISSEP.

Both of these developments represent a challenge to the liberal values which underpin the existing international order. To find out more, Ben spoke with Professor Dorit Geva and Dr Felipe Santos, whose recent article in International Affairs considers the implications of this illiberal educational turn. 

Why Europe must end limbo for Afghans seeking asylum Expert comment Anonymous (not verified) 14 October 2021

With a focus on evacuations from Afghanistan, the situation in Europe is often forgotten as thousands of asylum seekers continue to wait for their cases to be settled.

Following the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan, European leaders shared messages to welcome those evacuated, but the reality of European responses to displacement in Afghanistan paints a more contentious picture. 

As of July 2021, 33,325 cases of Afghan asylum applicants were pending in Germany, in France 18,410 people were waiting on a decision, while in Greece the numbers were 13,660. 

Arguably, such numbers are manageable given European states’ size and their functioning asylum systems but, while 56 per cent of Afghans in Europe receive protection status, a large proportion is still in limbo in differing European countries’ asylum systems. 

Europe hosts fewer than ten per cent of the three million UN-registered displaced Afghans globally, as neighbouring countries carry the burden of Afghanistan’s forced displacement: Iran hosts almost one million Afghan refugees and Pakistan 1.5 million, and these numbers double when adding undocumented or Afghan passport holders.
 
But despite these manageable numbers, national authorities in Europe often leave people waiting for months or even years to receive an asylum decision. Deportations to Afghanistan were halted only after the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul and even then there was resistance to this from certain European countries, while Austria suggested setting up ‘deportation centres’ in countries neighbouring Afghanistan. 

Europe remains a fortress

The European Commission’s Draft Action Plan responding to the events in Afghanistan confirmed the willingness of the European Union (EU) to continue returns to non-European ‘third countries’. So Europe remains a fortress, despite pledging support for ‘the safe and orderly departure of foreign nationals and Afghans who wish to leave the country’. 

The wall by Greece at its border with Turkey and Poland’s treatment of Afghan asylum seekers trapped at its border with Belarus illustrate this hardline stance. The president of the European Council Charles Michel and EU Home Affairs Chief Ylva Johansson both confirm the priority is to secure European borders. 

This is further backed up by the European Council’s latest set of Conclusions on Afghanistan which focuses on security and ‘preventing illegal migration’ while avoiding reference to any domestic asylum efforts or the establishment of protection pathways for Afghans. 

This disconnect is not new. At the national level, reports of illegal pushbacks on European land and sea borders alarmingly intensified in 2020 as authorities intercepted and sent migrants back to neighbouring countries without assessing asylum claims. 

At the EU level, development aid to countries such as Afghanistan has long been conditional on their governments’ adherence to the bloc’s migration objectives of preventing asylum seekers from reaching European borders and facilitating the repatriation of those refused asylum in Europe. 

But this latest displacement crisis from Afghanistan exposes clear inconsistencies in European approaches to asylum and humanitarianism. Migration remains a divisive issue in European politics, but European governments must act promptly to support Afghans already residing in their territories alongside establishing robust international commitments.

Time for concrete action

European countries should firstly improve the treatment of those Afghans currently in limbo within their respective asylum systems by expediting pending Afghan asylum applications and family reunification cases, re-examining rejected asylum applications, and facilitating integration.

Secondly, national authorities should not return asylum seekers to Afghanistan or any third countries deemed ‘safe’. For Europe to coordinate evacuations from Afghanistan while simultaneously deporting asylum seekers undermines the international refugee regime and threaten Europe’s global credibility. 

The law as a tool for EU integration could be ending Expert comment NCapeling 15 October 2021

Poland is not the only EU member state challenging the supremacy of European law, as historic change is happening in how European integration functions.

The Polish Constitutional Tribunal’s ruling that several articles of the European treaties are incompatible with the Polish constitution is prompting much debate, especially in terms of both the similarities and differences between it and rulings by the German constitutional court which have also challenged the European Court of Justice (ECJ).

Pro-Europeans are keen to draw a sharp distinction between the reasoning deployed by the two courts. They see the Polish court’s challenge as an exceptional case which the European Union (EU) cannot ‘tolerate’ because it would lead to the ‘demolition of the EU’s legal order from within’ and argue the EU must take a tough approach to Poland by re-asserting the supremacy of EU law.

But this view misses a bigger long-term shift in the EU. Both the German and Polish cases illustrate some of the basic conflicts within the EU’s legal system for decades. What is being challenged increasingly openly – even since the UK left the EU – is the idea of the EU as a de facto federation in which non-majoritarian institutions such as the ECJ have final say about the quality of democracy in member states.

ECJ’s quiet revolution

Historically ‘integration through law’ was central to the European project and the ECJ was a key institution driving forward integration – usually benefiting from what Erik Stein called ‘benign neglect by the powers that be and the mass media’. Even when European integration in the form of treaties stalled in the 1960s and 1970s, ‘judicial integration’ through the ECJ continued, including its notable 1964 decision that EU law was supreme.

This self-empowerment of the ECJ – what another scholar of European constitutionalism Joseph Weiler calls ‘a quiet revolution’ – was possible because there was a ‘permissive consensus’ in member states which allowed judicial integration to continue largely unchallenged. But this has now changed as both politicians and national courts are more willing to challenge what they see as judicial overreach.

There are important differences between the approach of the German and the Polish constitutional courts. The Law and Justice Party has politicized the Polish court, packing it with judges sympathetic to that party, whereas the German court is more independent.

In addition, whereas the German court made qualified and subdued objections to measures taken in response to the euro crisis during the past decade and, in particular, the steps towards the mutualization of eurozone debt – but often backed down with ‘all bark and no bite’ as Christoph Schmid put it – the Polish court is driven by political considerations and has challenged the supremacy of EU law in a more direct and general way.

However, the German court has made it clear it is the guardian of the German constitution and seeks to impose limits on the ECJ’s self-empowerment by arguing Europe is not a federation. According to the German court’s theory of ‘constitutional pluralism’, there is in effect a constant dialogue and accommodation between the national and EU level rather than a simple primacy of EU law over national law.

The court sees itself as the ultimate arbiter of whether steps in European integration are consistent with the German constitution, and is likely to challenge any further steps in fiscal integration even if the ECJ deems them in accordance with the treaties – as it did with the European Central Bank’s quantitative easing programme.

Supremacy of EU law is under pressure

Right across Europe, courts and politicians are increasingly challenging the ECJ and questioning the supremacy of EU law. Michel Barnier called for France to regain ‘legal sovereignty’ and should no longer be subject to the judgments of the ECJ – an extraordinary demand from the EU Brexit negotiator who regularly lectured the UK about the sanctity of the EU’s legal order.

Other possible French presidential candidates such as Valérie Pécresse and Eric Zemmour are also openly challenging the primacy of EU law. The UK, of course, is fighting its own battle with the EU about the ECJ’s role in the Northern Ireland Protocol.

It was not the current Polish government but the people of France and the Netherlands who blocked the attempt at explicit constitutionalisation of the EU in a referendum just one year after the 2004 enlargement. Whereas the Constitutional Treaty ‘would have codified the doctrine of EU legal supremacy’, that provision was dropped from its successor the Lisbon Treaty, again indicating consensus on EU legal supremacy is not as strong as is often claimed.

How do Eurasian kleptocracies earn and use their money? 9 November 2021 — 1:00PM TO 2:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 22 October 2021 Chatham House and Online

This event explores the presence of corrupt funds from Eurasia in Western democracies, what they are used for, and how they can be constrained.

The Pandora Papers once again shone the spotlight on the UK being home to corrupt funds from kleptocracies, where the ruling elite abuse their political power for private gain.

In recent years much focus has been placed on this term, and the possible effects such money could have on Western democracies.

• How do such states create this wealth in the first place?
• How do these funds make their way to the UK?
• Is the term kleptocracy appropriate for the majority of countries in Eurasia?
• What evidence is there that such funds are ‘weaponized’ to achieve foreign policy goals?

This event discusses the term, how it can be applied, and the differences between how ’grey’ funds are used by various countries. It also highlights how the UK and the wider international community can counteract these flows, both from a legal point of view, and via other methods.

Here we go again: Russia’s energy ‘diplomacy’ in Moldova Expert comment LJefferson 6 December 2021

The gas crisis shows that while the new Moldovan government may wish for geopolitics to go away, they are a weapon Russia will deploy at will.

In October, Moldova came under the spotlight when Russia, its primary provider of gas, slashed supplies by a third and refused to extend the existing contract.

The crisis was resolved at the end of October when Russia and Moldova signed a new contract, in which Moscow has used Moldova’s gas dependence to extract geopolitical concessions, weaken the new pro-western Chisinau government and drive a wedge between the EU and Moldova.

A chronic failure to reform

Moldova became a classic case of state capture when political elites – including nominally pro-European political elites – engaged in massive rent-extraction.

Up until 2020, when pro-reform forces came to power, Moldovan politics offered rapid route to riches for both the nominally pro-European parties and the pro-Russian Socialist Party; each was responsible for playing up ethnic and geopolitical cleavages in the country to mobilize votes and shore up legitimacy.

These predatory elites hollowed out Moldova economically and politically by a chronic failure to reform, in particular the energy sector which became a major source of rent.

However, this started to change when the pro-reform forces came to power as a result of the 2020 presidential and then 2021 parliament elections. The pro-reformist Maia Sandu defeated the incumbent president Igor Dodon (58 per cent to 42 per cent) in November of that year. And then her party got 58 per cent of the vote in the parliamentary elections which followed in July 2021.

Her Party of Action’s (PAS) winning formula was to focus on corruption and domestic reforms – rather than playing the ‘geopolitical’ card, a favourite strategy of their predecessors. As Sandu put it, the elections marked ‘the end of the reign of thieves in Moldova’.

A gas crisis is initiated  

Russia’s response to these results was to initiate a gas crisis. Up until the victory of the pro-reform forces, Russia had annually renewed a gas contract signed in 2007. However, in September 2021, Russia refused to renew the contract as it had done many times before and instead insisted on a new contract, which allowed Russia to create linkages between energy prices, debt settlement, a halt on energy market reforms and, it can be logically inferred, further integration with the EU.

Moldova’s national energy company, Moldovgaz, is 63.5 per cent de facto owned by Gazprom with the Moldovan government owning the remaining 35.5 per cent. (Moldova was forced to give Gazprom a controlling stake when faced with a cut in supplies in January 2006). It is therefore hardly surprising that no efforts were made to de-monopolise the sector and diversify energy supplies.

This lack of modernization can be explained by the somewhat surreal fact that in any negotiations and planning, Moldovagaz – majority owned by Gazprom – represents the Moldovan side in negotiations with Gazprom. So, when it came to signing of the new five-year contract in October 2021, Russia, through Gazprom, was able to institute a contract which made gas prices conditional on various geopolitical conditions.

It is noteworthy that Moldova’s original 2007 gas contract had been renewed annually despite the supposed accrual of debt. However, the very nature of this debt is suspect. While Moldova’s debt is said to be approximately $700 million, the debt of the much smaller breakaway Transnistria was around $7.3 billion.

The exact level and source of the debt remain murky. Russia appears to be making Moldova liable to repay at least some of Transnistria’s debt while only demanding the debt settlement with Moldova, but not with Transnistria.

High stakes for Moscow

Moreover, the contract is used to derail liberalisation of the energy market in line with EU’s energy market rules (through the so-called unbundling of supplies and distribution) which Moldova had committed itself to since the country joined the Energy Community in 2010.

Referring to ‘the non-application of forced reorganization and sanctions against Moldovagaz’, the new gas contract forces Moldova to postpone implementing the unbundling of supplies and distribution by making it conditional on resolving the energy debt.

Furthermore, Moldova ominously agreed to create an ‘intergovernmental commission on economic cooperation’ with Russia, which effectively blocks Moldova’s economic integration with the EU. (This demand is hardly new as Russia previously requested, and was granted, a seat at the negotiating table on a bilateral trade agreement between the EU and Ukraine. The trilateral EU-Ukraine-Russia negotiations have made it clear that Russia is seeking a veto over European integration of all neighbouring countries.)  

Targeting Moldova’s new reformist government reflects high personal stakes for Moscow. Moldova’s caretaker (kurator) in the Kremlin is Dimitrii Kozak, who in 2003 masterminded the so-called ‘Kozak Memorandum’. This sought to reintegrate breakaway Transnistria into a Moldova-Transnistria federation.

It was thwarted at the last minute but the Russian leadership has not given up on its plan. Now using his position as the deputy head of Presidential Administration, Kozak is masterminding Russia’s rehashed policy towards Moldova and has attempted to bring back his Memorandum as a political blueprint for a ‘settlement’.

Russia’s heavy-handed energy ‘diplomacy’

The new Moldovan government is caught in a crossfire of domestic expectations and Russian geopolitical demands. The gas crisis shows that while the new government may wish for geopolitics to go away, they are a weapon Russia will deploy at will.

The Moldovan government is brand new so it has relatively little experience of dealing with Russia’s heavy-handed ‘energy diplomacy’. But the EU has been on the receiving end of this before – this is a direct replica of Russia’s strategy toward Armenia and Ukraine – and neither ended well for the target countries or for the EU.

So, Russia’s plans for Moldova are likely to have similar consequences for the EU’s latest attempts to be a convincing foreign policy actor. 

Belarus-EU border crisis reveals wider security threat Expert comment NCapeling 8 December 2021

By engineering a crisis at the Belarus border, Lukashenka is attempting to exacerbate vulnerabilities within the EU. Securitizing migration is not the answer.

When thousands of migrants began freezing to death in the forests on the Belarus border with Poland, Belarusian leader Aliaksandr Lukashenka was forcing the European Union (EU) into a tough choice – either give in to blackmail and welcome migrants whose attempts to trespass the EU border were a result of his policy of luring them to Belarus to put pressure on the EU, or keep the borders closed and declare solidarity with Poland despite its known mistreatment and illegal pushbacks of potential asylum-seekers.

Lukashenka’s action was aptly exploiting three key pressure points of the EU – as a normative power where the human dignity of migrants is overlooked while the European border and coastguard agency Frontex stands by, as a geopolitical actor seeking to externalize its migration problem by signing readmission agreements with transit countries, and as a community of values with the EU-Poland dispute over rule of law.

His approach is typical ‘dictaplomacy’ and democracies which have confronted such a ‘continuation of war by other means’ in their past dealings with dictatorships know that blackmail mostly serves to divert attention away from a rogue leader’s misdemeanours towards his own population. But if this had been game of chess the EU would have been in check.

Thankfully checkmate was avoided – so far – as a compromise was found following weeks of heightened diplomatic efforts. Lukashenka was forced to back-pedal and take care of the migrants, and no humanitarian corridor was needed as the EU sent funds and took measures to support organizations providing shelter for the migrants in Belarus, while airlines and governments in the source countries were pressured to restrict flights to Minsk and started repatriating part of the migrants.

Causing a nuisance

‘Operation Gateway’ – the outline of which was allegedly drawn several years ago and tested by Russia in 2016 at its own borders with Norway and Finland – certainly caused a nuisance, but it ultimately backfired as Lukashenka now has to manage the remaining 2,000-5,000 migrants who refused to be flown back, as well as facing increased international sanctions. However, the fact that Angela Merkel had to personally call him made it look as if Lukashenka did not back down for nothing.

The EU and NATO, including the UK, only reacted collectively to this crisis once it was already out of hand, leaving questions over whether this experience of Lukashenka’s dictaplomacy is a wake-up call to boost resilience against rogue warfare, and to upgrade strategic assessments of the ‘Lukashenka problem’ too.

Back in June, the Belarus ministry of foreign affairs (MFA) announced its withdrawal from the Eastern Partnership and the visa facilitation and readmission agreement with the EU, while Lithuania sent early warnings about a ‘hybrid attack’ at its own border with Belarus. In August, Der Spiegel reported details of an alleged smuggling scheme whereby Tsentr Kurort – a company closely linked to the Administration of the President of Belarus with offices in the Middle East – was handling the shipping, accommodation, and relocation of migrants.

The smuggling of migrants was entirely predictable as Lukashenka has hinted many times Belarus could stop ‘protecting the EU from armed migrants’ seeking to enter it illegally. He has upped his rhetoric beyond notions of hybrid warfare by saying he needs Russian nuclear-capable bombers to ‘help him navigate the migrant crisis’, even hinting Belarus could station both Russian nuclear weapons and S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems. This shows Lukashenka is feeling increasingly cornered – which could lead to more unpredictable security crises.

Russia and Belarus are deepening relations

Although there is no smoking gun pointing to direct Russian involvement in orchestrating the hybrid attack at the EU’s borders, a new step in the military rapprochement between the two countries came when Putin and Lukashenka approved a new Military Doctrine of the Union-State of Russia and Belarus – a non-public document including a joint concept of migration policy. Lukashenka has also come off the fence over Crimea by openly accepting the legality of the peninsula’s integration with Russia.

Given Russia is also sabre-rattling over Ukraine, the risk of an accidental escalation into armed conflict is increasing in what feels like a return to classic Cold War logic, with the difference that the East is now offensively using the South for confronting the West. In recognition of the threat, the UK has joined the US, Canada, and the EU in the fresh sanctions on Belarus.

Crisis on Europe’s doorstep 2 February 2022 — 4:00PM TO 5:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 4 January 2022 Online

Domestic instability and foreign interference is destabilizing Bosnia, with the declining strength of the 1995 Dayton Agreement symbolic of the troubles growing within the country. 

Milorad Dodik’s continuing efforts to remove the international judicial and security presence in Bosnia, along with calls for the secession of Republic Sprska and increasing Russian efforts to destabilize the country are concerning many, particularly nearby European Union (EU) member states.

On 3 November 2021, the United Nations (UN) Security Council voted unanimously to extend the EU-led multinational stabilization force for another year, as well as NATO Headquarters Sarajevo.

However, the role played by the Office of High Representative was absent from the outcome and leaves the implementation of civilian aspects emanating from the Dayton Accords in a position of uncertainty.

Against a background of ongoing troubles in the country and the growing proxy conflict between the West and Russia, the situation in Bosnia is worrying.

The expert panel discusses:

• Why has the situation in Bosnia been allowed to deteriorate to such a condition?
• What is Europe’s best solution to resolve issues in Bosnia and how is it acting to remedy them?
• How have international efforts been hampered to support development in Bosnia?
• What are Russia’s aims in the country? 
• Does US foreign policy recognize Bosnia as a strategic partner?

Read the transcript

This event forms part of Chatham House’s work on Reinvigorating Multilateralism.

How European security is changing Expert comment LJefferson 10 January 2022

Although migration, economic, health, tech and climate policy are increasingly thought of in terms of security, different issues are taking place in each of these policy areas.

Since the end of the Cold War, debates about security among both academics and policymakers have shifted away from traditional military or state security towards a broader conception of what security is – including, for example, ideas such as ‘human security’.

More recently, there has been a widespread perception of a ‘return of great power competition’ and even renewed fears about great power war – in other words, a resurgence of traditional security debates that many hoped and believed were a thing of the past. At the same time, and especially since the COVID-19 pandemic began in 2020, the concept of ‘security’ has also been increasingly applied to other areas like economic and health policies.

These complex and parallel developments raise a number of difficult questions. First, does the changing way in which the concept of ‘security’ is used – and in particular the way people now increasingly speak of ‘economic security’ and ‘health security’ – reflect a changing reality or rather simply a changing perception of reality? Second, are these changes in the way we think about security helpful or not? In other words, is the redefinition of security that seems to be taking place leading to good policy responses and making citizens more secure, or is it rather unhelpfully ‘securitizing’ policy areas and possibly undermining democracy in the process?

Part of the reason that these questions are difficult to answer is that there are different developments taking place in different policy areas. This article briefly analyses developments in five policy areas: migration policy, economic and trade policy, health policy, technology policy, and climate policy.

The authors argue there are at least three separate developments taking place, though it is often quite difficult to disentangle them – and more than one development may be taking place in each policy area. The analysis focuses on developments in Europe – defined broadly as including countries such as the UK which are outside the European Union (EU) – which may be different from those taking place elsewhere.

Five policy areas, three trends

In migration policy, the clearest development that is taking place, in particular since the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015, is the militarization of borders in Europe – in particular, the militarization of the EU’s external border.

The removal of borders within Europe was once seen by some as a step towards a borderless world, but since 2015 the EU seems to have concluded that the internal removal of borders requires a much harder external border than was previously the case.

In particular, since the ‘refugee crisis’, the EU has massively invested in Frontex, its border agency, which describes itself as ‘Europe’s first uniformed service’ that ‘helps guarantee free movement without internal borders checks that many of us take for granted’. In short, we are seeing an application to migration policy of military tools, including armed border guards.

Something different seems to be taking place in economic policy. For the last three or four decades since the end of the Cold War, economic policy has been dominated by (neo-)liberal assumptions. But these are now increasingly being challenged and a shift may be taking place away from this macroeconomic paradigm.

The reasons for this are complex – in part, a domestic backlash against this paradigm, particularly from the ‘losers’ or ‘left behind’ (in other words those who have suffered from the distributional consequences of the economic and especially trade policies of the last 30-40 years going back to the ‘neoliberal turn’), and in part a sense among analysts and policymakers that a different set of more protectionist policies are required in order to compete with China as a ‘systemic rival’.

These two different drivers of an economic paradigm shift have become even more tightly connected since the COVID-19 pandemic began in 2020. The pandemic led to both an increased demand for a new economic paradigm and a sense of intensified competition with China and, in the EU, to a lesser extent with the United States.

However, because the set of rules governing economic and in particular trade policy was set during the earlier period of (neo-)liberal hegemony, they restricted the ability of states to pursue what were seen as protectionist policies in order to redistribute and created exceptions only for security reasons. This has created a structural pressure on nation states to present economic policies in terms of security.

Here, however, the EU may be an outlier. During the last few decades, the EU has gone even further than the rest of the world has in creating rules around economic policy – at least internally. In particular, the EU’s fiscal rules may prevent its member states from borrowing to invest and its state aid rules may prevent them from experimenting with new kinds of industrial policy.

Therefore, the EU may be structurally constrained from making the kind of paradigm shift in economic policy that many now think is necessary. In particular, despite the rhetoric about a more ‘geopolitical’ EU, it may be limited in the extent to which it can think of economic policy in terms of security – sometimes to the regret of security establishments, as is the case for debates around 5G, for example.

In health policy, something similar may be happening as in economic policy. During the last three or four decades, health policy has been approached in a rather liberal way. Across Europe, though to different degrees and in different ways, market principles have been introduced into health systems.

In many cases such as the UK, this has involved privatizing what were previously state functions in healthcare. But since the pandemic, there has been a renewed focus on renationalizing or, in the case of the EU, ‘re-regionalizing’ supply chains, in particular for personal protective equipment (PPE) and vaccines, which is presented in terms of ‘health security’. COVID-19 has also reinforced the need to better include pandemic preparedness in national security planning.

A similar trend seems to be taking place in technology policy, which as with health policy is now increasingly viewed in a defensive, protectionist way rather than the liberal way it was previously seen. For example, the production of semiconductors was previously viewed in economic liberal terms – in other words, they should be produced wherever they can be produced most efficiently.

But analysts and policymakers increasingly see technology as central to the competition between China and the United States – or even more broadly between authoritarian states and democracies. As in health policy, there is an increasing focus on a shared approach among allies and on the ‘resilience’ of supply chains for technology. A similar shift is taking place on the management of data flows and the need to think harder – and maybe, be less naive – about the security impact of our online life.

Finally, in climate policy, something different seems to be taking place. Here, there is neither an attempt to apply military tools (notwithstanding the fact some national European militaries as well as NATO are increasingly interested in climate security, for instance regarding the ability to train and fight in altered weather conditions, notably extreme heat) nor a paradigm shift away from liberalism – although some, especially on the left, do question whether it is possible to prevent catastrophic climate change unless we abandon economic liberalism and much of the debate about green investment is closely connected to debates about an economic paradigm shift.

Rather, what is striking is the increasing talk of a ‘climate emergency’ – with its implication of the need to suspend normal democratic decision-making – and of the need to take extraordinary measures to prevent catastrophic climate change. However, for the time being, such rhetoric on climate change is not matched by relevant extraordinary emergency measures.

Across these five policy areas, in other words, there seem to be at least three developments taking place that are reshaping how we think about security in Europe. The difficult question is whether each of these developments is a ‘good’ thing or not, i.e. whether they actually make European citizens more secure in an appropriate way.

In other words, is it a good idea to militarize the EU’s borders, to shift away from the earlier liberal paradigm in economic, health and technology policy and frame the shift in terms of ‘security’, or to invoke an emergency in order to be able to take more drastic measures to prevent climate change?

The limits of securitization theory

One way of thinking about these issues is what academics call ‘securitization’ – the situation when something is identified in rhetoric as an existential threat to some object, specifying a point of no return, that legitimizes the use of extraordinary measures and pushes the issue higher on the political and policy agenda.

The response to COVID-19 can be seen as an example of securitization – the existential threat to human beings but also healthcare systems was used to legitimize lockdowns and social distancing requirements.

The West must face down Putin The World Today MVieira 1 February 2022

If Russia’s ambitions are not checked, the implications will be global, warns James Nixey

After seven years of invasions, annexations, assassinations, abuses and now the current crisis in European security over the fate of Ukraine, one thing has been laid bare: the true nature of the Russian state.

Moscow made its ambition clear in mid-December with the unprecedented and public issuing of ultimatums in the form of draft treaty proposals.

Portrayed by Russia as an attempt to end Nato’s expansion eastwards, the Kremlin is in fact demanding that the United States and western institutions roll back their security guarantees to Eastern Europe. 

These are not two sides of the same coin if one believes and accepts the principles of the Helsinki Accords that the successor states to the Soviet Union are just as independent and sovereign as Russia.

Russia’s demands laid bare equate to giving it a free hand in Eastern Europe. This should not be reduced to simplistic labels such as ‘territorial expansionism’ or a ‘return to the Soviet Union’, both of which can be picked at for a lack of accuracy.

But it is, in Russia’s own words, the most explicit statement yet of its long-standing desire to return to a former age, where great powers directed their respective spheres of influence – a yearning for a time of empire and a disregard for the flow of history.

The intense diplomatic and media focus since then suggests there is a consensus that Russia has gone beyond being an awkward player at the negotiation table or a bully who can be dealt with further down the line.

But this has not as yet led to the operational conclusion that Russia must be challenged and ultimately faced down, no matter how unpalatable.

The logical response to the exposure of Russia’s true intentions would be an overhaul of western policy. Yet the West persists in its article of faith that dialogue with Russia will bring about a change in its behaviour – despite all evidence to the contrary. 

Western politicians have been anxious to avoid direct confrontation with Russia. But the Kremlin is likely to see this course of action as confirmation that it can proceed unchecked. When Moscow has chosen the path of conflict, efforts at dialogue rarely bring a peaceful resolution. 

Russia is blessed with particularly talented negotiators. While it has its fair share of angry ultra-nationalists who are easily dismissed, it also has more subtle brains at official and unofficial levels with whom western politicians are eager to engage to claim morsels of intelligence or to show that the Kremlin is not beyond redemption.

Sergei Lavrov, Russia’s foreign minister, is an intelligent and experienced man, who is adept at dismissing the protests of most of his western counterparts. In such circumstances, and with such a pressing need to avoid a war, dialogue must be tightly contained as it has the potential to lead to compromise in areas where there should be none.

Russia’s ambitions for a land empire

Eastern European states which were part of the Soviet Union or signatories to the Warsaw Pact are geographically closer to Russia and as a result more physically at risk. But their history and close relations with Moscow in the past have allowed them to acquire experience and expertise in dealing with their more powerful neighbour.

They uphold principled stances on sovereign rights, which has led the Kremlin to brand the Baltic states, Ukraine and more recently Moldova as traitors. To the West, on the other hand, they can often be seen as awkward or getting in the way.

While the sandwiched eastern states may have much to teach us about dealing with Russia, some central European countries have a closer relationship with Moscow. Serbia’s security services have recently been exposed as being under the influence of Russia’s own FSB, the Federal Security Service, successor to the KGB, and have colluded in repressing Moscow’s political opponents. At the same time, Viktor Orbán’s Hungary continues to defy the European Union with its repressions and is one of the few states that looks to Russia as a model. 

What is at stake here is a basic grasp of the nature of relations between states in the 21st century. What Russia is insisting on is its right to a land empire which is entirely at odds with the principles of statehood that now govern Europe, and indeed much of the rest of the world.

By failing to address the real nature of Russia’s demands, Europe is avoiding critical decisions that will affect its future security for generations to come. The implications of that avoidance do not only affect Europe – they are global in importance. 

Other powers, most notably China, will watch closely how the West responds to Russia and gauge its willingness to support allies, friends and partners against aggression.

Any failure to respond firmly to Russia’s approach of demanding limits on the sovereignty of its neighbours, backed by the threat of military force, can only encourage similar strong-arm tactics elsewhere. It is notable that, from Chechnya to Syria, Russia has not yet suffered an unambiguous defeat when it has asserted its ambitions through military power. 

Resolving the incompatibility between the way Russia sees itself and what the rest of Europe views as the acceptable limits of Russian power will be a long, painful process. Facing down Russia will take skill, time, spine, money, grit and self-sacrifice. Sanctions, for example, hurt those imposing them as well as the receiver. These are attributes in short supply in what Russia considers to be the weak, decadent West. 

Since such resources are unlikely to be found, the unappetizing future for relations is most likely to involve Russia continuing to chip away at European sovereignty while its own structural flaws further weaken it to the point of irrelevance, or to push it to take ever more extreme risks.

Review: Islam's role in shaping Europe The World Today rsoppelsa.drupal 1 February 2022

Maryyum Mehmood on a work that recasts the role of Muslim minorities

Muslims and the Making of Modern Europe
Emily Greble, Oxford University Press, £26.99

When discussing the historical role of Muslims in Europe, most authors focus on Muslims in the western part of the continent, many of whom arrived as immigrant settlers from Muslim-majority nations. As a result, Muslims are easily identifiable as a foreign ‘other’. 

Emily Greble takes a different trajectory. In Muslims and the Making of Modern Europe, Greble centres her analysis on south-eastern European Muslims who are native to the region and, despite this fact, have still been subject to continuous stigmatization. 

In light of the present-day political tensions and targeted attacks on Muslims in Bosnia, which has seen inter-ethnic and religious hostility at its worst in 30 years, Greble’s nuanced retelling of the region’s social and political landscape has renewed urgency. Her work serves as a refreshing intervention to the literature on various fronts. It subverts stereotypical assumptions promulgated by the ‘Eastern Question’, whereby Muslims are portrayed as a simple ethnic minority living under colonial rule. Instead, Greble shows how they are a marginalized indigenous group that is by no means a monolithic, homogeneous entity. 

By uncovering the history of the region through the lens of Muslims, Greble highlights their capabilities as agents of change. Muslims were not just passive subjects but active citizens whose engagement was vital in the framing of social norms, political, ethical and legislative structures. 

Greble’s neatly crafted thesis serves as a counterpunch to a decades-long clash-of-civilizations discourse, which pits Muslims of the region as Ottoman outsiders to be scapegoated as and when deemed necessary. 

The author offers a proposition that while secularism was the overarching aim of the new European state-project, the role of religion, especially marginalized or ‘othered’ religious communities cannot be overlooked or relegated to a simple ‘minority’ issue. 

This argument is laid out in three historical parts, beginning with the post-Ottoman transition of power (1878-1921), to the Yugoslav nation-building project (1918-1941) and finally to the political overhaul in a post-Second World War Europe (1941-1949).

Most historical analyses of the region focus on state actions towards Muslim minorities. Greble points out that such an approach is lacking because it is riddled with institutional biases from the very sources and methods used to understand them. 

Instead, the author takes Muslims, their lived realities and agency as her starting point and effectively manages to avoid such pitfalls.

What is most remarkable about this book is Greble’s self-reflective approach to confronting such a sensitive topic with great care.

Almost every chapter begins with an insightful and deeply personal historical account from a Muslim from the region which sets the scene for Greble’s assessment of key social, political and legal struggles.

With an enriching methodology, Greble explores the topic through first and second-hand accounts of how Muslims manoeuvred in both the secular realm and within religious spaces, such as madrasas (Islamic seminaries), waqfs (local community funds), muftis and ulemas (religious scholar), and the shariah courts. As a result, the reader is shown how Muslims affected change and steered the trajectory of constitutional democracies in Europe at key historical junctures. 

By taking this lens, Greble does not just offer another retelling of the significance of the 1878 Congress of Berlin, which enabled the demarcation of new territorial boundaries in a post-Ottoman world, but also conveys the story of how Muslims contributed to the emerging narratives around citizenship. 

Crucially, we are exposed to Muslim leadership as more than just a docile, homogenous grouping, but a defining entity that shaped the European citizenship project by refashioning both imperial secular norms, as well as Islamic jurisprudential rulings to suit their unique context, as opposed to a remnant of bygone Ottoman rule. 

A fundamental difference that sets this book apart from other contemporary work on the topic is that the author brings forth multiple intra-faith complexities found within Muslim groups of the region, from revivalist to reformists, and all else in between. The fluctuating relationship between the traditionalist ulema, muftis and qadis (religious scholars, clergy and judges) and the secular state powers is intricately captured across most chapters in this book. 

At times, the ulema would be seen to bandy with the state to acculturate Muslims to the emerging polities of the region. As Greble shows, muftis in 1914 travelled across southern Serbia giving dawah (missionary work) to locals to encourage them to support the Serbian state. Similarly, qadis in Montenegro in 1902 reassured local Muslims that by following the law of the land, they would be guaranteed their ‘shariah rights’, which were loosely defined by the Muslim clergy. 

This created a paradox for the states: the role of nation-building and liberalizing orthodox religious communities was given to conservative clerics who, in turn, were gatekeepers setting the boundaries and thus interpreted and applied Islam to preserve their position of power. The consequences were twofold. As Greble suggests, ‘instead of becoming more tied to secular structures of state and society – through centralized law, conscription, political representation – Muslims in formerly Ottoman lands were becoming more deeply bound to Islam’. 

Simultaneously, the rhetoric used further embedded Muslims firmly as a minority. 

Ironically in contrast, it was the liberal reformist thinkers who, sometimes, stood in opposition to the state regimes. Such internal divisions within Muslim spaces became more overtly discernible under communist rule, wherein members of the same Muslim community fought in different camps. 

For instance, the author notes how some were aligned with the communist regime, while others were fighting with the allied forces and many were still backing revivalist Islamic groups. In light of this, what is perhaps most intriguing is how the communist takeover in 1945 managed to tear down any seemingly progressive movement that benefited the region’s Muslims. And it brought them back to square one, with the scrapping of shariah law and the removal of a mufti-led judiciary. Such crackdowns caused greater frenzy among the region’s Muslims and led to resistance movements in the form of activism and insurgencies. 

Ultimately, the author offers a complex perspective not only of Balkan Muslims and their lived experiences, but also, the implications of this upon wider society and the states themselves.

Greble’s remapping of the historical underpinnings of the tale of Muslims and the Making of Modern Europe is not just a clear example of how Muslims are not a foreign entity to the region, but a call to overturn the entrenched Great Replacement theory which uses this foreign ‘othering’ to further prejudice and calls for the ousting of Muslims and other minorities from Europe, a land which has forever been their home.
 

Ukraine response reveals Europe’s security is changing Expert comment NCapeling 8 February 2022

Recent events regarding Ukraine show an active UK responding quickly while EU powers deliberate. But pulling ahead of the pack is not the same as leadership.

Britain’s relationship with Ukraine appears to be thriving, with Ukrainian defence journalist Illia Ponomarenko recently tweeting the ‘British are just unstoppable these days’ and that the UK finds itself ‘on the right side of history’ while one Ukrainian wine bar has started offering free drinks to British nationals.

Ponomarenko’s remarks and the wine bar offer – certainly one post-Brexit benefit of having a British passport – are down to the UK decision to send anti-tank weapons to support Ukraine’s forces against a potential Russian attack.

The UK’s quick response was praised by Ponomarenko as being ‘wise enough not to be lured into going the easiest way, which is always the fastest lane straight to hell’ and strikes a clear contrast with that of Germany, whose typically moderated approach to geopolitical tensions went down badly in Kyiv.

The chief of Germany’s navy was forced to resign after saying Russian president Vladimir Putin ‘deserved respect’ and that Ukraine will never win back annexed Crimea. The German government also sought an energy exception to proposed US sanctions, so that gas can continue to flow into Europe.

France’s response was somewhat stronger but rather confusing as Emmanuel Macron initially called for European Union (EU) member states to ‘conduct their own dialogue’ with Russia, seemingly as an alternative to supporting the US-led NATO response.

Risks of a ‘bullying’ Russia

Although positioning himself as the convener of a transatlantic response to the Ukraine crisis brings welcome respite for UK prime minister Boris Johnson from his domestic ‘partygate’ fiasco, he is also reported as saying some world leaders ‘may not appreciate the deteriorating picture on the Ukrainian border, or fully comprehend the risks posed by a bullying Russia’.

One particular image sums up the difference in approach between the UK and the EU, as a flight path shows a British RAF plane flying around Germany before taking a detour over Denmark on route to Ukraine.

Given that Germany later blocked the export of NATO ally Estonia’s weapons to Ukraine, this image gives ‘Global Britain’ advocates a strong symbol of apparent British reliability and resourcefulness in the face of supposed European deliberation and disunity.

But although the UK’s response to the Ukraine crisis has rightly been credited as swift and substantial, it also reveals deeper developments in the current European security landscape as EU countries had worried Britain might choose to become absent post-Brexit.

Losing one of its two main military powers would certainly have been a blow to Europe, particularly as Russia’s threat has grown in recent years, so there will be relief that the Ukraine crisis shows Britain is undoubtedly committed to the region. Now the question for leaders in Paris, Berlin, and Brussels is how to deal with an active Britain committed to Europe but under no obligation to work within EU processes.

The UK already has an interesting network of bilateral and mini-lateral relationships with European allies. Its Joint Expeditionary Force brings together ten European countries – including Scandinavian and Baltic states – and is well-placed to support NATO activities while also remaining flexible and independent. In the past year, the UK worked with Norway in the Arctic region, provided military engineers support to Poland, and worked directly with France and Germany through the E3 grouping – once again bypassing EU institutions.

The UK also brings a unique diplomatic, technology, and intelligence-sharing relationship with the US which is unavoidably important in dealing with the threat from Russia. As the US sees European security through a NATO lens – rather than an EU one – this makes Britain a leading player as one of the few countries meeting its NATO spending commitments.

UK must do more to win trust

But despite such creative partnerships transcending the constraints of Brexit, the UK must do more to win the trust of the EU’s biggest players France and Germany to be a permanent power in the region. And relations with France have deteriorated following disputes over fishing, a lack of cooperation on migrants, and the AUKUS defence technology agreement between the UK, US, and Australia.

When it comes to Germany, the UK must not use the Ukraine crisis as an opportunity for geopolitical point-scoring. There are good historical reasons for Germany’s cautious approach to military engagement, even if these do constrain the country’s response to this challenge.

In dealing with Russia, some members of Germany’s ruling SPD sincerely believe their party’s less confrontational posture was central to de-escalating conflict during the Cold War. And although some historians may dispute that belief, it is still a distinct and more noble motivation for ‘dovishness’ than pure economic self-interest.

Cooperation always requires some compromise on all sides. Germany must accept some level of economic risk if sanctions against Russia are to be meaningful and France has to accept the necessity of the UK and US’s involvement and that the most effective dialogue is unlikely to be achieved through EU institutions.

Meanwhile, the UK must accept some role for the two biggest EU players, particularly as the Normandy Format which includes Russia, Ukraine, France, and Germany has proved productive in the past. And the UK needs to clamp down on its own economic ties with Russia.

Limited expectations as Scholz heads to Kyiv and Moscow Expert comment NCapeling 14 February 2022

After heavy criticism for an initially timid response, the approach of Germany’s new government to the Ukraine crisis is improving as its position on Russia evolves.

Olaf Scholz is a famously quiet and cautious communicator and, as concerns mounted in Washington and London about the possibility of a Russian invasion of Ukraine, the new German chancellor remained silent.

This time his silence reflected the fact that his government was unprepared for its first major foreign policy test, with marked divisions between the SPD and the Greens on how to manage a rapidly deteriorating relationship with Russia.

When he did speak, Scholz caused dismay in several NATO capitals by defending the controversial Nord Stream 2 pipeline. He called it ‘a purely private economic project’ even though the company building the pipeline is a subsidiary of Russia’s state-owned Gazprom.

The absence of crisis management from Berlin was a stark reminder of the gap left by Angela Merkel. Her knowledge of Russia and Ukraine, and her personal experience of dealing with Vladimir Putin, were key assets in 2014 in developing a unified western response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its destabilization of south-eastern Ukraine.

Germany has coordinated with its allies

Scholz has prepared the ground carefully for his visits to Kyiv and Moscow, extensively coordinating with NATO allies, such as France and Poland – as part of the Weimar Triangle – and the three Baltic states. His inaugural visit to Washington helped align positions on US-EU efforts to develop an economic deterrent against further Russian intervention in Ukraine.

Scholz has also repeated Merkel’s language from 2014 to signal to Moscow that Germany and its partners are ‘united and determined’ to stand their ground. And he has spoken of Germany’s continuing double strategy of ‘clear announcements’ to Moscow of the price it would pay for further aggression accompanied by a readiness to use all possible channels of dialogue to preserve peace.

The continuation of Germany’s established policy will not surprise Moscow. But under the surface Germany’s discourse on Russia is evolving as the political class internalizes the fact that the current Russian leadership is openly threatening to use military force to impose its will on Ukraine and re-configure Europe’s security arrangements.

Despite deep concerns about Germany’s dependence on Russian gas – more than half of the gas it consumes comes from Russia – there is broad acceptance that Nord Stream 2 cannot go ahead if Russia invades Ukraine. But typically, Scholz has not yet said as much publicly, limiting himself to stating ‘all options are on the table.’

Robert Habeck, Germany’s vice-chancellor as well as economic affairs and climate action minister, says the ‘geopolitical situation’ requires Germany to diversify its gas supplies and infrastructure for importing gas. For years, a strong pro-Russian gas lobby has dominated the thinking of the Economics Ministry and one consequence is the complete absence of facilities to import liquefied natural gas.

The German debate on Russia is shifting

A public debate has also started about weapons deliveries to Ukraine, even though this runs counter to deeply embedded pacifist tendencies in German society. Some MPs, former diplomats, and experts have begun to make the case for Germany to supply weapons to Ukraine so it can exercise its right to self-defence and deter military attack.

Christoph Heusgen, a former long-standing foreign policy adviser in the Federal Chancellery, says Berlin’s decision not to deliver arms to Ukraine to avoid endangering the Minsk peace process requires revision now Moscow has abandoned the path of negotiation.

Despite its mantra that there is no alternative to the Minsk Agreements, Berlin now admits these currently offer no prospect of resolving the war in Donbas because Russia is not prepared to implement them properly.

Other taboos are also being broken inside Germany. Heavyweight left-of-centre Die Zeit published the first results of its investigation into the SPD’s links with Russia and their place in Russia’s channels of influence in Germany. And even the SPD’s Sigmar Gabriel, an outspoken champion of Nord Stream 2 during his time as a government minister, has raised the question of Germany terminating energy imports from Russia if there is a drastic deterioration of the security situation.

Why a no-fly zone risks escalating the Ukraine conflict Expert comment NCapeling 13 March 2022

The US rejection of Poland’s offer to send fighter jets as a boost to Ukraine’s air defence shows just how uneasy nations are about direct combat with Russia.

The Pentagon’s decision to turn down the proposal by its fellow NATO member Poland to put Russian-made MiG-29 jets at its disposal demonstrates again how keen the US and allies are to avoid risking major confrontation with Russian forces.

The US Department of Defense says the offer to locate jets at bases in Germany was ‘not tenable’ as this risks flying into contested airspace over Ukraine – a non-NATO member – raising ‘serious concerns for the entire NATO alliance’ and echoing the continuing rejection of calls to implement no-fly zones (NFZs) as a way of easing the devastation being faced by trapped Ukraine civilians.

NFZs restrict any aircraft, including drones, from flying over a pre-defined region and can be used for both military and civilian purposes. But the implementation of NFZs is difficult to enforce and – most significantly – is unlikely to achieve the intended effect on the ground.

In conflict situations, they are usually implemented under the remit of United Nations (UN) peace support operations, requiring authorization under Article 42 of the UN Charter. This details that if all possible methods have proven ineffective in responding to a threat, countries ‘may take such action by air, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security’.

Protection but with limitations

NFZs provide both protection from attack and surveillance but do have limitations. They must be monitored and enforced which requires committing to fighter jet patrols with the explicit task of defending the area from the air by whatever means necessary.

This could mean jets firing upon Russian planes and drones so, if NATO allies and partners were to enforce a NFZ, it would represent an escalation of measures which is a step that would most likely provoke an unpredictable Vladimir Putin into further escalation – in short, it is highly likely to be seen as an act of war.

UK defence secretary Ben Wallace – among others – has repeatedly dispelled the idea, saying that enforcing NFZs would mean deploying ‘British fighter jets directly against Russian fighter jets’. In relation to moves such as the Polish jets, the Kremlin has warned that any countries offering airfields to Ukraine for attacks on Russia may be viewed as having entered the conflict.

There have only been three past instances of military NFZs. In Bosnia, as part of Operation Deny Flight from 1993-1995, a NFZ was enforced as part of a strategy which also including the provision of close air support and approved air strikes.

In Iraq, an NFZ endured for 12 years from 1991 and was succcesful in preventing Saddam Hussein from attacking Kurdish and Shia Muslim civilians. And in Libya in 2011, a NFZ was deployed to prevent the destruction of military infrastructure and the Libyan regime – although this quickly morphed into the provision of close air support.

So it is unclear just how successful NFZs are at providing protection. In Iraq and Libya, NFZ cover protection was provided but neither Saddam Hussein or Colonel Gaddafi were able to effectively target victims through their ground forces whereas, in Bosnia, Slobodan Milosevic infamously used ground troops to slaughter 8,000 Bosnian men and boys at Srebrenica.

Putin would still be able to continue to use both ground forces and artillery to assault Ukrainian cities with or without a NFZ – in fact, his sparse use of his Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) has been one of the surprising features of the war so far. Under a NFZ, missile attacks could also continue, there is nothing in the record of no-fly zones to suggest the provision of safe areas for non-combatants would work.

And NFZs have only been successful against vastly inferior forces such as in Iraq, Bosnia, and Libya. But Russia has an air force second only in size to the US and has a vast range of defences including the potent S-400 Triumf at its disposal. Not only would an NFZ be ineffective, it might also not be possible to enforce without risking significant losses to the peace operations force.

It is due to a combination of these reasons that NFZs have not been used more in previous conflicts. The most recent consideration for a NFZ was in Syria but President Bashar al-Assad’s Syrian forces, protected by Russian air cover, could still have targeted their intended victims despite air policing so a NFZ was not used.

In the long-term, under the terms of a ceasefire agreement, it may be possible to include a NFZ under a UN or joint OSCE-UN peace terms. However, the forces involved should exclude NATO allies and partners or any states with Russian alliances to avoid further conflict.

This leaves few suitable countries with the capacity, willingness, and political stance to be called on. Two of the world’s most militarily capable states – China and India – abstained in the Uniting for Peace vote in the UN General Assembly (UNGA). Whether another willing state with the military capability – such as a Gulf state – could be considered acceptable to all sides remains to be tested.

Notable successes with SAMs

Many military commentators also note that currently Ukrainian forces are having notable success without jets, downing Russian aircraft using sophisticated surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) such as Stinger and Javelin, and NATO countries continue to supply those in their thousands.

Ukraine crisis could trigger cascading risks globally Expert comment NCapeling 16 March 2022

The effects on the wider world from the Ukraine invasion go far beyond the waves of shock and horror being felt from this escalating conflict.

Russia and Ukraine rank 11th and 55th respectively in terms of their national economies but, for the global supply of critical resources such as energy, food, and minerals, these two countries together are far bigger hitters – and both the threat and reality of resource flows from them being reduced have already driven up global prices.

The world is already facing a cost-of-living squeeze coming out of the COVID-19 pandemic, so further price spikes or supply constraints have the potential to seriously undermine food and energy security, equitable access to basic goods and services, and social stability around the world – which can then potentially create systemic risks for economies and societies.

The global implications of the Ukraine conflict are only just beginning to be explored fully but the immediate impacts of the crisis on global markets are already well-documented. In the first few days after Russia’s invasion, energy prices spiked, triggering further fertilizer price rises – as fertilizer production is highly energy intensive – which in turn is contributing to food price rises because fertilizer costs are an important factor in food production.

Interruptions to shipping in the region around Ukraine – as well as globally – have impeded the flow of goods which pushed prices up even further, while economic sanctions on cross-border flows of goods and finance are further adding to market pressures. But this is just the start – these impacts will bring ripple effects which propagate far beyond their point of origin, known as ‘cascading risks’.

Risk is a combination of hazard, exposure, and vulnerability – in terms of the Ukraine invasion, the hazard is the conflict and its immediate impacts on the societies and economies of Ukraine and Russia, while exposure relates to the degree to which other countries are likely to be affected depending on how much they are integrated into the global economy or the ‘just in time’ nature of their supply chains.

Vulnerability relates to a society’s capacity to mitigate the harmful impacts of the conflict, such as controlling borders, sourcing alternative goods from suppliers, or protecting against price or supply shocks.

Risk cascades – the second- and third-order impacts of the original hazard and of responses to that hazard – can interact across sectoral boundaries – as with energy and food, for example – and their compound effect can lead to overall systemic risks for society.

Anticipating this potential is essential to understanding the nature and scale of the global ramifications being felt from the Ukraine conflict. Recent work in the UK to assess levels of cascading risks resulting from a changing climate – the UK Climate Change Risk Assessment – provides a valuable framework for thinking about this area.

It examines key pathways for risk to cascade through global systems – when applied to the situation in Ukraine, these pathways and their interactions offer an indication of the scale of crisis that citizens face far beyond Ukraine’s and Russia’s borders.

Interruptions to the flows of goods and energy

In globalized trade networks, localized disruption to supply chains rapidly yields widespread international impacts – of particular concern is the immediate supply of food because most countries rely on lean supply chains and some may only have a few days food within their own borders.

Experience from previous food price crises indicate even small interruptions to trade can result in runs on the market and rapid price inflation. In the case of this conflict, the trade interruption will be far from small because, between them, Russia and Ukraine export around one-quarter of all traded wheat, more than three-quarters of traded sunflower oil, and one-sixth of traded maize.

Energy markets are also a concern because many countries use more energy than they produce and therefore rely on imports of energy or fuel for domestic use. Russia produces around ten per cent of the world’s commercial energy with a concentration of sales in major regions such as the European Union (EU) and China.

As with food, a shortfall in energy provision leads to market runs and rapid inflation as actors compete in a tightening space, while poorly designed policy interventions by nations trying to ensure their own security add further pressure to global supply and worsen price rises. In addition, the closely interconnected nature of energy markets means disruption to one fuel – such as gas in this case – affects global prices for other forms of energy.

The impact of moving people and money

As the last decade richly illustrates, the cross-border flows of people impact those societies absorbing them – for example, contributing to a rise in nationalism – as well as increase the costs of supplying essential resources. Given many people are understandably fleeing this conflict, other countries may struggle to cope as the cost-of-living crisis and urgent efforts to bolster national security infrastructure may squeeze available public funds.

Financial flows are crucial to the functioning of global economies, whether for inward investment or insurance and – as Russian citizens may be about to discover – restricting the global flow of money has a serious impact on households. Beyond Russia, the outflow of money from major financial centres such as London to meet insurance claims or to enable infrastructure reinvestment post-conflict may also have severe knock-on economic impacts.

The impact on governance and health

The global spikes in energy and food prices resulting from these supply chain disruptions will see many countries struggle with rising food and energy insecurity as well as increased inequality. Taken together these conditions create many issues beyond immigration pressures and the associated politics, including increased inequality and civil unrest.

This potentially destabilizes governments which has consequences for the stability of an entire region such as interrupted supply chains, the need to deploy peacekeeping forces, or significant flows of aid – all with global consequences far beyond the countries in question.

Populations may suffer mental health impacts arising from the Ukraine invasion, whether from the trauma of being forced to leave home to escape conflict, anxiety for the wellbeing and safety of families and friends caught up in it, or a more general anxiety arising from the perception of living in an unstable world.