The videos showing an unruly scene in and around Brookings last Thursday during the visit of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan make for distressing viewing. The incongruity of what occurred—think Trump security meets Turkish nationalism—invites introspection about how scholarly institutions manage appearances by controversial leaders.

There are legitimate criticisms to be made of the Turkish government in general and of Thursday’s security detail in particular. But lost in the melee—and in the past year of terrorism, arrests, and media closures—is the message that Erdoğan most needed to convey.

Dramatic changes in the geopolitical neighborhood now present the most serious challenge to Turkish territorial integrity since the founding of the Republic. With the aid of Western intervention, the wars in Iraq and Syria accomplished more for the Kurdish cause than decades of terrorism and negotiation. Since the addition of a second stronghold in Syria to the de facto Kurdish territory in northern Iraq, Turkey is paying a price for conflicts not wholly of its own making.

It is not quite a century since European armies last seized Ottoman territories or supported national Kurdish independence from Istanbul. Whether or not now is the moment an autonomous Kurdish state takes legal form, the model is being proven nearby under Western protection. It does not make things easier that this time it is not Western countries’ intention to hurt Turkey’s national interests. Adding insult to Erdoğan’s injury, in 2015 the Kurdish cause met unprecedented support among urban elites around Turkey—and the United States and Europe—for a political party (HDP) that spoiled Erdoğan’s institutional ambitions by denying him a supermajority in parliament.

The Turkish president is criticized for allowing feelings of personal betrayal to color his strategic relationships—for example with Israel and Syria—yet many in the U.S. foreign policy community also now react to him emotionally. Because their high hopes were dashed after Gezi Park and the Gülen scandals, he can do no good again. This fuels Erdoğan’s outrage: Turkey gets no respect for its current role absorbing waves of refugees or for “taking the fight to terrorists.”

Erdoğan alienated Western allies with a take-no-prisoners approach in domestic politics and bears some responsibility for the government’s disastrous relationship with the country’s two major dissident groups—one ethnic (Kurdish) and one spiritual (Gülenist). But that should not relax similarly robust democratic expectations of these groups’ own political behavior, and the impression of such a double standard is at the root of the Turkish president’s annoyance. The suicide bombs and illegal wiretaps his country endured have failed to capture the American imagination. Instead, he perceives friends who would tie his hands as he defends the rule of law against terror and treason.

The Turkish government should be discouraged from abusing executive power, squelching dissent, or other acts of overzealous majoritarianism and break the cycle of retaliation against political opponents. But it is bizarre to equate the Turkish president with former Venezuelan leader Hugo Chavez or Russian President Vladimir Putin: Turkish democracy is battered but not yet sunk, and its government is still not a strategic opponent—it remains a NATO member in accession talks with the EU.

The Brookings incident is said to have exposed the regime’s true colors and thin skin, and to emblematize how polarized and undemocratic Turkey has become in the last decade. But a lopsided and illiberal democracy also preceded AKP rule: a quarter century of single party rule followed by four military coups in as many decades, with strict limits on free speech and religious exercise. American enthusiasm for democratization in the region must include a commitment to remain constructively engaged when the spring recoils and conservative parties win power—including those who appear to abuse that power—through exactly this kind of visit.

Because last week’s scene unfolded in the same auditorium where a younger Erdoğan appeared as a promising democratic leader years ago, it is fair to ask which was the real one. He who walked down the aisle with files on 57 imprisoned journalists in March 2016? Or the Erdoğan who arrived in government with dossiers on negotiations with PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, opened talks with the Alevi religious minority, and established a ministry for European Union affairs?

Critics now say that was all just a show and diversionary tactic that have finally given way to his true attitudes towards the proverbial “tram of democracy.” But with friends who are deaf to some of Turkey’s legitimate concerns it is fair to ask what may now be an academic question: Is President Erdoğan an ex-liberal who simply got off the tram, or was he mugged by reality while on board?

      

The GOP presidential candidate said he would ban immigrants from sending money home to Mexico.

Donald Trump’s proposal to force Mexico to pay for a Wall guarding against the flux of immigrants into the U.S. made news this week, and rightfully so. Trump’s idea would be to curtail the ability of banks, credit unions, and wire transmission companies to send money abroad — a sharp departure from policy and law whose bipartisan aim has been to bring remittances to all countries into the financial mainstream and out from the shadowy illegal word of people moving cash in suitcases.

Encouraging remittances to go through the financial system benefits everyone: it enhances the ability to combat terrorist finance and money-laundering, it reduces crime in both the U.S. and abroad, it increases economic growth in the U.S. and overseas, and it provides for greater competition and market incentives to allow people to keep more of their hard-earned money to use as they see fit. Moving in the opposite direction would be a major mistake.

This is a big issue that affects a lot more people than one might think – more than just sending money to Mexico. In America today, more than 40 million people were born in other countries, a record number. This translates into just more than 1 in 8 Americans, a sharp increase from 1970 when fewer than 1 in 25 Americans were foreign born. Thus, it is not surprising that many people perceive America to have more foreign-born people than any time in their lifetime. However, that is not the case for the lifetime of America. Between the Civil War and the 1920s, America had as high — or higher — share of foreign born as we do today.

Remittances are not a new phenomenon. Most American families likely sent remittances at some point whenever their family first immigrated. My great-grand father sent money back to what is today the Czech Republic so that his wife and their children (including my grandmother) could come and join him and escape what became the Second World War. Today, remittance flows go toward the new generation of American immigrants and the children of those immigrants. More than $120 billion was sent abroad in 2012 according to the Pew Center and while it is true that Mexico received the largest amount at just under $23 billion, the rest of the top 5 countries may surprise you: China ($13 billion), India ($12 billion), Philippines ($10.5 billion), and Nigeria ($6 billion). And old habits remain as Germany ($2.5 billion) and France ($2 billion) are still among the top 15 countries that receive remittances from the United States.

This money comes in lots of small chunks, which can make sending it expensive. The typical new migrant worker sends money home around 14 times a year, which corresponds to once a month plus Mother’s Day and Christmas. These are usually small sums (less than $300) and represent an extraordinary level of savings given the worker’s income. The money goes through both the formal banking system including banks, credit unions, and wire transmitters who eventually use banks like Western Union and MoneyGram. Some goes through informal means, including “viajeros” who are people that literally carry cash in suitcases on planes that are often breaking the law and outside of the standard anti-money laundering and terrorist finance enforcement system. Why would anyone want to encourage that?

The idea of using this flow of funds to try to implement other policy objectives, such as border control, would be a sharp departure from current practice. The Patriot Act and subsequent federal law governing remittances in financial laws like the Dodd-Frank Act were never intended to be used to threaten to cut off the flow of migrant worker remittances. These laws were intended to track and crack down on the flow of money laundering or support for illegal and terrorist organizations while at the same time providing consumer protections to workers who are sending hard-earned cash back home to their parents, grandparents, and children. In fact, the bipartisan goal of policy concerning remittances has been to encourage the flow of money to come into the official system and to discourage the flow of funds through the underground network.

In 2004, then Federal Reserve Governor Ben Bernanke made clear that, “The Federal Reserve is attempting to support banks’ efforts to better serve immigrant populations, with remittances and other money transfers being a key area of interest.” House Financial Services Chairman Mike Oxley (R-OH) told President Bush’s then-Treasury Secretary John Snow, “Remittances between established and emerging economies foster growth in both types of economies simultaneously. I will be interested in hearing your views on how unnecessary costs can be eliminated in this area.” When Senator Paul S. Sarbanes (D-MD) introduced legislation that became the basis for today’s law that covers remittances, he had the simple goal to “increase transparency, competition and efficiency in the remittance market, while helping to bring more Americans into the financial mainstream.”

The longstanding bipartisan support for bringing remittances into the financial mainstream is based on the fact that most immigrants, regardless of whether they are U.S. citizens, legal residents, or undocumented, send remittances. A system that tried to assert proof of citizenship or legal status upon wiring money overseas would be burdensome, costly, and ineffective at best and if effective, it would simply drive more money into illegal transmission schemes while increasing crime here in the U.S. and abroad. Imagine if an entire community knew that someone would be walking through their immigrant neighborhood with a suitcase full of tens of thousands of dollars in cash.

Thought of another way, if I went to the bank to send money to my mother who lives in France part of the year, how would I prove that I’m a citizen? My driver’s license alone is not proof of legal status. Would I need to bring my passport? What if, like the majority of Americans, (62% according to the State Department) I don’t have a valid passport? Would I have to bring my birth certificate to the local Western Union? I guess the one positive thing from such a system is that it would help stop the email scams asking for money from a Nigerian Prince….

Aaron Klein is a fellow at the Brookings Institution and served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of the US Treasury Department from 2009 to 2012. He also serves as an unpaid member of the Clinton campaign’s Infrastructure Finance Working Group; he has not served as an advisor on any banking or finance issues.

Editor’s note: This piece originally appeared on Fortune.

      

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Increasingly, there are concerns about the direction of Turkey’s politics, economy, security, and foreign policy. Debate is growing about the Turkish economy’s vibrancy, and its commitment to democratic norms is being questioned. Moreover, against the backdrop of the chaos in the region, its ability to maintain peace and order is hindered. These difficulties coincide with a larger trend in which the global economy remains fragile, European integration is fracturing, and international governance seems under duress. The spill-over from the conflicts in Syria and Iraq has precipitated a refugee crisis of historic scale, testing the resolve, unity, and values of the West. Will these challenges prove pivotal in reshaping the international system? Will these trials ultimately compel the West to formulate an effective collective response? Will Turkey prove to be an asset or a liability for regional security and order?

On April 14, the Turkey Project of the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings hosted a discussion to assess Turkey’s strategic orientation amid the ever-changing international order. Panelists included Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy Bruce Jones, Şebnem Kalemli-Özcan of the University of Maryland, and Francis Riccardone of the Atlantic Council. Cansen Başaran-Symes, president of the Turkish Industry and Business Association (TÜSİAD) made introductory remarks. Turkey Project Director and TÜSİAD Senior Fellow Kemal Kirişci moderated the discussion.

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• Turkey, its neighborhood, and the international order

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• Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

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• 20160414_turkey_neighborhood_transcript

      

Donald Trump has made waves during this year’s election cycle by taking a hard line on illegal immigration. This, however, builds on years of heated debate among policymakers. It is also an enduring hot-button issue in Arizona, which has passed several immigration laws over the years.  In 2010, the passage of SB 1070 brought national attention to this debate.  Deemed the strictest immigration law to date, SB 1070 sought to achieve “attrition [of illegal immigrants] through enforcement” by requiring law enforcement to detain any person whom they believed to be residing in the country illegally. Although SB 1070’s effects on individuals and families have been well documented, little is known about its impact on students and schools. To this end, we sought to estimate the relationship between the passage of SB 1070 and school-level student achievement.

We anticipated that anti-immigration policies would primarily affect children from the families of undocumented immigrants. Such effects could be observed in different ways. For instance, the emotional and psychological distress of these children could result in a decline in average test scores at the school-level. On the other hand, students might have left the country or the state under the threat of being deported in which case school-level test scores would rise (since these students often perform below their peers). To this end, we considered three scenarios: 

1. Immigrant children remain in the state but experience higher levels of stress.  As a result, average school-level test scores will drop while Hispanic enrollment remains the same.
2. Children of undocumented immigrants leave the state, which results in a drop in Hispanic enrollment accompanied by an increase in school-level test scores.
3. Or, the first two scenarios occur simultaneously and we do not observe any change in test scores since the two effects would cancel each other, but note a slight decrease in Hispanic enrollment.

In order to see which of these hypothetical scenarios is supported by the data, we first estimated the relationship between the passage of SB 1070 and average school-level reading test scores. We then attempted to unpack the mechanism through which such an effect might have taken place. To this end, we used publicly available data on school-level achievement and enrollment collected by the Arizona Department of Education (ADE). Given the targeted nature of the policy and the demographics of immigrants in Arizona, the majority of whom are of Hispanic or Mexican descent, we focused on schools that traditionally enroll large proportions of Hispanic students. We identified schools with high (more than 75 percent) shares of Hispanic students as those whose average achievement and student composition are most likely to be affected by immigration reform. We contrasted changes in school-level achievement and enrollment in those schools with schools that enroll less than 25 percent Hispanic students, as these schools are less likely to experience any changes as a result of tightening immigration laws.

Figures 1 and 2 show trends in the average percentage of students passing the state reading test and average Hispanic enrollment at these schools between 2006-2007 and 2011-2012.           

Figure 1. Average Percent of Students Passing AIMS Reading

 

Figure 2. Average Hispanic Student Enrollment

Clearly, the rate of growth in school-level reading scores was much higher for high Hispanic schools after the passage of SB 1070 in 2010 (Figure 1). At the same time, there was a significant decrease in Hispanic enrollment in these schools (Figure 2). Thus, it appears the second scenario is likely driving the patterns we observe.

The data also suggest that the trends for high Hispanic and low Hispanic schools started diverging before the passage of SB 1070 - after the 2007-2008 school year.  This happens to be the year that Arizona passed an even more restrictive, though less controversial, immigration law – the Legal Arizona Workers Act (LAWA). LAWA required Arizona business owners to verify the legal status of their employees using E-Verify, an online tool managed by the federal government. Although LAWA used a different mechanism, similar to SB 1070 it sought to achieve the attrition of undocumented immigrants from the state. 

We then would anticipate both laws to have similar effects on school-level achievement and Hispanic enrollment. Indeed, we estimated that LAWA likely led to an average increase of roughly 4 percent of students passing the state reading test at high Hispanic schools. This was accompanied by an average loss of 38 Hispanic students per school. Because the passage of SB 1070 was preceded by the passage LAWA as well as a language policy that would have affected treatment schools, disentangling the effects of these two policies is not straightforward. However, based on our analysis, we estimate that SB 1070 is associated with an average increase of between 1.5 percent and 4.5 percent of students passing the state reading test at the school-level accompanied by an average loss of between 14 and 40 Hispanic students. 

Despite the fact that we cannot pin down the exact magnitude of SB 1070’s effect on school-level achievement, our analysis shows that when Arizona passed restrictive immigration laws in 2008 and 2010, it looked as if the state’s lowest performing schools were improving rapidly. This, however, likely had more to do with the changing composition of schools as an indirect though anticipated effect of immigration policies than with policies aimed at improving student achievement. 

Despite this, the Arizona Department of Education took credit for these gains. Similarly, Arizona was recently recognized as one of the nation’s leaders in growth on the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) over the last ten years. Although wrongly attributing these gains may seem harmless at first glance, it is important to remember that Arizona is viewed by many as a model for controversial education reforms like school choice and high-stakes accountability. It is easy to imagine how policymakers might look at increasing test scores in Arizona and wrongly attribute them to these kinds of reforms. That’s not to say that these policies don’t have merit. However, if other states adopt education policy reforms under the assumption that they worked in Arizona, then they might find that these policies fail to deliver.

      

When the priestly leaders of the Parsis, fleeing Persia for India after the Arab conquest of the 8th century, came before local ruler Jadhav Rana asking for sanctuary, Rana asked for a bowl of milk. The bowl was filled to the brim.  How could his kingdom accommodate more, asked Rana, without the bowl spilling over? The priestly leaders, the legend goes, slipped sugar in the milk, masterfully suggesting that the Parsis would dissolve into the existing population, sweetening their lives in the process.

As through history, we are once again faced with a situation where millions have left their homes, ravaged by violence and conflict, seeking sanctuary in foreign lands. And once again, the leaders of the promised lands worry about spilt milk.

Ever since labor economist David Card showed that the 1980 Mariel boatlift, which brought Cuban refugees to Miami, had no effect on local wages and employment, the academic wars have raged (for instance, see summaries and rebuttals here and here). People argue that labor demand curves always slope down—a shift in the supply of workers must decrease wages. Therefore, results that show otherwise are incorrect.

To resolve the debate, I find it useful to think of the ideal experiment. Refugees would come to a country and locate in communities chosen at random, so that there is no correlation between the economic characteristics of the community and its refugee population. Data would track the labor market outcomes of each and every “native,” regardless of where they moved. We could then compare the wages of the natives (wherever they are) who lived in communities that received refugees versus those who did not, yielding the causal impact of refugee populations on labor market outcomes of the natives.

For obvious reasons, this is hard to do. Leading researchers instead focus on “natural experiments” and “area-wide” estimates on the impact of refugees. That is, they examine what happens to wages in the communities where refugees settle using a clever way of teasing out the “natural randomness” in settlement patterns. But if the locals move or if the refugee population itself is badly measured, this could lead to a bias towards finding no results. In essence, the results are for the natives who chose to remain behind and therefore presumably had better job options to begin with. In addition, mismeasurement of the refugee population drives results towards zero—the iron law of econometrics.

But a recently published study from Denmark by economists Mette Foged and Giovanni Peri solves all these problems at once:

• They have data on each and every Danish worker between 1991 and 2008, so that they can track people wherever they go.
• The refugees came in two waves. In the first wave, they waited in a queue and as communities opened up spaces, they were allocated in groups from the same country. Since the department managing the transfers had no data on the skills of these refugees, this was like a random allocation. Later, between 1995 and 2003, the refugee flow from Somalia, Iraq, and Afghanistan increased—but they settled in the same communities that their fellow countrymen had gone to. This created large differences in refugee populations across communities that only grew over time. The authors present a number of very convincing tests that the “like-random” assumption truly holds in their data.
• Because they have fairly long-term data, they can assess both the immediate effects and the cumulative effects over time.

And the results?

Zip. Nada. Nothing. Kuch bhi nahin. No smoking gun showing that natives will be hurt when refugees enter.

More specifically, the authors generally find positive effects on the employment and wages of the natives who looked similar to the mostly unskilled refugees entering at this time. Quantitatively, they find that “a 1 percentage point increase in the share of low-skilled immigrants from refugee-sending countries increased wages for low-skilled native workers by 1 to 1.8 percent.” Nor do they find negative effects on employment—the fraction of the year that natives worked either remained the same or increased slightly, depending on the specification.

To interpret their findings, the authors say:

“The panel regressions suggest that refugee-country immigrants, who specialized mainly in manual, low-skilled jobs, encouraged low-skilled natives to take more complex occupations, decreasing the manual content of their jobs, especially when changing establishment and this contributed to produce a positive effect on their wages and employment. In no specification do we find crowding-out of native unskilled workers or depressing effects on their wages”.

Could it be that this was just because the refugees did not work? Nope. Over the time period of the data, the foreign-born share of employment in Denmark rose sharply, from 3 percent to just over 6 percent.

Could it be that the refugees were “like the Danes” and therefore fitted in better? Unlikely. Their estimates are driven by a surge in immigrants from Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq between 1995 and 2003. Hard to mistake them for Danes.

But the earlier “area” estimates were wrong, right? Nope. Actually it turns out that all the legwork Foged and Peri do pretty much replicates the simpler area estimates that have been saying this all along.

To be sure, more could be said. For instance, the paper could talk about the precise government policies that were put in place to help the refugees when they came and the associated costs. In fact, it would be good to show the per refugee cost to the government and compare this to the taxes that the refugees paid back to the system as they joined the labor force. Since there are no “spillovers” to natives, if the taxes are higher than the initial public costs, refugees are a net gain to the treasury. Bringing them in would actually increase government budgets over time, without hurting native wages. Of course, the wages and lives of the refugees will be immeasurably better, but we have known that for a while now.

When it comes to taking in refugees, there shouldn’t be worry about the effects on wages or employment of natives. On the contrary, refugees sweeten the deal, as the Parsi priests pointed out thirteen centuries ago.

      

On his fourth trip to the U.S. as Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi will spend some quality time on Capitol Hill on Wednesday, where he'll address a joint meeting of the U.S. Congress. House Speaker Paul Ryan will also host the Indian premier for a lunch, which will be followed by a reception hosted jointly by the House and Senate Foreign Relations Committees and the India Caucus. What's the significance of this Congressional engagement and what might be Modi's message? 

Given that all the most-recent Indian leaders who've held five-year terms have addressed such joint meetings of Congress, some have asked whether Ryan's invitation to Modi is a big deal. The answer is, yes, it is an honour and not one extended all that often. Since 1934, there have been only 117 such speeches. Leaders from France, Israel and the United Kingdom have addressed joint meetings the most times (8 each), followed by Mexico (7), and Ireland, Italy and South Korea (6 each). With this speech, India will join Germany on the list with leaders having addressed 5 joint meetings of Congress: Rajiv Gandhi in 1985, P.V. Narashima Rao in 1994, Atal Bihari Vajpayee in 2000 and Manmohan Singh in 2005. India's first premier, Jawaharlal Nehru, spoke to the House and Senate in separate back-to-back sessions in 1949 as well. 

Congress is a key stakeholder in the U.S.-India relationship and can play a significant supportive or spoiler role. While American presidents have a lot more lee-way on foreign policy than domestic policy, Congress is not without influence on U.S. foreign relations, and shapes the context for American engagement abroad. Moreover, the breadth and depth of the U.S.-India relationship, as well as the blurring of the line between what constitutes domestic and foreign policy these days means that India's options can be affected by American legislative decisions or the political mood on a range of issues from trade to immigration, energy to defense. 

The Indian Foreign Secretary recently said that the U.S. legislature was at "very much at the heart" of the relationship today. He noted it has been "very supportive" and "even in some more difficult days where actually the Congress has been the part of the US polity which has been very sympathetic to India." But India's had rocky experiences on the Hill as well--which only heightens the need to engage members of Congress at the highest levels. 

The speech and the other interactions offer Modi an opportunity to acknowledge the role of Congress in building bilateral relations, highlight shared interests and values, outline his vision for India and the relationship, as well as tackle some Congressional concerns and note some of India's own. He'll be speaking to multiple audiences in Congress, with members there either because of the strategic imperative for the relationship, others because of the economic potential, yet others because of the values imperative--and then there are those who'll be there because it is important to their constituents, whether business or the Indian diaspora. There is also the audience outside Congress, including in India, where the speech will play in primetime. What will Modi's message be? A glimpse at previous speeches might offer some clues, though Modi is likely also to want to emphasize change. 

The speeches that came before

The speeches of previous prime ministers have addressed some common themes. They've acknowledged shared democratic values. They've mentioned the two-way flow of inspiration and ideas with individuals like Henry David Thoreau, Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King getting multiple mentions. They've noted the influence of American founding documents or fathers on the Indian constitution. They've highlighted India's achievements, while stressing that much remains to be done. 

They've noted their country's diversity, and the almost-unique task Indian leaders have had--to achieve development for hundreds of millions in a democratic context. Since Gandhi, each has mentioned the Indian diaspora, noting its contributions to the U.S. Each prime minister has also expressed gratitude for American support or the contribution the U.S. partnership has made to India's development and security. They've acknowledged differences, without dwelling on them. They've addressed contemporary Congressional concerns that existed about Indian policy--in some cases offering a defense of them, in others' explaining the reason behind the policy.

Many of the premiers called for Congress to understand that India, while a democracy like the U.S. and sharing many common interests, would not necessarily achieve its objectives the same way as the U.S. And each subtly has asked for time and space, accommodation and support to achieve their goals--and argued it's in American interests to see a strong, stable, prosperous, democratic India.

In terms of subjects, each previous speech has mentioned economic growth and development as a key government priority, highlighting what policymakers were doing to achieve them. Since Gandhi, all have mentioned nuclear weapons though with different emphases: he spoke of disarmament; Rao of de-nuclearization and concerns about proliferation; two years after India's nuclear test, Vajpayee noted India's voluntary moratorium on testing and tried to reassure Congress about Indian intentions; and speaking in the context of the U.S.-India civil nuclear talks, Singh noted the importance of civil nuclear energy and defended India's track record on nuclear non-proliferation.

Since Rao, every prime minister has mentioned the challenge that terrorism posed for both the U.S. and India, with Vajpayee and Singh implicitly noting the challenge that a neighboring country poses in this regard from India's perspective. And Rao and Singh made the case for India to get a permanent seat on the U. N. Security Council.

The style of the speeches has changed, as has the tone. Earlier speeches were littered with quotes from sources like Christopher Columbus, Swami Vivekananda, Abraham Lincoln, Lala Lajpat Rai and the Rig Veda. Perhaps that was reflective of the style of speechwriting in those eras, but perhaps it was also because there were fewer concrete issues in the bilateral relationship to address. The evolution in the areas of cooperation is evident in the speeches. 

Rao's speech about two decades ago, for instance, listed U.S.-India common interests as peacekeeping, environmental crises, and combating international terrorism and international narcotics trafficking. Compare that to Singh's address which talked of cooperation on a range of issues from counterterrorism, the economy, agriculture, energy security, healthy policy, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), democracy promotion, and global governance.

The speech yet to come

Modi will likely strike some similar themes, acknowledging the role that the U.S. Congress has played in shaping the relationship and expressing gratitude for its support. Like Vajpayee, particularly in a U.S. election year, Modi might note the bipartisan support the relationship has enjoyed in recent years. He'll undoubtedly talk about shared democratic values in America's "temple of democracy"--a phrase he used for the Indian parliament when he first entered it after his 2014 election victory. Modi will not necessarily mention the concerns about human rights, trade and investment policies, non-proliferation or India's Iran policy that have arisen on the Hill, but he will likely address them indirectly. 

For example, by emphasizing India's pluralism and diversity and the protection its Constitution gives to minorities, or the constructive role the country could play regionally (he might give examples such as the recently inaugurated dam in Afghanistan). Given the issues on the bilateral agenda, he'll likely mention the strategic convergence, his economic policy plans, terrorism, India's non-proliferation record, defense and security cooperation, and perhaps--like Vajpayee--the Asia-Pacific (without directly mentioning China). And like Vajpayee, he might be more upfront about Indian concerns and the need to accommodate them. 

While he might strike some similar themes as his predecessors and highlight aspects of continuity, Modi will also want to emphasize that it's not business as usual. He'll likely try to outline the change that he has brought and wants to bring. In the past, he has noted the generational shift that he himself represents as the first Indian prime minister born after independence and the Modi government's latest tag line is, of course, "Transforming India." And he might emphasize that this changed India represents an opportunity for the U.S.

He won't wade directly into American election issues, but might note the importance of U.S. global engagement. He might also try to address some of the angst in the U.S. about other countries taking advantage of it and being "takers." He could do this by making the case that India is not a free rider--that through its businesses, market, talent and diaspora it is contributing to American economy and society, through its economic development it will contribute to global growth, and through Indian prosperity, security and a more proactive international role--with a different approach than another Asian country has taken--it'll contribute to regional stability and order. He might also suggest ways that the U.S. can facilitate India playing such a role.

Unlike previous leaders, he has not tended to appeal to others not to ask India to do more regionally and globally because it's just a developing country and needs to focus internally. The Modi government has been highlighting the contributions of India and Indians to global and regional peace and prosperity--through peacekeeping, the millions that fought in the World Wars, HADR operations in its neighborhood, evacuation operations in Yemen in which it rescued not just Indian citizens, but Americans as well.

His government has been more vocal in joint contexts of expressing its views on the importance of a rules-based order in the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions--and we might hear more on this in his address. Overall, a theme will likely be that India is not just a "taker," and will be a responsible, collaborative stakeholder.

It'll be interesting to see whether the Indian prime minister notes the role that his predecessors have played in getting the relationship to this point. With some exceptions--for example, he acknowledged Manmohan Singh's contribution during President Obama's visit to India last year--he has not tended to do so. But there's a case to be made for doing so--it can reassure members of Congress that the relationship transcends one person or party and is based on a strategic rationale, thus making it more sustainable. Such an acknowledgement could be in the context of noting that it's not just Delhi and Washington that have built and are building this relationship, but the two countries' states, private sectors, educational institutions and people. 

This wouldn't prevent Modi from highlighting the heightened intensity of the last two years, particularly the progress in defense and security cooperation. (From a more political perspective, given that there has been criticism in some quarters of India-U.S. relations becoming closer, it can also serve as a reminder that the Congress party-led government followed a similar path).

Modi will be competing for media attention in the U.S. thanks to the focus in the U.S. on the Democratic primaries this week, but he'll have Congressional attention. But it's worth remembering that Indian prime ministers have been feted before, but if they don't deliver on the promise of India and India-U.S. relations that they often outline, disillusionment sets in. Modi will have to convince them that India is a strategic bet worth making--one that will pay off.

This piece was originally published by Huffington Post India.

      

Editors’ Note: Presumptive Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump has proposed, in various forms and iterations, banning Muslims from entering the United States “until we figure out what’s going on,” in his words. Shadi Hamid responds to this proposal below, in an excerpt from a longer piece in The Atlantic in which Uri Friedman surveys various experts on the issue.

If Donald Trump is really interested in understanding the roots of anti-Americanism, there’s a solution: to read the hundreds of books and articles written on why, exactly, “Muslims” might not be particularly enthused about American policy in the Middle East (there’s little evidence to suggest that large numbers of Muslims have any particular antipathy toward Americans as people).

But it’s possible that Trump is just being imprecise. Perhaps what he really wants to say is not that Muslims “hate” Americans, but rather that they may be ambivalent about or even opposed to certain liberal values that are associated with being American. Obviously, it is impossible to generalize about an entire religious group, but polling does suggest that majorities in Arab countries like Egypt and Jordan, as well as non-Arab countries like Indonesia and Malaysia, aren’t quite classical liberals when it comes to issues like apostasy, religiously derived criminal punishments, gender equality, or the relevance of religious law in public life more generally.

If this happens to be Trump’s argument, it would be ironic, since Trump himself cannot be considered a liberal in the classical sense. In fact, he fits the definition of an “illiberal democrat” quite well, as I argued in a recent essay here in The Atlantic. That said, I have to admit that I’m concerned about anti-Muslim bigots misconstruing my own arguments around “Islamic exceptionalism”—that Islam has been and will continue to be resistant to secularization—after the attacks in Orlando. It’s undoubtedly true that large numbers of Muslims in both the West and the Middle East consider homosexual activity to be religiously unlawful, or haram, but let us be careful in drawing a link between such illiberalism (which many Christian evangelicals and Republican politicians share) and the desire to kill. That’s not the way radicalization works. We would never argue, for instance, that Senators Ted Cruz or Marco Rubio are “at risk” individuals who may, if we don’t keep a close eye on them, commit mass murder against gay Americans.

In any case, conservative Muslims, orthodox Jews, Christian evangelicals (or for that matter Trump supporters residing in Poland who want to emigrate to the U.S. if Trump wins) have the right to be “illiberal” as long as they express their illiberalism through legal, democratic means. These are rights that are protected by the American constitution, enshrined in the Bill of Rights.

Perhaps Trump is thinking specifically about violence perpetrated by Muslims, as he suggested in comments after the Orlando attacks. The interesting thing though—and something that is rarely acknowledged by U.S. politicians—is that the preponderance of Middle Eastern violence in recent decades has been perpetrated not by Islamists but by secular autocrats against Islamists, in the name of national security. These, as it happens, are the very strongmen that Trump seems to have such a soft spot for.

Ultimately, Trump cannot, through the force of arms or his genuinely frightening anti-Muslim rhetoric, compel the many conservative Muslims in the Middle East to be something they’re not, or would rather not be. To suggest that Muslims need to be secular or irreligious (by Trump’s own arbitrary standards) is dangerous. The message there is one that ISIS would find appealing for its own divisive purposes: that an increasingly populist and bigoted West has no interest in respecting or accommodating Islam’s role in public life, even when expressed legally and peacefully. The sad fact of the matter, though, is simple enough: Trump has less respect for the American constitution than the vast majority of American Muslims, many of whom, like me, are the children of immigrants. In Trump’s America, it so happens, my parents would have been banned from ever entering in the first place.

       

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As the 2016 election draws near, issues related to immigration and broader cultural change continue to dominate the national political dialogue. Now, an extensive new survey sheds light on how Americans view these issues. How do they feel about the proposed policy to build a wall on the U.S.-Mexico border or a temporary ban on Muslims entering the country? The survey of more than 2,500 Americans explores opinions on these questions and others concerning the current immigration system, immigrants’ contributions to American culture, and the cultural and economic anxieties fueling Donald Trump’s success among core Republican constituencies.

On June 23, Governance Studies at Brookings and the Public Religion Research Institute released the PRRI/Brookings Immigration Survey and hosted a panel of experts to discuss its findings. Additional topics explored in the survey and by the panel included perceptions of discrimination against white Americans and Christians, and the extent to which Americans believe that the uncertain times demand an unconventional leader.

Join the conversation on Twitter at #immsurvey and @BrookingsGov

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• The battle over the border: Public opinion on immigration and cultural change at the forefront of the election

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• The battle over the border: Public opinion on immigration and cultural change at the forefront of the election

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• 20160623_immigration_prri_transcript

       

Much ink will be spilled analyzing the results of the U.K. referendum on whether to leave the EU. Some will highlight the xenophobic edge to the “leave” campaign, and how the Brexiteers resorted brazenly to a politics of fear to exploit the public’s worries over immigration.

Not surprisingly, Turkey became the natural pick to serve as the Brexit campaign’s boogeyman. According to the “leave” campaign’s material, Turks are inherently prone to violence and criminality. If Britain remains in the European Union, the thinking goes, it will soon be overrun by flocks of Turks. Former Mayor of London Boris Johnson—one of the staunchest advocates of Brexit—remarked cynically that “he [would] not mind whether Turkey joins the EU, provided that the U.K. leaves the EU.” He has unabashedly stoked fears that EU membership means uncontrolled immigration into Britain, and that Turkish membership to the EU would only make that problem worse. 

Stoking fear of Turkey-the-boogeyman is a longstanding pastime in Europe, stretching back centuries. Turkey’s candidacy for the European Union breathed new life into the practice. When Turkey started to undertake reforms that set the country towards accession negotiations, it was met with mighty resistance in Europe—confirming the deep-seated skepticism in Turkey that “objective” criteria, also applied to Central and Eastern European countries, would not apply to it. The image of the “terrible Turk” appeared once again: to warn the European public of an impending Turkish invasion, and therefore to keep Turkey out of the European Union. 

Old habits die hard

It’s ironic that Boris Johnson—a great-grandson of an Ottoman minister and someone who has previously spoken proudly of his Turkish heritage—would succumb to Turkey-the-boogeyman scare tactics. But he has high political ambitions, which include chipping away at Prime Minister David Cameron’s leadership of the Conservative Party, and Johnson now seems to prefer pandering to populist, euro-skeptic forces. In an attempt to secure his right-side flank, Cameron (who had long supported Turkey’s EU membership, as long as the necessary conditions were met) had a sudden conversion just a few days ago and said that Turkey’s prospects for EU membership before the year 3000 were slim. So he too apparently believes, in some sense, that Turkey is a boogeyman—so Turkey has become a punching bag in the internal Conservative Party power struggle too. 

Mirror images?

It goes without saying that Turkey is not in the shape that it was a decade ago. It is no longer the darling of the international community with an enviable growth rate, and its soft power has waned dramatically. Instead, both its democracy and its economy are limping along, at best—though, to be fair, its economy is growing faster than the EU’s. And Turks are no strangers to the kinds of politics of fear we’ve seen in the U.K.—their increasingly authoritarian and repressive leader, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, is adept at stoking fear too. Meanwhile, he’s assumed a defiant posture towards Europe, threatening, for example, to lower the drawbridge on Greece and Bulgaria and unleash a repeat of last year’s migration crisis. These kinds of threats, of course, only bolster voices like Boris Johnson back in Britain. 

It’s quite remarkable that at the same time as prominent figures in both the “leave” and “remain” campaigns are engaging in forms of Turkey-bashing, they apparently borrow lexicon from the Turkish leader himself—employing a language of intolerance and xenophobia. This could not have been—and indeed, was not—what early promoters of European integration like Winston Churchill envisaged for their continent. They had seen the horrors that could come when politics of fear spun out of control. 

Regardless of the British referendum results, there has already been much damage inflicted on the West’s liberal image. This is why when ink is spilled in the coming days, discussing the vote’s results, we must also take a hard look at eroding liberal democratic standards and values. The very foundations of European—including British—democracies are being shaken: What will this mean for the European integration project? It seems surprising today, but there was actually a time when there were European leaders who pushed for Turkish membership in the EU—yes, Turkey the boogeyman—in order to strengthen this very project. Times and sentiments, as well as conceptions of democracy, have obviously changed. Welcome populism, welcome politics of fear, and pity to those Turks that genuinely believed in Europe’s strength as a bastion of liberal democracy and integration.

       

Although a few political analysts have been focusing on the white working class for years, it is only in response to the rise of Donald Trump that this large group of Americans has begun to receive the attention it deserves. Now, thanks to a comprehensive survey that the Public Religion Research Institute (PRRI) undertook in collaboration with the Brookings Institution, we can speak with some precision about the distinctive attitudes and preferences of these voters.

There are different ways of defining the white working class. Along with several other survey researchers, PRRI defines this group as non-Hispanic whites with less than a college degree, with the additional qualification of being paid by the hour or by the job rather than receiving a salary. No definition is perfect, but this one works pretty well. Most working-class whites have incomes below $50,000; most whites with BAs or more have incomes above $50,000. Most working-class whites rate their financial circumstances as only fair or poor; most college educated whites rate their financial circumstances as good or excellent. Fifty-four percent of working-class whites think of themselves as working class or lower class, compared to only 18 percent of better-educated whites.

The PRRI/Brookings study finds that in many respects, these two groups of white voters see the world very differently. For example, 54 percent of college-educated whites think that America’s culture and way of life have improved since the 1950s; 62 percent of white working-class Americans think that it has changed for the worse. Sixty-eight percent of working-class whites, but only 47 percent of college-educated whites, believe that the American way of life needs to be protected against foreign influences. Sixty-six percent of working-class whites, but only 43 percent of college-educated whites, say that discrimination against whites has become as big a problem as discrimination against blacks and other minorities. In a similar vein, 62 percent of working-class whites believe that discrimination against Christians has become as big a problem as discrimination against other groups, a proposition only 38 percent of college educated whites endorse.

This brings us to the issue of immigration. By a margin of 52 to 35 percent, college-educated whites affirm that today’s immigrants strengthen our country through their talent and hard work. Conversely, 61 percent of white working-class voters say that immigrants weaken us by taking jobs, housing, and health care. Seventy-one percent of working-class whites think that immigrants mostly hurt the economy by driving down wages, a belief endorsed by only 44 percent of college-educated whites. Fifty-nine percent of working-class whites believe that we should make a serious effort to deport all illegal immigrants back to their home countries; only 33 percent of college-educated whites agree. Fifty-five percent of working-class whites think we should build a wall along our border with Mexico, while 61 percent of whites with BAs or more think we should not. Majorities of working-class whites believe that we should make the entry of Syrian refugees into the United States illegal and temporarily ban the entrance of non-American Muslims into our country; about two-thirds of college-educated whites oppose each of these proposals.

Opinions on trade follow a similar pattern. By a narrow margin of 48 to 46 percent, college-educated whites endorse the view that trade agreements are mostly helpful to the United States because they open up overseas markets while 62 percent of working-class whites believe that they are harmful because they send jobs overseas and drive down wages.

It is understandable that working-class whites are more worried that they or their families will become victims of violent crime than are whites with more education. After all, they are more likely to live in neighborhoods with higher levels of social disorder and criminal behavior. It is harder to explain why they are also much more likely to believe that their families will fall victim to terrorism. To be sure, homegrown terrorist massacres of recent years have driven home the message that it can happen to anyone, anywhere. We still need to explain why working-class whites have interpreted this message in more personal terms.

The most plausible interpretation is that working-class whites are experiencing a pervasive sense of vulnerability. On every front—economic, cultural, personal security—they feel threatened and beleaguered. They seek protection against all the forces they perceive as hostile to their cherished way of life—foreign people, foreign goods, foreign ideas, aided and abetted by a government they no longer believe cares about them. Perhaps this is why fully 60 percent of them are willing to endorse a proposition that in previous periods would be viewed as extreme: the country has gotten so far off track that we need a leader who is prepared to break so rules if that is what it takes to set things right.

       

Like many Brits, I’m reeling. Everyone knew that the "Brexit" referendum was going to be close. But deep down I think many of us assumed that the vote would be to remain in the European Union. David Cameron had no realistic choice but to announce that he will step down.

Mr. Cameron’s fall can be traced back to a promise he made in the 2010 election to cap the annual flow of migrants into the U.K. at less than 100,000, "no ifs, no buts."Membership in the EU means free movement of labor, so this was an impossible goal to reach through direct policy. I served in the coalition government that emerged from the 2010 election, and this uncomfortable fact was clear from the outset. I don’t share the contents of briefings and meetings from my time in government (I think it makes good government harder if everyone is taking notes for memoirs), but my counterpart in the government, Mr. Cameron’s head of strategy, Steve Hilton, went public in the Daily Mail just before this week’s vote.

Steve recalled senior civil servants telling us bluntly that the pledged target could not be reached. He rightly fulminated about the fact that this meant we were turning away much more skilled and desirable potential immigrants from non-EU countries in a bid to bring down the overall number. What he didn’t say is that the target, based on an arbitrary figure, was a foolish pledge in the first place.

Mr. Cameron was unable to deliver on his campaign pledge, and immigration to the U.K. has been running at about three times that level. This fueled anger at the establishment for again breaking a promise, as well as anger at the EU. In an attempt to contain his anti-European right wing, Mr. Cameron made another rash promise: to hold a referendum.

The rest, as they say, is history. And now, so is he.

Immigration played a role in the Brexit campaign, though it seems that voters may not have made a clear distinction between EU and non-EU inward movement. Still, Thursday’s vote was, at heart, a plebiscite on what it means to British. Our national identity has always been of a quieter kind than, say the American one. Attempts by politicians to institute the equivalent of a Flag Day or July Fourth, to teach citizenship in schools, or to animate a “British Dream” have generally been laughed out of court. Being British is an understated national identity. Indeed, understatement is a key part of that identity.

Many Scots, Welsh and Northern Irish feel a much stronger affinity to their home nation within the U.K. than they do to Great Britain. Many Londoners look at the rest of England and wonder how they are in the same political community. These splits were obvious Thursday.

Identity politics has tended in recent years to be of the progressive kind, advancing the cause of ethnic minorities, lesbians and gays, and so on. In both the U.K. and the U.S. a strongly reactionary form of identity politics is gaining strength, in part as a reaction to the cosmopolitan, liberal, and multicultural forms that have been dominant. This is identity politics of a negative kind, defined not by what you are for but what you are against. A narrow majority of my fellow Brits just decided that at the very least, being British means not being European. It was a defensive, narrow, backward-looking attempt to reclaim something that many felt had been lost. But the real losses are yet to come.

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Editor's Note: This piece originally appeared in the Wall Street Journal's Washington Wire.

       

On June 23, Brookings hosted the release of the Immigrants, Immigration Reform, and 2016 Election Survey, a joint project with the Public Religion Research Institute (PRRI). The associated report entitled, How immigration and concern about cultural change are shaping the 2016 election finds an American public anxious and intensely divided on matters of immigration and cultural change at the forefront of the 2016 Election.

Dr. Robert Jones, CEO of PRRI, began the presentation by highlighting Americans’ feelings of anxiety and personal vulnerability. The poll found, no issue is more critical to Americans this election cycle than terrorism, with nearly seven in ten (66 percent) reporting that terrorism is a critical issue to them personally. And yet, Americans are sharply divided on questions of terrorism as it pertains to their personal safety. Six in ten (62 percent) Republicans report that they are at least somewhat worried about being personally affected by terrorism, while just 44 percent of Democrats say the same. 

On matters of cultural change, Jones painted a picture of a sharply divided America. Poll results indicate that a majority (55 percent) of Americans believe that the American way of life needs to be protected from foreign influence, while 44 percent disagree.  Responses illustrate a stark partisan divide:

74 percent of Republicans and 83 percent of Trump supporters believe that foreign influence over the American way of life needs to be curtailed.  Just 41 percent of Democrats agree, while a majority (56 percent) disagrees with this statement. Views among white Americans are sharply divided by social class, the report finds. While 68 percent of the white working class agrees that the American way of life needs to be protected, fewer than half (47 percent) of white college-educated Americans agree.

Jones identified Americans’ views on language and “reverse discrimination” as additional touchstones of cultural change. Americans are nearly evenly divided over how comfortable they feel when they encounter immigrants who do not speak English: 50 percent say this bothers them and 49 percent say it does not. 66 percent of Republicans and 77 percent of Trump supporters express discomfort when coming into contact with immigrants who do not speak English; just 35 percent of Democrats say the same.

 

Americans split evenly on the question of whether discrimination against whites, or “reverse discrimination,” is as big of a problem as discrimination against blacks and other minorities (49 percent agree, 49 percent disagree). Once again, the partisan differences are considerable: 72 percent of Republicans and 81 percent of Trump supporters agree that reverse discrimination is a problem, whereas more than two thirds (68 percent) of Democrats disagree.

On economic matters, survey results indicate that nearly seven in ten (69 percent) Americans support increasing the tax rate on wealthy Americans, defined as those earning over $250,000 a year. This represents a modest increase in the share of Americans who favor increasing the tax rate relative to 2012, but a dramatic increase in the number of Republicans who favor this position.

 

The share of  Republicans favoring increasing the tax rate on wealthy Americans jumped from 36 percent in 2012 to 54 percent in 2016—an 18 point increase. Democrats and Independents views on this position remained relatively constant, increasing from 80 to 84 percent and 61 to 68 percent approval respectively.

Finally, on matters of immigration, Americans are divided over whether immigrants are changing their communities for the better (50 percent) or for the worse (49 percent). Across party lines, however, Americans are more likely to think immigrants are changing American society as a whole than they are to think immigrants are changing the local community. This, Jones suggested, indicates that Americans’ views on immigration are motivated by partisan ideology more than by lived experience. 

At the conclusion of Dr. Jones’s presentation, Brookings senior fellow in Governance Studies, Dr. William Galston moderated a panel discussion of the poll’s findings. Karlyn Bowman, a senior fellow and research coordinator at the American Enterprise Institute, observed that cultural anxiety has long characterized Americans’ views on immigration. Never, Bowman remarked, has the share of Americans that favor immigrants outpaced the share of those who oppose immigrants. Turning to the results of the PRRI survey, Bowman highlighted the partisan divide influencing responses to the proposition that the United States place a temporary ban on Muslims. The strong level of Republican support for the proposal--64 percent support among Republicans--compared to just 23 percent support among Democrats has more to do with fear of terrorism than anxiety about immigration, she argued.

Henry Olsen, a senior fellow at the Ethics and Public Policy Center, remarked that many Americans feel that government should do more to ensure protection, prosperity, and security -- as evidenced by the large proportion of voters who feel that their way of life is under threat from terrorism (51%), crime (63%), or unemployment (65%).  In examining fractures within the Republican Party, Olsen considered the ways in which Trump voters differ from non-Trump voters, regardless of party affiliation. On questions of leadership, he suggested, the fact that 57% of all Republicans agree that we need a leader “willing to break some rules” is skewed by the high proportion of Trump supporters (72%) who agree with that statement. Indeed, just 49% of Republicans who did not vote for Trump agreed that the country needs a leader willing to break rules to set things right.

Joy Reid, National Correspondent at MSNBC, cited the survey’s findings that Americans are bitterly divided over whether American culture and way of life has changed for the better (49 percent) or the worse (50 percent) since the 1950s. More than two-thirds of Republicans (68 percent) and Donald Trump supporters (68 percent) believe the American way of life has changed for the worse since the 1950s. Connecting this nostalgia to survey results indicating anxiety about immigration and cultural change, Reid argued that culture—not economics—is the primary concern animating many Trump supporters.

       

Economist Albert Hirschman’s marvelously perceptive little book with big ideas written in 1970 titled “Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations and States” provides a cornucopia of insights into understanding Brexit and the current state of global governance.  When it emerged American economist Kenneth Arrow marveled at its extraordinary richness, and political scientist Karl Deutsch, in his presidential address to the American Political Science Association, called it an “outstanding contribution to political theory.”

Economists assume exit to mean dissatisfaction with an organization’s product or the service leading to decline in demand for it. The value of exit lies in the certainty it provides in terms of the relationship between the customer or member and the firm. Political scientists think of how a firm handles its response to customer dissatisfaction as the exercise of voice by stakeholders. The value of voice is that it can lead to reform that ultimately determines the firm’s revival, an idea also advanced by scholar Clayton Christiansen in his book “The Innovator’s Dilemma.” An understanding of the conditions under which exit and voice are exercised requires the incorporation of the concept of loyalty. Loyalty makes voice more probable and exit less likely. But loyalty does not by itself make the exercise of voice more effective. That depends on the extent to which customers or members are willing to trade off the certainty of exit against the uncertainties of improvement in the deteriorating product, and their ability to influence the organization.  

Applying these ideas to Brexit suggests that the option of a U.K. exit was made more likely because of the limited voice of the U.K. in achieving reforms, coupled with the fact that Britain’s loyalty to the European Union was mixed at best. Its self-perception as “special people” was accompanied by long-standing skepticism about foreigners, including other Europeans.

Some have attributed Brexit to misjudgment by Prime Minister David Cameron about holding a referendum, poor management of migration policy by the EU including procrastination and downright misjudgment on migration, and they have termed the historic vote as nothing short of the beginning of the end of the post-World War II institutional frameworks, including the Bretton Woods institutions. They fear that the longest and most prosperous period of sustained peace in modern human history, enabled by post-war global architecture, may have come to an end.

The Economist is one proponent of this view, describing Brexit as multiple calamities. The British economy and polity are wildly off the rails, the newspaper notes. The prime minister has resigned with no obvious successor. The leader of the opposition is struggling to survive a coup. The pound hit a 31-year low against the dollar and banks lost a third of their value before stabilizing. Meanwhile there is talk in Scotland and Northern Ireland of secession.

But my own English friends, some of whom favored Brexit, talk about the high tax payments to the EU, oppressive overreach of the EU bureaucracy, and the fear of open borders leading to uncontrollable immigration from Eastern Europe, Turkey, and the Middle East. In short they see EU membership as all pain and no gain. On the surface Brexit has all the flavors ranging from nostalgia of self-rule to xenophobia.

Lessons for global governance?

There are already signs that exit is becoming the preferred option in various global governance organizations. Global loyalties are split, not just among great powers, but also between developed and developing countries. Voice and reform have not been effective.

Hirschman mentions leadership and timely action in sharing power with the next generation as a behavioral trait (often found in the animal kingdom) favoring voice. He contrasts that with exit, which he describes as a human behavior which assumes markets, including political markets, will solve problems.

Hirschman’s chapter “Exit and Voice in American Ideology and Practice” helps us to better understand the U.S. role in global governance. He notes that exit has been accorded “an extraordinarily privileged position in the American tradition” founded in its very creation as a land of immigrants, who, he reminds us, were opting for exit.  Indeed, like in Britain, “the neatness of exit over the messiness and heartbreak of voice” has persisted throughout U.S. history. In his last chapter, “Elusive Optimal Mix of Exit and Voice,” he does not come up with a recipe for some optimum mix of the two, nor does he recommend each institution has its own optimum mix, instead arguing conditions are seldom ripe for their optimum and stable mix—although it is possible to say there is deficiency of one or the other at a given point in time.

Today, it seems that the dominant mode of the post-World War II era, namely voice, is plainly revealing its inadequacy, so the other mode, exit, will eventually be injected once again.

Having had a leading role in founding the global architecture of the United Nation, Food and Agriculture Organization, and Bretton Woods institutions, the U.S. has had a strong voice in and loyalty to the Bretton Woods institutions as well as leadership roles commensurate with its historic roles. U.S. loyalty to the U.N. outside of the Security Council has varied among administrations, since voice in U.N. organizations is distributed more equally. The U.S. has opted for exit from specific U.N. organizations from time to time when it has disliked the dissenting views of other members. 

Others are also choosing to exit. China’s slightly increased shares in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank after the financial crisis are nowhere near its weight in the global economy, thanks to European reluctance to accept a reduced voice. China and other emerging countries have exercised a partial exit option by establishing the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New Development Bank to meet the investment needs of developing countries.The U.S. considered the establishment of the two as a threat to its leadership and to the Bretton Woods institutions, viewing the acts as verging on disloyalty, whereas most U.S. allies have embraced membership in both. And yet the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank is following on the footsteps of the Bretton Woods institutions as regards norms and rules.

To strengthen global governance requires strengthening “voice” and weakening incentives for “exit” from the U.N. and Bretton Woods institutions and other forums of global governance. The U.S. needs to also lead the effort to increase the rewards and reduce the cost of exercising voice. This would be a timely reminder, when politics seems to thrive on divisions, that leadership means forging inclusive institutions that serve all members. 

       

My partner was caught at the Istanbul airport during the latest terrorist attack. She hid in a closet with a few people, including a small girl, disconcerted and afraid. And when the attack was over, she saw the blood, desolation, chaos, and tears of the aftermath. This was a horrific moment. Yet, it paled in comparison to what the injured and dead and their relatives had to suffer.

It seems that terrorism and political violence are becoming more prevalent and intense. They have been, however, long brewing and have affected many countries around the world. In the 1980s, my home country, Peru, suffered immensely from terrorism: The badly called “Shining Path” organization, with its communist ideology and ruthless tactics, terrorized first rural communities and then large cities with deadly bombs in crowded places and assassinations of official and civil society leaders.

A few years ago, Phil Keefer, lead economist at the World Bank, and I edited two books on what we perceived to be the main security threats of our time: terrorism and drug trafficking. We thought that the answers had to come from research, and we tried to gather the best available evidence and arguments to understand the links between these security threats and economic development.

After the myriad of recent terrorist attacks—in Istanbul, Munich, Nice, Bagdad, Brussels, and Paris, to name a few—we found it important to recap lessons learned. These lessons are not just academic: Understanding the root causes of terrorism can lead to policies for prevention and for reducing the severity of attacks. To defeat terrorism, a policy strategy should include three components: intelligence, integration, and development.

Intelligence. A terrorist attack is relatively easy to conduct. Modern societies offer many exposed and vulnerable targets: an airport, a crowded celebration by the beach, a bus station at peak hours, or a restaurant full of expats. And the potential weapons are too many to count: a squadron of suicide bombers, a big truck ramming through the streets, two or three comrades armed with semi-automatic guns. It is impossible to protect all flanks, and some of the measures taken to prevent the previous terrorist attacks are, well, frankly silly. For a strategy to have any chance against terrorism, it should be based on intelligence. Intelligence implies understanding the motivations, leadership structure, and modus operandi of terrorist organizations, and developing a plan that can anticipate and adapt to their constantly morphing operations. Importantly, the ideological dimension should not be ignored because it explains the extremes to which terrorists are willing to arrive: A suicide attack requires a person who has muted both his basic survival instinct and all sense of natural compassion for others. It was radical communism in the 1970s and 1980s; it is a perverted and fanatical misrepresentation of Islam nowadays. An intelligence strategy that targets the sources of terrorism, both the perpetrators and the social movements that underlie them, should be the first component of the campaign against terror.

Integration. Foreigners living in the U.S. like to make fun of Hollywood movies and the social rituals that Americans go through each year: Halloween and Thanksgiving are in many respects more popular than Christmas. Yet, thanks to these cultural norms along with widespread economic opportunities and equality under the law, the U.S. has mostly succeeded in what many countries, including some European ones, have failed: the integration of people of different ethnic, religious, and cultural backgrounds. The U.S. is no paradise of integration, but the social melting pot does work for immigrants: Within a generation or two, Mexican Americans, Italian Americans, Iranian Americans, and so forth are just Americans, with a single national identity and, at least by law, the same rights and obligations. In some European countries, in contrast, many immigrants feel like second-class citizens. There is little that can inflame more hatred than the feeling of being excluded, and a misguided search for a sense of belonging can be the trigger that incites religious, ethnic, and ideological radicalization. This may explain why France has suffered more from terrorist acts perpetrated by their own residents than the U.S. or U.K., that paradoxically are substantially more engaged in the war against ISIS and al-Qaeda. Social integration—especially of immigrants—through explicit and targeted programs from education at an early age to immigration and citizenship reforms is a key component in the fight against terrorism.       

Development. One of the puzzles in the evidence on terrorism is that while it tends to be led (and sometimes even perpetrated) by well-off and educated people, it represents the complaints and grievances of the disenfranchised, the poor, and the unemployed. The hundreds of thousands of unemployed and discouraged young men in places as diverse as Afghanistan, Somalia, South Africa, and Brazil are the potential armies of common and political violence. In South Africa and Brazil, lacking an overriding communal ideology, this violence is expressed in robberies, homicides, and common crime. In Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, the violence is mostly political, taking the shape or at least the cover of religious fundamentalism. Somehow in Somalia, violence has adopted both criminal and political expressions: We worry about Somali pirates as much as we do about Somali jihadists. (On the link between vulnerable youth and violence, it is telling that the name of the main terrorist organization in Somalia, al-Shabaab, means literally “The Youth”) But there is hope. A couple of decades ago, thousands of unemployed young people joined terrorist organizations in Cambodia, Colombia, and Peru, when these countries were fragile. Since their economies started growing and providing employment, these armies for criminal and political violence have started to fade away. Investing in development, conducting economic reforms, and providing (yes, equal) opportunities is the third component of a winning strategy against terrorism.

A sound military and police strategy is undoubtedly important to counter terrorism. However, it’s not sufficient in the long run. If we want to defeat terrorism permanently and completely, we need to tackle it comprehensively, using political and military intelligence, social integration, and economic development.

For more, please see Keefer, Philip and Norman Loayza, Editors. Terrorism, Economic Development, and Political Openness. Cambridge University Press. 2008.

       

For months, Europe has been dealing with the hectic, day-to-day struggles of managing a massive migrant crisis. While those challenges dominate in the short term, European leaders must also start thinking about medium- to long-term reforms to the European Union’s asylum and migration policies.

European governments have made clear that they want to reform the Common European Asylum System. The European Commission has proposed reforms of its own, which to become laws would need to be approved by both the Council and the European Parliament. But while these proposals are certainly steps in the right direction, they don’t go far enough in addressing structural weaknesses in Europe’s migration and asylum policies.

Positive momentum in a number of key areas

There are several areas where the Commission has already proposed good reforms:

1. The Commission is proposing to recast a directive aimed at standardizing the processing of asylum procedures across Europe into a fully-fledged regulation. This is good news. The persistent variation in the implementation of asylum procedures across the EU highlights this necessity. Unlike directives, which need to be transposed into national legislation, regulations are immediately and simultaneously enforceable across all member states. 
2. A directive specifying the grounds for granting international protection is to be replaced by a more stringent regulation, which is also a good thing. It’s problematic that asylum seekers from the same country of origin enjoy dramatically different acceptance rates across EU member states. Combined, these changes should force member states to comply with international standards on asylum procedures and increase opportunities for migrants to get asylum (particularly in countries that have applied more restrictive criteria).
3. The Eurodac system, which establishes a pan-European fingerprinting database, is now likely to be expanded as well. It would store data on third-country nationals who are not applicants for international protection. But implementation is again a challenge, since Croatia, Greece, Italy, and Malta already struggle to fingerprint new arrivals (something over which infringement proceedings are still ongoing). 
4. To attract highly skilled professionals, the Commission is working to make the EU Blue Card scheme more appealing. While member states will retain the right to set their own annual migrants quota, Blue Card procedures and rights will be harmonized across the EU. The minimum length of an initial contract offer will be lowered to six months, salary thresholds will be reduced, and the Blue Card will be offered to migrants granted asylum. Other measures—including a directive aimed at students and researchers and another facilitating intra-corporate transfers—are also steps in the right direction. 
5. Finally, the Commission has proposed making permanent a pan-European resettlement scheme that was launched during last summer’s migrant crisis. That’s also a good thing. The framework would harmonize resettlement procedures and financially incentivizes member states to favor the European framework over national ones. At the same time, it would allow asylum seekers to move to Europe without risking their lives trying to cross the Mediterranean. However, given that member states will still determine how many people to resettle annually, the long-term impact of the scheme remains to be seen. 

German Interior Minister Thomas de Maiziere watches as a migrant from Babel in Iraq has his fingerprints taken, during a visit to Patrick-Henry Village refugee centerin Heidelberg, Germany. Photo credit: Reuters/Kai Pfaffenbach.

Far more needed but little appetite among national capitals

There are several policy areas where far more should be done: 

1. There is at least one area where the EU is still planning reforms but of a far more limited nature, and that’s on the current directive on basic standards for housing, healthcare, and employment. In private conversations, EU officials stress that the sheer numbers of migrants make it hard for even the best-performing countries to implement this directive. Put simply, member states do not have the political will to do more than what they are already doing. The EU is therefore, understandably, proposing a more moderate reform: it aims to improve reception conditions throughout the EU without dictating to member states how to do so.
2. Less privileged migrants must be provided with safe avenues to contribute to Europe’s economy. Legislation allowing seasonal workers into the Union for a maximum of between five and nine months within any twelve-month period already goes in this direction. Forums connecting local industry associations and countries of origin to better match labor demand and supply would also be welcome. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cape Verde, Georgia, Morocco, Moldova, and Tunisia—which enjoy mobility partnerships with the EU—would benefit from such an approach. More can be done if the political will amongst European capitals is there.
3. Finally, Europeans must ensure that migrants feel welcome to stay. The EU is aware of the need to adequately integrate third-country nationals, but European capitals are in the driver’s seat when it comes to integration. Directives aimed at facilitating family reunifications, integrating long-term residents, and streamlining administrative processes do what they can in this respect. However, the paths to integration and to welcoming foreigners chosen by European countries are exceedingly different, and for the time being likely to remain so. Because of this and until policymakers put integration at the top of their national agendas, foreign nationals will likely continue to struggle. 

Dublin: Still the elephant in the room

The Dublin regulation, which outlines which member state should be responsible for handling asylum applications, still must be radically revised. This is the elephant in the room and the core of the current asylum refugee framework. Member states should consider the Commission’s proposals for a corrective mechanism in case of migrant surges, a new system for allocating applications across the EU based on a distribution key or, ideally, the centralization of competences to the European Asylum Support Office. 

Informal conversations with top national and European officials suggest that the corrective mechanism is the most likely proposal to be accepted by the member states and therefore adopted. Under such an agreement, Dublin would be maintained, but automatic relocations would start in case of exceptional migrant surges—with hefty fines imposed by the Commission on those member states refusing to play their part. Unfortunately, this is not good enough. Such an approach does not address the underlying structural unfairness and unsustainability of a system that leaves the burden of processing arrivals overwhelmingly on frontline states. 

The current situation exemplifies a significant failure of governance that harms the interests of migrants and member states alike. At present, the Dublin Convention largely ignores the needs of migrants in terms of family reunification, language skills, and cultural integration. Unfortunately, the corrective mechanism for the Dublin Convention does nothing more than provide some relief in case of acute emergencies. Meanwhile, it leaves frontline states to continue facing on their own a crisis that only Europe as a whole could solve. “European leaders” still think and act through national perspectives.

Moving along despite European governments

The European Commission faces both legal and political constraints that limit its scope of action. Whenever it can, it is pushing for a significant overhaul of European asylum and migration policies. However, once more, its initiatives are hampered by the so-called “interests” of the member states. For the time being, we are likely to see some degree of integration in the fields of asylum and migration policies. But because of national vetoes, progress is slow and proposals are often watered down. 

       

Editors’ Note: Turkey’s failed coup may lead to the worsening of Europe’s migration crisis, writes Jessica Brandt. That’s because it could lead to the dissolution of a recent pact between Brussels and Ankara over the plight of refugees arriving on the European Union’s shores. This post originally appeared on Vox.

Turkey’s recent failed coup may lead to the worsening of Europe’s migration crisis. That’s because it could lead to the dissolution of a recent pact between Brussels and Ankara over the plight of refugees arriving on the European Union’s shores. Even before the events of last weekend, the fate of the agreement was uncertain amid quarrels between the parties. Now its future is even more in doubt.

Last year, more than a million migrants and refugees crossed into Europe, roiling politics across the continent. It’s a crisis EU chief Donald Tusk has described as an “existential challenge.”

Under the terms of the deal, Turkey agreed to accept the “rapid return of all migrants not in need of international protection crossing from Turkey into Greece and to take back all irregular migrants intercepted in Turkish waters.” In other words, almost all refugees who cross into Greece are slated to be returned to Turkish soil.

In return, the EU pledged to speed up the allocation of €3 billion in aid to Turkey to help it house and care for refugees, “reenergize” Turkey's bid for membership in the EU, and lift visa restrictions on Turkish tourists and businessmen.

But the European Commission has conditioned changes to the visa restrictions on better governance in Turkey. In particular, it requires a change in President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s controversial anti-terror law, which he has used to crack down on journalists and critics. Erdoğan was already adamantly against narrowing the law to protect free speech. Having now overcome a determined coup attempt, he is even less likely to do so.

Instead, it appears probable that he will further clamp down on civil liberties, acting on his authoritarian instincts and retaliating against his detractors. On Sunday, he suggested that he might reintroduce the death penalty, a practice Turkey abolished in 2004 as part of its bid for EU membership. Doing so would widen the gap in political culture between Turkey and Europe and, as German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier asserted forcefully on Monday in Brussels, derail the already limited possibility of reigniting accession talks.

The pact has already been strongly opposed by the European left, and particularly by humanitarian and human rights groups. Rising authoritarianism in Turkey would only increase resistance to the deal, making implementation even harder, especially if those groups were to scale back their activities on the ground.

That would not be without precedent. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Doctors Without Borders, and the International Rescue Committee, among others, have suspended some of their activities in refugee centers because they do not want to be involved in implementing a deal that they describe as constituting the blanket expulsion of refugees from Turkey back to Greece.

[A] crackdown could also undermine the legal basis of the agreement.

Crucially, a crackdown could also undermine the legal basis of the agreement. One of the agreement’s key provisions is that individuals who cross from Turkey into Greece will be sent back across the Aegean to Turkey. That hinges on the notion that Turkey is a “safe third country” for migrants. A crackdown could prompt refugees to argue that it isn’t.

If that were the case, deporting them to Turkey could be seen as constituting “refoulement”—the forcible return of asylum seekers to a country where they are prone to be subjected to persecution—which is forbidden under both international and EU law.

That’s a problem, since some analysts believe worsening conditions in Turkey could lead even more people seeking refuge to journey onward to Europe. In the past, Erdoğan has threatened to “open the gates” and send refugees streaming into Europe when displeased with the level of financial assistance from Brussels earmarked for managing the crisis. Preoccupied by troubles at home, he may see stability as in his interest and resist taking aggressive steps that would cause an open breach.

For both parties, finding a stable, though imperfect, accommodation—as they were poised to do prior to the events of last weekend—is still the most promising path forward. Let’s hope the parties take it. Managing Europe’s migration crisis depends on it.

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

This keynote presentation by Bruce Katz at City Hall in Seattle describes how a vibrant center city stimulates a region's economy. The presentation also assesses how Seattle is faring on this front and what steps the city should take as it looks to the future.

The metro program hosts and participates in a variety of public forums. To view a complete list of these events, please visit the metro program's Speeches and Events page which provides copies of major speeches, powerpoint presentations, event transcripts, and event summaries.

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Bruce Katz focuses on the housing challenges facing Washington state in this presentation at the Housing Washington 2004 conference. In the speech Katz reviews Washington's particular challenges and then outlines a "winning affordable-housing playbook" applicable anywhere.

The metro program hosts and participates in a variety of public forums. To view a complete list of these events, please visit the metro program's Speeches and Events page which provides copies of major speeches, powerpoint presentations, event transcripts, and event summaries.

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"World class." The term has been bandied about the Puget Sound region for years now. But during the grinding tech and aerospace busts of recent years and the recession that followed, the term became a mocking one.

Despite those setbacks, Seattle nonetheless remains on the cusp of becoming a world-class city and region.

It just doesn't seem to know it sometimes.

Seattle is among the most educated places in the country. From this brainpower spring high median wages paid by good jobs. Despite the price pressure exerted by those wages, Seattle has low rates of childhood poverty and overall poverty, leading to a balanced income distribution, as documented by a recent Brookings study.

Moreover, Seattle has come a long way from the days when gas-station owners would raise prices on Boeing paydays. The University of Washington and a strong network of other research institutions like the Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center are continually setting the stage for more diversification of the economy by fostering new ideas and technologies.

Immigrants both foreign and domestic also contribute to the innovative ferment of the region.

In short, Seattle has Boston's high educational attainment without the persistent ghosts of racial animosity and deep poverty. Seattle has the Research Triangle of North Carolina's talent for innovation, but in a still mostly urban-centered environment surrounded by some of the greatest natural amenities and vistas in the world.

With the region slowly emerging from the recession, the technology bust and aerospace industry trouble, more growth is surely on the horizon. What form will that growth take?

Seattle and the Puget Sound like to talk about the sustainability of growth. To its credit, under the Greg Nickels administration, the city of Seattle has been moving toward allowing more density downtown to increase housing choices and, presumably, reduce growth pressures on the urban fringe. And suburban cities throughout the region—such as Bellevue, Renton and Auburn—are working to boost their downtowns in conjunction with transit investments.

Sustainability is also the rationale for myriad shoreline-reclamation and creek-restoration projects.

But regardless of all the respect for the environment evidenced in hundreds of decisions, Seattle, as constituted, is an unsustainable region.

For all of Seattle's and the region's current greatness, failure to address three key issues—transportation, housing and schools—will unravel achievements to date and degrade the quality of growth to come.

Despite employment density and concentration, mobility—partly because of geography and partly because of a lack of a unified transportation strategy—is getting worse. Left unaddressed, the pressure of excessive decentralization will be severe and the impact on quality of life will be brutal.

The innovative nature of the region's economy and its high wages are bidding up real-estate prices, raising three big threats: stunting of middle-class growth as burdens on low-income families become severe and dampen their ascent; acceleration of population decentralization by the search for affordable housing (again impacting quality of life and the environment); and stagnating economic growth.

The other limiting factor to future economic growth is education. Seattle's public schools continue to wrestle with severe budget problems and quality is sadly far too correlated with race and income, disadvantaging the students who need good schools the most.

Additionally, the University of Washington is turning away qualified students for lack of capacity. This especially hurts graduates of the region's successful community colleges such as Seattle Central, a key ladder into the middle class for many low-income and immigrant students. To shunt such potential elsewhere is nonsensical and will eventually hurt the region competitively and economically.

These three challenges threaten the region's current prosperity and undermine its potential to do what few U.S. cities have done—grow sustainably, spread the wealth and preserve natural and environmental assets—becoming truly world class in the process.

As Seattle contemplates its future, it needs to think along these lines:

• On transportation, the region has simply grown too much to have mobility run by a farrago of agencies.

Despite progress by Sound Transit on light rail, the days of multiple competing systems and their redundancies, wasting infrastructure dollars (read taxes), need to end. A coordinated regional transportation strategy is necessary.

Also, the one bidder, price yet-to-be-determined monorail seems a solution in search of a problem. Public dissatisfaction with transportation is understandable. Spending over a billion dollars out of pique on a system with no park-and-rides serving only one of the region's job centers, albeit downtown, is not.

The region, and not just the political leadership, also needs to unite behind a solution, whatever it may be, to replacing the creaky Alaskan Way Viaduct, a highway of not just state but national significance (read federal funding) due to trade and the Port of Seattle.

Though the state and city seem to be united on a tunnel solution, funding remains problematic, and many are still arguing for a new elevated viaduct because of views for drivers, a risible proposition at best. Form needs to follow function both for transportation and land use.

• On housing, the city and region need to embrace density in appropriate locations. But dense housing cannot be the province only of the well-to-do.

Dense, new housing needs to incorporate favorable regulatory treatment for affordable housing and local support not just for the very poor but work-force housing to allow people to live closer to their jobs if they choose.

• On education, Seattle schools and the city have made a start by targeting the latest levy at performance in the most struggling schools. But more needs to be done to spend existing revenues more wisely.

A re-examination of Olympia's long-unchanged local-funding formulas is also overdue.

More broadly, the economic integration fostered by housing redevelopment in the Rainier Valley and White Center can only benefit surrounding schools and their students. High-quality public schools keep middle-class residents close to their jobs, fostering many of the region's goals.

Complicating action on all three of these challenges is the region's sclerotic political culture in which process is valued more than results and Weyerhaeuser is kept in business by the printing of report after report after task force after advisory committee.

Seattle, from the outside, seems blessed with talent, but an overabundance of process compounded by a reflexive populism and anti-elitism leads people to dismiss valuable ideas and proposals. In South Lake Union, for example, many oppose a revamp of the neighborhood solely due to Paul Allen's involvement, despite the huge potential the area has as a new locus of jobs and housing.

Admittedly, in a state where so many people are from somewhere else, it's tough to achieve consensus. And certainly the region's leaders should not make decisions willy-nilly—especially in immigrant-heavy neighborhoods that most need investment—without public input.

But if the city's and region's political culture does not mature enough to leverage its economic strengths, the magnets bringing people to the Puget Sound and keeping them there—be it jobs, outdoor recreation or the sheer diversity of the metropolis—will decline.

Lost will be not just Seattle's opportunity to become the Vancouver, B.C., of the American West Coast, but the chance to become the leading city of the Pacific Rim, with jobs, culture and architecture like the San Francisco Bay Area and Tokyo, but with an ease of living too often only ascribed to the Sun Belt in this country.

And then in the struggle to become truly world class, local civic and political leaders won't have to worry about people being from somewhere else.

They will live there, having either left Seattle or never arrived.

      

Borders and fences, amnesty and enforcement, earned legalization and guest workers—such is the shorthand in debating immigration today.

Yet, we talk little about refugees.

It may be because refugees comprise only about 10 percent of annual immigration to America. It may also be because their entry to the United States is rarely debated. Accommodating refugees represents the best ideals of this nation.

Fleeing war, famine, religious or ethnic persecution, and, in some cases, former American foreign-policy engagement, refugees are the epitome of Emma Lazarus' words, engraved on the Statue of Liberty, of the "tired, poor, and huddled masses yearning to be free."

A replica of said statue is set to be returned to its place on the beach at Alki this spring. And it's appropriate, as the Puget Sound region increasingly accommodates many fleeing the worst life has to offer.

From 1983 to 2004, the Seattle region ranked No. 5 nationally in the resettlement of refugees, behind the big immigrant gateways of New York, Los Angeles and Orange County in California, and Chicago. However, Seattle's total foreign-born ranking is only 23rd, as refugees there comprise much more of the immigrant population than most other places around the country.

The region's refugee population is probably more important to the growth of the region than in other places. And it has been growing over the past 20 years.

Of the some 50,000 refugees resettled in Seattle over that period, fully one-third are from Southeast Asia—including Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos—and 42 percent come from the remnants of the USSR.

Other sizable populations come from the former Yugoslavia, Somalia and Ethiopia.

Metropolitan Seattle—along with Minneapolis-St. Paul, Atlanta, Sacramento and Portland—has progressively resettled more refugees over time.

Now, one in five U.S. refugees is initially placed in one of these metropolitan areas, up from only 9 percent in the 1980s and 13 percent in the 1990s.

And these refugees are different than in the past.

Because of changes in the conflicts beleaguering our planet, refugees admitted to the United States in recent years increasingly hail from African countries confronting civil conflict.

Like earlier waves, these newest refugees are determined to pursue, but unprepared for, life and work in the United States and need assistance as they settle into new communities and become active members of local schools, workplaces and neighborhoods.

Like other foreign-born migrants, Seattle's refugees have been quickly plugging into the economic life of the region, from the bustling International District downtown to the polyglot scene that is the Crossroads Mall in Bellevue.

Seattle's healthy local labor market has helped foster their adjustment as many refugees have found foothold jobs in hotels, restaurants, shops, health services, food production and preparation. Perhaps not long term, but these jobs are key steps on the road to economic independence and upward mobility. In any event, they are a far cry from the situations refugees left behind.

Local service agencies and assistance organizations, religious and ethnically based, play a strong role in the resettlement process.

These groups do the local work of connecting refugees to employers, housing, health care and language training and otherwise aid their progress toward self-sufficiency. And they are careful to do it in a linguistically and culturally appropriate way.

And other partners exist.

The Seattle Police Department reaches out to refugee and immigrant communities to deal with the potential downfalls of being a stranger in a strange land, specifically addressing gang and drug problems and launching efforts to prevent violence against refugees and immigrants.

The state Office of the Superintendent of Public Instruction has a multiyear program to target schools with large numbers of immigrant and refugee families that aims to improve schooling outcomes for high-school students and increase graduation rates. Involving parents is key to that success, as is the specialized training that tutors receive.

Programs like these—involving few tax dollars but reaping considerable economic rewards for all the region—are in the best interest of Seattle's residents, whether they are refugee newcomers or families that have lived in the region for generations.

Though Seattle fights about highways and stadiums, transit and buses, the entire Puget Sound should proclaim itself in the vanguard on this issue, a beacon, like the statue, of what is right.