There is a lively debate today over whether or not campaign finance reforms have weakened the role of political parties in campaigns. This seems an odd argument in an era of historically high levels of party loyalty — on roll calls in Congress and voting in the electorate. Are parties too strong and unified or too weak and fragmented? Have they been marginalized in the financing of elections or is their role at least as strong as it has ever been? Does the party role in campaign finance (weak or strong) materially shape the capacity to govern?

In addition, the increasing involvement in presidential and congressional campaigns of large donors – especially through Super PACs and politically-active nonprofit organizations – has raised serious concerns about whether the super-wealthy are buying American democracy. Ideologically-based outside groups financed by wealthy donors appear to be sharpening partisan differences and resisting efforts to forge agreement across parties. Many reformers have advocated steps to increase the number of small donors to balance the influence of the wealthy. But some scholars have found evidence suggesting that small donors are more polarizing than large donors. Can that be true? If so, are there channels other than the ideological positioning of the parties through which small donors might play a more constructive role in our democracy?

In this paper, Thomas Mann and Anthony Corrado attempt to shed light on both of these disputed features of our campaign finance system and then assess whether campaign finance reform offers promise for reducing polarization and strengthening American democracy. They conclude that not only is campaign finance reform a weak tool for depolarizing American political parties, but some break in the party wars is probably a prerequisite to any serious pushback to the broader deregulation of campaign finance now underway.

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The Supreme Court’s recent McCutcheon decision has reinvigorated the discussion on how campaign finance affects American democracy. Seeking to dissect the complex relationship between political parties, partisan polarization, and campaign finance, Tom Mann and Anthony Corrado’s new paper on Party Polarization and Campaign Finance reviews the landscape of hard and soft money in federal elections and asks whether campaign finance reform can abate polarization and strengthen governing capacity in the United States. The paper tackles two popular contentions within the campaign finance debate: First, has campaign finance reform altered the role of political parties as election financiers and therefore undermined deal making and pragmatism? Second, would a change in the composition of small and large individual donors decrease polarization in the parties?

The Role of Political Parties in Campaign Finance

Political parties have witnessed a number of shifts in their campaign finance role, including McCain-Feingold’s ban on party soft money in 2002. This has led many to ask if the breakdown in compromise and governance and the rise of polarization has come about because parties have lost the power to finance elections. To assess that claim, the authors track the amount of money crossing national and state party books as an indicator of party strength. The empirical evidence shows no significant decrease in party strength post 2002 and holds that “both parties have compensated for the loss of soft money with hard money receipts.” In fact, the parties have upped their spending on congressional candidates more than six-fold since 1980. Despite the ban on soft money, the parties remain major players in federal elections.

Large and Small Donors in National Campaigns

Mann and Corrado turn to non-party money and survey the universe of individual donors to evaluate “whether small, large or mega-donors are most likely to fuel or diminish the polarization that increasingly defines the political landscape.” The authors map the size and shape of individual giving and confront the concern that Super PACs, politically active nonprofits, and the super-wealthy are buying out American democracy. They ask: would a healthier mix of small and large donors reduce radicalization and balance out asymmetric polarization between the parties? The evidence suggests that increasing the role of small donors would have little effect on partisan polarization in either direction because small donors tend to be highly polarized. Although Mann and Corrado note that a healthier mix would champion democratic ideals like civic participation and equality of voice.

Taking both points together, Mann and Corrado find that campaign finance reform is insufficient for depolarizing the parties and improving governing capacity. They argue forcefully that polarization emerges from a broader political and partisan problem. Ultimately, they assert that, “some break in the party wars is probably a prerequisite to any serious pushback to the broader deregulation of campaign finance now underway.”

Click to read Mann and Corrado’s full paper, Party Polarization and Campaign Finance.

Editor's Note: This blog post is part of The Primaries Project series, where veteran political journalists Jill Lawrence and Walter Shapiro, along with scholars in Governance Studies, examine the congressional primaries and ask what they reveal about the future of each political party and the future of American politics.

Even though they have come to dominate political campaigns, Super PACs and their shadowy counterparts are barely old enough to qualify for pre-kindergarten. Since these big-bucks independent groups have only been legal since 2010, we are still groping to understand the long-term role that Super PACs are apt to play in congressional politics—especially primaries.

With the demonization of the Koch Brothers by the Democrats and the attacks on liberal givers like Tom Steyer from the right, it is easy to assume that Super PAC donors are ideologues. Scorched-earth contests like the Mississippi Republican Senate primary further fuel this impression. Thad Cochran versus Chris McDaniel could be viewed as a proxy war between the GOP establishment (personified by Karl Rove's Super PAC American Crossroads) and the Tea Party (working through groups like Club for Growth Action).

But there is another very important, but far less publicized, role that Super PACs are playing in this year's congressional primaries. And when the internecine warfare in the Republican Party dies down, this type of Super PAC involvement in party primaries may become the norm.

Two recent GOP House primaries in winnable districts in New York illustrate this alternative model. In both cases, Super PACs took on the role—once left to the political parties—of vetting the candidates. Super PAC donors and their campaign consultants made their own decisions about who is electable and who has the right political pedigree. And in these New York primary contests without any clear ideological markers, heavy spending by Super PACs made all the difference.

Twenty-nine-year-old Elise Stefanik was a major beneficiary of Super PAC spending in her primary in New York's rural 21st District that runs from the Saratoga racetrack to the Canadian border. Stefanik has never run for public office before, but she boasts all of the right credentials to appeal to Washington Republican politicos. Even though she calls herself a "small businesswoman" in her TV ads, Stefanik served on the White House domestic policy staff under George W. Bush and was in charge of 2012 debate preparation for Paul Ryan.

Small wonder that American Crossroads and Karl Rove invested heavily in Stefanik's primary race, spending  $772,000 in attack ads excoriating her GOP rival, Matt Doheny. This was, by the way, the only House primary in the nation in which American Crossroads has made a significant investment to distinguish between Republicans. And the Super PAC's involvement was certainly not motivated by ideology. As the Watertown Daily Times put it on the eve of the Stefanik-Doheny primary, "It's difficult to point to a single issue on which a big divide exists between the two."

Yes, Doheny—a largely self-funding investment banker who had lost two prior races for the House—was a flawed Republican candidate. And Stefanik was the embodiment of the kind of message discipline beloved by campaign consultants. But it is hard to believe that electability alone prompted attack ads with tag lines like: "Matt Doheny—it would be a big mistake to send him to Congress."

American Crossroads, which spent more than either the Stefanik or Doheny campaigns, prevailed in the June 24th primary. Stefanik romped home with 61 percent of the primary vote.

The same pattern emerged in the Republican primary in New York's 1st District on the tip of Long Island. The major player this time was the US Jobs Council, which is heavily funded by hedge-fund mogul Robert Mercer, whose home is in the district. As Mother Jones reported in an article by Molly Redden, Mercer's Ahab-like obsession has been defeating Democratic incumbent Tim Bishop ever since the congressman voted for the Dodd-Frank financial reform legislation.

Both candidates in the Republican primary to oppose Bishop had their weaknesses in appealing to a conservative electorate. State Senator Lee Zeldin carried the burden of votes in Albany that could be interpreted as raising taxes. George Demos, a former SEC lawyer, was heavily supported by his wife's in-laws who, in normal times, are liberal California Democrats.

In truth, there were scant philosophical differences between the two conservative Republicans. Newsday columnist Lane Filler wrote, "Both oppose abortion, think taxes are too high, support gun rights, hate Common Core, favor a strong national defense, are against 'amnesty' for immigrants here illegally...I have not turned up any meaningful difference between them on policy."

But that didn't prevent the US Jobs Council from spending more than $200,000 on attack ads that portrayed Demos, who had been endorsed by Rudy Giuliani and George Pataki, as a creature of "Nancy Pelosi's people." A typical ad charged that Demos "is trying to use the Pelosi cash machine to buy a seat in Congress."

Even though Demos donated $2 million to his own campaign, it was not enough to hold off the onslaught of Super PAC attacks. In the end, Zeldin defeated Demos in the primary by a 62-to-38 percent margin.

Politico reporter Ken Vogel in his praiseworthy new book, Big Money, likens Super PAC donors to meddlesome "sports junkies who plunk down hundreds of millions of dollars to buy a professional team." Often the motivation of these mega-givers is the arrogant belief that because they are rich, they know more about politics than the pros. With it comes the certainty that they can pick winners and losers in primaries just like they do with stocks on Wall Street.

And that is why the heavy Super PAC influence in these two little-covered New York House primaries may represent the wave of the future in party politics.

Tom Mann and Anthony Corrado recently argued that campaign finance reform will likely have little effect on political polarization. Their new paper has sparked a host of debate over campaign finance, the strength of parties, and the ideological motivations of donors. Today, the Monkey Cage blog hosted Mann and Corrado’s response to a critique from Ray LaRaja and Brian Schaffner.

LaRaja and Schaffner argue that pumping more funding to parties and changing the rules to facilitate that practice will provide a respite from polarization; to argue their point, they examine polarization at the state legislative level. In their response, Mann and Corrado argue that the critique is off point, noting that “no causal link to campaign finance laws (and polarization) is demonstrated.” Ultimately, Mann and Corrado explain: “The link between party financial practices and regulatory regimes is often a matter of strategy than law, and the evidence offered in their (LaRaja and Schaffner) response certainly falls well short of making a case that greater party resources would reduce the polarization that undermines the capacity to govern.”

For more on this debate:

Read Mann and Corrado’s paper, “Party Polarization and Campaign Finance”

Read LaRaja and Schaffner’s critique, “Want to reduce polarization? Give Parties Money”

Read Mann and Corrado’s response, “Don’t expect campaign finance reform to reduce polarization”

And check out some other great research on Washington Post’s Monkey Cage Blog

Editor's Note: This blog post is part of The Primaries Project series, where veteran political journalists Jill Lawrence and Walter Shapiro, along with scholars in Governance Studies and the Campaign Finance Institute, examine the congressional primaries and ask what they reveal about the future of each political party and the future of American politics.

A great deal of attention has been paid to the existence of independent expenditure groups and to the billionaires who fund them. The Koch brothers and Sheldon Adelson, right wing billionaires in politics, and Tom Steyer, the newest left wing billionaire in politics, seem to have had nearly as much ink spilled on them as have the candidates and causes they endorse.  And no wonder. Americans are fascinated and worried about the question Darrell West poses in the second chapter of his new book Billionaires, “Can rich dudes buy an election?”

Tracking the sources and amounts of money in post Citizens United elections is a full time and complex job. Our hats go off to the Campaign Finance Institute who has recently completed the most extensive study ever of the role of independent expenditures in primary elections. Michael Malbin, Founding Director of the Center and author of the upcoming report on this year’s primaries, shows us just how big these groups, often funded by billionaires, have gotten.  In research focusing on independent spending in the 2014 congressional primaries, Malbin points out that in the 15 House races with the most independent expenditure money ($500,000 +) these expenditures counted for 76% as much as the candidates own campaign money. In Senate races, the independent expenditures accounted for 44% as much as the candidates own money.  Even the candidates themselves are worried about this trend since it often seems that outside groups can swamp a candidate’s own message.

Malbin also shows us why it is so hard to figure out what’s going on in an individual election. Only 49 of the 281 organizations that were around in the 2012 cycle spending money on behalf of congressional primary candidates were also around in 2014. That means that there were 232 new and different groups playing in 2014, posing challenges for the journalists and academics trying to track them.

The Campaign Finance Institute, however, has data on all these organizations from 2012 and 2014.  They have categorized them by ideology and, as the following chart shows, there are some interesting developments. For instance, while conservative independent expenditure groups remain the biggest spenders in the 2014 congressional primaries, their overall proportion of independent expenditures is down from 2012.  That year, conservative groups spent $40.5 million, nearly three quarters of total independent expenditures, compared to $9.3 million or 17 percent of total expenditures for Democrats.  In 2014, conservative groups upped their spending to $56.8 million, but their overall share of independent expenditures fell to 68% as liberal groups doubled their spending and increased their percentage of the total to 23%.

Even more surprising is the change in spending patterns within the Republican Party. As the following table shows, this really was the year when the establishment fought back. In 2012 anti-establishment spending by independent expenditure groups in congressional primaries constituted 59% of all such expenditures while spending by independent expenditure groups on behalf of establishment Republicans was only 36% of the total.  In two years, those numbers flipped.  In 2014, with control of the Senate at stake, the establishment mobilized independent expenditure groups which spent 55% of all the money spent by such groups while the anti-establishment groups spent only 37%.

There’s something for everyone in these findings. For the Democrats who have been on the defensive for much of this year but who have gotten through a primary season with few internal divisions, the increase in spending on their behalf and the sense that they will be able to run a good ground game in the key states where it really counts is a plus.

For the Republicans, the heavy spending by establishment groups has paid off in that they haven’t let weak candidates slip into the general election contest. They are probably as strong as they can be going into the fall campaign.

Nonetheless, tracking the money in this new election environment is a complex and full time job. And Darrell West’s question still hangs over us—“Can rich dudes buy an election?”

Editor's Note: As part of the 2014 Midterm Elections Series, Brookings scholars and outside experts will weigh in on issues that are central to this year's campaigns, how the candidates are engaging those topics, and what will shape policy for the next two years.

Since the Citizens United decision, political spending by outside groups has been shaping voters’ opinions before Election Day and public policy afterwards.  Spending patterns that began after the 2010 decision will continue during the upcoming midterms: nonparty, outside spending will flow through two distinct pipelines—super PACs and politically active nonprofits. This time around there seems to be a partisan split to the spending, with Democrats leaning towards super PACs and Republicans relying more on dark money nonprofits. But whichever tool is used to funnel money into competitive races, imperfect or non-existent disclosure rules leave voters unable to determine whether access and influence is being sold to highest bidder.

Shining a brighter light on super PAC and nonprofit campaign spending would not cleanse the system of all of its corrupting influences, but it would help to restore citizens’ trust in government by eliminating the secrecy that makes voters believe their elected officials have something to hide. More disclosure would also result in the equally important outcome of demonstrating that government trusts us, its citizens, with information about how the influence industry works.   

When Thomas Jefferson wrote, “Whenever the people are well-informed, they can be trusted with their own government...whenever things get so far wrong as to attract their notice, they may be relied on to set them to rights,” he certainly could not have conceived of secret money’s impact on elections and policy-making. But every year that goes by with Congress failing to address secret campaign spending challenges the founding father’s time-tested wisdom.

When the Supreme Court decided Citizens United, it was either willfully blind or sorely naïve about the state of political finance disclosure. Justice Kennedy swept aside concerns about the corrupting influence of unlimited political spending by claiming that, “With the advent of the Internet, prompt disclosure of expenditures can provide shareholders and citizens with the information needed to hold corporations and elected officials accountable for their positions. . . This transparency enables the electorate to make informed decisions and give proper weight to different speakers and messages.”

Unfortunately, no such prompt disclosure existed at the time, nor has Congress been able to pass any improvements to the transparency regime since then. In the case of super PACs, while information about donors must eventually be disclosed to the Federal Election Commission (FEC), disclosures can be delayed by up to three months.  This is not an inconsequential delay, especially when contributions come are in the multi-million dollar range.

There is even less disclosure by politically active nonprofits.  Their overall expenditures are only disclosed after the election in annual reports filed with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The donors to dark money groups may never be known, as the law does not require the names of donors to such groups to be disclosed. Yet more than 55 percent of advertising has been paid for by dark money groups, and 80 percent advertising benefitting Republican candidates has been paid for with undisclosed funds according to the New York Times. 

Congress and the executive branch have no shortage of methods to make money in politics more transparent, but have so far failed to demonstrate they respect voters enough to entrust us with that information.  The Real Time Transparency Act (S. 2207, H.R. 4442) would ensure that contributions of $1000 or more to candidates, parties and PACs, including super PACs, are disclosed within 48 hours. It would also require electronic filing of campaign finance reports.  The DISCLOSE Act, S. 2516, would disclose contributors to political nonprofits entrusting voters with information that currently is only known to the candidates who may benefit from dark money contributions. 

Affirmative congressional action would be the strongest signal that government trusts its citizens, but executive branch agencies can also take important steps to make political finance information more transparent. The IRS is in the process of reforming rules to better clarify when a nonprofit is a political organization and thus must disclose its donors.  The Securities and Exchange Commission can likewise modify its rules to require publicly traded companies to disclose their political activities.

Many large donors have gone to great lengths to take their political activities underground, claiming they fear attacks in the form of criticism or boycotts of their companies.  But just as participating in the political process through contributing to election efforts is an expression of free speech, so is criticizing such efforts.  Yet until campaign finance information is fully and quickly made public, the first amendment rights of voters and their ability to participate fully in our democracy are drastically shortchanged.

It is no secret that American elections are getting wildly expensive. If you are unlucky enough to live in a swing state or a state with a competitive race for US House, US Senate or Governor, you know that every even numbered year means frequent phone calls, a barrage of campaign mail, and endless television ads. Candidates want your vote, and sometimes it seems their strategy is to annoy the average voter into turning out to the polls.

However, beyond direct candidate appeals, outside groups are now spending heavily on competitive races of all types. Many statewide campaigns now cost tens of millions of dollars, and interest groups, PACs, and other organizations are ponying up with substantial sums to try to reach voters and do one of two things. They either try to convince you one candidate deserves your vote or dissuade you from voting for the other candidate.

How much money is flowing into races beyond what candidates themselves spend? The answer is staggering. Below we profile the 20 most expensive Senate races since 2010 in terms of independent expenditures. The chart shows not only how expensive races are, but the extent to which outside groups seek to influence electoral outcomes.  

This chart shows that races are getting more expensive. Among these races, only two (Colorado and Pennsylvania) are from 2010. Half (10) of the races are being waged this cycle, and even though data are updated through Sunday, the totals are certain to rise. Those ten races alone have totaled over $435 million in spending in those states.

The totals provide a small picture into the magnitude of money in American politics. The totals exclude direct candidate spending and spending by other, outside groups not subject to as rigorous FEC disclosure requirements.

As campaigns continue to become more expensive and outside groups see participation in elections as a path toward influencing outcomes of both races and policy, there is one political certainty: over the next two to four years, many of the campaigns on this list will be displaced by future, more expensive campaigns for the Senate.

Totaling more than $111,000,000.00, the 2014 North Carolina Senate contest between Kay Hagan and Thom Tillis is the most expensive Senate election in the nation’s history (not adjusted for inflation). As we investigated earlier this week, outside money has been flowing into American politics in the wake of the Supreme Court’s Citizens United decision in 2010.

When candidate and independent spending are combined, 2014 ranks among the most expensive, if not the most expensive, in history. However, understanding campaign spending takes more than a simple examination of total dollars. Spending differences across states can occur for a variety of reasons, including geographic size, population size, and the expense of media markets.

As a result, a more useful metric for understanding the magnitude of campaign activity is spending per voter, and 2014 offers an interesting case: Alaska. This year, Alaska saw a highly competitive Senate race in which both outside groups and candidates spend substantial amounts of money. Alaska ranks 47th in population with just over 700,000 residents and an estimated 503,000 eligible voters. After adjusting spending (both candidate and independent expenditures) for each state's estimated voting eligible population, Alaska's 2014 Senate race, unsurprisingly, ranks as the most expensive in US history.

Alaska originally ranked 6^th most expensive in 2014, with about $60 million spent total. But it jumps to first place in dollars spent per voter. Candidates and outside groups spent roughly $120 per voter in Alaska this year, about double the next most-expensive race, Montana 2012, where candidates and outside groups spent $66.5 per voter. By comparison, the $111 million Senate race in North Carolina—with a voting-eligible population of about 6,826,610—equaled only $16.25 per voter. That’s still far above the median spending per race for all three cycles ($7.3 per voter) but certainly serves to put the spending in context.

Relative to 2012 and 2014, in terms of both combined and per-voter spending, 2010 could be considered one of the cheaper cycles for Senate races thus far.

These data lend some support to the observation that, since Citizens (and more recently McCutcheon v. FEC) independent expenditures are quickly outpacing contributions to candidates. But given changes in reporting requirements and limited data, there is still a lot about outside spending we still don’t know.

All in all, candidate and outside group spending totaled just over a billion dollars in Senate races in 2014. The fact that North Carolina alone accounted for more than ten percent of that spending is astonishing, but no less remarkable is the intensity of spending per voter in Alaska. But if spending continues to grow as it has the last three election cycles, both of those records will likely be shattered in 2016.

The news that Charles and David Koch and their network of conservative activists plan to spend $889 million on the 2016 elections has sent shockwaves throughout the political landscape. Publicized this week at a California gathering hosted by the business group Freedom Partners, this declaration of financial war raises the question of whether billionaires and their allies can buy elections.

As I note in my Brookings Institution Press book Billionaires: Reflections on the Upper Crust, the answer in 2012 clearly was no. A few billionaires devoted several hundred million dollars seeking to defeat President Barack Obama yet lost. Republicans nominated a candidate who was easy to caricature as an out-of-touch plutocrat who did not share the values of ordinary Americans. The President was successful in using that stereotype to mobilize voters, expand the electorate, and appeal to basic fairness on the part of the general public.

Yet 2014 was a different story. Conservative billionaires were far more successful in helping Republicans regain control of the Senate, boost their House numbers, and increase their domination over governorships and state legislatures.  The country now has GOP control of the House and Senate, and 31 governorships across the country.

In analyzing why they lost the 2012 presidential campaign, conservative billionaires decided they needed to recalibrate their message and strategy for the midterms. For example, Americans for Prosperity (AFP) focused on ads that employed moving personal stories to deliver policy messages and a robust field operation. Central to their approach was the idea that Obamacare was a failure and hurting ordinary people.

Explaining this communications shift, AFP President Tim Phillips told a reporter that “too often, we did kind of broader statistical ads or messages, and we decided that we needed to start telling the story of how the liberals’ policies, whether it’s the administration or Congress, are practically impacting the lives of Americans every day.” Media expert Elizabeth Wilner of Kantar Media/CMAG correctly anticipated that those kinds of ads would have a greater likelihood of electoral success. “Ads that tell stories are more compelling than ads that don’t,” she said. “And ads that use sympathetic figures are more compelling, generally, than those that don’t.”

In looking ahead to 2016, there are ominous signs that big money may distort the election outcome. Wealthy interests were far more likely in 2012 to contribute to Republicans than Democrats. Even if Democrats mobilize liberal billionaires, the GOP nominee is going to have a substantial fundraising advantage.

Money alone, of course, does not dictate elections. Research shows clearly that public opinion, media coverage, campaign strategies, policy positions, and the nature of the times matter as well. However, during a time of rising campaign costs and limited public engagement in the political process, big money sets the agenda, affects how the campaign develops, and shapes how particular people and policy problems get defined. It takes skilled candidates, favorable media coverage, and strong organizational efforts to offset the power of great wealth.

There are no guarantees that the future Democratic nominee will replicate Obama’s 2012 success. If Republicans nominate someone who relates well to ordinary voters and they tone down policies that disproportionately benefit the wealthy, the money story in 2016 likely will turn out very different from the last time. Billionaire activism very well could tilt a close election in favor of conservative interests.

One of the fundamental arguments in the “Political Realism” debate is whether or not strong political parties could make government work better. One way to assess party strength is to look at how much money parties can raise and spend.

In this vein, political scientists Ray LaRaja and Brian Schaffner have claimed that removing limits on party funding activity would make politics less polarized. I’ve been skeptical of this claim. In fact, in a short analysis, I found that the opposite is more likely the case—that states with limits on party fundraising appear to be less polarized, though I cautioned against inferring too much from this pattern.

LaRaja and Schaffner have now responded and previewed their forthcoming book, Campaign Finance and Political Polarization: When Purists Prevail, which will be out this fall from the University of Michigan Press. So, a response to their response is now in order.

I’ll start by granting a point of agreement: LaRaja and Schaffner note that I didn’t re-produce their analysis. I didn’t do this because, based on what they’ve written, it’s not clear exactly which states they consider to be “Parties Unlimited” and “Parties Limited” states. So, until they make their list public, it will be impossible to conduct a precise replication of their analysis.

The good news is they’ve promised to make their data public in the future. As they write in their recent post, “we will be posting all the data necessary to replicate (and challenge) our results upon publication of our book this fall, and we look forward to seeing what others find when they dig into the data.” They also note in their analysis that “11 states changed their laws on party limits during the period of our study (1993-2012).” Assembling this list, they note, was “possibly the most painstaking work we did on this book.” For now, their list of changes remains a well-kept secret, though the changes appear to be driving their analysis. So it will be good when all the relevant data and categorization choices are clear and on the table.

A lot depends on which states fall into which categories. But, there is a more fundamental question: does it make sense to dichotomize states into “Parties Unlimited” and “Parties Limited” states? States with limits vary considerably. Some states limit the money into parties, but allow unlimited flows to candidates; some states allow unlimited money into parties, but limit money from parties to candidates. Some limits are high, some are low. Some have exceptions for party-building activities. Rules vary between primary and general elections, as well.

Consider California. There are limits on how much parties can raise from individuals, but those limits are quite high (they are now at $35,200), and also only cover the party accounts that go to state candidates (so, for example, ballot measures are exempt or general party activities are exempted). California also has no limits on how much parties can transfer to candidates. So should California be a “limits” or “no limits” state? California also has the most polarized legislature, as measured by the distance between party medians. Depending on how you choose to classify states, you can get very different results, especially when you are only working with 20 states (LaRaja and Schaffner limit their claims to the 20 states with the most professionalized legislatures, as per the Squire Index).

LaRaja and Schaffner’s response presents a time series regression model to “calculate the predicted level of polarization over time in a state that limited party fundraising … and spending to on where those limits were removed.” But if states that removed limits became less polarized following the removal of those limits, why not tell us what those states were, and report the actual polarization trends in the states? Put another way: Why rely on model predictions when there are real world data? Grounding this debate in the trajectories of actual states would lend some realism to the claims. Then we could debate examples.

For example, as Thomas Mann and E.J. Dionne note in a recent Brookings paper, two of the states with no limits are Texas and North Carolina. As Mann and Dionne write, “The behavior of their legislatures in recent years cannot, on any plausible definition, be described as 'moderate.'” However, neither Texas nor North Carolina shows up as excessively polarized when polarization is merely a measure of voting patterns. Moreover, if parties are so pragmatic, why did the North Carolina Republican Party (which could raise and spend unlimited sums of money) fail to stop a takeover by multi-millionaire right-wing extremist Art Pope?

This takes us to questions of how party leaders actually behave. LaRaja and Shaffner show evidence in their response that parties give more money to moderate incumbents than to extreme incumbents. This should not be surprising. Presumably, moderate incumbents are more likely to be in competitive races, since moderates are more likely to represent competitive districts.

The more relevant question is what types of candidates parties recruit. Thankfully, we have answers to this courtesy of excellent work by David Broockman, Nicholas Carnes, Melody Crowder-Meyer, and Christopher Skovron, who surveyed 6,000 county-level political party leaders. They found that, “party leaders…use their influence to discourage moderates from seeking office: they strongly prefer candidates at least as ideologically polarized as their median party member. Republican party leaders show this preference especially.”

Their findings also reinforce something that should be apparent to students of polarization—that polarization is asymmetric. Republicans have moved far to the right. Democrats have mostly stayed in place. Let me quote Broockman et al.’s paper at further length, because the findings are extremely relevant to this debate:

“Republicans are much more likely to, unprompted, mention ideology as an important factor for candidates. Our evidence suggests that not only do Republicans care more about ideology, it is also readily accessible when they think of candidate recruitment. It seems likely, then, that Republicans are much more active in recruiting ideologically polarized candidates than Democrats are.”

“Democratic chairs are most inclined to support candidates who are middle-of-the-road or slightly left with respect to the party, while Republicans prefer candidates who espouse an ideology matching or more conservative than their party. In fact, while Democratic chairs are less likely to support very liberal candidates than those nearer to their party average, Republican chairs seem to give very conservative primary candidates the same boost that Democrats give to moderates.”

This does suggest that perhaps giving parties more money and therefore more control over candidates would produce moderation in blue states, but exacerbate polarization in red states. Unfortunately, there is nothing in LaRaja and Schaffner’s analysis that addresses this possibility.

The importance of recruitment also suggests that what we really want to know is who controls the actual recruitment mechanisms in the first place. It’s possible that states with limits might have strong party recruitment mechanisms. If what we really care about is the strength of party machines, why not try to measure that more directly?

LaRaja and Schaffner seem to envision parties being run by hard-headed pragmatists who can determine outcomes with money alone. They seem to assume that if parties can get billionaires to fund them, this will enable party leaders to support more moderate candidates. They seem to ignore that the billionaires may have a few ideas of their own about how they think government should be run (see, e.g. North Carolina).

This gets to a final point, about whether we ought to care if parties rely on small or large donors. LaRaja and Schaffner dismiss the case for small donors, noting that: “the endless romanticizing of small donors as being emblematic of American voters has no empirical grounding.” They go on to note that the ideological distribution of small donors and the ideological distribution of large donors “are nearly identical,” and therefore, “[p]utting more emphasis on ideological small donors may even make our politics worse as politicians streamline their messages to cater to this minority of individuals with more extreme views.”

Let’s grant that large and small donors have the same ideological distribution. If there is no difference, then there’s no reason to think that relying more on small donors would make politics any more extreme. However, since there are many more small donors than there are large donors, a small-donor matching system would allow less extreme candidates the ability to seek out less extreme donors from a larger population of potential donors. We know large donors are polarized, so relying more heavily on them doesn’t give parties much room to moderate. Of course, this presumes that large donors want to shape party positions. But that seems a safe bet.

There are also good (small-d) democratic reasons to support small-donor programs: they bring more participants into the political process; they orient politicians to think differently about whom they represent, and they probably make politics an attractive profession for a broader set of potential candidates. I’d even trade off some polarization for a small donor system. Fortunately, based on their data, it doesn’t appear that I’d even have to.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, polarization is a function of many, many things, and it’s hard to imagine how changing limits on what parties can raise and spend would have much of an influence given the many other factors. Consider this thoughtful systems map developed by the Hewlett Foundation to analyze American politics as a system: it describes multiple factors that might influence levels of polarization. Systems thinking warns us to be careful of putting too much focus on a single point of leverage without thinking about the larger systems dynamics. This is why many reform skeptics are cautious about unintended consequences—thinking about a single variable in the absence of a larger context usually has unexpected results.

Moreover, as Mann and Dionne explain, we need to be cautious of applying lessons from the states to Washington:

"The gridlock in Washington is a consequence of the ideological polarization of the parties buttressed by vast party networks, their strategic opposition to one another throughout the legislative process fueled by the intense competition for control of the White House and Congress, the prevalence of divided party government, and the asymmetry between the parties that leads Republicans to eschew negotiation and compromise."

"The situation in the states is dramatically different. Most now have unified party governments, and gridlock is the exception, not the rule. There is little evidence of moderation in the Republican- controlled states, whatever their campaign finance laws."

I’m sure we will continue this debate for many months to come, especially after the publication of Campaign Finance and Political Polarization: When Purists Prevail this fall. I’m glad that LaRaja and Schaffner are bringing valuable data to this important question. It’s certainly far from settled.

The use of economic resources to support election campaigns is an essential ingredient of democratic competition. Often viewed as a malady of democracy, campaign finance is actually part of the normal workings of democratic life. However, it is indisputable that money is capable of inflicting significant distortions on politics and policymaking. When there is a failure to regulate money in the political process or existing regulation is ineffectual, the legitimacy of democratic processes can be jeopardized.

These concerns are particularly relevant to Latin America, a region plagued by a highly unequal income distribution, and where organized crime has a major presence, transacts billions of dollars each year in illicit business, and has the potential to corrupt democratic institutions. In this policy brief, Kevin Casas-Zamora and Daniel Zovatto offer practical guidance for making campaign finance regulation feasible and increasing its likelihood of success. In undertaking reform, countries should prioritize the most urgently needed changes with the broadest political consensus. Proposals for reform include:

• Establish greater control over private funding of parties and election campaigns;

• Create a public subsidy system to ensure fair access for parties and candidates to adequate funding to finance both regular day-to-day operations and election campaigns;

• Adopt mechanisms to keep campaign spending from skyrocketing;

• Craft party and candidate reporting systems to increase accountability, transparency, and disclosure; and

• Establish a graduated and credible system of sanctions for the chief financial officers of political parties in the event of violations of the rules in force.

Downloads

• The cost of democracy: Campaign finance in Latin America

Editor’s Note: This post was originally published by the Institute of Governmental Studies. Thomas Mann is also Resident Scholar at IGS.

Donald Trump and the Amen chorus of Republican presidential aspirants may have appeared to monopolize the capacity to make fantastical claims about what’s wrong with America and how to fix it. But a rival has appeared on the scene, outlining a very different fantasy plan to run for president on the Democratic side of the aisle.

Harvard law professor Lawrence Lessig looks meek—a dead ringer for Mr. Peepers—yet is anything but. Lessig built an impressive career in legal scholarship on the regulation of cyberspace, and the mild-mannered, soft-spoken academic became a cult hero among libertarians fearful of increasing legal restrictions on copyright, trademark and the electromagnetic spectrum. But Lessig’s transformation into a political activist was spurred by his personal revelation that money in politics is the root of all our governing problems. Eliminate the dependence of elected officials on private donors and the formidable obstacles to constructive policymaking will crumble. Simple but searing truth, or a caricature of a complex governing system shaped by institutions, ideas/ideologies, and interests?

Lessig became a whirlwind of energy and organization to promote his new values and beliefs, leading efforts to “Change Congress,” convene a second constitutional convention, raise awareness of corruption in politics through the “New Hampshire Rebellion,” and start the “Mayday PAC,” a super PAC designed to end all super PACs. He wrote the bestselling book Republic, Lost: How Money Corrupts Congress—and A Plan to Stop It, delivered a series of popular TED talks, and tirelessly traveled the country with his PowerPoint.

With none of these enterprises yet bearing fruit, Lessig has decided to raise the stakes. He has announced that if he receives $1 million from small donors by September, he will seek the Democratic presidential nomination, running as a “referendum candidate.” His single-issue platform, built around the concept of “Citizen Equality,” consists of “true” campaign finance reform supplemented by electoral reform (to weaken the influence of gerrymandering) and voting rights. His goal is to use the election to build a mandate for political reform that will cure our democratic ills. Lessig will apparently have nothing to say about anything other than political reform, insisting that his issue should be and can be the number one priority of voters in the 2016 elections. If nominated and elected, President Lessig will serve in office only long enough to enact the Citizen Equality Act and then resign, turning over the powers and responsibilities of the office to the vice president. Recently he generously informed the Vice President that he would happily enable a third Joe Biden term by selecting him as his running mate.

The hubris of the Harvard Professor is breathtaking. In virtually every respect, his strategy is absurd. Lessig’s political reform agenda is stymied by Republicans, not Democrats. Why not direct his energies where the opposition resides? All of the current Democratic presidential candidates support the thrust of these reforms. But saying that this is their highest priority is likely to harm, not boost, their candidacies. Why would even the most ardent supporter of the three pillars of Lessig’s reform agenda cast a ballot solely on this basis? Big and important issues divide the two parties today and the stakes of public action or inaction are huge. We don’t have the luxury of using the election to try to build a mandate for a set of political reforms that would have no chance of passing in the face of GOP opposition and would be of only incremental utility if they did.

Campaign finance does play a corrosive role in our democracy and I have invested much of my career grappling with it. There is no doubt that money in elections facilitates the transfer of economic inequality into political inequality, and the spectacle of several hundred plutocrats dominating the finance of our elections should be a target of serious reform efforts in the courts and the Congress. At the same time it is foolish to imagine that campaign finance is the only route for private wealth to influence public policy or that its reform will dramatically transform the policy process. Money did not prevent the major legislative enactments of 2009-2010—including the stimulus, student loans, the Affordable Care Act, and financial services reform. Nor is it likely to be the critical factor on climate change, immigration, infrastructure or jobs and wages; which party wins the White House and whether control with Congress is unified or divided is key. If anything, the Lessig campaign is likely to weaken the forces for political reform by demonstrating just how small the relative priority for this action is.

Trump offers the country his outsider status, success in building his personal wealth, an outsized personality, a brashness in asserting how easily he can solve the country’s problems, and a hearty appetite for and skill in stoking the anger and fears of a segment of the country. He feeds the notion that a strong, fearless, wily leader, inexperienced and mostly uninformed in politics and governing, can be the man on a white horse saving a great country losing its exceptional status. His claim that all politicians are bought by private interests—a claim Lessig eagerly embraces—fits well with his grandiose claims that he alone can fix what ails the country. A significant segment of Republican voters, presumably not well versed in the American constitutional system are attracted to him, at least enough for him to be a factor in this election campaign.

Lessig is a far less commanding presence but his ambition burns no less than that of Trump. The notoriety, celebrity, and adoring audiences are heady stuff, even if on a much smaller scale. Lessig told Bloomberg that Trump’s candidacy is evidence that his reform message is taking hold. Lessig said, Trump “strikes people as credible when he says all these people (politicians) are bought—I used to buy them …Trump is saying the truth.” Lessig will be a minor figure in this election and the causes for which he fights are unlikely to advance from it. Both Lessig and Trump, despite their differences in visibility and importance in the election, will have contributed to the dumbing down of American politics, a reality that will bring tears to the eyes of civics teachers and political science professors across the country.

Hillary Clinton’s release of her campaign finance proposals on Tuesday confirms there will be no significant substantive differences on political reform among the aspirants for the Democratic presidential nomination but a huge gulf between the two parties, whoever the nominees.

Harvard law professor and activist Larry Lessig announced his candidacy for the Democratic nomination this past weekend based on the single issue of political reform, but his quixotic and gimmicky campaign is akin to carrying coals to Newcastle. His only difference with the other Democratic candidates is his insistence that political reform (primarily on campaign finance) should be of the highest priority and other concerns (immigration, wages, climate change, economic inequality, infrastructure, national security) should play second fiddle. Lessig apparently believes that Republican and independent voters will rally to his call and create a broad base of public support for bipartisan cooperation on changing the rules of the electoral game.

If only it were that simple. The gaping differences between the parties on campaign reform are both ideological and strategic. Republicans are more philosophically disposed to elevate free speech over political equality. They also realize that as presently constituted, their party is advantaged by fewer or no restrictions on money in politics, lower turnout among minorities and youth, and single-member districts. Democrats instinctively reject the argument that money is speech and are comfortable with using public authority to set and enforce the rules of democracy. But they also know that they would benefit from restrictions on big money in elections, guaranteed voting rights for all citizens, and a more proportional translation of votes into seats.

The Clinton campaign finance proposals generally follow the thrust of liberal reformers: building a counterforce to big money through multiple matching funds for small donors, increasing transparency by requiring timely disclosure of mega-contributions and transfers that now evade public scrutiny, and overturning Citizens United, which set the stage for a Wild West of outsized contributions and spending. Her support for a constitutional amendment to accomplish the latter is a pipedream and probably wouldn’t work if it were adopted. As she acknowledges, appointing Supreme Court justices to change the current 5-4 majority is the more promising route to the desired change.

Lessig’s dream notwithstanding, this particular agenda will be achieved only if and when Democrats manage to control both ends of Pennsylvania long enough to put the policies and a sympathetic Supreme Court in place. It’s an important choice for voters to consider in the 2016 elections but by no means the only or most pressing one.

I was honored today to speak at the kick off meeting of the new ReFormers Caucus. This group of over 100 former members of the U.S. Senate, the House, and governors of both parties, has come together to fight for meaningful campaign finance reform. In the bipartisan spirit of the caucus, I shared speaking duties with Professor Richard Painter, who was the Bush administration ethics czar and my predecessor before I had a similar role in the Obama White House. 

As I told the distinguished audience of ReFormers (get the pun?) gathered over lunch on Capitol Hill, I wish they had existed when in my Obama administration role I was working for the passage of the Disclose Act. That bill would have brought true transparency to the post-Citizens United campaign finance system, yet it failed by just one vote in Congress.  But it is not too late for Americans, working together, to secure enhanced transparency and other campaign finance changes that are desperately needed.  Momentum is building, with increasing levels of public outrage, as reflected in state and local referenda passing in Maine, Seattle and San Francisco just this week, and much more to come at the federal, state and local level.

The rise of SuperPACs, the decision in Citizens United, and intensified polarization in Congress has ignited a flame under the already robust academic debate over the role of money in elections. Last week, Lee Drutman wrote an article for Vox outlining the recent contribution of Raymond J. La Raja and Brian Schaffner made to the debate with their book, Campaign Finance and Political Polarization: When Purists Prevail.

The crux of the book argues that allowing political parties to control more money, not less, is the key to reducing polarization. This runs counter to many pro-reform writings, focused chiefly on empowering small donors in order to counter big-money politics. La Raja and Schaffner counter this narrative, suggesting parties channel money to create moderation, rather than small donors, which are polarizing.

Drutman pushes back on both accounts by taking issue with some of the underlying assumptions in When Purists Prevail, including the weight they place on median voter theory and the extent parties will spend money on moderate candidates in primary elections. He marshals a host of recent research to support the critique, including: a recent Brookings paper on the strength of political parties, data on the power of outside money in congressional elections, and research showing moderate districts do not necessarily produce moderate candidates.

Click here to read the full article on Vox.

Event Information

As the sixth anniversary of Citizens United v. FEC approaches on January 21, both experts and ordinary citizens believe the United States is confronting a campaign finance crisis. Citizens United and related court cases have unleashed a flood of dark money that many believe could drown our democracy. It is estimated that over $5 billion will be spent on the 2016 presidential race—more than 3 times the amount spent in 2008 (already the most expensive election cycle in history). A comprehensive poll conducted by the New York Times and CBS News in the spring of 2015 showed that 84 percent of adults—including 90 percent of Democrats and 80 percent of Republicans—believe that money has too much influence in American political campaigns. Even the richest Americans agreed: 85 percent of adults making $100,000 or more share that same belief.

There has been much handwringing about this state of affairs. But there has been too little public attention paid to finding solutions. On the sixth anniversary of Citizens United, the Governance Studies program at Brookings hosted current and former government officials, lobbyists, donors, advocates, and other experts to discuss how to resolve the campaign finance crisis. They focused on innovative reform efforts at the federal, state, and local levels which offer the hope of addressing the problem of big money in politics.

Panelists will included:

Cheri Beasley, Associate Justice, North Carolina Supreme Court
Daniel Berger, Partner, Berger & Montague, P.C.
John Bonifaz, Co-Founder and President, Free Speech for People
Norman L. Eisen, U.S. Ambassador to the Czech Republic (2011-2014); Special Assistant and Special Counsel to the President (2009-2011); Visiting Fellow, The Brookings Institution
Bruce Freed, Founder and President, Center for Political Accountability
Steve Israel, Member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-NY)
Roger Katz, Chair, Government Oversight Committee, Maine State Senate (R)
Allen Loughry, Justice, Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
Chuck Merin, Executive Vice President, Prime Policy Group; Lobbyist
Connie Morella, Ambassador to OECD (2003-2007); Member, U.S. House of Representatives (R-Md., 1987-2003)
Jeffrey Peck, Principal, Peck Madigan Jones; Lobbyist
Nick Penniman, Executive Director, Issue One
Trevor Potter, Commissioner, Federal Election Commission (1991-1995; Chairman,1994)
John Pudner, Executive Director, Take Back Our Republic
Ann Ravel, Commissioner, Federal Election Commission (Chairwoman, 2015)
Timothy Roemer, Ambassador to India (2009-2011); Member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Ind., 1991-2003); member 9/11 Commission; Senior Strategic Advisor to Issue One
John Sarbanes, Member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Md.)
Claudine Schneider, Member, U.S. House of Representatives (R-R.I.,1981-1991)
Peter Schweizer, President, Government Accountability Institute
Zephyr Teachout, CEO, Mayday PAC
Lucas Welch, Executive Director, The Pluribus Project
Fred Wertheimer, Founder and President, Democracy 21
Tim Wirth, Member, U.S. Senate (D-Colo.,1987-1993); Member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Colo.,1975-1987)
Dan Wolf, Chair, Committee on Steering and Policy, Massachusetts State Senate (D)

Click here for a full agenda.

Video

• The campaign finance crisis in America and how to fix it - Part 1
• The campaign finance crisis in America and how to fix it - Part 2
• The campaign finance crisis in America and how to fix it - Part 3
• The campaign finance crisis in America and how to fix it - Part 4

Audio

• The campaign finance crisis in America and how to fix it: A solutions summit (Part 1)
• The campaign finance crisis in America and how to fix it: A solutions summit (Part 2)
• The campaign finance crisis in America and how to fix it: A solutions summit (Part 3)
• The campaign finance crisis in America and how to fix it: A solutions summit (Part 4)

Transcript

• Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

• Solution Summits Agenda120
• 20160121_campaign_finance_summit_transcript

We have received many emails and calls in response to our blog last week about our campaign finance reform “Solutions Summit," so we thought we would share some pictures and quotes from the event. Also, Issue One’s Nick Penniman and I just co-authored an op-ed highlighting the themes of the event, which you can find here.

Ann Ravel, Commissioner of the Federal Election Commission and the outgoing Chairwoman kicked us off as our luncheon speaker. She noted that, “campaign finance issues [will] only be addressed when there is a scandal. The truth is, that campaign finance today is a scandal.”

(L-R, Ann Ravel, Trevor Potter, Peter Schweizer, Timothy Roemer)

Commenting on Ann’s remarks from a conservative perspective, Peter Schweizer, the President of the Government Accountability Institute, noted that, “increasingly today the problem is more one of extortion, that the challenge not so much from businesses that are trying to influence politicians, although that certainly happens, but that businesses feel and are targeted by politicians in the search for cash.” That’s Trevor Potter, who introduced Ann, to Peter’s left.

Kicking off the first panel, a deep dive into the elements of the campaign finance crisis, was Tim Roemer, former Ambassador to India (2009-2011), Member of the U.S. House of Representatives, (D-IN, 1991-2003) Member of the 9/11 Commission and Senior Strategic Advisor to Issue One. He explained that “This is not a red state problem. It’s not a blue state problem. Across the heartland, across America, the Left, the Right, the Democrats, the Republicans, Independents, we all need to work together to fix this.”

(L-R, Fred Wertheimer, John Bonifaz, Dan Wolf, Roger Katz, Allen Loughry, Cheri Beasley, Norman Eisen)

Our second panel addressed solutions at the federal and state level.  Here, Fred Wertheimer, the founder and President of Democracy 21 is saying that, “We are going to have major scandals again and we are going to have opportunities for major reforms. With this corrupt campaign finance system it is only a matter of time before the scandals really break out. The American people are clearly ready for a change. The largest national reform movement in decades now exists and it’s growing rapidly.”

Our third and final panel explained why the time for reform is now. John Sarbanes, Member of the U.S. House of Representatives (D-MD) argued that fixes are in political reach. He explains, “If we can build on the way people feel about [what] they’re passionate on and lead them that way to this need for reform, then we’re going to build the kind of broad, deep coalition that will achieve success ultimately.”

(L-R in each photo, John Sarbanes, Claudine Schneider, Zephyr Teachout)

Reinforcing John’s remarks, Claudine Schneider, Member of the U.S. House of Representatives (R-RI, 1981-1991) pointed out that “we need to keep pounding the media with letters to the editor, with editorial press conferences, with broad spectrum of media strategies where we can get the attention of the masses. Because once the masses rise up, I believe that’s when were really going to get the change, from the bottom up and the top down.”

Grace Abiera contributed to this post.

Campaign finance is a key issue for the quality of democracy. As we noted in a recently-published book of which we are co-authors, and which we had the honor to present in the Hall of Former Presidents of the Legislative Assembly last February 11 (El costo de la Democracia: Ensayos sobre el financiamiento político en América Latina, UNAM, Mexico City, 2015), it is important because of an inescapable fact: While democracy has no price, it does have an operating cost. The use of economic resources is an essential element for democratic competition. More than a pathology of democracy, political financing, when well-regulated, is a normal part of democratic life.

Yet it is undeniable that money is capable of introducing distortions in the democratic process. Its unequal distribution impacts, first, on the real possibilities enjoyed by the parties and the candidates to take their message to the voters. Second, having money gives individuals and social groups a differentiated possibility of participating in elections and exercizing their influence over the candidates through their contributions. This is vital for democracy. When political power is simply a reflection of economic power, the principle of “one person, one vote” loses meaning. Third, fundraising efforts offer obvious opportunities for the articulation of exchanges between donors and those who make decisions on public affairs, or at least for the continual appearance of conflicts of interest. This can be very problematic in the case of Latin America, where there is a risk of money from organized crime penetrating the campaigns.

And so it is not surprising that the issue is on the political agenda in many countries of the region, just as it has been for a long time in Costa Rica. Costa Rica introduced public financing for political parties in 1956, making it the second country in the world to do so, after Uruguay. Nonetheless, the generosity of the government contribution did not avoid a long succession of scandals associated with the issue, a history that includes figures ranging from Robert Vesco and Manuel Antonio Noriega to Carlos Hank González and the illegal donations from the government of Taiwan. 

The wounds left by each of these episodes gave way to worthy yet incomplete regulatory efforts. Most important has been the reform of the Electoral Code approved in 2009, which among many necessary changes prohibited corporate contributions to the political parties. And not only legislative action has made a difference. The Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court has also made a difference by lifting bank secrecy on financing, a very important decision that has been pointed to internationally.

Each of these steps has been moving the country in the right direction. This is worth underscoring: At a time when it is so easy to revile the Costa Rican political system, it should be recognized that in terms of political financing the country is, in general, better situated than it was 20 or 30 years ago. All the evidence we have indicates that private contributions today are less important in our campaigns than one generation ago. We can state with great certainty that our parties are financing more than 80% of the cost of their campaigns with the state contribution. That is good news.

However, the current regulatory framework presents problems such as:

a) It continues to be a regulatory system that is somehow upside down: It meticulously keeps tabs on the use of the state contribution by the parties, which does not give rise to conflicts of interest, while it is much less effective when it comes to verifying the truth of the information the parties provide about their private sources of financing, which do have the potential to compromise the autonomy of the political system. Correcting this imbalance, getting the Supreme Electoral Tribunal to prioritize monitoring private financing and to devote more resources to it, would not only be a way to straighten out its priorities, but frankly, all the parties would also breathe a sigh of relief.

b) The system of advances on the state contribution continues to be very limited (only 15% of the subsidy is disbursed before the presidential election and nothing in the case of municipal elections). It is time to admit that eliminating the system whereby the contributions were distributed in advance payments, which existed from 1971 to 1991 (when 50% was disbursed in advances), caused grave prejudice to the political system. The weakness of the advanced disbursement has ended up leaving the parties at the mercy of banks and lenders during the campaigns. Worse still, today the possibility of a party receiving loans during the campaign against its electoral expectations depends entirely on the fickle behavior of the opinion polls. This is unfair and risky, as the OAS electoral observation missions have noted.

c) The legal framework does little to limit parties’ spending on advertising, one of the most effective ways to reduce outlays during campaigns and to bring about fairness in electoral competition, which is one of the most important objectives in improving the current system. One must evaluate the advisability of adopting a system of advertising slots (provided free of charge by those holding concessions for the radio spectrum or purchased by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal and then made available to the parties) as has been done, with a positive outcome, by other democracies in the region such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and Mexico.

d) The current regulatory framework has serious vulnerabilities at the local level. Requiring the parties to file a single financial report with the contribution they receive nationwide (the same system that exists for the presidential election) is insufficient when in practice there are 81 local elections in which each candidate raises and spends money autonomously. Let’s be clear: Relatively little is known about who finances the campaigns at the local level in Costa Rica. This would not matter much except that the experience of other countries – from Mexico to Colombia – shows that local campaigns are the preferred point of entry for organized crime to penetrate the electoral structures. Reinforcing the financial controls on municipal elections is one of the country’s most urgent tasks in relation to campaign finance.

Costa Rica has made major strides in regulating political financing. Yet there is an urgent need to address the weaknesses in the current regulatory framework. There are bills in the legislative pipeline, such as No. 18,739, introduced by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal in April 2013, that incorporate almost all the reforms suggested here and that provide an excellent basis for moving this inevitable discussion forward. 

We will have to address the problems in the current regulatory framework sooner or later. The question is whether we will do so before or after the next scandal. Let’s hope that, for once, we act on time.

This piece was originally published by International IDEA. 

Super PACs and other lightly regulated political organizations are dumping hundreds of millions of dollars into American elections. What should be done about it? Unlike many candidates for federal or state office, so-called independent expenditure groups face no restrictions on how much individuals and groups can give to them. And thanks to several federal court decisions, including Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, independent groups can spend unlimited amounts to influence elections. The public understandably worries about the political clout of wealthy groups—especially since donors often can hide their identities.

Reformers have proposed various remedies: disclosure rules, the appointment of a liberal Supreme Court justice to reverse Citizens United, even a constitutional amendment to overturn that decision. Those long-shot strategies, however, are unlikely to create the kind of small-donor democracy that many reformers seek. Money, like water, will inevitably flow into the political system. Laws can’t do much to reduce the amount of money in politics; what they can change is where the money goes.

An easier path to improving politics

In our new Brookings paper, The State of State Parties, we suggest an easier path to improving politics—one that is right under our nose. Strengthening state political parties can help offset the clout of super PACs.

Our study, based on a survey of 56 state-party organizations plus detailed interviews with 15 of their leaders, points to the distinctive and constructive role that state parties play in American politics. In an era when politics seems to be spinning out of control, party organizations are among the few actors that seek to integrate and balance interests—for instance, by recruiting candidates with broad appeal, by playing honest broker among contending partisan factions, and by building coherent strategies among campaigns up and down the ticket. Party organizations also generate a lot of grassroots activity to mobilize volunteers and voters.

How regulations on parties increase super PAC spending

State parties are among the most heavily regulated entities in American politics, a situation that diminishes their influence relative to non-party groups. For instance, the vast majority of state parties face restrictions on the source and size of donations, and some contribution limits are unrealistically low. In Massachusetts, no donor can give more than annual aggregate of $5,000 to all local and state parties. That’s a paltry sum in statewide elections that can easily cost $55 million, including $20 million in independent expenditures.

Super PACs and other groups naturally fill the vacuum because they do not have to contend with limits on raising and spending money. Often, outside groups effectively drown out the parties. In our survey, only half the parties said they advertise on TV and radio sometimes or often, usually because they lack the resources to do more.

The figure below shows that parties’ independent spending is miniscule compared to the growing expenditures of non-party groups over the past five election cycles. In the 2014 election cycle, the parties accounted for just six percent of total independent spending in the states for which we had good data.

An especially significant finding is that restraints on political parties seem to amplify the activities and influence of outside groups. As illustrated in the table below, 65 percent of respondents in states with contribution limits to parties said that independent groups sponsor more than half or almost all political ads, compared to only 23 percent in states without contribution limits. 

In other words, independent spending is significantly lower when parties are not limited. These differences translate into electoral clout. In states with contribution limits, 65 percent of respondents said independent spending is often a key factor in gubernatorial elections, while fewer than half said the same in states with no limits.

Correlation does not prove causality, but our findings provide strong circumstantial evidence that when you restrict the parties, you get more independent expenditures by non-party groups.

It’s not hard to strengthen state parties

We recommend changes to strengthen state parties and restore them to a place of prominence in campaigns. First, state governments should raise or eliminate contribution limits so the parties can acquire sufficient resources to compete with outside actors. This would allow state parties to serve as clearinghouses for campaign money, which would bring more “dark money” toward accountability and transparency.

Second, parties should be allowed full freedom to coordinate their activities with their candidates and allied groups. This would make them more valuable to candidates and would allow the parties to perform their irreplaceable role of supporting candidates across the party ticket.

We also suggest giving parties favorable tax treatment so that donors are more likely to give to parties than candidate-sponsored super PACs or interest groups. We also recommend other regulatory changes that would encourage parties to do more grassroots work with voters.

Loosening the constraints on state parties would not stop the flow of money into politics (nothing can do that), but would channel more of the money to accountable actors. That’s why we think of this solution as building canals, not dams. And the incremental steps we propose require no sea-changes in public opinion or heroic legislation. In fact, they command support in both parties’ establishments, making them a good starting point for reform. That’s why we conclude that strengthening state parties is a realistic path toward a better balanced, more effective, and more accountable political system.