Eye-tracking technology now makes it possible for computers to gather staggering amounts of information about individuals as they use the Internet, and draw hyper-accurate conclusions about our behavior as consumers. As the technology becomes more practical, Senior Fellow John Villasenor discusses its benefits and risks.

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• Eye-Tracking Technology and Digital Privacy

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• @ Brookings Podcast: Eye-Tracking Technology and Digital Privacy

With new technologies for extracting oil and natural gas producing an energy boom throughout North America, Senior Fellow Charles Ebinger sees the potential in hydraulic fracturing or “fracking” to free the continent from dependence on Middle East oil, and even make some progress on curbing sources of air pollution.
 

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• Fracking and Prospects for Energy Security in North America

Baltimore provides a prime example of how metropolitan areas around the nation are turning to clean, green industries as a source of vibrant, sustainable growth. Expert Jennifer Vey outlines how such communities can identify their assets and capitalize on them to revitalize their economies.

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• Baltimore as a Case Study in Metro Economic Recovery

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• @ Brookings Podcast: Baltimore as a Case Study in Metro Economic Recovery

In many African countries, women still cannot own land or resources, a significant barrier to their ability to start businesses and take advantage of the continent’s economic potential.  Fellow Anne Kamau explores their plight.

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• Challenges for Women in the African Economy

Partisan gridlock and political extremism threaten to tear down the pillars of public policy and render the U.S. government utterly dysfunctional, argues Senior Fellow Thomas Mann, co-author with Norman Ornstein—resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute—of It’s Even Worse Than It Looks (Basic Books, 2012). He argues that a flood of super-PAC money, negative ads and cowed mainstream news media are contributing to the problem.

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• Mann: Blame for Gridlock Is Squarely on Republican Party

More than a decade after the start of the war in Afghanistan, America continues to face significant challenges in the Middle East. While news of U.S. struggles often dominate foreign policy discussions, Senior Fellow Bruce Riedel says it is important to remember that the United States is also making progress in the region. From the death of Osama bin Laden to an agreement on the use of Afghan military bases for U.S. counterterrorism operations, America is learning from its past mistakes and using these lessons to guide its response to the Arab Spring.

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• We Shouldn't Lose Sight of the Positive Developments in the Middle East

Drought, low agriculture productivity and a cascade of bad policy choices have put millions in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel at risk for starvation. Senior Fellow Mwangi Kimenyi, director of the Africa Growth Initiative, says the consequences will haunt the continent for decades to come.

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• Mwangi S. Kimenyi: Food Insecurity in Africa Can Be Solved

A little-known yearly survey conducted by the Census Bureau gathers a wealth of information that helps guide everything from investments in highways and schools to business decisions about building supermarkets and department stores. The American Community Survey gathers neighborhood-level data that isn’t collected in the decennial Census, providing invaluable information about issues from immigration to income levels. Losing that ground-level view of the changes in American life year after year would be disastrous, says Senior Fellow William Frey.

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• William Frey: Why the American Community Survey Is Important

In his book, Our Divided Political Heart, Senior Fellow E.J. Dionne, Jr. writes that the current deep political divide plaguing American politics has its roots in a fundamental misunderstanding of our founding principles and the strong role our forebears saw for government in protecting individual liberty.

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• E.J. Dionne, Jr.: Founding Fathers Believed Common Good Protected Individual Liberty

Year after year, federal spending on poverty programs has been going up, but we still see more and more people who have no margin to guard against unexpected expenses or job loss. At the same time, for different reasons, Americans who are not impoverished have seen their wealth decline sharply. Expert Ron Haskins, co-director of the Center on Children and Families, says the problems are growing deeper, despite increased federal spending on programs to assist the poor. Haskins says everyone must sacrifice, but also says, that people in general, who finish high school, get a job, and get married and delay having children until age 21 are better off.

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• Solutions to Poverty's Rise in America

Climate change and the search for resources have turned the Arctic into an emerging market and an important trade route. Senior Fellow Bruce Jones, director of the Managing Global Order project, says that the top of the world poses possibilities for international tensions among interested nations claiming sovereignty, but at least so far, no serious conflicts have emerged.

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• Bruce Jones: Arctic Region’s Importance for Trade, Transit and Energy Is Increasing

Emerging economies may chafe at international agreements calling for sustainable development, but Nonresident Fellow Nathan Hultman says many governments are putting plans for sustainability and green innovation in place out of self-interest, and cooperating with neighbors across the globe.

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• Nathan Hultman: Global Progress in Sustainable Development

The increasing diversification of news media—from online versions of major newspapers to political bloggers, to 24-hour cable news to social media—plus the profession’s changing economics have caused the balance of power between political reporters and presidential candidates to change. Stephen Hess, senior fellow emeritus, says our very good, well-trained reporters are “almost dangerous” to presidential candidates who are trying to stay on message. Thus, says Hess, the way the press covers campaigns has changed as well, and not for the better.

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• Stephen Hess: The Changing Balance of Power in Presidential Campaign Reporting

While falling off the "fiscal cliff" (of automatic spending cuts and tax increases if Congress fails to act) could hurt the economy, expert William Gale says the actual result, if coupled with a temporary economic stimulus, would be greater incentives to make a better long-term budget deal.

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• William Gale: Combine Going Over the Fiscal Cliff with a Stimulus

From the Arab-Israeli conflict, to the paradigm shift of the Arab Spring, to attacks on U.S. government personnel in Egypt and Libya, to the potentially explosive situation in Syria--events in the greater Middle East region continue to resonate here at home. In a recent study, “Americans on the Middle East,” Nonresident Senior Fellow Shibley Telhami finds that Americans have a great understanding and concern about Middle East events. Learn more about these findings in this episode of @ Brookings.

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• Shibley Telhami: What Americans Think about the Middle East

In this post-election season and with a fiscal cliff looming, states and metros have begun the work of meeting their many challenges. They’re implementing game-changing initiatives to create jobs and restructure their economies for the long haul. The federal government needs to take notice and get on board note, Metropolitan Program policy experts Bruce Katz and Mark Muro as they urge a move for remaking our federalism and renewing the economy. Katz and Muro explain in this episode of @ Brookings.

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• Bruce Katz and Mark Muro: Remaking Federalism and Renewing the Economy

Following U.S. troop withdrawal in 2014, Afghanistan faces an uncertain future. Its fate could be compromised or even commanded by war lords, terrorists or corrupt government officials. Fellow Vanda Felbab-Brown spent time on the ground observing events and talking to a mix of Afghans from high ranking officials to village elders, to merchants to the person on the street. In this four-part video series based on her book, “Aspiration and Ambivalence: Strategies and Realities of Counterinsurgency and State-Building in Afghanistan,” Felbab-Brown offers analysis on an Afghanistan in flux.

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• Vanda Felbab-Brown: Counterinsurgency and State-Building in Afghanistan after 2014
• Vanda Felbab-Brown: The Afghan People Simply Want to Live and Thrive
• Vanda Felbab-Brown: Pakistan Plays a Significant Role in Afghanistan's Future
• Vanda Felbab-Brown: The Choices the U.S. Makes Will Largely Determine Afghanistan's Future

The civil war tearing through Syria is worsened by a growing tide of refugees and displaced persons along with an escalating humanitarian crisis. Food shortages, a lack of housing and adequate health care are additional burdens that many Syrians now face. Senior Fellow and Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Dispacement Co-Director Elizabeth Ferris examines the cost of war in Syria in this episode of @ Brookings.

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• Elizabeth Ferris: Syria’s Escalating Humanitarian Crisis

Senior Fellows Fiona Hill and Clifford G. Gaddy discuss their book, Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin in a five part podcast series.

In the book, Hill and Gaddy write that Russian President Vladmir Putin’s style of rule is influenced by his identities as a Statist, a Man of History, a Free Marketeer, a Survivalist, an Outsider, and a Case Officer; these are distinct personalities, they note, that interact and affect policy decisions. On February 6, the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings hosted an event for the launch of Mr. Putin with a discussion featuring the authors.

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• Fiona Hill: Putin’s Statist Personality: Restoring the Greatness of Russia
• Clifford Gaddy: Putin the History Man and Survivalist
• Fiona Hill and Cliff Gaddy: The Outsider Influenced Putin’s “Free Market” Personality
• Fiona Hill: Putin’s History in KGB Leads to “Case Officer” Personality
• Fiona Hill: Putin’s Personalities Leveraged to Boost Russia

Despite widespread agreement that the federal budget is on an unsustainable path, there is also widespread disagreement about what should be done. The Hamilton Project asked leading experts from a variety of backgrounds—the policy world, academia, and the private sector, and from both sides of the political aisle—to develop and share their ideas for addressing the deficit. The proposals will be released at two events scheduled for February 22 and February 26. In a dialogue previewing those events, Hamilton Project Director Michael Greenstone and Policy Director Adam Looney discuss some of the key ideas offered by the experts.

Greenstone stresses that the goal of the papers is to move beyond the fights and disagreements between President Obama and Congress and to provide some of the poetry, or some of the details, on how government might run better. The papers will also be featured in a book, 15 Ways to Rethink the Federal Budget, and will take on a wide-ranging set of topics, including immigration, transportation, health care, defense spending, and tax expenditures.

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• Michael Greenstone and Adam Looney: These Authors Have Drafted Policies That Help the Budget and Provide Economic Benefits

The horrible tragedy in Orlando is rightly focusing attention on the threat posed by lone wolf terrorists—that is, radicalized individuals or couples who carry out attacks like those in Boston, San Bernardino, and Orlando. Yet there is a greater threat to the national well-being from small groups of terrorists, we can call them wolf packs, that could bring much greater carnage. If America's Muslim community is scapegoated and ostracized, the wolf pack threat will grow.

The idea of lone wolf attacks goes back well before the emergence of the self-styled Islamic State two years ago. The New Mexico-born radical Anwar al Awlaki urged individual Muslim Americans to carry out mass casualty attacks years ago. His English-language web magazine “Inspire” was the vehicle for self-radicalized extremists to learn how to make bombs and conduct violent jihad. The Fort Hood shooter was his disciple. Awlaki's message is still virulent despite his death by drone in Yemen in 2011.

More recently, Hamza bin Laden, the son of al-Qaida's founder, has issued two messages from his hide-out in Pakistan urging lone wolf attacks in Europe, America and Israel. The first came out a year ago and included the endorsement of Ayman Zawahiri. The second came out last month.

The Orlando shooter paid little attention apparently to the differences between radical Islamic organizations. He reportedly praised the Shiite Hezbollah, Sunni al-Qaida, and the Islamic State. The message of jihad is so pervasive now that has become a part of the global dialogue.

As deadly as the Orlando shooting was, it is not hard to envision worse given the horrific attacks in Paris and Brussels this year. Organized conspiracies of a relatively small number of extremists prepared to die in their attacks can do far more damage than individuals or couples.

Organized conspiracies of a relatively small number of extremists prepared to die in their attacks can do far more damage than individuals or couples.

The role model of a wolf pack attack was the November 26, 2008 attack in Mumbai. A pack of ten well-armed and trained Pakistani terrorists attacked simultaneously and sequentially luxury hotels, fancy restaurants, a train station, and a Jewish hostel. Westerners and Israelis were singled out for attack but the majority of victims were innocent Indians. The operation even had a secure command post back in Pakistan where the terrorist handlers from Lashkar e-Tayyeba and Pakistani intelligence coordinated the plot by cell phones.

The Paris attacks imitated many of the Mumbai tactics and added suicide vests to the mix. The Islamic State took the Mumbai model to Europe. It no longer required a foreign base like Pakistan, the conspiracy operated in the depressed Islamic slums of Brussels and Paris where the security services had few sources. 

The closest to a wolf pack attack in the United States was an al-Qaida plot in 2009 to attack the New York City subway system. That was foiled because our intelligence services detected the conspiracy. 

Islamophobia is the path to more catastrophic violence.

By definition, conspiracies involving even small numbers of plotters are easier to detect than lone wolves. The first line of detection is the local Muslim community where the plot is hatched. When local communities become angry pockets separated from the rest of the nation, it is much harder to find and foil conspiracies. In Europe, unfortunately, there are many such disaffected Islamic communities. America doesn't have them, at least not yet.

That fastest and surest route to wolf pack conspiracies in America is to scapegoat all Muslims and create an angry jihadist sub-culture. That is why calls for prohibiting Muslim travel to America are so dangerous and counter-productive. It will inevitably create a backlash. Islamophobia is the path to more catastrophic violence.

Editors’ Note: Terrorist groups don’t emerge out of nowhere, and wars are perhaps the richest soil for seeding and growing violent groups of all stripes, writes Dan Byman. This post originally appeared in the Washington Post.

Study after study has found no common profile of a terrorist. It is hard to explain why, say, almost four times as many recruits leave Sweden to fight with the Islamic State as from neighboring Norway, though Sweden’s population is only twice Norway’s. Pundits and politicians alike speculate on why individuals might embrace terrorism, but such a question risks missing one obvious point: Having a terrorist group around in the first place is one of the most important factors in influencing an individual’s choice to join.

Terrorist groups don’t emerge out of nowhere, and wars are perhaps the richest soil for seeding and growing violent groups of all stripes. Without the wars in the Middle East there would be no Islamic State, and it is not the only one: al-Qaida, Hezbollah, and other extremist groups all emerged out of regional civil wars. The formation of such groups is a political phenomenon, and so, too, is the radicalization of foreign fighters from the West.

Terrorist groups are rarely the cause of civil wars. Iraq’s civil war began in 2003 after the U.S. invasion and occupation; Syria’s civil war began with peaceful protests against a brutal dictator in 2011; and Libya’s strife came after a terrorist-supporting dictator was toppled in the same year.

Rather, such wars beget and foster terrorism in several ways. Terror itself is often a tool in war, used to sow an atmosphere of fear and undermine governments. Assassinations of rival political leaders, bombs for police and military recruits and random violence against civilians—these are all methods learned from Insurgency 101.

Groups such as al-Qaida and now the Islamic State exploit new wars wherever they can. Terrorist groups linked to civil wars seek supporters in the United States, Europe, and other areas outside the theater for reasons both obvious and obscure—and these factors generate more terrorists. This pull is especially strong when identities cross borders—as does a religious identity like Islam—and when local ties are weak or the community as a whole is poorly integrated, as the Muslim community is in many European countries.

Foreigners might join these groups for altruistic reasons, to help the genuinely oppressed (the Syrian people facing Bashar al-Assad, or the Afghans facing the Soviets). Yet often the oppression is a myth, or at least greatly exaggerated: One powerful narrative of the Islamic State is that Sunni Muslims are facing a global Shiite conspiracy led by Iran and Hezbollah.

Still others join because they are true believers and want to live the dream. In different ways, the war takes them out of their humdrum or depressing present, giving them a new life: “I’m the most content I have ever been in my life,” tweeted one young American woman who had gone to live in the Islamic State, ending the tweet with a heart emoji. Many are merely thugs who spent time in jail or otherwise led delinquent lives: Joining the Islamic State or a similar group gives them a license to kill and torture.

Because there is no single profile, terrorist groups such as the Islamic State seek to appeal to many different ones. Propaganda stresses the good life in the caliphate, the glory of fighting for God, the oppression the community is facing, and glorified ultra-violence. Religion matters, but only as a badge of meaning and belonging rather than for its specific ideological content. By professing religious beliefs, a young Muslim male can go from marginalized and alienated in his home country to part of God’s army, defending his people with his own sex slaves to boot. Yet one study of the European foreign fighters found that most were theologically illiterate. Omar Mateen, the Orlando shooter, may not have understood the difference between the theologies espoused by the Islamic State, al-Qaida and Hezbollah.

As long as these wars rage, the problems they generate will not stay confined to the Middle East. Only a fraction of a fraction end up fighting, and even fewer engage in terrorism, but only a small number need to respond for the problem to be serious.

Editor’s Note: Turkey's terrorism troubles are bad and getting worse. At least 41 people died Tuesday when authorities say that ISIS attackers opened fire on crowds at Istanbul's airport and then detonated suicide vests, wreaking havoc. Dan Byman writes that Turkey's ISIS problems are bound up in its Syria policy and that the biggest danger of the attacks is that they push Turkey further toward authoritarianism and away from Europe and the United States. This piece was originally published by Slate.

Turkey’s terrorism troubles are bad and getting worse. At least 41 people died Tuesday in a terrorist attack on Istanbul’s airport. Authorities say that ISIS attackers opened fire on crowds at the airport and then detonated suicide vests, wreaking havoc. For Turks, such an attack is not a surprise: The country has seen as spate of attacks throughout the country in recent years.

ISIS has not formally taken credit for the attack as of Wednesday morning, but it has struck Turkey repeatedly and with growing frequency: ISIS has previously hit Istanbul twice in 2016, including a January suicide bomber attack on Sultanahmet Square that killed 12 in the heart of Turkey’s tourist district. In 2015, Turkey suffered its most deadly terrorist attack ever when more than 100 people were killed after bombs went off near Ankara’s railway station, targeting a rally opposing Turkey’s conflict with its own Kurdish population. In 2013, more than 50 people were killed when car bombs went off in Reyhanli near the Syrian border. Although ISIS is usually blamed for these attacks, Turkey’s Kurds, the Syrian regime, and Syria’s al-Qaida affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra have all been named as suspects. The sheer number of possibilities and the politicized finger-pointing reveals how daunting a challenge Turkey faces on the counterterrorism front.

The government of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is trying to fight ISIS, but this is only one of its problems and, so far, not its No. 1 priority. Erdogan’s government also seeks to topple the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad, and manage its own and the regional Kurdish problem—tough enough tasks without having to also shore up the government’s declining legitimacy.

When the Arab Spring broke out in 2011, Turkey seemed a model for aspiring democracies in the Middle East. Here, after all, was a democratic government that embraced political Islam but did so in a seemingly moderate way, was a member of NATO, a booming economic power, and a force for stability in the region. The Middle East, however, has come to Turkey rather than the other way around. Although Turkey’s economy continues to do well, Turkey has far fewer admirers in the West and is often considered part of the problem, even drawing public criticism from President Obama. For many Turks, the Istanbul attack is part of this changing landscape. Asli Aydintasbas, a Turkish analyst, described a “world turned upside down” to the New York Times: Istanbul “was a happening town, cutting edge in arts and culture. It’s the kind of place that Condé Nast would write about. Now this is a Middle Eastern country where these things happen.”

Turkey’s ISIS problems are bound up in its Syria policy.

Turkey’s ISIS problems are bound up in its Syria policy. Erdogan had cultivated Assad and then was outraged when the Syrian dictator proved to be, well, a dictator. Instead of making reforms to placate protesters, as Erdogan had urged, Assad reached out to Iran and commenced a brutal crackdown that would lead to a civil war in which more than 400,000 Syrians have died so far—most at the hands of the regime, not ISIS. Although the United States prioritizes fighting ISIS, Turkey sees ousting Assad as more important. Ankara has armed and trained opposition fighters and hosted Syrian dissidents. Turkey has backed more radical groups like Ahrar al-Sham, which works with the Islamic State’s affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra.

The country’s policy toward ISIS should be seen in this context: Anyone opposing Assad seemed to be on the right side. Although ISIS relies heavily on foreign volunteers for manpower, Turkey dragged its feet and allowed volunteers to transit Turkey unimpeded so as to make their way to fight Assad. European governments reacted with growing concern and anger, fearing that these volunteers would come back and conduct terrorist attacks on the West. In the last year, Turkey has become far tougher on foreign fighters, but it is difficult to uproot the now-extensive radical infrastructure.

ISIS attacks on Turkey have grown in response to this crackdown. In addition to public attacks, ISIS has shot and beheaded activists linked to “Raqqa Is Being Silently Slaughtered,” a non-government organization providing information and video footage of the brutal life in ISIS-controlled areas.

Such acts and Western pressure have also led to more Turkish military involvement, and this too probably led to an escalation of ISIS attacks. Turkey used tanks and artillery to strike ISIS after the January bombing in Istanbul’s Sultanahmet Square and has shelled ISIS positions in response to ISIS cross-border shelling. Perhaps more importantly, Turkey allows the United States and other coalition countries to base aircraft out of the Incirlik and Diyabakir air bases in southern Turkey for strikes on ISIS.

Making things even more complex, Turkey’s own Kurdish problem put it at odds with Washington in the fight against ISIS. From Ankara’s point of view, there are good Kurds and bad Kurds. The good ones include Iraq’s main Kurdish organizations which have good relations and economic ties with Turkey.

On the other hand, the Erdogan government sees the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) as an enemy. The group claims to represent the aspiration of Turkey’s own Kurds, which make up perhaps 20 percent of the population, and past regimes had fought civil wars with the group, leading to 40,000 deaths since the conflict began in 1984. In 1999, the PKK’s leader was captured and the conflict declined in ferocity. Peace seemed at hand as negotiations commenced secretly in 2009, and at the end of 2012 Erdogan publicly embraced the talks. The ceasefire broke down in 2015, however, when Turkey bombed the PKK’s bases in Iraq, and Kurdish violence and terrorism in Turkey returned: Many observers believe Erdogan renewed operations because his electoral fortunes were waning and he sought to stir up nationalist sentiment.

With this dynamic in mind, Syria’s small Kurdish group the Democratic Union Party (PYD) has come to play an important role for Turkish policy, ISIS, and Syria. Although the group has historically been minor, its ties to the PKK made Turkey see it as an enemy. This mattered little until central government authority in Syria’s Kurdish areas collapsed. The PYD and other Kurdish groups carved out their own autonomous areas, leading to Turkish fears that the PYD would inspire Turkey’s Kurds to seek independence and would provide the PKK a base for attacks.

Washington took a different view: As U.S. military training programs against ISIS proved ineffective, the PYD also emerged as a valuable military ally, perhaps the most effective foe of ISIS within Syria. Even as the United States works with Syria’s Kurds, Turkey has embargoed Kurdish areas in Syria (at a time when humanitarian conditions are desperate) and even threatened to intervene if the Syrian Kurds expand their territory near the Turkish border too much. And to make this more complex, the PYD itself doesn’t work well with other anti-Assad groups, which oppose Kurdish autonomy and are angered by the PYD’s willingness to ignore Assad, making it difficult to square with broader U.S. goals in Syria.

All this would be easier for Turkey if the Erdogan government had broad support at home and abroad, but it doesn’t. Recent years have seen massive anti-government protests with the Turkish government responding by stepping up repression. Erdogan changed jobs from prime minister to the more ceremonial role of president, but he remains the power behind—or even in front of —the throne. Turkey has used anti-terrorism as an excuse to crack down on legitimate political dissent at home, straining ties with Europe and the United States. The government is increasingly authoritarian, with crackdowns on press freedom being particularly acute. (And whatever you do, don’t compare Erdogan to Gollum.) The good news is that Turkey is trying to break out of its growing isolation; the bad news is that it is doing so by mending fences with another authoritarian strongman, Russian President Vladimir Putin.

[T]he biggest danger of the ISIS attacks is that they push Turkey further toward authoritarianism and away from Europe and the United States.

In addition to the horrific loss of lives, the biggest danger of the ISIS attacks is that they push Turkey further toward authoritarianism and away from Europe and the United States. Dictators throughout the Middle East use legitimate security and terrorism dangers to justify delaying reforms, repressing any form of opposition, and labeling all foes as terrorists. The Turkish model, unfortunately, is a Middle Eastern one now.

"At the end of the day, we need to remember that Daesh is more a product of the civil wars than it is a cause of them. And the way that we’re behaving is we’re treating it as the cause.  And the problem is that in places like Syria, in Iraq, potentially in Libya, we are mounting these military campaigns to destroy Daesh and we’re not doing anything about the underlying civil wars.  And the real danger there is—we have a brilliant military and they may very well succeed in destroying Daesh—but if we haven’t dealt with the underlying civil wars, we’ll have Son of Daesh a year later." – Ken Pollack

“Part of the problem is how we want the U.S. to be more engaged and more involved and what that requires in practice. We have to be honest about a different kind of American role in the Middle East. It means committing considerable economic and political resources to this region of the world that a lot of Americans are quite frankly sick of… There is this aspect of nation-building that is in part what we have to do in the Middle East, help these countries rebuild, but we can’t do that on the cheap. We can’t do that with this relatively hands off approach.” – Shadi Hamid

In this episode of “Intersections,” Kenneth Pollack, senior fellow in the Center for Middle East Policy and Shadi Hamid, senior fellow in the Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World and author of "Islamic Exceptionalism: How the Struggle over Islam is Reshaping the World," discuss the current state of upheaval in the Middle East, the Arab Spring, and the political durability of Islamist movements in the region. They also explain their ideas on how and why the United States should change its approach to the Middle East and areas of potential improvement for U.S. foreign policy in the region. 

Show Notes

Fight or flight: America’s choice in the Middle East

Security and public order

Islamists on Islamism today

Temptations of Power: Islamists & Illiberal Democracy in a New Middle East

Ending the Middle East’s civil wars

A Rage for Order: The Middle East in turmoil, from Tahrir Square to ISIS

Building a better Syrian opposition army: How and why

With thanks to audio engineer and producer Zack Kulzer, Mark Hoelscher, Carisa Nietsche, Sara Abdel-Rahim, Eric Abalahin, Fred Dews and Richard Fawal.

Subscribe to the Intersections on iTunes, and send feedback email to intersections@brookings.edu.

Although there has been some progress in forming a national unity government in Libya, “unity” is a rather inapplicable word for the country. In reality, friction between various political actors remains high. Ultimately, perhaps a form of disunity—confederation, rather than centralization—is the best model for Libya.

Libyan politics: A primer

During the summer of 2014, the Libyan leadership, after an initial hint of cooperation, split into two governments: 

• One, headquartered in Tobruk and based on a secular matrix, was recognized internationally. It received support from the House of Representatives and was abetted by General Khalifa Haftar and his so-called National Libyan Army. Externally, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Russia have supported this government because of its anti-Islamist ideology. In May 2014, Haftar launched "Operation Dignity" against the Islamist militias, supported by the Zintan brigades (consisting of the Civic, al-Sawaiq, and al-Qaaqa brigades), and the militias coming from the ethnic minorities of Tebu and Fezzan.
• The other, headquartered in Tripoli, was Islamic in nature. It was supported by the new General National Congress (GNC) and was part of the Libya Dawn group of pro-Islamist militias (which included groups from Misrata, Amazigh, and Tuareg). Qatar, Sudan, and Turkey have supported this government for different reasons, including to earn a more prominent place on the global stage or to support the Muslim Brotherhood. 

But it gets more complicated, since it wasn’t just the Tobruk- and Tripoli-based governments that competed to fill the power vacuum post-Gadhafi. The constellation of militias and brigades has changed continuously. There are Salafist groups such as:

• Ansar al-Sharia Libya (or ASL, located between Benghazi and Derna); 
• Muhammad Jamal Network (between Benghazi and Derna);
• Al-Murabitun (in the southeast, around Ghat, Ubari, Tasawah, and Murzuq);
• Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (or AQIM, in the southwest and northeast of Libya); and
• Ansar al-Sharia Tunisia (or AST, located between Derna and Ajdabiya). 

Then in 2015, an Islamic State (or ISIS) cell—made up of about 3,000 Tunisians, Yemenis, Algerians, and Libyans, especially former supporters of the Gadhafi regime and members of Ansar al-Sharia—began to take hold in the city of Sirte, Gadhafi's hometown. Sirte is in an oil-rich desert area with tremendous strategic value, lying between the two regions of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. And Misratan militias treated Sirte ruthlessly after Gadhafi’s fall, prompting many locals to welcome ISIS. So it was no accident that ISIS chose that spot, or that it stepped into the Libyan power vacuum more broadly: Libya is strategically important for eventually expanding across North Africa; it’s a launching point for criminal trafficking in the Mediterranean; and there is a potential to exploit huge energy resources, as ISIS has done to a degree in Iraq. 

Then in December 2015 in Morocco, the Government of National Unity (GNA) signed an agreement by which Fayez Serraj became prime minister. But General Haftar and the government in Tobruk didn’t support the move, and the security environment across the country is still abysmal. Despite the assurances from United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) Special Envoy Martin Kobler that Libya would achieve stability, Libya is still seriously fragmented. 

Today, the real fight is not even between Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, per se, because the two regions—along with Fezzan—are so divided internally. Serraj was barely allowed to arrive in Tripoli this March, for instance—only thanks to the intervention of the international community. The GNC (with Prime Minister Khalifa Gwell and President Nouri Abusahmain) immediately dubbed Serraj’s cabinet "illegal," but then a month later decided to disband in favor of Serraj’s GNA. The government in Tobruk, led by President of the House of Representatives Aguila Saleh Issa, has still not given his full endorsement.

Bright spots?

In spite of these political frictions, there have been small signs of progress. Foreign ministers from other countries and even the prime minister of Malta have arrived in Tripoli as a sign that the new political situation is formalizing. And while embassies remain closed, there is a sense that things are moving in a positive direction. Given this, in late April Serraj asked the international community to intervene in order to secure oil wells, theoretically protected by Jadran Ibrahim and his Petroleum Facilities Guard (PFG), a powerful allied militia in Tripoli. But while the international community has seemed ready—including the Italian government, which has taken a leadership role—accusations of local weakness and Western meddling complicate the Libyan political arena. 

ISIS, meanwhile, is suffering setbacks, having been attacked in Sirte from the south, west, and east by a collection of GNA forces, Misrata militia brigades, and the PFG. The GNA forces are currently in the center of Sirte, clashing with ISIS and gaining terrain every day. ISIS seems to be weaker than many thought (indicating that estimates of its numbers were wrong) and now may be fleeing south—to Fezzan—where its strategy can be more fluid and less based on territorial control. 

Re-considering the fragmentation problem

The persistent fragmentation in Libya is what is most worrying. Internal divisions are the product of decades of Gadhafi’s reckless governing—he kept his citizens from each other and from the rest of the world and deprived them of any solid governmental or administrative structure that could keep the country stable in the event of a "post-regime" moment. And looking even further back, it’s important to remember that Tripolitania and Cyrenaica were never aligned, even during the two decades of rebellion against Italy. The Italians used the old "divide et impera" (divide and conquer) strategy, digging real "furrows of blood"—in the words of British scholar Edward E. Evans-Pritchard in 1949—between Libyan tribes. 

And today? A serious agreement between the main political factions—the Government of National Unity and the House of Representatives—seems out of reach. Meanwhile, few of the fundamental institutions required for the development and governance of a modern country are in place. Libya has invested little in education, and both corruption and unemployment are off the charts. Despite immense energy resources, the economy is contracting. Oil production has declined from 500,000 barrels per day in 2013 to 300,000 in January 2016, and not because deposits have depleted. And tourism, it goes without saying, isn’t taking place. 

Fayez Serraj, Libyan prime minister-designate under the proposed unity government, attends a meeting with officials of municipal council of Tripoli in Tripoli, Libya. Photo credit: Reuters/Ismail Zitouny.

Instead, there have been thousands of deaths and a massive outflow of refugees. While UNSMIL’s efforts have been commendable, the international community should seriously consider how to do more in Libya. It’s better to devise and implement an intervention plan now than wait for a true emergency in Libya. The international community must think about and articulate a real strategy, not merely implement tactical operations. Given the dramatically deteriorated security situation today, it seems impossible to imagine a non-security related intervention, even in defense of the soldiers called to the simple mission of protecting the new coalition government. 

One approach to consider is helping Libyans build a confederal state, divided into three large regions: Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Fezzan (or perhaps more if the Libyan people deem it appropriate). Perhaps it is time that such provinces become more autonomous—following different paths as they choose, based on their unique ethnic, social, religious, and political origins. This is an extreme solution, of course. But it is clear that the international community, which had been so much a part of the Libyan revolution, cannot now permit the failure of Libya as a state.

The paradox of deconstructing to construct, in this case, can work. The long-advocated national-level solution of political unity does not, in fact, seem possible. Instead, a confederation of the three regions built on the original disposition of tribes and natural borders could probably assure a deeper stability. Regional governments could better protect local interests in security, economic reconstruction, and governance. The international community should thus start from the bottom, emphasizing local solutions, supporting local actors, and helping to empower Libyans to choose their leaders at a local level. This is not to rule out a central government someday, but would mean that such a government would be somewhat less influential. It’s an incredibly difficult and long plan, but probably the only one that can work. 

The man who drove a truck through packed crowds celebrating Bastille Day, killing more than 80, may have acted alone, according to the early reports. We don't know if he was inspired by a jihadist ideology or linked to any specific group. In any event, these extremist groups are increasingly embracing a "lone wolf" approach, and the West should prepare for more such attacks.

I've argued that such lone wolf" attacks are deadly but often fail in the long-term. Part of the reason is that historically many are poorly prepared and incompetent, bungling the attack or at least not killing as many as a more skilled and trained individual might.

Yet the horrific body count in Nice, along with the 49 dead in recent Orlando nightclub shooting, shows how deadly even an unskilled loser like Omar Mateen can be.

This deadliness is not new – Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols, largely acting alone, killed 168 people when they bombed the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995 – but it suggests the potential lethality of lone wolves.

A Weaker Islamic State

The Islamic State is putting more emphasis on lone wolves out of desperation.

In the past, it urged its sympathizers to go to Syria to help the fledgling state defend itself and expand. However, the United States, France, and other countries and local fighters hitting hard at the Islamic State's core in Iraq and Syria. Other major areas of operations, like the Islamic State's "province" in Libya, are also under siege. The self-proclaimed state is short of funds, and the number of foreign recruits is declining.

Like all terrorist groups, the Islamic State needs victories to inspire new recruits and prevent existing members from losing hope. CIA Director John Brennan foresaw this in testimony and warned, "as the pressure mounts on [ISIS], we judge that it will intensify its global terror campaign to maintain its dominance of the global terrorism agenda."

A silver lining is that lone wolf terrorism, even if lethal, usually fails in a strategic sense. As one IRA terrorist said, "you don't bloody well kill people for the sake of killing them."

Violence with no strategy behind it terrifies, but it can backfire against a group and the cause it embraces. McVeigh and Nichols, for example, discredited other far right movements. McVeigh claimed he was dealing a blow against a tyrannical government, but the death of 19 children and three pregnant women in the bombing made it hard even for anti-government zealots to defend him.

In Nice, the driver killed children out to watch the fireworks, and the dead included innocent Muslims, like the grieving young man asking Allah to accept his mother into heaven may (and should) become the face of the attack, hardly a heroic move in a holy war that would inspire others.

Although the Islamic State's moves smack of desperation, that is no comfort to anyone concerned about terrorism.

Difficult To Prevent

Terrorist groups that draw on foreign fighters or otherwise are organized tend to be more deadly and dangerous in the long-term, but lone wolves are exceptionally hard to stop. The very organizational connections that give most terrorism direction are by definition lacking, and thus it is harder to find and disrupt the attacks. So more attempts, and likely some successful ones, seem inevitable.

One clear recommendation – and the one least likely to be heeded in the aftermath of a terrorist attack – is to ensure community support. If a community has good relations with the police and society in general, it has fewer grievances for terrorists to exploit and is more likely to point out malefactors in their midst.

Even though he was never arrested, Mateen came to the FBI's attention because a local Muslim found him worrisome. In France in particular, however, relations between the Muslim community and the government are often poisonous, and a terrorist attack will probably make this worse as France's already popular far-right movement becomes strong. And this will only mean more lone wolves will slip through in the future.

This piece originally appeared on NPR's Parallels.

The terrible attack in Nice on July 14—Bastille Day—saddened us all. For a country that has done so much historically to promote democracy and human rights at home and abroad, France is paying a terrible and unfair price, even more than most countries. My colleagues Will McCants and Chris Meserole have carefully documented the toll that France, and certain other Francophone countries like Belgium, have suffered in recent years from global terrorism. It is heart wrenching.

From what we know so far, the attack was carried out by a deeply distraught, potentially deranged, and in any case extremely brutal local man from Nice of Tunisian descent and French nationality. Marital problems, the recent loss of his job, and a general sense of personal unhappiness seem to have contributed to the state of mind that led him to commit this heinous atrocity. Perhaps we will soon learn that ISIS, directly or indirectly, inspired the attack in one way or another as well. My colleague Dan Byman has already tapped into his deep expertise about terrorism to remind us that ISIS had in fact encouraged ramming attacks with vehicles before, even if the actual manifestation of such tactics in this case was mostly new. 

This attack will again raise the question: Why France? On this point, I do have a somewhat different take than some of my colleagues. The argument that France has partly brought these tragedies upon itself—perhaps because of its policies of secularism and in particular its limitations on when and where women can wear the veil in France—strikes me as unpersuasive. Its logical policy implications are also potentially disturbing, because if interpreted wrongly, it could lead to a debate on whether France should modify such policies so as to make itself less vulnerable to terrorism. That outcome, even if unintended, could dance very close to the line of encouraging appeasement of heinous acts of violence with policy changes that run counter to much of what French culture and society would otherwise favor. So I feel the need to push back.

Here are some of the arguments, as I see them, against blaming French culture or policy for this recent string of horrible attacks including the Charlie Hebdo massacre, the November 2015 mass shootings in Paris, and the Nice tragedy (as well as recent attacks in Belgium):

• Starting with the simplest point, we still do not know much about the perpetrator of the Nice killings. From what we do surmise so far, personal problems appear to be largely at the root of the violence—different from, but not entirely unlike, the case with the Orlando shooter, Omar Mateen.
• We need to be careful about drawing implications from a small number of major attacks. Since 2000, there have also been major attacks in the Western world by extremist jihadis or takfiris in New York, Washington, Spain, London, San Bernardino, Orlando, and Russia. None of these are Francophone. Even Belgium is itself a mixed country, linguistically and culturally.
• Partly for reasons of geography, as well as history, France does face a larger problem than some other European countries of individuals leaving its country to go to Syria or Iraq to fight for ISIS, and then returning. But it is hardly unique in the scale of this problem.
• Continental Europe has a specific additional problem that is not as widely shared in the United Kingdom or the United States: Its criminal networks largely overlap with its extremist and/or terrorist networks. This point may be irrelevant to the Nice attack, but more widely, extremists in France or Belgium can make use of illicit channels for moving people, money, and weapons that are less available to would-be jihadis in places like the U.K. (where the criminal networks have more of a Caribbean and sub-Saharan African character, meaning they overlap less with extremist networks).
• Of course, the greatest numbers of terrorist attacks by Muslim extremists occur in the broader Muslim world, with Muslims as the primary victims—from Iraq and Syria to Libya and Yemen and Somalia to South Asia. French domestic policies have no bearing on these, of course.

There is no doubt that good work by counterterrorism and intelligence forces is crucial to preventing future attacks. France has done well in this regard—though it surely can do better, and it is surely trying to get better. There is also no doubt that promoting social cohesion in a broad sense is a worthy goal. But I would hesitate, personally, to attribute any apparent trend line in major attacks in the West to a particular policy of a country like France—especially when the latter is in fact doing much to seek to build bridges, as a matter of national policy, with Muslims at home and abroad. 

There is much more to do in promoting social cohesion, to be sure, even here in America (though our own problems probably center more on race than on religion at the moment). But the Nice attacker almost assuredly didn’t attack because his estranged wife couldn’t wear a veil in the manner and/or places she wanted. At a moment like this in particular, I disagree with insinuations to the contrary.

Editors’ Note: The attack in Nice will inevitably, and appropriately, lead to more aggressive intelligence efforts against suspected ISIS networks and tighter security in general, writes Dan Byman. Unfortunately, they are also likely to bolster anti-Muslim voices in France and throughout Europe, and ISIS may in turn exploit Muslims’ resulting shame and anger. This post originally appeared on Slate.

At least 84 people are dead in Nice, France, after a truck deliberately plowed for over a mile through packed crowds celebrating Bastille Day; ISIS or one of its supporters is believed to be linked to the attack. As we reel in horror from yet another instance of terrorist carnage, news reports are trickling in, giving us a sense of the attack, its victims, and those behind the killings.

We’ll learn more in the days to come, but we already knew Europe—and France in particular—has a terrorism problem and that it may go from bad to worse in the near future. Ironically, one of the reasons for the increased attacks is the military successes the United States, France, and other countries and local fighters are scoring against ISIS’s core in Iraq and Syria and the setbacks suffered by ISIS’s key provinces such as that in Libya. ISIS, which had long trumpeted its success in establishing the now-shrinking caliphate, needs victories to compensate for these major losses. Earlier this month, CIA Director John Brennan warned, “As the pressure mounts on ISIL, we judge that it will intensify its global terror campaign to maintain its dominance of the global terrorism agenda.”

Running down people with a truck is a new form of violence for ISIS, though ISIS propaganda has called for supporters to kill by “ramming” people, al-Qaida’s Yemen branch recommended it in the past to “mow down the enemies of Allah,” and in 2008 a Palestinian used a bulldozer to kill three Israelis. But this is the fourth major terror attack in Europe in the past eight months: ISIS-directed terrorists killed 130 people in November in Paris; in March suicide bombers killed 32 people in Brussels, and just two weeks ago three men believed to be tied to ISIS killed more than 40 at the Istanbul airport.

The attacks will inevitably, and appropriately, lead to more aggressive intelligence efforts against suspected ISIS networks and tighter security in general. Unfortunately, they are also likely to bolster anti-Muslim voices in France and throughout Europe, fostering daily humiliations and furthering Muslim communities’ sense that they are suspect and under siege. ISIS will exploit the resulting shame and anger, increasing the risk of future attacks.

European nations face several types of terror threats from ISIS. The first is the unprecedented number of fighters—more than 5,000—that Europe has exported to Iraq and Syria to fight under the banners of ISIS and other jihadi groups. More than 900 of them (including 200 women) have come from France. More than 130 are dead, and almost 250 have returned; the rest are believed to still be in Iraq and Syria. The Paris attacks, which were coordinated and practiced, illustrate the danger such fighters can pose: Time in the battle zone allows them to gain fighting skills, become indoctrinated, and develop a network to exploit for future attacks. In addition, ISIS leaders can direct their operations to achieve maximal effect. As the so-called caliphate shrinks, more of these fighters may try to return. More than 1,000 other Frenchmen are believed to be radicalized but have not gone to Iraq and Syria, and this represents another overlapping danger. In the past many might have tried to go to Syria, but now, perhaps acting on directions from ISIS leaders with whom they are communicating or perhaps mixing with returned foreign fighters, these individuals might strike directly at France or other countries.

The last category are true “lone wolves”—those inspired by ISIS or other jihadi ideologies but with no direct operational connection to a group (the attacks in San Bernardino and Orlando appear to fall into this category). Two years ago ISIS propaganda emphasized coming to the “caliphate” to help it consolidate and expand. Earlier this year, however, its spokesman and external operations leader Muhammad al-Adnani declared, “The smallest action you do in the heart of their land is dearer to us than the largest action by us and more effective and more damaging to them.”

France, as we’ve seen, is particularly vulnerable. As my Brookings colleagues Will McCants and Chris Meserole have recently argued, French political culture is a counterterrorism problem. They found that “four of the five countries with the highest rates of radicalization in the world are Francophone, including the top two in Europe (France and Belgium).” Part of the problem are the large numbers of unemployed urban youth, a fertile field for radical recruiting. But part of it is also France’s aggressive secularization programs, which prohibit girls from wearing the veil in school and are considered by many Muslims to be a deliberate attack on their religion. Muslims’ trust in the government and security services is low. Add such a sense of humiliation to a surging far-right political movement that constantly blasts Muslim immigrants and citizens, and the conditions for radicalization are strong.

The United States is less vulnerable by comparison. Fewer than 300 Americans have gone to fight in Iraq and Syria. Part of this is because of an aggressive and effective law enforcement and intelligence effort to disrupt volunteers. But part of it is because the American Muslim community is far better integrated than its French counterpart and regularly cooperates with law enforcement. U.S. politics are becoming more poisonous toward Muslims, but—we can hope—that anti-Muslim sentiment in America may have peaked, and recent polls suggest positive attitudes toward Muslims are increasing.

Continued military and intelligence operations against the ISIS core by U.S.-led coalition forces and their local partners are necessary, but they will take time to bear fruit and in the end still don’t solve the terrorism problem. Stopping an attack like the one in Nice is exceptionally difficult. The attacker chose a “soft” (undefended) target and showed that one sick person can kill many with the right combination of determination and luck. Unfortunately, the most likely reaction after the Nice attack is also the worst one: more vitriol and hostility toward French and European Muslims, furthering a cycle that makes it harder for European security services to gain the cooperation of local communities and easier for ISIS to gain recruits and score victories.

Media coverage of the Islamic State frequently refers to the group’s violent and seemingly archaic justice system without considering the institutional structures that enable this violence, or the broader function that it serves in the group’s ambitious state-building project. Legal institutions make it easier for the group to capture and retain territory by legitimizing its claim to sovereignty, justifying the expropriation of the property and land of enemies, and building goodwill with civilians by ensuring accountability.

The Islamic State’s legal system purports to strictly apply the divinely revealed body of Islamic law known as Sharia, which it regards as the only legitimate basis for governance. Although its legal system is frequently characterized as medieval, it has instrumentally supplemented the original text of the Quran with the modern rules and regulations that are needed to govern a 21st century state and punish modern day offenses—for example, traffic violations. It has the same three features that are present in any modern legal system: police, courts, and prisons.

In a region that has long been plagued by corruption, the Islamic State has attempted to ingratiate itself with civilians by claiming that its legal system is comparatively more legitimate and effective than the available alternatives. However, two emerging vulnerabilities—the system’s susceptibility to corruption and propensity for extra-legal violence—are increasingly undermining the Islamic State’s ability to obtain the trust and cooperation of civilians. Counterinsurgency efforts should be designed to undermine the legitimacy of its institutions. Long-term solutions in the region must involve a fundamental reorganization of political and legal institutions in ways that promote legitimacy and rule of law.

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• The legal foundations of the Islamic State