Editors' Note: Hammering out the political deal that has now brought Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations to a successful conclusion was a landmark achievement, but as Mireya Solis argues, there are still battles to be fought. This post originally appeared in Nikkei Asian Review.

The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) deal that the United States and 11 other Pacific Rim countries struck in Atlanta today was five years in the making. More than once we heard that the end game had come, only to see deadlines pass us by as the negotiations continued to move at a frustratingly slow pace. The grueling work required to cinch this mega trade deal should not come as a surprise, however, given the sheer complexity of the negotiation agenda and the wide differences in the makeup of the participating countries.

Hammering out the essential political deal that has brought TPP negotiations to a successful conclusion is a landmark achievement. But we should not lose sight of the fact that more battles will need to be won before the TPP morphs from an agreement in principle to an agreement in reality. Success at the Atlanta ministerial, however, delivers immediate and portentous benefits. 

U.S. leadership: A balance between strength and flexibility 

Central to American grand strategy has been updating the international economic architecture to match the realities of 21st-century economy and consolidating the critical role of the United States as a Pacific power as envisioned by the Asian rebalance policy. The TPP has long emerged as a litmus test of the American will and resolve to rise to these challenges in a world of fluid geopolitics. With success at the TPP negotiating table, the convening power of the United States—as demonstrated by its ability to steward the most ambitious blueprint for trade integration—has received an enormous boost. 

But equally important is that in the final TPP deal, the United States has displayed another key trait of international leadership: flexibility. Critics of American trade strategy have frequently complained that the U.S. rigidly pushes for its own free-trade agreement (FTA) template without incorporating the preferences of its counterparts: that de facto, the United States does not “negotiate” in trade negotiations. But the set of final compromises that enabled the TPP deal to be struck at Atlanta shows a different picture, one that in fact makes U.S. leadership more attractive and the TPP project more compelling. 

The TPP project is still a promise, not a reality.

In endorsing the principle that TPP countries can opt out of investor-state dispute settlement in their public regulation of tobacco products, and in adopting a hybrid approach that will give up to eight years of data protection for biologic drugs, the United States has shown the strength to compromise without surrendering high standards. In turn, these negotiated compromises cast a favorable light on the TPP as a collective endeavor with a commonality of purpose among founding members: to ensure that protection of foreign direct investment does not hinder public health regulations; and to both promote innovation and access to medicines.

Reviving trade policy 

The trade regime has not had a success of this magnitude for the past two decades. Rather, the list of failures and missed opportunities is long, and the prospects of the Doha Round are dim at best. 

In powerful ways, the TPP revives a stagnant trade regime. It shows that mega trade agreements can offer a platform to devise updated rules on trade and investment that cover sizable share of the world economy. And it creates an incentive structure for concurrent trade agreements to aim higher if they want to remain competitive. 

A genuine re-launch of Abenomics 

After a bruising political battle to secure passage of the security legislation, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe announced that the economy would be his utmost priority. In so doing, he disclosed three fresh arrows: a strong economy, raising the fertility rate, and boosting social security to care for the elderly. 

Abenomics 2.0, however, has fallen flat, as it lacks specifics on how to achieve the target of 600 trillion yen GDP, and because subsidies for young families and the expansion of nursing homes, while desirable and politically popular, do not make for a strategy of economic revitalization. Instead, the TPP deal boosts Abenomics 1.0 where its true transformative power lies: structural reform.

An informed debate on TPP 

After legal scrubbing, the TPP text will be released. This will offer the much-needed opportunity to debate the merits and demerits of the agreement with facts, and not speculation. Full disclosure of the agreement, close public scrutiny, and a spirited discussion on where the agreement has lived up to expectations and where it has fallen short will be essential in shoring up public support.

The TPP project is still a promise, not a reality. Another set of milestones will be required (twelve, to be exact). Each participating country has its own domestic procedures for ratification, and some definitely face an uphill battle: Malaysia is gripped by a major political crisis as Prime Minister Najib Razak fights charges of corruption; and it is anyone’s guess what the electoral results in a couple of weeks will mean for Canada’s place in the TPP. 

For the United States too, the quest for TPP ratification could not come at a more complicated time with a full-blown presidential election race. In wrapping up the TPP negotiations, the United States has demonstrated its leadership in convening a significant and diverse group of countries and in stewarding with success the negotiation of an ambitious blueprint for economic governance. But this will mean little if TPP is voted down in Congress or stays frozen in ratification limbo. Without the power to deliver a TPP in force, past accomplishments will rightfully be brushed aside. 

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Japan’s presence in the Arctic is not new, but it has been limited mostly to scientific research. Japan has stepped up its engagement after it gained observer status to the Arctic Council and appointed its first Arctic ambassador in 2013. However, Japan has yet to flesh out a full-blown Arctic strategy that identifies the range of its national interests in the polar region and actionable strategies to achieve them. The Arctic offers Japan an opportunity to expand cooperation with the United States in an uncharted area, poses hard questions on how to interact with Russia in the post-Ukraine era, and creates the interesting proposition of whether China and Japan can cooperate in articulating the views of non-Arctic states.

On October 19, the Center for East Asia Policy Studies at Brookings hosted a panel of distinguished experts for a discussion on what components should be included in Japan’s Arctic strategy, ranging from resource development, environmental preservation, and scientific research, to securing access to expanding shipping lanes and managing a complex diplomatic chessboard. 

Join the conversation on Twitter using #JapanArctic

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• Charting Japan's Arctic strategy

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• taisaku ikeshima presentation

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Despite being a developed and prosperous country, Japan faces a host of basic challenges today and going forward—some of its own creation and others beyond the country’s control. For example, Japan lacks essential natural resources, while also facing overcrowding in cities and depopulation in rural areas. As a result, food and energy self-sufficiency is low. Also, while the dual phenomena of a low birthrate and an ageing population have long been deemed problematic, these issues are rapidly growing more serious. The problems Japan faces today are potentially the same problems the rest of the world will face in the near future. Japan, therefore, may serve as a bellwether for the global community as many nations anticipate similar challenges in the future.  

On October 26, the Center for East Asia Policy Studies at Brookings and the U.S.-Japan Research Institute co-hosted Hiroshi Komiyama, chairman of the Mitsubishi Research Institute and president emeritus of the University of Tokyo, for a discussion of his recent book, “Beyond the Limits to Growth: New Ideas for Sustainability from Japan.” In this book, Komiyama examines the issues facing Japan—and the world—presenting a number of potential viable solutions and offering insights into Japan’s experiences and the lessons it can provide for a more sustainable future.

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• Overcoming the limits to growth: Sustainability lessons from Japan

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Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has been promoting the increased participation of women in the Japanese economy, a policy popularly known as womenomics, as a pillar of his campaign for economic revitalization. While significant strides have been made with regard to increasing female workforce participation, corporate efforts to introduce flexible working practices, and spurring the promotion of women on the corporate ladder, womenomics will be incomplete if it remains confined to the established corporate structure. Unleashing the creative potential of half of Japan’s population will require an equally sustained effort to promote female entrepreneurship. This is a tall order for Japan where female entrepreneurs face a two-fold challenge: the modest development of venture capital and a host of legal and cultural hurdles to individual entrepreneurship; plus the additional hurdles for women in gaining access to the assets widely perceived as essential to success such as business networks, financing, technology, and access to markets at home and abroad. However, entrepreneurship offers Japanese women significant benefits through the opportunity to bypass rigid corporate hierarchies, custom tailor their workloads to better achieve work-life balance, and offer new and innovative products and services to the Japanese consumer.

On February 8, the Center for East Asia Policy Studies at Brookings hosted a distinguished group of policy experts and entrepreneurs for a discussion on the current state of female entrepreneurship in Japan and concrete strategies to promote female-run businesses in the country. They compared Japan and the United States, both in terms in differing results but also on-going common challenges, and discussed their own personal experiences.

Join the conversation on Twitter using #Womenomics

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• Womenomics 2.0: The potential of female entrepreneurs in Japan
• The importance of mentors for female entrepreneurs
• Female entrepreneurs: Different options and different styles
• Female leadership creates opportunities

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• Womenomics 2.0: The potential of female entrepreneurs in Japan

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• Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

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As part of his economic revitalization plan, Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has been touting “womenomics,” a plan to increase the number of women in the labor force. One way for women to enter the workforce but bypass the conventional corporate structure is through entrepreneurship.

Four questions for three female entrepreneurs

At a recent Center for East Asia Policy Studies event on womenomics and female entrepreneurship in Japan, we brought together three successful female entrepreneurs to discuss their experiences both in the United States and Japan. Prior to their panel discussion, we asked each of the speakers four questions about their careers.

1. What was the trigger that made you decide to start your own business?
2. What was the biggest hurdle in starting and/or running your business?
3. How or when was being a woman an asset to you as an entrepreneur and/or running your business?
4. How has the climate for female entrepreneurs changed compared to when you started your business?

Despite the differing environments for entrepreneurs and working women in the two countries, the speakers raised many of the same issues and offered similar advice. Access to funding or financing was an issue in both countries, as was the necessity to overcome fears about running a business or being in male-dominated fields. All of the speakers noted the positive changes in the business environment for female entrepreneurs since they had started their own businesses, as well as the impact this has had in creating more opportunities for women.

Donna Fujimoto Cole

Donna Fujimoto Cole is the president and CEO of Cole Chemical and Distributing Inc. in Houston, Texas. She started her company in 1980 at the urging of her clients. Today Cole Chemical is ranked 131 among chemical distributors globally by ICIS (Independent Chemical Information Service) and its customers include Bayer Material Scientific, BP America, Chevron, ExxonMobil, Lockheed Martin, Procter & Gamble, Shell, Spectra Energy, and Toyota. Cole is also an active member of her community and serves on the boards of a variety of national and regional organizations.

Fujiyo Ishiguro

A founding member for the Netyear Group, Fujiyo Ishiguro is now the president and CEO of the Netyear Group Corporation based in Tokyo, Japan. The firm, which was established in 1999, devises comprehensive digital marketing solutions for corporate clients. The Netyear Group was listed on the Mothers section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange in 2008. Recently, Ishiguro has served on a number of Japanese government committees including the Cabinet Office’s “The Future to Choose” Committee and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry’s “Internet of Things” Committee. 

Sachiko Kuno

Sachiko Kuno is the co-founder, president, and CEO of the S&R Foundation in Washington, D.C., a non-profit organization that supports talented individuals in the fields of science, art, and social entrepreneurship. A biochemist by training, Kuno and her research partner and husband Ryuji Ueno have established a number pharmaceutical companies and philanthropic foundations including R-Tech Ueno in Japan and Sucampo Pharmaceuticals in Bethesda, Maryland. Together, Kuno and Ueno hold over 900 patents. Kuno is active in the greater Washington community and serves on the boards of numerous regional organizations.

Full video of the event featuring these speakers can be found here.

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• The importance of mentors for female entrepreneurs
• Female entrepreneurs: Different options and different styles
• Female leadership creates opportunities

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Earlier this month, the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement was signed by its 12 member states in New Zealand, bringing the trade deal one step closer to fruition. The member states must now work on resolving their respective domestic issues tied to TPP. For Japan, one of the major issue areas involving TPP is agriculture.

On February 24, the Center for East Asia Policy Studies hosted Kazuhito Yamashita for a presentation in which he discussed the impact of Japan’s market access commitment on agriculture, the TPP countermeasures that the Japanese government announced for agriculture, and the types of agricultural policy reform that are being considered in Japan.

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• Transcript of Kazuhito Yamashita Presentation (.pdf)

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• Yamashita Brookings presentation for website 022416
• Transcript Kazuhito Yamashita Presentation

What makes the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) consequential?

Since the onset of the 21st century, countries from every corner of the world have vigorously negotiated free trade agreements (FTAs) based on the principle of preferential market access (as opposed to the most-favored nation obligation of the WTO). This has resulted in a veritable avalanche of such trade deals, with close to 400 FTAs notified to the WTO in the past 20 years. If the negotiation of preferential trade agreements is now the dominant trend in the trading regime, and almost no country has escaped contagion from the FTA syndrome, why does one agreement in particular—the TPP—remain the focal point of policy debates on trade?

Chart 1. Multilateral trade regimes and FTA proliferation

The TPP generates most attention because it has spurred the emergence of mega trade agreements (as compared to the mostly small bilateral trade deals that had characterized the FTA wave), and has offered a new platform to advance the trade agenda as negotiations on the Doha Round continue gridlocked. The TPP has come a long way from its humble beginnings as a trade grouping of four small open economies (Brunei, New Zealand, Chile, and Singapore). Today, it comprises 12 nations, covers 26 percent of world trade, and is expected to generate global income gains in the neighborhood of $492 billion by 2030.

Chart 2. From humble beginnings to mega trade deal

But the significance of the TPP is not to be grasped by numbers alone. Consider the following defining traits of this trade agreement:

1. Its high level of ambition for tariff liberalization vowing to disallow sectoral carve-outs. While it is true that sensitive sectors asserted their political weight by deferring or limiting tariff elimination (e.g., autos for the United States and five agricultural commodities for Japan), the commitment of TPP countries to eventually eliminate 99-100 percent of tariff rates is indeed impressive. Japan does stand out for a lower level of committed tariff elimination (95 percent); but again this is the highest level of liberalization that Japan has ever committed to in any trade negotiation.
2. Its comprehensive set of rules to target non-tariff barriers by introducing disciplines on issues such as regulatory coherence, state-owned enterprises, competitiveness, supply chains, etc. With 30 chapters and over 5,000 pages of text, grasping the reach of TPP rules will certainly take time. However, a quick glance does reveal novel, and needed, disciplines in important areas of the economy. For example, the e-commerce chapter establishes a binding obligation for governments to allow free data flows, disallows forced localization of data servers (except for the financial sector), and mandates that all countries must provide a legal framework to protect personal information. Another important innovation is the TPP provision that governments cannot require the transfer of source code from private companies operating in their market.
3. Its expansive vision as an Asia-Pacific platform with aspirations to set global standards. Its open architecture with a docking mechanism to encourage further member expansion and its explicit aim to establish a trans-regional platform that bridges Asia and North and South America are strong selling points for the TPP. It undercuts the oft-mentioned fear of using preferential trade agreements to create closed-off regions, and it gives its rules and standards the opportunity to disseminate far and wide.
4. Last but not least, the TPP has emerged as a central policy priority for both the U.S. and Japan to hone their international economic competitiveness and achieve broader foreign policy goals. In the area of foreign economic policy, the TPP is one of the most compelling frameworks to encourage China to deepen its market reforms and sign on to more ambitious liberalization commitments. The TPP, therefore, has emerged as a central arena for the interaction of the three giants of the world economy.

The United States as a Pacific power

The U.S. expects to reap important economic benefits from the TPP. It is a trade agreement that taps into the areas of competitive strength of the American economy: agricultural exports, trade in services, the digital economy, to name a few. Econometric studies put the expected income gains of the TPP for the U.S. in the order of $131 billion per year, and to the extent that the TPP becomes a global standard, these gains will grow. Indeed, the TPP is the centerpiece of the American trade agenda. Its success is required for continued momentum in the on-going trans-Atlantic trade negotiations, but it could also influence other important trade initiatives. For example, TPP disciplines on services and state-owned enterprises are expected to influence deliberations on the Trade in Services Agreement, a plurilateral trade negotiation carried out under the aegis of the WTO.

From the point of view of global governance, the TPP is a litmus test of the U.S. ability to provide leadership at a time of great complexity in the world economic order: one where supply chains have emerged as a main driver of production and trade, where emerging economies are increasingly vocal in the management of the global economy, and where the test of updating Bretton Woods institutions looms large. Through the TPP, the U.S. can display its convening power to negotiate novel trade rules, to devise new institutional forms that complement and spur on the multilateral regime, and to be proactive and not just reactive to initiatives from rising economic powers.

But the TPP is also a pillar of U.S. Asia policy, one that solidifies the U.S. commitment to remain an engaged Pacific power. This trade agreement increases the appeal of the rebalancing policy by defining it not just as a reorientation of military resources toward a region undergoing a significant power transition; but also as the pursuit of a common endeavor: furthering economic interdependence with rules that match the realities of the 21st century economy, and potentially establishing a bridge toward China with the prospect of TPP membership.

Japan is an essential partner for the U.S. to achieve these important goals. Japan came late to the TPP negotiations (in the summer of 2013), but it transformed the economic and political significance of this deal. Japan’s participation allowed the TPP to qualify as a mega trade agreement. For the U.S. alone, the projected economic gains with Japan on board tripled. This is not surprising given the size of the Japanese market and the fact that the U.S. and Japan do not have a bilateral trade agreement; nor has Japan ever accepted these levels of liberalization. Moreover, prior to Japan joining the TPP there were doubts as to whether this could indeed become an Asia-Pacific platform of economic integration since no major Asian economy was participating. Japan’s entry put those objections to rest.

Japan as a reviving power

For Japan as well, the TPP negotiations have had salutary effects on its trade diplomacy and on the pursuit of central domestic and foreign policy priorities. Prior to joining the TPP, Japan’s trade strategy had achieved modest results: it lagged behind its peer competitors in negotiating an FTA network that covered a substantial share of its trade, it had faced difficulty in persuading Southeast Asian countries to adopt many WTO+ rules, it had received the cold shoulder from the U.S. and Europe as it proposed the negotiation of trade agreements, and remained deadlocked with China over the membership configuration of an East Asian trade grouping. The TPP altered the parameters of Japanese trade policy. It allowed the country to negotiate preferential access to main markets of destination, to disseminate next frontier trade rules, and to undertake concurrent mega trade negotiations. As a reaction to Japan’s courting of TPP membership, China recalibrated its trade policy to speed up the launch of trilateral trade negotiations in Northeast Asia and was now amenable to a 16-member trade grouping upholding the principle of ASEAN centrality (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership or RCEP), and the Europeans also came to the negotiation table.

As a full participant in the mega FTA movement, Japan can aim high in order to pursue signature objectives such as:

• Negotiate deep integration FTAs that enhance the international competitiveness of Japanese global supply chains. An assessment of Japan’s core competencies in the 21st century should start with the recognition that a significant share of industrial capacity has been relocated overseas. On-shoring of manufacturing operations is not a viable goal given projected demographic trends. Rather, the aim should be to sustain and strengthen Japan’s role in global supply chains (the leading force of international production and trade today). Japan’s international diplomacy has a role to play here by negotiating deep FTAs that meet the needs of fragmented production chains. Additionally, deep FTA commitments will also help Japan address its own domestic inefficiencies such as the modest liberalization of the services sector.
• Lock-in structural reforms. One of the main benefits of linking the domestic structural reform agenda to international trade commitments is that it will be harder to roll back the reforms if and when political circumstances change (this is indeed a major lesson of the failure to institutionalize Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s reforms). Importantly, the TPP negotiations do not conform to the old-style gaiatsu pattern where a reluctant Japan would deflect U.S. pressure for it to change its ways. This time Japan has eagerly sought to be at the TPP table and has—of its own accord—identified the synergies between the new trade commitments and its own efforts to reform the domestic economy.
• Manage the transition from “regime-taker” to “regime-maker.” With the stagnation of the WTO, we have moved to a system of decentralized competition whereby different clusters of countries seek to define the standards for economic integration. The costs of a passive trade policy are much higher today than in a most favored nation (MFN) world where preferential trade agreements were the exception and not the rule. The expectation of steady liberalization benefits through successive multilateral trade rounds has been sharply revised. Therefore, countries that want to avoid the discriminatory effects of existing preferential trade deals and to improve access to important markets through additional elimination of tariffs and the adoption of rules that address behind-the-border barriers have resorted to an active FTA diplomacy. More broadly, Japan has much to win from displaying leadership in international economic governance, in a manner that resonates with the goals of the Abe administration to play a proactive role in world affairs.

For all the shared interests between the U.S. and Japan in the TPP project, negotiations over long divisive market access terms proved difficult and frustratingly long. Of course, a host of other issues also kept the larger TPP membership apart. Biologics especially was the last topic to close in the final TPP ministerial held in Atlanta in October 2015, and negotiations went to the wire. Despite all these difficulties, the ability to strike a TPP deal last fall represents a big win for the trade regime which has not seen a success of this magnitude in two decades. Since its creation, the WTO has not updated the rules of international trade and investment, and the Doha Round lingers on life support. Many were skeptical that a major trade negotiation tackling front and center the complex and unwieldy behind-the-border agenda could succeed. This is the most powerful message coming from Atlanta: it can be done.

With a TPP deal in hand there is greater hope that we can manage the tectonic changes in international trade governance. The transformation of the trade agenda (increasingly about regulatory matters) and the limitations of the WTO as a negotiation forum, have called into question the pure multilateral ideal—one set of binding rules for 150+ countries. Instead, the center of action is now on what we call “variable geometry” arrangements where subsets of countries negotiate next-frontier rules: the plurilaterals in the WTO and the preferentials through mega trade agreements. The emerging system for trade governance is not risk-free, and much effort will be required to forestall potential dangers: fragmentation (if TPP-like standards do not disseminate widely) and exclusion (if less developed countries are bypassed by the FTA wave).

Moreover, the TPP deal opens a new and promising chapter in U.S.-Japan relations. It is certainly more than a U.S.-Japan trade agreement—it represents the ability of 12 countries at varying levels of development and with very different regulatory regimes to agree on the most substantive trade liberalization to date. But it is also true that at the core of the TPP, the U.S. and Japan as the largest and most developed economies have acted as an engine of negotiations. The TPP marks a milestone in U.S.-Japan relations, as an effective instance of cooperation to upgrade the international economic architecture. In the TPP, the U.S. and Japan are on close alignment on the rules area of the talks and were able to reach an agreement on market access issues that in the past had proven intractable.

Ratification, reform, and reach

None of these effects will be long lasting nor will they reach their full potential, if TPP countries (and the U.S. and Japan in particular) do not double down on the next crucial steps. For simplicity sake, these can be dubbed the three “Rs” of ratification, reform, and reach.

Ratification

Ratification rules in the TPP require that six countries representing 85 percent of combined GDP approve the agreement before it enters into force. Therefore, to meet this numerical requirement both the U.S. and Japan must ratify. However, for the U.S., TPP ratification will represent a steep political battle in the midst of an American presidential election year. Despite public opinion polls showing that most Americans see in international trade an opportunity, the politics of trade agreements are fractious. Long-standing opposition by environmental groups and unions to trade agreements has resulted in their active mobilization against the TPP. And the debate on the merits of trade agreements has only become more heated as critics suggest that trade globalization is to be blamed for growing income inequality and the erosion of state regulatory powers.

For both national parties, the TPP is a divisive issue. While President Barack Obama has made TPP negotiation and ratification a central priority of his administration, Democrats in Congress have not backed his trade initiative in large numbers, in part due to the opposition of the party’s traditional base, labor unions. The internal dynamics of the Republican Party have shifted dramatically, complicating the odds for the TPP. The Republican Party has become less cohesive with the emergence of the Tea Party wing determined to deny Obama a legacy-making trade agreement. The support of key Republican figures in the Senate has also waned due to dissatisfaction over the tobacco carve-out from investor-state dispute settlement and the exclusivity period for biologics. And the business community has also criticized these provisions, offering only qualified support for the TPP deal.

The U.S. has yet to fail in ratifying a negotiated trade agreement. And a vote down on the TPP would be singularly costly for the credibility of U.S. foreign policy and the evolution of the international trade regime.

Reform

One of the most powerful benefits of trade agreements is the ability of governments to use them as commitment devices to implement needed economic changes. Reform is in fact the crucial issue for Japan as it tries to leave behind stagnant growth. Economic revitalization certainly goes beyond agricultural reform, to encompass the host of productivity-enhancing measures across all areas of the economy, the internationalization of services, the promotion of inward direct investment, and the further upgrading of regional and trans-regional production networks.

Yet, farming countermeasures adopted in the wake of the TPP deal have raised doubts about the government’s resolve to transform its agricultural sector. Japan’s TPP market access commitments do include a 56,000-ton import rice quota (to grow eventually to 78,400 tons). But the government promptly announced an increase in stockpiling purchases to match the TPP quota, effectively preventing a drop in the price of rice and market adjustment. This artificial support preempts the modernization of the agricultural sector since it enables part-time farmers to continue operating in tiny plots, hindering the emergence of commercial farming. The government also submitted a generous 2016 supplementary budget with 312 billion yen earmarked for agricultural TPP countermeasures. But informed experts question its impact in boosting farming competitiveness since public works allocations still loom large (30 percent of outlays will go to land reclamation projects).

Just as the electoral cycle has not facilitated TPP ratification in the U.S., the looming Japanese Upper House election in July is not conducive to moving past prior trade compensation practices.

Reach

The release of the TPP text has clarified a very important point: membership can be extended not only to APEC economies but also to other countries that are willing to meet TPP disciplines. Enlargement will be critical to avoid the above-mentioned risks of fragmentation and exclusion by helping disseminate TPP standards. In the short and medium term, the conclusion of the TPP talks is expected to have two main effects: increase the list of potential applicants, and encourage a higher level of ambition among on-going trade negotiations.

The number of economies expressing an interest in joining the TPP has grown to include South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, Colombia, and Costa Rica, among others. Regarding the second wave of accession the key issue will be readiness to undertake the ambitious liberalization commitments of the TPP, and the list of prospective applicants shows wide variation on this score. The conclusion of TPP talks also creates an incentive for the updating of existing FTAs and/or scaling up the level of ambition in ongoing trade negotiations, as countries outside the TPP want to secure export markets, attract foreign direct investment, and embed their companies in global supply chains.

In the long run, the key challenge will be to devise an effective strategy to engage emerging economies, such as China, India, and Brazil. This is still the gaping hole in the U.S. plans to develop trans-Pacific and trans-Atlantic trade groupings. Certainly, putting in place the TPP and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership is the first step in such strategy since it changes the incentive structure for these countries to entertain further market liberalization. But at the end of the day, these emerging economies must reach the determination that it is in their national interest to abide by these economic standards, and find the political will to tackle vested interests. This is a tall order indeed.

The most pressing question may well be how China will position itself vis-à-vis the TPP. Can we expect it to act on past precedent and seek TPP accession just as in the past it used WTO membership to advance economic reforms? Or will it choose instead to champion the negotiation of a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) after both the TPP and RCEP materialize, in order to play a more proactive role in the international economic architecture—more in conformance with the recent launch of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank?

The recently struck TPP agreement underscores the potential of furthering U.S.-Japan cooperation to supply needed international economic governance. However, the overview of remaining challenges also shows that clinching a TPP deal is just the first step.

This article originally appeared in the March/April 2016 issue of Economy, Culture & History Japan SPOTLIGHT Bimonthly.

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• The high stakes of TPP ratification: Implications for Asia-Pacific and beyond

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In an era of fluid geopolitics and geoeconomics, challenges to the global order abound: from ever-changing terrorism, to massive refugee flows, a stubbornly sluggish world economy, and the specter of global pandemics. Against this backdrop, the question of whether leader summitry—either the G-7 or G-20 incarnations—can supply needed international governance is all the more relevant. This question is particularly significant for East Asia this year as Japan and China, two economic giants that are sometimes perceived as political rivals, respectively host the G-7 and G-20 summits. 

On April 18, the Center for East Asia Policy Studies and the Project on International Order and Strategy co-hosted a discussion on the continued relevancy and efficacy of the leader summit framework, Japan’s and China’s priorities as summit hosts, and whether these East Asian neighbors will hold parallel but completely separate summits or utilize these summits as an opportunity to cooperate on issues of mutual, and global, interest.

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• Japan’s G-7 and China’s G-20 chairmanships: Bridges or stovepipes in leader summitry?

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• Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

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• 20160418_g7g20_transcript

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For decades Chinese companies focused their international investment on unearthing natural resources in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. In recent years, Chinese money has spread across the globe into diverse sectors including the real estate, energy, hospitality, and transportation industries. So far in 2016, Chinese investment in offshore mergers and acquisitions has already reached $101 billion, on track to surpass its $109 billion total for all of 2015. What do these investments reveal about China’s intentions in the West? How is China’s image being shaped by its muscular international investments? Should the West respond to this new wave, and if so, how?

On April 25, 2016, the Center on the United States and Europe and the John L. Thornton China Center at Brookings hosted the launch of "China’s Offensive in Europe" (Brookings Institution Press, 2016), the newly-published, revised book co-authored by Visiting Fellow Philippe Le Corre (with Alain Sepulchre). During the event, Le Corre offered an assessment of the trends, sectors, and target countries of Chinese investments on the Continent. Following the presentation, Senior Fellow Mireya Solis moderated a discussion with Le Corre and Senior Fellows Constanze Stelzenmüller and David Dollar.

 Join the conversation on Twitter using #ChinaEurope

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• China’s overseas investments in Europe and beyond

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Japan may face political uncertainty in the weeks ahead with an election slated for the Diet’s Upper House this summer. Only a few months ago, it was widely thought that Prime Minister Abe would dissolve the Lower House in order to have a double election this summer. However, lackluster economic performance, the pending decision on a consumption tax increase, and the task of reconstruction after the Kumamoto earthquakes may encourage the Prime Minister to reevaluate his options. How will the ruling coalition redefine its electoral strategy as voters expect further progress on the economic agenda? Can the newly-formed Democratic Party use this first electoral test to demonstrate greater potential?

On May 3, the Center for East Asia Policy Studies hosted a panel of distinguished Japanese politicians for a discussion on the future of Japanese politics. Yoshimasa Hayashi, Yasutoshi Nishimura, and Itsunori Onodera of the Liberal Democratic Party and Goshi Hosono of the Democratic Party shared their thoughts on their respective parties’ preparations for the upcoming election and the impact the election may have on the balance of power in the Diet, as well as issues such as the ratification of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the implementation of signature reform policies, and the potential resurgence of the opposition Democratic Party.

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Audio

• The future of Japanese politics (Japanese)

The Brexit vote has stunned us. It has shaken us. It has forced upon us a set of dreadful questions none of us ever wished answers were required for:

• How do you disarticulate deeply integrated economies? How do you prevent the rancor of the U.K.'s divorce from the EU wreaking more havoc, not only in Europe but in the rest of the world? The divorce metaphor is apt here as it signals the treacherous waters ahead when the feeling of betrayal and the temptation of revenge may result in a misguided punitive approach to separation. Let's not forget that almost half of U.K.'s referendum voters chose "remain." Let's not forget that the youth in the U.K. overwhelmingly chose the EU for their future. EU leaders therefore face the ultimate test of leadership. In negotiating exit terms they must strengthen this constituency for internationalism. The U.K. needs committed internationalists. We all need them.
• How do you prevent rising nationalism from dialing back globalization? Is the "Great Convergence" at risk? In the past few decades, developing countries have emerged into the international trading system, and in opening their economies they have lifted millions from abject poverty. Will this future be off-limits to the next round of poor nations seeking to avail themselves of the opportunities of the international marketplace? Has globalization already peaked and are we to be the unlucky generation that lives through the tumultuous process of retrenchment? Are we to feel firsthand the dread that the generation of a century ago experienced when they all suffered from beggar-thy-neighbor policies?
• Are we next? Are the forces of economic nationalism and nativism that drove the referendum outcome in the U.K. unstoppable elsewhere? Will they decide the outcome of the American presidential election this fall? And if so, what happens to the international economic order?

These are still imponderable questions, but I would venture two answers: Brexit is not the final indictment of globalization, and our futures are not yet destined to be ruled by the politics of grievance.

The United States need not become the next domino to succumb to the harmful influence of populism. The parallels in the anti-globalization campaign on both sides of the Atlantic are of course unnerving:

• Anti-elitism: Fueled by the sense of economic disenfranchisement of older white voters who feel that a future of "splendid isolation" is possible.
• Nationalism: Driven by a desire to "take back" our country.
• Nativism: Spurred by strong anti-immigration feelings and rejection of a multicultural polity.

But the differences are also striking, especially when it comes to the issue of trade which commanded so much attention during both the Brexit campaign and the American presidential nomination debates. In reading the "Leave" campaign's statement on trade policy, you will not find:

• The rejection of trade deals for "killing jobs" with special blame placed on developing countries (aka China) for inflicting a mortal wound on manufacturing prowess;
• The promise to impose punitive tariffs on major trading partners even at the risk of initiating a trade war;
• The call for a boycott of firms that relocate part of their production overseas.

Brexit then is not an endorsement of the Trump brand of predatory protectionism.

Instead, what the Leave campaign offered on trade policy are heaps of wishful thinking and hidden truths. It sought to downplay the importance of the EU market to U.K. producers in order to justify setting its sights on other horizons. It promised to open up trade opportunities and job growth by negotiating trade deals with emerging economies such as China and India. And it confidently stated that trade links with the EU could be restored through a U.K.-EU trade deal that would mirror what countries like Norway have done. But this optimistic prognosis left out a lot. For starters, a future U.K.-EU free trade agreement will most likely yield pared-down benefits. Norway gained access to the single market by agreeing to free movement of labor that Brexiters vehemently reject. Moreover, the U.K. cannot chart its own course on trade policy until its separation from the EU is complete. Restructuring U.K.'s trading relations will take years and the results are hard to predict. But the costs of uncertainty are immediate as companies and investors will recalibrate their strategies without waiting for a protracted process of trade negotiations.

Brexiters struck a xenophobic note, but did not produce an overtly protectionist manifesto. Yet, their success at the ballot did deliver a major blow to economic internationalism. Trumpism is both xenophobic and protectionist, and were it to prevail in the November election, its negative impact on globalization will be vastly more profound. But the die has not been cast, and there are sound reasons to doubt a Trump victory.

If we are to prevail in overcoming the politics of grievance, we must first reckon that populism did not materialize from thin air. It is based on a fact: As globalization intensified during the past two decades, the middle classes in the industrialized world experienced stagnant incomes. The inward push is enabled by the manipulation of this fact: Offering trade as an easy scapegoat for a vastly more complex set of factors producing economic disparities (such as technological change and political decisions on taxation, education, and safety nets). And this populism is based on a false promise—that "taking control," i.e., taking our countries out of the existing trading regime will make those left behind better off. Its one unmistakable deliverable will be to make all of us worse off.