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For Cubans, “D17”—December 17, 2014—changed everything. On that day, the United States and Cuba announced that the two countries would renew diplomatic relations nearly 60 years after Fidel Castro came to power. For both countries, a new transformation has begun—but this time, it is the promise of Cuba’s insertion in the globalized economy and the crumbling U.S. embargo that is catalyzing change on the island.

On May 31, the Brookings Book Club hosted Nonresident Senior Fellow Richard E. Feinberg and NPR Correspondent Tom Gjelten for a discussion of Feinberg’s new book, “Open for Business: Building the New Cuban Economy” (Brookings Institution Press, 2016). The discussion focused on the factors that guided this monumental decision: international diplomacy; changes already underway in Cuba; successful Cuban entrepreneurs and foreign investments; and scenarios for Cuba’s future development path.

Three young Cuban leaders, including two whose vignettes appear in the book, “Open for Business,” joined the discussion and shared their personal experiences with the economic realities in Cuba today, as well as the opportunities created by the shift in Cuban-American relations.

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• Open for business: Building the new Cuban economy

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• Open for business: Building the new Cuban economy

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On April 2, 2011, Ethiopia embarked upon the construction of what is expected to be the biggest hydroelectric power plant in Africa.  Called the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), it will be located on the Blue Nile, 40 kilometers (25 miles) from the border with the Republic of Sudan and will have the capacity to produce 6,000 megawatts of electricity.  The GERD, once completed and made operational, is expected to ameliorate chronic domestic energy shortages, help the country’s households (especially those located in the rural areas) switch to cleaner forms of energy and allow the government to earn foreign exchange through the exportation of electricity to other countries in the region.  Although authorities in Addis Ababa believe that the dam will contribute  significantly to economic growth and development—not just in Ethiopia, but also in neighboring countries, such as Sudan—its construction has been very controversial.  The major controversies revolve around Ethiopia’s decision to fund the building of the dam from its own sources and the potential impacts of the dam on downstream countries, especially Egypt.  

Ethiopia opted to source funds for the construction of the GERD through selling bonds to citizens at home and abroad.  Government employees have been encouraged to devote as much as one or two months of their salaries to the purchasing of the GERD bonds.  Most public workers in Ethiopia earn relatively low wages and face a significantly high cost of living.  Hence, they are not likely to be able to sacrifice that much of their salaries to invest in this national project.  Nevertheless, many of them have been observed purchasing the GERD bonds, primarily because of pressure from the government and the belief that participation in this national project is a show of one’s patriotism.

The government of Ethiopia has also encouraged the private sector to invest in the GERD project.  Specifically, private domestic banks and other business enterprises are expected to purchase millions of Birr worth of these bonds.  The government also hopes that Ethiopians in the diaspora will contribute significantly to this massive effort to develop the country’s hydroelectric power resources.  However, many Ethiopians in the diaspora have not been willing to invest in the GERD project, citing pervasive corruption in the public sector and dictatorial government policies as reasons why they would not commit the resources necessary to move the project forward.  Additionally, Ethiopians living outside the country have argued that the present government in Addis Ababa continues to impede the country’s transition to democracy by making it virtually impossible for opposition parties to operate, using draconian laws (e.g., anti-terrorism laws) to silence legitimate protests and generally denying citizens the right to express themselves.  For these reasons, many of them have refused to invest in the GERD project.  Finally, Ethiopia’s traditional development partners, including such international organizations as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, appear to be unwilling to lend the country the necessary funds for the construction of the dam given the controversies surrounding the dam and their policies on the building of megadams.

Egypt has registered its opposition to the construction of the GERD.  In fact, before he was ousted, former Egyptian president Mohamed Morsi made it known to authorities in Addis Ababa that Egypt would not support the project.  The Egyptians, as they have done before, have invoked the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1929, which granted Egypt veto power over all construction projects on the Nile River and its tributaries.  According to Cairo, then, Ethiopia was supposed to obtain permission from Egypt before embarking on the GERD project.

In May 2010, five upstream riparian states (Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda and Tanzania) signed the Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA), which, they argue, would provide the mechanism for the equitable and fair use of Nile River waters.  On June 13, 2013, the Ethiopian Parliament ratified the CFA and incorporated it into domestic law.  The other four signatories have not yet ratified the treaty but plan to do so eventually.  Egypt and Sudan, however, have refused to sign the CFA and continue to argue that the 1929 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, as well as the 1959 bilateral agreement between Egypt and Sudan, represent the only legal mechanisms for Nile River governance.  Recently, however, the government of Sudan has indicated its support for the GERD, and South Sudan, which gained its independence from Khartoum on July 9, 2011, does not oppose the project either.

Significant increases in population in Egypt, the need for the country to expand its irrigated agricultural base, as well as other industrial needs have significantly increased the country’s demand for water.  Unfortunately for Egyptians, the only viable source of water in the country is the Nile River.  Thus, Egyptians, as made clear by their leaders, are not willing to relinquish even one drop of water.  The country’s bitter opposition to the GERD stems from the fact that it will reduce the flow of water into the Nile River and force Egyptians to live with less water than now.  Egyptian leaders are not willing to accept the assertion made by the Ethiopian government that the construction of the dam will not significantly reduce the flow of water from the Blue Nile into Egypt.  Thus, Cairo has hinted that it would employ all means available to stop the construction of the GERD.

The site of the GERD was identified during geological surveys conducted between 1956 and 1964 by the United States Bureau of Reclamation.  Although studies determining the feasibility of a dam on the Blue Nile were completed almost half a century ago, previous Ethiopian governments did not make any attempt to build such a structure on the Blue Nile.  This inaction may have been due to Egypt’s ability to lobby the international donor community and prevent it from providing Addis Ababa with the necessary financial resources to complete the project, Ethiopia’s chronic internal political instability, or Egypt’s military strength and its strong ties with neighboring Sudan (the latter shares the same interests as Egypt regarding the waters of the Nile River).  In fact, the 1929 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and the 1959 bilateral agreement between Sudan and Egypt granted both countries complete control of all the waters of the Nile River.

Since the ouster of Hosni Mubarak, Egypt has been weakened significantly, politically, economically and militarily.  The struggle between the military and civil society for control of the government has been a major distraction to the Egyptian military, and it is unlikely that it can effectively face a relatively strong and more assertive Ethiopian military.  Hence, it appears that this might be the most opportune time for Ethiopia to initiate such a construction project.  Perhaps more important is the fact that virtually all of the upstream riparian states are no longer willing to allow both Egypt and Sudan to continue to monopolize the waters of the Nile River.  In addition, Ethiopia is relatively at peace and maintains good relations with its neighbors, particularly the Republic of Sudan, which would be critical in any successful attack on Ethiopia by Egypt.  Of course, Addis Ababa has also invoked and relied on the Cooperative Framework Agreement which, besides Ethiopia, has been signed by four other upstream riparian States—the CFA favors the equitable and fair use of the waters of the Nile River.  Authorities in Addis Ababa believe that the GERD will contribute to such fair and equitable use; after all, the Blue Nile (which is located in Ethiopia) provides 86 percent of the water that flows into the Nile River.  Up to this point, Ethiopia has made virtually no use of that water, allowing Egypt and Sudan alone to dictate its usage.

Critics of the GERD, including some Ethiopians within and outside the country, argue that Addis Ababa initiated the building of the dam just to divert public attention away from internal political tensions associated with lack of religious freedom, human rights violations, suppression of the press, and the economic and political polarization that has become pervasive throughout the country during the last several decades. 

Given the economic significance of the Blue Nile for the source country (Ethiopia) and downstream countries (Egypt and Sudan), it is critical that these countries engage in constructive dialogue to find a mutually beneficial solution for the project.  Such negotiations should take into consideration the fact that the status quo, characterized by Egyptian monopolization of the waters of the Nile River and the exclusion of Ethiopia from exploiting its own water resources for its development, cannot be maintained.  Thus, the construction of the GERD should be taken as a given and the three countries—Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia—should find ways to maximize the benefits of the dam and minimize its negative impacts on the downstream countries.  As part of that negotiation, both Egypt and Sudan should abandon their opposition to the CFA, sign it and encourage their legislatures to ratify it.  The Nile River and its tributaries should be considered common property belonging to all Nile River Basin communities and should be managed from that perspective.

It appears that Omar al-Bashir’s regime in Khartoum may be counting down to its demise as internal and external pressures seem poised to boil over and finally wrest the country out of his control. While the international community has imposed painful trade sanctions and the International Criminal Court has sought to bring al-Bashir to justice for his role in the Darfur conflict, Sudan’s own citizens have been increasingly demonstrative of their dissatisfaction and desire for change. During the last few years, al-Bashir has faced growing opposition from restless urban youth who are no longer willing to live with the status quo. There have also been fears within the old guard—the military and hardcore Islamists—that Sudan could fall victim to uprisings like those in Egypt and Tunisia.

In addition to the significant dislocations to the Sudanese economy caused by trade sanctions by Western countries, Khartoum has also lost significant revenues from the sale of oil produced in South Sudan’s oil fields due to ongoing disputes. To deal with these large shortfalls, al-Bashir’s government has imposed severe austerity measures on the economy, including major reductions in government subsidies, most notably on food and fuel. In response, a broad cross-section of the population took to the streets in protest. In September of this year, like their counterparts in Egypt and Tunisia before them, large numbers of unemployed and restless Sudanese youth took to the streets to demand the ouster of al-Bashir and his government. Government security forces responded with a vengeance, arresting large numbers of protesters and either killing or causing the deaths of many of them.

Within the military, which, together with Islamists, has been the base of al-Bashir’s support since the 1989 coup, there is significant discontent. In addition, there is evidence that some members of al-Bashir’s party—the National Congress Party—are not happy with the president for his failure to deal effectively with the country’s multifarious problems. Today, Sudan’s economy is falling apart—there is galloping inflation, high unemployment, especially among urban youth, and many Sudanese live below the poverty level. In addition, Khartoum is still unable to deal properly with the demands of various ethnic minorities, which are waging violent protests to force the government to allow them to rule themselves. Many groups want genuine institutional reforms and a governing process that is truly democratic and characterized by the rule of law.

Added to the litany of problems Sudan faces is the fact that it remains embroiled in conflict with South Sudan over the future of the Abyei region and its rich oil reserves. The scheduled 2011 vote for Abyei citizens to decide between South Sudan and Sudan did not occur and just recently opposing stakeholders in the region have argued over when and how to hold the referendum with one group boycotting the other’s efforts. Thus, the region remains in limbo.

Hardcore Islamists, long in the president’s corner, are now warning al-Bashir that he is not likely to successfully solve Sudan’s complex problems by simply cracking down on protesters. The question now is: Will al-Bashir give in to the demands of his protesting fellow citizens and initiate the necessary democratic reforms, or will he continue to resist and eventually suffer a fate similar to the one that befell his counterparts in Egypt and Tunisia?

On January 30, 2011, al-Bashir’s vulnerability to a similar uprising was first made apparent when protesters took to the streets of Khartoum and Al-Ubayyid after using online social networking sites to coordinate demonstrations. The government response was swift and extremely brutal—several students were arrested and one was killed. Sporadic and uncoordinated protests, particularly among university students, were also witnessed in the coming months. Then, on September 23, 2013, riots broke out in response to the removal of state subsidies on fuel and cooking gas in Khartoum. The violence spread first across Khartoum and Omdurman in the heart of the regime’s power base, and then to other cities in the days that followed. Protesters, calling for the removal of al-Bashir, blocked roads and set government buildings on fire. As usual, the regime responded brutally, killing more than 50 protesters according to some witnesses and arresting thousands of Sudanese citizens.

Although the Sudanese situation in 2013 is similar to the 2011 situations of its North African neighbors in terms of social frustration over incumbent regimes, Sudan differs from them in three main ways.

First, the majority of Sudanese do not use social media; hence, it is much more difficult to coordinate protests using tools like Facebook and Twitter.

Second, the government has cracked down on the press and blocked the free flow of information, further disconnecting citizens from potentially valuable information.

Third, Bashir’s regime is much less tolerant of protests and demonstrations and has demonstrated a proclivity for using as much force as quickly as possible to snuff out public uprisings. Such efforts are likely to buy only temporary reprieve for the dying regime as it clutches to power, and such responses cannot force the people to give up their demands for improvements in their standard of living, as well as for respect of their fundamental rights.

Without a credible opposition party to coordinate and peacefully channel the frustrations of restless youth into a peaceful revolution, current events in Sudan are likely to force the country into another bloody civil war. There is, of course, a possibility that, given the fact that Sudan does not have the type of institutional arrangements (free and independent press; independent judiciary; regular, free, credible and fair elections) that can provide citizens with the tools to either change their government or petition the latter for relief from tyranny, Sudan could soon become another failed state, such as Somalia. It would then become, like Somalia, a magnet for terrorists and extremist groups seeking to destabilize the region. In addition, another civil war in Sudan would flood the region with refugees and exacerbate the problems now facing many countries in East Africa. Of course, unrest in Sudan could easily spill over into neighboring countries such as Eritrea, Ethiopia, South Sudan and Uganda and create a serious humanitarian crisis in the Horn of Africa.

Dictators and autocrats can be undone by their inability or unwillingness to learn from history, even if that history is not theirs. Given the fact that Sudan’s neighbors have been embroiled in revolutions initiated and carried out by young people frustrated by their countries’ failure to provide them with jobs and protect their fundamental rights, one wonders why al-Bashir thinks the same fate would not befall him and his regime. It has become apparent that al-Bashir is unwilling or unable to recognize the fact that the world is no longer willing to tolerate his regime’s disregard for basic human rights and that Sudan, if it hopes to regain its standing as an accepted member of the international community, cannot afford to serve as a hiding place for dictators.

At the moment, al-Bashir faces a lot of problems emanating from inside and outside the country. It would be wise for al-Bashir and his government to start constructive dialogue with the people of Sudan in an effort to develop the modalities to peacefully transition to democracy. A credible first step would be for al-Bashir to form a transitional government that includes opposition parties. One of the most important functions of such a government should be to engage all relevant stakeholder groups in democratic constitution making to develop and adopt institutional arrangements that guarantee the rule of law and, hence, provide citizens with a governing process that protects their fundamental rights and provides them with the tools for self-actualization. Of course, while institutional reforms are a long-term project, in the short term, the transitional government must put into place mechanisms to protect the fundamental rights of citizens, as well as improve relations with South Sudan in order to secure the peaceful coexistence that is critical for investment and economic growth.

In recent years, relations between the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the African Union have been crumbling. Relations between the two were once solid with strong support from AU member countries.  The ICC has had support from African countries because of the court’s ability to prevent Rwandan genocide-type atrocities and ease power differentials between small and large African nations in international trial situations. 

Brookings nonresident scholar, John Mukum Mbaku, discusses the rising tensions between the ICC and African countries in his contribution to Foresight Africa, a collection of short briefs on the top challenges and opportunities for Africa in 2014.

Read the related paper »

According to John Mbaku, some African countries see the ICC as quite problematic because of the perceived bias that the court brings mostly African criminal cases to trial.  Other countries feel their sovereignty is threatened by the court.  The African Union has gone so far as to ask member countries not to comply or cooperate with the ICC and has attempted (unsuccessfully) to withdraw from The Hague.  A major trigger for these the recent issues with the ICC and African countries was the election of Uhuru Kenyatta as president of Kenya. Kenyatta was indicted by the ICC for crimes against humanity and for allegedly inciting ethnic violence following the highly disputed 2007 elections in Kenya.  

John argues that repairing the ties between African countries and the ICC will be difficult, but might be possible through reforms to the ICC process and commitment to stronger judicial systems in African nations.

Read Foresight Africa 2014, which details the top priorities for Africa in the coming year, to learn more about the prospects for strengthening  international justice in Africa, and other critical issues for the region.

For many years, Africans have complained that the International Criminal Court (ICC) has concentrated its efforts exclusively in Africa, a process that has made a mockery of the court’s claims to bring about an end to global impunity. Some Africans have even argued that the ICC’s claims that it is helping bring about justice in Africa are not unlike those made by proponents of the colonial order established by the Berlin Conference in 1884-1885.

On Tuesday, March 11, I participated in a panel discussion entitled, “The International Criminal Court in Africa: Bias, Legitimate Objections, or Excuses for Impunity?” co-hosted by New York University’s School of Continuing and Professional Studies (SCPS), Center for Global Affairs and the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ).  The program brought together experts interested in justice and peaceful coexistence in Africa to examine the role that the International Criminal Court (ICC) can play in minimizing impunity in the continent.

I was joined by Ambassador Tiina Intelmann, president of the Assembly of States Parties of the International Criminal Court; Richard Dicker, director of the International Justice Program at Human Rights Watch; and Jennifer Trahan, clinical associate professor at the New York University’s School of Continuing and Professional Studies (SCPS), Center for Global Affairs.  David Tolbert, president of the International Center for Transitional Justice, moderated the discussion.

The most important conclusions from what was a robust dialogue were that (i) it is very important that African countries develop the legal and institutional capacity to deal effectively and fully with impunity and other extra-legal activities that impede human development and peaceful coexistence; (ii) the international community should help African countries develop that capacity; (iii) the ICC should make a concerted effort to open dialogue with the African Union in particular and Africans generally in order for the court to gain a better insight into African problems, while, at the same time, help Africans understand and appreciate the nature of the ICC’s work, how it functions, and why it is a critical international body in the fight against impunity; and (iv) the ICC needs to improve openness and transparency in its activities. To make the ICC a truly international court, important countries such as the United States, India, the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation need to be brought aboard. Obviously, more dialogue is needed and it is my hope that soon, we will be able to undertake a discussion of this type somewhere in Africa.

During my presentation, I argued that an important part of improving relations between Africa and the ICC is that Africans must take ownership of their problems and find ways to resolve them themselves. For one thing, justice is most effectively delivered locally. Hence, the first line of business is for each African country to develop the legal and institutional capacity to deal with impunity and other governance problems. External actors, notably the ICC, should only be considered conflict-resolution instruments of last resort.

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Professor Riek Machar, former vice president of South Sudan and now leader of the rebel group that is fighting the government of South Sudan for control of the apparatus of the government, has publicly threatened to capture and take control of both the capital city of Juba and the oil-producing regions of the country. Branding South Sudan’s president, Salva Kiir, a “dictator” and arguing that he does not recognize the need to share power, Professor Machar stated that the present conflict, which has lasted for more than five months and resulted in the killing of many people and the destruction of a significant amount of property, will not end until Kiir is chased out of power.

Violent mobilization by groups loyal to Machar against the government in Juba began in December 2013. It was only after bloody confrontations between the two parties that targeted civilians based on their ethnicity had resulted in the deaths of many people (creating a major humanitarian crisis) that a cease-fire agreement was signed in Addis Ababa on January 23, 2014, with the hope of bringing to an end the brutal fighting. The cease-fire, however, was seen only as the first step towards negotiations that were supposed to help the country exit the violent conflict and secure institutional arrangements capable of guaranteeing peaceful coexistence.

If Machar and his supporters have the wherewithal to carry out the threats and successfully do so, there is no guarantee that peace would be brought to the country. For one thing, any violent overthrow of the government would only engender more violence as supporters of Kiir and his benefactors are likely to regroup and attempt to recapture their lost political positions. What South Sudan badly needs is an institutionalization of democracy and not a government led by political opportunists. In fact, an effective strategy to exit from this incessant violence must be centered around the election of an inclusive interim government—minus both Kiir and Machar—that would engage all of the country’s relevant stakeholders in negotiations to create a governing process that adequately constrains the state, establishes mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of conflict, enhances peaceful coexistence, and provides an enabling environment for the rapid creation of the wealth needed to deal with poverty and deprivation.

On March 9, 2012, less than a year after South Sudan gained independence, then-Vice President Machar met with several Brookings scholars, including myself, in New York City. The meeting was part of the new country’s efforts to seek assistance from its international partners to address complex and longstanding development challenges, including critical issues such as the effective management of the country’s natural resource endowments, gender equity, the building of government capacity to maintain law and order, the provision of other critical public goods and services, and poverty alleviation. Among participants in this critical consultation were Mwangi S. Kimenyi, senior fellow and director of the Africa Growth Initiative (AGI) at the Brookings Institution; Witney Schneidman, AGI nonresident fellow and former deputy assistant secretary of state for African Affairs; and me. The vice president, who appeared extremely energetic and optimistic about prospects for sustainable development in the new country, requested an analysis of the commitments and achievements that the government of South Sudan had made since independence and suggestions for a way forward. The scholars, working in close collaboration with their colleagues at Brookings, produced a policy report requested by the vice president. The report entitled, South Sudan: One Year After Independence—Opportunities and Obstacles for Africa’s Newest Country, was presented at a well-attended public event on July 28, 2012. Panelists included Peter Ajak, director of the Center for Strategic Analyses and Research in Juba; Ambassador Princeton Lyman, U.S. special envoy for South Sudan and Sudan; Nada Mustafa Ali scholar at the New School for Social Research; Mwangi S. Kimenyi and me.

The report provided a comprehensive review of the policy issues requested by the vice president—the provision of basic services; future engagement between South Sudan and the Republic of Sudan; efficient and equitable management of natural resources; ethnic diversity and peaceful coexistence; federalism; eradication of corruption; and the benefits of regional integration. Most important is the fact that the report placed emphasis on the need for the government of South Sudan to totally reconstruct the state inherited from the Khartoum government through democratic constitution making and produce a governing process that (i) guarantees the protection of human and fundamental rights, including those of vulnerable groups (e.g., women, minority ethnic groups); (ii) adequately constrains the government (so that impunity, corruption and rent seeking are minimized); (iii) enhances entrepreneurial activities and provides the wherewithal for wealth creation and economic growth; and (iv) establishes mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of conflict and creates an environment within which all of the country’s diverse population groups can coexist peacefully.

Unfortunately, when the report was completed, members of the ruling Sudan People’s Liberation Movement were already embroiled in a brutal power struggle that eventually led to President Kiir sacking his entire cabinet, including the vice president. The collapse of the government raised the prospects of violent and destructive mobilization by groups that felt the president’s actions were marginalizing them both economically and politically. The ensuing chaos created an environment that was hardly conducive to the implementation of policies such as those presented in the Brookings report.

The government of Sudan has failed to engage in the type of robust institutional reforms that would have effectively prevented President Kiir and his government from engaging in the various opportunistic policies that have been partly responsible for the violence that now pervades the country. South Sudan’s diverse ethnic groups put forth a united front in their war against Khartoum for self-determination. Following independence, the new government engaged in state formation processes that did not provide mechanisms for all individuals and groups to compete fairly for positions in the political and economic systems. Instead, the government’s approach to state formation politicized ethnic cleavages and made the ethnic group the basis and foundation for political, and to a certain extent, economic participation. This approach has created a "sure recipe for breeding ethnic antagonism," and has led to the crisis that currently consumes the country.

While the most important policy imperative in South Sudan today is the need to make certain that the cease-fire continues to hold, long-term prospects for peaceful coexistence and development call for comprehensive institutional reforms to provide the country with a governing process that guarantees the rule of law. Hence, both the opposition and the government—the two sides in the present conflict—should take advantage of the cease-fire and start putting together the framework that will eventually be used to put the state back together. A new interim government, without the participation of the two protagonists—Kiir and Machar—should be granted the power to bring together all of the country’s relevant stakeholders to reconstitute and reconstruct the state, including negotiating a permanent constitution.

Dear South Sudan's Leaders:

Today, the country that all of you and your fellow citizens fought to establish is at a crossroads. And you, the country’s leaders, are now standing at the proverbial “fork in the road.” The question now is: Which road will each of you take? Your choice will determine not only your place in history but will significantly impact the future of your shared country, its diverse peoples and your neighbors. Each of you can choose to chase after personal power, primitive accumulation, and self-enrichment—using the ethnic group that you belong to as a foundation for that quest. This disastrous decision would plunge your country further into violent and destructive mobilization, effectively shutting the door to the type of state formation that is undergirded by a desire to achieve national integration, peaceful coexistence and sustainable development. Alternatively, each of you can opt to maximize a different value, one that places you among the world’s greatest leaders—that is, those who, when they came to the fork in the road, chose to lead their people down the road of opportunities for peaceful coexistence, prosperity and liberty.

As the citizens of South Sudan watch and wait in utter fear and disgust, it is time for you, the country’s leaders, to decide whether you want to lead them into a future filled with unending violence, hunger, and desolation, or into one where all of the country’s various peoples, regardless of their ethnic or religious affiliation, gender, and economic status, can live together peacefully and pursue their values and interests without molestation from others.

In the early 1990s, Nelson Mandela and his compatriots found themselves at a similar crossroads. They chose not to act opportunistically and retreat to their various ethnic enclaves.  Like the great leaders that history has proven them to be, they knew that, as apparently beneficial as such an option would have been to them, they would have plunged their country into an abyss from which it was unlikely to recover anytime soon. Instead, they chose the road that led them and their country to the type of state formation that is undergirded by institutional arrangements that provide an enabling environment for wealth creation and economic growth. That is why, today, the country that they founded has one of the world’s most progressive and human-rights friendly constitutions.

South Sudan is a new and relatively underdeveloped country, but it has the potential to emerge as a highly developed and peaceful one. However, in order for that potential to be fully exploited and used effectively to enhance development, the latter must be provided with institutional arrangements that guarantee the rule of law.

To you, the leaders of this new country: All of you can gracefully exit the scene, serve as elder statesmen, and provide the country’s new crop of leaders with the type of advice and support that can help the country successfully emerge from its violent and destructive past, as well as chart a path towards peace, sustainable economic growth and development, and equitable and fair allocation of national resources.

How will history judge you? As tyrants, opportunists, despots, exploiters, and oppressors, who used their public positions to grab power and riches for themselves or as public servants who spearheaded and led the transformative processes that brought peace, security, and development to their country? The choice is yours.

Posterity will judge you well, but only if you choose wisely!

On Tuesday, October 28, 2014, tens of thousands of citizens of Burkina Faso gathered in its capital city, Ouagadougou, and its second biggest city, Bobo Dioulasso, to protest proposed changes to its constitution regarding term limits. A vote was planned for Thursday, on whether to extend the current limit of two terms to three. This vote is extremely controversial:  Current President Blaise Compaoré, who came to power in a coup in 1987, has ruled the country for 27 years. Allowing him to run for election in November 2015 could extend his reign for another five years. In Ouagadougou on Wednesday, citizens angry over the possibility that parliament might make it possible for Campaoré to stay in power indefinitely set fire to the parliament and forced legislators to postpone the vote that had been set for Thursday, October 30, 2014 to decide the constitutional issue.

The West African country has been plagued by dictators, autocracies and coups in the past. At independence on August 5, 1960, Maurice Yaméogo, leader of the Voltaic Democratic Union (Union démocratique voltaïque), became the country’s first president. Shortly after assuming power, Yaméogo banned all political opposition, forcing mass riots and demonstrations that only came to an end after the military intervened in 1966. Lt. Col. Sangoulé Lamizana and a collection of military elites took control of the government and subsequently dissolved the National Assembly as well as suspended the constitution. Lamizana stayed in power until November 1980 when the military overthrew the government and installed Col. Saye Zerbo as the new president. Two years later, Col. Zerbo’s government was overthrown by Maj. Dr. Jean-Baptiste Ouédraogo and the Council of Popular Salvation (CSP—Conseil du salut du peuple). Although it promised to transition the country to civilian rule and provide a new constitution, the Ouédraogo regime banned all political organizations, including opposition parties. There soon arose a political struggle within the CSP. The radicals, led by Captain Thomas Sankara, eventually overthrew the government in August 1983, and Capt. Sankara emerged as the country’s new leader. In 1984, the Sankara government changed the country’s name from Upper Volta to Burkina Faso and introduced many institutional reforms that effectively aligned the country with Marxist ideals.

On October 15, 1987, Capt. Blaise Compaoré, a former colleague of Sankara’s, killed Sankara and several of his confidants in a successful coup d’état. In 1991, Campaoré was elected president in an election in which only 25 percent of the electorate participated because of a boycott movement organized and carried out by opposition parties. In 1998, he won reelection for another seven-year term. As president, Campaoré reversed all the progressive policies that Sankara had implemented.

In 2000, the country’s post-Cold War 1991 constitution was amended to impose a limit of two five-year consecutive terms on the presidency. However, Campaoré’s supporters argued that because he was in office when the amendments went into effect, they did not apply to him and, hence, he was qualified to run for re-election in 2005. Despite the fact that the opposition fielded several candidates, Campoaré won 80.35 percent of the votes cast in the 2005 presidential election. And, in the presidential elections held in November 2010, he captured 80.2 percent of votes.

Over more than a quarter century in power, Campaoré has used an unusual formula to achieve relative stability in Burkina Faso—authoritarianism mixed with traces of democracy. The complex governance system has relied primarily on Campaoré’s dominant and charismatic political power and has failed to build sustainable institutions—specifically, those capable of maintaining the rule of law and enhancing peaceful coexistence in his absence.

Constitutionally mandated presidential term limits strengthen the rule of law and provide a significant level of stability and predictability to the country’s governance institutions. In response to the efforts by Burkinabé members of parliament to change the constitution to enable Compaoré to secure another term in office, U.S. government officials have recently stated that “democratic institutions are strengthened when established rules are adhered to with consistency.” On his part, Campaoré has proclaimed that his main and immediate concern “is not to build a future for myself—but to see how the future of this country will take shape.” If this is indeed true, then he should exit gracefully from the Burkinabé political scene and henceforth serve as an elder statesman, providing his country’s new leadership with the advice and support that they need to deepen and institutionalize democracy, as well as enhance economic, social, political and human development.

Insisting, as President Campoaré has done, that the constitution be changed so that he can seek an additional term in power not only destroys the country’s fragile stability but also sends the wrong message to citizens about the rule of law—while citizens must be law-abiding, the president does not have to abide by the country’s settled law; if the law stands in the way of the president’s personal ambitions, he can simply change the law to provide him with the wherewithal to achieve those objectives. Such behavior from the country’s chief executive does not augur well for deepening the country’s democracy, an objective that is dear to many Burkinabé. The question to ask President Campoaré is: How do you want history to remember you? As a self-serving political opportunist who used his public position to accumulate personal power and wealth, at the expense of fellow citizens, or as a public servant who led and directed his country’s transformation into a peaceful, safe and productive society?

On Friday, October 31, 2014, President Blaise Campaoré, who had ruled Burkina Faso for the last 27 years, was forced out of office. The resignation and subsequent military takeover of the government has created instability and questions over leadership in the country—especially since the constitutional line of succession has been broken by the insertion of military leaders. The power of the military is clear, especially since it has already influenced a second change in leadership. This interruption, subsequent transition and suspension of the constitution, then, have seriously threatened the strength of the rule of law and the future of the Burkinabé government.

The violent demonstrations that eventually forced President Campaoré to flee with his family into exile in Côte d’Ivoire could have been avoided had he not considered himself above the law. The impetus for the mass demonstrations was his attempt to change the country’s constitution in order to secure for himself another five-year term in office. Campaoré’s initial reaction to the violent demonstrations was to dissolve the government but retain his position as president until new elections were carried out to select a new government. He also agreed not to seek another term in office. The opposition, however, insisted that he resign. Interestingly, in his resignation statement, issued shortly before he fled the country, President Campaoré called for “free and transparent” elections to be held in 90 days to form a new government.

Shortly after the president’s resignation, General Honoré Traoré, Campaoré’s aide de camp, proclaimed himself president of the republic. This immediate military intervention into Burkinabé politics betrays either a lack of appreciation for constitutional democracy or a willful attempt by the military to take advantage of the instability occasioned by the planned constitutional changes to maximize their corporate interests. But, could someone who had risen to the head of the Burkinabé military have such little understanding of and appreciation for the constitutional order? In announcing that he had assumed the office of head of state, Traoré actually stated as follows: “In line with constitutional measures, and given the power vacuum . . . I will assume as of today my responsibilities as head of state.”

Importantly, there is no provision in the constitution of Burkina Faso for the head of the military or some other military officer to assume the powers of the president in case of a vacancy in the office. Succession, in the case of a vacancy in the presidency of the republic, is governed by Article 43 of the Constitution of Burkina Faso, 1991, which states that, in a case like this, the functions of the presidency should be performed by the president of the senate. [1]

After Traoré’s quick takeover, the leaders of the protests rejected the government headed by such a close and trusted advisor of the ousted president, claiming it would not represent a full and effective break with the painful past, especially the attempted constitutional changes. In fact, according to Al Jazeera, many of the protesters proclaimed that “[t]he general is linked to Campoaré, and they don’t want anyone linked to Campaoré to lead the country.”

Thus, early on Saturday, November 1, 2014, Colonel Isaac Zida declared that the army had taken control of the state to prevent further violence and that he had assumed the functions of head of state, leading what he referred to as a “peaceful transition”—one that would guarantee the “continuity of the [Burkinabé] state.” He, however, was extremely vague, providing few details, especially regarding how long this transitional government would stay in power or if the elections planned for 2015 will be held. Again, it is difficult to imagine that Zida, like Traoré, was not aware that the resignation and subsequent exit of the president from the political scene did not call for military intervention in the political system. In fact, a military officer of his standing should have had enough familiarity with the constitution to be aware of Article 43.

Oddly, the protesters appeared to have accepted the leadership of Zida, who is said to have been the deputy head of Campaoré’s elite presidential guard. It appears that the deciding factor in the struggle between the two men to assume the position of head of state was acceptance by the military: In a statement issued early on Saturday, November 1, 2014, the military indicated that Zida had been unanimously elected by military chiefs to lead the post-Campaoré transitional government. But, again, in making this decision, were these military leaders not aware of Article 43 of the constitution, which sets out the succession procedures in case of a temporary or permanent vacancy in the presidency? If, indeed, they had knowledge of the provisions of Article 43, then why did they interfere with what should have been a constitutionally mandated succession?

The international community has called on all sides in the Burkinabé political crisis to follow “constitutionally mandated” procedures for the transfer of power. The international community (especially the African Union) is asking the Burkina Faso military not to exploit the constitutional crisis for its own benefit but to respect the desire of the majority of Burkinabé for democracy and peaceful coexistence. That, of course, calls for respect by all Burkinabé, including the military, for the constitution.

The president’s resignation in itself did not create a constitutional crisis in Burkina Faso. The Constitution of 1991 specifically anticipates the resignation or incapacitation of the president and prescribes procedures for succession. According to Article 43, if the president is temporarily incapacitated and is incapable of carrying out his or her duties, “his powers shall be provisionally exercised by the Prime Minister.” As noted above, in this particular case, where the president has resigned and created a permanent vacancy in the presidency, the constitution states that the functions of the presidency should be performed by the president of the senate. [2] The military should not have intervened—military intervention in the country’s political system actually created what is fast becoming a major constitutional crisis. The military has suspended the constitution and, without the guidance provided by it, the military is now governing the country extra-constitutionally through decrees. The military can end this unfolding crisis by restoring the constitution and handing power back to a civilian regime, led, as prescribed by their constitution, by the president of the senate. The latter will, of course, serve as a transitional head of state until elections are completed in 2015 to select a permanent president. International organizations, including especially the African Union, support this approach—on November 3, 2014, the AU issued a statement asking the Burkinabé military to exit the political system and hand power to a civilian ruler.

But what about the riots and violence that had enveloped the city of Ouagadougou and were gradually spreading to other cities? Should the army not have been called upon to quell the riots and bring about peace? In virtually all countries, including Burkina Faso, the police—not the army—should be the institution enforcing the law and maintaining order. There is no indication that military intervention was necessary to bring the rioting under control or that it actually did. Most of the people participating in the riots voluntarily stopped their activities after the president resigned and left the country.

However, what the army did was interfere with the constitutional process and in doing so, actually created this constitutional crisis—shortly after declaring himself head of state and leader of the transition, Zida suspended the constitution, as noted above. Although Zida has assured the people that the military will strive to quickly return Burkina Faso to democratic governance, such guarantees appear hollow, especially given the military’s past history of intervention—every time the Burkinabé military has intervened in politics, it has remained in power for a very long time, 27 years in the case of the Campaoré-led intervention of 1987.

Article 43 of the Constitution of Burkina Faso also states that elections should be held between 60 and 90 days after a vacancy has been declared in the presidency. Zida, who is now the de facto head of state in Burkina Faso, has stated that his would be a transitional government and that it would seek input from all stakeholders to organize and undertake democratic elections to choose a new government. However, the constitution, which would have provided the necessary guidelines for carrying out such elections, has been suspended. In addition, he has closed the country’s borders and imposed a general curfew, which severely restricts the right of citizens to live freely. Such restrictions could have a significant impact on economic activities and negatively affect what is already a relatively fragile economy. These initial draconian and extra-constitutional measures do not augur well for an early exit of the military from politics and the return of constitutional rule to the country. If history teaches us anything about the military and Burkinabé politics, it is that this military, like the one that intervened in 1987, is likely to stay in politics much longer than the 90 days needed to elect a new civilian government.

[1], [2] This is in line with the constitutional amendment of June 11, 2012 (Loi No. 033-2012/AN du 1 juin 2012).

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The Nile River is one of the most important resources in Africa and supports the livelihoods of millions of people. Recently, though, efficient and equitable utilization of the waters of the Nile River has become an increasingly contentious issue, with many of the riparian countries demanding a revision of what they believe is an inappropriate legal regime. Currently, allocation and utilization of the waters of the Nile River is governed by the colonial-era Nile Waters Agreements, which were negotiated and entered into with the help of Great Britain, but without the participation of most of the river’s riparian states. These agreements allocated most of the waters of the Nile River to the downstream riparians—Egypt and Sudan—largely ignoring the development needs of the upstream riparians, like Ethiopia, whose highlands provide most of the water that flows into the Nile River. The upstream riparians contend that they were not party to the Nile Waters Agreements and thus should not be bound by them. As such, they want these agreements set aside and a new, more equitable legal regime. Egypt, however, considers the existing legal regime binding on all the Nile River riparian states and, thus, is opposed to any changes that might interfere with or reduce its “historically acquired rights.” Already the decision by Addis Ababa to proceed with the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Blue Nile has caused significant deterioration in relations between Cairo and Addis Ababa.

With significant increases in population and pressure to deliver development, especially in the upstream riparian states, the demand for water has become a very important policy imperative in the region. In fact, earlier this year Egypt claimed that, in order to meet its growing water needs by 2050, it will need to add 21 billion cubic meters of water per year to its current water allocation of 55 billion cubic meters. Thus, there is a fear that if this issue is not fully resolved soon, it could morph into a military crisis.

In our new book, Governing the Nile River Basin: The Search for a New Legal Regime, we argue that the current legal regime governing the allocation and utilization of the waters of the Nile River is not tenable, and there is an urgent need for all the Nile River riparian states to enter into a mutually agreed upon legal regime. Issues pertaining to transboundary water resource management, the evolution of current agreements and the role and interests of colonial powers, theories of treaty succession, and the recent attempts by the riparian states to formulate a new legal agreement, are thoroughly examined. We conclude that the most effective way to deal with conflict arising from the allocation and utilization of the Nile River’s waters is for all the downstream and upstream riparians to engage in fresh negotiations to design and adopt a new legal regime. Through a fully consultative process, these countries can provide the Nile River Basin with a legal regime that enhances equitable allocation and utilization. 

Later this month, Sudanese voters will head to the polls to elect their next president. Like many of Sudan's earlier elections, this one is not without controversy: Current President Omar al-Bashir and his National Congress Party (NCP) have been in power for decades and are under intense criticism for human rights abuses and for their failure to significantly improve living conditions for most of the Sudanese people. The NCP is the expected favorite, largely due to current regional violence and lack of government openness, among other problems.

Thus, opposition leaders have called on the country to postpone the elections until certain critical issues are resolved—including peace agreements with various groups that are fighting the central government and the adoption of major constitutional reforms. Similarly, Minni Minnawi, leader of the Sudan Liberation Army that has been fighting national government forces in Darfur, believes that the April election will not resolve the country’s governance and development quagmire. In fact, arguing that their participation would help legitimize the process, many of the opposition parties, led by the National Consensus Forces (NCF), a coalition of political parties opposed to the NCP, has indicated that it will not participate in the April exercise and has, in fact, launched a campaign for the boycott of the elections. Then again, some commentators argue that this decision is ill-advised and could further marginalize the opposition, destroying its ability to participate in governance in the future.

President al-Bashir rose to power in a 1989 bloodless coup and declared himself president in 1993. Since that time and despite the efforts of pro-democracy movements to change the status quo, al-Bashir has managed to maintain his monopoly on power. In addition to the fact that he has been helped by a brutal civil war and the opposition’s decision to boycott elections, al-Bashir and his government have outlawed political parties and engaged in the brutalization of many regions of the country. In fact, in 2008, the International Criminal Court called for his arrest for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide in Darfur. In addition, in January of this year, the country’s parliament, which is dominated by al-Bashir’s NCP, enacted a series of constitutional amendments granting the president additional powers, effectively strengthening what has been an imperial presidency, reinforcing the country’s highly centralized and authoritarian governing process.

Despite the fact that as many as 15 individuals are running for president, both al-Bashir and the NCP are likely to emerge victorious. According to the National Election Commission, six presidential candidates are being sponsored by their political parties; the rest are running as independents. The largest opposition party, the National Umma Party (NUP), led by seasoned politician al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, has decided to boycott the 2015 elections. Al-Mahdi and the NUP want the elections postponed, and a transitional government of unity formed and granted the power to oversee the amendment of the constitution. As argued by the opposition, once a new, democracy-enhancing constitution has been drafted and ratified, the country can proceed with elections to pick a permanent government. Hassan al-Turabi’s Popular Congress Party (PCP) and some factions within the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) are also boycotting the 2015 elections.

The fact that the government in Khartoum has persistently refused to consider the opposition’s arguments that the elections should be postponed until the national dialogue has been completed, a transitional government of unity formed, and a more acceptable constitution drafted and adopted means that there is likely to be much controversy. In addition, given the fact that most of the opposition has already indicated that it would boycott the election, making sure that the election is fair, free, and credible is challenging. Recently, the opposition has accused security forces of making it difficult for them to express themselves and educate Sudanese citizens about the government’s continued suppression of individual freedoms, including the right to express opinions not favored by or favorable to the incumbent regime in Khartoum. Given the fact that a large part of the Sudanese electorate believes that the present political environment within the country is not conducive to the carrying out of a fair and free election, those individuals and groups are not likely to accept the results or consider the process as fair and free—and that will definitely put the legitimacy of the government to question. If the international community also concludes that the elections were neither credible nor free and fair, which is also quite likely, that could further isolate the regime in Khartoum and hamper any efforts to resolve conflicts in various regions of the country and generally improve the environment for investment and economic growth.  

Since independence in 1956, Sudan has not been able to provide itself with institutional arrangements and a governing process that guarantees the rule of law. The failure of the country’s laws and institutions to adequately constrain the state has allowed state custodians (i.e., civil servants and political elites) to behave with impunity and engage in activities (e.g., corruption) that have constrained economic growth and development, endangered the peaceful coexistence of the country’s diverse population groups, alienated the international community, significantly reduced foreign investment, and endangered the country’s international standing. In addition, many government policies during most of the post-independence period have been viewed by several groups as marginalizing them and pushing them to the economic and political periphery. Some of these groups have been engaged in armed conflict against the national government for many years.

If, on the highly unlikely chance that al-Bashir capitulates to the opposition and forms its proposed transitional government, many questions need to be answered. How would it be chosen? Would al-Bashir and the NCP be part of it? Given the fact that the NCP has not been willing to participate in any efforts to reform the country’s political system and provide for more transparency in government communications, as well as improved accountability of the government to the people, how likely is it that a transitional government involving the NCP would be able to successfully undertake the reforms suggested by the opposition?

On the other hand, assuming that the 2015 elections are carried out as scheduled and al-Bashir and the NCP win, will the new government undertake the reforms necessary to enhance Sudan’s ability to take its place among the other democratic countries of the world—specifically, those that respect human rights, provide legal mechanisms for their citizens to organize their private lives and live together peacefully, and enhance the creation of the wealth needed to deal fully and effectively with poverty and high rates of material deprivation? 

President al-Bashir and the National Congress Party have ruled Sudan with significant levels of discretion for many decades. During this period, little effort has been made to engage the Sudanese people in the type of institutional reforms that would have provided the country with more democracy-enhancing institutional arrangements, that is, those that guarantee the rule of law. In his campaign speeches, President al-Bashir has alluded to his government’s supposed interest in peace and development. However, during nearly two decades in power, [1] he and the NCP have either been unwilling or incapable of spearheading the reforms needed to bring about peaceful coexistence and genuine development in Sudan. In fact, the constitutional amendments implemented by the NCP-dominated legislature in January this year significantly increased the powers of the presidency and effectively negated efforts by the opposition to transition the country to democratic governance. Thus, while it is possible that al-Bashir and the NCP might surprise us after the elections, decide to shed their authoritarian image, form a unity government that will undertake necessary institutional reforms (some of which are mentioned above), and transition this important country to democracy, with laws and institutions that guarantee the rule of law, and hence, enhance peaceful coexistence and the creation of the wealth that the country needs to fight poverty and improve national living standards, it is hard to be optimistic, especially given al-Bashir’s and his government’s long history of political opportunism.

Regardless of the winner (though it is most likely to be al-Bashir and the NCP), the post-election government will have to deal with several urgent and critical issues facing the country:

• First, the new government must engage all relevant stakeholder groups in Sudan in constitutional talks to develop and adopt a development-oriented constitution and one that is acceptable to all of the country’s different groups. The new government must steer the country away from authoritarianism and toward democracy and the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. This can be accomplished, first, by forming a transitional government of national unity, one that provides representation for all of the country’s relevant stakeholders, and then empowering that government to engage the people in robust constitution making to develop and adopt a constitution that adequately constrains the state, enhances peaceful coexistence, and guarantees the rule of law. Such a governing process, for example, can be characterized by a separation of powers with effective checks and balances. Perhaps, some sort of national sovereign conference, to be attended by representatives of all of the country’s relevant stakeholder groups, including especially historically marginalized regions such as Darfur, South Kordofan, and the Blue Nile states, can be granted the power to draw up the political principles that would guide and form the foundation for the construction of the country’s permanent constitution. As I note above, this new transitional government will face complex challenges, especially regarding the NCP’s role in it. The question on everyone’s minds is: How likely is it that such a transitional government would be formed if al-Bashir and the NCP are victorious in the April 2015 election?
• Second, the new government must make an effort to resolve the conflicts in Darfur, South Kordofan, the Blue Nile states, and other parts of the country, enhance the peace, and provide an enabling environment for the peaceful coexistence of groups, as well as for economic growth and development. In a recent campaign speech, al-Bashir intimated that Sudan is a rich country with significant endowments of resources that could be used to meet the needs of all its citizens. He then called on groups who have taken arms against the government to seek peace so that the country could proceed with its development agenda. So far, the country’s civil wars and regional conflicts have squandered resources (including scarce human capital) that could have been used to develop the country. Nevertheless, Khartoum and the new government must reach out to historically alienated groups and give them a reason to lay down their arms and negotiate in good faith so that the country can achieve the peace necessary to begin the process of genuine political and economic development in the country.
• Relatedly, national identity needs to be strengthened. Many groups in Sudan, especially those living in peripheral areas, unsurprisingly consider themselves alienated from the government in Khartoum. National integration and nation-building must be at the top of any post-election government’s policy priorities.
• Fourth, the new government must deal with a relatively high unemployment rate, especially among young people, by significantly increasing investment in education and job training, especially for people living in areas of the country that have, historically, been pervaded by conflict. It is important that these economically and politically marginalized regions be fully integrated into the country’s economy and be made full participants in wealth creation and economic growth. Additionally, the new government must make certain that genuine efforts are made to improve access to education for other historically marginalized groups, notably girls and women. In a recent campaign speech, al-Bashir announced that his government intends to invest heavily in higher education and provide opportunities for all Sudanese to acquire human capital. While higher education is critical to Sudan’s industrial transformation, it is important for the government to recognize the fact that a robust, well-funded, and easily accessible system of primary and secondary schools is the foundation for any sustainable industrialization scheme.    
• Fifth, the new government needs to improve its relations with the international community and with its neighbors—better relations should improve the country’s ability to participate gainfully in the global economy, as well as create opportunities for foreign investment flows, cultural and educational exchanges, and improved protection of human rights, especially those of ethnic and religious minorities. Of critical importance is the need for Sudan’s post-election government to settle its disputes with its neighbor South Sudan, especially on Abyei, the border, the use of Sudan’s pipelines to transport South Sudan’s oil to export markets, South Kordofan, and the status of refugees.
• Finally, al-Bashir and the National Congress Party, the likely winners of the 2015 elections, must ask themselves how they want posterity to judge and remember them. African political elites rarely think about the type of legacy that they are likely to leave to future generations. For al-Bashir and the NCP, the April 2015 election offers a rare opportunity for them to rehabilitate themselves and emerge as public servants with truly transformative development agendas, and not as opportunistic exploiters whose only interest was self-enrichment.

[1] Although al-Bashir came into office in 1989, the National Congress party was came into being in 1996.

Note: This article was amended on April 1, 2015 to reflect the delay of the elections to April 13.

On Monday, March 23, 2015, leaders of Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan met in the Sudanese capital Khartoum to sign an agreement that is expected to resolve various issues arising out of the decision by Ethiopia to construct a dam on the Blue Nile. The Khartoum declaration, which was signed by the heads of state of the three countries—Abdel Fattah al-Sisi (Egypt), Omar al-Bashir (Sudan), and Halemariam Desalegn (Ethiopia), has been referred to  as a “Nile Agreement,” and one that helps resolve conflicts over the sharing of the waters of the Nile River. However, this view is misleading because the agreement, as far we know, only deals with the Blue Nile’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam project (GERDP) and does not tackle the broader, still contentious issues of sharing of the Nile River waters among all riparian states. Thus, the new agreement does leave the conflict over the equitable, fair, and reasonable allocation and utilization of the waters of the Nile River unresolved.

As we celebrated Earth Day recently, it is important that we reflect upon the importance of natural resources such as the Nile and gain an understanding of why they are so important, especially for Africa and its long-term development. In fact, 160 million people rely on the waters of this important river for their livelihoods. Thus, preserving, maintaining, and using the waters and resources of the Nile River efficiently and sustainably is a goal shared by all.

These disagreements over the use of the Nile are not recent and, in fact, have a long history because of these countries’ high dependence on the waters of the Nile. In 1929, an agreement was concluded between Egypt and Great Britain regarding the utilization of the waters of the Nile River—Britain was supposedly representing its colonies in the Nile River Basin. [1] The Anglo-Egyptian Treaty covered many issues related to the Nile River and its tributaries. Of particular relevance to the present discussion is that it granted Egypt an annual water allocation of 48 billion cubic meters and Sudan 4 billion cubic meters out of an estimated average annual yield of 84 billion cubic meters. In addition, the 1929 agreement granted Egypt veto power over construction projects on the Nile River or any of its tributaries in an effort to minimize any interference with the flow of water into the Nile.

In 1959, Egypt and an independent Sudan signed a bilateral agreement, which effectively reinforced the provisions of the 1929 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty. The 1959 agreement increased water allocations to both Egypt and Sudan—Egypt’s water allocation was raised from 48 billion cubic meters to 55.5 billion cubic meters and Sudan’s from 4 billion cubic meters to 18.5 billion cubic meters, leaving 10 billion cubic meters to account for seepage and evaporation. Finally, the agreement stipulated that in the case of an increase in average water yield, the increased yield should be shared equally between the two downstream riparian states (i.e., Egypt and Sudan). The 1959 agreement, like the 1929 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, did not make any allowance for the water needs of the other riparian states, including even Ethiopia, whose highlands supply more than 80 percent of the water that flows into the Nile River.

Over the years, especially as the populations of the other countries of the Nile River Basin have increased, and these countries have developed the capacity to more effectively harvest the waters of the Nile River for national development, disagreements have arisen over the fact that Egypt has insisted that the water rights it acquired through the 1929 and 1959 agreements (collectively referred to as the Nile Waters Agreements) be honored and that no construction project be undertaken on the Nile River or any of its tributaries without prior approval from Cairo. In fact, various Egyptian leaders have threatened to go to war to protect these so-called “acquired rights.” Upstream riparian states such as Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, and Ethiopia, have argued that they are not bound by these agreements because they were never parties to them. In fact, shortly after independence from Great Britain in 1961, Tanganyika’s (now Tanzania, after union with Zanzibar in 1964) new leader, Julius Nyerere, argued that the Nile Waters Agreements placed his country and other upstream riparian states at Egypt’s mercy, forced them to subject their national development plans to the scrutiny and supervision of Cairo, and that such an approach to public policy would not be compatible with the country’s status as a sovereign independent state. All the upstream riparian states have since argued in favor of a new, more inclusive legal framework for governing the Nile River Basin.

In 1999, the Nile River riparian states, [1] except Eritrea, signed the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) in an effort to enhance cooperation on the use of the “common Nile Basin water resources.” Under the auspices of the NBI, the riparian states began work on developing what they believed would be a permanent legal and institutional framework for governing the Nile River Basin. The Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA), as this agreement is called, formally introduced the concept of equitable water allocation into discussions about Nile governance, as well as a complicating concept called “water security.”

The CFA was ready for signature beginning May 10, 2010; Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda have signed it; and the Ethiopian parliament has ratified it. However, arguing that their “acquired rights” to the waters of the Nile River would not be protected, Egypt and Sudan immediately registered their intention not to sign the agreement because they objected to the wording of Article 14(b): “Nile Basin States therefore agree, in a spirit of cooperation: . . . (b) not to significantly affect the water security of any other Nile Basin State.” They then proposed an alternative wording for Article 14(b): “Nile Basin States therefore agree, in a spirit of cooperation: . . . (b) not to significantly affect the water security and current uses and rights of any other Nile Basin State,” (emphasis added). This wording was rejected by the upstream riparian states, who argue that “the current uses and rights” phrasing would entrench the concept of prior rights, including those created by the Nile Waters Agreements and effectively retain the inequity and unfairness that has characterized the allocation and utilization of water in the Nile River Basin since the 1920s.

On April 2, 2011, then-prime minister of Ethiopia, Meles Zenawi, laid the foundation for the construction of the Grand Ethiopia Renaissance Dam. The dam is located on the Blue Nile, in the Benishangul-Gumuz region of the country. Shortly after the announcement, authorities in Cairo immediately launched a campaign of words against what they believed was an attempt by Addis Ababa to interfere with Egypt’s water needs. Then Egyptian president, Mohamed Morsi, angrily stated that while he was not “calling for war” with Ethiopia, “Egypt’s water security cannot be violated at all,” that “all options are open,” and that Egyptians would not accept any projects on the Nile River that threatened their livelihood.

The 2015 agreement between Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan—with Sudan acting as an intermediary—represents an important but predictable shift in Cairo’s approach to the Nile River—that those colonial agreements are unsustainable. About 85 percent of the water that flows into the Nile River comes from the Ethiopian highlands through the Blue Nile; the rest comes from the White Nile. It was simply unrealistic and untenable for Egypt to believe that it could continue to prevent Ethiopia from using water resources located within its boundaries to meet the needs of its people. While it is true that Egyptians rely totally on the waters of the Nile River for all their needs, they must be sensitive to the development needs of the upstream riparian states, especially given the fact that the latter, particularly Ethiopia, are in a position to cause significant harm to the quantity and quality of water that flows into the Nile. Hence, the practical and more accommodating attitude taken by Egyptian leaders in their decision to endorse Addis Ababa’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam project (GERDP), should be welcomed. However, Cairo needs to go further and sign and ratify the CFA without insisting on changes to Article 14(b) to guarantee Egypt the rights created by the Nile Waters agreements. With the CFA in place, all 11 riparian states can negotiate in good faith to agree an allocation formula that is acceptable to all of them and considered fair, equitable, and reasonable. As Africa becomes more and more affected by climate change, the continent’s various groups must agree to cooperate in the development of institutional structures that can enhance their ability to live together peacefully and allocate their natural resources, including water, in a fair and sustainable manner.

Further reading

Mwangi S. Kimenyi & John Mukum Mbaku, Governing the Nile River Basin: The Search for a New Legal Regime (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2015).

[1] Ethiopia was not one of those colonies. The British colonies then included Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, and what was known as Anglo-Egyptian Sudan (a condominium under the control of Britain).

[2] The Nile River riparian states are Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Sudan (Republic of), Tanzania, and Uganda. Egypt, Sudan, and South Sudan are downstream riparian states. South Sudan, however, has indicated that it does not recognize the 1959 bilateral agreement between Egypt and Sudan.

Professor Mwangi S. Kimenyi, senior fellow and former director of the Africa Growth Initiative (AGI), passed away on Saturday, June 6, 2015, in Baltimore, Maryland.

Professor Kimenyi was the heart and soul of the Africa Growth Initiative, something that all of us care about. He believed very much in AGI’s mission, its work, and perhaps, more importantly, its people. His scholarship and work ethic were only matched by his dedication to the AGI team and the issues that we were (and are) striving to accomplish.

Professor Kimenyi not only cared about the right things, but he was also keen about addressing them and doing so in the right way, no matter how difficult or challenging. In many ways, if the world worked like this, the world would be a much better place for all of us to live. In all AGI activities, Professor Kimenyi tried to bring people together, help colleagues advance their careers, and nurture the expertise that is needed in the long term.

Professor Kimenyi dedicated himself to utilizing the resources and prestige of the Brookings Institution to enhance governance, peaceful coexistence, the protection of human rights—especially those of vulnerable groups—and economic and human development in Africa. During his short tenure at AGI and the Brookings Institution, he achieved a lot. Through his leadership and thanks to the generosity of the Brookings Institution, AGI has contributed significantly to the improvement of the policy environment in Africa, as well as to a better understanding of African issues by U.S. policymakers.

Professor Kimenyi was an accomplished man: Before he came to AGI and Brookings, Professor Kimenyi was a professor at the University of Mississippi and the University of Connecticut. He was the founding executive director of the Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis (KIPPRA, 1999-2005); a resource person with the African Economic Research Consortium (AERC); and a research associate with the Center for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford. Professor Kimenyi earned his undergraduate degree from the University of Nairobi (Kenya), and completed graduate work at Ohio University and George Mason University. He received a Ph.D. in economics  from the Center for Study of Public Choice at George Mason University in 1986.

Through his research, he sought to enhance governance and economic development in Africa. He was especially interested in poverty reduction, pro-poor economic growth, and peaceful coexistence on the continent. He authored or co-edited eight books, many policy monographs, and several chapters in edited volumes. He also published many papers in refereed journals.

Professor Kimenyi was also the recipient of many honors and awards, including the Outstanding Research Award (2001) from the Global Development Network, and the Georgescu-Roegen Prize in Economics (1991). He was recognized by the Senate and House of Representatives of the State of Mississippi for his work on the public transit system. In 1994, Professor Kimenyi was named by Policy Review (Washington, D.C.) among the top 10 young market economists in the United States. During his tenure as the executive director of KIPPRA, the institute was ranked the top policy institution in Africa and was recognized as an international center of excellence.

At KIPPRA, he believed in and promoted excellence, leading the institute from its founding in 1999 to Africa’s premier research and policy institution by the time he left in 2005. KIPPRA remains an important and influential source of policy advice for Kenya and the region, thanks to the solid foundation laid by Professor Kimenyi.

He was not afraid to criticize or be controversial when he believed that something important needed to be said. In many of the blogs that he wrote about policy issues in Africa, for example, he challenged President Obama and his administration to take a more active part in Africa. He rebuked the government of South Sudan for its decision to ban all foreign workers from the country and replace them with nationals—a decision that Professor Kimenyi argued would undermine badly needed foreign investment. Nevertheless, in seeking to hold governments accountable, Professor Kimenyi was professional, respectful, and polite.

Despite his extraordinary professional and academic accomplishments, Professor Kimenyi was humble, extremely kind, and loyal to his friends and colleagues. I have worked very closely with Professor Kimenyi on projects in Africa since 1986, and have often been taken aback by the patient and kind manner in which Professor Kimenyi treated young scholars who approached him and asked him to help them further their education or research.

I can recall a particularly memorable incident at Mount Kenya in 2002: We were at the Mount Kenya Lodge to consult with then-vice president of Kenya, Professor George Saitoti, who was working on his vision for holistic development in Africa. While we were eating breakfast, a couple of young people recognized Professor Kimenyi and came to talk to him about their plans for graduate school. He patiently talked to each one of them, gathered as much information from them, gave each person that he talked to his business card, and promised to contact them once he had an opportunity to research their issues further. Despite the fact that his breakfast was going cold, he calmly advised these young people and told them that it was important that they remained hopeful because they held the future of Kenya in their hands. He was truly inspiring. Of course, during nearly 30 years of friendship with me, he remained a loyal and supportive friend to me and my family.

There is no question that Professor Kimenyi was a talented and well-regarded economist. Nevertheless, his colleagues, students, and the many people whom he worked with and whose lives he touched will remember him more for his kindness, warmth, and willingness to mentor younger scholars.

Professor Kimenyi’s untimely passing is a great loss, not only to his colleagues and friends at AGI, but also to the many scholars whom he has mentored in Africa and around the world. He will be greatly missed, not only at AGI, but also at the many institutions that he has worked with to improve economic and human development in Africa.

Our thoughts and prayers are with his family. May his soul rest in peace.

The 26th Ordinary Session of the African Union (AU) Executive Council has just concluded in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, under the theme, “2016: African Year of Human Rights with a particular focus on the Rights of Women.” Addressing the delegates, who included some of the continent’s most important political leaders and a collection of distinguished foreign dignitaries, the chair of the AU Commission, Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, reminded delegates of the organization’s vision as embodied in Agenda 2063. This pledge, a blueprint for the social, political, and economic transformation of the continent, emphasizes a bottom-up, inclusive, participatory, and people-driven approach to development. As envisioned by the agenda’s architects, Africa’s diverse peoples should spearhead the continent’s transformation and direct its development. Dr. Zuma also made note of 2016’s theme, which is the protection of human rights, with particular emphasis on the rights of women.

Since it became operational, the AU has faced many challenges, some of them linked to problems that have plagued the continent for many decades (e.g., chronic poverty; political instability and violent mobilization by various subcultures; corruption and other forms of impunity) and others (e.g., terrorism and violent extremism) that have come to the fore since the turn of the century. At the recent Addis Ababa meeting, the AU leadership spoke specifically of “Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want,” which is heralded as a new development strategy that will enhance the ability of Africans to use their resource endowments fully and effectively for their own development. Although this 50-year initiative has many objectives, the overall aim is to encourage Africans to own their problems, take control of their resolution, and build, by themselves, a prosperous continent “based on inclusive growth and sustainable development.” [1] The AU’s 26th Ordinary Session gives us a chance to reflect on the continental organization’s recent performance and examine how much further it needs to go.

The challenges that the AU faces can be classed into two categories—those that require immediate attention and those whose resolutions can be undertaken through a long-term process. Although cooperation of the international community is critical for the effective resolution of many of the problems and challenges that Africa currently faces, it is important to reiterate the fact that full and effective resolution lies with the African countries themselves. The AU must not be timid but rather act boldly and aggressively, especially in situations of gross violations of human rights and where people are being massacred and others pushed into forced exile (e.g., Burundi, Darfur, Somalia) and provide the leadership needed to prevent genocide and minimize further deterioration in political and economic conditions in many communities throughout the continent.

Coordinating the fight against terrorism and violent extremism: Terrorism and rising violent extremism are major obstacles to peace efforts, national integration, nation building, and the effective management of diversity throughout the continent. From the destruction of economic infrastructures and the massacre of university students in Kenya by al-Shabab; the slaughter of villagers and the kidnapping of school girls in northeastern Nigeria by Boko Haram; the indiscriminate killing of people at hotels in Mali and Burkina Faso; and the downing of an airliner in Egypt, terrorism and violent extremism continue to constrain the ability of Africans to live together peacefully and create the wealth that they need to fight poverty and improve their living conditions. These affiliated and unaffiliated extremist groups—which also include the Lord’s Resistance Army, al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, the Islamic State, and others—are just a few of the entities that threaten to derail Africa’s transition to good governance and inclusive development, respect for human rights, and peaceful coexistence.

Fighting terrorism in the continent requires a coordinated effort at both the regional and national levels. The AU, through the Algiers Convention of 1999, has created a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy for the continent. Unfortunately, the atrocities listed above show that the AU’s counterterrorism framework does not seem to be working and is not being implemented timely and effectively at the level of individual countries. In fact, in addition to the years-long delay of the Algiers Protocol coming into force, less than a third of the African countries have ratified the convention. In addition, only a few African countries have enacted national legislation and restructured their legal and judicial systems to deal with terrorism. The AU must take bold steps to make sure that the necessary steps are taken at the national level to implement policies that significantly enhance the fighting of terrorism at the continental level (e.g., processes for information sharing and consultation; harmonization of immigration policies, etc.). Of course, the AU must also make certain that national leaders do not use anti-terrorism laws to oppress and exploit innocent citizens.

It is important to note that only inclusive economic growth and development and the establishment, within each African country, of governance systems that guarantee the rule of law, including respect for human rights, can deal fully with terrorism and other types of violent and destructive mobilization.

Analysts argue, however, that fighting terrorism effectively is a long-term effort. It is important to note that only inclusive economic growth and development and the establishment, within each African country, of governance systems that guarantee the rule of law, including respect for human rights, can deal fully with terrorism and other types of violent and destructive mobilization. African countries must fully address those issues (e.g., extreme poverty; severe inequality in access to opportunities for self-actualization, as well as in the distribution of income and wealth; and religious and ethnic persecution) that enhance radicalization and render joining extremist groups an attractive option for many of the continent’s youth.

Pressing South Sudanese leaders for peace: South Sudan gained independence on July 9, 2011 and was immediately faced with a multiplicity of problems. In addition to the fact that the new government lacked the capacity to deliver necessary public goods and services to all citizens, as well as the fact that the country faced significantly high levels of venality in the public sector, it was not able to manage diversity effectively. By the summer of 2013, the country had plunged into a major political crisis, which eventually deteriorated into civil war as President Salva Kiir fought forces loyal to his former vice president, Riek Machar, to remain the country’s chief executive. The struggle soon took on ethnic dimensions since Kiir gets significant support from the Dinkas, and Machar gets support from ethnic Nuer. Both parties signed a peace agreement in 2015 but have failed to meet a January 22, 2016 to form a Transitional Government of National Unity. It is important that South Sudan’s leaders place the interests and welfare of the people above their own and form an inclusive government, which can create the conditions necessary for effective state reconstruction. The AU should hold the country’s leaders accountable for meeting the commitments that they made in the peace agreement. Significant pressure must be put on these leaders by the international community, including especially the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), to act responsibly and form an inclusive government that would move the country forward in a peaceful and productive manner. 

Ending the crisis in Burundi: President Pierre Nkurunziza’s decision to defy the constitution and seek a third term in office unleashed violent and destructive mobilizations that have killed more than 400 people and created a major humanitarian crisis in the region. The United Nations says that since April 2015, as many as 240,000 people have fled the country into exile. Are we about to see a repeat of the past—that is, the manipulation of ethnicity by political demagogues that eventually produced a brutal civil war that killed as many as 300,000 people? Some analysts believe that without a quick stop to what the locals simply call “La Crise,” the country is on the verge of being visited by the ghosts of its violent past. The AU, which had planned to send 5,000 peacekeepers to secure the peace and help restore stability, has abandoned that initiative in view of fierce opposition from Nkurunziza. Even a visit from the U.N. Security Council was not enough to convince Nkurunziza to either allow the AU force to enter Burundi or for the government to engage in dialogue with opposition parties without preconditions.

After their recent visit to Burundi, members of the U.N. Security Council “stressed the urgency of addressing the situation” in the country “before it deteriorates further and possibly takes on ethnic dimensions, despite the position of the government of Burundi that the situation is not of such concern.” But can the AU deploy peacekeepers without Burundi’s approval? Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union grants the AU the right to intervene in any member country “pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.” However, a top diplomat at the AU has been quoted as saying that unilateral deployment would be an “unimaginable” act. In addition, it is ironic that at the same time the AU was opting not to act forcefully to secure the peace in Burundi and avert what could be another genocide, the incoming chairman of the AU (President Deby of Chad) was declaring that “[t]hrough diplomacy or by force...we must put an end to these tragedies of our time. We cannot make progress and talk of development if part of our body is sick. We should be the main actors in the search for solution to Africa’s crises.”

The AU and the Libyan crisis: The events of the Arab Spring represented a new modality of regime change that the AU had never before encountered. When military forces of the National Transitional Council (NTC) captured Tripoli on August 22, 2011 and drove away then Libyan President Muammar Qaddafi’s forces, members of the NATO-led military alliance that had been providing “aerial bombardment support to the NTC” immediately proceeded to pressure the African Union to recognize the NTC as the only legitimate government of Libya. Nevertheless, when the democratic uprising morphed into a de facto civil war, the AU’s response was a roadmap, which was informed by the organization’s long-established approach to dealing with intra-state conflicts, which called for a ceasefire and negotiations for an inclusive interim government.

The NTC, however, rejected the roadmap, arguing that it did not make allowance for Qaddafi’s immediate departure. The position taken by the NTC was significantly enhanced by the support that it was receiving from the NATO countries, the Arab League, the United Nations, and several African countries.

Although it denounced what it believed was an illegal regime change in Libya orchestrated by NATO powers supposedly to protect Libyan civilians, the AU went ahead, although reluctantly, and recognized the NTC as Libya’s legitimate government and granted the NTC the right to represent the country in the AU.

Some analysts have examined the AU’s failed efforts to mediate the peace in Libya’s political crisis and have argued that "the most important reason for this failure was the decision by France, the United Kingdom, and the United States to “undermine and sideline the AU.” Other reasons for the failure of the AU’s roadmap are said to include the inability of the AU to garner coherent support among African countries for its position on Libya and the fact that the AU never really gained the confidence of either the Qaddafi regime or the NTC.

Although Qaddafi’s regime was recognized as both oppressive and repressive towards the country’s citizens, the AU did not approve the decision by the NTC to transform a democratic uprising into a civil war. The AU became even more adamant about its non-violent approach to the Libyan crisis after the NATO countries effectively became agents of forceful regime change in Libya. However, some observers have argued that the AU’s emphasis on the fact that the regime change was unconstitutional must be weighed against the fact that the Qaddafi regime was not only unconcerned about democratic governance but promoted basic laws that were designed to perpetuate and entrench Qaddafi’s hold on power.

To retain its relevance, the AU must provide the leadership to fully and timely resolve various continental problems, such as democratic and popular uprisings, terrorism and violent extremism, armed conflicts, and of course, the necessary political and economic transformations to enhance inclusive growth and development and participatory governance.

It has been argued that the recognition of the NTC by the AU was inconsistent with the organization’s legal positions [2] regarding the illegal/unconstitutional changes of regime on the continent. But, what can be learned from the AU’s handling of the Libyan crisis? While the AU is quite clear about its opposition to unconstitutional regime changes on the continent, it is important for the organization to put in place clear and specific mechanisms to deal with popular uprisings such as those that occurred in North Africa, including Libya.

As much as resolving armed conflicts is important, the AU needs to actively engage in other transformative activities on the continent, including especially, those activities that fundamentally transform the critical domains (i.e., the political, administrative, and judicial foundations of the state) and provide institutional arrangements that foster inclusive economic growth, peaceful coexistence of each country’s various subcultures, and enhance participatory and inclusive governance. Perhaps, had the AU developed such a specific mechanism for dealing with popular uprisings, it would have been able to more effectively confront the present uprising in Burundi.

To retain its relevance, the AU must provide the leadership to fully and timely resolve various continental problems, such as democratic and popular uprisings, terrorism and  violent extremism, armed conflicts, and of course, the necessary political and economic transformations to enhance inclusive growth and development and participatory governance. African countries must not and should not continue to rely on intervention by external actors (e.g., the EU, the U.N., the ICC, and the United States) to help them resolve domestic problems.

Support good governance: While it is quite clear that countries such as Somalia, the Central African Republic, and South Sudan are in urgent need of institutional reforms to guarantee the rule of law, enhance the protection of human rights, and advance inclusive economic growth, it is important to note that even countries that appear peaceful are still suffering from governance systems that are pervaded by corruption, rent seeking, the lack of government accountability, and impunity. One long-term goal for the African Union should be to galvanize grassroots support throughout the continent for institutional reforms to produce (1) constitutions that cannot be easily manipulated by political elites (as occurred in Burundi and Burkina Faso) to prolong their stay in power; and (2) governing processes that are undergirded by some form of separation of powers, with checks and balances—at the minimum, judicial independence must be safeguarded and the legislative branch granted enough independence so that it can effectively check on what have been, in many African countries during the last several decades, imperial presidencies with virtually no check on the exercise of government power.

Create institutions for improving the livelihood of the average citizen: Institutional arrangements that provide citizens with the wherewithal to resolve conflicts peacefully, organize their private lives and engage in those activities (e.g., start and operate a business for profit; practice their chosen religion; get married and raise a family—that is, engage freely in self-actualizing activities) that enhance their ability to maximize their values and protect themselves from abuse by state- and non-state actors, as well as participate fully and effectively in governance, including being able to hold their governors accountable for their actions.

Strengthen the African Court of Justice and Human Rights: The court needs the authority to actually serve as an effective legal instrument for the protection of human rights in all countries in the continent, including dealing with crimes that are currently being referred to the International Criminal Court in The Hague.

Facilitate economic integration: Currently, many African countries have economies that are relatively small and not very viable and hence, are not capable of engaging in production processes that can effectively utilize and benefit from technological economies of scale. Integration can significantly increase the size of these economies and enhance their ability to produce goods that are competitive globally in both price and quality. In fact, integration at the regional level, especially if supported by the AU, for example, can help small countries more effectively construct and maintain infrastructures such as roads and bridges, universities and research centers, and other projects that require large initial investments but are characterized by significant scale economies.

Transform the AU from observer to actor: During the last several years, as the continent has been devastated and ravaged by terrorist attacks, the AU has remained essentially an observer. When it comes to the fight against terrorism, the AU should make the plight of the victims of these insidious crimes—not state claims of sovereignty and independence—the main basis for its decisions. The AU, of course, must work with national governments and regional organizations (e.g., ECOWAS in West Africa) but must not allow these local groups to constrain its ability to intervene when doing so would save lives or prevent situations that could deteriorate into mass pogroms. Thus, the AU should act purposefully and forcefully to develop an effective anti-terrorism framework that can deal effectively with terrorism and help member states target and address those issues that enhance extremism. The current one just doesn’t cut it.

Address poverty and inequality: Extreme poverty and unequal access to opportunities for self-actualization remain serious challenges for virtually all African countries. Already, in its Agenda 2063, the AU has promised to address these issues and enhance what it calls “inclusive economic growth and sustainable development.” [3] These issues, of course, are interrelated and tied to many of the recommendations listed above. For example, without peace, it is not likely that any African country will be able to engage in the types of entrepreneurial activities that enhance inclusive growth and development. Hence, it is important for the AU to promote the rule of law and thus create the enabling environment for the emergence of the entrepreneurial communities that offer all citizens the opportunities for self-actualization.

Respond effectively to pandemics: As evidenced by the response to the Ebola pandemic that devastated Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone beginning in March 2014, few African countries have health care systems that can effectively and fully respond to pandemics. In addition, there is no continent-wide framework that can timely deal with such health threats and effectively prevent them from becoming pandemics. The AU must take the lead in helping develop a continent-wide response framework to future health threats.

Ensure the equitable allocation of and access to water: The continuing struggle between Egypt and Sudan, on the one hand, and Ethiopia and the other upstream riparian states, on the other hand, over access to the waters of the Nile River, has reminded us of the need for African countries to develop effective legal frameworks for the equitable allocation of existing water resources. With increased demand for water for household use and for irrigated farming—due to rapid population increases, urbanization, and the effects of global warming—it has become evident that African countries must develop and adopt effective legal frameworks to govern the allocation of water resources, as well as deal with other water-related issues such as ecosystem degradation, conservation, and water treatment and reclamation. The AU can provide the mechanisms for regional discourses on water management and enhance the ability of member countries to develop and adopt effective systems to manage international watercourses.

The African Union is in a position to provide the leadership for Africa to develop into a much more effective competitor in the global economy and a full participant in global governance. To do so, the AU must move aggressively to deal with some pressing issues in order to secure peace and security in several countries and avert descend into anarchy and genocide. In the long-run, the AU should help its member countries develop and adopt institutional arrangements and governing processes that guarantee the rule of law, enhance the protection of human rights (including especially those of women and other vulnerable groups), and promote inclusive growth and development. The timid and extremely cautious approach that the AU is taking with respect to the crisis in Burundi is almost tantamount to a dereliction of duties. The AU leadership must not allow claims of sovereignty and independence made by the governments of member states to inform, and perhaps, cloud its decisions. Emphasis should be placed on the plight of the people who are being exploited, displaced and forced into homelessness and/or exile, maimed, and killed by the violence in these countries.

[1]Aspiration 1 of the AU’s Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want.

[2] The AU’s guiding principles can be found in the Lomé Declaration on Unconstitutional Changes in Government and the Constitutive Act of African Union, which prohibit unconstitutional changes in government. For example, Art. 30 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union states as follows: “Governments which shall come to power through unconstitutional means shall not be allowed to participate in the activities of the Union.” Also, Art. 4 states that “[t]he Union shall function in accordance with the following principles: “(p) condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes of government.” See Constitutive Act of the African Union, available at http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/ConstitutiveAct_EN.pdf (last visited on February 6, 2016).

[3] Aspiration 1 of the AU’s Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want.

The African Union (AU) will hold its 27th Heads of State Assembly in Kigali from July 17-18, 2016, as part of its ongoing annual meetings, during which time it will elect individuals to lead the AU Commission for the next four years. Given the fierce battle for the chairperson position in 2012; and  as the AU has increasingly been called upon to assume more responsibility for various issues that affect the continent—from the Ebola pandemic that ravaged West Africa in 2013-14 to civil wars in several countries, including Libya, Central African Republic, and South Sudan, both the AU Commission and its leadership have become very important and extremely prestigious actors. The upcoming elections are not symbolic: They are about choosing trusted and competent leaders to guide the continent in good times and bad.

The African Union (AU) [1] came into being on July 9, 2002 and was established to replace the Organization of African Unity (OAU). The AU’s highest decisionmaking body is the Assembly of the African Union, which consists of all the heads of state and government of the member states of the AU. The chairperson of the assembly is the ceremonial head of the AU and is elected by the Assembly of Heads of State to serve a one-year term. This assembly is currently chaired by President Idriss Déby of Chad.

The AU’s secretariat is called the African Union Commission [2] and is based in Addis Ababa. The chairperson of the AU Commission is the chief executive officer, the AU’s legal representative, and the accounting officer of the commission. The chairperson is directly responsible to the AU’s Executive Council. The current chairperson of the AU Commission is Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma of South Africa and is assisted by a deputy chairperson, who currently is Erastus Mwencha of Kenya.

Dr. Zuma has decided not to seek a second term in office and, hence, this position is open for contest. The position of deputy chairperson will also become vacant, since Mwencha is not eligible to serve in the new commission.

Notably, the position of chairperson of the AU Commission does not only bring prestige and continental recognition to the person that is elected to serve but also to the country and region from which that person hails. Already, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), Dr. Zuma’s region, is arguing that it is entitled to another term since she has decided not to stand for a second. Other regions, such as eastern and central Africa, have already identified their nominees. It is also rumored that some regions have already initiated diplomatic efforts to gather votes for their preferred candidates.

In April 2016, SADC chose Botswana’s minister of foreign affairs, Dr. Pelonomi Venson-Moitoi, as its preferred candidate. Nevertheless, experts believe that even if South Africa flexes its muscles to support Venson-Moitoi’s candidacy (which it is most likely to do), it is not likely to succeed this time because Botswana has not always supported the AU on critical issues, such as the International Criminal Court, and hence, does not have the goodwill necessary to garner the support for its candidate among the various heads of state.

Venson-Moitoi is expected to face two other candidates—Dr. Specioza Naigaga Wandira Kazibwe of Uganda (representing east Africa) and Agapito Mba Mokuy of Equatorial Guinea (representing central Africa). Although Mokuy is relatively unknown, his candidacy could be buoyed by the argument that a Spanish-speaking national has never held the chairperson position, as well as the fact that, despite its relatively small size, Equatorial Guinea—and its president, Teodoro Obiang Nguema—has given significant assistance to the AU over the years. Obiang Nguema’s many financial and in-kind contributions to the AU could endear his country and its candidate to the other members of the AU.

In fact, during his long tenure as president of Equatorial Guinea, Obiang Nguema has shown significant interest in the AU, has attended all assemblies, and has made major contributions to the organization. In addition to the fact that Equatorial Guinea hosted AU summits in 2011 and 2014, Obiang Nguema served as AU chairperson in 2011. Thus, a Mokuy candidacy for the chairperson of the AU Commission could find favor among those who believe it would give voice to small and often marginalized countries, as well as members of the continent’s Spanish-speaking community. Finally, the opinion held by South Africa, one of the continent’s most important and influential countries, on several issues (from the political situation in Burundi to the International Criminal Court and its relations with Africa) appears closer to that of Equatorial Guinea’s than Botswana’s.

Of course, both Venson-Moitoi and Kazibwe are seasoned civil servants with international and administrative experience and have the potential to function as an effective chairperson. However, the need to give voice within the AU to the continent’s historically marginalized regions could push Mokuy’s candidacy to the top.

Nevertheless, supporters of a Mokuy candidacy may be worried that accusations of corruption and repression labeled on Equatorial Guinea by the international community could negatively affect how their candidate is perceived by voters.

Also important to voters is their relationship with former colonial powers. In fact, during the last election, one argument that helped defeat then-Chairperson Jean Ping was that both he and his (Gabonese) government were too pro-France. This issue may not be a factor in the 2016 elections, though: Equatorial Guinea, Uganda, and Botswana are not considered to be extremely close to their former colonizers.

Finally, gender and regional representation should be important considerations for the voters who will be called upon to choose a chairperson for the AU Commission. Both Venson-Moitoi and Kazibwe are women, and the election of either of them would continue to support diversity within African leadership. Then again, Mr. Mokuy’s election would enhance regional and small-state representation.

Also open for contest are the portfolios of Peace and Security, Political Affairs, Infrastructure and Energy, Rural Economy and Agriculture, Human Resources, and Science and Technology. Many countries are vying for these positions on the commission in an effort to ensure that their status within the AU is not marginalized. For example, Nigeria and Algeria, both of which are major regional leaders, are competing to capture the position of commissioner of Peace and Security. Algeria is keen to keep this position: It has held this post over the last decade, and, if it loses this position, it would not have any representation on the next commission—significantly diminishing the country’s influence in the AU.

Nigeria’s decision to contest the position of commissioner of Peace and Security is based on the decision by the administration of President Muhammadu Buhari to give up the leadership of Political Affairs. Historically, Nigeria has been unwilling to compete openly against regional powers for leadership positions in the continent’s peace and security area. Buhari’s decision to contest the portfolio of Peace and Security is very risky, since a loss to Algeria and the other contesting countries will leave Nigeria without a position on the commission and would be quite humiliating to the president and his administration.

Since the AU came into being in 2002, there has been an unwritten rule that regional powers (e.g., Algeria, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa) should not lead or occupy key positions in the AU’s major institutions. Thus, when Dr. Zuma was elected in 2012, South Africa was severely criticized, especially by some smaller African countries, for breaking that rule. The hope, especially of the non-regional leaders, is that the 2016 election will represent a return to the status quo ante since most of the candidates for the chairperson position hail from small- and medium-sized countries.

While professional skills and international experience are critical for an individual to serve on the commission, the AU is quite concerned about the geographical distribution of leadership positions, as well as the representation of women on the commission, as noted above. In fact, the commission’s statutes mandate that each region present two candidates (one female and the other male) for every portfolio. Article 6(3) of the commission’s statutes states that “[a]t least one Commissioner from each region shall be a woman.” Unfortunately, women currently make up only a very small proportion of those contesting positions in the next commission. Thus, participants must keep in mind the need to create a commission that reflects the continent’s diversity, especially in terms of gender and geography.

Individuals that have served in government and/or worked for an international organization dominate leadership positions in the commission. Unfortunately, individuals representing civil society organizations are poorly represented on the nominee lists; unsurprisingly, given the fact that the selection process is controlled by civil servants from states and regional organizations. Although this approach to the staffing of the commission guarantees the selection of skilled and experienced administrators, it could burden the commission with the types of bureaucratic problems that are common throughout the civil services of the African countries, notably, rigidity, tunnel vision, and the inability, or unwillingness to undertake bold and progressive initiatives.

The AU currently faces many challenges, some of which require urgent and immediate action and others, which can only be resolved through long-term planning. For example, the fight against terrorism and violent extremism, and securing the peace in South Sudan, Burundi, Libya, and other states and regions consumed by violent ethno-cultural conflict require urgent and immediate action from the AU. Issues requiring long-term planning by the AU include helping African countries improve their governance systems, strengthening the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, facilitating economic integration, effectively addressing issues of extreme poverty and inequality in the distribution of income and wealth, responding effectively and fully to pandemics, and working towards the equitable allocation of water, especially in urban areas.

Finally, there is the AU’s dependence on foreign aid for its financing. When Dr. Dlamini Zuma took over as chairperson of the AU Commission in 2012, she was quite surprised by the extent to which the AU depends on budget subventions from international donors and feared that such dependence could interfere with the organization’s operations. The AU budget for 2016 is $416,867,326, of which $169,833,340 (40 percent) is assessed on Member States and $247,033,986 (59 percent) is to be secured from international partners.  The main foreign donors are the United States, Canada, China, and the European Union.

Within Africa, South Africa, Angola, Nigeria, and Algeria are the best paying rich countries. Other relatively rich countries, Egypt, Libya, Sudan, and Cameroon, are struggling to pay. Libya’s civil war and its inability to form a permanent government is interfering with its ability to meet its financial obligations, even to its citizens. Nevertheless, it is hoped that South Africa, Nigeria, Angola, Egypt, and Libya, the continent’s richest countries, are expected to eventually meet as much as 60% of the AU’s budget and help reduce the organization’s continued dependence on international donors. While these major continental and international donors are not expected to have significant influence on the elections for leadership positions on the AU Commission, they are likely to remain a determining factor on the types of programs that the AU can undertake.

Dealing fully and effectively with the multifarious issues that plague the continent requires AU Commission leadership that is not only well-educated and skilled, but that has the foresight to help the continent develop into an effective competitor in the global market and a full participant in international affairs. In addition to helping the continent secure the peace and provide the enabling environment for economic growth and the creation of wealth, this crop of leaders should provide the continent with the leadership necessary to help states develop and adopt institutional arrangements and governing systems that guarantee the rule of law, promote the protection of human rights, and advance inclusive economic growth and development.

[1] The AU consists of all the countries on the continent and in the United Nations, except the Kingdom of Morocco, which left the AU after the latter recognized the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (Western Sahara). Morocco claims that the Western Sahara is part of its territory.

[2] The AU Commission is made up of a number of commissioners who deal with various policy areas, including peace and security, political affairs, infrastructure and energy, social affairs, trade and industry, rural economy and agriculture, human resources, science and technology, and economic affairs. According to Article 3 of its Statutes, the Commission is empowered to “represent the Union and defend its interests under the guidance of and as mandated by the Assembly and Executive Council.”

During the 27th Heads of State Assembly of the African Union (AU) meeting in Kigali, Rwanda, from July 17-18, 2016, the heads of state were supposed to elect individuals to lead the AU for the next four years. One of the most important functions that the delegates were expected to perform was to elect the chairperson of the AU Commission to replace the present chairperson, South Africa’s Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, who had indicated that she would not seek re-election.

Three candidates were standing for the position of chairperson of the AU Commission. These were Dr. Pelonomi Venson-Moitoi, foreign minister of Botswana, Dr. Specioza Waigaga Wandira Kazibwe, former vice president of Uganda, and Mr. Agapito Mba Mokuy, foreign minister of Equatorial Guinea. There was great expectation that the election of any one of these three candidates would significantly advance gender and regional balance, with respect to key leadership positions in continental institutions. Hence, the election of either one of the two female candidates would have been welcomed by supporters of gender balance. However, if the delegates had opted for Mr. Mokuy, such a choice would have been welcomed by the Spanish-speaking community, as well as the continent’s smaller and historically marginalized states. Given the fact that the outgoing chairperson of the AU Commission, Dr. Zuma, is a woman, the hope within the central African community was that Mr. Mokuy would emerge victorious and represent the region, as well as serve as a sign of hope for the heretofore marginalized regions.

Reports from Kigali are that the election for the chairperson has been postponed until January 2017. It is reported that the AU took that decision based on the fact that none of the three candidates had secured the two-thirds majority of votes needed to win. During the election’s first round, Dr. Venson-Moitoi received 16 votes, Mr. Mokuy received 12 votes, and Dr. Kazibwe received 11 votes. 

Those who abstained from voting claimed that the candidates were not qualified to lead the commission.

After receiving the least votes in the first round, Dr. Kazibwe withdrew from the competition. That left Dr. Venson-Moitoi and Mr. Mokuy to compete for the position. Although Dr. Venson-Moitoi garnered 23 votes in the next round, that number was less than the 36 votes to constitute the two-thirds majority needed to emerge victorious.

Part of the reason for this quagmire, as the news from Kigali is indicating, is that as many as 15 heads of state abstained from voting in the first round of the competition and that in the second round, 20 acted similarly. These many abstentions derailed the process and made certain that none of the remaining candidates would emerge victorious.

While these may be legitimate issues to raise, one wonders why these issues were not raised and fully resolved before the delegates actually assembled in Kigali.

Indeed, the AU assembly chair, President Idriss Déby of Chad, cited the boycott as a deciding factor in the failure of any of the three candidates to secure the necessary votes to win. He then announced that the elections had been postponed until January 2017 and that the heads of state had opened up the contest to more candidates—a decision that appears to be a slap in the face of the current candidates. Notably, this appears to support the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) bloc’s pre-election petition that the elections be postponed because, as they argued, none of the candidates was qualified to lead. That petition, however, had been previously denied.

President Déby argued, in his post-election proclamation, that the delay would provide candidates and their respective regions with the time to adequately prepare for the elections in January 2017. What appears to be implied by this declaration is that preparations for the failed July elections were inadequate and that with this extra time, the type of behavior exhibited by some representatives during the recently concluded elections would not occur in January. However, unless the AU puts in place rules to prevent such an eventuality, there is no guarantee that January 2017’s elections would not be marred by such last-minute maneuvering again. What is to prevent other blocs from engaging in similar strategic behavior (i.e., boycotting the election) in order to promote their own candidates for the various leadership positions in the commission?

Nevertheless, the AU is a continental organization, and no country or region should be allowed to dominate and monopolize leadership positions in its institutions.

Those who abstained from voting claimed that the candidates were not qualified to lead the commission. Dr. Kazibwe’s candidacy was questioned on the grounds that she was previously convicted of abusing state funds. Mr. Mokuy was taken to task for his country’s human rights record, while Dr. Venson-Moitoi’s candidacy was questioned because her home country, Botswana, has often taken positions that are contrary to those of many other AU members, notably on the issue of Africa’s relations with the International Criminal Court.

While these may be legitimate issues to raise, one wonders why these issues were not raised and fully resolved before the delegates actually assembled in Kigali. Certainly, the AU must have mechanisms to vet individuals who are nominated for leadership positions in its institutions to determine their fit for office. During such a vetting process, groups and individuals within the AU can make known their objections to candidates that they believe are not qualified to perform the jobs for which they are being nominated. Of course, such a vetting process must be governed by rules chosen in an earlier period such as those presented in The Statutes of the Commission of the African Union, which provide information on the minimum qualifications and experience of the commissioners. Hence, any challenge to the qualifications of an individual running to serve on the commission should begin with and be governed by such rules.

Once candidates have been fully vetted and determined to meet the minimum qualifications to stand for the positions for which they have been nominated, no head of state (i.e., elector) should boycott the voting. Of course, it is not surprising that electors would prefer to vote for candidates from either their own countries or region. Nevertheless, the AU is a continental organization, and no country or region should be allowed to dominate and monopolize leadership positions in its institutions. Hence, the AU Commission’s leadership must reflect the continent’s diversity, with specific emphasis on gender and geographic balance. Efforts by heads of state or blocs (e.g., ECOWAS) to engage in last minute strategic maneuvering (e.g., boycotting of elections) in order to secure certain political advantages should be discouraged. Such opportunistic behavior can seriously undermine the AU’s electoral system and place the organization in a very precarious position. In fact, one could argue that the outcome of the July 2016 commission elections in Kigali betray an organization that appears to be adrift and without proper leadership and one that is not willing to follow its own rules.  

In fact, one could argue that the outcome of the July 2016 commission elections in Kigali betray an organization that appears to be adrift and without proper leadership and one that is not willing to follow its own rules.

As the AU looks forward, it must make certain that no voting bloc within the organization is allowed to grant itself the power to derail the electoral process. Such opportunism and capriciousness on the part of any group within the AU can prevent the deepening and institutionalization of democratic principles within the organization and effectively hold hostage the interests of the continent to those of a smaller group or region.

Thus, the process through which the member states of the African Union choose individuals to serve in and manage their institutions must be competitive and based on democratic principles. The AU should learn a lesson from what happened in Kigali and put legal mechanisms in place to deal fully and effectively with any future efforts by groups, individuals, and factions to engage in any behavior that can frustrate the functioning of the organization and its institutions. Perhaps the failure of the AU to anticipate such behavior is due to its inexperience. Nevertheless, the organization must provide itself with the wherewithal to prevent this type of stalemate. For, come January, another region may, at the last minute, register its dissatisfaction with all candidates and seek to replace them.

If the AU is to teach member states the principles of good governance, it must first put its own house in order and lead by example.

As the AU looks forward to the January 2017 round of elections, Senegalese politician and diplomat, Abdoulaye Bathily, has already indicated his interest in competing for the position of chairperson of the AU Commission. To avoid the problems that were encountered by the electoral process in Kigali, he, his country, and his region should commence the formal nomination process in order to provide all interested parties with the opportunity to properly vet his candidacy and determine his fit for office. In fact, other candidates who are planning to stand for the elections in January 2017 should also have themselves formally nominated as soon as possible so that the vetting process can be completed and a final list of qualified candidates agreed before the delegates meet in January 2017.

If the AU is to teach member states the principles of good governance, it must first put its own house in order and lead by example. It must, for example, make its electoral decisions through a democratic and competitive process. It must be governed by the rule of law in order for it to stand as a beacon of light for the many countries in the continent that are trying to deepen and institutionalize democracy. Unless the AU puts into place mechanisms to deal with the types of behaviors that derailed the commission elections in Kigali in July 2016, it risks descending into a quagmire from which it might not get out uninjured.

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Crisis seems to be the byword for Brazil today: political crisis, economic crisis, corruption crisis. Even the 2016 Rio Olympics seem to teeter on the edge of failure, according to the governor of the state of Rio de Janeiro. Yet despite the steady drum beat of grim news, Brazil is more than likely to resume its upward trajectory within a few years. Its present economic and political troubles mask a number of positives: the strength of its democracy and a new found willingness to fight corruption at all costs. With the correct policies in place, its economy will recover in due course. The impeachment process against Dilma Rousseff will soon be over, one way or the other. The present troubles are merely a temporary detour on Brazil’s long quest to achieve major power status and a consequential role in the international system. In a world in turmoil, where geopolitical tensions are on the rise and the fabric of international politics is stressed by events such as Brexit, we should not lose sight of Brazil’s history of and potential for contributing to sustaining the liberal international order.

Brazil’s aspirations for greatness

Brazil has long aspired to grandeza (greatness) both at home and abroad. As its first ambassador to Washington, Joaquim Nabuco (1905-1910) once said, “Brazil has always been conscious of its size, and it has been governed by a prophetic sense with regard to its future.” As we document in our new book, Brazil has reached for major power status at least four times in the past 100 years: participating as a co-belligerent with the Allies in World War One and seeking a permanent seat on the Council of the League of Nations thereafter; joining the Allies in World War II and aspiring to a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in 1945; mastering nuclear technology beginning in the 1970s, including launching a covert military program (now terminated) to build a nuclear explosive device; and most recently, beginning with the presidency of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2011), seeking to become a leader in multilateral institutions, including actively campaigning for a permanent seat on the UNSC.

A decade ago, many Brazilians believed that this time their country was poised to secure its position as a major power. As the seventh largest economy in the world with the 10th largest defense budget and significant soft power, Brazilian leaders such as Lula saw their country as being “in the mix” of major powers who, while not able to make the international order alone, could very well shape its evolution through uncertain times together with other major powers. Certainly, they no longer saw Brazil as one of the middle or small powers, the “order takers” in the international system.

Brazil saw a new opportunity to emerge as a major power in the advent of a relatively stable and peaceful post-Cold War geopolitical order, the decade-long commodity boom that supercharged its economy after 2002, and the rise of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). Between 2002 and 2013, Brazil’s virtuous trifecta—democratic consolidation, rapid economic growth, and reduced inequality—was a boon to its soft power. This combination was highly attractive to many in the developing world, contributing to Brazil’s claim to leadership on the international stage as a bridge between the global South and the great powers. International peace and stability particularly favored Brazil’s predilection for deploying soft power rather than hard power. And in the BRICS, Brazil saw an opportunity to work together with other emerging powers critical of the present international order to advance its agenda for reformed global institutions.

Rethinking Brazil’s approach to global influence

Brazil’s bridge-building strategy was effective in advancing its national interests in multilateral forums, most recently on global internet governance and global climate change. But the BRICS dimension of Brazil’s strategy detracted from its ability to influence the world’s great democracies. The BRICS identity associated Brazil with authoritarian powers—China and Russia—that were viewed by the United States and its allies, at best, as unhelpful critics and, at worst, as deliberate saboteurs of the present order. This undermined Brazil’s credibility with Washington and other leading democracies, and hindered its ability to advance its preferred policies on everything from nonproliferation to the reform of global economic institutions to the debate on humanitarian intervention. In retrospect, working more closely with other emerging democracies that seek reform of the international order, such as through the India-Brazil-South Africa association known as IBSA, would have more clearly signaled Brazil’s constructive intentions while still preserving its critical posture.

Today, the opportunities that powered Brazil’s most recent rise—post-Cold War geopolitical stability and a massive commodity boom—are receding, replaced by a more fractious and dangerous international system. Despite troubles at home, it is not too early for Brazil’s leaders to think anew about how to strengthen national capabilities and deploy them strategically to address this new environment. This includes fortifying domestic institutions, both to address the present crisis but also to restore the luster of Brazil’s soft power. It means bolstering Brazil’s hard power capabilities once the economy improves and deploying them in ways that contribute to its soft power, for example by taking on additional responsibility for leading critical international peacekeeping operations as it has in Haiti. It means thinking carefully about how to signal to the democratic great powers Brazil’s commitment to a strengthened liberal international order, even as it holds onto its own principles and works towards reform of multilateral institutions. And eventually, as Brazil completes its recovery, it means contributing more substantially to the costs of maintaining its preferred global order. A Brazil that achieves all this will be well positioned to have a positive global impact, continuing to be a strong (if sometimes critical) partner for the United States in shaping the international order.

Since May 2010’s Mavi Marmara incident, which resulted in the killing of nine Turkish activists from Israel Defense Forces’ fire, relations between Turkey and Israel have been suspended. Two major regional developments in 2012, the lingering Syrian crisis and Israel’s Operation Pillar of Defense in Gaza, have underscored the lack of a senior-level dialogue between Israel and Turkey. However, in the wake of the latest Gaza crisis, officials on both sides have confirmed press reports detailing recent bilateral contacts between senior Turkish and Israeli officials in Cairo and Geneva, possibly signaling a shift in the relationship.

Since 1948, Israeli-Turkish relations have been through periods of disagreement and tension, as well as periods of cooperation and understanding. Relations developed gradually over the years and eventually reached their peak in the 1990’s when the two countries forged a strategic partnership, supported and strengthened by the United States. During those years, the Turkish general staff and the Israeli defense establishment were the main proponents for an enhanced relationship between the two countries. Military cooperation and coordination with Israel fit the broader world view of the secularist Turkish defense establishment. Turkey’s military structure and posture was NATO and Mediterranean oriented, and within this framework Israel was naturally viewed as an ally. From the Israeli perspective, Israel’s defense establishment recognized Turkey’s geostrategic importance and the potential that existed for defense collaboration.

Positive relations between the two countries continued well into the first decade of the 21st century but began to slow down when Turkey experienced a new social transformation and political Islamists became the dominant political force in Turkey. The clash that ensued between the new Turkish leadership and the military elite eroded the military’s standing, coupled with a major shift in Turkish foreign policy, inevitably led to a souring in the relationship between Turkey and Israel. With the launch of Israel’s Operation Cast Lead in December 2008, relations began to seriously weaken, as Turkey expressed clear disapproval of Israel’s actions. Despite its efforts, the United States was not able to repair relations between the two countries. The Mavi Marmara incident in 2010 led to further decline of relations between the two.

Two and a half years have passed since the incident on board the Turkish passenger vessel, and relations between Turkey and Israel remain strained, with the two countries locked into their positions. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyib Erdoğan insists that if Israel wishes to normalize relations, it must accept three conditions: issue a formal apology over the incident; compensate the families of the nine Turks (one of them an American citizen) killed on board; and lift the naval blockade of Gaza. Not surprisingly, Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu is reportedly not willing to meet the three Turkish demands.

In recent months, Israel has made several attempts, both directly and through third parties, to find a formula that will restore the dialogue between Jerusalem and Ankara, but to no avail. Erdoğan publicly rejected these Israeli diplomatic approaches, reiterating the need to address the three conditions before further talks can ensue. As a result, bilateral ties, excluding trade, are practically at a standstill, with low level (second secretary) diplomatic representation in respective embassies in both Ankara and Tel Aviv.

Over the past year and a half, the upheaval in the Arab world has occupied the top of the Turkish foreign policy agenda. Thus, the relationship with Israel has not been a priority for the Turks, pushing Israel to invest greater efforts in developing its ties with Turkey’s rivals and neighbors, including Greece, Cyprus, Bulgaria, and Romania. Moreover, Turkey, previously an Israeli vacation hotspot, has experienced a substantial decline in the number of Israeli tourists.

The Turkish-Israeli relationship was not a high priority on the U.S. administration’s foreign policy agenda in the months leading up to the U.S. presidential elections. While the United States did previously engage in efforts to bridge the gap between the two countries, recently, other issues, including the 9/11 attack on the U.S.’s mission in Benghazi, Libya, the Syria crisis, and Iran’s nuclear program, have consumed the attention of U.S. policy makers dealing with the Middle East.

Against this backdrop, Erdoğan’s willingness to allow his head of intelligence to meet the head of Mossad in Cairo, and his foreign ministry’s director general to meet with Israeli Senior Envoy Ciechanover in Geneva, may seem surprising, especially considering Erdoğan’s own harsh rhetoric against Israel during the initial phases of Operation Pillar of Defense. Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu explained that the meetings were aimed at finding an end to the Gaza crisis and that there would be no discussion of reconciliation so long as Israel did not address Turkey’s three previously stated conditions. Israeli officials confirmed that while the discussion in Cairo focused on Gaza, the meeting in Geneva went beyond the Gaza issue, and Israel’s envoy Ciechanover did in fact suggest possible options to address Turkey’s three stipulations.

What does all this mean?

Turkey’s recent moves can be attributed to a growing realization that it has hurt its interests and hampered its diplomatic efforts by not maintaining dialogue and open channels with Israel. This move has allowed the Muslim Brotherhood-led Egypt to take center stage and orchestrate, together with the United States, the ceasefire between Israel and Hamas. Turkey, which takes pride in facilitating diplomacy in the Middle East (as demonstrated in the 2008 Turkish-brokered Syrian-Israeli proximity peace talks), was marginalized in the latest round of negotiations on Gaza simply for having damaged its relationship with Israel.

Furthermore, as Turkey’s involvement in the Syrian crisis deepens, and as it prepares to deploy Patriot missiles on the Turkish-Syrian border, Turkey most certainly will aspire to improve intelligence cooperation with Israel. With regards to Syria, there is very little disagreement, if any, between Turkey and Israel, and cooperating on this issue could prove to be very useful and beneficial for both countries.

The possible cooperation on Syria does not mean that Turkey will drop its insistence on Israel meeting the three conditions, but it may indicate a greater inclination to show flexibility with regard to the actual wording and terms of those conditions.

Israel may be willing to be more forthcoming toward Turkey in respect to the three conditions, so long as it receives assurances that Turkey will not just pocket an Israeli apology and compensation and revert to its anti-Israel mode. Israel has its own concerns, and feels more isolated than ever before in a volatile Middle East region. Its need to rely solely on Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi’s mediating efforts last week certainly left Israeli decision makers uneasy. Israel will likely continue to reach out to Turkey in the coming weeks, but a final decision, which may include compromises, will possibly wait until after the Israeli elections in January 2013.

One must not lose sight of the fact that the Turkey-Israel relationship has deteriorated to a low point not only because of disagreement on political issues but also because of the clash of personalities between leaders on both sides. Officials on both sides will face tough decisions in the coming year, and will likely have to go against their own constituencies and popular public sentiments in order to repair relations.

The distrust between both countries is deep and the level of animosity at the leadership level is high. While it is encouraging that they are finally communicating with one another, undoubtedly progress will require a third party presence and involvement. In this respect, the Obama administration has an important role to play. Unquestionably, a rapprochement between Turkey and Israel will serve U.S. global and regional strategic interests. The strong rapport between U.S. President Barak Obama and Erdoğan and what seems in the aftermath of the Gaza crisis as more frequent consultations between Obama and Netanyahu, can contribute to a U.S.-brokered deal between the two sides. If successful, this deal will address not only the Mavi Marmara incident and Turkish demands, but it will also lay out guidelines and a “code of conduct” for interaction between the two sides in times of war and peace and sponsor a Turkish-Israeli dialogue on regional developments and issues of mutual concern. After a long disconnect between the parties, recent interactions between the two regarding the latest Gaza crisis signal that both sides are predisposed to take another look at seriously engaging with each other again, and the United States can help make this a reality.

Perhaps this could be one of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s last missions before leaving office.

Israel apologized to Turkey today for the May 2010 incident on board the Mavi Marmara naval vessel, part of a flotilla to Gaza, in which nine Turks were killed from Israel Defense Forces fire. The apology came during a 30-minute telephone conversation between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, orchestrated by President Barack Obama, who was ending his 3 day visit to Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Erdogan accepted the Israeli apology, and the leaders agreed to begin a normalization process between Israel and Turkey, following the past three years, when relations were practically at a standstill. (Last December, I wrote about the beginnings of a Turkey-Israeli rapprochement, and discussed more of the policy implications here.)

This development allows the two countries to begin a new phase in their relationship, which has known crisis and tension, but also cooperation and a strong strategic partnership.

The U.S. administration played a key role behind the scenes in creating the conditions that paved the way for an Israeli apology and Turkish acceptance. Undoubtedly, a close relationship between Turkey and Israel-- two of America’s greatest allies in the region-- serves United States’ strategic interests globally and regionally. At a time when the Middle East political landscape is changing rapidly, it was imperative to end the long impasse between Ankara and Jerusalem.

Over the past year, Turkey and Israel have also come to realize that repairing their relationship and re-establishing a dialogue is at their best interest, as they face great challenges in their immediate vicinity (first and foremost, the Syrian civil war).

United States officials emphasized that this is the first step in a long process. Nevertheless, the parties will have to make a great effort to overcome years of distrust and suspicion if they want the relationship to work. No one is under the allusion that relations will go back to what they were in the “honeymoon” period of the 1990s but modest improvement can be made. It will not be an easy task, and for that to happen it is essential that the parties not only talk to each other, but also listen to one another and begin to respect each other’s sensitivities. In order for this rapprochement to be successful, United States will have to continue to oversee discussions between Turkey and Israel, and remain heavily engaged in this process.

Seven months have passed since Israel officially apologized to Turkey for the Mavi Marmara incident of May 2010, in which nine Turks were killed by Israeli fire. What seemed, at the time, to be a diplomatic breakthrough, capable of setting into motion a reconciliation process between America’s two greatest allies in the region, has been frustrated by a series of spiteful interactions.

The Turkish-Israeli alliance of the 1990s and first decade of the 2000s was viewed by senior U.S. officials as an anchor of stability in a changing region. The relationship between Ankara and Jerusalem served vital U.S. interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, and so it was therefore a U.S. priority to restore dialogue between the two former allies-turned-rivals. The Obama administration, throughout both terms, has made a continuous effort to rebuild the relationship and was ultimately successful in setting the stage for the Israeli apology and the Turkish acceptance of that apology. The U.S. was not the only party that stood to gain from reconciliation; both Turkey and Israel have many incentives for normalizing relations. For Turkey, the reestablishment of a dialogue with Israel has four main potential benefits: It would allow for greater involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations, it would provide greater opportunity for information sharing on the developments of the Syrian civil war allowing Turkey to have a more comprehensive perspective, it would also provide more economic opportunities for Turkey especially with regard to cooperation in the field of natural gas (following Israel's High Court of Justice recent ruling that paves the way toward exports of natural gas), and finally it would remove an irritant from Turkey's relations with the United States. In turn, Israel would benefit from the reestablishment of dialogue in three major ways: the rebuilding of relations between senior Turkish and Israeli officials would facilitate intelligence sharing and help to gain a more complete picture of the Syrian crisis, Israel would have the opportunity to contain delegitimization efforts in the Muslim and Arab worlds, and Israel may be able to rejoin NATO related activities and maneuvers.

Despite these enticements, in recent weeks a series of news stories and revelations have put the Turkish-Israeli relationship, yet again, in the international spotlight, raising doubts whether reconciliation between the two countries is at all possible at this time. As the Obama administration struggles to deal with the fallout of allegations that the NSA has tapped the office and cellular phones of Western European leaders and as it focuses on more pressing issues in the Middle East, namely the P5+1 negotiations with Iran, the Syrian crisis, Egypt and negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, it finds itself with little time to chaperone the Turkish-Israeli reconciliation process. Nevertheless, despite tensions, direct talks are reportedly being held between senior Turkish and Israeli officials in an effort to reach a compensation agreement in the near future.

The Israeli apology and Turkish acceptance, orchestrated by Barack Obama during his trip to the region in March 2013, was an essential first step in a long process of reconciliation, aimed at normalizing relations between the two countries after a four year hiatus in their relationship. The next step was an agreement between the two sides in which Israel was to pay compensation to the families of the victims of the Mavi Marmara. Several rounds of talks between senior Turkish and Israeli representatives were reportedly held during the spring of 2013 in Ankara, Jerusalem and Washington, but to no avail. Disagreements over the amount of compensation to be paid by Israel were reported, but later, in July, Turkish Deputy Prime Minister Arinc clarified that money was not the issue. He stated that the problem lay in Israel’s refusal to acknowledge that the payment was a result of its “wrongful act.” Arinc added that another point of contention was Turkey's demand that Israel cooperate in improving the living conditions of the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. Arinc emphasized that only when these two conditions were met could the countries move forward to discuss the specific amount of compensation.

The shadow cast over negotiations by Arinc’s comments was darkened by a string of comments made by Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan against Israel. First, he blamed the “interests lobby” – perhaps a reference to the so-called “Israel Lobby” -- for the large protests that took place against him and his government in Istanbul’s Taksim square and across Turkey in June. Then, in August, Erdogan accused Israel of backing the military coup in Egypt, citing comments made in 2011 by the French Jewish philosopher Bernard Henri-Levy, as proof of a long standing Israeli-Jewish plot to deny the Muslim Brotherhood power in Egypt. This drew sharp Israeli criticism, notably from former Israeli Foreign Minister, Avigdor Lieberman, who compared Erdogan to the Nazi Minister of Propaganda, Joseph Goebbels.

Despite these setbacks, bilateral trade between Turkey and Israel has expanded since the official apology and the number of Israeli tourists returning to visit Turkey has risen dramatically. Yet it is clear that with such harsh rhetoric it will be difficult to effectively advance a reconciliation process. Among American, Turkish and Israeli experts, the prevailing view is that Erdogan and the AKP government, mainly due to domestic political considerations, are not interested in normalizing relations with Israel, and that the only reason Erdogan accepted Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu’s apology was to gain favor with U.S. President Obama.

At the end of August, as the plan for a U.S. military strike in Syria gained momentum, relative calm prevailed in the relations between Ankara and Jerusalem, both focusing on preparations and plans to address the fallout of such an attack. Yet, just when it seemed that tensions were reducing, and Turkish President Gul stated that negotiations "are getting on track," in a September interview with the Washington Post, a series of news stories and revelations injected a poisonous dimension to the already-strained ties.

In early October another round of Turkish-Israeli verbal attacks and counter-attacks was sparked by a Wall Street Journal profile of the Turkish Head of Intelligence, Hakan Fidan, which included a quote from an anonymous Israeli official stating, "It is clear he (Fidan) is not an enemy of Iran." Shortly after came the revelation by David Ignatius in the Washington Post that quoted reliable sources that pointed to Fidan as allegedly passing the names of 10 Iranians working for the Israeli Mossad on to the Iranian intelligence in early 2012. These ten people were later arrested by the Iranian authorities. Senior Turkish officials blamed Israel for leaking the story to Ignatius and the Turkish daily, Hurriyet, reported that Fidan was considering severing ties between Turkish and Israeli intelligence agencies. Reactions in Turkey and Israel to the Ignatius story were harsh and emotional. Turkish officials denied the report while Israeli officials refrained from any public comments. The Friday edition of Yediot's front page headline read, “Turkish Betrayal,” and former Foreign Minister Lieberman voiced his opposition to the apology made in March; he expressed his opinion that it weakened Israel’s stance and image in the region, and he attacked Erdogan for not being interested in a rapprochement.

In recent days Prime Minister Erdogan struck a more conciliatory tone, saying that if Israel is denying involvement in the leak then Turkey must accept it. Israeli media outlets reported over the weekend that Israeli and Turkish negotiators are again trying to reach a compensation agreement. Israeli experts, quoted in these reports, view November 6 as a possible target date to end negotiations over this agreement. The logic behind this being that former Israeli Foreign Minister Lieberman’s verdict is expected that day. If acquitted of corruption charges Mr. Lieberman will return to the Foreign Minister’s job and will likely try and block any attempt to reach an agreement. Turkish experts however assess that Turkey is simply not ready to move forward at this time due to domestic political constraints, as Prime Minister Erdogan and the AKP are bracing for Presidential and local elections in 2014.

A 2010 publication of the U.S. Geological Survey caused major excitement in Cyprus, an island that at the time was suffering from the economic collapse of its neighbor and major trading partner, Greece. According to the publication, the seabed of the Eastern Mediterranean could contain up to 120 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of natural gas.3 Three years later, the Cypriot administration has high hopes that natural gas exports may get Cyprus—the third smallest European Union member state—back on its feet, after its own financial collapse in 2012. Unfortunately for the Cypriots, the reality on the ground is sobering, and it is currently unclear whether Cyprus will become a producer, or an exporter, of natural gas. Around Cyprus, other countries hope to benefit from the energy potential as well, including Israel, Lebanon and the Palestinian Authority. In the Israeli Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), in particular, substantial reserves of natural gas have been found, though the verdict is out whether these will in fact all be produced.

Exploration of Cyprus’s offshore concessions is at an early stage. Energy majors such as ENI and Total are among the first to explore possible gas (and oil) reserves and they expect results not before 2015. To date, only two test wells have been drilled by Houston-based Noble Energy. Proven reserves have been downgraded since and are currently estimated to be between 3 and 5 tcf. At this level of reserves, investing in a natural gas liquefaction terminal, which the Cypriot administration has supported, is not economically viable. A better alternative would be to construct a pipeline to Turkey, which has a large and rapidly growing market for natural gas.

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• Politics Trump Economics in the Complex Game of Eastern Mediterranean Hydrocarbons

The recent outbreak of hostilities between Israel and Hamas is a serious setback to ongoing Turkish-Israeli normalization efforts. Israel launched Operation Protective Edge, its third operation against Hamas since leaving Gaza in 2005, in response to rockets and missiles fired by Hamas from Gaza into Israel. As in Israel’s two previous Gaza campaigns, Operation Cast Lead (2008-09) and Operation Pillar of Defense (2012), Turkey quickly condemned Israel’s actions, yet offered to mediate, together with Qatar, between Israel and Hamas.

After Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, in the midst of his presidential campaign, equated Israeli policy towards Gaza to a “systematic genocide” and accused Israel of surpassing “Hitler in barbarism,” Israel accepted an Egyptian cease-fire proposal. Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman accused Turkey and Qatar of “sabotaging the cease-fire proposal,” and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu complained to U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry about Erdogan’s statements.

Turkish leaders’ harsh rhetoric sparked violent demonstrations in front of Israel’s embassy in Ankara and its consulate in Istanbul, lead the Israeli government to evacuate diplomats’ families, and issue a travel warning advising against travel to Turkey, which prompted numerous cancellations of tourist travel. On Sunday, Netanyahu refrained from declaring Turkish-Israeli reconciliation dead, but accused Erdogan of anti-Semitism more aligned with Tehran then the West.

These heightened Israeli-Turkish tensions come just as the two countries were negotiating a compensation deal for families of victims of the May 31, 2010 Mavi Marmara incident. The deal was intended to facilitate a long-awaited normalization between the two countries, more than a year after Israel’s official apology. The draft stipulated an estimated $21 million in Israeli compensation, the reinstatement of each country’s ambassador, and the reestablishment of a senior-level bilateral dialogue. However, a series of issues has prevented the deal’s finalization, including: Turkish domestic political considerations about the timing (related to March 2014 municipal elections and August 2014 presidential elections) and Israeli demands for Turkish commitments to block future lawsuits related to the Marmara incident.

With the ongoing Gaza conflict, prospects for normalization have again faded at least in the short term, and policymakers on both sides seem to have accepted a limited relationship. Erdogan even declared publicly that as long as he’s in power, there is no chance “to have any positive engagement with Israel”, dismissing any prospect for normalization. Israeli-Turkish animosity runs deep, not only among leaders, but at the grassroots level as well. While it may be difficult to look beyond the short term, a focus on the broader regional picture suggests four reasons why the two countries would benefit from restoring ties.

• First, they share strategic interests. Turkey and Israel see eye to eye on many issues: preventing a nuclear Iran; concerns over spillover from the Syrian civil war; and finally, the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS/ISIL) and security and stability in Iraq. A resumed dialogue and renewed intelligence sharing can pave the way for more concrete cooperation between Turkey and Israel on all these regional issues, with development of a joint approach toward Syria topping the agenda.
• Second, regional environment may be beyond their control, the bilateral relationship is not. Normalization can eliminate one factor of instability in an unstable region.
• Third, Washington sees greater cooperation and cohesiveness in the U.S.-Turkey-Israel triangle as essential. President Obama has sought to restore a dialogue between Ankara and Jerusalem, including efforts to “extract” an Israeli apology and Turkish acceptance. Senior U.S. officials remain active in trying to improve the Turkish-Israeli relationship.
• Fourth, normalization may convey benefits in the economic sphere, with possible cooperation on natural gas, tourism, and enhanced trade. Gas in particular is viewed as a possible game-changer. In 2013, bilateral trade first crossed the $5 billion mark, and data from the first six months of 2014 indicates a continued rise. A political thaw can help accelerate these joint business opportunities. 

Nevertheless, at this stage it is clear that serious U.S. involvement is required for Turkish-Israeli rapprochement to succeed, even in a limited fashion. At present, there are far greater challenges for U.S. foreign policy in the region. The question now is whether the relationship between two of America’s closest regional allies reflects a new “normal,” or whether the leaders of both countries – and the U.S. – can also muster the political will to reconnect the US-Turkey-Israel triangle along more productive lines.

Check back to Brookings.edu for Dan Arbell’s upcoming analysis paper: The U.S.-Turkey-Israel Triangle.

The confrontation between Israel and Hamas during the summer of 2014 deepened tensions between Israel and Turkey. Now, in the fall of 2014, U.S.-Turkish relations are strained over Turkey’s role in the fight against ISIS, while gaps between the United States and Israel over policies on Iran and Palestine serve as points of friction in the relationship. Clearly the U.S.-Turkey-Israel triangle has suffered many setbacks in recent years on all sides, but the Turkish-Israeli relationship has suffered the most, as it has been in a state of semi-paralysis for the last four years.

The watershed moment in this gradual process of deterioration between Ankara and Jerusalem is the Mavi Marmara incident of May 31, 2010, when Israeli commandos boarded a Turkish flotilla consisting of six vessels, among them the MV Mavi Marmara, headed from Turkish ports to Gaza to break the Israeli naval blockade. When activists resisted, using knives and metal bars, the commandos opened fire. Eight Turks and one Turkish-American were killed. 

Relations between Israel and Turkey were already sorely strained, but bilateral relations mostly collapsed following the incident, with a total disconnect and absence of a dialogue at the very senior levels.

This new paper, "The U.S.-Turkey-Israel Triangle," looks at the diplomatic ties among all three countries before, during and after this period. Dan Arbell suggests two closely intertwined conclusions: first, that good Turkish-Israeli relations are essential to the security and stability of the Middle East; and second, that U.S. leadership has come to play a central role in shaping–and often mediating–the Turkish-Israeli relationship. 

Other highlights from this paper include:

• The history of the relations between Turkey and Israel, developing gradually during the “early years” (1948-1992) and moving towards the “golden years” (1992-2008), during which a strategic partnership was forged between Turkey and Israel.
• The lessons learned and policy implications for the United States. 
• What diplomatic steps by the United States led to an apology from Prime Minister Netanyahu to Prime Minister (recently elected President) Erdoğan for the incident. 
• The key drivers in the Turkish-Israeli relationship, focusing on domestic and regional interests that inform geostrategic alliances in the region, including the Islamic Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
• How the two countries’ economic ties held together the Turkish-Israeli relationship, when political and diplomatic ties came practically to a standstill.
• Why it is important to consider a set of regional challenges, on which the two countries almost see eye to eye, that may provide the necessary glue for a future Israeli-Turkish normalization process.

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• The U.S.-Turkey-Israel Triangle

Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusolu’s decision earlier this month to decline to participate in the Munich Security Conference due to Israeli ministerial participation marks a new low in the troubled Turkish-Israeli relationship.

And yet, the latest statistics released this week by the Israeli government document an overall volume of $5.44 billion dollars in Turkish-Israeli trade during 2014. This marks an all-time high point in Turkish-Israeli economic relations, up 11.5 percent from 2013, including $2.75 billion in Israeli exports to Turkey (a 10 percent year-to-year increase) and $2.68 billion in Turkish imports to Israel (13 percent higher than 2013).

This pattern of an almost non-existent political dialogue at the senior levels accompanied by robust bilateral trade has characterized the Turkish-Israeli relationship since 2011. Short of unexpected dramatic changes, the relations between the two former allies will likely continue in this pattern for the foreseeable future. 

Almost two years after Israel’s official apology to Turkey over the Mavi Marmara incident (which I wrote about in depth here), the two countries continue to move in different directions, despite sharing similar strategic concerns on a range of regional issues – the civil war in Syria, instability in Iraq and Iran’s nuclear program.

The main bone of contention between the AKP-led Turkish government and the Likud-led government in Israel remains the Palestinian issue. Turkey continues to speak out against Israeli occupation and settlement activity in the West Bank, as well as on Israeli human rights violations towards the Palestinian population. In addition, Turkey remains one of the main (very few) patrons of Hamas, providing the group with political and economic support and allowing the organization to maintain representation in Istanbul. Israel viewed with disdain Turkish attempts, together with Qatar, to facilitate a ceasefire with Hamas during the summer 2014 war. Anti-Turkish sentiments in Israeli public opinion skyrocketed in response to President Erdogan’s allegations that Israeli policies on Gaza are genocidal. 

Amidst rising tensions in the relationship, President Erdogan publicly vowed after his August 2014 election that as long as he’s in power, Turkey’s approach to Israel will not change. As a result, there are no serious expectations that any senior-level political dialogue will resume, and mutual representation is likely to remain at a junior diplomatic level (after ambassadors were withdrawn from Tel Aviv and Ankara in 2011).

The interesting aspect of the relationship continues to be the booming trade between the two countries, which despite political tensions continues to grow at a rapid pace. Clearly there is an interest on both sides to insulate the economic sphere from the political sphere. Robust trade serves both countries’ economic interests and during a very unstable period keeps the relationship afloat. Nevertheless, an Israeli – Turkish natural gas deal which was considered in the past as a likely scenario and possibly a regional and bilateral “game changer” seems at present to be “off the table.” Potential energy cooperation between Turkey and Israel around the Eastern Mediterranean natural gas discoveries may be possible only in the context of political rapprochement. 

Event Information

Two of the United States' closest traditional allies in the Middle East, Israel and Turkey, have a tumultuous relationship. Once-strong relations soured in the last decade, with the Mavi Marmara flotilla incident in 2010 marking its nadir. Repeated attempts by the United States to mediate have helped move the parties closer together, but the gap is still wide, hindering regional security and impacting U.S. interests. Questions remain about whether the ties between the two former allies be mended and what role the United States can play in managing the relationship.

On March 23, in conjunction with the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, the Center for Middle East Policy (CMEP) at Brookings hosted a discussion examining the relationship between Israel and Turkey. The discussion built on an ongoing dialogue between the Israeli think tank Mitvim, and the Turkish Global Political Trends Center, sponsored by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, as well as ongoing work by Brookings experts.

Join the conversation on Twitter using #IsraelTurkey

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• Strained alliances: Israel, Turkey, and the United States

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• Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

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• 20150323_turkey_israel_transcript

Recent developments in Turkey and Israel—on energy security and domestic politics, in particular—may help pave the way for a long-awaited rapprochement between the two countries.

It’s been five and a half years since the May 2010 Israel raid on the Mavi Marmara (part of the Gaza flotilla), which soured relations between Ankara and Jerusalem. At present, they’re characterized by distrust and suspicion at the top level, personal animosity between the leaders, a limited dialogue between the two governments, and ambassadors yet to be appointed. However, trade is booming and Israeli tourists are flocking back to Turkish vacation destinations.

Wanted: Energy supply and cooperation on Syria

Turkey’s downing of a Russian SU-24 fighter jet along the Syrian border on November 24 has provoked crisis in its relationship with Russia, with Russian President Vladimir Putin characterizing Turkey’s action as “a stab in the back.” Extending beyond bilateral relations, that crisis affects Turkey’s foreign policy more broadly. For Turkey, the most critical element in this feud is its energy security. 

Turkey imports most of its natural gas from Russia, and the two sides have long been engaged in talks to expand this relationship through the proposed Turkish Stream natural gas pipeline, which would channel gas to Turkey and Europe underneath the Black Sea (circumventing Ukraine). But on November 26, Russian Minister of Development Alexi Ulyukayev announced the cancellation of the project, sending shock waves throughout Turkey. The move has prompted concerns among the Turkish leadership about the reliability of Russian gas and a corresponding search for alternative supplies in the region. In addition to discussions with Qatar and Azerbaijan, there have been more statements in recent weeks from Turkish politicians, energy companies, and others calling for talks with Israel about future natural gas imports.

The Syrian crisis is another issue on which Turkey may seek quiet Israeli support—particularly the support of Israeli intelligence, which may prove crucial to Turkish war efforts.

Politically, the timing could be convenient: the Justice and Development Party (AKP)-led government could approach Israel and begin talks where they left off nearly two years ago. The dust has settled over the November 2015 elections and the AKP is not facing any serious domestic political challenges in the near future. The ball is now in President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s court. He commented to reporters in Paris on November 30 that he believes he’s “able to fix ties” with Israel, hinting at his willingness to move forward. He then stated on December 13 that the “region definitely needs” Turkish-Israeli normalization, citing previous Turkish demands for compensation to the families of the victims of the Mavi Marmara incident as well as the lifting of the Gaza blockade as his conditions for normalization.

Wanted: Energy demand and cooperation on Syria

From Jerusalem’s perspective, Israeli energy security may provide a “fig leaf” for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government to reach out to Turkey. Netanyahu and his cabinet have been stuck for nearly a year in attempts to approve and launch a compromise between the government and the gas companies (Delek and Noble) to begin the crucial phase of development of Israel’s largest Eastern Mediterranean gas field, Leviathan. About to clear the last hurdle before launching the deal, Netanyahu is under pressure to demonstrate the national security benefits of developing the gas. In this context, he and the Minister of Energy Yuval Steinitz have said that Turkey is being seriously considered as a future export destination. In a Knesset hearing, Netanyahu went even further by revealing that Israel has recently been engaged in discussions with Turkey to further explore the export option. 

The Syrian crisis provides Israel another reason to engage with Turkey. Israel is quite weary of the situation in Syria and may benefit from Turkish analysis and intelligence on this issue. 

Politically, Netanyahu will not face problems within his narrow coalition if he decides to warm up relations with Turkey. Former Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman, a staunch critic of Turkey and its leadership, is no longer in office. The recently appointed Chief of Mossad (currently National Security Advisor) Yossi Cohen, in contrast, is known to be a proponent of closer ties between Israel and Turkey. 

Re-friending?

Official visits between the two sides have been increasing: in June, Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Director General Dore Gold and his Turkish counterpart Feridun Sinirlioğlu met in Rome; in September, Professor Guven Sak (the head of the government-supported research institute of the Turkish industrialists and businessmen, TEPAV) led the first official visit to Israel by a Turkish political delegation; on December 3, Israeli news outlet NRG reported on a visit by Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Deputy Director General for Europe, Aviv Shiron's visit to Ankara and Istanbul in an attempt to warm relations between the two countries. 

There is no love lost between Israel and Turkey, and many issues still need to be resolved. Erdoğan has stated his conditions for normalization, and Netanyahu is reportedly insisting that Turkey expel Hamas operative Saleh al-Arouri (who has been directing Hamas terrorist activities in the West Bank) from its territory, as a condition. However, the current convergence of interests may pave the way to a resolution of the crisis between these two former strategic allies. In March 2013, President Obama helped orchestrate a formal Israeli apology to Turkey over the Mavi Marmara incident. Moving forward, more American senior-level diplomacy is needed. The United States—which has been active behind the scenes—will likely need to further push the two sides toward one another.