Disputes between international companies and national governments commonly arise in the extractive industry where high expectations from producer countries often run alongside emotive issues of ‘ownership’ and ‘exploitation’. In 2013, Chatham House published the report Conflict and Coexistence in the Extractives Industries, examining the rising occurrence of long-running and expensive company-government disputes. Continuing the conversation, the speakers will share their personal insights regarding doing business in Africa's oil and gas sector and preparing for crisis situations. They will outline why they believe the effective management of any crisis is critical to achieving an early settlement and why arbitration is the best formal mechanism for resolving disputes in Africa. They will also discuss what the preconditions of success are, and how companies must adjust to new commercial and political realities when engaging with national companies. 

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

This paper accompanies a series of Chatham House assessments on China, France, Japan, the Netherlands, the UK, the US and Vietnam and provides details on how the estimates of the level of illegality of imports of wood-based products into those countries were derived. The assessments are part of a research project that monitored levels of illegal logging and related trade in selected consumer, producer and processing countries in order to evaluate the effectiveness of efforts to tackle this problem.

The paper describes the methodology for estimating the levels of wood-based products at high risk of illegality that are being imported into consumer and processing countries. The methodology was developed in order to provide quantitative estimates of the scale of such imports and to assess how they have changed over time. The figures adopted for the assessments are based on the best available evidence; but, given the challenges of quantifying levels of illegal logging and the limited information available for some countries, they should not be regarded as definitive. Rather, they indicate the likely levels of illegality and, perhaps more important, how they may have changed over time.

This paper is part of a broader Chatham House study which assesses illegal logging and the associated trade. 

The Vietnamese government has made some progress towards tackling illegal logging and the associated trade. It has negotiated a voluntary partnership agreement (VPA) with the EU, a process that has prompted a review of relevant legislation and improved the government’s engagement with civil society. In addition, it has signed agreements with Lao PDR and Cambodia in which it has committed to coordination on forest management and trade. However, there has been little progress in policy reform, and there is still no legislation regulating illegal timber imports.

There is a high level of awareness of illegal logging and associated trade within the private sector: Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) chain-of-custody (CoC) certification has increased rapidly, particularly in the furniture sector. But efforts are hampered by poor access to third-party verified raw material.

Both trade data discrepancies and analysis of trade flows indicate that illegal trade remains a serious problem. The volume of imports of wood-based products at a high risk of illegality is estimated to have increased since 2000, while its share in the volume of total imports of wood-based products gradually declined until 2009 and then increased slightly: they are estimated to have comprised 18 per cent of the total by volume in 2013.

In order to build on its response to illegal logging and related trade, the government should establish a legal responsibility for Vietnamese importers to ensure that their timber sources are legal. Furthermore, to increase domestic demand for legal products, it should establish a public procurement policy requiring the use of verified legal products. Within the framework of the VPA, broad and effective multi-stakeholder engagement will be vital to ensure that a robust timber legality assurance system is developed. In addition, proactive partnerships should be forged with high-risk supply countries to establish legality criteria and indicators that reflect the full scope of the relevant legislation in those countries.

As part of the international dialogue on Valuing Vital Resources, this seminar will convene policy-makers, scholars, technical practitioners, NGOs, multilateral agencies and the media to discuss recommendations for new policy approaches in India to reorient energy and water use in agriculture. The aim is to gain input to practical policy proposals and identify the work now needed to make them robust. 

Attendance is by invitation only. Please note this event is held in New Delhi, all times are local. 

This event is organized together with the CUTS Institute for Regulation & Competition (CIRC).

Summary

• This paper challenges the view that the ‘resource curse’ – for which so many academics found evidence in previous decades – has now been laid to rest.
• During the commodities boom of the past decade, a number of influential policy and corporate institutions have encouraged poor countries to capitalize on below-ground resources for economic growth and development. The key assumption is that improved management of the extractives sector will enable it to spearhead positive national development and avoid resource curse effects such as declining global competitiveness in the rest of the economy and a widening wealth gap. This assumption continues to influence governance advice and country investment choices.
• The extractives-led growth agenda promoted by donors and international advisers in multilateral banks, consultancies and some development agencies has tended to reinforce domestic, government and investor pressures to pursue a ‘fast-track’ approach to extractives projects. This appears logical, given the obvious benefits of foreign-investment inflows and export revenues for countries suffering from poverty, lack of infrastructure and high levels of indebtedness.
• However, there is an urgent need to re-evaluate whether the policy advice stemming from this agenda can serve as an antidote to the negative effects identified in the resource-curse literature. First, there is often a mismatch between governance advice given and the capacity of countries to follow it. Second, the global context has changed: exporters are suffering as a result of the current downturn in commodity prices, while reliance on the sale of high-carbon fuels is challenged by the global shift to lower-carbon technologies and energy efficiency.
• Extractive revenues should not be viewed as income to be consumed, but as representing a reshuffling of the national portfolio of assets. Converting extractive resources below ground into cash above ground raises key questions about how this cash can be deployed to create productive assets for the future which do not rely on depletable resources.
• Diversification of the economy away from the resource sector over an appropriate timeframe remains a key priority. In many cases, this will require slower development of projects to allow time for institutional capacity in government and the private sector to develop.
• More economic and governance capacity needs to be in place before investment begins in a project, to enable investment and eventual revenues to generate real benefits to the rest of the economy, as well as appropriate, sustainable diversification.

Executive summary

China’s new role in the global governance of natural resources is coming to the fore against a backdrop of profound uncertainty, driven by the convergence of three interlinked trends. At home, China’s leaders are navigating the structural shift to slower but higher-quality growth, a phase of development referred to as the ‘new normal’, while facing considerable environmental and resource security challenges. Globally, the slowdown in China’s economy has sent reverberations through commodity markets, pulling the plug on the decade-long commodities ‘super cycle’. Meanwhile, China is taking on a growing role in global governance, from the G20 and multilateral development banks, to its regional partnerships in Latin America and Africa.

During the resources boom of the last decade, policy-makers and businesses in consumer countries were focused on high and volatile resource prices. The risks posed by resource nationalism in producer countries were seen in the proliferation of export restrictions and the increase in investment disputes. Today, the tables have turned, leaving producer countries facing economic pressure from falling revenues and investments. Many organizations have called on governments to phase out subsidies for fossil fuels and other natural resources while prices are low. The international policy debate is shifting to the immediate challenges presented by a massive oversupply of many energy and mineral commodities, and the longer-term risk of ‘stranded assets’.

These new resource realities will provide the context for China’s growing global role, as well as setting the tenor of its relations with producer countries. Over the past decade, narratives around China often focused on its real or perceived impacts from resource production overseas and consumption at home. In the next, China’s approach to resource security and sustainability will help define its reputation, and whether it is perceived as a responsible actor on the world stage and as a development partner. The collection of international narratives, norms, rules and organizations that currently guides resource production, trade and consumption – what we call ‘global resource governance' in this report – will provide the framework.

Much political leadership will be required to overcome the barriers to China assuming a more active role in global resource governance. On the one hand, there has been slow progress in expanding China’s role in organizations from the World Bank to the International Energy Agency (IEA). On the other, new instruments or processes initiated by China can be seen as a challenge to the existing rules-based order, as the US reaction to the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) demonstrated. Yet developments such as the US–China Joint Presidential Statement on Climate Change in September 2015, ahead of the Paris Climate Conference, show that it is possible to forge cooperation and boost the prospects for progress on public goods at the multilateral level, even in politically fraught areas.

China’s international role on natural resources is also closely tied to ongoing reforms at home. The introduction of ‘ecological civilization’ as a guiding principle for China’s development at the Communist Party’s 17th Congress in 2007 marked a recognition of the need not only to address China’s domestic challenges such as air quality and water scarcity but also shift to an environmentally sustainable model of economic development. In 2015 China’s leaders set out the key incentives, accountability and mechanisms to deliver the ecological civilization in China’s 13th Five-Year Plan. Central elements of this vision, such as building sustainable cities, pursuing environmentally-friendly economic growth and developing the circular economy will have major impacts on China’s future resource consumption and import needs.

Globally, the speed and scale of the economic realignments have taken most experts and policy-makers by surprise – in many respects, China’s new normal is the world’s new normal. The greatest challenge that China’s government faces is managing a shift to slower but higher-quality growth. It is clear that the ramifications of this reach far beyond the confines of the Chinese economy or global commodity markets; yet the situation remains fluid and the nature of a new equilibrium is difficult to predict. This only makes it more urgent to consider the strategic and practical options available to policy-makers, both in China and around the world.

This report is the result of two years of joint research between Chatham House and the Development Research Center of the State Council (DRC), including six expert workshops in China and conversations with international organizations. It discusses key policy areas in global resource governance as they relate to China – in light of recent falls in commodity prices, China’s shifting economic situation, and its growing global role in the ‘new normal’. The scope of the research is limited to non-renewable energy, metals and mineral resources; throughout this report, the term ‘resources’ refers to these commodities. Other traded commodities such as agricultural goods are not included, and land, water and air are discussed only in the context of their important linkages with energy and metals. 

The report considers the costs and benefits of a more active role for China in global resources governance. It recognizes that different commodities face different challenges and require different governance frameworks, and that different regions require context-specific responses. The report also considers the risks of more limited engagement of China and other new actors, which could mean declining relevance for existing processes and institutions that govern resource production, trade and consumption, and a diminished capacity to tackle longer-term challenges like climate change.

The measures taken to limit the spread of the coronavirus - in particular social distancing -  come with significant economic costs, as the drop both in demand for goods and services and in supply due to workers being at home sick will create a short-term economic shock not seen in modern times.

Sectors that are usually less affected by regular economic swings such as transport and tourism are being confronted with an almost total collapse in demand. In the airline sector, companies are warning they might only be able to hold out for a few months more.

Building on the calls to provide income support to all citizens and shore up businesses, European leaders should now be giving explicit permission to the European Central Bank (ECB) to provide whatever financial support is needed.

Although political leaders have responded to the economic threat, the measures announced across the continent have mainly been to support businesses. The crisis is broader and deeper than the current response.

Support for weaker governments

The ECB already reacted to COVID-19 by announcing measures to support the banking system, which is important to guarantee the continuity of the European financial system and to ensure financially weaker European governments do not have to confront a failing banking system as well.

Although government-subsidised reduced working hours and sick pay are a solution for many businesses and workers, crucially they are not for those working on temporary contracts or the self-employed. They need direct income support.

This might come down to instituting something that looks like a universal basic income (UBI), and ensuring money keeps flowing through the economy as much as possible to help avoid a cascade of defaults and significant long-term damage.

But while this is likely to be the most effective remedy to limit the medium-term impact on the economy, it is particularly costly. Just as an indication, total compensation of employees was on average around €470bn per month in the eurozone last year.

Attempting to target payments using existing welfare payment channels would reduce costs, but is difficult to implement and runs the risk of many households and businesses in need missing out.

The increase in spending and lost revenue associated with these support measures dwarf the fiscal response to the 2008-09 financial crisis. The eurozone economy could contract by close to 10% this year and budget deficits are likely be in double digits throughout the bloc.

The European Commission has already stated member states are free to spend whatever is necessary to combat the crisis, which is not surprising given the Stability and Growth Pact - which includes the fiscal rules - allows for such eventualities.

Several eurozone countries do probably have the fiscal space to deal with this. Countries such as Germany and the Netherlands have run several years of balanced budgets recently and significantly decreased their debt levels. For countries such as Italy, and even France, it is a different story and the combination of much higher spending and a collapse in tax revenue is more likely to lead to questions in the market over the sustainability of their debt levels. In order to avoid this, the Covid-19 response must be financed collectively.

The Eurogroup could decide to use the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) to provide states with the funds, while suitably ditching the political conditionality that came with previous bailout. But the ESM currently has €410bn in remaining lending capacity, which is unlikely to be enough and difficult to rapidly increase.

So this leaves the ECB to pick up the tab of national governments’ increase in spending, as the only institution with effectively unlimited monetary firepower. But a collective EU response is complicated by the common currency, and particularly by the role of the ECB.

The ECB can’t just do whatever it likes and is limited more than other major central banks in its room for manoeuvre. It does have a programme to buy government bonds but this relies on countries agreeing to a rescue programme within the context of the ESM, with all the resulting political difficulties.

There are two main ways that the ECB could finance the response to the crisis. First, it could buy up more or all bonds issued by the member states. A first step in this direction would be to scrap the limits on the bonds it can buy. Through self-imposed rules, the ECB can only buy up to a third of every country’s outstanding public debt. There are good reasons for this in normal times, but these are not normal times. With the political blessing of the European Council, the Eurosystem of central banks could then start buying bonds issued by governments to finance whatever expenditure they deem necessary to combat the crisis.

Secondly, essentially give governments an overdraft with the ECB or the national central banks. Although a central bank lending directly to governments is outlawed by the European treaties, the COVID-19 crisis means these rules should be temporarily suspended by the European Council.

Back in 2012, the then president of the ECB, Mario Draghi, proclaimed the ECB would do whatever it takes, within its mandate, to save the euro, which was widely seen as a crucial step towards solving the eurozone crisis. The time is now right for eurozone political leaders to explicitly tell the ECB that together they can do whatever it takes to save the eurozone economy through direct support for businesses and households.