Amid anger and protests in Baltimore following the death of 25-year-old Freddie Gray from a spinal injury sustained after being arrested by police, much of the discussion has focused on the poverty-ridden neighborhood in which Gray grew up (Sandtown-Winchester, on the city’s west side). Conversation has centered around the economic disadvantages that Gray, his peers, and so many young adults are facing in certain neighborhoods throughout Baltimore and in other U.S. metro areas.

Metropolitan Policy Program Fellow Jennifer Vey spoke yesterday with CNN’s Maggie Lake on the poverty and economic inequality prevalent in Baltimore—particularly in impoverished neighborhoods like that of Gray’s and throughout the country.

In the interview, Vey says that, “it’s important to look at the events of the last few days in Baltimore against a backdrop of poverty, of entrenched joblessness, of social disconnectedness that’s prevalent in many Baltimore neighborhoods…but that isn’t unique to Baltimore, and I think that’s a really important point here, that we really need to put these issues in a much broader national context.

“I think what this really indicates is we’ve been operating under an economic model for quite some time that clearly isn’t working for large numbers of people in this country.”

Vey also discusses how we can work to break the cycle:

“What we’re really focused on at Brookings is trying to understand how cities and metropolitan areas can really be trying to grow the types of advanced industries that create good jobs, that create more jobs, and also focusing on how then, people can connect back to that economy. What can we do to make sure that more people are participating in that economic growth as it happens?”

She goes on to say that investment in education, workforce programs, and infrastructure are all key in incorporating everyone into a prosperous economy.

To learn more about poverty in Baltimore, read this piece by Karl Alexander.

The United Nations will convene a major international conference on Financing for Development (FfD) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia from July 13 to 16, 2015, to discuss financing for the post-2015 agenda on sustainable development. This conference, the third of its kind, will hope to replicate the success of the Monterrey conference in 2002 that has been credited with providing the glue to bind countries to the pursuit of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

The analogy is pertinent but should not be taken too far. The most visible part of the Monterrey Consensus was the commitment by rich countries to “make concrete efforts towards the target of 0.7 percent of gross national product” as official development assistance (ODA). This was anchored in a clear premise that “each country has primary responsibility for its own economic and social development,” which includes support for market-oriented policies that encourage the private sector. While not all of the Monterrey targets have been met, there has been a considerable increase in resources flowing to developing countries, as a central plank of efforts to achieve the MDGs.

Today, aid issues remain pivotal for a significant number of countries, but they are less relevant for an even larger number of countries. The core principles of Monterrey need to be reaffirmed again in 2015, but if the world is to follow-through on a universal sustainable development agenda, it must address the multi-layered financing priorities spanning all countries. A simple “30-30-130” mnemonic helps to illustrate the point. There are 193 U.N. member states. Of these, only around 30 are still low-income countries (33 at the latest count). These are the economies that are, and will continue to be, the most heavily dependent on aid as the world looks to how it should implement the sustainable development goals (SDGs). Conversely, there are only around 30 “donor” countries (including 28 members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee, or DAC) that have made international commitments to provide more aid. For the remaining 130 or so emerging middle-income economies that have achieved higher levels of average prosperity, aid discussions risk forming a sideshow to the real issues that constrain their pursuit of sustainable development. The bottom line is that for most countries, the Financing for Development conference should unlock finance from many different sources, including but not exclusively aid, to implement the SDGs.

Addis will take place in the context of sluggish global growth, an upsurge in conflict, considerable strains in multilateral 2 political cooperation, and challenging ODA prospects in many countries.

There are other differences between Addis and Monterrey. Monterrey took place after agreement had been reached on the MDGs, while Addis will precede formal agreement on the SDGs by a few months. Monterrey was focused on a government-to-government agreement, while Addis should be relevant to a far larger number of stakeholders—including businesses, academics, civil society, scientists, and local authorities. Monterrey was held against a backdrop of general optimism about the global economy and widespread desire for intensified international collaboration following the terrorist events of September 11, 2001. Meanwhile, Addis will take place in the context of sluggish global growth, an upsurge in conflict, considerable strains in multilateral political cooperation, and challenging ODA prospects in many countries. In addition, regulators are working to reduce risk-taking by large financial institutions, increasing the costs of providing long-term capital to developing countries.

Against this backdrop, an Intergovernmental Committee of Experts on Sustainable Development Finance (ICESDF) crafted a report for the United Nations on financing options for sustainable development. The report provides an excellent overview of issues and the current state of global financing, and presents over 100 recommendations. But it falls short on prescribing the most important priorities and action steps on which leaders should focus at Addis.

This paper seeks to identify such a priority list of actions, with emphasis on the near-term deliverables that could instigate critical changes in trajectories towards 2030. At the same time, the paper does not aim to describe the full range of outcomes that need to be in place by roughly 2025 in order to achieve the SDGs by their likely deadline of 2030. Addis will be a critical forum to provide political momentum to a few of the many useful efforts already underway on improving global development finance. Time is short, so there is limited ability to introduce new topics or ideas or to build consensus where none already exists.

We identify three criteria for identifying top priorities for agreement in Addis:

• Priorities should draw from, and build on, on-going work—including the ICESDF report and the outputs „„of several other international workstreams on finance that are underway.
• Agreements should have significant consequences for successful implementation of the SDGs at the coun„„try, regional or global level.
• Recommendations should be clearly actionable, with next steps in implementation that are easy to under„„stand and easy to confirm when completed.

It is not necessary (or desirable) that every important topic be resolved in Addis. In practical terms, negotiators face two groups of issues. First are those on which solutions can be negotiated in time for the July conference. Second are those for which the problems are too complex to be solved by July, but which are still crucial to be resolved over the coming year or two if the SDGs are to be achieved. For this second group of issues, the intergovernmental agreement can set specific timetables for resolving each problem at hand. There is some precedent for this, including in the 2005 U.N. World Summit, which included timetables for some commitments. What is most critical is that the moment be used to anchor and advance processes that will shift toward creating a global financing system for achieving sustainable development across all countries. Committing to timetables for action and building on reforms already undertaken could be important ways of enhancing the credibility of new agreements.

In this paper, we lay out nine areas where we believe important progress can be made. In each area, we start from identifying a gap or issue that could present an obstacle to the successful implementation of the SDGs if left unattended. In some cases the gaps will affect all countries, in other cases only a subset of countries. But we believe that the package of actions, taken as a whole, reflects a balance of opportunities, responsibilities and benefits for all countries. We also believe that by making the discussion issue-focused, the needs for financing can be balanced with policy actions that will be required to make sure financing is effectively and efficiently deployed.

In addition to the nine areas listed below, there are other commitments already made which have not yet been met. We urge renewed efforts to meet these commitments, but also recognize that political and financial realities must be managed to make progress. Such commitments include meeting the Monterrey Consensus target to provide 0.7 percent of GNI in official development assistance (ODA), the May 2005 agreement of all EC-15 countries to reach that target by 2015, and bringing the Doha Development Round of trade talks to a successful conclusion. These remain important and relevant, but in this paper we choose to focus on new areas and fresh ideas so as to avoid treading over well-worn territory again.

Should increasing exports be part of the solution to Greater Cleveland's -- and the nation's -- economic doldrums? Can export growth make this recovery job-filled rather than jobless?

That's a counterintuitive proposition, but one that is gaining traction in Northeast Ohio. Cleveland, Youngstown and other metros often see themselves on the losing end of globalization, as manufacturing has moved abroad and trade barriers and currency manipulations impede the entry of U.S.-made goods into foreign markets.

But exports bring tremendous benefits to workers, companies and the nation as a whole. Exporting companies tend to be more innovative. They pay higher wages across all skill levels. And they are a response to a new global reality: 95 percent of the world's customers live outside the United States.

Any successful export strategy, including the one that the Obama administration is developing, must start with where U.S. exports come from. Our major metropolitan areas are the nation's export hubs. In 2008, they produced about 64 percent of U.S. exports, including more than 62 percent of manufactured goods and 75 percent of services.

Northeast Ohio's major metros are leaders in exports, oriented toward global consumers in a way that most American regions are not. Exports contribute more than 12 percent of the gross metropolitan product in Akron, 13 percent in Cleveland, and a jaw-dropping 18 percent in Youngstown, compared to a national metro average of 10.9 percent.

Exports are also a source of much-needed jobs in these metros. As of 2008 (the most recent year for which we have data) there were 110,000 export jobs in the Cleveland metro and about 30,000 each in greater Akron and Youngstown. Every $1 billion in exports from the average metropolitan area in 2008 supported 5,800 jobs.

To leverage the powerful export activity already occurring in Cleveland and elsewhere, the Obama administration should connect its macroeconomic vision for export growth with the metro reality where the doubling will mostly occur.

For example, the president's export advisory council should include state and local leaders, and revamp export guidance and support to meet the needs of small firms, which find it hard to enter new markets.

But Northeast Ohio metros have their own work to do. The rate of export growth between 2003 and 2008 in Cleveland and Akron is lackluster when compared to the large metro average. U.S. companies dominate the global market in service exports, and the nation actually has a generous service trade surplus, but service exports' share of overall output in Northeast Ohio metros is smaller than the large metro average, and growth in service exports is slower.

Most troubling, Cleveland and its neighbors are underperforming when it comes to innovation, which is a critical ingredient for future international success. Metros that are manufacturing-oriented or export-intensive (or both) tend to create patents at a rate of just over five patents per 1,000 workers. But Cleveland, Akron and Youngstown fall short, with 2.8, 4.5, and 1 patent per 1,000 workers, respectively.

Northeast Ohio must accelerate its efforts to increase the region's innovation and export capacity, through regional organizations such as NorTech and JumpStart. Just as the president set an export goal for the nation, Northeast Ohio should embrace the opportunity to set its own aggressive export goals. Business groups, the Fund for Our Economic Future, universities and regional economic development organizations have made a start but need to devote more resources and collaborate to achieve those goals.

The region can make this happen. Organizations like the Manufacturing and Advocacy and Growth Network (MAGNET) and its partners, with support from the Fund and chambers, are working directly with companies to increase manufacturing innovation in Northeast Ohio, with increasing exports one of their major emphases.

China’s approach to Europe is a contrasting mix of economic opportunism and strategic vision.

A continent gripped by economic weakness and debt is crying out for Chinese investment, and Chinese state enterprises and funds are eagerly participating in the sale of the century, buying up ports, prime real estate and technology firms from Greece to the U.K.

At the same time, Beijing views Europe as the terminus for its massively ambitious “One Belt, One Road” project – a string of ports, logistics hubs and other trading infrastructure stretching all the way from Southeast Asia to the north of England.

Yet a populist backlash against China is building in Europe: recent street demonstrations by European workers over Chinese steel dumping have highlighted the risks of a relationship that increasingly looks troubled.

In their book “China’s Offensive in Europe,” Philippe Le Corre, a visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution, and Alain Sepulchre, a senior adviser with BCG in Hong Kong, analyze China’s rapidly expanding footprint on the continent — and what it means in global terms. They set out some of their thinking in a written Q&A with China Real Time:

You title your book “China’s Offensive in Europe.” This sounds somewhat alarming. Should we be worried?

It may have sounded slightly alarming a few years ago, but China’s economic intentions toward Europe are not just about creating jobs and value: they are about spreading influence on a weakened and somewhat divided continent (the U.K. being perhaps the most obvious example) that is also far away from the U.S., the country seen by China as the ultimate competitor. Europe is part of “the West” where China is willing to leave more than footprints.

Overall, how do you assess the relationship between the EU and China? What are the opportunities and the risks?

On one hand, China has offered to take part in major EU projects such as the European Strategic Investment Fund, launched by the European Commission to relaunch European infrastructure. It will probably become the biggest non-European stakeholder in the ESIF. But on the other hand, there is an attempt by China to divide the EU at various levels. A typical example is the “16+1” group created by China and sixteen Eastern and Central European countries in 2011. Once a year, leaders of these countries meet with Chinese Premier Li Keqiang. Last year in Suzhou, they also met with President Xi Jinjping. Seven countries signed memorandums of understanding with China on “one-belt, one-road.” Three of them hosted Mr. Xi recently, and were offered substantial Chinese investment promises. China has also tried to establish similar platforms with Southern Europe and Nordic countries, so far without success, but there is a risk that a large number of smaller countries (some of them non-EU members, a good example being Serbia which is getting a Chinese-made high-speed railway) will take a separate approach from the rest of Europe when dealing with China. This is not what Europe needs now.

How coordinated is Chinese investment in Europe? Is there a master plan in Beijing?

There is no “master plan” to take over Europe. First, Europe was part of the “China goes out” [investment] policy in the late 1990s. It then started accelerating with opportunities in 2008-2009 during the euro-debt crisis (and thanks to a favorable exchange rate), when China bought eurobonds and started buying into European infrastructure such as Athens’ Piraeus Harbor (which it now controls). Now, Chinese investment is taking a different dimension through the cultivation of individual European countries via the “one belt, one road” initiative as was demonstrated by Mr. Xi’s visits to the Czech Republic in May, and to Poland and Serbia more recently. Although many aspects of OBOR remain unclear, Europe is definitely a final destination for this project.

Would “Brexit” make the U.K. a less attractive destination for Chinese capital?

As a financial center, London would remain attractive to Chinese investors who would still use it as an renminbi trading hub – but they would also use Frankfurt, Paris and Luxembourg, where they have started trading, too. As for the British market, it would be treated as a medium-sized economy with some prospects but a much less important group than the 450-million consumer common market. For all its flaws, the EU is a powerful trade block with clear interlocutors on issues of importance to China, such as the Market Economy Status. Finally, it is not clear if the U.K. would remain a top destination for Chinese investments. Real estate is one thing, but projects such as the “Northern Power House,” a massive development plan in the north of England, have little chance to receive Chinese financial support if the U.K. votes to exit the EU on Thursday.

Chinese companies are on a buying spree in Europe. This is good news for job creation, yet it also creates anxiety, particularly in Germany, about the loss of key technologies. How do you see this playing out?

Overall, the mood within European elites is about welcoming Chinese investments providing they play the European way. So far Chinese investors have been targeting primarily nonsensitive sectors or companies in financial trouble. The case of [German robot maker Kuka being acquired by Chinese home appliance giant Midea] is quite unique as it involves some specific high-tech content in a sector which is of huge potential. The fact that the Chinese acquirer is perceived as low-tech and very aggressive in its domestic and international expansion strengthens the anti-China Inc. feeling.

Is there a danger of a real populist backlash in Europe against perceived unfair Chinese trading practices, including steel dumping?

It is already happening with the recent (nonbinding, but overwhelming) vote on May 12 by the European Parliament against granting market economy status to China by the end of 2016. Members of the European Parliament are directly elected by the European people, and they reflect the continent’s worries over unfair trade practices from China. These are sensitive times in Europe, and China’s message is obviously not popular with European grassroots where people worry about jobs and the future of the continent’s economy.

What is behind the debate on giving China market economy status?

It is a complicated issue for Europeans as the EU itself is based on the rule of law. In this case, the law is the 2001 World Trade Organization agreement that says that China should receive MES by December 2016. Economics and politics are two other factors European leaders cannot avoid: both France and Germany are facing general elections in 2017 and populism is on the rise everywhere. It would be suicidal to grant the status to China now, as almost none of the criteria to be a market economy have been met – except perhaps the upcoming deadline. A compromise will be needed with mitigating measures at the very least, and in the current political context, it will obviously take time.

Europe complains that while its markets are wide open to Chinese investment, China is closing up. German Chancellor Angela Merkel has called for greater reciprocity. How can China be persuaded to level the playing field?

European cumulative overseas direct investment into China is far bigger than what China has been investing so far into Europe. China is still considered an emerging market, typically showing some kind of protectionism. At the same time, China is often not sympathetic to reciprocity be it in politics or business. Two ways could be considered to pressure China. One way – as we have just heard from Chancellor Merkel – is to be offensive by blocking some Chinese investments in deemed sensitive areas (similarly to what is taking place in the US through the CFIUS mechanism) and by finding alternative suitors to firms like Kuka that China wants to acquire. Another way would be to use the pan-European card. In many cases, European businesses and / or political bodies have been battling each other for Chinese investments. This has been going on for years, and it is time for Europeans to partner vis-a-vis China.

On her recent visits to China, Ms. Merkel has spoken out strongly on issues from human rights to the South China Sea. This compares quite markedly with the approach to China adopted by Britain, which tends to avoid sensitive issues. What accounts for Ms. Merkel’s frankness?

There is still a Chinese fascination for Germany’s economic and technological model, which has no equivalent in Europe. Although the German trade surplus with China is shrinking, many German industrial brands are recognized and vastly respected in China (Audi, Siemens, BMW, BASF…). German technology and brands give Germany an incentive. In addition, Ms. Merkel, who has been in power for almost 11 years, is seen by Beijing as Europe’s clear leader. David Cameron is only considered as his country’s prime minister, with little influence on decisions taken within the EU. The fact Ms. Merkel has spoken frankly and repeatedly about sensitive issues has not weakened her – it is the opposite. A good lesson for others, perhaps?

What is the experience so far of European companies bought by Chinese firms?

The experience so far has been a mixed bag. On the workforce front, most companies have been expanding rather than the opposite, but some have been downsizing their labor force at least initially. A typical challenge lies more at the top management / governance level: Chinese owners tend to over-manage or under-manage dispatching too many or too few skilled managers, governing too tightly or too loosely. The right balance has not been found yet. The most ‘non value-added’ factor is probably on the transfer of technology side. In many instances, Chinese investors have not been able to fully leverage the European technology content into their domestic operations. 

This interview originally appeared in the Wall Street Journal. 

Editors’ Note: Outgoing British Prime Minister David Cameron once proudly stated that "there is no country in the Western world more open to Chinese investment than Britain." What will happen to the Sino-British relationship now that the U.K. will almost certainly leave the EU? This post originally appeared in the Nikkei Asia Review.

One of the many side effects of the June 23 British referendum on the European Union is that it will put an end to a honeymoon that had barely started less than a year ago, when George Osborne, the U.K.'s chancellor of the exchequer, declared on the eve of Chinese President Xi Jinping's state visit to Britain: "Let's stick together and make a golden decade for both our countries." Much has happened since the visit, during which Xi was feted as a guest of honor by Queen Elizabeth II at Buckingham Palace and at the British Parliament.

Over the past three years, British Prime Minister David Cameron and Osborne, (the man in effect running the country's China policy), seem to have partly anticipated the referendum's outcome by partnering with a few Asian countries outside the European Union—China especially—that would help finance some of the major infrastructure projects needed by the U.K., including nuclear plants, high-speed railways and airport infrastructure.

Now, in the turmoil following the referendum, Cameron is on the way out and Osborne's future remains uncertain. What will happen to the Sino-British relationship now that the U.K. will almost certainly leave the EU? Initial signals from China have been subdued. Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying recently said she believed that the impact of Brexit will be at all levels—not only in relations between China and Britain.

"China supports the European integration process and would like to see Europe playing a proactive role in international affairs. We have full confidence in the outlook for the development of China-EU ties," she said. This is a far cry from the enthusiastic comments in Chinese media on the Sino-British relationship in 2015, when Britain decided—much to the chagrin of Washington, Tokyo, Berlin and Paris—to be the first Western country to join the China-backed Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and when it hosted Xi, hoping to attract massive Chinese foreign direct investment.

Cameron had proudly stated that "there is no country in the Western world more open to Chinese investment than Britain." The U.K. is currently Europe's top destination for Chinese FDI with a cumulative investment of $16.6 billion in the country since 2000 (including $3.3 billion in 2015 alone), and many memoranda of understanding signed during Xi's visit last fall. Will these be completed now that the British people have voted to leave the EU? A few months ago, Wang Jianlin, the head of China's Dalian Wanda Group—a commercial property and cinema chain operator—and a major investor in Europe warned: "Should Britain exit the EU, many Chinese companies would consider moving their European headquarters to other countries," adding that "Brexit would not be a smart choice for the U.K., as it would create more obstacles and challenges for investors and visa problems."

The Global Times, an English-language publication that is part of the Chinese Communist Party's People's Daily, was even less sympathetic to the British situation, writing in an editorial after the referendum, that the vote would "probably be a landmark event that proves Britain is heading in the direction of being a small country with few people, writing itself off as hopeless and acting recklessly."

The Beijing leadership—which uniquely went out of its way to support the Remain camp on several occasions—is puzzled by the referendum's result, which has not only created some disorder (an unbearable word in official party language) but also led to the resignation of the country's prime minister and the risk of further pro-autonomy referenda (namely, in Scotland). In the eyes of a communist party fully focused on retaining all its powers, Cameron made a serious mistake as the leader of a major country.

After all, China has no soft intentions toward the U.K. The two countries have had a complicated history. The Chinese still call the period starting in the mid-1800s— which included the British-led Opium Wars—the "century of humiliation." And it has only been 19 years since Hong Kong was returned to the motherland as a Chinese "special administrative region (SAR)." Not that the Cameron government has done very much to support its former territory: As the "golden decade" was unfolding, Hong Kong faced one of its most difficult times, with arrests of dissidents and the disappearance of some booksellers—including Lee Bo, who holds dual Sino-British citizenship and had published controversial books about Chinese leaders.

Now that British voters have spoken, chances of a backlash are running high. For a start, China is keen on keeping close involvement with the EU—its second-largest trading partner after the U.S., a source of technology transfers, and an ally in Beijing's "One Belt, One Road" projects in Europe and Asia, or in initiatives such as the AIIB and the country' Silk Road fund. In this respect China will almost certainly want to continue its close partnership with both EU institutions and individual countries, especially in Eastern and Central Europe where "One Belt, One Road" has been warmly welcomed. (Two countries recently visited by Xi, Poland and the Czech Republic, received substantial financial commitments from the Chinese president.)

London will, of course, continue to play a key role in finance as one of the world's top international trading platforms with Chinese treasury bonds issued in renminbi. Chinese visitors (including property buyers looking for fresh opportunities) will continue to flock to the city. But when it comes to being China's bridge to the EU, it is clear that Beijing will look for alternatives, particularly Germany, which is China's top economic partner in Europe. German Chancellor Angela Merkel recently made her ninth visit to China and managed to address a long list of key issues, including trade, investment and reciprocity, as well as human rights, new laws regulating nongovernment organizations and territorial claims in the South China Sea. In a powerful speech to Nanjing University students in Beijing on June 12, she stressed that the trust of the citizens can only be achieved by the rule of law, "rather than rule by law." It has been many years since British leaders have used this language in China. Even though some British politicians are now calling for a reassessment of the country's China policy, it is unlikely that the U.K. will do anything but accommodate China in order to preserve trade and investment in the post-Brexit uncertainty.

For all its openness, the "new U.K." will become less attractive market-wise. After Brexit, China will also lose a proponent of free trade within the EU—that is bad news as the 28-nation block is pondering the decision to grant market economy status to China, in accordance with an agreement under the World Trade Organization. Market economy status affects the way anti-dumping duties are used. Job-wise, the European steel industry is vulnerable. Since the adoption by the European Parliament of a nonbinding resolution against granting market economy status to China on May 12, many European politicians fear that more Chinese economic involvement in their home countries would lead to more cheap goods competing with European-made products and fewer jobs at home—hence a less favorable context for China. The chances of an EU-China free-trade agreement are becoming more remote now as the EU is more focused on finalizing a comprehensive agreement on investment with China. European companies have been lobbying for such a pact.

Although it will almost certainly make the most of an autonomous U.K. after conducting its own assessment, China does not like uncertainty—especially in turbulent times both at home and abroad. It worries about challenges against ruling parties, as well as an anti-globalization attitude that could affect its own image as a beneficiary of globalization. As for Europe, both Germany and France have strong relations with China. With their backing, the European Commission has just published an ambitious new strategy on China. It looks like the U.K. will not be part of it.

On March 5, Chinese President Xi Jinping spoke to the Shanghai delegates to the National People’s Congress (NPC) session in Beijing. China’s top leaders use these side meetings to convey policy guidance on a range of issues, and Xi used this particular one to offer his perspective on relations with Taiwan. There has been some nervousness in the wake of the January 16 elections, which swept the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) to power in both the executive and legislative branches. Because the Beijing government has always suspected that the fundamental objective of the DPP is to permanently separate Taiwan from China, observers were waiting expectantly to hear what Xi would have to say about Taiwan.

Well before the March 5 speech, of course, Xi’s subordinates responsible for Taiwan policy had already laid out what Taiwan President-elect Tsai Ing-wen and her party would have to do to prevent cross-Strait relations from deteriorating, and they continued to emphasize those conditions after Xi’s speech. But analysts believed that Xi’s own formulation would be the clearest indicator of Beijing’s policy. He is, after all, China’s paramount leader, and his words carry a far greater weight than those of other Chinese officials.

This is what Xi said to the Shanghai NPC delegation about Taiwan [translation by the author, emphasis added]:

Compatriots on the two sides of the Strait are blood brothers who share a common destiny, and are people for whom blood is thicker than water…Our policy towards Taiwan is correct and consistent, and will not change because of a change in [who heads] the Taiwan authorities. We will insist upon the political foundation of the “1992 consensus,” and continue to advance cross-Strait relations and peaceful development…If the historical fact of the “1992 consensus” is recognized and if its core connotation is acknowledged, then the two sides of the Strait will have a common political basis and positive interaction [virtuous circle] can be preserved. We will steadily push forward cross-Strait dialogue and cooperation in various fields, deepen cross-Strait economic, social, and financial development, and increase the familial attachment and welfare of compatriots [on both sides], close their spiritual gap, and strengthen their recognition that they share a common destiny. We will resolutely contain the separatist path of any form of Taiwan independence, protect state sovereignty and territorial integrity, and absolutely not allow a repetition of the historical tragedy of national separation. This is the common wish and firm intention of all Chinese sons and daughters, and is also our solemn pledge and obligation to history and to the people. The fruits of cross-Strait relations and peaceful development require the common support of compatriots on the two sides; creating a common and happy future requires the common effort of compatriots on the two sides; and realizing the great revival of the Chinese nation requires that compatriots on the two sides join hands to work with one heart.

The italicized sentences are key: They state what the new DPP government should do if it wishes to maintain healthy cross-Strait relations and affirms Beijing’s resolve to oppose any behavior it doesn’t like. Xi didn’t threaten specific actions, but he probably didn’t have to. As always, Beijing reserves the right to decide what DPP attitudes and actions constitute separatism and a quest for Taiwan independence. 

Xi didn’t threaten specific actions, but he probably didn’t have to.

Some background

There are two important points of reference contextualizing this statement from Xi. 

Xi on November 7, 2015. First, there are his reported remarks on the future of cross-Strait relations during his unprecedented meeting with current Taiwan president Ma Ying-jeou in Singapore last November 7. At that time, Xi first appealed to ethnic solidarity and national unity, as he did again on March 5. He asserted that the stakes to end the state of division between Mainland China and Taiwan were very high because it was a critical part of how he views rejuvenating the Chinese nation—a theme he repeated to the Shanghai delegation. 

Xi said Taiwan, under the new government, could either continue to follow the path it has walked for the last seven-plus years under the current Ma Ying-jeou administration (“peaceful development”), or it could take the path of renewed “confrontation,” “separation,” and zero-sum hostility. If Taiwan wished to follow the first path, Xi insisted, its leaders must adhere to the 1992 consensus and oppose “Taiwan independence.” Without this “magic compass that calms the sea,” Xi warned, “the ship of peaceful development will meet with great waves and even suffer total loss.” He was willing to overlook the DPP’s past positions and actions, but only if it identified with “the core connotation of the 1992 consensus” (a reference to the PRC view that the Mainland and Taiwan are both within the territorial scope of China, a view the DPP contests). Xi alluded to the “core connotation” on March 5 but did not re-state its content. Xi then made clear that if “disaster” occurred, it would be the DPP’s fault—it was therefore up to Tsai, he implied, to accommodate to Beijing’s conditions. 

In language and tone, Xi’s Singapore statement was far more strident and alarmist than what he said on March 5. He made that first statement more than two months before the election, when perhaps he thought that tough talk would weaken Tsai’s and the DPP’s appeal to voters. If that was his objective, he failed. The tone of his March 5 remarks was more modulated, but the substance was the same. Beijing would define the crossroads that Taiwan faced, and it was up to Tsai to take the right path—at least what it defined the right path.

Beijing would define the crossroads that Taiwan faced, and it was up to Tsai to take the right path—at least what it defined the right path.

Tsai on January 21, 2016. Second, there is an interview that Tsai gave to Liberty Times (Tzu-yu Shih Pao) on January 21—less than a week after the elections—in which she sought to meet Beijing partway. For the first time, she used the phrase “political foundation” and said it had four elements: 

• “The first is that the SEF-ARATS discussions of 1992 are a historical fact and both sides had a common acknowledgment to set aside differences and seek common ground;” 
• “The second is the Republic of China’s current constitutional order.”
• “The third is the accumulated results of the more than 20 years of cross-strait negotiations, exchanges, and interactions;” and
• “The fourth is Taiwan’s democratic principles and the will of the Taiwanese people to make sure that Taiwan voters understood the limits to his tolerance.”

So, Tsai accepts the 1992 meetings as a historical fact and acknowledges that the two sides did reach an agreement of sorts, but does not accept the 1992 consensus itself as a historical fact. She spoke more about process than content. The Republic of China’s “current constitutional order” is also part of the foundation, which some have read as Tsai’s acceptance that the Mainland and Taiwan are both parts of China’s territory (Beijing’s “core connotation”)—I, however, am not so sure. Tsai did not reject Xi’s requirements out of hand, but she framed them in her own way. 

So are ties growing friendlier?

Was Xi’s tonal moderation on March 5—relative to November 7—an indicator that mutual accommodation was going on? Perhaps. But the fact that the November meeting was ostensibly private while the March speech was public might explain the difference. 

Moreover, the stream of Chinese articles and statements since March 5 that explicitly restate Beijing’s long-standing preconditions are reason to doubt that much accommodation is actually occurring. The three basic scenarios I outlined last December—accommodation, limited Chinese punishment of the Tsai administration, and comprehensive punishment—are still in play, and the key variable remains whether Xi and his subordinates trust Tsai Ing-wen’s basic intentions. That is, will they accept her recent formulations as a good-faith effort to avoid deterioration? The next milestone will be May 20, when Tsai Ing-wen gives her inaugural address and may provide a more detailed formulation of her approach to China.

China’s approach to Europe is a contrasting mix of economic opportunism and strategic vision.

A continent gripped by economic weakness and debt is crying out for Chinese investment, and Chinese state enterprises and funds are eagerly participating in the sale of the century, buying up ports, prime real estate and technology firms from Greece to the U.K.

At the same time, Beijing views Europe as the terminus for its massively ambitious “One Belt, One Road” project – a string of ports, logistics hubs and other trading infrastructure stretching all the way from Southeast Asia to the north of England.

Yet a populist backlash against China is building in Europe: recent street demonstrations by European workers over Chinese steel dumping have highlighted the risks of a relationship that increasingly looks troubled.

In their book “China’s Offensive in Europe,” Philippe Le Corre, a visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution, and Alain Sepulchre, a senior adviser with BCG in Hong Kong, analyze China’s rapidly expanding footprint on the continent — and what it means in global terms. They set out some of their thinking in a written Q&A with China Real Time:

You title your book “China’s Offensive in Europe.” This sounds somewhat alarming. Should we be worried?

It may have sounded slightly alarming a few years ago, but China’s economic intentions toward Europe are not just about creating jobs and value: they are about spreading influence on a weakened and somewhat divided continent (the U.K. being perhaps the most obvious example) that is also far away from the U.S., the country seen by China as the ultimate competitor. Europe is part of “the West” where China is willing to leave more than footprints.

Overall, how do you assess the relationship between the EU and China? What are the opportunities and the risks?

On one hand, China has offered to take part in major EU projects such as the European Strategic Investment Fund, launched by the European Commission to relaunch European infrastructure. It will probably become the biggest non-European stakeholder in the ESIF. But on the other hand, there is an attempt by China to divide the EU at various levels. A typical example is the “16+1” group created by China and sixteen Eastern and Central European countries in 2011. Once a year, leaders of these countries meet with Chinese Premier Li Keqiang. Last year in Suzhou, they also met with President Xi Jinjping. Seven countries signed memorandums of understanding with China on “one-belt, one-road.” Three of them hosted Mr. Xi recently, and were offered substantial Chinese investment promises. China has also tried to establish similar platforms with Southern Europe and Nordic countries, so far without success, but there is a risk that a large number of smaller countries (some of them non-EU members, a good example being Serbia which is getting a Chinese-made high-speed railway) will take a separate approach from the rest of Europe when dealing with China. This is not what Europe needs now.

How coordinated is Chinese investment in Europe? Is there a master plan in Beijing?

There is no “master plan” to take over Europe. First, Europe was part of the “China goes out” [investment] policy in the late 1990s. It then started accelerating with opportunities in 2008-2009 during the euro-debt crisis (and thanks to a favorable exchange rate), when China bought eurobonds and started buying into European infrastructure such as Athens’ Piraeus Harbor (which it now controls). Now, Chinese investment is taking a different dimension through the cultivation of individual European countries via the “one belt, one road” initiative as was demonstrated by Mr. Xi’s visits to the Czech Republic in May, and to Poland and Serbia more recently. Although many aspects of OBOR remain unclear, Europe is definitely a final destination for this project.

Would “Brexit” make the U.K. a less attractive destination for Chinese capital?

As a financial center, London would remain attractive to Chinese investors who would still use it as an renminbi trading hub – but they would also use Frankfurt, Paris and Luxembourg, where they have started trading, too. As for the British market, it would be treated as a medium-sized economy with some prospects but a much less important group than the 450-million consumer common market. For all its flaws, the EU is a powerful trade block with clear interlocutors on issues of importance to China, such as the Market Economy Status. Finally, it is not clear if the U.K. would remain a top destination for Chinese investments. Real estate is one thing, but projects such as the “Northern Power House,” a massive development plan in the north of England, have little chance to receive Chinese financial support if the U.K. votes to exit the EU on Thursday.

Chinese companies are on a buying spree in Europe. This is good news for job creation, yet it also creates anxiety, particularly in Germany, about the loss of key technologies. How do you see this playing out?

Overall, the mood within European elites is about welcoming Chinese investments providing they play the European way. So far Chinese investors have been targeting primarily nonsensitive sectors or companies in financial trouble. The case of [German robot maker Kuka being acquired by Chinese home appliance giant Midea] is quite unique as it involves some specific high-tech content in a sector which is of huge potential. The fact that the Chinese acquirer is perceived as low-tech and very aggressive in its domestic and international expansion strengthens the anti-China Inc. feeling.

Is there a danger of a real populist backlash in Europe against perceived unfair Chinese trading practices, including steel dumping?

It is already happening with the recent (nonbinding, but overwhelming) vote on May 12 by the European Parliament against granting market economy status to China by the end of 2016. Members of the European Parliament are directly elected by the European people, and they reflect the continent’s worries over unfair trade practices from China. These are sensitive times in Europe, and China’s message is obviously not popular with European grassroots where people worry about jobs and the future of the continent’s economy.

What is behind the debate on giving China market economy status?

It is a complicated issue for Europeans as the EU itself is based on the rule of law. In this case, the law is the 2001 World Trade Organization agreement that says that China should receive MES by December 2016. Economics and politics are two other factors European leaders cannot avoid: both France and Germany are facing general elections in 2017 and populism is on the rise everywhere. It would be suicidal to grant the status to China now, as almost none of the criteria to be a market economy have been met – except perhaps the upcoming deadline. A compromise will be needed with mitigating measures at the very least, and in the current political context, it will obviously take time.

Europe complains that while its markets are wide open to Chinese investment, China is closing up. German Chancellor Angela Merkel has called for greater reciprocity. How can China be persuaded to level the playing field?

European cumulative overseas direct investment into China is far bigger than what China has been investing so far into Europe. China is still considered an emerging market, typically showing some kind of protectionism. At the same time, China is often not sympathetic to reciprocity be it in politics or business. Two ways could be considered to pressure China. One way – as we have just heard from Chancellor Merkel – is to be offensive by blocking some Chinese investments in deemed sensitive areas (similarly to what is taking place in the US through the CFIUS mechanism) and by finding alternative suitors to firms like Kuka that China wants to acquire. Another way would be to use the pan-European card. In many cases, European businesses and / or political bodies have been battling each other for Chinese investments. This has been going on for years, and it is time for Europeans to partner vis-a-vis China.

On her recent visits to China, Ms. Merkel has spoken out strongly on issues from human rights to the South China Sea. This compares quite markedly with the approach to China adopted by Britain, which tends to avoid sensitive issues. What accounts for Ms. Merkel’s frankness?

There is still a Chinese fascination for Germany’s economic and technological model, which has no equivalent in Europe. Although the German trade surplus with China is shrinking, many German industrial brands are recognized and vastly respected in China (Audi, Siemens, BMW, BASF…). German technology and brands give Germany an incentive. In addition, Ms. Merkel, who has been in power for almost 11 years, is seen by Beijing as Europe’s clear leader. David Cameron is only considered as his country’s prime minister, with little influence on decisions taken within the EU. The fact Ms. Merkel has spoken frankly and repeatedly about sensitive issues has not weakened her – it is the opposite. A good lesson for others, perhaps?

What is the experience so far of European companies bought by Chinese firms?

The experience so far has been a mixed bag. On the workforce front, most companies have been expanding rather than the opposite, but some have been downsizing their labor force at least initially. A typical challenge lies more at the top management / governance level: Chinese owners tend to over-manage or under-manage dispatching too many or too few skilled managers, governing too tightly or too loosely. The right balance has not been found yet. The most ‘non value-added’ factor is probably on the transfer of technology side. In many instances, Chinese investors have not been able to fully leverage the European technology content into their domestic operations. 

This interview originally appeared in the Wall Street Journal. 

Event Information

In an era of fluid geopolitics and geoeconomics, challenges to the global order abound: from ever-changing terrorism, to massive refugee flows, a stubbornly sluggish world economy, and the specter of global pandemics. Against this backdrop, the question of whether leader summitry—either the G-7 or G-20 incarnations—can supply needed international governance is all the more relevant. This question is particularly significant for East Asia this year as Japan and China, two economic giants that are sometimes perceived as political rivals, respectively host the G-7 and G-20 summits. 

On April 18, the Center for East Asia Policy Studies and the Project on International Order and Strategy co-hosted a discussion on the continued relevancy and efficacy of the leader summit framework, Japan’s and China’s priorities as summit hosts, and whether these East Asian neighbors will hold parallel but completely separate summits or utilize these summits as an opportunity to cooperate on issues of mutual, and global, interest.

Join the conversation on Twitter using #G7G20Asia

Audio

• Japan’s G-7 and China’s G-20 chairmanships: Bridges or stovepipes in leader summitry?

Transcript

• Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

• 20160418_g7g20_transcript

The “green” or “clean” or low-carbon economy—defined as the sector of the economy that produces goods and services with an environmental benefit—remains at once a compelling aspiration and an enigma.

As a matter of aspiration, no swath of the economy has been more widely celebrated as a source of economic renewal and potential job creation. Yet, the clean economy remains an enigma: hard to assess. Not only do “green” or “clean” activities and jobs related to environmental aims pervade all sectors of the U.S. economy; they also remain tricky to define and isolate—and count.

The clean economy has remained elusive in part because, in the absence of standard definitions and data, strikingly little is known about its nature, size, and growth at the critical regional level.

Seeking to help address these problems, the Metropolitan Policy Program at Brookings worked with Battelle’s Technology Partnership Practice to develop, analyze, and comment on a detailed database of establishment-level employment statistics pertaining to a sensibly defined assemblage of clean economy industries in the United States and its metropolitan areas.

"Sizing the Clean Economy: A National and Regional Green Jobs Assessment" concludes that:

The clean economy, which employs some 2.7 million workers, encompasses a significant number of jobs in establishments spread across a diverse group of industries. Though modest in size, the clean economy employs more workers than the fossil fuel industry and bulks larger than bioscience but remains smaller than the IT-producing sectors. Most clean economy jobs reside in mature segments that cover a wide swath of activities including manufacturing and the provision of public services such as wastewater and mass transit. A smaller portion of the clean economy encompasses newer segments that respond to energy-related challenges. These include the solar photovoltaic (PV), wind, fuel cell, smart grid, biofuel, and battery industries.

The clean economy grew more slowly in aggregate than the national economy between 2003 and 2010, but newer “cleantech” segments produced explosive job gains and the clean economy outperformed the nation during the recession. Overall, today’s clean economy establishments added half a million jobs between 2003 and 2010, expanding at an annual rate of 3.4 percent. This performance lagged the growth in the national economy, which grew by 4.2 percent annually over the period (if job losses from establishment closings are omitted to make the data comparable). However, this measured growth heavily reflected the fact that many longer-standing companies in the clean economy—especially those involved in housing- and building-related segments—laid off large numbers of workers during the real estate crash of 2007 and 2008, while sectors unrelated to the clean economy (mainly health care) created many more new jobs nationally. At the same time, newer clean economy establishments— especially those in young energy-related segments such as wind energy, solar PV, and smart grid—added jobs at a torrid pace, albeit from small bases.

The clean economy is manufacturing and export intensive. Roughly 26 percent of all clean economy jobs lie in manufacturing establishments, compared to just 9 percent in the broader economy. On a per job basis, establishments in the clean economy export roughly twice the value of a typical U.S. job ($20,000 versus $10,000). The electric vehicles (EV), green chemical products, and lighting segments are all especially manufacturing intensive while the biofuels, green chemicals, and EV industries are highly export intensive.

The clean economy offers more opportunities and better pay for low- and middle-skilled workers than the national economy as a whole. Median wages in the clean economy—meaning those in the middle of the distribution—are 13 percent higher than median U.S. wages. Yet a disproportionate percentage of jobs in the clean economy are staffed by workers with relatively little formal education in moderately well-paying “green collar” occupations.

Among regions, the South has the largest number of clean economy jobs though the West has the largest share relative to its population. Seven of the 21 states with at least 50,000 clean economy jobs are in the South. Among states, California has the highest number of clean jobs but Alaska and Oregon have the most per worker.

Most of the country’s clean economy jobs and recent growth concentrate within the largest metropolitan areas. Some 64 percent of all current clean economy jobs and 75 percent of its newer jobs created from 2003 to 2010 congregate in the nation’s 100 largest metro areas.

The clean economy permeates all of the nation’s metropolitan areas, but it manifests itself in varied configurations. Metropolitan area clean economies can be categorized into four-types: service-oriented, manufacturing, public sector, and balanced. New York, through mass transit, embodies a service orientation; so does San Francisco through professional services and Las Vegas through architectural services. Many Midwestern and Southern metros like Louisville; Cleveland; Greenville, SC; and Little Rock—but also San Jose in the West—host clean economies that are heavily manufacturing oriented. State capitals are among those with a disproportionate share of clean jobs in the public sector (e.g. Harrisburg, Sacramento, Raleigh, and Springfield). Finally, some metros—such as Atlanta; Salt Lake City; Portland, OR; and Los Angeles— balance multi-dimensional clean economies.

Strong industry clusters boost metros’ growth performance in the clean economy. Clustering entails proximity to businesses in similar or related industries. Establishments located in counties containing a significant number of jobs from other establishments in the same segment grew much faster than more isolated establishments from 2003 to 2010. Overall, clustered establishments grew at a rate that was 1.4 percentage points faster each year than non-clustered (more isolated) establishments. Examples include professional environmental services in Houston, solar photovoltaic in Los Angeles, fuel cells in Boston, and wind in Chicago.

The measurements and trends presented here offer a mixed picture of a diverse array of environmentally-oriented industry segments growing modestly even as a sub-set of clean energy, energy efficiency, and related segments grow much faster than the nation (albeit from a small base) and in ways that are producing a desirable array of jobs, including in manufacturing and export-oriented fields.

As to what governments, policymakers, and regional leaders should do to catalyze faster and broader growth across the U.S. clean economy, it is clear that the private sector will play the lead role, but governments have a role too. In this connection, the fact that significant policy uncertainties and gaps are weakening market demand for clean economy goods and services, chilling finance, and raising questions about the clean innovation pipeline reinforces the need for engagement and reform. Not only are other nations bidding to secure global production and the jobs that come with it but the United States currently risks failing to exploit growing world demand. And so this report concludes that vigorous private sector-led growth needs to be co-promoted through complementary engagements by all levels of the nation’s federal system to ensure the existence of well-structured markets, a favorable investment climate, and a rich stock of cutting-edge technology—as well as strong regional cast to all efforts. Along these lines, the report recommends that governments help:

Scale up the market by taking steps to catalyze vibrant domestic demand for low-carbon and environmentally-oriented goods and services. Intensified “green” procurement efforts by all levels of government are one such market-making engagement. But there are others. Congress and the federal government could help by putting a price on carbon, passing a national clean energy standard (CES), and moving to ensure more rational cost recovery on new transmission links for the delivery of renewable energy to urban load centers. States can adopt or strengthen their own clean energy standards, reduce the initial costs of energy efficiency and renewable energy adoption, and pursue electricity market reform to facilitate the use of clean and efficient solutions. And localities can also support adoption by expediting permitting for green projects, adopting green building and other standards, and adopting innovative financing tools to reduce the upfront costs of investing in clean technologies.

Ensure adequate finance by moving to address the serious shortage of affordable, risk-tolerant, and larger-scale capital that now impedes the scale-up of numerous clean economy industry segments. On this front Congress should create an emerging technology deployment finance entity to address the commercialization “Valley of Death” and also work to rationalize and reform the myriad tax provisions and incentives that currently encourage capital investments in clean economy projects. States, for their part, can supplement private lending activity by providing guarantees and participating loans or initial capital for revolving loan funds targeting clean economy projects using new or improved technologies. And for that matter regions and localities can also help narrow the deployment finance gap by helping to reduce the costs and uncertainty of projects by expediting their physical build-out, whether by managing zoning and permitting issues or even pre-approving sites.

Drive innovation by investing both more and differently in the clean economy innovation system. With the needed major scale-up of investment levels unlikely for now, Congress at least needs to embrace continued incremental growth of key energy and environmental research, development, and demonstration (RD&D) budgets. At the same time, Congress should continue its recent institutional experimentation through measured expansion of such recent start-ups as the Energy Frontier Research Centers, ARPA-E, and Energy Innovation Hubs programs. Two worthy additional experiments would be the creation of a water sciences innovation center and the establishment of a regional clean economy consortia initiative. States can also advance the clean economy through maintaining and expanding their own RD&D efforts, perhaps by tapping state clean energy funds where they exist. All should be focused and prioritized through a rigorous, data-driven analysis of the nature, growth, and strengths of local clean economy innovation clusters.

In addition, the “Sizing the Clean Economy“ emphasizes that in working on each of these fronts federal, state, and regional leaders need to:

Focus on regions, meaning that all parties need to place detailed knowledge of local industry dynamics and regional growth strategies near the center of efforts to advance the clean economy. While the federal government should increase its investment in new regional innovation and industry cluster programs such as the Economic Development Administration’s i6 Green Challenge, states should work to improve the information base about local clean economy industry clusters and move to support regionally crafted initiatives for advancing them. Regional actors, meanwhile, should take the lead in using data and analysis to understand the local clean economy in detail; identify competitive strengths; and then move to formulate strong, “bottom up” strategies for overcoming key clusters’ binding constraints. Employing cluster intelligence and strategy to design and tune regional workforce development strategies will be a critical regional priority.

***

The measurements, trends, and discussions offered here provide an encouraging but also challenging assessment of the ongoing development of the clean economy in the United States and its regions. In many respects, the analysis warrants excitement. As the nation continues to search for new sources of high-quality growth, the present findings depict a sizable and diverse array of industry segments that is—in key private-sector areas—expanding rapidly at a time of sluggish national growth. With smart policy support, broader, more rapid growth seems possible. At the same time, however, the information presented here is challenging, most notably because the growth of the clean economy has almost certainly been depressed by significant policy problems and uncertainties.

That question is: Will the nation marshal the will to make the most of those industries?

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• Full Report
• Executive Summary
• Methodology Appendix
• Media Memo

Video

• Sizing the Clean Economy

For all the debate, speculation, and controversy that has surrounded the hoped-for growth of the so-called “clean” economy and “green jobs” one thing has been in pretty short supply: facts. 

For all the talk of its alluring promise, the clean or green economy remains an enigma, in large part due to the continued absence of standard national definitions and data.

Today that changes with a new report assessing the current nature, size, and growth of the “green” or “clean” economy in U.S. regions. 

Developed by the Brookings Metropolitan Policy Program in partnership with Battelle’s Technology Partnership Practice, our report and its underlying database--entitled “Sizing the Clean Economy”--are not perfect accountings. Still, I think you will agree they offer a compelling new national and metropolitan look at a sector of the economy that has remained at once an important aspiration and a frustrating enigma. Do look over the report; watch video of our release discussion; and check out the special interactive mapping tool we’ve developed--both of which are aimed at shedding further light on the geography of this hard-to-assess sector.

Over the last 18 months we’ve developed and analyzed a detailed database of establishment-level employment statistics pertaining to a sensibly defined assemblage of low-carbon and environmentally oriented industries in the United States and its metropolitan areas.

Covering the years 2003 to 2010 for larger U.S. metros, the resulting information provides a new source of timely information that is both consistently applied so as to allow cross-region comparisons but detailed enough to be of some use to inform national, state, and regional leaders on the dynamics of the U.S. low-carbon and environmental goods and services super-sector as they are transpiring in U.S. regions.

To be sure, localized drill-downs in particular places may capture a fuller profile in some regions. But overall, our new information provides what we believe is a plausible, useful, first-of-its-kind measure of the size and growth of the clean economy as it is occurring in the nation’s 100 largest metropolitan areas. 

What is more, our definition, approach, and data have been structured as much as possible to anticipate the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ own forthcoming “green jobs” count, due next year at somewhat broader levels of geography.  It’s time that all U.S. regions begin to have access to some at least rough order-of-magnitude facts about the size and shape of their clean economies.

Event Information

To access a curated stream of tweets from the #CleanEcon event, please visit this Storify page. Below you will find this event's full webcast archive--or, you may view one of four segments taken from that webcast.

No swath of the U.S. economy has been more widely celebrated as a source of economic renewal than the “clean” or “green” economy. However, surprisingly little is really known about these industries’ nature, size and growth—especially at the regional level. As a result, debates on transitioning to a green or clean economy are frequently short on facts and long on speculation as the nation searches for new sources of economic growth.

On July 13, the Metropolitan Policy Program at Brookings brought together business, economic development and political leaders to review the progress of clean industries, identify policy issues and opportunities, and consider how faster and broader growth of the clean economy could be encouraged at the national, state and regional level. A report and first-of-its-kind database, produced in collaboration with Battelle’s Technology Partnership Practice, was released at the event, providing new measures of the clean economy at the national and metropolitan levels. Also featured was an interactive web tool that allows users to track jobs, growth, segments, and other variables nationally, by state and by region.

Brookings Managing Director William Antholis welcomed participants and Bruce Katz, vice president and director of the Metropolitan Policy Program, presented the findings of this major new report on the status of the U.S. clean economy. Panel discussions followed, presenting the corporate and regional perspective.

After each panel, the speakers took audience questions.

Go to the report »

Go to the interactive web tool »

Video

• Introducing the Metropolitan Clean Economy
• Panel One: The Clean Economy, Firm by Firm
• Panel Two: The Clean Economy, Region by Region
• Clean Economy Closing Dialogue
• Growing the Clean Economy in Philadelphia

Audio

• Sizing the Clean Economy: A National and Regional Green Jobs Assessment
• Sizing the Clean Economy: A National and Regional Green Jobs Assessment
• Sizing the Clean Economy: A National and Regional Green Jobs Assessment
• Sizing the Clean Economy: A National and Regional Green Jobs Assessment

Editor's Note: During an appearance on the Platts Energy Week program, Mark Muro discussed jobs in the green sector, using findings from the "Sizing the Clean Economy" report.

Host BILL LOVELESS: Green jobs – what are they? And can they make much of a contribution to the economy? It’s an ongoing debate in Washington, and the rest of the U.S. for that matter, and it’s a knotty one because defining the term “green jobs” is difficult.

But now the Brookings Institution has taken a crack at it with a new report, “Sizing the Clean Economy.” One of the authors, Mark Muro, with the Brookings Metropolitan Policy Program, joins me now. Mark, do you think you’ve defined, once and for all, what the clean economy is?

MARK MURO: The answer to that is “no.” This has been an ongoing discussion for decades, really. On the other hand, I do think that we have done is tried to embrace good precedents, good sensible precedents from Europe. The European Statistical Agency comes at it similar to the way we did. But we’ve also anticipated where the Bureau of Labor Statistics, here in the U.S., will be next year when it offers our first U.S. official definition.

LOVELESS: A summer preview, maybe. I know the Bureau of Labor Statistics is working on that. Should this report ... tell me a little bit about this report — where the jobs are and should this in any way change the way we look at green jobs.

MURO: I think one thing that comes from this is that it’s a broad swath of, sometimes not very glamorous, industries that are very familiar. Wastewater, mass transit – those are properly viewed as green jobs because they take pressure off the environment. They keep our environment clean.

Watch Mark Muro's full interview with Platts Energy Week »

Event Information

The start of the 21st century has been an auspicious period for global economic development. In the 1990s, a mere 13 emerging economies succeeded in growing at a speed at least twice that of the OECD countries, enabling rapid convergence on Western living standards. By the first decade of the 2000s, this number had mushroomed to 83. Accelerated rates of economic growth lay behind many of the recent success stories in global development, not least the fulfilment of the first Millennium Development Goal to halve the global poverty rate, five years ahead of the 2015 deadline. Yet in a number of places, growth has failed to take off, has undergone periodic reversals, or has benefited a few while leaving the majority short-changed.

On August 7-9, 2014, Brookings Global Economy and Development is hosting the eleventh annual Brookings Blum Roundtable on Global Poverty in Aspen, Colorado. This year’s roundtable theme, “Jump-Starting Inclusive Growth in the Most Difficult Environment,” brings together global leaders, entrepreneurs, practitioners, and public intellectuals to discuss what strategies exist for promoting inclusive economic growth in settings where standard prescriptions are not feasible or sufficient as well as what the comparative advantages are of different actors seeking to improve the prospects for inclusive growth and how can they most effectively collaborate with each other to increase their impact. 

This event is closed, but you can follow along on Twitter using #Blum2014.

Roundtable Agenda

Event Materials

• PArticipant list

The mobile economy in China and India has grown by leaps and bounds over the past decade. Mobile technology has the potential to shrink the broadband gap, improve financial inclusion, and support humanitarian efforts. A recent report from the Boston Consulting Group adds another interesting perspective into the existing conversation about the impact of mobile technologies. India appears poised to eschew building up its fixed broadband infrastructure and jump directly to mobile. Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in India appeared poised to take advantage of this amazing change.

Mobile innovation lower costs and improve performance

Source: Boston Consulting Group

Maximum download speeds have risen greatly when comparing second generation networks with current fourth generation technology. 2G networks were capable of reaching 20 kilobits per second and 4G technologies can reach 250 megabits per second, which is about 12,000 times faster. At the same time the actual cost of network infrastructure per megabyte is falling dramatically: a 95 percent decrease from 2G to 3G and 67 percent decrease from 3G to 4G. Subsequently, the consumer cost of data per megabyte decreased sharply. From 2005 to 2013, the average cost of a mobile subscription relative to the maximum data speed dropped about 40 percent each year or 99 percent in an 8 year period. Higher speeds and lower costs make mobile a viable development platform for SMEs. In America this had led to the growth of the app economy. In India this effect is even more pronounced.

Widespread use of mobile technologies fuels the leap

In 2013 India reached 900 million mobile connections and became the second largest market in terms of mobile connections and unique subscribers. Indians spend 45 percent of their incomes on mobile technologies and platforms whereas Americans only spend 11 percent.

Source: World Bank Indicators

For the average Indian, mobile is the only point-of-entry to the Internet. Mobile devices are much more common than computers. The PC penetration rate in India of 5 percent stands in stark contrast to the 75 percent rate for mobile devices. Rates of fixed broadband Internet usage increased at a snails pace in India and at the same time mobile cellular subscriptions soared. More and more people in India are choosing to access Internet solely through mobile devices. Currently about 34 percent of people in India access the Internet exclusively from mobile devices. Flipkart an Indian e-commerce company predicts that 75 to 80 percent of their customer’s traffic will come on mobile platforms. The proliferation of mobile technologies in India provides incentives for SMEs to focus on developing mobile oriented business models.

Existing mobile focused SMEs lead the leap

SMEs in India place a greater emphasis on mobile platforms compared to companies in other countries. About 25 to 35 percent of surveyed SMEs in India are identified as mobile leaders, firms that use mobile productivity tools, operational tools (real-time job tracking or mobile data analytics) and sales and marketing tools. In developed countries such as Germany, only 14 percent of the surveyed SMEs are mobile leaders. Further, mobile oriented SMEs are thriving in India in a variety of fields. India’s largest E-commerce marketplace Flipkart Sidesteps has seen its traffic grow twice as face on mobile when compared with PC. Anti-violence apps such as FightBack and mobile health initiatives such as Swasthya Samvedana Sena are also experiencing great success.

India is in the midst of a mobile revolution that is categorically different than other parts of the world. Without existing complex legacy systems, businesses in India are now in the unique position to leapfrog terrestrial Internet technologies and reap the full benefits of a truly mobile economy.

Yikun Chi contributed to this post

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One of the foundational notions of digital financial services has been the distinction between payment rails and services running on the rails. This is a logical distinction to make, one easily understood by engineers who tend to think in terms of hierarchies (or stacks) of functionalities, capabilities, and protocols that need to be brought together. But this distinction makes less sense when it is taken to represent a logical temporal sequencing of those layers.

It is not too much of a caricature to portray the argument —and, alas, much common practice— like this: I’ll first build a state-of-the art digital payments platform, and then I’ll secure a great agent network to acquire customers and offer them cash services. Once I have mastered all that, then I’ll focus on bringing new services to delight more of my customers. The result is that research on customer preferences gets postponed, and product design projects are outsourced to external consultants who run innovation projects in a way that is disconnected from the rest of the business.

This mindset is understandable given limited organizational, financial and human resource capabilities. But the problem with such narrow sequencing is that all these elements reinforce each other. Without adequate services (a.k.a. customer proposition), the rails will not bed down (a.k.a. no business case for the provider or the agents). In businesses such as digital payments that exhibit strong network effects, it’s a race to reach a critical mass of users. You need to drive the entire stack to get there, as quickly as possible. Unless, you develop a killer app early on, as M-PESA seems to have done with the send money home use case in the Kenyan environment.

It is tough for any organization to advance on all these fronts simultaneously. Only superhero organizations can get this complex job done. I have argued in a previous post that the piece that needs to be parceled off is not the service creation but rather cash management: that can be handled by independently licensed organizations working at arms length from the digital rails-and-products providers.

What are payment rails?

Payment rails are a collection of capabilities that allow value to be passed around digitally. This could include sending money home, paying for a good or a bill, pushing money into my or someone else’s savings account, funding a withdrawal at an agent, or repaying a loan. The first set of capabilities relates to identity: being able to establish you are the rightful owner of the funds in your account, and to designate the intended recipient in a money transfer. The second set of capabilities relates to the accounting or ledger system: keeping track of balances held and owed, and authorizing transactions when there are sufficient funds per the account rules. The third set of capabilities relates to messaging: collecting the necessary transaction details from the payment initiator, conveying that information securely to the authorizing entity, and providing confirmations.

Only the third piece has been transformed by the rise of mobile phones: we now have an increasingly inclusive and ubiquitous real-time messaging fabric. Impressive as that is, this messaging capability is still linked to legacy approaches on identity and accounting. Which is why mobile money is still more an evolution than a revolution in the quest for financial inclusion.

The keepers of the accounts —traditionally, the banks— are, of course, the guardians of the system’s choke points. There is now recognition in financial inclusion circles that to expand access to finance it is not enough to proliferate the world with mobile phones and agents: you need to increase the number and type of account keepers, under the guise of mobile money operators, e-money issuers or payment banks. But that doesn’t change the fundamental dynamics, which is that there still are choke point guardians who need to be convinced that there is a business case in order to invest in marketing to poor people, that there are opportunities to innovate to meet their needs, and that perhaps all players can be better off if only they interoperated. A true transformation would be to open up these ledgers, so anyone can check the validity of any transaction and write them into the ledger.

That’s what crypto-currencies are after: decentralizing the accounting and transaction authorization piece, much in the same way as mobile phones have decentralized the transaction origination piece. Banks seek to protect the integrity of their accounting and authorizations systems —and hence their role as arbiters of financial transactions— by hiding them behind huge IT walls; crypto-currencies such as Bitcoin and Ripple do the opposite: they use sophisticated protocols to create a shared consensus for all to see and use.

The other set of capabilities in the digital rails, identity, is also still in the dark ages. Let me convince you of that through a personal experience. My wallet was stolen recently, and it contained my credit card. I can understand the bank wanting to know my name, but why is the bank announcing my name to the thief by printing it on the credit card, thereby making it easier for him to impersonate me? The reason is, of course, that the bank wants merchants to be able to cross check the name on the card with a piece of customer ID. But as you can imagine, my national ID got stolen along with my credit card, and because of that the thief knows not only my name but also my address. That was an issue because I also kept a key to my house in the wallet. None of this makes sense: why are these “trusted” institutions subverting my sense of personal security, not to mention privacy?

The problem is that the current financial regulatory framework is premised on a direct binding of every transaction to my full legal identity. As David Porteous and I argue in a recent paper, what we need is a more nuanced digital identity system that allows me to present different personas to different identity-requesting entities and choose precisely which attributes of myself get revealed in each case, while still allowing the authorities to trace the identity unequivocally back to me in case I break the law.

The much-celebrated success of mobile money has so far really only transformed one third (messaging) of one half (payment rails) of the financial inclusion agenda. We ain’t seen nothin’ yet.

About 12,000 troops will parade through Tiananmen Square in Beijing tomorrow to celebrate the 70th anniversary of Japan’s surrender to the allies in World War II. China’s leadership is ostensibly using the anniversary as an opportunity, to use the Chinese phrasing, to celebrate “victory in the World Anti-fascist War and the Chinese people’s War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression.”

But really, the purpose is to display its modernized weaponry ahead of several key international visits by President Xi Jinping. For Western leaders, the parade has proven a diplomatic nightmare: The Chinese have pressured them to attend, but they realize that the event is aimed at celebrating the country’s new international assertiveness (and perhaps to sideline a rather bloody summer on the Chinese stock markets). 

Students pose with Chinese national flags and red stars in preparation for the parade on August 31, 2015. Photo credit: Reuters/China Daily.

It’s the present, stupid

Sixty-six years after the end of the war, the world has been learning how to deal with a new China—now a powerful country with a strong economy and an increasingly well-equipped military. China’s defense budget has seen a double-digit increase for the past 25 years, and the country now has J-15 fighter jets, Z-19 attack helicopters, and a truck-mounted version of the DF-41 intercontinental missile. There is little doubt the parade will be impressive both in precision and display. 

In spite of how the Chinese leadership spins it, the parade is not just about history—it’s also about the present and the future. China is using it as a moment to show off its strengths and assert a stronger role in the Asia-Pacific region (as tensions in the South China Sea remain high), if not the world.

The red carpet

One interesting sight will be the VIP box: Which heads of state will actually attend? Confirmed leaders include Russian President Vladimir Putin (who himself hosted Xi Jinping last May for a huge victory parade in Moscow); South African President Jacob Zuma; Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro; Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir (who has an international arrest warrant against him); and—somewhat unexpectedly considering World War II sensitivities in the region—South Korean President Park Geun-hye. Park will attend ceremonies, but not the parade. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un will not be present, nor will Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. 

Fellow leading industrial nations countries don’t want to put Japan in a bind, but no one is willing to offend China. Hence, state leaders have responded to the standing Chinese invitation with an array of contortions. In the end, no Western leader will attend: President Barack Obama—who will be hosting Xi Jinping in the United States in a few weeks—will be represented by U.S. Ambassador to China Max Baucus. Unlike for the launch of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) earlier this year, Washington didn’t pressure other Western leaders to avoid Beijing. This wasn’t necessary, as those governments all had their own reasons for staying away. Even the German president—a largely ceremonial figure—has declined. So has his French counterpart François Hollande, who will travel to China in October to discuss climate issues; French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius will attend instead. Italy will also be represented by its foreign minister. As for the United Kingdom, Prime Minister David Cameron chose to wait for the Chinese state visit to London in October to meet Xi in person. Britain is represented by a former Conservative cabinet minister, Kenneth Clarke. Even more surprising is the list of retired statesmen: former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, who is known to have engaged with Russia’s Putin after leaving office in 2005, will be in there, like his friend and former U.K. counterpart Tony Blair. 

Aircraft perform during a rehearsal on August 23, 2015 for the September 3 military parade in Beijing. Photo credit: Reuters.

Enough troubles

The U.S.-China relationship is already complicated enough and needs no further upsets. While China flexes its muscles with a parade, America is in the middle of a presidential campaign during which candidates—such as Republican Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker, who recently called on President Obama to cancel Xi's visit—are openly criticizing China. For his part, Donald Trump claimed that “China would be in trouble” should he become president, adding: “The poor Chinese.” Although these kinds of comments cannot be taken too seriously, they will require even more diplomatic skills on the part of the current administration, and its successor, to fully restore fully the U.S.-China dialogue.

In these circumstances, it is no surprise that Washington has shown little interest in attending the Beijing events. Nor does the Obama administration want to be part of a demonstration of assertiveness weeks before a state visit to Washington by President Xi. History tells us that U.S.-China relations are going to get even more interesting than a parade.

Event Information

Stability in Europe’s eastern neighborhood, already precarious, is being further strained. The political prospects of several countries, including Ukraine, Georgia, Turkey and Russia, remain unclear. The region is grappling with the fallout of the economic crisis, and Russia and Turkey, in particular, are threatened by the turmoil in the Arab world.

On April 13, the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings (CUSE) hosted former European Union High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana for a discussion on how the European Union (EU) and NATO should engage with Europe’s strategic partners in the East and Southeast. As a former secretary general of NATO and secretary-general of the Council of the European Union, Solana offered insight into the prospects for future EU and NATO enlargement, the potential impact of the eurozone crisis on the region and how Europeans should attempt to cooperate with their neighbors in tackling global challenges.

Brookings President Strobe Talbott provided introductory remarks and moderated the discussion.

Video

• Syria, Russia and Iran
• Global Governance Can Work
• Turkey and Cyprus

Audio

• Europe's Eastern Frontiers: A Conversation with Javier Solana

Transcript

• Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

• 20120413_eastern_europe

It’s a fair question to ask: what was all the fuss about last October? The elections in Georgia and Azerbaijan came and went and the results were no surprise. Azerbaijani incumbent Ilham Aliyev won and Georgia's Mikhail Saakashvilli did not. The Azerbaijani elections were bogus; the Georgian elections were not. So what? Life goes on.

But perhaps it is not that simple. Most outside observers saw these elections as a barometer of democratic progress in a region where the West — and the U.S. in particular — has invested time, resources and effort over more than 20 years to help these countries to build a better future for themselves. As stakeholders in the democratic process in the South Caucasus since Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia gained their independence in 1991, Europe and the U.S. must fuss over the outcomes of the Azerbaijani and Georgian elections. 

Beyond Election Day

Evaluating these elections and their impact on the domestic social and political landscape as well as foreign relations requires, however, a focus on more than just election day. The excellent report from the European Stability Inititive on the election observation mission to Azerbaijan makes a strong case for not judging democratic progress based only on how the elections may appear to be conducted on election day.

The Georgian elections proved that post-Soviet governments could change, politicians could change and a European path be chosen. The Azerbaijani elections proved that a regime could “buy” favorable reports from short-term observers imported for election day, carry on with election rigging, continue human rights violations and ignore international criticism, whether from the Department of State or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s long-term observer mission.

Why the difference between the two neighboring countries? There are several reasons. First, Georgia’s generally free and fair 2012 parliamentary elections set a strong example for the 2013 presidential elections, and Georgia welcomed outside involvement and observation. Azerbaijan, on the other hand, prevented the visit of U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary for Democracy and Human Rights Tom Melia before its elections. Second, Georgian political parties, including the opposition, agreed on electoral ground rules. Third, the Georgian population demanded leadership change. Fourth, the outcome of elections in Georgia was accepted as a transparent way to — for the first time in modern Georgian history — transfer political legitimacy.

Test of Democratic Evolution

The real test of democratic evolution has to do with actions — over a period of months before and after election day — as well as rhetoric that affect the integrity of the elections. The pre- and post-election environments in Azerbaijan consist of continuing intimidation of the political opposition and independent NGO leadership, suppression of freedom of expression and official dismissal of any need to change. While Georgia had a pretty good pre-election period, the post-election period remains fraught with challenges to the effectiveness of Parliament and other fragile institutions, and whether the current government will pursue criminal charges against former President Saakashvili.

Is it Our Business?

There are different views regarding whether democratic evolution — in its broadest sense — is our (e.g. the West, U.S.) business at all. Who are we — despite our support for democratic change — with all our defects to establish standards for others to follow? At least for the short-term the Maidan events in Ukraine put this point into practical focus. If a country wants to be part of the West there are certain standards of economic and political reform that must be met as part of that association. In other words values matter. The traditional excuses of geopolitical importance or interests of energy security for failure to accept even the minimal international norms for treatment of a country’s own citizens are gone.

A major issue for the post-election period has become the choice between closer association with the EU or Vladimir Putin’s Eurasian Union. This choice really is about values that countries choose to be identified by. Armenia and Georgia made clear choices at Vilnius summit for the Eastern Partnership: Georgia and Moldova for the EU; Armenia for Eurasian Union. Ukraine was asked to make a decision but chose to walk the line between short-run financial expediency and a long-term commitment to a European future. Azerbaijan decided to choose none of the above; “neutrality” the regime called it. All the while proclaiming — along with its apologists in the West — the strategic importance of Azerbaijani energy for Europe’s future.

These countries can no longer talk their way around this or employ foreign surrogates to do this for them. Arguments for overlooking bogus elections, corruption and human rights abuses based on overriding strategic importance to the U.S. (e.g. war against terror, Northern Distribution Network, energy security) are excuses for inaction on the fundamental values that must be at the core of our relationships in the 21st century.

When countries like Azerbaijan fail to live up to these standards we do not walk away. Rather we continue to insist on solid, value-based behavior by those who profess they are partners with us. That means economic and political reforms to complete the transition from post-Soviet to 21st Century status. This requires observance of human rights, respect for freedom of expression, and release of political prisoners. It also requires a pattern of increasingly democratic elections. That’s why we need to care about elections in the south Caucasus.

We must congratulate Tbilisi on its accomplishments in the October electoral process. At the same time we must encourage the Georgian government to move along with strengthening institutions like Parliament and the judiciary so Georgia can avoid a political justice system.

There has been no shortage of news about South Africa’s recent economic and political turmoil—from its plummeting currency and slowing economy, to President Zuma’s cabinet shake-up, to weeks-long student protests over rising tuition fees in October.

Understanding what is driving political volatility requires understanding the central economic challenge facing South Africa’s major metropolitan regions: insufficient labor market opportunities for young people.

A recent Brookings report found that the unemployment rate among youth (ages 15 to 34) in Gauteng, the home province of the Johannesburg region, was nearly 40 percent, exceeding the 37 percent national rate. Young people continue to flock to Johannesburg, and the broader Gauteng City-Region that surrounds it, in search of economic opportunity. But the city-region has only created jobs at a 1.3 percent annual clip since 2000, far lower than peer regions like Shenzhen (8.2 percent), Istanbul (2.8 percent), and Santiago (2.4 percent), limiting its ability to absorb young workers. At the same time, the skills demands of the labor market have shifted as the region’s economy has transitioned from mining to more advanced services, creating a mismatch between what education and training systems are providing and what the labor market demands. This employment crisis matters for both economic competitiveness (output per worker growth, a rough measure of productivity, has stagnated since 2010) and economic justice (the unemployment rate for black South Africans is four times the rate for whites).

At a recent Global Cities Initiative event in Johannesburg local private, public, and civic leaders discussed both the immense scale of the youth unemployment challenge and an ambitious proposed solution: the youth skills empowerment initiative “Vulindlel’ eJozi” (a Zulu phrase meaning “open the way in Johannesburg”) created by the city of Johannesburg in partnership with the Harambee Youth Employment Accelerator. Of the approximately 1.6 million Johannesburg residents aged 19-34, just under half are not engaged in employment, education, or training. Vulindlel’ eJozi’s seeks to “reach 200,000 of these young people to meaningfully include and engage them in our economy over the next year.”

Vulindlel’ eJozi stands out for at least two reasons. Most glaringly is its sheer scale. Through its work with Harambee and other initiatives, the city of Johannesburg provided over 45,000 opportunities for youth to move towards employment during the first quarter of 2015. Second, the partnership leverages the resources and competencies of the private and civic sectors. Harambee has successfully trained and placed 20,000 youth in sustained formal employment with over 200 employers and ambitiously wants to engage 500,000 South African youth in their training programs. Constant employer feedback on what skills are demanded is one of the accelerator’s hallmarks, helping Harambee achieve higher trainee retention rates than industry averages.  

Youth unemployment, of course, is not a problem unique to South Africa. Recent Brookings research found that labor force participation, employment, and median earnings among American teens and young adults all declined between 2000 and 2014. How effectively the city of Johannesburg can build the institutional architecture to engage with private and NGO actors on a youth employment initiative at this scale will ultimately determine its success. These lessons could serve other cities well as they seek to deliver economic opportunity to their young people.

Editor's Note: This blog post is part of The Primaries Project series, where veteran political journalists Jill Lawrence and Walter Shapiro, along with scholars in Governance Studies and the Campaign Finance Institute, examine the congressional primaries and ask what they reveal about the future of each political party and the future of American politics.

A great deal of attention has been paid to the existence of independent expenditure groups and to the billionaires who fund them. The Koch brothers and Sheldon Adelson, right wing billionaires in politics, and Tom Steyer, the newest left wing billionaire in politics, seem to have had nearly as much ink spilled on them as have the candidates and causes they endorse.  And no wonder. Americans are fascinated and worried about the question Darrell West poses in the second chapter of his new book Billionaires, “Can rich dudes buy an election?”

Tracking the sources and amounts of money in post Citizens United elections is a full time and complex job. Our hats go off to the Campaign Finance Institute who has recently completed the most extensive study ever of the role of independent expenditures in primary elections. Michael Malbin, Founding Director of the Center and author of the upcoming report on this year’s primaries, shows us just how big these groups, often funded by billionaires, have gotten.  In research focusing on independent spending in the 2014 congressional primaries, Malbin points out that in the 15 House races with the most independent expenditure money ($500,000 +) these expenditures counted for 76% as much as the candidates own campaign money. In Senate races, the independent expenditures accounted for 44% as much as the candidates own money.  Even the candidates themselves are worried about this trend since it often seems that outside groups can swamp a candidate’s own message.

Malbin also shows us why it is so hard to figure out what’s going on in an individual election. Only 49 of the 281 organizations that were around in the 2012 cycle spending money on behalf of congressional primary candidates were also around in 2014. That means that there were 232 new and different groups playing in 2014, posing challenges for the journalists and academics trying to track them.

The Campaign Finance Institute, however, has data on all these organizations from 2012 and 2014.  They have categorized them by ideology and, as the following chart shows, there are some interesting developments. For instance, while conservative independent expenditure groups remain the biggest spenders in the 2014 congressional primaries, their overall proportion of independent expenditures is down from 2012.  That year, conservative groups spent $40.5 million, nearly three quarters of total independent expenditures, compared to $9.3 million or 17 percent of total expenditures for Democrats.  In 2014, conservative groups upped their spending to $56.8 million, but their overall share of independent expenditures fell to 68% as liberal groups doubled their spending and increased their percentage of the total to 23%.

Even more surprising is the change in spending patterns within the Republican Party. As the following table shows, this really was the year when the establishment fought back. In 2012 anti-establishment spending by independent expenditure groups in congressional primaries constituted 59% of all such expenditures while spending by independent expenditure groups on behalf of establishment Republicans was only 36% of the total.  In two years, those numbers flipped.  In 2014, with control of the Senate at stake, the establishment mobilized independent expenditure groups which spent 55% of all the money spent by such groups while the anti-establishment groups spent only 37%.

There’s something for everyone in these findings. For the Democrats who have been on the defensive for much of this year but who have gotten through a primary season with few internal divisions, the increase in spending on their behalf and the sense that they will be able to run a good ground game in the key states where it really counts is a plus.

For the Republicans, the heavy spending by establishment groups has paid off in that they haven’t let weak candidates slip into the general election contest. They are probably as strong as they can be going into the fall campaign.

Nonetheless, tracking the money in this new election environment is a complex and full time job. And Darrell West’s question still hangs over us—“Can rich dudes buy an election?”