Hillary Clinton isn’t often in the business of offering unsolicited advice to her Republican—or even Democratic—rivals in the presidential race. However, in a CNN interview with Alisyn Camerota on January 12, 2015, Hillary Clinton did just that. She did something quite taboo. She talked about the presidential transition.

Her comments did not flow from confidence that she would be elected president—a confidence she may indeed have. Her words came from experience, pragmatism and reality. They were words that did not simply reflect her own approach to a candidacy or a prospective administration. It was advice to everyone running for president about the right thing to do—not for themselves, but for the American public.

Clinton said:

I want to think hard—if I do get the nomination, right then and there—how we organize the White House, how we organize the Cabinet, what’s the legislative agenda. You know, the time between an election and an inauguration is short. You can’t wait. I mean, you can’t take anything for granted; you need to keep working as hard as you possibly can. But I think it’s important to start planning because we know what happens if you get behind in getting your agenda out, in getting your appointments made. You lose time, and you’re not doing the work the American people elected you to do.

Presidential candidates almost never speak of a transition until they are declared the president-elect in the late hours of the Tuesday following the first Monday in November. Candidates fear being accused of taking the election for granted, or “measuring the drapes.” They worry such planning will signal to voters an off-putting overconfidence.

Those fears may be legitimate, but acting on those concerns can be dangerous. If a voter believes a candidate should not prepare for a new administration until they are officially elected, that leaves the president-elect about 11 weeks to ready themselves for the busiest, most complicated, most important job in the world. In those 11 weeks, a president-elect would need to think not just about the 15 Cabinet secretaries who serve as the most visible political appointees in government, but literally hundreds and thousands of other posts. (One dirty little secret is that the President of the United States appoints over 3,000 people to his or her administration.)

Presidents have to think about the structure, order, and sequence of their legislative agenda. They need to communicate their intentions and plans to congressional leadership. They need to think about organizing a White House. The truth is from president to president, the White House looks the same from the outside, but is structured and functions dramatically differently on the inside. Presidents have myriad important decisions to make that will set the tone and agenda for the following four years and will affect every American in some way. Eleven weeks is not enough time. Clinton acknowledges this.

Clinton’s “bold” statement actually reflects a reality in American politics. As soon as an individual accepts his or her party’s presidential nomination, they are entitled to funding, office space, and government email and technology as part of the transition process. The Office of Personnel Management is involved, as is (of late) the Office of Presidential Personnel for the outgoing administration. The presidential transition is an essential part of democracy, policymaking, administration, and the continuity of government. Every four years, the government supports two transitions—one that comes to be and one that closes up shop.

In one way however, Hillary Clinton is entirely wrong. Waiting until you receive the nomination is too late to begin thinking about the transition. As I have written before, every presidential candidate should start thinking about a transition as soon as they announce their candidacy. They don’t need a full Cabinet chosen on Day 1 of the campaign, but they should designate one or two close advisers to organize for the process, begin considering names for posts, think through the types of policies to propose in the first 100 days, and begin what is one of the most complicated managerial tasks in the world.

Hillary Clinton is right “it is important to start planning,” and it’s also never too early to do so. I hope Clinton’s claim that one should start upon securing the nomination is a reflection of that fear of the “drape measuring” accusation. I hope she is planning her transition now. I hope Bernie Sanders and Ted Cruz and Donald Trump and John Kasich and everyone else is planning their transition right now. It’s essential. Clinton knows the challenges of setting up a White House and the complications that early disorganization can cause; she saw that dysfunction first hand in 1993. But most candidates have also worked in or around the White House or have been in politics long enough to know the importance of an effective transition. And candidates who haven’t, like Donald Trump and Carly Fiorina, should be more inclined to set up a transition early, as they have more managerial experience than anyone else in the race.

To this end, I have a modest proposal. It probably won’t happen. It’s likely one that candidates would fear, and it would likely only be effective if everyone is on board. Every current presidential candidate should sign a pledge committing to two things. First, by February 1, 2016, they will designate at least one staffer, adviser or confidante as a transition director.  Second, they will not publicly criticize another candidate—of either party—for having a transition staffer or team in place. Call it a “Transition Truce.” But the reality is that such a pledge—and the actions behind it—are essential for a better functioning, better prepared, more effective administration, no matter who it is who swears the oath exactly one year from today.

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Thailand has been under military rule since May 2014, when General Prayuth Chan-Ocha and the Royal Thai Army seized power after deposing democratically elected Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra. Current Prime Minister Prayuth has systematically postponed elections on the grounds of prioritizing order and drafting a new constitution to restore democracy. Since the coup, Thai authorities have used the murky lèse-majesté law to curtail opposition to the monarchy, while the country’s economy has languished.

On February 24, the Center for East Asia Policy Studies at Brookings hosted an event to explore the root causes of Thailand’s political crisis, the implications of an upcoming royal succession, and the possibilities for the road ahead. The event was moderated by Senior Fellow Richard Bush.  Panelists included Duncan McCargo, professor of political science at the University of Leeds, Joshua Kurlantzick, senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Don Pathan, an independent security analyst based in Thailand.

 Please follow the conversation on Twitter at #ThaiPolitics

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• Kingdom at a crossroads: Thailand’s uncertain political trajectory

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• Transcript (.pdf)

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• 20160224_thailand_political_crisis_transcript

Editors’ Note: For the United States to succeed in its mission in Afghanistan, it is essential that the Obama administration sustain the current level of U.S. forces there. Recognizing this, John Allen spearheaded a move to ask President Obama to do so, in the following open letter to which former leaders from the military and diplomatic corps signed on. This letter originally appeared on The National Interest.

Washington, DC

June 3, 2016

Dear Mr. President,

We are writing, as Americans committed to the success of our country’s Afghanistan mission, to urge that you sustain the current level of U.S. forces in Afghanistan through the remainder of your term. Aid levels and diplomatic energies should similarly be preserved without reduction. Unless emergency conditions require consideration of a modest increase, we would strongly favor a freeze at the level of roughly ten thousand U.S. troops through January 20. This approach would also allow your successor to assess the situation for herself or himself and make further adjustments accordingly.

The broader Middle East is roiled in conflicts that pit moderate and progressive forces against those of violent extremists. As we saw on 9/11 and in the recent attacks in Paris, San Bernardino and Brussels, the problems of the Middle East do not remain contained within the Middle East. Afghanistan is the place where Al Qaeda and affiliates first planned the 9/11 attacks and a place where they continue to operate—and is thus important in the broader effort to defeat the global extremist movement today. It is a place where Al Qaeda and ISIS still have modest footprints that could be expanded if a security vacuum developed. If Afghanistan were to revert to the chaos of the 1990s, millions of refugees would again seek shelter in neighboring countries and overseas, dramatically intensifying the severe challenges already faced in Europe and beyond.

In the long-term struggle against violent extremists, the United States above all needs allies—not only to fight a common enemy, but also to create a positive vision for the peoples of the region. Today, aided by the bipartisan policies of the last two U.S. administrations, Afghans have established a democratic political system, moderately effective security forces, a much improved quality of life, and a vibrant civil society. Afghans are fighting and dying for their country, and in our common battle against extremism, with more than five thousand police and soldiers laying down their lives annually each of the past several years.

Afghanistan is a place where we should wish to consolidate and lock down our provisional progress into something of a more lasting asset. It is a Muslim country where most of the public as well as government officials want our help and value our friendship. Afghanistan is also a crucial partner in helping to shape the calculations of Pakistan, which has been an incubator of violent extremism but which might gradually be induced to cooperate in building a regional order conducive to peace and economic progress.

You have rightly prioritized Afghanistan throughout your presidency and have successfully achieved several crucial objectives. You have prevented the reemergence of a terrorist sanctuary in Afghanistan, from which attacks on Americans might emanate. You have helped Afghanistan develop security forces so that it is principally Afghans who are defending Afghanistan, thereby enabling a 90 percent reduction in the U.S. military presence relative to its peak (and a two-thirds reduction relative to what you inherited in 2009). You have established a long-term strategic partnership with Afghanistan that can address common threats from extremist groups based in Pakistan. To our minds, these are significant accomplishments. They have established much of the foundation for pursuing the ultimate goals of stabilizing Afghanistan and defeating extremism in the region.

To be sure, there have been significant frustrations in Afghanistan along the way. All of us have lived and experienced a number of them. All of us have, like you, deeply lamented the loss of each American life that has been sacrificed there in pursuit of our mission objectives and our national security.

Yet, though the situation is fraught, we have reason to be confident. President Ghani, Chief Executive Abdullah, and many brave Afghans are working hard to rebuild their country. NATO allies and other partners remain committed to the mission. The level of support we must provide to enable continued progress is much lower than in earlier periods.

Our group is taking full stock of the situation in Afghanistan and will make a broader range of recommendations available to the next U.S. president on the interrelated subjects of governance, the economy, and security. But as an interim measure, and with the NATO Warsaw summit as well as other key decision points still looming on your watch, we urge you to maintain the current U.S. troop strength in Afghanistan through the end of your term. Based on longstanding experience in the country as well as recent trips to Afghanistan by some of us, this step would be seen as a positive reaffirmation of America’s commitment to that nation, its people and its security. It would likely have helpful effects on refugee flows, the confidence of the Taliban, the morale of the Afghan military and Afghan people, the state of the Afghan economy and perhaps even the strategic assessments of some in Pakistan. Conversely, we are convinced that a reduction of our military and financial support over the coming months would negatively affect each of these.

Sincerely,

Ambassadors to Afghanistan

Ryan Crocker

James Cunningham

Robert Finn

Zalmay Khalilzad

Ronald Neumann

Military Commanders in Afghanistan

John Allen

David Barno

John Campbell

Stanley McChrystal

David Petraeus

Special Representatives for Afghanistan/Pakistan

James Dobbins

Daniel Feldman

Marc Grossman

On February 9, President Obama submitted his FY 2017 budget request to Congress. The proposed international affairs budget is down 1 percent from current funding levels and 12 percent (in constant dollars) since 2010, better than many domestic accounts. In addition, outside the regular budget, the administration is proposing $1.8 billion ($376 million from the international affairs budget account) to meet the latest pandemic—the Zika virus. Given the budget environment, the proposed amounts for the international affairs budget seem reasonable.

But from a long-term perspective, the budget is alarming. It seems unable to take account of global trends, it relies on fractured and ad hoc processes, and it is excessively siloed into pre-determined sectors.

Being satisfied with relatively small budget cuts does not face the reality of far greater and more pressing challenges today than in 2010. Today, Iraq and Afghanistan are still demanding sizable budget resources. We need to respond to Russia’s muscle-flexing by demonstrating our commitment to its independent neighbors. The effort to move HIV/AIDS to a more sustainable model is commendable but showing minimal success, so U.S. funding cannot slip. The Ebola crisis has been succeeded by the Zika virus. The Middle East is unstable and violent, with half the population of Syria killed or displaced. Sixty million displaced persons is the highest level ever reached. The world is addressing four Level 3 humanitarian crises, an unprecedented number. The fear of terrorism is spreading and disrupting rational political dialogue. Domestic violence and civil strife is increasing in Central America. Free expression is under siege in many countries and civil societies are in need of reinforcement.

Many of these challenges reflect an underinvestment in development in the past. We are using a Rube Goldberg budget system that cobbles together funding from multiple sources for a single objective and locks in funding several years before a penny flows, making it difficult to adjust to changing circumstances.

The budgeting system problem

The 2017 budget uses a gimmick that may not be sustainable. To fund the Iraq war, the Bush administration invented an off-budget account (Overseas Contingent Operations, or OCO, a successor to earlier emergency funding) that does not count against the annual budget caps. The State Department and USAID got part of their budgets starting in 2012 from this account. OCO for FY 2017 is proposed at one-quarter of the international affairs budget. The problem is that OCO cannot be counted on in the long-term, and the sustainable base budget for FY 2017 is down 30 percent from FY 2010 in constant dollars.

The budget process is also absurdly long. The Obama administration began planning the FY 2016 budget in the spring of 2014, roughly 18 months before Congressional appropriations. Typically, it could take another six months for agency officials and appropriation committees to agree on country and program allocations. Only then, 30 months later, can U.S. development professionals working overseas get on with the business of putting those resources to work.  

This budget process, with its long timeframes and pre-determined earmarks and presidential initiatives, means that despite best efforts by USAID, it is difficult to respect “local ownership” of development—something that development experience demonstrates is fundamental to successful and sustainable development.

Presidential initiatives have their place as a way to bring along political allies and the American populace. It is also appropriate and constructive for Congress to weigh in on funding priorities. But it can be counterproductive to effective development when presidential initiatives and congressional earmarks dictate at the micro level and restrict flexibility in implementation, especially in a rapidly changing world with frequent crises. 

Another problem with the current budget system is that most but not all sectors are protected by budget accounts or earmarks. Health is protected and the funding divided into various sub-accounts. Education and agriculture get earmarks. New in the FY 2016 appropriations bill is a separate line item for democracy.

Another structural issue is the crisis-reactive nature of our assistance programs. Health, which garners the lion’s share of U.S. economic assistance, has been dominated for nearly two decades by responses to global crises — first massive funding for combatting HIV/AIDS, followed by significant funding to tackle malaria, Ebola, and now the Zika virus. It is funding by individual disease. Crisis galvanizes political and popular support for the here and now. But what if we had focused on building up national health systems for the last 20 years rather than fighting one-off diseases? If we moved to more preventive approaches now, maybe in 10 or 20 years the pandemic of the day could be met less by the U.S. ramping up in a crisis mode and more by the health systems in those countries affected, with the U.S. playing a supportive and technical role rather than the core funding role. 

These issues are examples of why it is imperative for the next administration and congress to engage in a strategic dialogue on the objectives and priorities of foreign assistance programs, both in funding levels and how the funds are used. It is time to move away from the current structure that resembles building a Cadillac from parts of models stretching from 1949 to 1973, as in the Johnny Cash song "One Piece at A Time.”

Figure 1: How we build our budget

Source: Abernathyautoparts, CC BY-SA 2.5

It is not unrealistic to envisage a more strategic approach. One option is to return to the approach in the 1970s, when all development funding was put into one of just five or six functional accounts, and provide some flexibility in moving funds between accounts.

Policymakers who believe that America is an exceptional or indispensable nation and that world problems do not get solved without American involvement need to take a hard look at whether they are providing the U.S. government with the required diplomatic and development tools. It is high time for U.S. policymakers to take a more strategic approach to the level of funding of international affairs and how the U.S. uses its foreign assistance. The inauguration of a new president and Congress in 2017 offers the opportunity to seize this challenge.

Once upon a time, long ago, the development industry was fixated on measuring aid from richer to poorer countries. They called it ODA, standing for Official Development Assistance. For decades this aid has been codified, reported, and tracked, mostly by the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (DAC/OECD), a club of advanced economies. In advance of the Spring Meetings of the IMF and World Bank, the DAC announced that ODA has risen by 6.9% over 2014 levels to 132 billion dollars, a record amount. Importantly, ODA increased even after stripping out funds spent on refugees.

The United Nations has established targets for ODA—like the famous 0.7 percent of national income—which have taken on legendary status as benchmarks of national generosity. Only six out of 28 DAC countries met this target last year: Denmark, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom.

Some institutions and lobby groups remain fixated on ODA, but many development actors now reject it as flawed. A major theme of the Spring Meetings is how to move beyond ODA and expand other forms of financing for development. ODA is, among other things, symptomatic of a charity perspective, rather than investment; inappropriate for South-South cooperation; and unable to capture the big new landscape of public-private links. What’s more, it is riddled with self-serving quirks like scoring numerous flows—the cost of university places in donor countries, and administrative costs of aid agencies—that never reach developing countries.

Perhaps the most telling weakness of ODA is that emerging powers like China and India see little merit (and arguably, some residual stigma) in this concept and, therefore, will not report on that basis to a club to which they do not belong. As their share of the world economy and their interactions with other “developing” countries continue to grow, this means ODA will inevitably start to represent an ever smaller share of official financing for development.

TOSSD stands for Total Official Support for Sustainable Development. The idea, still being fleshed out, is to have a universally accepted measure of the full array of public financial support for sustainable development. TOSSD should differ from ODA in at least three ways:

• First, it should take a developing country perspective rather than a donor country perspective. So it should cover the value of all funding for development that is officially supported, from pure grants to near-market loans and equity investments, as well as guarantees and insurance.
• Second, it should measure cross-border flows from all countries, not just the rich members of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee.
• Third, it should include contributions to global public goods needed to support development, like U.N. peacekeeping and pandemic surveillance.

There are many complications behind any international attempt to define and track such a huge range of activities. Some are technical, but can probably be resolved with enough goodwill and professionalism. So, for example, we can debate how to establish whether and how official support to private investors changes their behaviour, delivering “additional” development results compared to a situation without that support. In the end, sensible solutions and workarounds will be found.

More difficult are a couple of politically sensitive challenges, which at the same time underlie the value of reaching consensus on a new measure. How far, for example, should the new measure recognise indirect spending on global public goods? Take for example public research on an AIDS vaccine that could lead to prevention of millions of deaths in developing countries. Right now, this would not count as ODA because the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries is not its main objective.

We tend to think that consideration of globe-spanning benefits like these, which do not fit the simple mould of money crossing borders, is an essential feature of a new measure of development finance. However, it will need to be bounded sensibly, not least because of underlying suspicions that the countries that are today most likely to deploy such tools, and claim them as a large part of their distinctive contribution, are among the “old rich”—though that could change quickly. We suggest that spending on a defined list of global public goods should be included, perhaps those that support Agenda 2030, such as U.N. peacekeeping or a global research consortium like GAVI, the Vaccine Alliance.

A second potentially divisive issue, already alluded to, is how to value non-monetary flows, like technical assistance, and in a fair way across countries. We think it would be a powerful positive signal for international cooperation if even modest contributions by low- and middle-income countries are recognised, celebrated, and valued according to the contribution being made, not the cost of providing the assistance. The assistance provided by professionals from developing countries (think Cuban doctors) should be measured at the same prices as assistance provided by professionals from rich countries. Some form of purchasing power parity equivalence would need to be defined and used.

This is a hugely contentious question. Neither of the most obvious answers, the well-organised but globally unloved OECD and the legitimate but under-resourced U.N. secretariat, are likely to be acceptable without some changes. A preferred candidate has to have a sufficiently broad group of countries prepared to self-report on even a loose set of definitions in order to get momentum. At a minimum all the major economies of the world, for example members of the G-20, should be willing to participate. It should also have the technical capacity to help countries provide information in a consistent way.

The International Monetary Fund or World Bank could be candidates—most countries already report to them on a range of data, including financial flows. The Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, with its membership of many development actors and technical support, could be another. Or a new group could be created in much the same way as the International Aid Transparency Initiative. This could even be a revamped Development Assistance Committee that operates with broader support in much the same way as the OECD’s tax work has many non-OECD members participating. What is important is that the guiding principle be to measure official cross-border financial resources that support the new universally-agreed Sustainable Development Goals, and to start now and learn by doing.  Such initiatives are too easily killed by subjecting them to endless external criticism that a perfect solution has not been found.

TOSSD may be one of the least attractive acronyms on offer today. Without disrespect to its OECD authors, it will anyway have to change to something that works for all the major stakeholders, and is not visibly invented in Paris and that also encourages players who are not strictly speaking “official,” like foundations, to sign up. We tend to favor a plainer, simpler wrapper like International Development Contributions (IDC), or Defined Development Contributions (DDC). 

Introduction

Ohio has already taken important steps to address the state’s ongoing foreclosure crisis, yet the crisis continues, causing distress for thousands of families and individuals, and destabilizing cities, towns and neighborhoods across the state. Therefore, the state, its local governments and private stakeholders need to do still more to deal more effectively with the crisis and its impacts on the state’s housing stock, cities and neighborhoods.

What is often termed the “foreclosure crisis” is actually a multi-dimensional crisis, in which the collapse of the housing bubble, the devastation caused by the lax and often irresponsible credit practices that accompanied and perpetuated that bubble, the resulting freeze on commercial and consumer credit, and the worldwide recession are interwoven, and can only with great difficulty be untangled. In Ohio, those forces are further exacerbated by profound changes to the state’s historical economic underpinnings. Ohio cannot solve the crisis by itself, but it can significantly mitigate its impact on people, neighborhoods, and towns and cities. These mitigating efforts will also help preserve the value of homes and neighborhoods in the state, and place Ohio in a stronger position to benefit from the future economic recovery.

The paper begins with a short summary of current conditions and the actions the state has already taken to address the wave of foreclosures, followed by a discussion of areas for future action. This discussion will address mitigating both the individual and community impacts of foreclosure, but will give particular emphasis to the critical issue of softening the blow of foreclosure on communities, which up to now has been less of a focus for state action.

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Editor’s Note: The following chapter is part of the report, "After the Drug Wars," published in February 2016 by the London School of Economics and Political Science's Expert Group on the Economics of Drug Policy.

Even as the administration of Mexico’s President Enrique Peña Nieto has scored important reform successes in the economic sphere, its security and law enforcement policy toward organized crime remains incomplete and ill-defined. Despite the early commitments of his administration to focus on reducing drug violence, combating corruption, and redesigning counternarcotics policies, little significant progress has been achieved. Major human rights violations related to the drug violence, whether perpetrated by organized crime groups or military and police forces, persist – such as at Iguala, Guerrero, where 43 students were abducted by a cabal of local government officials, police forces and organized crime groups. This has also been seen in Tatlaya and Tanhuato, Michoacán, where military forces have likely been engaged in extrajudicial killings of tens of people. Meanwhile, although drug violence has abated in the north of the country, such as in Ciudad Juárez, Monterrey and Tijuana, government policies have played only a minor role. Much of the violence reduction is the result of the vulnerable and unsatisfactory narcopeace – the victory of the Sinaloa or Gulf Cartels. 

The July 2015 spectacular escape of the leader of the Sinaloa Cartel and the world’s most notorious drug trafficker – Joaquín Guzmán Loera, known as El Chapo – from a Mexican high-security prison was a massive embarrassment for the Peña Nieto government. Yet it serves as another reminder of the deep structural deficiencies of Mexico’s law enforcement and rule-of law system which persists more than a decade after Mexico declared its war on the drug cartels.

The Peña Nieto administration often pointed to the February 2014 capture of El Chapo as the symbol of its effectiveness in fighting drug cartels and violent criminal groups in Mexico. The Peña Nieto administration’s highlighting of Chapo’s capture was both ironic and revealing: ironic, because the new government came into office criticizing the anti-crime policy of the previous administration of Felipe Calderón of killing or capturing top capos to decapitate their cartels; and revealing, because despite the limitations and outright counterproductive effects of this high-value-targeting policy and despite promises of a very different strategy, the Peña Nieto administration fell back into relying on the pre-existing approach. In fact, such high-value-targeting has been at the core of Pena Nieto’s anti-crime policy. Moreover, Chapo’s escape from Mexico’s most secure prison through a sophisticated tunnel (a method he had also pioneered for smuggling drugs and previously used for escapes) showed the laxity and perhaps complicity at the prison, and again spotlighted the continuing inadequate state of Mexico’s corrections system.

Read the full chapter here.

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• Cuidado: The inescapable necessity of better law enforcement in Mexico

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This April, the United States will assume chairmanship of the Arctic Council for a two-year term. Since the last U.S. chairmanship fifteen years ago, the Arctic has changed dramatically. Melting sea ice has impacted indigenous communities as well as wildlife in significant ways. New Arctic transportation corridors have opened and new prospects for offshore oil and gas development have emerged. The region’s growing strategic, economic, and environmental importance has made U.S. policy toward the Arctic more of a priority than ever before. Recent statements from the White House have emphasized the opportunity for the United States to lead in global efforts to mitigate climate change impacts in the region, govern resources responsibly, and protect Arctic ecosystems and inhabitants.

On March 12, the Energy Security and Climate Initiative (ESCI) at Brookings will host Admiral Robert J. Papp, Jr., the U.S. special representative for the Arctic, for a keynote address on the future of U.S. policy for the region. Deputy Director for Foreign Policy at Brookings Bruce Jones will provide introductory remarks, and ESCI Senior Fellow Charles Ebinger will moderate the discussion and audience Q&A. 

 Join the conversation on Twitter using #USArctic

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• U.S. leadership in the Arctic

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• Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

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• 20150312_us_arctic_transcript

This weekend the United States will assume the chairmanship of the Arctic Council for a two-year term. While the Obama administration has been preparing for this for several years, it remains to be seen how the president will balance the concerns of most Arctic residents who view development of the region as vital to improving their economic and social livelihood and those individuals inside and outside the administration who want to limit development out of concern for the how economic development may cause local environmental degradation while also accelerating climate change.

As part of this preparation, in May 2013, the president launched a new National Strategy for the Arctic Region based on three principles

1. Advancement of U.S. security interests defined as ensuring the ability of our aircraft and vessels to operate, in a manner consistent with international law through, under, and over the airspace and waters of the Arctic; to support lawful commerce; to achieve greater awareness of activities in the region; and to intelligently evolve our Arctic infrastructure and capabilities including ice-capable platforms as needed;
2. Pursue responsible Arctic regional stewardship defined as protection of the Arctic environment and conservation of its resources, establishment of an integrated Arctic management framework, charting of the Arctic region, and employment of scientific research and traditional knowledge to increase understanding of the Arctic;
3. Strengthen international cooperation defined as working through bilateral relationships and multilateral institutions, including the Arctic Council, to advance collective interests, promote shared Arctic state prosperity, protect the Arctic environment, and enhance regional security, and to work toward U.S. accession to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

Undergirding these principles were commitments to make decisions using the best available information, to foster cooperation with the state of Alaska, other international partners, the private sector, and to consult and coordinate with Alaskan natives to gain traditional knowledge. As part of this new strategy, the president appointed Admiral Robert J. Papp Jr. as the U.S. special representative for the Arctic in July 2014. Shortly after his appointment, and in several major speeches since, including one at Brookings, the admiral has stated that the administration’s agenda centers on stewardship of the Arctic Ocean including insuring its safety and security, improving economic and living conditions for the regions’ inhabitants, and addressing the impacts of climate change on the region. 

The administration’s new policy was buttressed in January 2015 by an executive order designed to enhance coordination of all the various agencies responsible for different aspects of federal oversight of the Arctic (Alaska). Paradoxically, however, the fact that the reorganization came nearly in tandem with the announcement of new wilderness restrictions on the exploration of oil and gas in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) and the Arctic Coastal Plain. This announcement left many Alaskans skeptical on how further restrictions on development of the state’s resources could be viewed as improving economic and living conditions of people in the region. In a February 2015 meeting of Arctic Council Senior Arctic Officials (SAOs) in Yellowknife, Canada, the administration looked to put meat on the bones of what it intended to pursue upon assumption of the chairmanship of the Arctic Council. This resulted in an additional elucidation of 15 broad themes that had originally been presented in a Virtual Stakeholder Outreach Forum on December 2, 2014 in Washington, D.C..

The announced reorganization of government agencies and lines of authority dealing with U.S. Arctic and Arctic Council policy has done little or nothing to streamline the overlapping and sometimes conflicting policies governing natural resource development or energy projects in Alaska. These overlapping jurisdictions are well highlighted in a major new National Petroleum Council (NPC) report, Arctic Potential: Realizing the Promise of U.S. Arctic Oil and Gas Resources. This report was prepared at the request of Energy Secretary Moniz to address how best to pursue prudent development of Alaska’s offshore oil and gas resources and ironically issued shortly after the president’s closing of ANWR. Whether or not the White House was even aware of the NPC’s report, which represented months of substantive work by many people, remains open to question.

The Arctic reorganization plan did little to resolve some key questions as to actually who is in charge of Arctic policy in the United States. While Admiral Papp was named “Coordinator” of the U.S. Arctic Council Chairmanship, this position is not listed in the Council’s enabling documents. Historically, the foreign minister or the secretary of state of the country chairs the Council while a career diplomat chairs the meetings of the senior officials dealing with the day-to-day activities of the Council. It appears that Admiral Papp has neither of these positions. In any case, it looks from the organizational chart that the White House science advisor will be the real coordinator of U.S. Arctic policy.

The chief problem that U.S. Arctic policy must resolve is that while in the Arctic Council we have to address issues affecting the entire Circumpolar North, our domestic Arctic policy centers only on Alaska, where a slew of domestic agencies have overlapping and often conflicting oversight and regulatory responsibilities. The situation is made still more complex by the large amount of the state that is owned by the federal government. This makes it almost inevitable that any resource development project by private or state interests will run into federal government restrictions, in terms of needing to cross federal land to get a resource to market, permitting to ensure that water resources are not polluted, or making sure that fish and wildlife habitats are not disturbed, etc.

Our Arctic policy also suffers from an acute lack of awareness by most Americans that we are an Arctic nation with a huge maritime boundary and very limited resources (ice-worthy ships, proper navigation charts and aids, lack of port facilities, lack of search and rescue capabilities, lack of knowledge of what fishery resources we possess) to protect it. While many of these issues lie outside the scope of the Arctic Council, many are cross-cutting with our Arctic neighbors, most notably with increased traffic in the region (from tourism, fishing, energy development, and shipping) comes the increased possibility of an accident. Currently, the United States does not have the capable means (both in terms of timely response and adequate infrastructure) to respond to an accident in the Arctic, which could be catastrophic, as all of these industries are active and gaining popularity every day.

As the United States takes the helm of the Arctic Council, there are several core issues that the administration must address. Some critical questions are: What is the U.S. position on the development of the Arctic’s oil, gas, mineral, and fishery resources? What specific action is the United States prepared to support in the Arctic Council to uplift the standard of living of Arctic people across the Circumpolar North? Given that each icebreaker costs at least $700 million and that we only have one in operation, what resources are we prepared to expand to build a fleet capable to respond to events in the Arctic? Should any of these expenses be viewed as vital to our national security and defense, and if so, which budget should they be taken out of? What role does the United States in its chairmanship role see for closer interaction between the Arctic Council and the Arctic Economic Council? Would the United States support the closing off of certain ecologically sensitive parts of the Arctic to all commercial exploitation? Finally, how does the administration in its Arctic Council leadership role get its Arctic policy in sync with that of the state of Alaska in its recently released Alaska Arctic Policy Implementation Plan?

Other Arctic nations surpass the United States in terms of Arctic policies. Norway, Russia, Canada, and even Denmark (through complicated ties with Greenland’s claim on the Arctic) all have the Arctic at the front and center of policymaking decisions. I hope to see these issues addressed as the United States moves to enact effective policy on the Arctic over the next two years as the alternative is too great a risk and too great a wasted opportunity. 

As the United States readies to assume chairmanship of the Arctic Council today, it is timely to assess where the United States stands in terms of its ability and commitment to lead in the region. While there are many important elements of Arctic leadership outlined in the U.S. National Arctic Strategy, the ultimate metric of state leadership comes not from policy alone but also willingness to commit the resources needed to advance national interests and shape favorable global norms for peace, stability, and responsibility. In this context, the United States has yet to demonstrate a strong commitment to 21st century Arctic leadership. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the decaying state of the U.S. heavy icebreaking “fleet”—currently consisting of just one operational heavy icebreaker—and the lack of a credible national strategy to expand, much less sustain, this capacity.

Although the Arctic Council framework focuses specifically on shared, non-military interests, it would be a mistake to assume the region will be immune from future incidents, whether from eventual increases in tourism and shipping, energy development, or even limited geopolitical conflict. The United States must sustain heavy icebreaking capability to assure year-round access to the region and to be ready to respond in the event of a safety, security, or environmental threat.

Commercial activity in the Arctic

While commercial activity in the Arctic remains limited today, signs of increased economic investment are on the rise, including Royal Dutch Shell’s announcement of intent to resume Arctic drilling later this year and Crystal Cruises’ planned 2016 traverse of the Northwest Passage with its 820 foot, 1,000 passenger cruise ship Crystal Serenity. The Arctic’s vast untapped resources and opening sea lanes are beginning to drive previously-unheard of levels of human activity.

Some have suggested companies like Shell can and will invest in their own icebreaking and emergency response capabilities for Arctic drilling, rendering a U.S. government asset superfluous. This is a shortsighted view that fails to recognize the fundamental risks associated with abdicating prevention and response capabilities solely to the private sector.

While a single icebreaker obviously has neither the capacity nor capability to clean up a large oil spill in the Arctic, or anywhere else for that matter, in certain scenarios it could help prevent a spill from happening in the first place, mitigate the severity of a spill, and provide a means to ensure on-scene government oversight and command of any incident.

In the case of Arctic tourism, it is important to recognize that a mass rescue operation involving hundreds of passengers on a cruise ship—already one of the most difficult scenarios for search and rescue professionals—becomes exponentially more difficult in the remote and harsh Arctic environment.

Finally, although unlikely in the near-term, a future scenario can also be envisioned in which U.S. Navy surface ships need access to the Arctic, and icebreaking capacity is necessary to execute the mission. This is perhaps a distant possibility in the context of today’s Arctic but is a contingency for which the nation should be prepared in the future.

Access to the polar regions

The Coast Guard’s nearly 40-year old and recently reactivated Polar Star is the only U.S. icebreaker with the size and horsepower to provide unfettered access to the polar regions. The reactivation of this vessel, built in the 1970s, cost nearly $60 million and is estimated to have extended its lifetime by only 7 to 10 years. This presents a difficult and unique challenge in an emergency; if for example, the aging Polar Star has a machinery failure and gets stuck in the ice, the United States does not have the means to extract it and may have to resort to assistance from a foreign country. Coast Guard Commandant Admiral Paul Zukunft recently put it bluntly, saying the Coast Guard “has no self-rescue for its Arctic mission, for its Antarctic mission."

While dozens of small and medium sized icebreakers operate successfully in other parts of the world, heavy icebreakers—generally classified as those that exceed 45,000 horsepower—are needed to assure unrestricted access to the Arctic at any time of the year. Additionally, for the United States, heavy icebreaking capacity is also needed for missions like the annual resupply of McMurdo Station in Antarctica, an operation sponsored by the National Science Foundation and executed by the Coast Guard.

Sustaining the capability to access any region of the globe has been a fundamental tenet of U.S. national security policy for decades, and the Arctic should be no exception. The United States is falling behind other Arctic nations, like Russia, that have demonstrated an enduring commitment to maintaining access to the Arctic with heavy icebreakers.

These investments may be considered consistent with the size of Russia’s Arctic coastline and associated Exclusive Economic Zone, both of which are substantially larger than those of the United States or any other Arctic Nation. Indeed, there is certainly room to debate how many heavy icebreakers the United States will ultimately need in the future. A 2011 Coast Guard study concluded that meeting the tenets of the 2010 Naval Operations Concept—which calls for constant, year-round presence in both polar regions—would require six heavy and four medium icebreakers. Likewise, the study indicated three heavy and three medium icebreakers are needed for Arctic presence. Putting the debate in perspective, the Obama administration’s special representative for the Arctic, retired Coast Guard Commandant Admiral Robert Papp, recently gave a keynote address at the Brookings Institution stressing that “we should at least build one,” acknowledging the critical state of U.S. capability.

Replacing the Polar Star presents a unique challenge. Such vessels have not been built in four decades in the United States, and most estimates suggest a 10-year, $1 billion program to build just one in a U.S. shipyard under the federal government’s arduous acquisitions process. This places delivery of a new heavy icebreaker beyond the Polar Star’s remaining service life and adds to the urgency of the current situation.

U.S. engagement in the Arctic

In short, the United States must have the ability to access and engage in the polar regions on its own terms. No entity is better positioned to fulfill this national security imperative than the United States Coast Guard, which has the authority and organizational ethos to advance high latitude safety, security, and environmental interests without a corresponding threat of excessive militarization. The Coast Guard also remains one of few governmental entities capable of collaborative engagement with the Russians, built on years of maritime cooperation with their border guard.

While the case for icebreaker investment is clear, the Coast Guard lacks the resources to move forward on its own. For the Coast Guard, a new icebreaker is at best a distant runner-up to other recapitalization imperatives within the chronically underfunded service. The Coast Guard’s Medium Endurance Cutters are the cornerstone of the service’s offshore presence in the Western Hemisphere and are even older than the icebreakers. Replacing these 1960s-era cutters is justifiably the service’s top acquisition priority. The question here is not whether the Coast Guard wants new icebreaking capability, but rather how a new icebreaker stacks up against other, more urgent priorities in the context of current budget constraints.

The most appropriate funding solution is one that reflects the full breadth of inherently governmental interests in the Arctic, including safety, security, environmental protection, facilitation of maritime commerce and responsible economic development, national defense, and scientific research. In other words: funding from across the government to deliver a national, multi-mission asset.

The United States is considered an “Arctic Nation,” a term proudly used by policymakers to highlight our intrinsic national interests in the region and a profoundly basic yet important acknowledgement that Alaska and its associated territory above the Arctic Circle are indeed part of the United States. Unfortunately, the United States has yet to advance from this most basic construct of high latitude stakeholder to a proactive leadership and investment posture for the future. Not because of a lack of “skin in the game,” the United States has a legacy of well-documented interests in the Arctic, but a lack of consensus to make it a national priority in the context of the current budget environment.

Whether via national crisis or a comprehensive budget deal, polar icebreakers must eventually become the subject of serious resource discussions, and should ultimately garner broad bipartisan support. At that time, additional funding should be appropriated to the Coast Guard to support the acquisition of the much-needed heavy icebreakers, but not at the expense of its other, more pressing recapitalization programs. Until then, let’s be more realistic about our ability and commitment to lead in the Arctic.

Event Information

The past year has been one of intense engagement in U.S -India relations with several high-level visits exchanged and working-level dialogues held between the two countries. Most recently, President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Narendra Modi met at the Paris climate change summit and Indian Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar will visit the United States to discuss the bilateral defense relationship.

On December 11, The India Project at Brookings hosted a conversation with U.S. Ambassador to India Richard Verma to reflect on developments in U.S.-India relations in 2015. He also discussed the recent high-level engagements on defense policy and climate change, as well as the road ahead for the bilateral relationship. Tanvi Madan, director of the India Project and fellow in Foreign Policy at Brookings moderated the discussion. Bruce Jones, vice president and director of Foreign Policy at Brookings provided introductory remarks.

Join the conversation on Twitter using #USIndia

Video

• U.S.–India relations: A conversation with U.S. Ambassador to India Richard Verma

Audio

• U.S.–India relations: A conversation with U.S. Ambassador to India Richard Verma

Transcript

• Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

• 20151211_india_verma_transcript

Executive Summary

In the concluding chapter of Red and Blue Nation? Consequences and Correction of America’s Polarized Politics (Brookings Press, 2007), Pietro S. Nivola and William A. Galston lay out a series of changes aimed at “depolarizing” the politics of the United States. One of their recommendations calls on the states to introduce fundamental changes to the process of redistricting congressional electoral districts. A handful of states have already established redistricting commissions, so the first steps have been taken in reforming one of the most important pillars of the electoral process.

This paper explores the possibility that the United States could build on those initial moves. Additionally, would it be possible to “import” the Canadian model of independent electoral boundary redistricting commissions? For the first 100 years of Canadian history redistricting seats in the federal House of Commons followed a pattern familiar to Americans. It was a process firmly under the control of the politicians, and the results reflected that. Wide disparities in population size were a tell-tale sign of the extent to which Canada’s parliamentary districts were gerrymandered.

Starting at the provincial level in the 1950s, partisan redistricting eventually gave way in all jurisdictions to nonpartisan commissions. How that change came about and why the Canadian commission-directed redistricting commends itself to Americans concerned about the highly politicized state of redistricting in the United States are the subjects of this study.

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After decades of abuse under the old regime, how can the civilian government of President Mohamed Morsi turn Egypt’s security apparatus into one befitting a new democracy? What are the necessary steps in overcoming institutional barriers to reform and creating an Egyptian police force in the service of its citizens?

In a new "Project on Arab Transitions" paper from the Brookings Doha Center and Stanford University’s Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law (CDDRL), From Good Cop to Bad Cop: The Challenge of Security Sector Reform in Egypt, nonresident fellow Omar Ashour discusses the political dynamics of transforming Egypt’s security establishment.

Based on months of interviews with current and former officers and generals in the police, army, and intelligence services, Ashour lays out the workings of the Mubarak regime’s repressive security apparatus and assesses current reform initiatives, drawing on lessons from other transitions in the Arab world and beyond. He offers a set of policy proposals for establishing an accountable, civilian-led security sector, ranging from a presidential commission on reform to new oversight mechanisms. Ashour cites the brutality and abuse of Egypt’s police as a key catalyst of the January 25 Revolution; the success of that revolution, he says, will hinge on effective security sector reform.

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When Iran and the P5+1 signed a deal over Tehran’s nuclear program last July, members of Congress, Middle East analysts, and Arab Gulf governments all warned that the agreement would prompt Iran’s rivals in the region to race for the bomb.

In a report that Bob Einhorn and I released this week, we assessed this risk of a so-called proliferation cascade. We look at four states in particular—Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Turkey—and Bob briefly explores each case in another blog post out today. In the paper, we argue that although the likelihood of a proliferation cascade in the Middle East is fairly low, and certainly lower than a number of critics of the Iran deal would have you believe, it is not zero. Given that, here are eight steps that leaders in Washington should take to head off that possibility:

1. Ensure that the JCPOA is rigorously monitored, strictly enforced, and faithfully implemented;
2. Strengthen U.S. intelligence collection on Iranian proliferation-related activities and intelligence-sharing on those activities with key partners;
3. Deter a future Iranian decision to produce nuclear weapons;
4. Seek to incorporate key monitoring and verification provisions of the JCPOA into routine IAEA safeguards as applied elsewhere in the Middle East and in the global nonproliferation regime;
5. Pursue U.S. civil nuclear cooperation with Middle East governments on terms that are realistic and serve U.S. nonproliferation interests;
6. Promote regional arrangements that restrain fuel cycle developments and build confidence in the peaceful use of regional nuclear programs;
7. Strengthen security assurances to U.S. partners in the Middle East; and
8. Promote a stable regional security environment.

Taken together, these steps deal with three core challenges the United States faces in shoring up the nonproliferation regime in the region.

The first is that the central test of nonproliferation in the Middle East will come from how the JCPOA is believed to be meeting its core objective of preventing Iranian nuclear weapons development and Iranian establishment of regional hegemony. It cannot be stressed enough that the decision to pursue nuclear weapons by any state, including those in the region, starts with a sense of vulnerability to core security threats and an inability to address those threats through any other means. The history of nuclear proliferation is one of tit-for-tat armament in the face of overriding security imperatives. Both finished and aborted nuclear programs bear the hallmarks of a security dilemma impelling states to make the political, economic, and security investments into nuclear weapons.

This is no less true for countries across the region than for Iran. To the extent that the overall security environment can be stabilized, there will be less impetus for any Middle Eastern state to develop nuclear weapons. The United States should focus on:

• Fully implementing and enforcing all sides of the JCPOA (nuclear restrictions, transparency, and sanctions relief);
• Creating a strong sense of deterrence toward Iran, manifest most clearly in the passage of a standing Authorization to Use Military Force if Iran is determined to be breaking out toward acquisition of a nuclear weapon;
• Providing security assurances and backing them up with the mechanisms to make them actionable like joint exercises, logistical planning, and cooperation with a range of regional and extra-regional actors; and,
• Working to promote a more stable regional environment by seeking the resolution of simmering conflicts.

But, these latter two factors also point to another resonant theme in our research: the need for the United States to be a player. After decades of involvement in the region, the United States has yet to settle upon the right balance between involvement and remove. Yet, establishing this equilibrium is essential. States in the region need predictability in their affairs with the United States, including knowing the degree to which our assurances will stand the test of time.

States in the region need predictability in their affairs with the United States, including knowing the degree to which our assurances will stand the test of time.

In part for this reason, the United States should not only pursue deeper security relationships, but also civil nuclear cooperation with interested states throughout the region. Such a relationship both ensures a closer link between the United States and its partners and discourages the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technology by disincentivizing countries from “going it alone.” In the Middle East, the United States would need to find a formulation that offers some flexibility (such as by building in language that would permit the United States to terminate any nuclear cooperation arrangements in the face of sensitive fuel cycle development by the other side).

The United States should also share intelligence more closely with its partners in the region. This is helpful in the short term, of course, but also helps the United States understand the mindset of and intelligence picture of its regional partners in a broader sense. It also helps leaders in Washington address concerns brought about by unfounded rumors or speculation as to Iran’s intentions or capabilities.

Changing how we do business

Even more important than how the JCPOA was negotiated will be how we transition from its restrictions and transparency mechanisms into a new world in 15 to 20 years. 

The United States seek to incorporate elements of the JCPOA into normal international monitoring practices and should negotiate new arrangements to help govern the future development of nuclear technology in the region. 

To achieve the former, the IAEA will need to make some changes to how it does business. For example, the IAEA determines how best to implement its monitoring mission, contingent on acceptance by the country being inspected. The United States and its partners should work with the IAEA (and other countries with significant nuclear activities) to make some parts of the JCPOA standard operating practice, such as online monitoring of enrichment levels. Other elements of the JCPOA may require agreements at the IAEA and beyond for how nuclear-related activities, including those that could have value for nuclear weaponization, are handled. It might be hard to get agreement, not least because there is clear language in the JCPOA that states that it will not be seen as a precedent for future nuclear nonproliferation efforts. However, it should still be the ambition of the United States to make such steps part of the norm. 

A far more difficult lift would be organizing a regional approach to the nuclear fuel cycle. This is not the same as creating a multilateral fuel cycle, though some elements that approach would be helpful. Rather, the United States should find ways to craft regional agreements or, failing that, moratoria on aspects of the fuel cycle that others in the region would find threatening. It would be easier to negotiate constraints some aspects than others. For example, spent fuel reprocessing is rare in the Middle East, with only Israel having been known to do it to a significant degree. It may therefore be an attractive first place to begin. Enrichment would be altogether more difficult, but it may be possible to convince states in the region to forego the expansion of their enrichment programs beyond their status quo. For Iran, it would continue to possess uranium enrichment but with constraints that limit the utility of this program for weapons production; its incentive would be to avoid creating the rationale for regional competition. For other countries in the region, it would involve holding off on enrichment, but also on the financial and political investment enrichment would involve—as well refraining from creating a security dilemma for Iran that could produce miscalculation in the future.

While some of these recommendations are more challenging (and may prove impossible), others are potentially easier. By taking a multifaceted approach, the United States increases the chances that no further weapons of mass destruction proliferate in the Middle East down the road. 

Editors’ Note: Richard Nephew and Bob Einhorn spoke about their new report at a recent Brookings event. You can see the video from the event here.

At a news conference in Seoul today, the United States and the Republic of Korea jointly announced the decision to deploy a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system on the Korean Peninsula, with operational deployment planned by the end of 2017. Though many details are still pending, the decision is not a surprise, and the purposes of the deployment are wholly transparent.

As elaborated in the official announcement, the THAAD deployments are intended to defend the infrastructure and citizens of South Korea, and to protect core military capabilities underpinning the U.S.-Korea alliance. It is not a panacea for South Korea’s potential vulnerabilities to North Korean missile attack, but it will appreciably buttress Seoul’s still-limited air and missile defense capabilities, and explicitly link them to the far greater assets of the United States. 

Seoul did not undertake this commitment lightly. In recent years, South Korean strategic analysts have hotly debated the missile defense issue, but the political-military leadership has proceeded very deliberately. It was only in the aftermath of North Korea’s fourth nuclear test in early January and a long-range rocket test that soon followed that President Park Geun-hye’s administration agreed to initiate consultations on the “earliest possible” deployment of a THAAD missile battery. The North’s accelerated missile testing program, evident since April, reinforced the need for a meaningful response to Pyongyang’s actions.

Neither China nor Russia seems mollified by today’s announcement. Beijing and Moscow both perceive a malign U.S. strategic design, purportedly intended to detect and intercept Chinese and Russian strategic missiles, thereby invalidating their respective deterrence capabilities. But these worst-case estimates attribute technical reach and refinement to the Raytheon radar system likely to accompany the THAAD deployment that substantially exceeds even the manufacturer’s claims. 

China and Russia also contend that the THAAD deployment will further complicate the larger goal of denuclearization and threat reduction on the Korean Peninsula. But this places the cart before the horse. Pyongyang’s determination to expand and diversify its nuclear and missile programs has triggered the THAAD decision. Without the North’s accelerated military efforts, it is very doubtful that sentiment in Seoul would favor deployment of THAAD. Beijing and Moscow assuredly know how to connect the dots, but they seem unwilling to do so. 

At a time of increased Chinese wariness about U.S. military strategy along China’s periphery, it is not a surprise that Beijing has paid little heed to American and South Korean assurances.

Beijing also calculates that warning South Korea of unspecified consequences will convince Seoul to forego the THAAD decision. But this underestimates the South’s determination to proceed with missile defense, which will tie Seoul even more integrally to longer-term cooperation with the United States. This decision is unwelcome in China, but it is wholly within Seoul’s sovereign right to defend its vital interests by all appropriate means; China routinely does the same.

In meetings with Chinese counterparts, senior Korean officials have repeatedly stated that the THAAD deployment serves one irreducible purpose: the protection of South Korean vital national security interests. Seoul is keenly aware of Chinese strategic equities, and will remain very mindful of Beijing’s concerns as it moves ahead with this program. 

At the same time, Seoul and Washington have repeatedly conveyed their willingness to impart to officials in Beijing the limited purpose of the THAAD deployment. It will be directed entirely towards the North’s threats against the South; it will be exclusively bilateral in design; and it will not be targeted against the capabilities of any other party. 

At a time of increased Chinese wariness about U.S. military strategy along China’s periphery, it is not a surprise that Beijing has paid little heed to American and South Korean assurances, at least publicly. But officials and analysts in China must quietly grasp the reasons for the THAAD decision. The North’s nuclear and missile programs worry China deeply, as well. 

The need for a quiet, private conversation about the risks to stability on the peninsula has never been greater. The United States and South Korea are surely ready for this conversation. Whether China is ready remains to be seen.

Summary: Why digital skills matter

As the influence of digital technologies in the global economy expands, metropolitan areas throughout the United States face the task of preparing residents for an increasingly technology-powered world. Most jobs now require basic computer literacy to operate email and other software, while jobs specific to information technology (IT) require advanced skills such as coding. At home, residents need access to the Internet and consumer technologies to do homework, shop at online retailers, communicate with one another, or check real-time traffic and transit conditions.

Digital technologies hold out the promise of more widely shared prosperity, but achieving that vision will require every person to have basic digital skills—the ability to use digital hardware and software to manage information, communicate, navigate the web, solve problems, and create content.¹

While some metro areas have made important advances on digital skills acquisition, the effects are not ubiquitous. The Census Bureau found that only 73 percent of U.S. households subscribed to in-home broadband service in 2013, leaving 31 million households without a high-speed in-home connection.² Pew Research Center finds that over one-third of U.S. adults doesn’t own a smartphone, while 7 percent of smartphone owners lack high-speed Internet access at home and have few ways to get online beyond their smartphone.³ Another survey finds that 29 percent of Americans have low levels of digital skills, and many of these persons tend to be older, less educated, and lower-income.⁴

In an advanced economy, all residents deserve an opportunity to obtain digital skills. It is up to leaders in each U.S. metropolitan area to determine how best to meet this need. As with any social challenge of this scale, meeting it will require pragmatic problem-solving and deep collaboration across the public, private, and civic sectors.

This brief summarizes the results of a workshop held in Seattle to explore these issues. While the findings from the workshop discussions are unique to the Seattle region—making its leaders and residents the primary audience for this brief—the workshop approach can be replicated in any metropolitan area interested in addressing digital skills shortfalls and developing solutions tailored to residents’ needs.

Introduction: Digital skills and the Seattle metropolitan economy

Metropolitan Seattle is well positioned to prosper in the information era. Advanced industries—including global leaders in aerospace and IT—power the regional economy and have created an impressive network of patent-producing firms that employ over 295,000 people.⁵ The region’s households actively participate in the digital economy as well, as evidenced by a broadband adoption rate of 82 percent.⁶ Collaborations bringing together firms, public utilities, and government institutions make Seattle a national leader in the use of data monitoring to reduce energy usage.

However, for the region to maintain its position in the years ahead, it will need to cultivate a more inclusive economy that gives every resident the opportunity to acquire the skills needed to succeed in the digital era.

Like most U.S. metro areas, metropolitan Seattle continues to struggle with digital inclusivity. Strong broadband adoption across the region masks lagging adoption rates in many low-income neighborhoods and communities of color.⁷ A skills mismatch between job openings requiring digital skills and the education and skills training of area residents contributes to income inequality.⁸ This inequality, though less marked than in other cities with similar high-tech economies, continues to increase, with the highest-earning households experiencing rising incomes while lower-income households’ earnings stay relatively flat.⁹ Meanwhile, more than 45 percent of jobs in the region are more than 10 miles from downtown Seattle and Bellevue, and over two-thirds of poor households now live in the suburbs.¹⁰ This kind of job sprawl and suburban poverty limit many residents’ physical access to economic opportunity.

But the Seattle area has the assets to address these challenges. The region has a legacy of direct private-sector support for professional skills development and a huge network of IT firms that can expand such efforts. Government agencies and civic institutions already manage programs to promote digital skills acquisition. In addition, there is a regional ethic of supporting equitable economic growth, seen most recently in Seattle’s landmark living wage policy and Sound Transit’s discounted fee system for lower-income riders.¹¹

In an effort to address Seattle’s digital skills gap, the Brookings Institution Metropolitan Policy Program convened a group of leaders from the public, private, and civic sectors to discuss how to continue building a regionally inclusive digital skills infrastructure. The workshop consisted of brief presentations from Brookings experts and local leaders, group discussions of current efforts and challenges, and break-out groups to identify specific barriers and discuss strategies and next steps to improve future outcomes.

The following is a distillation of the key themes and lessons from the workshop.

1. Commit to ongoing collaboration

There is a clear consensus among Seattle-area leaders that basic digital skills are essential for everyone. The tough part is ensuring that all residents in the region have the opportunity to acquire these skills.

This challenge implicates a wide range of stakeholders, from municipal and county government, public libraries, and universities to area businesses, education and training providers, philanthropies, and nonprofits.

Many of these actors already manage their own initiatives, to great effect. Programs like the Seattle Goodwill’s Digital Literacy Initiative are working to increase the number of people with 21st-century digital skills, particularly among traditionally underserved populations. The private sector is advancing a similar agenda with major initiatives, such as Microsoft IT Academy and Google’s Made With Code, that promote computational thinking through computer science. Meanwhile, nonprofit training programs like the Ada Developers Academy as well as for-profit training providers such as Code Fellows and General Assembly are getting more people on pathways into tech-intensive careers that pay well.

However, despite this demonstrated willingness to act, coordination of activities across the region remains a challenge. Most initiatives operate independently from one another, often resulting in duplicative efforts and missed opportunities for greater impact. Furthermore, current efforts often concentrate activities in either the central cities or specific portions of the three-county region, thereby excluding those who live in other parts of the metro area. For example, the city of Seattle’s excellent digital equity programs extend only to the city limits and are not available in South King County. Without more collaboration, the region will not be able to take full advantage of its creativity, resources, and capacity for pragmatic problem-solving.

By committing to ongoing collaborative action, leaders in the Seattle region will be well positioned to design, launch, and maintain smart solutions to the digital skills challenge today and in the future.

2. Identify a convener and organize for action

Once stakeholders commit to collaborative problem-solving, they must then determine how best to organize for action. Identifying a neutral convener organization can help expedite this process. Designating a convener ensures that there is a single organization tasked with driving the group’s agenda forward and fostering greater collaboration among stakeholders.

The role of convener involves a handful of specific tasks that help keep the group on track and in regular contact. Organizing regular group meetings, delegating critical tasks like research into best practices, and managing communication within the group are all critical functions for the convening organization. To take just one example, the Community Center for Education Results (CCER) fills the convener role for the many stakeholders involved in the Road Map Project, which is working to improve student outcomes in South Seattle and South King County.¹²

The Seattle area is fortunate to have a number of organizations that could act as convener. Potential candidates include the Workforce Development Council of Seattle-King County (WDC), the Seattle Public Library, the University of Washington, or one of the many large philanthropies in the region.

Regardless of which organization ultimately takes on this role, selecting a convener marks a crucial first step toward an actionable, collaboratively developed digital skills agenda for the Seattle region.

3. Develop a shared vision for digital skills acquisition

Crafting a shared vision for digital skills acquisition will strengthen the group’s work by ensuring that all involved are on the same page. That vision can support the creation of a coordinated regional plan, which will help stakeholders take advantage of economies of scale and ensure the greatest return on resources invested. This plan should take particular care to address challenges faced by traditionally underrepresented groups, including women and people of color as well as those in lower-income communities.¹³ Ending the persistent lack of diversity in tech-oriented careers will require a concerted effort on the part of all stakeholders involved.¹⁴

To start, the convener’s first task should be organizing a time for stakeholders to sit down, develop a shared vision, and determine the next steps necessary to achieve that vision. Conducting an audit of existing programs in the region that support digital skills acquisition can be a good place to begin. This inventory will highlight any overlapping initiatives while also providing information on gaps in the digital skills infrastructure that will need to be addressed.

In addition, the group should work with the private sector to identify the digital skills needed in various industries and begin to map out pathways into tech-oriented careers. This information will ensure that the solutions developed are informed by current and projected industry demand.

The industry-sector panels convened by WDC offer one possible approach. Under this model, WDC serves as convener, bringing together key stakeholders from industry, education, workforce development, labor, nonprofits, and other relevant areas to identify shared challenges and engage in collaborative problem-solving. The outcomes and activities of the sector panel are determined by the group, with WDC facilitating the process throughout. WDC has a demonstrated record of success in organizing sector panels for the maritime and health care industries, and it could apply the same techniques to industries requiring digital skills.

Preliminary research will provide the data and analyses necessary for truly evidence-based solutions that respond directly to specific challenges in the region. Once this baseline research is completed, the group can begin problem-solving in earnest. To start, the group should identify a punch list of action items that can be easily accomplished in order to start building a record of successful collaborations.

As the group designs these solutions, it should also take care to establish performance management systems that track progress over time. Monitoring the performance of each solution implemented will also support efforts to refine and course-correct programming over time.

4. Adopt new roles to accomplish regional goals

With a new, shared vision of the community’s digital skills infrastructure in hand, stakeholders will need to align their individual initiatives to that goal and, in some cases, redefine their roles in order to support the broader vision.

These new roles should leverage each organization’s core strengths rather than require them to develop new ones. For example, metropolitan Seattle’s public libraries are already community-meeting spots that specialize in information exchange, offer free access to the Internet, and host a variety of classes for the public. This current work positions the libraries to serve as an information clearinghouse for digital skills programs offered in the region, ranging from job-skills training to classes on smartphone use. Likewise, academic experts at the University of Washington and other postsecondary institutions could help create a new curriculum for teaching applied digital skills to diverse populations.

At the same time, organizations should be open to adapting their core projects in order to fill gaps in the region’s digital skills infrastructure. For example, technology firms like Microsoft and Google could draw on their extensive civic philanthropic efforts and employee skills-training programs to provide basic, applied digital skills and computer science training that enhances the regional workforce. Such efforts could build on Microsoft’s IT Academy model and Google’s support for programs at the Boys and Girls Clubs, which could be repurposed to address adult needs rather than those of children and teens.

As individual organizations adopt new roles, they will need to ensure that services are available to residents across the entire metropolitan area. Anchored by its Department of Information Technology and its Digital Equity Initiative, the city of Seattle has an impressive record of boosting digital skills within the city proper. But the vast majority of area residents live outside Seattle. Furthermore, over 60 percent of the region’s poor households now live in the suburbs. As a result, regional actors like Puget Sound Regional Council, Sound Cities, and county governments face enormous pressure to serve residents across the three-county metro area.

To start, organizations should work together to conduct metrowide surveys of digital equity issues, perhaps following the model employed by Seattle’s Digital Equity Initiative. This quantitative and qualitative data will set the baseline for the entire region and will help organizations set achievable benchmark goals for the years ahead.

5. Create a regional digital skills brand and marketing strategy to galvanize action

In order to communicate the shared vision to area residents, stakeholders should develop and publicize a new regional brand that positions the Seattle region as a leader in digital skills adoption and more equitable economic outcomes.

The associated marketing campaign can counter misconceptions about digital skills and the tech industry, maximize awareness of individual stakeholders’ projects, and minimize costs for each organization. Working together, stakeholders can reach the broadest possible pool of local residents with a cohesive message that encourages digital skills and computer science skills acquisition. Furthermore, by directing residents to centralized

information centers like local public libraries, the campaign will connect individuals with experts who can help them find the best programs for their needs.

In crafting this branding effort, the Seattle area should look to similar campaigns for inspiration. One example is Portland, Ore.’s We Build Green Cities campaign, a trade-based effort to leverage Portland’s international reputation for environmental sustainability and design in order to increase the region’s exports. Baltimore’s Opportunity Collaborative offers a more equity-focused model that brings together local and state public agencies, nonprofit organizations, and universities to solve common workforce, housing, and transportation challenges. A digital skills marketing campaign patterned after existing efforts will allow the region to capitalize on proven models when positioning itself as a leader in digital skills adoption that supports more widely shared prosperity.

Conclusion

The Seattle region stands at a crossroads. It has the industrial assets for continued growth that fosters ongoing innovation and provides jobs that pay well. It also has a commitment to shared prosperity, best represented by the public, private, and civic actors that support better wages, affordable transportation options, and education and training focused on science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) occupations. The region should build on these efforts by advancing a shared vision for digital skills and undertaking the sustained collaboration necessary to make that vision a reality.

Additional resources

The Boston Consulting Group, “Opportunity for All: Investing in Washington State’s STEM Education Pipeline” (2014).

The Boston Consulting Group and the Washington Roundtable, “Great Jobs Within Our Reach: Solving the Problem of Washington State’s Growing Job Skills Gap” (2013).

Capital One and Burning Glass, “Crunched by the Numbers: The Digital Skills Gap in the Workforce” (2015).

City of Austin, “Digital Inclusion Strategy 2014” (2014).

City of Seattle Department of Information Technology, Community Technology Program, “Information Technology Access and Adoption in Seattle: Progress Towards Digital Opportunity and Equity” (2014).

Communities Connect Network, “Defining Digital Inclusion for Broadband Deployment & Adoption” (2014).

Maureen Majury, “Building an IT Career-Ready Washington: 2015 and Beyond” (Seattle: Center of Excellence for Information & Computing Technology, 2014).

Seth McKinney, “Economic Development Planning in Seattle: A Review and Analysis of Current Plans and Strategies” (Seattle: University of Washington Evans School of Public Policy, 2013).

Seattle Goodwill, “Digital Literacy Initiative: Overview” (2014).

Seattle Goodwill, “Digital Literacy: Theoretical Framework” (2014).

Angela Siefer, “Trail-Blazing Digital Inclusion Communities” (OCLC and Institute of Museum and Library Services, 2013).

Tricia Vander Leest and Joe Sullivan, “ICT Training and the ABCs of Employability: YearUp’s Jobs Program for Urban Youth” (Seattle: University of Washington Center for Information & Society, 2008).

Authors

• Jessica A. Lee
• Adie Tomer