How can companies defend civic space? 2 February 2021 — 4:00PM TO 5:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 19 January 2021 Online

Panellists discuss how companies can go beyond corporate social responsibility and philanthropy initiatives to protect and support civic freedoms around the world.

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There is increasing pressure on companies to use their power and profits to engage with social and political causes. In doing so, companies can help to support the ‘shared civic space’ that enables the private sector and civil society organizations to benefit from a society that respects the rule of law and human rights, at a time when many of these rights are under threat around the world.

Many companies have introduced CSR initiatives, due diligence mechanisms and corporate philanthropy. Over 11,000 companies are now signatories to the UN’s Global Compact for sustainable and socially responsible business worldwide.

But as demonstrated by misguided corporate responses to the Black Lives Matter protests this year, there is a danger of corporate activism being perceived as ‘lip service’ rather than genuinely addressing the negative impacts of business operations on civic space.

Recent Chatham House research indicates that meaningful engagement by businesses on such issues must be timely, contextually sensitive and industry-relevant. For example, in 2015, Tiffany & Co. worked with other companies to intervene on behalf of Rafael Marques after he was arrested for reporting on widespread human rights abuses in the Angolan diamond industry. During COVID-19, Microsoft offered free cybersecurity software to healthcare and human rights organizations at increased risk of hacking attacks.

This panel event will draw upon practical examples of private sector support for civic space across different sectors, geographies and political environments.

Why might companies step up to defend freedom of association, expression or political participation even where this comes at a financial or political cost? How can companies resist complicity with governments or regulation that threaten civic space? And what forums exist, or should exist, for developing tactical alliances between companies and civil society actors?

This event is also the launch of a new Chatham House resource, The Role of the Private Sector in Protecting Civic Space.

Deplatforming Trump puts big tech under fresh scrutiny Expert comment NCapeling 22 January 2021

The response of digital platforms to the US Capitol riots raises questions about online content governance. The EU and UK are starting to come up with answers.

The ‘deplatforming’ of Donald Trump – including Twitter’s announcement that it has permanently banned him due to ‘the risk of further incitement of violence’ after the riots in the US – shows once more not only the sheer power of online platforms but also the lack of a coherent and consistent framework for online content governance.

Taking the megaphone away from Trump during the Capitol riots seems sensible, but was it necessary or proportionate to ban him from the platform permanently? Or consistent with the treatment of other ‘strongmen’ world leaders such as Modi, Duterte and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei who have overseen nationalistic violence but whose accounts remain intact?

Such complex decisions on online expression should not made unilaterally by powerful and unregulated tech actors, but instead should be subject to democratic oversight and grounded in the obligations of states and responsibilities of companies under international human rights law.

The speed and scale of digital information has left governments across the world struggling with how to tackle online harms such as hate speech, extremist content and disinformation since the emergence of mass social media 15 years ago.

The US’s hallowed approach to the First Amendment, under which speech on public issues – even hate speech – occupies the highest rank and is entitled to special protection, has contributed to a reluctance to regulate Silicon Valley’s digital platforms. But the irony is that by not regulating them, the government harmed freedom of expression by leaving complex speech decisions in the hands of private actors.

Meanwhile at the other extreme is the growing number of illiberal and authoritarian governments using a combination of vague laws, censorship, propaganda, and internet blackouts to severely restrict online freedom of expression, control the narrative and, in some cases, incite atrocities.

Regulation is on the way

The happy medium – flexible online content regulation providing clarity, predictability, transparency, and accountability – has until now been elusive. But even before the deplatforming of Trump, 2021 was set to be the year when this approach finally gained some traction, at least in Europe.

The EU’s recently-published draft Digital Services Act puts obligations on dominant social media platforms to manage ‘systemic risks’, for example through requirements for greater transparency about their content decisions, algorithms used for recommendations, and online advertising systems.

The UK will shortly publish its Online Safety Bill, which will establish a new regulatory framework for tackling online harms, including the imposition of a duty of care and codes of conduct on Big Tech, to be overseen by an independent regulator (Ofcom).

Both proposals are based on a ‘co-regulatory’ model under which the regulator sets out a framework substantiated with rules by the private sector, with the regulator performing a monitoring function to ensure the rules are complied with.

Both also draw on international human rights standards and the work of civil society in applying these standards in relation to the online public square, with the aim of increasing control for users over what they see online, requiring transparency about tech companies’ policies in a number of areas, and strengthening the accountability of platforms when they fall foul of the regulation.

The procedure for both proposals has also been inclusive, involving extensive multi-stakeholder consultations with civil society organizations and Big Tech, and the proposals will be subject to scrutiny in 2021, notably from the EU and UK parliaments.

Both proposals are at an early stage, and it remains to be seen whether they go far enough – or indeed will have a chilling effect on online platforms. But as an attempt to initiate a dialogue on globally coherent principles, they are positive first steps. They also provide food for thought for the new Joe Biden administration in the US as it turns its attention to the regulation of Big Tech.

For some time civil society – most prominently David Kaye, the former UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression and opinion – have called for content regulation to be informed by universal international human rights law standards.

The EU and UK are peculiarly well-placed to take the lead in this area because European countries have for decades been on the receiving end of judgments from the European Court of Human Rights on the appropriate limits to freedom of expression in cases brought under the European Convention on Human Rights.

In deciding these cases, the court has to balance the right to freedom of expression against the restrictions imposed – for example in the context of incitement to violence, political debate, and satire. Deciding where to draw the line on what can and cannot be expressed in a civilised society which prizes freedom of expression is inevitably a difficult exercise.

International human rights law provides a methodology that inquires whether the interference to freedom of expression was prescribed by law and pursues a legitimate aim, and also whether it was necessary in a democratic society to achieve those aims – including whether the interference was necessary and proportionate (as for example in Delfi AS v Estonia, which involved a news portal failing to take down unlawful hate speech).

To be effective, online content regulation has to bite on tech companies, which is a challenge given the internet is global but domestic law normally applies territorially. The EU’s proposals have an extraterritorial element as they apply to any online platforms providing services in the EU regardless of where the platform is headquartered.

Further, both the EU and UK want to give the regulator strong enforcement powers – it is proposed for example that Ofcom will have powers to fine platforms up to ten per cent of their turnover for breaches.

Although the proposals would not apply directly to the deplatforming of Trump which occurred in the US, the philosophy behind the EU and UK approach is likely to have an impact beyond European shores in promoting a co-regulatory model that some of the bigger tech companies have been inviting for some time, reluctant as they are to ‘play God’ on content moderation decisions without reference to any regulatory framework.

In the absence of regulation, the standards of tech platforms such as Facebook and Twitter have already evolved over time in response to pressure from civil rights groups, users, and advertisers, including updated policies on protecting civic conversation and hate speech.

Facebook has also set up an independent Oversight Board, whose members include leading human rights lawyers, to review decisions on content including – at its own request – the decision to indefinitely suspend Trump from Facebook and Instagram. Decisions on the Board’s first tranche of cases are expected imminently.

Gatekeeper status is key

Online content regulation also needs to address the role of Big Tech as the ‘digital gatekeepers’, because their monopoly power extends not just to editorial control of the news and information we consume, but also to market access.

The decision of Apple, Google, and Amazon to stop hosting right-wing social network Parler after it refused to combat calls for violence during the US Capitol riots was understandable in the circumstances, but also underlined the unilateral ability of Big Tech to decide the rules of the market.

Again, it is Europe where efforts are underway to tackle this issue: the EU’s draft Digital Market Act imposes obligations on online gatekeepers to avoid certain unfair practices, and the UK’s new Digital Markets Unit will have powers to write and enforce a new code of practice on those technology companies with ‘substantial and enduring’ market power.

In the US, Biden’s team will be following these developments with interest, given the growing bipartisan support for strengthening US antitrust rules and reviving antitrust enforcement. The EU’s recently published proposals for an EU-US tech agenda include a transatlantic dialogue on the responsibility of tech platforms and strengthened cooperation between antitrust authorities on digital markets.

Ultimately a consistent – and global – approach to online content is needed instead of fragmented approaches by different companies and governments. It is also important the framework is flexible so that it is capable of applying not only to major democracies but also to countries where too often sweeping state regulation has been used as a pretext to curtail online expression online.

The pursuit of a pluralistic framework tailored to different political and cultural contexts is challenging, and international human rights law cannot provide all the answers but, as a universal framework, it is a good place to start. The raft of regulatory measures from the EU and UK means that, regardless of whether Trump regains his online megaphone, 2021 is set to be a year of reckoning for Big Tech.

Implications of post-COVID-19 Restructuring of Supply Chains for Global Investment Governance 14 July 2020 — 9:00AM TO 10:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 9 February 2021 Online

As companies rethink and diversify their supply chains in order to enhance resilience, what will this mean for current and future global investment governance?

What are the risks of negative effects on inclusivity and transparency? Does this shift create an opportunity to advance good governance of cross-border investment practices?

This event is part of the Inclusive Governance Initiative, which is examining how to build more inclusive models and mechanisms of global governance fit for purpose in today’s world.

The Future of Investment Dispute Settlement Regimes 30 June 2020 — 2:00PM TO 3:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 9 February 2021 Online

This event is part of the Inclusive Governance Initiative, which is examining how to build more inclusive models and mechanisms of global governance fit for purpose in today’s world.

Is an ‘atomized’ approach to cross-border investment dispute resolution inevitable? Has the multiplicity of mechanisms helped or hindered inclusivity in and transparency in governance? Is there a need for, and scope to, increase the international coordination of dispute resolution mechanisms? If so, what form should it take? What could be the implications for international economic law?

Innovating Governance: Examples from the Digital Arena 25 February 2020 TO 26 February 2020 — 10:00AM TO 11:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 9 February 2021 Chatham House

The Inclusive Governance Initiative is launched with this roundtable on digital governance.

The Inclusive Governance Initiative, a centenary project which is examining how to build more inclusive models and mechanisms of global governance fit for purpose in today’s world, is launched with this roundtable on digital governance.

The event brings together a diverse and multidisciplinary group of leading experts to consider where and how early initiatives around governance of the digital sphere have succeeded – or not – and how they are evolving today.

The conversation will include the debate between multilateral and multi-stakeholder approaches, the opportunities and challenges of collective non-binding commitments, and converting civil society collaboration into policy contribution.

The Implication of Greater Use of Investment Screening 26 June 2020 — 9:00AM TO 10:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 11 February 2021 Online

What is driving the trend towards greater use of investment screening by nation states and regional economic groupings?

• How is the COVID-19 crisis affecting this trend?
• What will the economic implications be?
• Will this help or hinder inclusivity and transparency in investment governance?
• Is there a role for international safeguards and/or international coordination of national/regional approaches to investment screening?

This event is part of the Inclusive Governance Initiative, which is examining how to build more inclusive models and mechanisms of global governance fit for purpose in today’s world.

The regional and international implications of restrictions to online freedom of expression in Asia 25 March 2021 — 12:30PM TO 1:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 12 March 2021 Online

Panellists discuss the latest developments affecting online freedom of expression in the Asia region.

Please note this is an online event. Please register using the link below to finalize your registration.

In recent years, state-led clampdowns on online freedom of expression have become widespread in several countries across Asia, further intensified by the COVID-19 crisis.

The reasons for this are complex and diverse – drawing upon history, culture and politics, in addition to external influences. Across the region, governments have been accused of silencing online criticism and failing to uphold rights to free speech.

Individuals have been arrested, fined or attacked for the alleged spread of ‘fake news’, raising concern among human rights organizations. In some countries, this has culminated in the imposition of new social media rules, which could require social media companies to censor posts and share decrypted messages.

In China, the government’s restrictive online regime has relied on a combination of legal, technical and manipulation tactics to manage control of the internet, and now includes attempts at censorship beyond its borders.

Panellists will discuss the latest regional developments affecting online freedom of expression in the Asia region, and will consider the broader regional and international implications for technology governance.

This webinar launches the publication Restrictions on online freedom of expression in China: The domestic, regional and international implications of China’s policies and practices.

Battle lines being drawn over online freedoms in Asia Expert comment NCapeling 22 March 2021

Social media giants are increasingly clashing with Asian governments over free expression and censorship as the region lurches towards digital authoritarianism.

Freedom of expression was subject to significant restrictions in Asia even before the pandemic, with several governments having enacted laws that stifle online debate. But since COVID-19, restrictions have increased even further due to a rash of so-called ‘emergency measures’ introduced by governments across the region.

Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Vietnam have all put new laws into place, and many restrictions are already being applied in a draconian fashion, such as in the Philippines and Bangladesh.

As outlined in a new Chatham House research paper, one inspiration behind this trend is China, home to the world’s most sophisticated and restrictive system of internet control. The Chinese government’s restrictive online regime, which has tightened further under COVID-19, relies on a combination of legal regulations, technical controls, and proactive manipulation of online debates.

This model was an inspiration for Vietnam’s cybersecurity law, as well as Myanmar’s new draft cybersecurity bill, proposed by the Military-run State Administration Council in the wake of the military coup last month, which would give the military there extensive powers to access individuals’ data, restrict, or suspend access to the internet.

This ‘sovereignty and control’ model of internet governance is also gaining impetus through China’s ‘Digital Silk Road’ initiative, under which the Chinese government is exporting both its technology – such as through the establishment of smart cities, the installation of AI, and surveillance technology – and its vision of how the internet should be governed.

In November 2020, Xi Jinping pledged to further deepen cooperation with ASEAN through the Digital Silk Road, and the pandemic has expanded the appeal of Chinese surveillance technologies and data collection platforms to governments both in Asia and beyond. China’s Health Silk Road, which aims to promote global health cooperation, is centered on the Chinese government’s high-tech model under which civic freedoms are sacrificed in the name of public health.

An alternative model

This ‘sovereignty and control’ model is increasingly at odds with the more ‘human-centric’ model of tech governance favoured by many democratic states, Western social media companies, and international institutions, especially the United Nations (UN) and European Union (EU).

Although this emerging model also involves regulation, it is regulation which aims to be inclusive, risk-based, and proportionate – balancing the need for protection against online harms with the need to preserve freedom of expression. It is a multi-stakeholder, rights-based approach which brings together not just governments but also representatives of the private sector, civil society, and academia. The EU’s draft Digital Services Act and the UK’s proposals for an Online Safety Bill are both reflective of this approach.

Western social media giants such as Facebook and Twitter have recently introduced new policies which seek to identify and mitigate online harms, such as hate speech and disinformation. Industry bodies such as the Global Network Initiative, independent oversight bodies such as the Oversight Board established by Facebook, and civil society advocacy and initiatives such as the Santa Clara Principles on Transparency and Accountability in Content Moderation are also an important part of the picture.

Admittedly, these various digital governance initiatives are in some cases embryonic, and are by no means a silver bullet solution to the complex problem of online content moderation, which continues to be hotly debated in democratic societies. But they are at least underpinned by the same philosophy – that international human rights law standards must continue to apply even during emergencies such as COVID-19. With the Biden administration in the US prioritizing tech governance in its policy agenda, there is added momentum to the international leadership behind this model.

A clash of ideology

These conflicting philosophies are playing out in debates on technology governance at the UN, with one group of countries led by China and Russia advocating for greater government control of the internet, and many Western democracies emphasizing the need for an open, global internet that protects human rights.

These differing ideologies are also creating tensions between Western social media companies operating in Asia and the various governments in that region which have increased restrictions on online expression. And the gulf between the two appears to be widening.

In 2017, the Thailand government threatened Facebook with legal action unless it agreed to remove content critical of Thailand’s royal family and, in 2020, Facebook announced it had been ‘forced to block’ such material. Also in 2020, the Vietnam government pressured state-owned telecom companies to throttle internet traffic to Facebook, effectively restricting access to the platform, until Facebook agreed to take down content the government deemed to be anti-state.

Platforms refuse to silence legitimate criticism

However, Silicon Valley’s social media companies have also been pushing back. Facebook restricted the accounts of Myanmar’s military on the basis of ‘spreading misinformation’ in the wake of the military’s imposition of an internet shutdown that blocked access to Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram. And Twitter resisted requests by the Indian government to block accounts involved in protests by farmers.

Twitter stated that while it would block any accounts which it felt incited violence, it would not take action on accounts belonging to news media entities, journalists, activists, and politicians because it believed that would ‘violate the fundamental right to free expression under the Indian law’. The Indian government responded by fast-tracking stringent new social media regulations heavily criticized by rights groups for increasing government power over content on social media platforms, including online news.

So how can social media companies find avenues for operating in Asia and beyond without being co-opted into the lurch towards digital authoritarianism? There are no easy answers here, but collaboration is key. Cooperation between tech companies and local civil society partners can help companies better understand risks to human rights in the country concerned and how they might be mitigated. And tech companies are more effective in alliance with each other than acting on their own, such as the refusal by Facebook, Google, Telegram, and Twitter to hand over data on protestors to the Hong Kong police.

The fact that in many countries in Asia there are no alternatives to Western social media companies – unlike China, where platforms such as WeChat are part of the government’s internet control apparatus – gives the companies concerned some leverage. In February 2020, Facebook, Google, and Twitter together – through the Asia Internet Coalition – threatened to leave Pakistan in response to the government’s draconian proposals to regulate social media. Along with pressure and lawsuits from civil society, this forced the government into retreat, although the tussle over the new rules, introduced in November, continues.

At a time when illiberalism was already on the rise in Asia (including in democracies – Freedom House has just downgraded India’s status from ‘free’ to ‘partly free’), COVID-19 has made tighter state control of online freedom of expression even more attractive to many governments. As it seems increasingly unlikely that restrictions enacted under the guise of pandemic-related emergency measures will be repealed once the COVID-19 crisis ends, it is even more important that tech companies work with civil society on the ground to minimize the censorship of citizen voices.

Digital governance must not marginalize smaller states Expert comment LToremark 19 May 2021

For effective and inclusive digital governance, multi-stakeholderism must raise its game.

Last month, the G7 announced it is to work towards a trusted, values-driven digital ecosystem. While this is commendable, the G7 must recognize that key international digital governance decisions should involve all states whose populations will be affected. Not doing so is to deny the legitimate interests of those populations and may cause a lack of trust in international digital governance that embeds longer-term instability.

While a multi-stakeholder approach to digital governance is important, it must be structured in a way that allows for meaningful representation of states’ interests and ensures their representatives have the opportunity and capacity to take part. As the internet becomes fundamental to life in every country of the world, international digital governance is increasingly important to all governments and excluding some states’ perspectives may engender wider risks to international security and governance.

The ‘glitter ball’ of digital governance

International digital governance is playing catch-up with the digital sphere it needs to govern. Its starting point is a ‘glitter ball’ of governance initiatives: a large number of complex facets with overlapping impacts – and an almost impenetrable core. Governance initiatives (see infographic) include governance of the internet itself and its uses, international cybersecurity, international human rights, data management, as well as the impact of digital developments in areas such as armed conflict, trade and health.

Many of the bodies involved – such as the Internet Governance Forum, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) and technical standards bodies – include a wide range of stakeholders, yet there is no one accessible, central body. Furthermore, certain key issues, such as the role and responsibilities of tech platforms, are barely touched upon by international governance mechanisms. There is also currently only a limited role for traditional UN multilateral decision-making, a process which builds in a role for smaller states.

The sheer number of forums involved, each with a different set of working methods and rules on participation, makes it difficult to fully grasp what digital governance looks like as a whole. The UN secretary-general’s High-level Panel on Digital Cooperation recognized the complexity of digital cooperation arrangements and the barriers to inclusion facing small and developing countries as well as under-represented groups. In response, the June 2020 UN Roadmap on Digital Cooperation accepts the need to streamline digital governance while ensuring marginalized voices are heard.

The UN is considering potential models for future governance, each of which would – reassuringly – involve multi-stakeholder participation, dedicated funds to boost participation, consolidation of discussions currently split between different forums and a minor coordinating role for the UN.  

Building in roles for smaller states

As the UN designs new digital governance architecture, it is particularly important to build in roles for small and medium states. Core constituencies affected by decisions should be at the centre and governments – as guardians of public interest – should have a key say in the decision-making process. The distrust generated by built-in power imbalances needs to be addressed, as does the dominance of voices from the Global North in bodies such as ICANN.   

There has been some progress made to increase participation. For example, the Freedom Online Coalition includes a number of developing countries and the 2020 Internet Governance Forum included input from 175 states.

However, participation is not only a matter of having a seat at the table. As discussed at the March 2021 UN Open-ended Working Group on ICTs in the context of international security, capacity-building is vital. The group’s conclusions include the suggested development of a global cyber capacity-building agenda with information sharing and norms guidance under the auspices of the UN. Representatives of small and medium states need a roadmap to understand in which forums they can defend and pursue their interests, and the financial help to do so if necessary.

Managing multi-stakeholder participation

A multi-stakeholder approach has been fundamental to digital governance from the start and has played a vital role in helping to secure the openness and universality of the internet. This approach is rightly seen as essential to effective governance because it introduces diverse expertise, allows the interests of all impacted sectors to be taken into account and helps ensure decisions are accepted by those affected.

However, as identified in a Chatham House report on inclusive global governance, multi-stakeholderism needs to raise its game. One of its downsides is that in the cacophony some important voices may not be heard because they lack resource or capacity to speak up. There is a perennial risk of debate and decision-making being captured by the wealthiest companies or the most powerful states. At present, small and medium states are under-represented in multi-stakeholder forums and it is important that those managing such forums seek to identify and include previously excluded voices.

Multi-stakeholderism should not come at the expense of efficiency. While it does not have to mean huge, inefficient meetings or endless discussion, it should also not mean that smaller, less well-funded voices are not heard. Instead, such processes should enable representation of appropriate interest groups, complemented by wider meetings (such as regional meetings, or sector-specific meetings) as needed. While inclusivity and transparency are key, synergies between regional and global forums can work well –  for example, some countries have adopted national versions of the Internet Governance Forum –  and so too can hybrid models such as the Freedom Online Coalition, which meets both as government members and for regular multi-stakeholder dialogue.

A multi-stakeholder approach should also not lose sight of the key role of states – and where mandated, sub-state entities – in making public policy decisions.

An important role for the UN

For 75 years, the UN has acted as a bulwark of international security and shared values, and a promoter of economic and social development. If misused, technology has the potential to undermine this bulwark, to facilitate conflict, erode rights and undermine development. The UN must encourage the harnessing of technology for society’s benefit, while leading a collective effort to guard against the risks through the retention and growth of a universal, open internet – particularly in the face of growing digital authoritarianism exacerbated by COVID-19.

The UN can also help protect against a commercial culture that threatens to trample fundamental freedoms of privacy and autonomy in its pursuit of wealth and to widen economic and social gulfs by leaving large swathes of the world behind. If the UN is to play this role effectively – and for the benefit of all its members ­– it requires the active participation of all states, large and small.

Geopolitical shifts and evolving social challenges – what role for human rights? 29 June 2021 — 3:00PM TO 4:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 10 June 2021 Online

Speakers reflect on some of the key themes that will influence the future of human rights.

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Shifts in geopolitical power and the rise of authoritarianism are disrupting the dynamics for making progress on human rights globally.

At the same time, the relevance of the global human rights framework is being called into question by some of our most acute social challenges – rapidly evolving technology, deepening inequality and the climate crisis.

Chatham House’s Human Rights Pathways project is exploring how alliances, strategies and institutions are adapting, and will need to evolve, to strengthen human rights protection in this increasingly contested and complex global environment.

At this panel event speakers reflect on some of the key themes that will influence the future of human rights, including the long-term impacts of the pandemic, the place of human rights diplomacy in the new geopolitics, the relevance of human rights to social movements, and the potential of human rights law to galvanise efforts on urgent challenges such as the climate crisis.

New UK bill can fight fresh wave of online racist abuse Expert comment NCapeling 21 July 2021

The Euros final and Grand Prix put online abuse once more in the spotlight. The UK’s Online Safety Bill provides a strong framework for tackling the problem.

The ugly online abuse targeted at members of the England football team following the Euros final, and then at Lewis Hamilton after the British Grand Prix, was not only hateful to the individuals concerned, but divisive for the UK more broadly.

More needs to be done to regulate online platforms to avoid the spread of such abuse at scale. Online platforms are making increasing efforts to ‘self-regulate’ in order to tackle online abuse. Over the past year, Facebook and Twitter have strengthened their policies on hateful speech and conduct, such as Facebook’s policy banning Holocaust denial. Both have become more vigilant at deplatforming those who violate their terms of service, such as Donald Trump, and at removing online abuse using a combination of machines and humans.

Twitter announced in the 24 hours following the Euros final that it had removed more than 1,000 tweets, and permanently suspended several accounts, for violating its rules. But inevitably not all abusive posts are picked up given the scale of the issue and, once the post has been seen, arguably the damage is done.

Platforms have also partnered with NGOs on initiatives to counter hate speech and have launched initiatives to tackle the rise in coordinated inauthentic behaviour and information operations that seek to sow distrust and division. But while these efforts are all laudable, they are not enough.

The root of the problem is not the content but a business model in which platforms’ revenue from advertising is directly linked to engagement. This encourages the use of ‘recommender’ algorithms which amplify divisive content by microtargeting users based on previous behaviour, as seen not just with racist abuse but also other toxic content such as anti-vaccination campaigns. Abusers can also remain anonymous, giving them protection from consequences.

Creating a legal duty of care

The UK government’s Online Safety Bill, published in May 2021, aims to tackle harmful content online by placing a duty of care on online platforms to keep users safe and imposing obligations tailored to the size, functionality, and features of the service.

Social media companies will be expected to comply with their duties by carrying out risk assessments for specified categories of harm, guided by codes of practice published by the independent regulator, OFCOM. The bill gives OFCOM the power to fine platforms up to £18 million or ten per cent of global turnover, whichever is higher, for failure to comply.

Following the Euros final, the UK government spoke of referring some racist messages and conduct online to the police. But only a small proportion of it can be prosecuted given the scale of the abuse and the fact only a minority constitutes criminal activity. The majority is ‘lawful but harmful’ content – toxic and dangerous but not technically falling foul of any law.

When addressing ‘lawful but harmful’ material, it is crucial that regulation negotiates the tension between tackling the abuse and preserving freedom of expression. The scale at which such expression can spread online is key here – freedom of speech should not automatically mean freedom of reach. But it is equally important that regulation does not have a chilling effect on free speech, as with the creeping digital authoritarianism in much of the world.

The Online Safety Bill’s co-regulatory approach aims to address these tensions by requiring platforms within the scope of the bill to specify in their terms and conditions how they deal with content on their services that is legal but harmful to adults, and by giving the regulator powers to police how platforms enforce them. Platforms such as Facebook and Twitter may already have strong policies on hate speech – now there will be a regulator to hold them to account.

Devil is in the detail

How successful OFCOM is in doing so will depend on the precise powers bestowed on it in the bill, and how OFCOM chooses to use them. It’s still early days - the bill will be scrutinized this autumn by a committee of MPs before being introduced to parliament. This committee stage will provide an opportunity for consideration of how the bill may need to evolve to get to grips with online abuse.

These latest two divisive and toxic episodes in UK sport are only likely to increase pressure from the public, parliament, and politicians for the bill to reserve robust powers for OFCOM in this area. If companies do not improve at dealing with online abuse, then OFCOM should have the power to force platforms to take more robust action, including by conducting an audit of platforms’ algorithms, enabling it to establish the extent to which their ‘recommender’ settings play a part in spreading hateful content.

Currently, the bill’s definition of harm is confined to harm to individuals, and the government has stated it does not intend this bill to tackle harm to society more broadly. But if racist abuse of individuals provokes racist attacks more widely, as has happened, the regulator should be able to take that wider context into account in its investigation and response.

Responses to the draft bill so far indicate challenges ahead. Some argue the bill does not go far enough to tackle online abuse, especially on the issue of users’ anonymity, while others fear the bill goes too far in stifling freedom of expression, labelling it a recipe for censorship.

Parliamentary scrutiny will need to take into account issues of identity, trust, and authenticity in social networks. While some call for a ban on the cloak of anonymity behind which racist abusers can hide online, anonymity does have benefits for those in vulnerable groups trying to expose hate.

An alternative approach gaining attention is each citizen being designated a secure digital identity, which would both provide users with greater control over what they can see online and enable social media platforms to verify specific accounts. Instituted with appropriate privacy and security safeguards, a secure digital ID would have benefits beyond social media, particularly in an online COVID-19 era.

The online public square is global so countries other than the UK and international organizations must also take measures. It is encouraging to see synergies between the UK’s Online Safety Bill and the EU’s Digital Services Act, published in draft form in December 2020, which also adopts a risk-based, co-regulatory approach to tackling harmful online content. And the UK is using its G7 presidency to work with allies to forge a more coherent response to internet regulation at the international level, at least among democratic states.

Addressing the scourge of online hate speech is challenging so the UK’s Online Safety Bill will not satisfy everyone. But it can give the public, parliament, and politicians a structure to debate these crucial issues and, ultimately, achieve more effective ways of tackling them.

Counter-terrorism measures and sanctions: How to avoid negative consequences for humanitarian action? 9 September 2021 — 2:00PM TO 3:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 21 July 2021 Online

Exploring current endeavours to address the tensions between counter-terrorism measures, sanctions and humanitarian action.

Counter-terrorism measures  address broad forms of support to terrorist acts. Their expansion, internationally and domestically, has given rise to new points of friction with international humanitarian law. Unless the measures include adequate safeguards, they  can impede humanitarian action. Country-specific sanctions imposed for other objectives, such as ending conflicts or protecting civilians, raise similar challenges for humanitarian action. 

These problems are not new, but solutions at international and national level remain elusive. 

At this panel event, which marks the launch of a new Chatham House research paper, panellists explore current endeavours to address the tensions between counter-terrorism measures, sanctions and humanitarian action.

• What are the current dynamics and developments at Security Council level?  
• What are the opportunities now that the UK is developing its independent sanctions strategy? 
• What challenges do counter-terrorism requirements in funding agreements for humanitarian action  pose? 
• What is necessary to make progress?

How can the investor community address the ‘S’ in ESG? – the role of social purpose values 16 November 2021 — 1:30PM TO 2:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 18 October 2021 Online

This webinar highlights the crucial relationship between an open civic space and a profitable business environment.

2020 was a tipping point for investors to think and act more responsibly, galvanized by catalysts like the killing of George Floyd and the pandemic. There is increasing investor support for social and environmental causes. Younger investors are placing increasing emphasis on values and social issues in their investment decisions.

The ‘S’ in the Environment Social and Governance (ESG) agenda is clearly gaining traction, but how far does it extend to civil and political liberties i.e. the right of citizens, NGOs and journalists to speak freely, assemble and associate which are increasingly shrinking around the world?

While there is increasing focus on human rights issues such as modern slavery and supply chains, civil society space issues often fall between the cracks when investors consider ESG.

This webinar also explores opportunities and challenges that arise for the investor community in terms of factoring civic space issues into their political risk and ESG analysis.

• To what extent are civic space issues being factored into ESG social purpose values, especially by younger investors?
• What is the best methodology for assessing these issues in order to ensure a common and coherent set of global standards in this area?
• And how can investors mitigate the risks of their activities to civic space in practice?

Re-imagining trade for domestic and foreign policy Expert comment NCapeling 7 December 2021

Exploring future trade policy through issues such as the green transition, labour standards, human rights, the role of the WTO, and non-trade policy objectives.

Balancing trade and non-trade policy objectives

Marianne Schneider-Petsinger

The supply chain disruptions stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic highlight trade cannot be taken for granted, and economic interdependencies have both benefits and costs. As international commerce rebounds and trade policy is increasingly seen through the prism of enhancing resilience, the moment is ripe to redefine and reimagine trade.

The goal of trade policy has never been to increase trade for trade’s sake, so a new narrative and framework for global trade requires striking a careful balance between pursuing trade and non-trade policy objectives.

Protecting the environment, strengthening labour standards, and upholding human rights have long been goals for which trade policy is used as a lever, and the interaction of trade and national security interests as well as the links between trade and competition policy are not new issues either.

All these non-trade policy aspects have come to the forefront as the geopolitical context has shifted and the transition to green and digital economies has gathered force – and, at times, these different non-trade policy goals clash.

The US and European Union (EU) are promoting solar energy to fight climate change but supply chains for solar panels are heavily reliant on forced labour from Xinjiang, and hence it is not yet certain whether environmental or human rights concerns will prevail. However, it is clear trade policy tools can be part of a comprehensive solution which manages inherent tensions while still advancing both objectives.

Trade policy is also not just a foreign policy instrument but links closely to domestic policy – the populist backlash against globalization in much of the developed world, especially the US and Europe, was in part driven by anti-trade sentiment.

While American attitudes towards trade improved after the 2016 election of Donald Trump, positive views towards trade dropped sharply in 2021. The Biden administration’s worker-centred trade policy aims to address distributional effects of international economic integration which is a long-standing challenge. Thus, tackling non-trade policy issues without losing sight of this unresolved core issue requires careful calibration.

Trade policy is being pulled in many different directions at the same time as the core institution governing global trade – the World Trade Organization (WTO) – is in crisis, and it is uncertain how much of the non-trade policy agenda the WTO can handle. If the linkage to non-trade policy becomes too strong, this could be the straw that breaks the WTO’s back, but if it is too weak, the WTO risks becoming irrelevant in efforts to tackle key global challenges.

But if its 164 members can generate trade-oriented solutions to non-trade issues, they can revive the organization and mobilize domestic support for global trade at the same time. This balancing act in managing the tensions between trade and non-trade policy objectives lies at the centre of future-proofing trade policy and global trade governance.

Developing countries must be part of green trade revolution

Carolyn Deere Birkbeck

The biggest challenge in taking environmental efforts forward within the multilateral context is to successfully combine environmental ambition with an approach which engages developing countries as partners, reflects their environment-related trade priorities, and addresses their sustainable development interests.

The importance of engaging developing countries must not be underestimated because it is vital a global green economy does not leave the poorest behind, or becomes two-tier where green trade happens only between certain countries and the essential task of incentivizing and supporting sustainable production and consumption patterns in all countries is neglected.

The new member-led initiatives at the WTO do signal that, while the rulemaking and negotiating functions remain central to the global trade body, governments recognize the need for enhanced, transparent, and inclusive policy dialogue as well as problem-solving on sectoral issues and specific trade-related challenges.

Given the well-documented challenges of achieving multilateral consensus at the WTO, governments are exploring new ways to work within multilateral frameworks and to redefine what progress and successful outcomes should look like.

Therefore, there is a need for best practices, voluntary action, pledges, and guidelines to both sustain the relevance of the multilateral trading system and support policy action at the national level for trade which underpins environmental and wider sustainable goals.

Making progress on an environmental agenda which reflects sustainable development concerns requires stronger leadership, engagement, and advocacy from business, civil society, and research communities in both developing and developed countries, as well as economies in transition.

Meaningful, inclusive dialogue and action at the WTO also requires deeper efforts to build policy coherence among environment, development, and trade policymaking at home, with environmental ministries having a key role to play in bringing expertise to bear and ensuring strong regulatory environments and institutions for the implementation of national, regional, and international environmental commitments.

But at the domestic level, many countries still have to overcome complex politics and diverse interests as they work to transform their economies toward greater sustainability and tackle the costs of transition.

Social preparation holds the key to trade transitions

Bernice Lee 

Trade being often depicted as the mother of all ills should not come as a surprise, as politicians are only too happy to put the blame on trade when all sorts of exogenous shocks, such as technological change, could actually be the trigger which fires the bullet into local industries or jobs.

Admittedly trade does have a way of breaking the seams in the social fabric but the fact politicians often ignore negative impacts of trade means its benefits can be likened to Schrodinger’s cat, both real and illusive. But trade being mainly depicted as a ‘zero-sum’ pursuit and trade deals as the result of swashbuckling duels belie the reality that the real business of trade is often boring, bureaucratic, but necessary.

This is particularly true when trade provides access to a much larger variety of necessary products, such as medicine, food, and minerals, which can be expensive to make domestically. Selling products and services abroad also brings in the hard currency needed to buy these goods or to spend on trips abroad.

This does not take away the fact trade is extremely disruptive but, as a result of all the theorizing and understandable rants about trade, large swathes of the international community have effectively foregone it as a force for good or as an instrument which – while not the answer to all problems – can help smooth the path to well-being through efficiency gains and income growth, as well as putting to work the theory of comparative advantage as promised by the textbooks.

Alas, what the textbooks do not clearly spell out – until recently – is that trade brings positive benefits only if a society is ready for trade, which often means having the cushion for social protection such as healthcare, unemployment benefits, and opportunities for training and reskilling.

The ‘China shock’ literature vividly depicts how workers rarely seamlessly move from one job or sector to another and so, without adequate social protection, trade not only magnifies existing fractures, it also exacerbates inequality. As the aftershock lingers for decades, the lesson learned is the importance of social readiness for trade, especially the role played by governments in providing support for workers as part of the adjustment to trade and globalization.

Authors of this China shock literature recently suggested the next shock will be the transition from fossil fuel production, but the good news is this so-called ‘just transition’ challenge is one which proponents of green energy are well aware of.

But ultimately the China shock could be the dry run for the advent of machine intelligence, meaning better preparation is needed with solid social policies, investment in institutional readiness, and social preparedness to ensure the machines only take on monotonous and unsafe work – not our livelihoods and communities.

Trading partners must move to creating human rights impact

Dr Jennifer Zerk

The question of whether, and how, trade policy should be used as a way of addressing human rights concerns remains controversial and attempts to link the two still attract accusations of ‘protectionism’ and ‘neo-colonialism’.

Momentum appears to be behind those arguing for greater alignment between trade policy and human rights objectives – a trend which is most noticeable in the increasing willingness of trade partners to reference human rights standards in their trade agreements and in the growth of complementary activities such as human rights impact assessment and monitoring.

Evidence that these are having an impact ‘on the ground’ remains elusive. Nevertheless, efforts to enhance scrutiny of trade agreements from a human rights perspective, and to signal the importance of respect for human rights to a trading relationship, can still have value.

Even if causal relationships between trading arrangements and human rights impacts are difficult to establish conclusively, human rights impact assessment and subsequent monitoring activities provide valuable opportunities for stakeholders to weigh in on aspects of trade policy which are of concern.

Such processes not only help governments to realize rights of public participation, they also contribute to good governance by making it more likely that potential human rights problems will be recognized and addressed.

Turning to the agreements themselves, various ideas have been put forward on how to make these more responsive to human rights concerns.

Options mooted by EU institutions in recent years include an enhanced monitoring and enforcement role for consultative bodies established under specialized ‘trade and sustainable development’ chapters, and better mainstreaming of human rights commitments in sector-specific chapters.

However, given the political and resource-related difficulties in developing credible monitoring systems for human rights-related issues, and the unlikelihood of actual enforcement, many view this as little more than window-dressing.

For governments wanting to see real impact, ‘supply chain due diligence’ regimes pioneered by the EU in relation to timber and conflict minerals present a promising regulatory model.

These regimes seek to curb trade in products derived from, or which aggravate, human rights abuses as well as aiming to promote more responsible sourcing of products by EU importers. They create powerful incentives within partner countries to crack down on harmful practices by producers, which are bolstered further by regulations that demand more proactive human rights risk management by EU operators throughout their supply chains. Capacity-building and aid packages have been deployed to help speed up the necessary reforms.

New regulatory measures imposing mandatory human rights due diligence obligations on companies operating in a much broader range of sectors are now under consideration by the European Commission. While the role of trade-related measures in the enforcement of this new regime is still unclear, trading partners should be sure to preserve the regulatory space for sector-level and company-level initiatives such as these in future agreements.

Understanding the impact of NTPOs on investment

Professor Michael Gasiorek

Increasingly, trade policy is not just all about achieving trade-related outcomes as international trade, by definition, involves interaction with partner countries and therefore trade policy with regard to those partner countries can be used as a means to achieve ‘non-trade policy objectives’ (NTPOs).

In turn this means trade policy is also no longer just about the domestic economy but also about policies and economies in other countries – such as poorer countries achieving sustainable development goals (SDGs), concerns about practices in other countries in areas such as governance or corruption, or a desire to address broader challenges such as climate change.

But the inclusion of NTPOs in trade policy arrangements between countries also creates possible impacts on investment flows between countries. Stronger NTPO commitments could have a negative impact both on foreign direct investment (FDI) and domestic investment because the commitments increase costs for the companies involved which makes the investment less attractive.

However, NTPOs bringing progress on governance, or strengthening institutions, or giving more clarity on environmental regulations could signal a more stable and safe business environment, with production standards which create increased market access for exports – all of which may lead to increased incentives to invest.

A third possibility is that NTPOs do not have much effect either way because, although trade agreement increasingly include provisions on economic and social rights, or civil and political rights, or environmental protection – these are typically ‘best endeavour’ clauses which are frequently not binding or subject to dispute settlement, making them less likely to be implemented.

Challenges of AI Explainer jon.wallace 22 March 2022

What are the practical, legal and ethical implications of artificial intelligence (AI) and how can regulation help meet these challenges?

This article explains the challenges associated with the funding, development, supply and regulation of artificial intelligence (AI). It deals with narrow AI, that is systems and applications that are task-specific.

The article is not concerned with the concept of artificial general intelligence, or AGI, that is an AI which could meet and exceed the full capabilities of the human mind in the future.

Definition of AI

There is no universally accepted definition of AI, but in the UK’s Industrial Strategy White Paper, AI is defined as ‘technologies with the ability to perform tasks that would otherwise require human intelligence’. 

AI makes decisions using algorithms that either follow rules or, in the case of machine learning, review large quantities of data to identify and follow patterns. Because machine learning consists of multiple layers, and machines develop their own learning and patterns, it is opaque compared to traditional rule-following computing.

Today AI applications are common in many economic activities including online shopping and advertising, web search, digital personal assistants, language translation, smart homes and infrastructure, health, transport and manufacturing. 

Risks and benefits of AI

AI has the potential to bring huge advantages, for example in medical science, education, food and aid distribution, more efficient public transport and in tackling climate change. 

Used well, it could help humanity meet the UN’s 2030 Sustainable Development Goals and make many processes swifter, fairer and more efficient. It is a technology which is likely to be as transformative to human history as was the Industrial Revolution.

However, there are serious ethical, safety and societal risks associated with the rapid growth of AI technologies. 

Will AI be a tool that makes rich people richer? Will it exaggerate bias and discrimination? Will AI decision-making create a less compassionate society? Should there be limits to what decisions an AI system can take autonomously, from overtaking a car on the motorway to firing a weapon?

And if AI goes wrong – for example if a self-driving car has an accident – who should be liable? 

To ensure AI is used safely and fairly, up-to-date and rigorous regulation is needed. 

Regulation of AI

AI creates serious regulatory challenges due to the way it is funded, researched and developed.  

The private sector drives progress in AI, and governments mostly rely on big tech companies to build their AI software, furnish their AI talent, and achieve AI breakthroughs. In many respects this is a reflection of the world we live in, as big tech firms have the resources and expertise required.

However, without government oversight the future application of AI’s extraordinary potential will be effectively outsourced to commercial interests. That outcome provides little incentive to use AI to address the world’s greatest challenges, from poverty and hunger to climate change.

Government policy on AI

Currently governments are playing catch-up as AI applications are developed and rolled out. Despite the transnational nature of this technology, there is no unified policy approach to AI regulation, or to the use of data. 

It is vital that governments provide ‘guardrails’ for private sector development through effective regulation. But this is not yet in place, either in the US (where the largest amount of development is taking place) or in most other parts of the world. This regulation ‘vacuum’ has significant ethical and safety implications for AI. 

Some governments fear that imposing stringent regulations will discourage investment and innovation in their countries and lose them a competitive advantage. This attitude risks a ‘race to the bottom’, where countries compete to minimize regulation in order to lure big tech investment. 

The EU and UK governments are beginning to discuss regulation but plans are still at an early stage. Probably the most promising approach to government policy on AI is the EU’s proposed risk-based approach. It would ban the most problematic uses of AI, such as AI that distorts human behaviour or manipulates citizens through subliminal techniques. 

And it would require risk management and human oversight of AI that poses high risk to safety or human rights, such as AI used in critical infrastructure, credit checks, recruitment, criminal justice, and asylum applications.

Meanwhile, the UK is keen to see the establishment of an AI assurance industry that would provide kitemarks (or the equivalent) for AI that meets safety and ethical standards.

Despite these policy developments, there remain fundamental questions about how to categorize and apply risk assessments, what an AI rights-based approach could look like, and the lack of inclusivity and diversity in AI.

AI ethical issues

AI has serious ethical implications. Because AI develops its own learning, those implications may not be evident until it is deployed. The story of AI is littered with ethical failings: with privacy breaches, with bias, and with AI decision-making that could not be challenged.

It’s therefore important to identify and mitigate ethical risks while AI is being designed and developed, and on an ongoing basis once it is in use. 

But many AI designers work in a competitive, profit-driven context where speed and efficiency are prized and delay (of the kind implied by regulation and ethical review) is viewed as costly and therefore undesirable. 

Designers may also not have the training, tools or capacity to identify and mitigate ethical issues. The majority are from an engineering or computing background, and do not reflect the diversity in society.

Shareholders and senior management will also naturally be hostile to criticism which could affect profits.

Once an AI application has been designed, it is often sold to companies to fulfil a task (for example, sifting employment applicants) without the buyer being able to understand how it works or what risks may come with it.

Ethical frameworks for AI

Some international bodies have made efforts to create an ethical framework for AI development, including UNESCO’s Recommendation on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence, and the IEEE’s Global Initiative on Ethics of Autonomous and Intelligent Systems. And some companies have developed their own ethical initiatives.

But each of these proposals naturally overlaps, is slightly different and is voluntary. They set out principles for creating ethical AI, but provide no accountability in the event that an AI goes wrong.

Ethical roles in the AI industry are a potentially important new profession, but the field is underfunded and under resourced. There is widespread agreement that ethics is important, but a lack of consensus on how it should be enforced.

Government use of AI

It’s equally important that the way governments use AI is understood, consensual and ethical, complying with human rights obligations. Opaque practices by governments may feed the perception of AI as a tool of oppression. 

China has some of the clearest regulation of AI private industry in the world, but the way the government has deployed AI tools in the surveillance of its citizens has serious civil liberties implications.

China’s exports of AI to other countries are increasing the prevalence of government surveillance internationally.

Privacy and AI

Probably the greatest challenge facing the AI industry is the need to reconcile AI’s need for large amounts of structured or standardized data with the human right to privacy. 

AI’s ‘hunger’ for large data sets is in direct tension with current privacy legislation and culture. Current law, in the UK and Europe limits both the potential for sharing data sets and the scope of automated decision-making. These restrictions are limiting the capacity of AI. 

During the COVID-19 pandemic, there were concerns that it would not be possible to use AI to determine priority allocation of vaccines. (These concerns were allayed on the basis that GPs provided oversight on the decision-making process.)

More broadly, some AI designers said they were unable to contribute to the COVID-19 response due to regulations that barred them from accessing large health data sets. It is at least feasible that such data could have allowed AI to offer more informed decisions about the use of control measures like lockdowns and the most effective global distribution of vaccines.

Better data access and sharing are compatible with privacy, but require changes to our regulation. The EU and UK are considering what adjustments to their data protection laws are needed to facilitate AI while protecting privacy.

How are war crimes prosecuted? Explainer Video NCapeling 26 April 2022

Explaining what war crimes are and how, in the circumstances of Ukraine, could war crimes be prosecuted.

The Geneva Conventions and Protocol 1 describe what they call ‘grave breaches’ of international humanitarian law, and both Ukraine and Russia are parties to these treaties.

Grave breaches include directly attacking civilians and launching an indiscriminate attack affecting the civilian population or civilian property.

Many states and the International Criminal Court (ICC) also have the possibility to prosecute a wider set of war crimes although, in the past, states have not prosecuted many such crimes committed outside their own territory.

Neither Russia nor Ukraine is a party to the ICC Statute, but Ukraine did declared it accepted the Court’s jurisdiction for crimes on its territory, and and investigations have now started.

But there are several problems to be overcome to achieve successful prosecutions, such as the collection and preservation of evidence, proof of the intent of the suspects in the heat of war, how to be arrest suspects, and the issue of immunity.

Chatham House welcomes 2022 interns News release jon.wallace 11 May 2022

Internships provide learning opportunities about shaping policy, influencing debate and creating real change.

Chatham House is excited to welcome the second cohort to the Molchanov Sustainability Internship Programme.

Introduced in January 2021, the programme has been made possible following the gift of Pavel Molchanov, to support the next generation of leaders in sustainability.

The internships grant invaluable, practical learning opportunities about shaping policy, influencing debate and creating real change towards a sustainable future.

Alis Martin, Internships and Outreach Manager at Chatham House, said:

‘We are delighted to welcome the second cohort to the Molchanov Sustainability Internship Programme. This cohort brings a diversity of new and invaluable perspectives and ideas to the work of our programmes.

‘Over the course of 12 weeks, interns will be working alongside internationally respected experts in Chatham House programmes, exploring issues of sustainability through the lenses of climate change, the circular economy, conflict prevention, emerging technology, global health, governance, human rights, security policy, sustainable cities and sustainable finance.

‘Fostering sustainable and equitable growth and engaging the next generation of policy leaders is central to Chatham House’s vision. We are committed to providing the best experience and opportunities to our interns who share an interest in pursuing a career in the field of sustainability.

‘It is crucial that we incorporate the views and knowledge of those who will be affected most in the future and I very much look forward to seeing the innovative and impactful ideas that will undoubtedly result from their work.’

Mr Molchanov said:

‘Recent headlines around the world underscore the importance of taking the broadest possible perspective on sustainability. Energy supply concerns, rising food prices, and continued pandemic pressure are all interconnected with climate issues. I look forward to hearing about the work in which this year’s internship participants engage.’

Jerome Puri, intern, Middle East and North Africa Programme, said:

‘I applied for this internship to gain a holistic insight into the coordination of a policy institute and to understand how Chatham House promotes international cooperation and accountable governance around the world.  Chatham House offers an unparalleled opportunity to contribute to projects on frontier issues facing the MENA region and develop a diverse range of skills ranging from project management and communications to policy-oriented research skills.’

Obioma Egemonye, intern, Africa Programme, said:

‘I was particularly interested in joining the Africa Programme at Chatham House after learning an immeasurable amount from their work on the Social Norms and Accountable Governance (SNAG) research for my undergraduate dissertation. I am most looking forward to attending the variety of events held by Chatham House and the Africa programme specifically.’

Valdone Sniukaite, intern, Europe Programme, said:

‘I am excited to be joining the Europe Programme team and getting exposure to the inner workings of a policy and research think tank. I’m mostly looking forward to building my organizational skill set by working on the Belvedere Forum and using the opportunity of being around experts in the field of international affairs to broaden my knowledge.’

Lucile de Laforcade, intern, Queen Elizabeth II Academy for Leadership in International Affairs, said:

‘As part of the Academy, I am able to work at the crossroads of research, leadership, international affairs and personal development. This makes the Academy a place of constant challenge to find innovative, sustainable solutions, and emulate new ideas. As an aspiring academic, this is particularly empowering! I am hoping to gain new skills, further develop independent thinking, and cultivate my own research interests in the vibrant environment of a leading policy institute.’

Katie McCann, intern, Communications and Publishing, said:

‘I’m really interested in youth engagement in international politics so I’m very excited to be working on the Common Futures Conversations platform which brings young people across Europe and Africa into the debate on the pressing global issues of our time. I hope my time at Chatham House will expose me to people of different backgrounds and beliefs which will encourage me to engage even more critically with international affairs.’

Rachael Mullally, intern, International Law Programme, said:

‘What I admire most about the International Law Programme here is its position as a dependable yet experimental source on global governance debates. I am especially excited to get working on the Human Rights Pathways Project, focusing on tangible ideas as to how the human rights framework can evolve to meet power shifts between states and non-state actors.’

Elia Duran-Smith, intern, International Security Programme, said:

‘I was particularly drawn to this internship because of the thematic focuses of the programme around nuclear security and emerging technologies in the sector, which are fundamental to understanding the future of the global security environment. I am looking forward to learning more about these topics while developing and expanding my research and writing skills, as well as gaining an understanding of project management and how Chatham House engages with stakeholders on policy.’

Rory Selvey, intern, Sustainability Accelerator, said:

‘For me, speeding up the transition towards a fairer, low-carbon society is one of most important global challenges. I’m really excited to be an intern at the Sustainability Accelerator, collaborating with different teams and exploring innovation solutions to this challenge. Chatham House will help me develop vital knowledge and skills, acting as a fantastic springboard for a potential career in sustainable finance, macroeconomics, or international development.’

Bruna Miguel, intern, Environment and Society Programme, said:

‘Being an intern in the Environment and Society Programme will give me the opportunity to further investigate how these issues relate and how we can achieve true sustainability. I look forward to learning from the experts in the area that I will meet (and hopefully find a dissertation topic!).’

Ritvij Singh, intern, Global Health Programme, said:

‘My view of healthcare delivery is from the frontlines as a medical doctor. I applied to this internship to widen my perspective and get an insight into the institutions that will help facilitate universal health. I will use this experience to pursue a career in global health.’

For more information about the internships, please contact Alis Martin.

Geopolitical corporate responsibility can drive change Expert comment NCapeling 26 July 2022

Russia’s long invasion of Ukraine is testing the commitment of business, but this could see the emergence of a new pillar of support for the rules-based international order.

The massive exit of more than 1,000 international companies from Russia has surpassed – by a factor of nearly ten in merely four months – the number which pulled out of apartheid-led South Africa over an entire decade.

These company exits extend beyond those industries targeted for sanctions – oil and gas, banks and financial services, aerospace, and certain technology sectors – to include hundreds in consumer products ranging from Levi’s and H&M clothing to Coca-Cola and McDonalds. Many of these companies may wish to return to a post-conflict – or post-Putin – Russia, while a few have already sold their Russian operations, as McDonald’s has to an existing Siberian licensee.

Both reputational and operational factors are driving the huge exodus: reputational as companies have chosen to disassociate themselves from Putin’s regime; operational as transportation routes and supply chains have been interrupted.

Few of these companies have made explicit the principles at stake, while many still face ‘tricky legal, operational and ethical considerations’ and some have kept operations in place. But the collective impact of the exit in response to Russia’s affront to international law has sent shockwaves around the world.

Current issues and future implications

Minds now turn to whether this exodus sets a blueprint for the future, and how companies having to make complex and sensitive risk assessments and global business planning decisions can address both current issues as well as similar future challenges.

The new Declaration from the Business for Ukraine Coalition – an international civil society initiative of organizations and individuals – encourages companies to reinforce ‘responsible exit’ from Russia ‘in response to its unprovoked, full-scale war on Ukraine’.

The declaration’s objective is to ‘block access to the economic and financial resources enabling Russian aggression’ and it urgently calls on companies that have terminated or suspended their business operations and relationships to ‘stand by those commitments until the territorial sovereignty of Ukraine within internationally recognized borders is restored.’

It also states companies yet to terminate or suspend operations in Russia should do so unless they can demonstrate through due diligence that their provision of ‘essential’ services or products – such as medicines – meet critical humanitarian needs.

The 2022 Edelman Trust Barometer Special Report: The Geopolitical Business suggests Ukraine represents an inflection point posing ‘a new test’ for business. According to an online survey of 14,000 respondents in 14 countries, including employees, NGOs, and other stakeholders, there is a ‘rising call’ for business to be more engaged in geopolitics, with CEOs ‘expected to shape policy’ on societal and geopolitical issues.

Such expectations have been intensifying with the impetus of the combined stakeholder capitalism and corporate purpose agenda, even as a political backlash in the US against the environmental, social, and governance (ESG) movement linking institutional investors and multinational corporations gains momentum.

The emergence of corporate activism is a further development – partly driven by employees and accelerated during the pandemic – on issues of economic inequality, racial injustice, and gender equality, as well as the climate crisis.

When considering what broader purpose should drive this corporate geopolitical engagement, the Business for Ukraine Declaration offers an answer, calling Russia’s aggression ‘an attack on the rules-based international order which must be protected to ‘safeguard the international community and the global economy.’

This points to broader interests and values at stake in the Russian war on Ukraine because supporting the rules-based international order can become the basis of a new geopolitical corporate responsibility. Business, especially multinational corporations and institutional investors, fundamentally depend on and have enormously benefitted from this order.

Economic development needs a stable rules-based international order

Trade and investment, entrepreneurship, and innovation – the sinews of economic development – depend on predictable, rational behaviour by states at home and abroad. Individual companies and entire industries share a stake in upholding this order at a time when its stability and even legitimacy is undergoing a severe challenge.

The rules-based international order has evolved since the adoption of the UN Charter in 1945, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, and the establishment of the standards, norms and institutions that reflect and reinforce these lodestars. It defines the international community, the rule of law, accountable governance, civic freedoms, and human rights within nations. It also supports national self-determination, sovereignty, and the disavowal of the use of force to alter borders among nations, and it provides accountability for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.

Business has a fundamental stake in the international order as the framework for stability, prosperity, open societies, and markets.

A new geopolitical corporate responsibility does not need to become a doctrine but can instead be an agenda to support the international rules-based order under stress. Such an agenda may help multinationals deal with expectations they already face, such as:

Avoiding situations where they cause, contribute, or are directly linked to human rights abuses. This objective is enshrined in the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and companies can be further informed by the new UN Guide to Heightened Human Rights Due Diligence for Business in Conflict-Affected Contexts.

Committing to the ‘shared space’ of the rule of law, accountable governance, civic freedoms, and human rights. These are both the enablers of civil society and the underpinning of sustainable and profitable business and investment environments. The Chatham House synthesis paper The role of the private sector in protecting civic space sets forth the rationale for companies to defend these vital elements.

Supporting peace, justice, and strong institutions both within nations and across the international community as set forth by UN Sustainable Development Goal 16. The SDG 16 Business Framework: Inspiring Transformational Governance shows how companies, as well as national governments and international institutions, can contribute to these building blocks of stability and prosperity.

Demonstrating corporate responsibility at the national and geopolitical levels to enhance equity, transparency, and accountability. Multinationals are already challenged to accept minimum corporate taxation within and across jurisdictions, curb excessive executive compensation, endorse mandatory disclosure of environmental and human rights due diligence, and strengthen corporate governance of ESG risks and responsibilities, including with respect to human rights.

Diminishing inequality by tackling poverty and ensuring sustainability by arresting the climate crisis. Alongside governments and international institutions, the business community already faces increasing pressure to improve its efforts in these areas.

What are the priorities for the new UK prime minister? Expert comment GBhardwaj 2 September 2022

Experts from across Chatham House examine the range of domestic and foreign policy issues facing Rishi Sunak as he prepares to lead the UK government.

Experts from across Chatham House’s research programmes give their insights on a range of issues facing Rishi Sunak as he becomes UK prime minister, covering energy prices, the climate change agenda, war in Ukraine, China and the Indo-Pacific, Africa, the US, global health, international law and security, science and technology, trade, and the global economic crisis.

Rising energy prices

Antony Froggatt, Senior Research Fellow and Deputy Director, Environment and Society Programme, Chatham House

The social and economic impact of high energy prices this winter may be greater than that of COVID-19. However, in contrast to the pandemic, there has been ample warning of the expected scale of this crisis.

The European Union (EU) gets much more of its energy from Russia than the UK does, but all are part of a largely informal European price zone which is why UK consumers are now facing, what would have been to many, unimaginable bills despite no longer importing energy from Russia.   

The cost of energy will continue to be a major concern for households and businesses and, given the cost of interventions, will significantly affect government finance.

The current policy of capping the unit price for six months increases affordability but will only offer some relief for this winter. The new government urgently needs to look at what happens to bills in the spring and next winter which, from a gas supply perspective, may be even worse than this one.

The EU has reacted with much greater purpose, proposing new legislative packages to diversify supply, accelerate the deployment of renewable energy, make adjustments to markets, and put in place energy saving measures. While these are unlikely to be enough they will make a difference and can become a benchmark for UK policy.

The role that government plays in assisting public and private sectors to save energy will be important. This is where past administrations have wasted the last eight months, where public information campaigns and small technology changes, such as refurbishing and resetting boilers and larger energy consuming products or insulating homes, would have made a difference.

Action needs to be taken across all levels, including co-ordination with the devolved administrations and local government.

Support for new supply needs to be immediately given to new low-carbon technologies which can deliver both cheaply and rapidly, primarily onshore wind and solar, which also help to decarbonize the sector.

The UK will need to maintain, and more likely increase, its relationship with the EU on energy as it continues to trade gas and electricity which is likely to require the resolution of tricky issues such as the Northern Ireland Protocol.

However, the discussions at the European Political Community in early October on greater co-operation on North Sea grids, creating an important opportunity for the accelerated deployment of offshore wind, needs to be taken forward.

Other supply options and market restructuring will be needed and they all must balance affordability, security of supply, and environmental considerations.

The agenda on climate change

Professor Tim Benton, Director, Environment and Society Programme, Chatham House

The record temperatures this summer show how the changing climate is impacting the daily lives of UK citizens. Climate change remains the most important challenge of this century and one that the prime minister will rapidly need to get a grip of ahead of COP27.

Hosting COP26 in 2021, along with Italy, was seen as an important post-Brexit opportunity for the UK in the climate space and ensured the development of many new multilateral sectorial initiatives, such as on climate finance, the Global Methane Pledge and on electric vehicles, while further supporting other emerging initiatives, such as on loss and damage. It will be important for the new prime minister, and the UK’s credibility, to continue to deliver on these.

Concrete things that are needed are a fast roll-out of renewable energy rather than fast-tracking more fossil fuel production, driving ahead the net-zero agenda particularly around land use and food and considering how to restructure markets to better deliver the long-term goals.

Grasping the need to address the demand-side of consumption growth, and not just supply, is key. The UK has prided itself on being a global leader on the climate over the last 15 years but let’s hope that is now not in peril.

Russia and the war in Ukraine

James Nixey, Director, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House

Supporting Ukraine and confronting Russia are indisputable foreign policy priorities so it is highly likely the new prime minister will look to continue on this path and go with both popular and expert consensus in assisting Ukraine generously and standing up to Russia.

The other question, though, is to what extent the UK’s position can continue to make a difference to the outcome of the war.

Bringing the waverers of western Europe more firmly on board is surely beyond any UK prime minister’s ability considering the UK’s post-Brexit behaviour where the UK still has its own questions to answer including over the failure to tackle the problems of Russian influence at home.

That said, Brexit may not always be relevant to shared hard security challenges. Other countries do see the difference training, money and weapons are making and, if these continue to bring success, it is possible even the waverers can be guilted into providing more aid and economic support.

However, supporting Ukraine is one thing. Truly understanding Russia and devising a coherent Russia strategy is another. What needs to be learned is that Russia, in its present incarnation, cannot be reasoned with whatever the state of the war.

Therefore, given the threat Russia poses to the UK and other democracies, Britain now needs to consider how it can assist with engendering change in Russia. This should not be confused with engineering ‘regime change’ as the Kremlin accuses the UK of doing already.

But it does suggest a more proactive, less defensive Russia policy is required, rather than waiting for the Russian people to instigate change from within. That will take a degree of leadership and political will rarely seen in UK politics.

China and the Indo-Pacific tilt

Ben Bland, Director, Asia-Pacific Programme, Chatham House

Both candidates in the last Conservative leadership contest argued during their campaigns that China was the biggest long-term threat to the UK’s national security. They both promised to call out China’s violations of human rights and international law and extend curbs on China’s access to sensitive technology.

However, to successfully respond to the scale of the challenge, the next prime minister will need to do much more than say what they do not want from Beijing. There needs to be a convincing, positive vision for how the UK can navigate a world where the centre of global economic and geopolitical gravity is moving eastwards.

The Indo-Pacific ‘tilt’ which Liz Truss oversaw as UK foreign secretary was a good start. But tilting isn’t a strategy. So what comes next?

At a time when its in-tray is full of problems closer to home, the UK government needs to sustain enhanced levels of engagement in the Indo-Pacific, particularly in Southeast Asia, while investing at home in the UK’s Asia literacy.

That should include more support for research and education about China as well as the rest of this dynamic region. Labelling China a threat does not make it go away. The UK needs to learn how to live in a world where Chinese power and influence will continue to grow from Asia to Latin America and across the UN and other multilateral organizations.

Investing in the UK’s knowledge of, and relationships in, Asia will also support British businesses as they look for new opportunities in fast-growing but challenging emerging markets such as India, Indonesia, and Vietnam.

The UK’s Middle East policy

Dr Lina Khatib, Director, Middle East and North Africa Programme, Chatham House

The UK government must restore a distinct cabinet position for the Middle East and North Africa and reorient to give Iran’s regional role greater focus.

The Middle East portfolio remains hefty and complex and requires diplomatic engagement to match. No sooner had the UK merged the ministerial Middle East portfolio into the broader one of minister of state for Asia and the Middle East than the war on Ukraine began, directing Western attention to Gulf Arab countries as one potential energy source to offset the loss of Russian oil and gas. Yet Gulf Arab countries are hesitating to fully heed Western calls to increase energy production. 

One key cause is Gulf Arab perceptions that the UK and other Western countries have overlooked their concerns of the threats that Iran poses to their security and political clout.

Despite the UK’s characterization of Iraq as ‘post-conflict’, and of the situation in Syria as a ‘crisis’, recent clashes in Baghdad’s Green Zone and American and Israeli bombing of Iran-linked targets in Syria, as well as recurring attacks by Iran-backed groups on targets in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, underline Iran’s role in ongoing instability in the Middle East, which threatens the interests of the UK and its allies in the region.

Although the UK’s Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office resources have been recently redistributed to further support response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the UK can, and must, use existing resources earmarked for the Middle East to engage more effectively.

The two are not wholly distinct: Russia is using Iranian drones to attack Ukraine and Iranian military personnel are active on the ground in Ukraine in aid of the Russian military. Iran and Russia’s ongoing military intervention in Syria paved the way for their cooperation in the invasion of Ukraine.

The UK must restore diplomatic cabinet distribution to give the Middle East the attention it requires, but also revising its approach, putting Iran’s regional and international interventions high on the agenda and in parallel to efforts on the Iran nuclear deal.

The UK sees GCC countries as a potential alternative source of energy to Russian oil and gas specifically and as important trade partners more broadly. UK foreign policy must not compartmentalize its approach to the Middle East.

Diplomatic engagement on Iran’s regional role is a key factor in strengthening trust between the UK and its Middle Eastern allies, including in the GCC, which in turn supports the UK’s economic and security priorities. This means UK policy must approach Iran not just more comprehensively, and coherently, but also as a component of the broader strategy of dealing with the geopolitical and economic threats presented by Russia. 

Africa and the UK

Alex Vines, Director, Africa Programme, Chatham House

Senior UK politicians often claim that Africa is a priority but UK prime ministers and foreign secretaries rarely visit the continent. Boris Johnson attending the Commonwealth Heads of Government Summit in Kigali in August was his first as prime minister where he was accompanied by Liz Truss who was then his foreign secretary.

Despite saying she was an Africa enthusiast as secretary of state for international trade and president of the Board of Trade, Truss had never visited the continent. Her focus was consistently on other parts of the world except for defending the UK’s contested partnership with Rwanda to repatriate to Kigali informal migrants to the UK.

Viewing global politics through the lens of great power rivalry has cast African states as second tier players, disrespecting their agency and prided sovereignty and ignoring the preference of many states to remain non-aligned on issues pertaining to great power competition.

This is a mistake as 25 per cent of the UNGA is comprised of African member states and, of them, 21 are Commonwealth members with Gabon and Togo recently joining. The Russian invasion of Ukraine and intensifying competition with China is a reminder that in this era of sharper geopolitics, Africa increasingly matters for UK’s foreign policy objectives.

The new prime minister will need to review the 2021 Integrated Review, which downplayed much of Africa for UK strategy and advocated a pivot focus to East Africa. The war in Ukraine, coupled with democratic reversals in East Africa and worsening stability in West Africa requires a UK priority rethink. With limited resources to support an expanded UK footprint, sharper focus and defined ambition is important.

Continuity is important too. Since 1989, there have been 21 ministers for Africa, an average tenure of just over 18 months. This is not the time to change the UK’s minister responsible for Africa but it is the moment to make once again that post focused just on sub-Saharan Africa rather than also covering the Caribbean and Latin America too.

The UK-US relationship

Dr Leslie Vinjamuri, Director, US and Americas Programme, Chatham House

As the US approaches its midterm elections, the new prime minister should think carefully about the UK’s response to potential disruption or challenges to the legitimacy of electoral results.

The US faces a period of unpredictable politics with the possibility of significant disruption, upheaval, and the potential for violence. The UK should be careful to differentiate between being independent with respect to partisan politics, which is essential, from being neutral with respect to democracy and especially the integrity of elections.

It would be a mistake for the UK prime minister or the next foreign secretary to be neutral on the question of free and fair elections and the importance of democracy in the US. Boris Johnson’s administration, especially his foreign secretary, was poorly equipped to respond to questions about the outcome of the 2020 presidential elections and prevaricated more than once. 

On foreign policy, a shared interest in supporting Ukraine and strengthening NATO is the current anchor for this partnership, but its historical foundation is both deeper and wider.

The new UK prime minister should demonstrate to the US, and to the world, that Britain is serious about its existing international commitments, especially in the Euro-Atlantic and through NATO, but also with respect to Northern Ireland and Europe.

The UK should deepen its participation in the new European Political Community and seize any opportunity to strengthen mechanisms for security cooperation with Europe. It should aim to restore Britain’s reputation as a nation committed to international, regional and domestic multilateral and legal frameworks.

These measures strengthen Britain’s attractiveness to the US and so lend it greater influence in this essential partnership. Any move to undermine the Northern Ireland protocol should be carefully measured against its wider impacts, not only with Europe, but also with the US.

Continuing Boris Johnson’s policy of restraint, rather than demanding a US-UK trade deal, is wise given the persistence of anti-trade sentiment in the US Congress and the looming US midterm elections.

The prime minister should also do what they can to lend support and work effectively and pragmatically with this US administration. What comes next could be disruptive so now is the time to leverage US power and lock the US into durable commitments that enhance international stability and prosperity.

US president Joe Biden is determined and pragmatic. He will choose the partners that best enable him to deliver his foreign policy priorities. The UK will be both more attractive, and less supplicant, to the US if it has a strong relationship with Europe.

Global health priorities

Robert Yates, Director, Global Health Programme and Executive Director, Centre for Universal Health, Chatham House and Emma Ross, Senior Research Fellow, Global Health Programme. 

Global health has been one of the areas where the UK has historically been seen as punching above its weight due to the magnitude of its financing for global health programmes and its reputation as a leader in global health initiatives.

However, the UK’s standing has taken a significant hit since the start of the pandemic with it demonstrating a lack of solidarity in combatting COVID-19 when it hoarded vaccines and failed to lead the G7 in raising adequate funding for the COVAX facility and blocked attempts to share vaccine technologies with developing countries.

Slashing the international aid budget and deprioritizing global health within its aid strategy has further tarnished the UK’s reputation as a global health leader.

Rebuilding the UK’s hard-earned status as a leading force in global health by at least restoring the level of official development assistance (ODA) for health, if not enhancing it, should be one of the new prime minister’s top priorities.

This should include support for major initiatives such as the Financial Intermediary Fund for Pandemic Prevention, Preparedness and Response (FIF), the Hub for Pandemic and Epidemic Intelligence in Berlin and the vaccine technology transfer hub in Africa.

There is a risk that the ongoing pandemic treaty negotiations will result in a weak instrument of little value. The UK prime minister should prioritize the successful outcome of the negotiations by championing provisions that ensure the treaty makes a meaningful difference in enhancing global health security.

There is a need for workable mechanisms to ensure countries cooperate next time in preventing, preparing for and responding to a pandemic and supporting countries that need extra resources while, another related priority, should be to engage in efforts to reform the International Health Regulations in a way that strengthens global health security.

Championing international law

Rashmin Sagoo, Director, International Law Programme, Chatham House

Compliance with international law is in the best interests of the UK, and the new UK government needs to recognize this.  

The UK wants Russia to comply with the UN Charter and stop its aggressive war against Ukraine. It wants China to recognize the rights of its Uighur citizens, for women to be protected from violence in armed conflict, for compliance with nuclear non-proliferation treaties and  negotiate lucrative international trade agreements. 

These are all excellent aims and they should continue to be pursued. But exhortations to the rest of the world to support the international rules-based order ring hollow if they come from a government which itself does not itself adhere to those rules. 

How the UK conducts itself domestically is a mirror of how it conducts itself internationally. What elected UK officials say and do here matters elsewhere. How we treat the rule of law in this country impacts how others treat it – and us.  

The new prime minister has an opportunity to lead by example by ending the slow but dangerous habitualization of the British public becoming numb to government ‘intentions’ to break international law whether or not such threats are ultimately carried out.

There should also be a full public and parliamentary scrutiny of constitutionally significant proposals, such as the Northern Ireland Protocol bill and reform of the Human Rights Act, rather than fast-track them past a public distracted by the cost-of-living crisis. 

International law is founded upon principles of mutual trust, cooperation, good faith and reciprocity. To be a credible global leader, the UK must put the rule of law, including international law, at the heart of both its foreign and domestic policy. They cannot be disaggregated.   

Strengthening international security

Dr Patricia Lewis, Director, International Security Programme, Chatham House

Security and defence will be high on the agenda for the new UK prime minister. Russia’s war in Ukraine and the potential for sudden, wider escalation remains a serious concern.

Threats of nuclear weapons use, possible false flag ‘dirty bomb’ threats, the continuing attacks on the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant threats and veiled references to chemical or biological attacks has demonstrated the willingness of Russia to take enormous risks in regard to threatening Europe as a whole in order to achieve its aims.

If Ukraine’s counter-offensive continues to make gains, then NATO countries will likely be threatened again in this manner. These are not just threats to Ukraine but to NATO states. And, most likely, given the significant role it has played in supporting Ukraine militarily, aimed primarily at the UK.

In the longer term, the UK prime minister needs to review the 2021 Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy. The review came following the decision to increase defence spending and the UK secretary of defence Ben Wallace – continuing in place –has been clear that he has no need to increase his budget further although that may change as the impact of inflation becomes clearer across the board.

The Integrated Review is all about serious investment in the science and technology needed for security and defence in the future. Without such investment the UK will not be able to contribute to international security even in the limited way it can now and certainly not in an ambitious way in decades hence.

There are many long-term security threats that the UK will need to grapple with in addition to Russia’s aggression in Europe, not least of which are China’s rising military capabilities and global ambitions.

In the Arctic and Antarctic, China along with several other major economies, has serious ambitions for exploiting natural resources in terms of minerals, energy, particularly as climate change drives fish stock to the polar seas.

The newly-established AUKUS arrangement which plans to produce a nuclear-powered submarine capability for Australia also provides a mechanism for joint investment by Australia, the UK and the US in science and technologies such as in artificial intelligence (AI) and quantum technology. There are discussions about extending this arrangement to other countries such as Japan and could also include the space sector.    

Meanwhile, at home, in the short-term, there will be increasing calls to end Russia’s war in Ukraine. The prime minister will need to be ahead of that game so that Ukraine is supported and European security is enhanced rather than further stressed.

This will require a new approach to international security – a need that was further highlighted at the end of August in New York with yet another collapse of agreement in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a result of Russia’s veto.

The UK has long played an important diplomatic role in finding creative solutions for international security and the new prime minister would be well advised to lever that reputation.

Supporting science and technology

Marjorie Buchser, Executive Director, Digital Society Initiative, Chatham House, David Lawrence, Research Fellow, UK in the World Initiative Chatham House and Alex Krasodomski, Head of Innovation Partnerships, Chatham House

In science and technology, the UK currently finds itself in a balancing act between the US and the EU: ideologically attached to the light-touch approach of the US while dependent on the EU as an export market and for supply chains.

While Brexit in theory gives Britain more regulatory freedom, UK companies have often ended up abiding by EU regulations they are unable to shape. The new prime minister should explore forms of regulatory cooperation with the EU that prioritize market access while offering incentives to attract scientists and boost technical innovation.

Beyond transatlantic and European partnerships, it is essential for the UK to foster coalitions with a broader group of like-minded democracies which will be crucial to addressing global technology concerns and countering China’s digital model expansion.

Entrenching the UK as a science and technology ‘superpower’ will require a collaborative approach and involve identifying critical areas where the UK can drive international efforts. For example, the UK should build on its recent successes in the sensitive issues of data flows and digital technical standards as well as encourage investment in open-source security and infrastructure.

Finally, it is essential to unblock the skills and talent pipeline. It is difficult and expensive for high-skilled workers to move to the UK and a key source of labour supply has been lost since leaving the EU. The UK should consider introducing a Commonwealth visa scheme and radically reduce the cost for science and technology companies to offer those visas.

Strengthening infrastructure and housing, particularly in areas that need levelling up, will allow talent to move to areas with the most productive opportunities. 

Trade, climate and green supply chains

Bernice Lee, Research Director, Futures; Hoffmann Distinguished Fellow for Sustainability; Chair, Sustainability Accelerator Advisory Board 

The new prime minister will soon find the answers to the UK’s supply security challenges and soaring energy and food prices as well as future growth lie not at home but are global problems.

At a time of crisis, solutions can only come from countries working together. The UK is a perfectly sized state with plenty of heft but it is not so large as to be able to afford to ignore the needs of others.

It should lead the convening of a growing ‘coalition of the willing’ on trade, climate and green supply chains which could include Australia and Canada as well as developing nations with large extractive sectors in Africa and Asia that are pro-trade, pro-climate, pro-development and pro-growth.

Even though working together on trade and green supply chains can reduce unwanted dependencies, support climate action and help businesses unlock the $26 trillion in market opportunities, many governments have yet to take bold steps due to a fear of disguised protectionism.

Meanwhile, the European Union (EU) carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) is fuelling bitter divides on competitiveness and development concerns.

Trade retaliation is likely and most probably will happen in parallel with legal processes at the WTO. These dynamics mean trade will be underused as an instrument but will create challenging dynamics for COP27. 

Although the Agreement on Climate Change, Trade, and Sustainability (ACCTS) was launched in 2019, the UK could fill a leadership gap since no major economies have positioned themselves as leaders at the intersection of trade, climate, and green supply chains.

British International Investment, the UK’s development institution, should support the establishment and scaling of low-carbon, resource-efficient, sustainable and deforestation-free supply chains which could help fuel the next generation of growth in the UK and beyond.

Improve regulation, give priority to trade relations with the EU, and maintain transparency

Creon Butler, Research Director, Trade, Investment and New Governance Models, and Director, Global Economy and Finance Programme

The UK’s new prime minister comes into office with the country facing the most serious set of economic challenges since 2008-09.

But, in contrast to the global financial crisis, the causes of today’s crisis are more multifaceted and to a degree more UK-specific: the Brexit trade shock; increased public spending pressures linked to the backlog in the NHS and potentially serious long-term effects of ‘long COVID’ and disrupted schooling; the unprecedented shock to energy prices following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine linked in part to the UK’s lack of gas storage capacity; and the shock to market confidence in the UK’s economic management resulting from the 44-day Liz Truss administration.

While the new prime minister should not delay addressing the UK’s long-term challenges, there are three critical questions which will help determine the success or failure of the government’s approach.

First, should the priority be less regulation or, in the context of the tech revolution and the need to accelerate the transformation of the economy to net zero, smarter regulation?

The ICC response to Russia’s war gives hope for justice Expert comment NCapeling 19 March 2023

The ICC’s arrest warrants against Putin and Lvova-Belova show the commission of international crimes is not without consequences.

Warrants of arrest for Russian president Vladimir Putin and Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova, commissioner for children’s rights in the president’s office, have been issued because the Pre-Trial Chamber II of the International Criminal Court (ICC) has reasonable grounds to believe they have committed war crimes.

Following an independent investigation and evidence-gathering by the ICC prosecutor Karim Khan in his first new case since taking office, the pair are accused of committing two different war crimes – the unlawful deportation of children from Ukraine to Russia, and the unlawful transfer of children from occupied areas of Ukraine to the Russian Federation.

The focus on those two war crimes is likely due to clear evidence that deportation and forcible transfer of thousands of Ukrainian children have occurred, as the Russian government was overt about its policy of taking Ukrainian children to Russia and placing them in camps or putting them up for adoption by Russian families.

Furthermore, in line with the Office of the Prosecutor’s policy on children, crimes against children are prioritized given their particularly vulnerable status.

Jurisdiction and enforcement

The ICC does not have jurisdiction over crimes committed fully in Russia by Russian nationals, as Russia is not a party to the Rome Statute which created the ICC.

However, it does have jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide committed in Ukraine irrespective of who committed them, pursuant to two declarations lodged by Ukraine in 2014 accepting the Court’s jurisdiction over its territory from November 2013.

Although a prosecution has been initiated, it is ultimately for the judges of the ICC to decide on the accused’s fate. But the chances of Putin getting arrested or tried for these offences are slim.

The ICC lacks enforcement or police powers and depends on state cooperation to execute arrest warrants. Also, because it cannot try individuals in their absence, a trial or conviction cannot occur without Putin and Lvova-Belova being in custody.

But by issuing and unsealing these arrest warrants, the ICC is relying on the symbolic function of international criminal law – it is publicly naming and shaming Putin and Lvova-Belova for the commission of serious atrocities, and it is sending a message to other leaders and the international community that such actions are not without consequence.

The arrest warrants also give victims some form of vindication or recognition for their suffering and hope for justice in the future. And making the warrants public enables the ICC to reclaim itself as a key avenue for ensuring accountability for international crimes, following a wave of criticism and disenchantment about its work in Africa and delays in advancing its investigation on Afghanistan.

International courts gearing into action

This ICC case is the latest in a series of ongoing cases related to Russia’s war in Ukraine before different international courts and tribunals. Others include at least four cases before the European Court of Human Rights for events that occurred before Russia was excluded from the Council of Europe, such as the MH17 flight case and the annexation of Crimea.

Two cases have also been brought by Ukraine against Russia before the International Court of Justice – in 2017 and 2022 – with hearings scheduled for June. An unprecedented number of states parties have sought to intervene in one or more of these cases.

Each case must be considered on its own merits and the decisions cannot be prejudged. But they showcase an important feature of the global legal system and its judicial architecture that cannot be underestimated – the ability to quickly swing into action in response to violations of international law. In this case, the response was prompted by Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in breach of the United Nations Charter and fundamental principles of international law.

A starting point for a bigger case

The ICC prosecutor already has a broader investigation into other international crimes committed in Ukraine since 21 November 2013. So this is likely to be just the starting point of a much bigger case against Putin and other senior Russian officials for international crimes committed in the context of the war in Ukraine and within the ICC’s jurisdiction.

These potentially include other war crimes such as the indiscriminate or disproportionate targeting of civilians, crimes against humanity, and genocide.

Mammalian circadian clocks are driven by transcription/translation feedback loops composed of positive transcriptional activators (BMAL1 and CLOCK) and negative repressors (CRYPTOCHROMEs (CRYs) and PERIODs (PERs)). CRYs, in complex with PERs, bind to the BMAL1/CLOCK complex and repress E-box–driven transcription of clock-associated genes. There are two individual CRYs, with CRY1 exhibiting higher affinity to the BMAL1/CLOCK complex than CRY2. It is known that this differential binding is regulated by a dynamic serine-rich loop adjacent to the secondary pocket of both CRYs, but the underlying features controlling loop dynamics are not known. Here we report that allosteric regulation of the serine-rich loop is mediated by Arg-293 of CRY1, identified as a rare CRY1 SNP in the Ensembl and 1000 Genomes databases. The p.Arg293His CRY1 variant caused a shortened circadian period in a Cry1−/−Cry2−/− double knockout mouse embryonic fibroblast cell line. Moreover, the variant displayed reduced repressor activity on BMAL1/CLOCK driven transcription, which is explained by reduced affinity to BMAL1/CLOCK in the absence of PER2 compared with CRY1. Molecular dynamics simulations revealed that the p.Arg293His CRY1 variant altered a communication pathway between Arg-293 and the serine loop by reducing its dynamicity. Collectively, this study provides direct evidence that allosterism in CRY1 is critical for the regulation of circadian rhythm.

Zika virus (ZIKV) is a neurotropic flavivirus that causes several diseases including birth defects such as microcephaly. Intrinsic immunity is known to be a frontline defense against viruses through host anti-viral restriction factors. Limited knowledge is available on intrinsic immunity against ZIKV in brains. Amyloid precursor protein (APP) is predominantly expressed in brains and implicated in the pathogenesis of Alzheimer's diseases. We have found that ZIKV interacts with APP, and viral infection increases APP expression via enhancing protein stability. Moreover, we identified the viral peptide, HGSQHSGMIVNDTGHETDENRAKVEITPNSPRAEATLGGFGSLGL, which is capable of en-hancing APP expression. We observed that aging brain tissues with APP had protective effects on ZIKV infection by reducing the availability of the viruses. Also, knockdown of APP expression or blocking ZIKV-APP interactions enhanced ZIKV replication in human neural progenitor/stem cells. Finally, intracranial infection of ZIKV in APP-null neonatal mice resulted in higher mortality and viral yields. Taken together, these findings suggest that APP is a restriction factor that protects against ZIKV by serving as a decoy receptor, and plays a protective role in ZIKV-mediated brain injuries.

Reactive oxygen species (ROS) are an unavoidable host environmental cue for intracellular pathogens such as Mycobacterium tuberculosis and Mycobacterium bovis; however, the signaling pathway in mycobacteria for sensing and responding to environmental stress remains largely unclear. Here, we characterize a novel CmtR-Zur-ESX3-Zn2+ regulatory pathway in M. bovis that aids mycobacterial survival under oxidative stress. We demonstrate that CmtR functions as a novel redox sensor and that its expression can be significantly induced under H2O2 stress. CmtR can physically interact with the negative regulator Zur and de-represses the expression of the esx-3 operon, which leads to Zn2+ accumulation and promotion of reactive oxygen species detoxication in mycobacterial cells. Zn2+ can also act as an effector molecule of the CmtR regulator, using which the latter can de-repress its own expression for further inducing bacterial antioxidant adaptation. Consistently, CmtR can induce the expression of EsxH, a component of esx-3 operon involved in Zn2+ transportation that has been reported earlier, and inhibit phagosome maturation in macrophages. Lastly, CmtR significantly contributes to bacterial survival in macrophages and in the lungs of infected mice. Our findings reveal the existence of an antioxidant regulatory pathway in mycobacteria and provide novel information on stress-triggered gene regulation and its association with host–pathogen interaction.

CARM1 is a protein arginine methyltransferase (PRMT) that acts as a coactivator in a number of transcriptional programs. CARM1 orchestrates this coactivator activity in part by depositing the H3R17me2a histone mark in the vicinity of gene promoters that it regulates. However, the gross levels of H3R17me2a in CARM1 KO mice did not significantly decrease, indicating that other PRMT(s) may compensate for this loss. We thus performed a screen of type I PRMTs, which revealed that PRMT6 can also deposit the H3R17me2a mark in vitro. CARM1 knockout mice are perinatally lethal and display a reduced fetal size, whereas PRMT6 null mice are viable, which permits the generation of double knockouts. Embryos that are null for both CARM1 and PRMT6 are noticeably smaller than CARM1 null embryos, providing in vivo evidence of redundancy. Mouse embryonic fibroblasts (MEFs) from the double knockout embryos display an absence of the H3R17me2a mark during mitosis and increased signs of DNA damage. Moreover, using the combination of CARM1 and PRMT6 inhibitors suppresses the cell proliferation of WT MEFs, suggesting a synergistic effect between CARM1 and PRMT6 inhibitions. These studies provide direct evidence that PRMT6 also deposits the H3R17me2a mark and acts redundantly with CARM1.

Stop codon read-through (SCR) is a process of continuation of translation beyond a stop codon. This phenomenon, which occurs only in certain mRNAs under specific conditions, leads to a longer isoform with properties different from that of the canonical isoform. MTCH2, which encodes a mitochondrial protein that regulates mitochondrial metabolism, was selected as a potential read-through candidate based on evolutionary conservation observed in the proximal region of its 3' UTR. Here, we demonstrate translational read-through across two evolutionarily conserved, in-frame stop codons of MTCH2 using luminescence- and fluorescence-based assays, and by analyzing ribosome-profiling and mass spectrometry (MS) data. This phenomenon generates two isoforms, MTCH2x and MTCH2xx (single- and double-SCR products, respectively), in addition to the canonical isoform MTCH2, from the same mRNA. Our experiments revealed that a cis-acting 12-nucleotide sequence in the proximal 3' UTR of MTCH2 is the necessary signal for SCR. Functional characterization showed that MTCH2 and MTCH2x were localized to mitochondria with a long t1/2 (>36 h). However, MTCH2xx was found predominantly in the cytoplasm. This mislocalization and its unique C terminus led to increased degradation, as shown by greatly reduced t1/2 (<1 h). MTCH2 read-through–deficient cells, generated using CRISPR-Cas9, showed increased MTCH2 expression and, consistent with this, decreased mitochondrial membrane potential. Thus, double-SCR of MTCH2 regulates its own expression levels contributing toward the maintenance of normal mitochondrial membrane potential.

Hepatocyte nuclear factor-1β (HNF-1β) is a tissue-specific transcription factor that is required for normal kidney development and renal epithelial differentiation. Mutations of HNF-1β produce congenital kidney abnormalities and inherited renal tubulopathies. Here, we show that ablation of HNF-1β in mIMCD3 renal epithelial cells results in activation of β-catenin and increased expression of lymphoid enhancer–binding factor 1 (LEF1), a downstream effector in the canonical Wnt signaling pathway. Increased expression and nuclear localization of LEF1 are also observed in cystic kidneys from Hnf1b mutant mice. Expression of dominant-negative mutant HNF-1β in mIMCD3 cells produces hyperresponsiveness to exogenous Wnt ligands, which is inhibited by siRNA-mediated knockdown of Lef1. WT HNF-1β binds to two evolutionarily conserved sites located 94 and 30 kb from the mouse Lef1 promoter. Ablation of HNF-1β decreases H3K27 trimethylation repressive marks and increases β-catenin occupancy at a site 4 kb upstream to Lef1. Mechanistically, WT HNF-1β recruits the polycomb-repressive complex 2 that catalyzes H3K27 trimethylation. Deletion of the β-catenin–binding domain of LEF1 in HNF-1β–deficient cells abolishes the increase in Lef1 transcription and decreases the expression of downstream Wnt target genes. The canonical Wnt target gene, Axin2, is also a direct transcriptional target of HNF-1β through binding to negative regulatory elements in the gene promoter. These findings demonstrate that HNF-1β regulates canonical Wnt target genes through long-range effects on histone methylation at Wnt enhancers and reveal a new mode of active transcriptional repression by HNF-1β.

Evolving evidence suggests that nicotine may contribute to impaired asthma control by stimulating expression of nerve growth factor (NGF), a neurotrophin associated with airway remodeling and airway hyperresponsiveness. We explored the hypothesis that nicotine increases NGF by reducing lung fibroblast (LF) microRNA-98 (miR-98) and PPARγ levels, thus promoting airway remodeling. Levels of NGF, miR-98, PPARγ, fibronectin 1 (FN1), endothelin-1 (EDN1, herein referred to as ET-1), and collagen (COL1A1 and COL3A1) were measured in human LFs isolated from smoking donors, in mouse primary LFs exposed to nicotine (50 μg/ml), and in whole lung homogenates from mice chronically exposed to nicotine (100 μg/ml) in the drinking water. In selected studies, these pathways were manipulated in LFs with miR-98 inhibitor (anti-miR-98), miR-98 overexpression (miR-98 mimic), or the PPARγ agonist rosiglitazone. Compared with unexposed controls, nicotine increased NGF, FN1, ET-1, COL1A1, and COL3A1 expression in human and mouse LFs and mouse lung homogenates. In contrast, nicotine reduced miR-98 levels in LFs in vitro and in lung homogenates in vivo. Treatment with anti-miR-98 alone was sufficient to recapitulate increases in NGF, FN1, and ET-1, whereas treatment with a miR-98 mimic significantly suppressed luciferase expression in cells transfected with a luciferase reporter linked to the putative seed sequence in the NGF 3'UTR and also abrogated nicotine-induced increases in NGF, FN1, and ET-1 in LFs. Similarly, rosiglitazone increased miR-98 and reversed nicotine-induced increases in NGF, FN1, and ET-1. Taken together, these findings demonstrate that nicotine-induced increases in NGF and other markers of airway remodeling are negatively regulated by miR-98.

The molecular mechanisms of reduced frataxin (FXN) expression in Friedreich's ataxia (FRDA) are linked to epigenetic modification of the FXN locus caused by the disease-associated GAA expansion. Here, we identify that SUV4-20 histone methyltransferases, specifically SUV4-20 H1, play an important role in the regulation of FXN expression and represent a novel therapeutic target. Using a human FXN–GAA–Luciferase repeat expansion genomic DNA reporter model of FRDA, we screened the Structural Genomics Consortium epigenetic probe collection. We found that pharmacological inhibition of the SUV4-20 methyltransferases by the tool compound A-196 increased the expression of FXN by ∼1.5-fold in the reporter cell line. In several FRDA cell lines and patient-derived primary peripheral blood mononuclear cells, A-196 increased FXN expression by up to 2-fold, an effect not seen in WT cells. SUV4-20 inhibition was accompanied by a reduction in H4K20me2 and H4K20me3 and an increase in H4K20me1, but only modest (1.4–7.8%) perturbation in genome-wide expression was observed. Finally, based on the structural activity relationship and crystal structure of A-196, novel small molecule A-196 analogs were synthesized and shown to give a 20-fold increase in potency for increasing FXN expression. Overall, our results suggest that histone methylation is important in the regulation of FXN expression and highlight SUV4-20 H1 as a potential novel therapeutic target for FRDA.

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In animals, the response to chronic hypoxia is mediated by prolyl hydroxylases (PHDs) that regulate the levels of hypoxia-inducible transcription factor α (HIFα). PHD homologues exist in other types of eukaryotes and prokaryotes where they act on non HIF substrates. To gain insight into the factors underlying different PHD substrates and properties, we carried out biochemical and biophysical studies on PHD homologues from the cellular slime mold, Dictyostelium discoideum, and the protozoan parasite, Toxoplasma gondii, both lacking HIF. The respective prolyl-hydroxylases (DdPhyA and TgPhyA) catalyze prolyl-hydroxylation of S-phase kinase-associated protein 1 (Skp1), a reaction enabling adaptation to different dioxygen availability. Assays with full-length Skp1 substrates reveal substantial differences in the kinetic properties of DdPhyA and TgPhyA, both with respect to each other and compared with human PHD2; consistent with cellular studies, TgPhyA is more active at low dioxygen concentrations than DdPhyA. TgSkp1 is a DdPhyA substrate and DdSkp1 is a TgPhyA substrate. No cross-reactivity was detected between DdPhyA/TgPhyA substrates and human PHD2. The human Skp1 E147P variant is a DdPhyA and TgPhyA substrate, suggesting some retention of ancestral interactions. Crystallographic analysis of DdPhyA enables comparisons with homologues from humans, Trichoplax adhaerens, and prokaryotes, informing on differences in mobile elements involved in substrate binding and catalysis. In DdPhyA, two mobile loops that enclose substrates in the PHDs are conserved, but the C-terminal helix of the PHDs is strikingly absent. The combined results support the proposal that PHD homologues have evolved kinetic and structural features suited to their specific sensing roles.

DNA polymerases are today used throughout scientific research, biotechnology, and medicine, in part for their ability to interact with unnatural forms of DNA created by synthetic biologists. Here especially, natural DNA polymerases often do not have the “performance specifications” needed for transformative technologies. This creates a need for science-guided rational (or semi-rational) engineering to identify variants that replicate unnatural base pairs (UBPs), unnatural backbones, tags, or other evolutionarily novel features of unnatural DNA. In this review, we provide a brief overview of the chemistry and properties of replicative DNA polymerases and their evolved variants, focusing on the Klenow fragment of Taq DNA polymerase (Klentaq). We describe comparative structural, enzymatic, and molecular dynamics studies of WT and Klentaq variants, complexed with natural or noncanonical substrates. Combining these methods provides insight into how specific amino acid substitutions distant from the active site in a Klentaq DNA polymerase variant (ZP Klentaq) contribute to its ability to replicate UBPs with improved efficiency compared with Klentaq. This approach can therefore serve to guide any future rational engineering of replicative DNA polymerases.

RecQ family helicases are highly conserved from bacteria to humans and have essential roles in maintaining genome stability. Mutations in three human RecQ helicases cause severe diseases with the main features of premature aging and cancer predisposition. Most RecQ helicases shared a conserved domain arrangement which comprises a helicase core, an RecQ C-terminal domain, and an auxiliary element helicase and RNaseD C-terminal (HRDC) domain, the functions of which are poorly understood. In this study, we systematically characterized the roles of the HRDC domain in E. coli RecQ in various DNA transactions by single-molecule FRET. We found that RecQ repetitively unwinds the 3'-partial duplex and fork DNA with a moderate processivity and periodically patrols on the ssDNA in the 5'-partial duplex by translocation. The HRDC domain significantly suppresses RecQ activities in the above transactions. In sharp contrast, the HRDC domain is essential for the deep and long-time unfolding of the G4 DNA structure by RecQ. Based on the observations that the HRDC domain dynamically switches between RecA core- and ssDNA-binding modes after RecQ association with DNA, we proposed a model to explain the modulation mechanism of the HRDC domain. Our findings not only provide new insights into the activities of RecQ on different substrates but also highlight the novel functions of the HRDC domain in DNA metabolisms.

Rhodopsin is a canonical class A photosensitive G protein–coupled receptor (GPCR), yet relatively few pharmaceutical agents targeting this visual receptor have been identified, in part due to the unique characteristics of its light-sensitive, covalently bound retinal ligands. Rhodopsin becomes activated when light isomerizes 11-cis-retinal into an agonist, all-trans-retinal (ATR), which enables the receptor to activate its G protein. We have previously demonstrated that, despite being covalently bound, ATR can display properties of equilibrium binding, yet how this is accomplished is unknown. Here, we describe a new approach for both identifying compounds that can activate and attenuate rhodopsin and testing the hypothesis that opsin binds retinal in equilibrium. Our method uses opsin-based fluorescent sensors, which directly report the formation of active receptor conformations by detecting the binding of G protein or arrestin fragments that have been fused onto the receptor's C terminus. We show that these biosensors can be used to monitor equilibrium binding of the agonist, ATR, as well as the noncovalent binding of β-ionone, an antagonist for G protein activation. Finally, we use these novel biosensors to observe ATR release from an activated, unlabeled receptor and its subsequent transfer to the sensor in real time. Taken together, these data support the retinal equilibrium binding hypothesis. The approach we describe should prove directly translatable to other GPCRs, providing a new tool for ligand discovery and mutant characterization.

Defining discontinuous antigenic epitopes remains a substantial challenge, as exemplified by the case of lipid transfer polyproteins, which are common pollen allergens. Hydrogen/deuterium exchange monitored by NMR can be used to map epitopes onto folded protein surfaces, but only if the complex rapidly dissociates. Modifying the standard NMR-exchange measurement to detect substoichiometric complexes overcomes this time scale limitation and provides new insights into recognition of lipid transfer polyprotein by antibodies. In the future, this new and exciting development should see broad application to a range of tight macromolecular interactions.

RNA-protein interfaces control key replication events during the HIV-1 life cycle. The viral trans-activator of transcription (Tat) protein uses an archetypal arginine-rich motif (ARM) to recruit the host positive transcription elongation factor b (pTEFb) complex onto the viral trans-activation response (TAR) RNA, leading to activation of HIV transcription. Efforts to block this interaction have stimulated production of biologics designed to disrupt this essential RNA-protein interface. Here, we present four co-crystal structures of lab-evolved TAR-binding proteins (TBPs) in complex with HIV-1 TAR. Our results reveal that high-affinity binding requires a distinct sequence and spacing of arginines within a specific β2-β3 hairpin loop that arose during selection. Although loops with as many as five arginines were analyzed, only three arginines could bind simultaneously with major-groove guanines. Amino acids that promote backbone interactions within the β2-β3 loop were also observed to be important for high-affinity interactions. Based on structural and affinity analyses, we designed two cyclic peptide mimics of the TAR-binding β2-β3 loop sequences present in two high-affinity TBPs (KD values of 4.2 ± 0.3 and 3.0 ± 0.3 nm). Our efforts yielded low-molecular weight compounds that bind TAR with low micromolar affinity (KD values ranging from 3.6 to 22 μm). Significantly, one cyclic compound within this series blocked binding of the Tat-ARM peptide to TAR in solution assays, whereas its linear counterpart did not. Overall, this work provides insight into protein-mediated TAR recognition and lays the ground for the development of cyclic peptide inhibitors of a vital HIV-1 RNA-protein interaction.