A guide to the Chinese Communist Party's National Congress The World Today rescobales.drupal 21 September 2022

In the first of a three-part series examining the global importance of the CCP’s 20th National Congress, Yu Jie explains how it makes its big decisions.

Why does the CCP National Congress matter?

The world’s most populous country and its smallest state have little in common with one exception: how they select their leader. Like the Vatican, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) shrouds its leadership selection process in secrecy.

Every five years, a week-long conclave – the Party Congress – is held and at its end a new cohort of leaders is presented that will steer the world’s second largest economy for the next five years.

The congress is the most important date in China’s political calendar. It not only selects China’s leadership team but acts as a signpost indicating the direction the country will be heading in the near future, with implications for decades to come. It also reveals the breadth and depth of power held by Xi Jinping, the party’s general-secretary.

The 20th CCP National Congress, opening on October 16 and expected to last a week, is taking place during unsettling times. While Xi Jinping is expected to embark on his third term as general-secretary of the party after the removal of a two-term limit in February 2018, it is hardly a crowning glory. Xi’s China is battling an economic maelstrom at home while juggling fraught foreign relations abroad.

What does the National Congress do?

Quite simply, the CCP National Congress is the gathering that defines China’s political leadership and sets the tone for its relationship with the rest of the world.

It serves to fulfil three primary functions:

First, it sets the party’s principal agenda across all policy sectors, from macroeconomics to the price of food. During the week, it draws up a consensus-based evaluation of the party’s work over the past five years, which includes a detailed examination of the party’s current situation.

Second, it introduces any revisions to the party constitution deemed necessary, for instance on changes to the criteria for leadership recruitment or amendments to the party’s ‘guiding ideology’.

Third, it selects the leadership team that will steer China for the next five years, a function that attracts the most international attention but is not the sole purpose of the congress.

How is the party leadership team chosen?

The congress comprises 2,300 delegates representing all levels of the party hierarchy across 34 provinces and regions – from the governors of towns and cities, to Olympic champions, astronauts, and even the odd stand-up comedian to mark the ‘inclusiveness’ of the party.

The votes that decide the next cohort of party leaders come from three committees only: the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, with 205 members and 171 alternate members (alternate members are simply substitutes to replace a member if they die, retire or are dismissed); the Central Committee, with 204 members; and the Politburo, with 25 members, only one of whom is a woman.

Unlike multiparty elections in liberal democracies, neither the full 25 members of the Politburo nor the seven members of its Standing Committee are nominated by or directly voted for by constituents.

A procedure known as ‘democratic recommendation’ is essentially a straw poll that includes all congress participants. They are then given a ballot listing the names of around 200 Politburo candidates in stroke order – the Chinese equivalent to alphabetical order. This short-listing process is completed in the run-up to the congress. Some pundits asserted that this process was put on hold after 2017, yet this has not been formally confirmed within the party constitution.

A few senior delegates may express their preferences to their colleagues anonymously during this process. All the shortlisted candidates must meet the criteria for Politburo membership, which means serving at either a ministerial rank or above or in the People’s Liberation Army at military region level or above and being younger than 62.

Based on the result of this straw poll, and more importantly on the preferences of current Politburo members, the incumbent Politburo and its Standing Committee will approve the nominees, conclude the Seventh Plenum of the 19th Party Congress and call for the 20th Congress. The delegates at the Party Congress then ceremonially cast their votes for the Politburo at the Party Congress although the result is pre-agreed, a procedure somewhat similar to the US Electoral College.

What are the rules for choosing Politburo members?

The Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) consists of between five and nine members, with seven selected at the 19th Congress. It is the supreme decision-making body of the Communist Party as well as the People’s Republic of China.

If the 20th Congress follows convention, there are three de-facto rules to be followed:

First, Politburo and Standing Committee members must retire at 68. This age limit is known as ‘Eight down, Seven up’.

Second, new appointments to the PSC are drawn exclusively from regular Politburo members. The only exceptions to this rule have been Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang, who were appointed at the 17th Party Congress in 2007.

This exception follows the third convention, under which PSC appointees are among the youngest senior party leaders eligible. Potentially three vacancies could arise in 2022, as Xi himself is 69 but it is highly unlikely that he would step down. That would be a radical departure from past precedents.

The extent to which past procedure is applied could act as a signal as to whether Xi Jinping is consolidating his power, while the size of the standing committee will be scrutinized to assess how much power Xi wields.

If the procedure for leadership appointments at the 20th Congress deviates from these conventions, it could indicate two things. First, the CCP faces a new set of challenges and requires the introduction of new rules to shape the top leadership. Or, second, Xi has gained substantial personal power that allows him to bypass the collective leadership system endorsed by Deng Xiaoping and choose appointees to suit his own taste. There has thus far been little evidence from the official media to reflect on any changes.

Changes in party institutional constraints, however, raise the danger of undermining governance at home and China’s relations abroad.

Read the two further articles in this series: the second discusses the key domestic policy themes that Xi Jinping is expected to outline at this year’s congress; the third analyses the foreign policy issues likely to be discussed at the congress.   

Beijing briefing: Party power remains a male preserve The World Today mhiggins.drupal 27 September 2022

Yu Jie explores why so few women have won leadership roles in Communist China.

UPDATE: Since this article was published at the end of September, the incoming members of the Politburo and the Standing Committee were announced at the 20th Chinese Communist Party Congress on October 22. The party broke more than two decades of convention by not appointing any women to the Politburo or its Standing Committee. The sole woman among the outgoing 19th CCP Politburo, Sun Chunlan, will retire. Only 33 women rank among the 376 members of the 20th CPC Central Committee, which elects the Politburo - less than one in 10.

As the curtain of the 20th Chinese Communist Party Congress gets ready to rise, the lack of female representation in Beijing’s corridors of power attracts international attention once again.

Female participation in Chinese finance, science, sports or other aspects of society is relatively healthy. Yet there has never been a single woman at the apex of power in the party nor any who has held a seat on the Politburo Standing Committee, the supreme decision-making body for the party and the state.

Historically, China has been run by a number of powerful women starting in 307BC during the first imperial era of the Middle Kingdom. In the Qin Dynasty the Queen Dowager Xuan held de facto power for 35 years during the Warring States period.

More than 2,000 years later, Empress Dowager Cixi wined and dined her European visitors at the Imperial Summer Palace. She was also responsible for the demise of the late Qing Dynasty. Their legacies continue to fascinate and inspire stories in contemporary China.

In modern times, Mao Zedong, one of the founders of the Chinese Communist Party, proclaimed that ‘women hold up half of the sky’. While Chinese law states that women and men should have equal rights in all aspects of political life, the reality is that women remain marginalized in politics, even after the economic and social transformation seen in the past few decades. Chinese men continue to dominate political power.

The top three party, military or state leadership positions have never been filled by a woman and none of China’s 26 ministers is female. There is only one woman among the 31 party bosses that control China’s provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions and only one woman among the 25 members of the all-powerful Politburo, and she oversaw the government’s response to the Covid pandemic. She is Vice-Premier Sun Chunlan, a former party boss of Fujian Province. Among the 371 members of the Central Committee, which elects the Politburo, there are only 30 women, which is less than one in 10.

Women are less likely to join the Communist Party

It is difficult to explain why female participation in the Chinese elite politics is so low but social convention certainly plays its part. Despite increasing financial independence and much improved career prospects, Chinese women are still expected to run the household and look after the children while holding down a full-time job. This surely reduces opportunities to seek public offices.

Although unspoken, China’s experience of handing power to a woman may be another reason why the party is hesitant to put a female in charge. Jiang Qing, better known to the outside world as Madame Mao, was China’s de-facto First Lady until 1976. She was one of the architects of the ‘Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution’, which ushered in a decade of chaos and political upheaval and brought the country to a standstill.

Successive leaders have been determined to prevent a repeat of this misfortune so no woman has been chosen for a top leadership role. But perhaps the main reason for the absence of women in top positions is the way people move up the party ranks.

Women make up around 49 per cent of China’s 1.4 billion population, yet they account for only about 30 per cent of the Chinese Communist Party membership. Once inside the party they are often handed less competitive positions. Rising through the ranks requires party members to achieve certain career breakthroughs. Such success makes them eligible to participate in high politics.

The majority of China’s top leaders have served as a party chief of a province or municipality, a position women rarely achieve. Consequently, few female candidates are considered eligible for more senior roles.

By the time they qualify for Politburo membership, too often they are fast approaching the retirement age for Chinese women politicians: 55. As it is rare to secure a spot on the Politburo under that age, women are virtually ruled out from joining this exclusive group of 25 people.

The Iron Lady of China

There has been one exception since the early 2000s. Vice-Premier Wu Yi, who is known as the Iron Lady of China, was described by Forbes magazine as the third most powerful woman in the world. She led China into the World Trade Organization and successfully bid for the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games. However, her success has been an exception, not a rule.

While Chinese women have been given a nominal egalitarian status with female astronauts, female Olympic champions and female Nobel Prize laureates in place, beneath the surface older practices of patriarchy still hold firm. Liberated or not, the quest for a Chinese female leader under the Communist Party is a long way off.

China Party Congress: Xi’s political blueprint The World Today rescobales.drupal 28 September 2022

In the second of her three-part series on the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, Yu Jie outlines two key policy themes we can expect Xi to define: ‘common prosperity’ and ‘self-reliance’.

What can we expect from the Party Congress?

In mid-October five years ago, the 19th Party Congress opened with Xi Jinping delivering a political report lasting three-and-a-half hours. He will repeat the performance on October 16, the opening day of this year’s 20th Party congress.

Bland as its name may be, this political report is one of the Party Congress’s core items of business. It remains the most authoritative public account of the Chinese Communist Party’s path on all major policy fronts, containing a laundry list of policies undertaken by the outgoing Central Committee in the past five years, while putting forward guidance for future policy.

It represents the view of the current Politburo Standing Committee and that of the CCP. The 20th Congress report is a collegial effort and should not be considered Xi’s personal manifesto, nor should it be counted as another of his speeches to his comrades.

However, as general-secretary of the party for the past decade, it will most probably reflect many of the elements that Xi has influenced.

What are China’s political priorities?

No matter how complicated the geopolitics of the world becomes, Xi sticks to the conservative approach that has served his country well for past centuries: that China prioritizes the management of its own affairs.

Since the Cold War ended, two recurring themes have dominated the political report: the economy and security. For the 20th session, Xi will use the phrases ‘common prosperity’ as shorthand for the economy and ‘self-reliance’ for security.

Xi introduced the slogan ‘common prosperity’ at the start of his third term in August 2021. His aim was to close the income gap, address regional economic inequality and improve social welfare provision. Rebalancing social inequality was seen as essential to avoid the social disruption witnessed in other parts of the world.

Xi’s concept of ‘common prosperity’ was influenced by his childhood experiences living in exile in a remote village in Shanxi Province, in northwest China, during the Cultural Revolution. The ensuing upheaval was to prove a tragedy for his family and a disaster for the country.

His ambition is to define progress not in terms of producing double-digit growth but in dealing with the long-standing challenge of scarcities across different sections of society to meet ‘people’s ever-growing needs for a better life’. This direction was indicated at the 19th Party Congress by the term ‘shifting the principal contradiction’.

What state is the Chinese economy in?

Xi may have arrived at the right diagnosis but he has so far failed to find a cure that invokes ‘common prosperity’. After sweeping regulatory measures, the CCP has clamped down on its most successful private companies and spooked investors. While providing 80 per cent of China’s jobs, private enterprises are worried that the ‘common prosperity’ initiative may jeopardize their business.

Equally, Beijing’s zero-Covid policy has discouraged much-needed investment and failed to win the hearts and minds of Chinese youth, who have suffered most, both economically and socially.

The challenge facing Xi over the next five years will be to manage the financial risks in downsizing China’s property sector while coming out of a rigidly imposed Covid lockdown without reducing economic growth to such an extent that it damages the personal wealth of millions of people.

One hopes that Xi’s policies in future will be based on an innovative reading of the first-century phrase ‘seeking truth from facts’ adopted by Mao Zedong and last promoted as the political philosophy of Deng Xiaoping in the Seventies. A healthy market economy is not only essential for China’s development but as the only means of maintaining the party’s legitimacy, something vital for Xi.

Does China need more security?

China’s weakened export markets and less-friendly relations with the United States have encouraged it to become more self-reliant. Expect an emphasis on greater self-sufficiency in sectors of strategic importance to form a substantial part of this year’s political report.

In view of increased international hostility, Xi and his lieutenants have publicly recognized the need to take control of production and supply chains. These supply chains need to become ‘self-determined, self-controlled’ they have said, voicing frustration that the highest value-added elements of the Chinese tech sector remain reliant on overseas suppliers and vulnerable to geopolitical tensions.

Equally, on food and energy security, Russia’s invasion in Ukraine has exacerbated China’s already fragile food supplies as both countries are vital sources of food imports. Xi has already called for a ‘comprehensive thrift strategy’ to manage China’s food and energy needs.

Beijing is equally worried about the increase in oil and commodity prices which is driving up the cost of living. This may push parts of Chinese society out of ‘common prosperity’ and into ‘common poverty’, as it threatens to in some parts of Europe.

For the next five years, Xi needs to strike a balance between ‘common prosperity’ and ‘self-reliance’ to mitigate the storms ahead. He cannot afford to lockdown the world’s second largest economy indefinitely.

The hope is that the 20th Party congress will bring much-needed course corrections.

Read the two further articles in this series: the first provides a guide to why the Chinese Communist Party Congress matters; the third analyses the foreign policy issues likely to be discussed at the congress.  

Book preview: Guide to Chinese Climate Policy 2022 20 October 2022 — 10:00AM TO 11:15AM Anonymous (not verified) 28 September 2022 Chatham House and Online

Join authors David Sandalow and Michal Meidan to discuss their upcoming book.

China is the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases and a key player in tackling the global climate crisis. Its stated climate policies, namely its high-level targets to peak emissions by 2030 and to achieve carbon neutrality by 2060, are significant.

But while national-level ministries, local governments and businesses are setting climate roadmaps, implementation is challenging at times. In the current context of the global energy market and geopolitical turmoil, China’s need to maintain energy security can seem at odds with its climate pledges.

The authors will present the book, which examines Chinese emissions, the impacts of climate change in China, as well as China’s domestic and international climate change policies and the main implementation challenges these policies face.

China's Party Congress: a dose of foreign policy realism is needed The World Today mhiggins.drupal 11 October 2022

In the final article of three on the 20th Chinese Communist Party Congress, which opens on 16 October, Yu Jie argues that Beijing must show more pragmatism about Taiwan and the West.

How important is foreign policy at the congress?  

The political reports delivered to the delegates of the week-long 20th Chinese Communist Party Congress, which happens every five years, follow a Marxist-Leninist formula. Economics and the means of production form the base, while politics and society fill in the superstructure. 

We can expect sections on the work of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), ideological discussion, economics, domestic politics, foreign affairs, cultural reform and social developments. Usually, the report prioritizes big domestic political issues.  

The political report typically sheds some light on the status of, and relationships between, senior party members. It can also provide insights into the political fortunes of various interest groups. The report acts as a summary of the party’s achievements and its plans – expressed as the lowest common denominator of consensus between competing factions. 

This year’s congress should be no different, and the political reshuffle that takes place is likely to signal how Beijing intends to rise to the many challenges at home and abroad. 

Given China’s growing power and its fraught relationship with the West, this year’s congress is expected to feature serious discussion on weighty foreign affairs issues affecting Beijing, and which will have long-lasting implications for the rest of the world.  

Which geopolitical issues will be priorities?  

When it comes to foreign affairs, China’s priorities rarely change. The CCP seeks to create a stable external environment to foster its domestic economic development. This conservative maxim was advocated in the 1980s by China’s then-paramount leader, Deng Xiaoping, and it will continue to guide Beijing’s relationships after this congress. 

While we don’t know the exact details of this year’s political report, we can expect discussion on relations with the US-led West, a possible shift in the relationship between Beijing and Moscow, and elaboration on China’s ties with the Global South.  

Notably, it’s likely that a separate chapter of the political report will see Taiwan treated alongside the special administrative regions of Hong Kong and Macau, signalling the party’s commitment to its claims over the contested island.  

Despite a chorus of nationalistic rhetoric surrounding the issue of Taiwan, Beijing will be careful not to stumble into an international conflict which risks causing colossal damage on all fronts. The choice of language on the so-called ‘Taiwan question’ in this political report will serve as a bellwether as to how, if at all, the party might fundamentally shift its views regarding Taiwan and deviate from the principle of ‘peaceful reunification’, the policy stated at every congress since 1979. 

How have China’s relations with the West worsened?  

President Richard Nixon’s visit to China in 1972, the first by an American president to the Communist nation, kicked off five decades of relative stability. However, as China’s global influence has grown, so have Washington’s fears.  

The relationship has transitioned from the cooperation and relative stability that existed under President George W. Bush and President Hu Jintao in the early 2000s, into one characterized by volatility and competition under Xi Jinping, Joe Biden and Donald Trump. These tensions are almost certain to continue in Xi’s likely third term. 

Elements of China’s relationship with the West, such as cooperation over military and aviation technology, are becoming far more competitive. At the same time, trade and investment, once viewed as strong ties, have been rapidly deteriorating – as seen, for example, by several major publicly listed Chinese state-owned enterprises and large private companies withdrawing from the New York Stock Exchange.  

Will Beijing stand by the Kremlin despite Russia’s invasion of Ukraine?  

At the same time, Beijing’s close relationship with Moscow and its lack of opposition to Russia’s war in Ukraine have put China in an awkward position. The CCP has realized that cooperation with its long-standing ally and neighbour must come with substantial limits to avoid undermining its own political priorities and interests.  

Russia’s recklessness may spur Xi and the CCP’s senior leadership to minimize the economic, financial and political risks associated with the Kremlin’s pursuit of war against a country aligned with, and supported by, the West.  

Will China continue to support its regional partners?  

On its ties with the Global South, Beijing began to rethink its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as the US-led Indo-Pacific strategy gained geopolitical momentum. Regions of Southeast Asia and South Asia received a lot of funding and resources for BRI projects, as seen with Chinese support for the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.  

Xi also recently introduced the Global Development and Global Security initiatives, which the political report should flesh out. 

Beijing is fully aware that it can only prosper if its regional partners prosper, and it can only achieve resource security and border stability if its southern and western neighbours in Myanmar and Afghanistan cease to fight over land and resources. 

Chinese foreign policy over the last five years has been a strange combination of high-octane rhetoric and patient pragmatism. To respond to this contradiction, the congress could be used as an opportunity to inject a dose of realism.  

Read the two further articles in this series: the first is a guide to why the Chinese Communist Party Congress matters; the second discusses the key domestic policy themes that Xi Jinping is expected to outline at this year’s congress.

20th CCP National Congress: Five issues to watch Expert comment LJefferson 13 October 2022

Interpreters of the Chinese Communist Party’s tea leaves will be paying close attention to the issues that will shape China’s trajectory for the next five years.

Xi Jinping’s expected anointment for an unprecedented third term as general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is likely to generate global headlines when the party’s five-yearly National Congress begins on 16 October.

But with that outcome so widely forecast, interpreters of the CCP’s tea leaves will be paying closer attention to a range of more contested – and sometimes byzantine – issues that will shape China’s trajectory for the next five years, and reverberate around the world.

These are five key issues to watch out for during Xi’s political report, a dry but authoritative account of the CCP’s policy priorities for the next five years, and the subsequent deliberations over personnel appointments.

1. From market economy to ‘common prosperity’

As the world grapples with the economic impact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Chinese economy is entering particularly choppy waters. China is forecast to grow at a slower rate than the rest of Asia for the first time in more than 30 years, according to the World Bank, as the impact of Xi’s COVID zero policies compounds a growing list of structural and cyclical challenges.

Xi is under pressure to offer some new prescriptions for the world’s second biggest economy, and he is likely to signal further shifts away from the market economics that propelled Chinese growth for decades toward his vision of ‘common prosperity’.

His ambition is to redefine progress, not in terms of producing double-digit growth, but in tackling long-standing challenges such as demographic decline, social inequality and high property prices – thereby meeting ‘people’s ever-growing needs for a better life’.

China’s leader may have arrived at the right diagnosis, but he has so far failed to find measures that deliver common prosperity. He will use the Party Congress to redesign some policy measures, likely putting a stronger focus on the development of rural areas to promote economic dynamism and generate employment opportunities.

2. COVID zero to endure?

While most of the world has opened up and learned to live with COVID-19, China is still pursuing a COVID zero policy that requires frequent lockdowns, stringent movement controls and closed borders. This approach has intensified economic pressures, exacerbated high youth unemployment, and is testing the patience of China’s upwardly mobile middle classes.

Those not employed by the state have been particularly hard hit and it is difficult to see how China’s economy can start to crank up again until Beijing reduces internal restrictions and reconnects with the world.

Xi has championed the COVID zero policy, which Beijing continues to insist is vital to protect vulnerable people and support economic and social stability. So, observers will be playing close attention to his political report for any signs of a possible softening or indications of alternative future pathways for managing the pandemic. But a wholesale shift does not appear to be on the cards.

3. Xi Jinping’s team

Sinologists’ enthusiasm for predicting leadership changes in the CCP is not matched by their ability to do so. The party’s roots as a secret organization ensure that it keeps a tight lid on information about top leaders.

Observers will be closely following appointments to the seven-member Politburo Standing Committee, the apex of power for the CCP and China’s supreme decision-making body. These choices will shape China’s future policy trajectory and give some signals about the extent of Xi’s concentration of power and his future plans.

Names to watch for possible promotion include Xi allies such as He Lifeng, currently head of the National Development Reform Commission, a key economic planning entity, and Zhang Qingwei, currently the party secretary of Hunan, an important and populous province.

As Vice Premier Sun Chunlan, the only woman on the Politburo, reaches the retirement age, there is also likely to be a slot open for her replacement, with Shan Yiqin, the party secretary of Guizhou, one potential option.

Tracking the fate of key Xi allies will also indicate how far he has managed to overturn the collective leadership system he inherited in 2012 and how comprehensively the CCP endorses this more centralized approach to governing China.

4. Taiwan

After the escalating tensions of the last few months, analysts will be looking for any possible change in tone when Xi speaks about Taiwan, a self-governing island that China claims as a renegade province. During the past five years, Xi has approached the outside world with a mix of high-octane rhetoric with pragmatism and patience.

Why a more inward-looking China is bad news for the world economy Expert comment LToremark 16 October 2022

The increased role of geopolitics and ideology in Beijing’s economic decision-making is bad news not just for China but for the world.

This quote by President Xi clearly outlines the inward tilt of Chinese economic policymaking that is now becoming increasingly obvious to the rest of the world. But it actually has deep roots. Ever since the 2008 global financial crisis, when the West’s reliability as a trading partner was thrown into question, self-reliance has become a more decisive organizing principle for Chinese officials.

As a result, the export-dependent growth model on which China built its economic rise in recent decades has been fraying. Exports as a share of China’s GDP peaked at 35 per cent in 2007 but had fallen to around 20 per cent by last year, a level not seen since before China’s accession to the WTO in 2001. This shows that net exports no longer make any meaningful contribution to Chinese GDP growth.

Although China’s inward tilt may have started out as a response to purely economic phenomena – the post-crisis global recession, belt-tightening in the West, the eurozone crisis, and a general softening of global trade growth in the post-crisis years – geopolitical considerations are now dominant in shaping this shift toward self-reliance.

The role of geopolitics in pushing China towards a more inward-looking development path became clear in China’s response to the aggressive tariffs and export controls introduced by the Trump administration in the US. Because of these new constraints on China’s access to international markets and technology, Beijing sought to limit its dependence on the rest of the world.   

The most obvious result of this was the introduction of the ‘dual circulation’ strategy in May 2020, which sets out a rebalancing of China’s economy away from a reliance on external demand as a stimulus to growth (‘international circulation’) towards increased self-dependence (‘domestic circulation’). 

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has provided another geopolitical impetus to China’s pursuit of self-reliance. Since it is not far-fetched to think that China, like Russia, might one day also face coordinated sanctions, Chinese authorities must be thinking hard about how to respond to such a risk. 

The only credible strategy that China can adopt is to reduce its economic dependence on the West by creating, in effect, a kind of economic fortress, as its dependence on imported technology, food, and fossil fuels in particular, has created a substantial strategic vulnerability.

Over the next few years, Chinese policymakers will likely attempt to build up the country’s ability to supply its own semi-conductors, food, and green energy sources.

This new approach to economic policymaking isn’t just about China’s relationship with the rest of the world. Within China itself, a new emphasis on the role of the state is increasingly apparent – and seemingly rooted in ideology. 

The previous National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), in October 2017, made a push for ‘stronger, better, and bigger’ state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and the past five years have indeed seen a measurable rise in the role that SOEs play in the Chinese economy. These firms now account for more fixed investment in the economy than private firms, for the first time since 2005.

Xi Jinping prepares the Communist party for new reality Expert comment NCapeling 20 October 2022

Political report reflects a worsened economic and diplomatic position as Xi knows his unprecedented third term as leader will be judged on results.

In stark contrast to the aura of triumphant glory that greeted Xi Jinping at the last National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 2017, this week’s convocation opened with an air of sobriety.

Amid a domestic economic downturn and a return to enmity with Western liberal democracies, Xi offered his own recipe for party legitimacy and the country’s economic survival in the lengthy executive summary of his political report to the CCP congress. The prime keyword was security, with some 73 mentions, underscored with a message of self-reliance.

The periodic report acts as a summary of the party’s achievements and of its future plans, with both expressed as the lowest common denominator of consensus between competing voices in the CCP. It thus typically sheds some light on relationships among senior party members and insights into the political fortunes of important intraparty groups.

Most portions of the new report combined Xi’s personal preferences with concessions to the reality of what is necessary for China’s economic survival. Both ends point to an urgent prioritization of economic and political self-reliance for Xi’s third term as party general secretary.

Holistic concept of security

On the domestic front, much emphasis was given to enhancing national security and promoting equitable growth.

Since even before COVID-19, Xi has advocated a holistic conceptualization of security that includes food, the internet, energy and manpower. Reflecting Beijing’s deep anxieties about high-tech development and its frustrations with dependence on overseas suppliers vulnerable to the vagaries of geopolitical tensions, the political report noted the need for China’s supply chains to become more “self-determined and self-controlled.”

Xi, though, went further to stress the importance of improving scientific education and grooming and attracting the necessary talent to accelerate China’s quest to achieve breakthroughs in semiconductor production and overcome development choke points created by Western technological monopolies.

As China has traditionally relied on connectivity with the rest of the world to support innovation and attract talent, a turn toward autarky is not a viable option, given Xi’s technological priorities. Yet the renewed mention of his ‘dual circulation’ strategy in the report signals that Beijing is indeed turning to domestic consumption and homegrown technological prowess as the means to provide the rising wealth that the Chinese people have come to expect from the Communist Party.

Worsening Sino-US relations and tightening access to overseas markets for Chinese companies have prompted party leaders not only to reconsider the country’s sources of economic growth but have also forced them to reconfigure their approach to foreign affairs.

Judging by his report summary, Xi has completely abandoned the ‘new type of great power relations’ concept used repeatedly in the last two editions of his congressional update to refer to his preferred approach to relations with the US-led West.

The omission shows that Beijing has concluded that its fraught relationship with advanced developed nations is here to stay, with little prospect of improvement soon. To this end, China needs to prepare for the worst of decoupling and become more self-reliant in terms of markets and technologies.

In place of the discarded concept, Xi stressed that China should further develop its ties with the global South through the Global Development Initiative and the Global Security Initiative he announced earlier this year. These efforts aim to reshape the global governance agenda in multilateral forums and to project Beijing’s influence on the developing world.

Meanwhile, the party’s latest official rhetoric about the Belt and Road Initiative shows it is no longer a one-size-fits-all slogan but on its way to becoming a genuine tool of trade and investment promotion with China’s near neighbors but with provincial governments taking the lead rather than Beijing.

With the central government grappling with the country’s domestic economic woes, its spending spree on development assistance has had to come to an end. The new political report clearly signals this change.

A modern socialist society is still the aim

The current economic downturn and dangerous geopolitical tensions have not dented the CCP’s ambitions to build a modern socialist society by 2035 and thus join the world’s club of upper middle-income countries, but this is easier said than done.

The G20 will survive but needs major repair Expert comment NCapeling 15 November 2022

Russia’s attack on Ukraine is the biggest challenge to the existence of the G20 since its foundation.

The leader-level version of the G20 was founded in 2008 to coordinate the international response to the global financial crisis across advanced and major emerging economies.

At the outset it was judged a great success. The 2009 London Summit demonstrated a high degree of unity among the world’s largest economies on a comprehensive action plan to tackle the crisis.

The group’s subsequent performance has disappointed. Particularly during the pandemic and the Donald Trump presidency in the US, the group made only a limited additional contribution to policies which national governments were pursuing in any case.

Nonetheless, its members continued to see it as an essential forum without which it would be even harder to tackle a growing list of global economic challenges. This faith was partly repaid when, following the election of the Joe Biden administration in the US, agreement was reached on the $650 billion special drawing rights (SDR) general allocation by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in summer 2021.

Impact of the war in Ukraine

Following Russia’s attack on Ukraine earlier this year, leading western members of the group called for Russia to be suspended from the G20 as Russia’s action ran directly against the key principles of the rules-based international system on which the G20 was founded.

Western countries also walked out of meetings of the G20 Finance Ministers’ and International Monetary and Financial Committee this spring rather than sit at the same table as Russian representatives.

This contrasted with 2014 when Russia was suspended indefinitely from the G7 for its takeover of Crimea but no action was taken against it in the G20.

However, China and India, supported by several other emerging economies declined to suspend Russia, creating a standoff which could have resulted in a rapid collapse of the G20, particularly as its informal structure means that, in contrast to the international financial institutions (IFIs), there are no legal principles or procedures to determine how to address such a situation.

It appears the West has now concluded (rightly) that the G20 is too important as a forum for working with China and the other major emerging economies to be allowed to disappear.

This is likely to be because there are no straightforward alternatives. The G7 is too narrow to fill the role and China is now highly unlikely to attend a future G7 Summit as a guest. The boards of the IFIs are not equipped to coordinate across institutions, which is a vital role of the G20, and the United Nations (UN) system does not offer the scope, speed, leader-level engagement, or flexibility of the G20.

Moreover, as evidenced by the chair’s summary of the third G20 Finance Ministers’ and Central Bank Governors’ meeting in July, once the group gets past the dispute over how to handle Russia, there is a worthwhile agenda of issues which can be agreed on.

As the 2022 president of the G20, Indonesia has been determined to produce a final communique for the leaders’ summit and it looks increasingly like this will be achieved, even though it was impossible to agree concluding statements for some earlier G20 ministerial meetings.

The key will be to deal with the differences over Ukraine between the West and emerging economies with a short opening paragraph reflecting both views. This would then be followed by a consensus text on all the areas where the two groups do agree.

Russia is unlikely to play a disruptive role as preserving its membership of the group will be its key objective, and it will not want to undermine support among other emerging economies by blocking issues that all agree on.

However, even with a final communique achieved, returning to a fully functioning agenda setting, coordination, and decision-making role for G20 will be very challenging, particularly while the war in Ukraine continues.

Tackling sovereign debt distress should be a top priority

There are critically important issues on which G20 action is urgently needed. Top of the list is the acute problem of sovereign debt distress. Some 60 per cent of low-income countries are now judged to be in debt distress or at high risk of debt distress.

But the existing G20 approach for tackling debt distress in low-income countries, the ‘Common Framework’, is progressing far too slowly, and there is no agreed mechanism for handling the growing list of emerging economies in debt distress.

Without tackling debt distress, it is extremely hard to see how it will be possible to generate the vast flow of private sector climate finance necessary to help the developing world progress to net zero.

And yet the G20 is one of the few forums in which a high-level approach to debt distress can be defined because China – along with the IFIs and the western-based private sector – is a key player in any solution.

Urgent repairs needed

However, there is a critical lack of trust among G20 participants which, although in part a reflection of the disagreements over handling Russia, is also about longer-term factors such as the growing geopolitical tensions between China and the US on trade and investment in high tech.

An example of how this has played out was the action China and India took at the Rome G20 Summit in 2021 in blocking Italy’s efforts to establish a new ministerial task force designed to address the threat of future pandemics – a subject which all G20 countries agree is important.

China’s zero-COVID cannot continue, reopening is needed Expert comment NCapeling 1 December 2022

Unsure of how to loosen rules, local officials have doubled down on severe restrictions behind so much economic damage. Reopening will quell public anger.

When President Xi Jinping was seen unmasked at the G20 summit in Indonesia, he maintained a largely positive tone with President Joe Biden and other world leaders. This left an impression that China was on the verge of withdrawing its zero-COVID strategy.

A set of loosening policy measures introduced by Beijing seemed to further suggest that China was on track to reopen. As outlined in the 20th party congress, Xi wants to forge a pathway towards economic modernization and this means building economic resilience and a further increase in household incomes.

However, a series of displays of public defiance against the government’s zero-COVID policy has left the rest of the world perplexed. Some loosening of restrictions announced on 11 November by the central government, with the number of new cases still rising rapidly, left the provincial governments in confusion as to which direction to turn.

Absolute political loyalty

The persistent slogan of ‘zero-COVID’ was in stark contrast to the slackening of restrictions. Local officials decided to double down on stringent COVID measures as a way of displaying absolute political loyalty to the top, which inevitably caused daily agonies among large parts of the Chinese population.

This decision-making process sheds some light on the way the Chinese bureaucracy approaches crises at a time when the party leadership is tightening political control. Lower-level officials avoided making important decisions and instead decided to wait for instructions from the top. As the rules were unclear, they implemented policies according to past precedents, in this case zero-COVID, which had worked relatively well for China in 2020 and 2021.

For decades, local governments have been major political actors in China and have known what works best under local conditions. But with tighter regulation being exercised by lower-level bureaucrats and civil servants, there is less opportunity for the input of local knowledge, increasing the risk of ineffective policies being implemented.

Away from Beijing, those not employed by the state have been hit particularly hard by zero-COVID measures. The strategy has intensified economic pressures, exacerbated rising levels of youth unemployment, and tested the patience of the entire country.

Billions of Chinese people want to have their life return to normal without the fear of having the wrong colour – yellow or red – on their COVID health QR code or endless mandatory testing. Only a green code shows that a person is healthy and able to move around freely.

Economy is suffering

China is still balancing its twin aims of containing the spread of COVID and re-engineering its economy along similar lines to the rest of the world. It is difficult to see how China’s economy can crank up again until the country reduces its internal restrictions and reconnects with the world.

Director's briefing: Key challenges for China’s economy in 2023 6 February 2023 — 8:00AM TO 9:15AM Anonymous (not verified) 18 January 2023 Chatham House

This event examines the structural challenges facing the Chinese economy in the wake of the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party.

This event examines the structural challenges facing the Chinese economy after the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in October 2022 and how President Xi Jinping is responding to short and long-term domestic pressures.

The panel, including Professor Huang Yiping, discuss how quickly the Chinese economy could rebound after the Chinese government abandoned its ‘Zero COVID-19’ policy in December 2022 and to what extent the Chinese economy is pivoting toward Xi Jinping’s stated goal of ‘self-reliance’. The panel also discuss the broader implications for the global economy.
 
Key questions to be explored:

• Which sectors will China prioritize in pursuit of greater economic self-reliance?

• If China is turning inward, how will it drive technological innovation in the coming years?

• Is China’s economy robust enough to withstand geopolitical turbulence and other external shocks?

This event is held under the Chatham House Rule.

Beijing briefing: China bets on warmer EU relations The World Today mhiggins.drupal 30 January 2023

With the Sino-US Xi relationship cooling, Xi Jinping is sending a new diplomatic team to Europe – but his ties to Putin may mean slow progress, writes Yu Jie.

It has been a momentous year for Beijing. Twelve months after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, its relations with the West have become more strained than ever. And after President Xi Jinping secured an unprecedented third term in office at the 20th Party Congress, the country has embarked on a chaotic exit from the Covid lockdown amid hopes the economy will rebound quickly.

Some are already asking if Beijing will set a course correction in its diplomatic priorities to spare itself some of the setbacks it incurred in 2022. But when it comes to foreign affairs, China’s priorities rarely change. 

The Chinese leadership seeks to create a stable external environment to allow its domestic economic development. This conservative maxim was adopted in the 1980s by Deng Xiaoping, and President Xi is likely to follow it as a time-honoured recipe for diplomatic reconciliation.

China’s awkward position

Beijing’s close relationship with Moscow and its failure to oppose Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have put China in an awkward position. Xi and his colleagues have begun to realize that cooperation with Russia comes with substantial limits to avoid undermining China’s own political priorities and longer-term economic interests.

Interestingly, pundits interpreted the omission of ‘pursuing new types of great power relations’ in the 20th Party Congress report as an acceptance by the party leadership that its fraught relationship with advanced developed nations is likely to remain, with little prospect of improvement in the short term.

Chinese diplomatic literature has always presented Russia as a great power, but the abandonment of such terms signals that Beijing is keen to put clear daylight between itself and Vladimir Putin, although international commentators may argue this is not enough and nothing has changed.

There has been little sign of China using its influence to help resolve the Ukraine conflict. Facing, as it feels it now does, a ‘collective West’ and not the Americans alone, Beijing has concluded there are few reasons not to move closer to Russia.

But a reset would appear necessary if China is to tackle its domestic economic woes. So far, Beijing’s main political tactic has been to reassure European countries that it is willing to use its ties with Russia to restrain Putin from entertaining the deployment of nuclear weapons. That was the message conveyed during the visit of Olaf Scholz, the German Chancellor, and it will be said again when both President Emmanuel Macron of France and Giorgia Meloni, Italy’s prime minister, each visit later this year.

Economically, China has traditionally relied on its relationships with the European Union and the United States to support innovation and growth. So, a perceived isolation from ‘a collective West’ is not an attractive option given Xi’s hopes of achieving a robust economic rebound after dropping the country’s ‘zero-covid’ policy. A precarious bilateral tie with the US has already reduced Beijing’s choice of partners and consumers. Worsening Sino-US relations and a tightening of access to overseas markets for Chinese companies have prompted Beijing not only to reconsider the country’s sources of economic growth but to reconfigure its approach to foreign affairs.

China is making a renewed push to strengthen ties with the Global South, which does not see the war in Ukraine as black and white as the West does. Such a move is only possible because five decades of engagement with the ‘collective West’ has allowed China to emerge from poverty and become a global economic powerhouse.

A new diplomatic team

In an attempt to reset the tone of China’s relations with the EU, its largest trading partner, Xi has formed a new diplomatic team headed by Qin Gang, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, who is returning from his post in Washington as ambassador to the US and who has a background in European affairs. Achieving warmer relations will be easier said than done, however, as China has maintained its ‘neutrality’ at Russia’s aggression since February 2022.

Review: The Cultural Revolution still haunts China The World Today mhiggins.drupal 30 January 2023

Tania Branigan’s searching ‘Red Memory’ reveals the costs to Chinese society of not addressing that upheaval’s lingering injustices, writes Nathan Law.

Red Memory: Living, Remembering and Forgetting China’s Cultural Revolution
Tania Branigan, Faber, £20

The Cultural Revolution, a decade-long socio-political upheaval initiated by Chairman Mao Zedong in 1966, caused as many as two million deaths and reshaped China. Under the influence of Mao’s personality cult, an entire nation was mobilized to purge the ‘reactionary elements’ in society and the Chinese Communist Party through public denunciation and demolition of traditional heritages.

Children turned on their parents; pupils murdered their teachers, and those who survived the summary public trials were often banished – as a young Xi Jinping himself was, living in a cave for seven years, after his father fell from favour.

Impossible moral choices

In her engaging and sensitive narrative account of the revolution’s upheaval and its consequences, Tania Branigan, the Guardian’s China correspondent between 2008 and 2015, speaks to some of those who survived those terrible years, considers their impossible moral choices and explores the far-reaching legacy of the revolution in present-day China.

Mao urged the party to cleanse itself of its ‘class enemies’: ‘capitalists’ such as landowners and shopkeepers, but also artists, farmers and university professors. Often their family members were tainted by association and persecuted. Branigan captures the awful sense of intimate betrayal and tragedy nowhere more than in the testimony of Zhang Hongbing, a lawyer turned zealous Red Guard.

Zhang denounced his mother, a hospital worker, as a ‘counter-revolutionary’ because her father owned land. She was eventually executed but not before her son struck her twice during her arrest to show his party loyalty. ‘What I did to my mother was worse even than to an animal,’ the remorseful Zhang tells Branigan.

Zhang points out that his actions were far from uncommon: ‘The whole country was doing it.’ This unreconciled sense of betrayal and fear still blights China: ‘Our society is ethically hollow. If we trace these problems to their roots, we are likely to find them in the Cultural Revolution,’ one survivor is quoted as writing.

Branigan encapsulates the difficulties around reconciliation and remembering in the story of Song Binbin. As a schoolgirl in 1966, she and two classmates were the first to pin up a poster attacking teachers for urging students to focus on their work instead of the revolution. Song’s classmates then beat the school vice principal Bian Zhongyun to death in the playground. The case was never properly investigated, and the death was dismissed as an accident.

The pain of remembering

In 2014, Song apologized publicly for the poster and expressed a sense of guilt for not intervening on Bian’s behalf. But Bian’s widower rejected the apology. Song did not speak to Branigan herself, instead allowing her friends to speak in her defence. ‘They had spoken of truth and reconciliation, but not once of justice. Every remark brought them towards closure, not accountability,’ Branigan writes.

The inability to come to terms with the past pervades the book, most of whose interviewees express feelings of resentment, fear and shame about the Cultural Revolution. I sensed the same emotions when, as a boy, I talked to a neighbour in Hong Kong who was then in his 70s. He escaped from China in the late 1960s due to political and economic strains. He simply nodded and fell silent when I asked him to elaborate.

As Branigan writes: ‘Most Cultural Revolution survivors had learnt to bend with the will of the time; not only to do as they were told but to imply that doing so was their own idea. It was better – safer – to stay silent or lie.’

This collective trauma is exacerbated by official unwillingness to address the past. The Cultural Revolution warrants no more than a few paragraphs in official textbooks with no mention of the suffering it unleashed. Documents of the period that might tarnish the CCP remain unavailable; any attempts to interrogate the Cultural Revolution are condemned as ‘historical nihilism’ by the party.

China is attempting a precarious balancing act Expert comment NCapeling 9 March 2023

In its efforts to maintain ties with both Russia and Europe, China is having to wade through conflicting interests and rapidly changing sentiments.

Precisely how far China will go in supporting Russia has been one of the most important questions of the war in Ukraine.

On 20 February, US secretary of state Antony Blinken warned China may soon provide arms (‘lethal support’) to Moscow. But then, on 24 February – the anniversary of Russia’s invasion – China released a position paper calling for a political settlement to end the conflict, tellingly omitting any mention of its ‘no-limits partnership’ with Russia.

China’s goal was to present itself as a neutral mediator. In fact, Beijing’s ties with Russia remain unchanged, even if this relationship has grown more exasperating for Chinese diplomats over the past year.

Their job is to continue striking a delicate balance, a task that is becoming increasingly difficult as Russian president Vladimir Putin doubles down on nuclear brinkmanship and reckless rhetoric.

Staying out of the Ukraine war

With Putin extolling the law of the jungle in its most brutal form, China must be careful not to involve itself too much in the conflict. After all, Russia is clearly losing, and China has high hopes of repairing ties with major European economies.

But Putin is of course keen to signal that China has his back. That is why he recently rolled out the red carpet for China’s top diplomat Wang Yi and then alluded to an (unconfirmed) upcoming visit by Chinese president Xi Jinping.

Such diplomatic developments allow him to present China’s ambivalent position as, in fact, an endorsement of the invasion. While the costs of aligning with Russia could easily outweigh the benefits for China, one must remember that China’s reasons for maintaining good relations with the Kremlin go beyond the war in Ukraine.

For starters, the two countries share a 2,672-mile (4,300-kilometer) border – roughly equivalent to the width of Europe – and the frontier’s exact location was not even finally settled until the beginning of this century, after generations of negotiations that included some 2,000 meetings.

Yet to this day, the spectre of the Sino-Soviet split in the 1950s and 1960s looms large on both sides and it is not likely to be exorcised anytime soon. With China focused on moves by the US and its allies in East Asia and the Indo-Pacific, it simply cannot afford sabre-rattling or unrest on its other borders.

Moreover, unlike the collective West, China’s foreign policy has always been shaped by interests rather than by values. Even with respect to Russia, the two countries’ bond is based mainly on shared resentment of US hegemony. By deepening their bilateral cooperation in recent years, they have been able to achieve a level of great-power status with which to counterbalance America.

But Putin’s misadventure in Ukraine has forced Xi and China’s newly minted Politburo to manage a new set of economic, financial, and political risks.

Russia’s war has left the West more firmly united than it has been in years. As China’s relations with the US have reached new lows, Chinese leaders want to avoid also alienating the European Union (EU), which is one of the country’s biggest trading partners.

This is why Xi and Chinese diplomats have been so careful not to accept the Kremlin’s talking points in full. Being isolated from the ‘collective West’ is not an attractive option for China, given its hopes of achieving a robust economic rebound after years of the zero-COVID policy.

Balancing Europe with the Global South

In seeking to keep diplomatic and trade channels open, China’s main tactic has been to reassure European countries that it will use its own ties with Russia to restrain Putin from deploying nuclear weapons.

At the same time, China is making a renewed push to strengthen its ties with the Global South where many countries do not see the war in Ukraine in the same stark moral terms as the West does.

The emphasis on energy and food security in China’s recent position paper may have struck a chord with developing countries that have been reeling from the war’s negative knock-on effects on their economies.

Beijing briefing: China aims for tech self-reliance The World Today mhiggins.drupal 28 March 2023

Xi Jinping’s new appointments are tasked with a technology led recovery, but they face a daunting task to restore growth, writes Yu Jie.

The three-day state visit to Moscow by President Xi Jinping in March may have eclipsed the National People’s Congress in Beijing a fortnight earlier, but as Xi seeks to establish a new global order with China at its centre, the political events in the Great Hall of People provide an important insight into the country’s longer-term economic plans.

While a new cohort of cabinet members was appointed to sit on the State Council for the next five years, much of the attention remains on China’s economic stimulus plan to enable a rapid post-Covid recovery, as well as proposals to restructure central government.

Mountainous task

Three aspects of this year’s Congress deserve deeper scrutiny: Li Qiang’s confirmation as premier to succeed Li Keqiang’s decade-long subdued tenure under Xi; the extent to which Xi’s new cabinet sheds light on China’s economic and scientific self-reliance; and the unveiling of a major restructuring of central government administration in sectors such as finance and science.

China’s new premier initially faces the mountainous task of restoring growth and market confidence. During a press conference much shorter than his predecessor would hold, Li Qiang praised China’s private business sector and repeated the words ‘China remains open to foreign business’ to address the growing anxieties among foreigners and Chinese private entrepreneurs.

Beside the daunting task of economic recovery, Li Qiang faces another big challenge. Unlike his predecessors, he has never worked as a vice premier and overseen ministries under the State Council. The test for him will be to pursue a sound economic recovery plan while coordinating numerous central government agencies. He will also need to regulate relations among provincial heads who have a tendency to argue endlessly over the distribution of public finances.

Even though Xi is secure in his third term, his involvement in shaping and implementing macro-economic policies is keenly felt. Li Qiang made explicit the State Council under his leadership will be the chief implementor of all policies approved by the president. This is a less equal working partnership with Xi than his predecessors on the State Council enjoyed in the past.

Beijing published its official plan to restructure its central government administration announcing planned cuts of 5 per cent of its civil service. The newly established Central Commission on Finance intends to deal with systemic financial risks and to coordinate the financial regulatory bodies, central bank and Ministry of Finance. This is seen to reflect the Chinese leadership’s growing concern with the poor performance of local government loans and debt as well of the volatility of the property market, all of which threaten huge uncertainty for the economy.

As well as reorganizing the financial sector, Xi’s intention to pursue an integrated national strategy combining economic and scientific self-reliance has led to significant appointments following the Congress. As a starter, a new Central Commission for Science under the party leadership has been established. This commission will focus on providing a renewed impetus to accelerate China’s drive to achieve ‘scientific reliance’ and to ease the choke points in the economy, such as the supply chain for semiconductors.

It remains unclear who will head this new commission or who will be on it, however, as scant detail has been made public. It is seen as a direct response to the tough measures adopted by the United States designed to dent China’s ambitions of technology supremacy.

Departure from the past

New appointees to the Politburo come with substantial backgrounds in science as well as a solid track record of running state-owned enterprises. This is a departure from the past.

Instead of inserting financial specialists, Xi appointed two scientists, Liu Guozhong and Zhang Guoqing, as the vice premiers overseeing science, education and industrial policies. This signals that Xi intends to prioritize science and innovation during his third term. The appointment of technocrats to the State Council is seen as a move to strengthen innovation and prepare the Chinese economy, political system and society for potential external shocks.

India-China relations: Is the Quad the answer? Interview NCapeling 28 March 2023

The threat of China’s military aggression is being felt across the world, but this is a phenomenon India has been contending with for decades.

India’s border with China became the site of tense conflict in 2020, which led to India reinvesting in the Quad. Arzan Tarapore discusses key issues from his International Affairs article, such as how India is responding to increased aggression at the border and how a reinvigorated Quad may hold answers to balancing China in the Indo-Pacific.

What have India-China relations been like in the past?

Relations between India and China have varied over the decades. In the years following World War Two there was some hope they would find common cause in their international outlooks but that was quite quickly extinguished with their border war of 1962.

Since then, the two countries have oscillated between detente and tension. It took decades for them to normalize their relations and slowly build trust through several confidence-building agreements.

More recently it seemed the two countries were both willing to set aside their border dispute in order to profit from their burgeoning economic relationship – as, for both, there is no question development and economic growth is the primary national objective.

The question has been the extent to which their unresolved sovereignty and security issues undermine those goals as, at the same time, they both began paying more attention to the security of their territorial claims.

China in particular matched its explosive economic growth with startling military modernization and assertiveness. Its long-standing military doctrine and terrain advantages means it relies heavily on quality military infrastructure on the Tibetan plateau and it has accelerated the pace of those infrastructure upgrades and expansion.

In the 2010s, India belatedly began to improve its own transport infrastructure near the border, which threatened to reduce China’s military advantages. The earlier quiet on the border began to crack and China began launching border incursions with increasing frequency and scale.

This was a dynamic, iterative process, with incursions prompting India to accelerate its infrastructure development, which in turn probably prompted more incursions by China.

What happened around 2020 to change their relationship?

The cycle of competitive security policies on the border reached a tipping point in 2020 with Chinese incursions at multiple points simultaneously in Ladakh, apparently designed to establish a new status quo on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) separating Indian and Chinese-controlled territory.

The Indian political leadership played down the incursions but both Indian and Chinese militaries rushed to reinforce their positions near the border. They held multiple rounds of military talks which made halting progress.

On 15 June 2020, a skirmish resulted in the loss of 20 Indian troops, and an unknown number of Chinese troops. In the weeks that followed, both sides further reinforced their positions in a scramble to gain positional advantage.

How has India responded to China’s increasing military might?

The Indian government’s response to the Chinese landgrab was to threaten the entire bilateral relationship. In a reversal of decades of policy, it argued China had demolished the painstakingly constructed confidence-building measures on the border, and so the relationship could not continue as normal until the border crisis was resolved.

It imposed new restrictions on Chinese investment in India – even as overall trade continued to increase – and adopted a more assertive diplomatic posture.

Strategically, the 2020 border crisis had two major effects. First, it reinforced the Indian proclivity to see its northern borders as the primary threat to Indian national security.

India has heavily reinforced the border, reassigning some major formations and making numerous new investments in military capability to manage the threat. The significance of this however is that, in the context of budget scarcity, these military improvements come at the cost of potential increases in India’s capability in the Indian Ocean region – ultimately a more consequential zone of competition in the Indo-Pacific.

The Indian government may yet change course and reallocate resources for power projection but, at this stage, I see no evidence of that.

The second major strategic effect of the crisis was to unleash Indian cooperation with its partners, especially the US and the reinvigorated Quad grouping of Australia, India, Japan and the US.

India has generally avoided formal international alliances, and the Quad was in hiatus for years – why has India invested in it now?

India had always been mindful not to embrace external partners too closely so as to maintain its freedom of action and to not provoke a Chinese reaction. But since the Ladakh crisis, New Delhi has a newfound willingness to work more closely with the US, Japan, and Australia – because it calculates correctly that these partnerships enhance its freedom to act, and that China has already adopted the aggressive posture India feared.

It is important to note however that the border crisis was not the only driver of India’s strategic adjustment. The crisis coincided with the COVID-19 pandemic which highlighted to India the ineffectiveness of existing international institutional arrangements.

For New Delhi, then, the twin crises of Ladakh and the pandemic stressed the need for new international arrangements, and the Quad offered the best combination of agility and capability to meet the most pressing challenges of the Indo-Pacific region.

What do the Quad partners hope to achieve in their renewed partnership?

Beginning in 2021, the Quad assumed far greater significance. The first national leader summits happened – which have since continued at regular intervals – and its members have all agreed to a continually expanding agenda of work.

It seeks to provide international public goods, and everything from climate action to telecommunications regulations. Critically, it has limited its security role to some niche and relatively unprovocative areas, such as humanitarian assistance and maritime domain awareness – issues which benefit the Indo-Pacific as a whole and do not intensify security competition. It has certainly eschewed military cooperation.

Interestingly, the four Quad countries have also separately accelerated their military cooperation, bilaterally, trilaterally, and even quadrilaterally. But that cooperation lies outside the formal mechanisms of the Quad.

What impact will these Quad actions have on Chinese aggression and the Indo-Pacific region?

This Quad approach, which I call ‘zone balancing’ in my article, is specifically designed to build the capacity and resilience of regional states, and to not inflame dyadic security competition.

The relatively uncompetitive character of these activities helps to deflate Chinese claims that the Quad is an antagonistic new bloc, and to ameliorate southeast Asian states’ concerns over the potential intensification of strategic competition.

But the Quad’s agenda is not fixed and not bounded. It has expanded year on year and may continue to extend into new areas. This gives it a degree of flexibility and coercive leverage as Beijing cannot be confident about the Quad’s future direction.

This slate of activities has a lot of utility in building the Quad’s regional legitimacy and habits of cooperation among its members. But it conspicuously does not address the region’s most pressing security challenges.

It is not, in its current form, equipped to manage the challenge of territorial disputes or aggression. So the Quad will not address India’s unresolved border dispute with China, potential crises over Taiwan, or the South China Sea.

I would argue, however, that the four members of the Quad have unparalleled advantages of capacity and geography. With further military cooperation, even outside the formal structures of the Quad, they have the potential to deter Chinese aggression, but that remains subject to their political preferences.

Will other countries in different parts of the world adopt similar balancing strategies?

Zone balancing could be an attractive strategy for other countries which want to either avoid the costs of hard military balancing, or to not provoke their rivals.

It has been used in the past – such as the Marshall Plan during the early Cold War – and I would not be surprised if other countries competing with China, or even China itself, use it.

An important mechanism of resistance to β-lactam antibiotics is via their β-lactamase–catalyzed hydrolysis. Recent work has shown that, in addition to the established hydrolysis products, the reaction of the class D nucleophilic serine β-lactamases (SBLs) with carbapenems also produces β-lactones. We report studies on the factors determining β-lactone formation by class D SBLs. We show that variations in hydrophobic residues at the active site of class D SBLs (i.e. Trp105, Val120, and Leu158, using OXA-48 numbering) impact on the relative levels of β-lactones and hydrolysis products formed. Some variants, i.e. the OXA-48 V120L and OXA-23 V128L variants, catalyze increased β-lactone formation compared with the WT enzymes. The results of kinetic and product studies reveal that variations of residues other than those directly involved in catalysis, including those arising from clinically observed mutations, can alter the reaction outcome of class D SBL catalysis. NMR studies show that some class D SBL variants catalyze formation of β-lactones from all clinically relevant carbapenems regardless of the presence or absence of a 1β-methyl substituent. Analysis of reported crystal structures for carbapenem-derived acyl-enzyme complexes reveals preferred conformations for hydrolysis and β-lactone formation. The observation of increased β-lactone formation by class D SBL variants, including the clinically observed carbapenemase OXA-48 V120L, supports the proposal that class D SBL-catalyzed rearrangement of β-lactams to β-lactones is important as a resistance mechanism.

Epoxide hydrolases (EHs) have been characterized and engineered as biocatalysts that convert epoxides to valuable chiral vicinal diol precursors of drugs and bioactive compounds. Nonetheless, the regioselectivity control of the epoxide ring opening by EHs remains challenging. Alp1U is an α/β-fold EH that exhibits poor regioselectivity in the epoxide hydrolysis of fluostatin C (compound 1) and produces a pair of stereoisomers. Herein, we established the absolute configuration of the two stereoisomeric products and determined the crystal structure of Alp1U. A Trp-186/Trp-187/Tyr-247 oxirane oxygen hole was identified in Alp1U that replaced the canonical Tyr/Tyr pair in α/β-EHs. Mutation of residues in the atypical oxirane oxygen hole of Alp1U improved the regioselectivity for epoxide hydrolysis on 1. The single site Y247F mutation led to highly regioselective (98%) attack at C-3 of 1, whereas the double mutation W187F/Y247F resulted in regioselective (94%) nucleophilic attack at C-2. Furthermore, single-crystal X-ray structures of the two regioselective Alp1U variants in complex with 1 were determined. These findings allowed insights into the reaction details of Alp1U and provided a new approach for engineering regioselective epoxide hydrolases.

Mitochondria are specialized compartments that produce requisite ATP to fuel cellular functions and serve as centers of metabolite processing, cellular signaling, and apoptosis. To accomplish these roles, mitochondria rely on the genetic information in their small genome (mitochondrial DNA) and the nucleus. A growing appreciation for mitochondria's role in a myriad of human diseases, including inherited genetic disorders, degenerative diseases, inflammation, and cancer, has fueled the study of biochemical mechanisms that control mitochondrial function. The mitochondrial transcriptional machinery is different from nuclear machinery. The in vitro re-constituted transcriptional complexes of Saccharomyces cerevisiae (yeast) and humans, aided with high-resolution structures and biochemical characterizations, have provided a deeper understanding of the mechanism and regulation of mitochondrial DNA transcription. In this review, we will discuss recent advances in the structure and mechanism of mitochondrial transcription initiation. We will follow up with recent discoveries and formative findings regarding the regulatory events that control mitochondrial DNA transcription, focusing on those involved in cross-talk between the mitochondria and nucleus.

The QT interval is a recording of cardiac electrical activity. Previous genome-wide association studies identified genetic variants that modify the QT interval upstream of LITAF (lipopolysaccharide-induced tumor necrosis factor-α factor), a protein encoding a regulator of endosomal trafficking. However, it was not clear how LITAF might impact cardiac excitation. We investigated the effect of LITAF on the voltage-gated sodium channel Nav1.5, which is critical for cardiac depolarization. We show that overexpressed LITAF resulted in a significant increase in the density of Nav1.5-generated voltage-gated sodium current INa and Nav1.5 surface protein levels in rabbit cardiomyocytes and in HEK cells stably expressing Nav1.5. Proximity ligation assays showed co-localization of endogenous LITAF and Nav1.5 in cardiomyocytes, whereas co-immunoprecipitations confirmed they are in the same complex when overexpressed in HEK cells. In vitro data suggest that LITAF interacts with the ubiquitin ligase NEDD4-2, a regulator of Nav1.5. LITAF overexpression down-regulated NEDD4-2 in cardiomyocytes and HEK cells. In HEK cells, LITAF increased ubiquitination and proteasomal degradation of co-expressed NEDD4-2 and significantly blunted the negative effect of NEDD4-2 on INa. We conclude that LITAF controls cardiac excitability by promoting degradation of NEDD4-2, which is essential for removal of surface Nav1.5. LITAF-knockout zebrafish showed increased variation in and a nonsignificant 15% prolongation of action potential duration. Computer simulations using a rabbit-cardiomyocyte model demonstrated that changes in Ca2+ and Na+ homeostasis are responsible for the surprisingly modest action potential duration shortening. These computational data thus corroborate findings from several genome-wide association studies that associated LITAF with QT interval variation.

Business Briefing: Assessing the geopolitical implications of EU AI regulation 17 September 2024 — 4:00PM TO 5:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 8 August 2024 Chatham House

Join us for this critical discussion of how the EU AI Act will shape the world’s approach to the technology.

Join us for this critical discussion of how the EU AI Act will shape the world’s approach to the technology

Governments, technology companies and civil society groups across the world are now advocating firmer AI regulation. Machine learning algorithms have changed the way we interact with technology and powered much of our online lives for decades: why has this pendulum swung back so far toward greater control, and why now?

In 2023 the UK government seized the initiative with its Bletchley AI Safety Summit. The event attempted to address the so called ‘frontier risks’ associated with AI development. Global competition on AI is reflected in AI governance efforts in China, US, the Gulf and beyond. But to date, it is the EU that has led the West in passing AI legislation. The EU AI Act, has separated AI systems into graded risk categories carrying different regulatory requirements, and it remains to be seen whether global AI will feel the Brussels effect.

This conversation will cover the following questions:

• Critics have painted regulation including the AI Act as anti-innovation. Is this a fair assessment?
• What lessons can we learn from the successes and shortcomings of GDPR?
• How do we tackle the challenge of low public trust in AI and low public trust in government technology projects, particularly in Western democracies?
• Does the proliferation of safety institutes, and the AI office, point to the emergence of a new type of technical governance institution? What is its future?

30 Years of Non-Maghreb: What next for Algeria-Morocco relations? 10 September 2024 — 2:00PM TO 3:15PM Anonymous (not verified) 13 August 2024 Online

Experts discuss Algeria-Morocco relations and implications for regional actors.

In 1989, the establishment of the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA) brought a promise of economic integration and strengthening of ties between Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia for the benefit and prosperity of their societies.

Decades on, very little has been accomplished in developing the Maghreb project, and the region remains one of the least integrated in the world, despite significant social and cultural similarities between member countries. The last time the full UMA leadership met was back in 1994, with August 2024 marking 30 years of closed borders between Algeria and Morocco.

Relations between the two largest Maghreb countries have deteriorated further since 2020 due to disagreements over issues of Western Sahara, and, most recently, the Abraham Accords, with Algeria cutting diplomatic ties with Morocco in 2021.

In this webinar, experts will discuss:

• Which primary obstacles are hindering Maghreb integration and Algeria-Morocco relations?
• What are the costs and implications for regional countries?
• What are the positions of Libya, Tunisia, and Mauritania?
• What is required for a rapprochement and how can external partners support this? 

In conversation with David Miliband: Finding a new approach to tackle conflict, climate and extreme poverty 11 September 2024 — 5:00PM TO 5:45PM Anonymous (not verified) 15 August 2024 Chatham House and Online

David Miliband discusses how the climate crisis, extreme poverty and conflict are becoming inextricably linked and how the global community must respond.

Combatting the climate crisis, ending protracted conflicts, and alleviating poverty are three of the greatest priorities for international action. However, these three challenges become increasingly concentrated in a handful of countries. The subsequent feedback loop makes addressing these challenges even more complex.

The International Rescue Committee’s (IRC’s) work in crisis-affected communities highlights this new geography of crisis. Just 16 countries, which are both climate-vulnerable and conflict-affected. This represents 43% of all people living in extreme poverty, 44% of all people affected by natural disasters and 79% of all people in humanitarian need. This trend towards the concentration of crisis is only deepening. In three decades, the number of conflict-affected, climate-vulnerable states has increased from 44% to more than two-thirds.

Affected countries - like Sudan, Myanmar, and Syria - are also among the least supported financially. Debt burdens are siphoning away critical resources needed for adaptation and resilience. Humanitarian aid budgets are being slashed by donor governments. The private sector refuses to invest in these communities they view as too risky. And the international financial institutions meant to alleviate poverty and spur climate action are not well-designed to work with crisis-affected states or local communities. With the upcoming COP29 Summit in Azerbaijan focused on the New Collective Quantified Goal for climate finance, vulnerable communities will be watching closely whether they will get support in their fight against the worst impacts of the climate crisis.

Conflict, the climate crisis, and extreme poverty are taking their toll. But how can the world best respond?

Key questions to be discussed during the session include:

• At a time of political disruption, how does the West engage with vulnerable countries? What actions should be prioritised in providing support to such countries?
• Can global institutions evolve to better protect vulnerable and displaced people from conflict and climate-risk, particularly as geopolitical rivalries reduce space for cooperation?
• What is the UK’s role in supporting climate action in fragile states and how does this align with its agenda on the Sustainable Development Goals and extreme poverty?

What is the future of cross-border data flows? 16 September 2024 — 6:00PM TO 7:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 15 August 2024 Chatham House and Online

Navigating long-standing tensions and newfound difficulties for unlocking shared prosperity among modern, digital economies.

Cross-border data flows can unlock shared prosperity among digital economies, advance international security, and address cybercrime and global crises. But ensuring the free flow of data across borders involves navigating complex regulatory, security, trust, political, and technical challenges. Developing effective frameworks and agreements to support data flows is a significant undertaking.

Recent bilateral and multilateral agreements and initiatives have advanced data-sharing, respecting the right to privacy and upholding notions of sovereignty. This has contributed to clearer rules and (potentially) better solutions such as the OECD declaration on government access to data held by companies. Further progress, supportive of public safety and national security, is on the horizon, like G7 support for data free flow with trust and industry-led, trusted cloud principles on protecting human rights and competitiveness.

More work is needed to operationalize commitments and advance ongoing negotiations, like US–EU negotiations on e-evidence in criminal proceedings. This is key for ensuring ‘hard’ legal and regulatory mechanisms complement OECD principles. Stakeholders from law enforcement, national security, data protection and industry must confront tensions between sovereign prerogatives and cooperation. They must also overcome traditional silos between law enforcement and national security work. On the horizon are newfound challenges (for example, in harmonizing legal frameworks and responding to advances in technology). All the while, stakeholders must work together to promote economic interests, data protection, privacy and cybersecurity.

This expert panel discusses the future of cross-border data-sharing, raising questions including:

• What value does cross-border data-sharing bring and where are its current ‘pain points’?
• To enable data free flows, how should principles complement ‘hard’ legal and regulatory mechanisms?
• Beyond states, law enforcement, major industry players and international organizations, what roles should SMEs, the technical community and civil society stakeholders play in shaping and operationalizing principles?
• Looking ahead, where is progress in data-sharing principles and arrangements expected or possible?

A drinks reception follows the event.

This event is supported by Microsoft as part of a project on data sharing. The project has benefited greatly from the insights of a multi-stakeholder taskforce and concludes with an open-access special issue of the Journal of Cyber Policy.

A world in transition and the future of the global workforce 15 October 2024 — 9:00AM TO 10:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 22 August 2024 Chatham House and Online

How are migration and global megatrends shaping international labour?

As the fallout of 2024’s ‘Election Super-Year’ becomes clearer, international policymakers and business leaders must now equip themselves to face the challenges and opportunities of the three key transitions that will dominate the next few decades: the journey toward a greener and healthier world; the transition to a more technologically adept society; and the development of a secure and productive economy for all.

The adaption and evolution of the global workforce is an essential component of all three of these transitions and therefore a prescient analysis of how migration, workforce policies and modern technology trends will impact this ecosystem is essential.

Upskilling the workforce will no doubt remain a key focus for stakeholders. But the question remains, how do these plans move beyond the ‘ideas-phase’ and become policies that will keep pace in the fast-paced, modern and digital workplace?

It may prove harder than ever for these ideas to come to fruition, with the rise of populist and nationalist political thinking fragmenting the balance between local and international labour. Indeed, this often leads to reduced attractiveness of skilled foreign labour in domestic markets.

This puts global business in a very powerful position though, as companies can play an important role in readdressing these narratives, shaping the future of workforce policies and using examples of best practice to improve access, mobility and ultimately economic productivity, for the benefit of all.

Through this event, in partnership with EY, the panel analyses how migration, skills development agendas and global megatrends, such as technology, sustainability and the global economy, will shape developments in the years to come.

A networking breakfast precedes this event, served between 0800 and 0900 BST.

Director’s Briefing: Assessing foreign policy challenges for the next US president 5 September 2024 — 2:00PM TO 3:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 27 August 2024 Chatham House and Online

This briefing will explore what challenges might await the winner of 2024 US presidential election.

As the 2024 US Presidential election draws closer, the future direction of American foreign policy seems ever more uncertain. Kamala Harris, the Democratic presidential candidate, appears to be embracing many of Biden’s policies, but she brings a different background, and most likely a different team, so change is likely.  Donald Trump has more well-known views on foreign policy, but the context for a second Trump administration would be very different than the first.

The next U.S. President will be confronted a world in need of leadership with two major wars, a more assertive and capable China, a climate crisis, ungoverned technological change, emerging powers that demand a seat at the table, and debt distress across much of the developing world.

Please join us for this critical conversation covering:

• How will US-China strategic competition and the threat of conflict over Taiwan challenge US policy makers?
• What are the risks and challenges posed by Russia’s illegal full-scale invasion of Ukraine?
• How does war in the Middle East and the threat of regional escalation shape US foreign policy?

Making the circular economy work for global development: how the UN Summit of the Future can deliver 23 September 2024 — 6:15PM TO 9:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 5 September 2024 Online

This policy roundtable focusses on how to advance implementation of a global approach and collaboration to an inclusive circular economy for an updated post-2030 SDG framework.

As the world looks beyond the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) towards the post-2030 era, integrating the principles of the circular economy into the future global development agenda becomes imperative.  

A new Chatham House research paper about the role of the circular economy for the SDGs and their possible extension into the post-2030 development agenda will be launched in September 2024 during the UN Summit of the Future and the New York Climate Week. The paper outlines the rationale for the integration of circular economy goals into for the next crucial phase of international development and how to meet net-zero 2050 targets. It provides actionable recommendations on international cooperation mechanisms for policymakers and stakeholders at the UN Summit for the Future in 2024 and beyond.

The aim of the roundtable is to bring together stakeholders and leaders from intergovernmental organisations, business, governments and civil society. The focus of the roundtable meeting is: 

• Reflections on the Summit of the Future and the role of circularity for an updated post-2030 SDG framework.
• Discussion on key aspects of the institutional arrangements and international coordination that are needed for a globally coordinated approach to achieve an inclusive circular economy that supports SDG implementation. 
• Development of joint strategies on how to advance implementation of a global approach and collaboration to an inclusive circular economy as a follow-up from the Summit of the Future.

The objective is to emerge from the roundtable with a clearer roadmap for translating the recommendations for international coordination into concrete actions, with a shared commitment to driving meaningful change on the international level.

The event is co-hosted by Chatham House and partners from the Global Circular Economy Roadmap initiative including the African Circular Economy Network, the African Development Bank, Circular Change, Circular Innovation Lab, Circle Economy, EU CE Stakeholder Platform, Hanns Seidel Foundation, Institute of Global Environmental Strategies, Sitra, UNIDO, World Business Council on Sustainable Development, World Economic Forum and the Wyss Academy for Nature.

Further background information is available on the initiative website.

More speakers to be announced.

Labour Party Conference – International affairs networking brunch 24 September 2024 — 11:00AM TO 12:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 16 September 2024 Labour – Grace 1 Suite, Hilton Hotel, Liverpool

Hosted by Sir Simon Fraser, Chairman of Chatham House.

This event is taking place at the Hilton Hotel, Grace 1 Suite, Liverpool.

You are warmly invited to join us for an exclusive networking brunch at the 2024 Labour Party Conference.

Sir Simon Fraser, Chairman of Chatham House, and Olivia O’Sullivan, Director of Chatham House’s UK in the World Programme, will deliver opening remarks, followed by an interactive networking session where you will have the chance to engage with a wide range of stakeholders. Join us to connect with key senior parliamentary, corporate and media attendees at the Labour Party Conference.

This event will be taking place outside of the secure zone.

In conversation with Martin Griffiths: How can a divided world address conflict? 1 October 2024 — 10:00AM TO 11:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 16 September 2024 Chatham House and Online

The former United Nations Under-Secretary-General describes how a weakening multilateralism system and dysfunctional political diplomacy can be revitalized by a humanitarian approach.

US domestic polarization and implications for the presidential election 30 September 2024 — 5:00PM TO 6:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 19 September 2024 Online

This webinar explores the rise of polarization amongst the US public and implications for the upcoming election.

Domestic polarization has been on the rise in the US in recent years, with Democrats and Republicans moving further away from the centre on key policy issues. As polarization increases, so too do concerns about the state of US democracy and prospects of political violence surrounding the upcoming presidential election. 

This expert panel discusses key questions including:

• What are the driving forces of the growing political divide in the US?
• How far apart are voters on key election issues, from healthcare to immigration to national security?
• How is partisan polarisation altering the effectiveness of US foreign policy and influencing America’s role in the world?

Looking ahead to the 2024 US Presidential Election 2 October 2024 — 6:00PM TO 7:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 23 September 2024 Chatham House and Online

This panel explores the state of the US presidential election following the vice presidential debate.

With only weeks to go, this panel looks at the state of the 2024 US presidential election.

Harris and Trump are campaigning to drive up voter enthusiasm and bring undecided voters to their side.

What are the key issues shaping voter’s preferences and how may this impact voter turnout? What can we expect in the weeks ahead?

Funding Ukraine’s recovery 15 October 2024 — 2:00PM TO 3:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 24 September 2024 Online

The expert panel explores the role of the private sector in financing recovery projects.

Despite the ongoing war, recovery and reconstruction is under way in Ukraine. The question of how to push and finance the pipeline of the recovery projects remains one of the key challenges for the Ukrainian government. Most importantly, there is an outstanding question about how foreign investors can participate in the process.

Energy, together with access to finance and uninterrupted export routes is one of the key pillars of Ukraine’s wartime economy. In the coming months, Ukraine faces an ultimate test on its capacity to implement energy projects to restore energy generation. It is a test case for how effectively Kyiv raises public and private funds and delivers results to mitigate destruction as the war continues.

This expert panel discusses key questions including:

• What funding streams and mechanisms are currently in place?
• What does the new Ukraine Investment Framework offer?
• How successful is the energy sector in generating necessary funding?
• What role for private-public partnerships? Do we have examples?

This event is organised in partnership with Ukrainian project ‘The Recovery Spending Watchdog’ financed by the EU. The project is a joint effort of the Centre for Economic Strategy, the Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting, and the NGO ‘Technologies for Progress’.

What are MENA countries’ priorities for climate action and COP? 24 October 2024 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 2 October 2024 Online

Experts discuss the impacts of COP27 and 28 on the region and priorities for COP29.

In November this year, all eyes will be on Azerbaijan as Baku hosts the 29th UN Climate Conference (COP). Hosting COP offers an opportunity to push for climate action that reflects the host country’s unique circumstances, as well as regional interests. COP28 in the United Arab Emirates and COP27 in Egypt highlighted the climate priorities for the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), one of the world’s most vulnerable regions to the impacts of climate change.

From rising temperatures and deadly heatwaves, to extreme weather events such as heavy rainstorms, sandstorms, and cyclones, climate change exacerbates existing vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities include water scarcity, food security, and the preservation of livelihoods increasingly threatening the region’s social and economic stability.

While there has been some progress in advancing formal negotiations on key issues, the gap between COP agreements and tangible actions to address the increasingly severe effects of climate change in the MENA region remains vast. 

This webinar aims to assess:

• What are the key tangible impacts of COP27 and COP28 in Egypt and the UAE respectively on driving climate action in the region?
• How do MENA countries balance COP28’s landmark agreement to transition away from fossil fuels with their unique national circumstances?
• How will the region benefit from COP28 breakthrough in integrating the issues of climate, peace and security in climate action through the ‘Declaration of Climate, Relief, Recovery and Peace’?
• What are the priorities for COP29 and how do they align with the climate agenda in the MENA region?

Iraq Initiative Conference 2024 20 November 2024 — 9:30AM TO 5:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 4 October 2024 Chatham House and Online

Our sixth annual Iraq Initiative conference will convene Iraqi and international policymakers, experts and civil society in London to discuss the critical questions for Iraq’s future, and the country’s trajectory in the year ahead.

Over two decades following regime change, Iraq appears to be on a path to recovery and growth. With the support of high oil prices, Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani’s government is implementing an ambitious plan to develop critical infrastructure, enhance ties with neighbouring countries, and renegotiate relationships with international partners like the US and UN. The political system has rebounded from a series of shocks and is in the process of consolidating and centralising power in Baghdad under the governing Shia Coordination Framework.

However, underlying political, economic, security, and regional challenges, if not addressed, threaten this apparent stability and frustrate longer-term hope for a better future. Despite the country’s wealth, many young Iraqis struggle to find jobs while the space for civic activism shrinks. Meanwhile, the escalation of violence across the region threatens to engulf Iraq in further conflict. With the 2025 parliamentary election approaching, infighting within the governing coalition also suggests political turmoil in the year ahead.

The key questions explored through each session include:

• How can the Sudani government tackle the roots of these obstacles to ensure that development can be sustained over time?
• What are the key steps to coherent and effective state-building?
• And how can regional and international actors support this process?

This conference is part of Chatham House’s Iraq Initiative.

This year’s conference features RE-PLAY – a video art exhibition curated by Dr Tamara Chalabi of the Ruya Foundation. The artists featured in this exhibition, spanning multiple generations both within Iraq and in the Iraqi diaspora, use their work to grapple with complex notions of Iraqi identity through the thematic issues of heritage, exile, disconnection, freedom of expression, and other persistent issues explored in this show.

Simultaneous English-Arabic interpretation will be available for all conference sessions. This event is part of Chatham House’s Iraq Initiative.

The institute occupies a position of respect and trust, and is committed to fostering inclusive dialogue at all events. Event attendees are expected to uphold this by adhering to our code of conduct.

Is the world ready for the next pandemic? 29 October 2024 — 6:00PM TO 7:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 9 October 2024 Chatham House and Online

In a joint event with The Elders, Helen Clark, Ban Ki-moon and other experts discuss the policies needed to prevent the next health catastrophe. A drinks reception will follow this event.

The world faces multiple interlinked existential threats such as pandemics and the climate crisis, exacerbated by conflict and extreme poverty. However, the multilateral system is failing to respond with sufficient urgency or impact. As the fifth anniversary of the COVID-19 pandemic approaches, Chatham House and The Elders will discuss the risk of a general slide into complacency. 

Amid the expanding outbreak of mpox in Africa, rich countries continue to withhold stockpiled mpox vaccines. The failure to release the required amount is contributing to the diseases spread across the continent. 

Meanwhile, the Pandemic Accord negotiations are in overtime, with nations unable to reach agreement over concerns around sovereignty and resource distribution in any future pandemic. Similarly, a proposal to include a UN Emergency Platform in the recent Summit of the Future to strengthen the multilateral response to complex global shocks was shelved due to political deadlock.

Can the world learn from past mistakes and break the cycle of panic and neglect? In today’s fractious and polarized geopolitical context, what would it take for leaders to do what’s necessary? And why is it so critical to have equity at the heart of any sustainable global response?

Join Chatham House for this event in which the panel discuss key questions including:

• Five years on from COVID-19, who is showing global leadership today in preparing for future pandemics?
• Are international organizations and institutions fit for purpose to respond to pandemics in a multipolar geopolitical environment? How can they best adapt?
• What can be done to clarify and detoxify current debates around sovereignty to improve global pandemic prevention, preparedness and response?

The cystic fibrosis transmembrane conductance regulator (CFTR) is a plasma membrane anion channel that plays a key role in controlling transepithelial fluid movement. Excessive activation results in intestinal fluid loss during secretory diarrheas, whereas CFTR mutations underlie cystic fibrosis (CF). Anion permeability depends both on how well CFTR channels work (permeation/gating) and on how many are present at the membrane. Recently, treatments with two drug classes targeting CFTR—one boosting ion-channel function (potentiators) and the other increasing plasma membrane density (correctors)—have provided significant health benefits to CF patients. Here, we present an image-based fluorescence assay that can rapidly and simultaneously estimate both CFTR ion-channel function and the protein's proximity to the membrane. We monitor F508del-CFTR, the most common CF-causing variant, and confirm rescue by low temperature, CFTR-targeting drugs and second-site revertant mutation R1070W. In addition, we characterize a panel of 62 CF-causing mutations. Our measurements correlate well with published data (electrophysiology and biochemistry), further confirming validity of the assay. Finally, we profile effects of acute treatment with approved potentiator drug VX-770 on the rare-mutation panel. Mapping the potentiation profile on CFTR structures raises mechanistic hypotheses on drug action, suggesting that VX-770 might allow an open-channel conformation with an alternative arrangement of domain interfaces. The assay is a valuable tool for investigation of CFTR molecular mechanisms, allowing accurate inferences on gating/permeation. In addition, by providing a two-dimensional characterization of the CFTR protein, it could better inform development of single-drug and precision therapies addressing the root cause of CF disease.

The main protease (3CL Mpro) from SARS–CoV-2, the etiological agent of COVID-19, is an essential enzyme for viral replication. 3CL Mpro possesses an unusual catalytic dyad composed of Cys145 and His41 residues. A critical question in the field has been what the protonation states of the ionizable residues in the substrate-binding active-site cavity are; resolving this point would help understand the catalytic details of the enzyme and inform rational drug development against this pernicious virus. Here, we present the room-temperature neutron structure of 3CL Mpro, which allowed direct determination of hydrogen atom positions and, hence, protonation states in the protease. We observe that the catalytic site natively adopts a zwitterionic reactive form in which Cys145 is in the negatively charged thiolate state and His41 is doubly protonated and positively charged, instead of the neutral unreactive state usually envisaged. The neutron structure also identified the protonation states, and thus electrical charges, of all other amino acid residues and revealed intricate hydrogen-bonding networks in the active-site cavity and at the dimer interface. The fine atomic details present in this structure were made possible by the unique scattering properties of the neutron, which is an ideal probe for locating hydrogen positions and experimentally determining protonation states at near-physiological temperature. Our observations provide critical information for structure-assisted and computational drug design, allowing precise tailoring of inhibitors to the enzyme's electrostatic environment.

Dilated cardiomyopathy (DCM) is associated with mutations in cardiomyocyte sarcomeric proteins, including α-tropomyosin. In conjunction with troponin, tropomyosin shifts to regulate actomyosin interactions. Tropomyosin molecules overlap via tropomyosin–tropomyosin head-to-tail associations, forming a continuous strand along the thin filament. These associations are critical for propagation of tropomyosin's reconfiguration along the thin filament and key for the cooperative switching between heart muscle contraction and relaxation. Here, we tested perturbations in tropomyosin structure, biochemistry, and function caused by the DCM-linked mutation, M8R, which is located at the overlap junction. Localized and nonlocalized structural effects of the mutation were found in tropomyosin that ultimately perturb its thin filament regulatory function. Comparison of mutant and WT α-tropomyosin was carried out using in vitro motility assays, CD, actin co-sedimentation, and molecular dynamics simulations. Regulated thin filament velocity measurements showed that the presence of M8R tropomyosin decreased calcium sensitivity and thin filament cooperativity. The co-sedimentation of actin and tropomyosin showed weakening of actin-mutant tropomyosin binding. The binding of troponin T's N terminus to the actin-mutant tropomyosin complex was also weakened. CD and molecular dynamics indicate that the M8R mutation disrupts the four-helix bundle at the head-to-tail junction, leading to weaker tropomyosin–tropomyosin binding and weaker tropomyosin–actin binding. Molecular dynamics revealed that altered end-to-end bond formation has effects extending toward the central region of the tropomyosin molecule, which alter the azimuthal position of tropomyosin, likely disrupting the mutant thin filament response to calcium. These results demonstrate that mutation-induced alterations in tropomyosin–thin filament interactions underlie the altered regulatory phenotype and ultimately the pathogenesis of DCM.

In their comment (1) on our publication (2), the authors make two points: (i) they raise concerns about the possible effect of residual NONOate in our study, and (ii) they promote nitrosylcobalamin (NOCbl) supplied by their own company. Both points lack merit for the following reasons. The authors make the astonishing claim that the spectra of nitric oxide (NO•) and cobalamins overlap. Unlike NO•, cobalamin absorbs in the visible region, permitting unequivocal spectral assignment of NOCbl as reported (3). We demonstrated that whereas NOCbl is highly unstable in solution, it is stabilized by the B12 trafficking protein CblC. So even if present, residual NONOate (which is unstable at neutral pH and is removed during the work-up (3)) could not account for the observed difference.The authors then misrepresent our synthetic method, claiming that anaerobic conditions were used to generate nitrocobalamin (NO2Cbl), which results in the transient formation of NOCbl. We synthesized NO2Cbl aerobically using nitrite as described (4); NOCbl is not an intermediate in this ligand exchange reaction. The aerobic instability of NOCbl has been rigorously described by inorganic chemists (3, 5) and raises obvious questions about its purported biological effects as exemplified by the authors' own 2003 JBC publication, which was later withdrawn.As to promoting NOCbl from their company, the authors refer to a synthetic route from a mixture of NO• gas and aquocobalamin. The authors' method (6) has been described as “dubious” by chemists (5). Whereas DEAE NONOate used in our method is widely known as an NO• donor,...

G protein–coupled receptors (GPCRs) initiate signaling cascades via G-proteins and beta-arrestins (βarr). βarr-dependent actions begin with recruitment of βarr to the phosphorylated receptor tail and are followed by engagement with the receptor core. βarrs are known to act as adaptor proteins binding receptors and various effectors, but it is unclear whether in addition to the scaffolding role βarrs can allosterically activate their downstream targets. Here we demonstrate the direct allosteric activation of proto-oncogene kinase Src by GPCR–βarr complexes in vitro and establish the conformational basis of the activation. Whereas free βarr1 had no effect on Src activity, βarr1 in complex with M2 muscarinic or β2-adrenergic receptors reconstituted in lipid nanodiscs activate Src by reducing the lag phase in Src autophosphorylation. Interestingly, receptor–βarr1 complexes formed with a βarr1 mutant, in which the finger-loop, required to interact with the receptor core, has been deleted, fully retain the ability to activate Src. Similarly, βarr1 in complex with only a phosphorylated C-terminal tail of the vasopressin 2 receptor activates Src as efficiently as GPCR–βarr complexes. In contrast, βarr1 and chimeric M2 receptor with nonphosphorylated C-terminal tail failed to activate Src. Taken together, these data demonstrate that the phosphorylated GPCR tail interaction with βarr1 is necessary and sufficient to empower it to allosterically activate Src. Our findings may have implications for understanding more broadly the mechanisms of allosteric activation of downstream targets by βarrs.

Hdac3 is a lysine deacetylase that removes acetyl groups from histones and additional proteins. Although Hdac3 functions within mesenchymal lineage skeletal cells are defined, little is known about Hdac3 activities in bone-resorbing osteoclasts. In this study we conditionally deleted Hdac3 within Ctsk-expressing cells and examined the effects on bone modeling and osteoclast differentiation in mice. Hdac3 deficiency reduced femur and tibia periosteal circumference and increased cortical periosteal osteoclast number. Trabecular bone was likewise reduced and was accompanied by increased osteoclast number per trabecular bone surface. We previously showed that Hdac3 deacetylates the p65 subunit of the NF-κB transcriptional complex to decrease DNA-binding and transcriptional activity. Hdac3-deficient osteoclasts demonstrate increased K310 NF-κB acetylation and NF-κB transcriptional activity. Hdac3-deficient osteoclast lineage cells were hyper-responsive to RANKL and showed elevated ex vivo osteoclast number and size and enhanced bone resorption in pit formation assays. Osteoclast-directed Hdac3 deficiency decreased cortical and trabecular bone mass parameters, suggesting that Hdac3 regulates coupling of bone resorption and bone formation. We surveyed a panel of osteoclast-derived coupling factors and found that Hdac3 suppression diminished sphingosine-1-phosphate production. Osteoclast-derived sphingosine-1-phosphate acts in paracrine to promote bone mineralization. Mineralization of WT bone marrow stromal cells cultured with conditioned medium from Hdac3-deficient osteoclasts was markedly reduced. Expression of alkaline phosphatase, type 1a1 collagen, and osteocalcin was also suppressed, but no change in Runx2 expression was observed. Our results demonstrate that Hdac3 controls bone modeling by suppressing osteoclast lineage cell responsiveness to RANKL and coupling to bone formation.

Ligand bias is the ability of ligands to differentially activate certain receptor signaling responses compared with others. It reflects differences in the responses of a receptor to specific ligands and has implications for the development of highly specific therapeutics. Whereas ligand bias has been studied primarily for G protein–coupled receptors (GPCRs), there are also reports of ligand bias for receptor tyrosine kinases (RTKs). However, the understanding of RTK ligand bias is lagging behind the knowledge of GPCR ligand bias. In this review, we highlight how protocols that were developed to study GPCR signaling can be used to identify and quantify RTK ligand bias. We also introduce an operational model that can provide insights into the biophysical basis of RTK activation and ligand bias. Finally, we discuss possible mechanisms underpinning RTK ligand bias. Thus, this review serves as a primer for researchers interested in investigating ligand bias in RTK signaling.

The inositol 1,4,5-trisphosphate (IP3) receptors (IP3Rs), which form tetrameric channels, play pivotal roles in regulating the spatiotemporal patterns of intracellular calcium signals. Mutations in IP3Rs have been increasingly associated with many debilitating human diseases such as ataxia, Gillespie syndrome, and generalized anhidrosis. However, how these mutations affect IP3R function, and how the perturbation of as-sociated calcium signals contribute to the pathogenesis and severity of these diseases remains largely uncharacterized. Moreover, many of these diseases occur as the result of autosomal dominant inheritance, suggesting that WT and mutant subunits associate in heterotetrameric channels. How the in-corporation of different numbers of mutant subunits within the tetrameric channels affects its activities and results in different disease phenotypes is also unclear. In this report, we investigated representative disease-associated missense mutations to determine their effects on IP3R channel activity. Additionally, we designed concatenated IP3R constructs to create tetrameric channels with a predefined subunit composition to explore the functionality of heteromeric channels. Using calcium imaging techniques to assess IP3R channel function, we observed that all the mutations studied resulted in severely attenuated Ca2+ release when expressed as homotetramers. However, some heterotetramers retained varied degrees of function dependent on the composition of the tetramer. Our findings suggest that the effect of mutations depends on the location of the mutation in the IP3R structure, as well as on the stoichiometry of mutant subunits assembled within the tetrameric channel. These studies provide insight into the pathogenesis and penetrance of these devastating human diseases.

Brexit: Implications for EU–China Relations Research paper sysadmin 10 May 2017

For Beijing, the EU–China relationship will take priority over UK–China ties – with China’s relative focus on Germany becoming even more significant.

Summary

• The extent of current UK relations with China means that Brexit will notably reduce the scale and diversity of overall EU–China economic and commercial interactions. But the impact will vary across different areas.
• In policy terms, liberal voices on economic policy towards China will be somewhat weaker among the post-Brexit EU27. Brexit will not be the most important factor determining the future level of strategic coherence in EU policy towards China.
• The impact on post-Brexit EU27 trade with China will be felt both in the volume of trade and its composition. Following Brexit the EU will no longer be China’s largest trading partner.
• There will be some relative shift in Chinese investment in Europe away from the UK, though over time the impact of Europe-wide policy approaches to Chinese investment will have more impact than Brexit per se.
• EU–China educational exchanges will be weakened after Brexit, but inbound Chinese tourism will be less affected by Brexit.
• By 2025, the EU will have compensated for Brexit’s impact in some areas, but much depends on the EU’s own trajectory over the next decade.
• For Beijing, the EU–China relationship will take priority over UK–China ties. Within the EU, China’s relative focus on Germany will be even more significant.

India Budget 2018: Who are the Biggest Winners and Losers? Expert comment sysadmin 2 February 2018

Any claims to boost farmers’ prospects will inevitably be seen as political, coming ahead of a series of key elections. But this budget recognises India’s most pressing concerns - and seeks to address them.

In 2016 India’s prime minister, Narendra Modi, pledged to double farmers’ incomes by 2022. While the pledge may have been aspirational, reliant on good weather as much as government policy, the 2018/19 budget demonstrates the depth of the government’s commitment to the agriculture sector.

There’s clearly a political edge to any moves to bolster agriculture: any solace to rural India will be described as political opportunism until most people in India are not engaged directly or indirectly in the agricultural sector.

And with a number of state elections coming up this year and a general election next – suggestions that it will be brought forward have increased in volume since the budget – a politically-astute budget is unsurprising. At the same time, there is a real sense of crisis in Indian agriculture which the budget is attempting to ameliorate.

Significant hike in infrastructure spending

The budget – which has Keynesian undertones – announces both direct and indirect support for rural India; it increases significantly the price at which the government purchases agricultural produce, and offers a range of further support through initiatives in areas such as irrigation. Furthermore, there is a significant hike in spending on infrastructure – roads, railways, ports and waterways – with a major allocation for rural infrastructure.

While government spending on infrastructure had been growing, the 2018/19 budget appears to accept that innovative funding models to fund rural projects are unlikely to work – instead, rural highways will have to be funded from overall taxation, as is generally the norm.

The other bold initiative focuses on healthcare. One hundred million poor families (so around half a billion Indians in total) will receive up to Rs500,000 for medical care under a health insurance programme. Given the correlation between ill health and poverty, this should have implications for the economy as well as healthcare itself. At the moment poverty effectively excludes many Indians from private healthcare.

Education too received a boost, with several proposals including teacher training. There have long been concerns over the quality of Indian education. In particular, even where schools exist physically, teachers themselves are absent.

As is often the case with India, the question will be in the implementation. While there are bound to be hiccups, the current Indian government does appear to realise the need for on-the-ground, visible change.

The recent state election in Gujarat demonstrated that while the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is clearly favourite to win another term, it is not invulnerable. If the changes do not reach the “last mile”, then they will accrue neither the economic nor the political benefits.

The downsides? Increased taxes will raise inflation, potentially exacerbated by sustained government borrowing; a 20% rise in customs duty will affect imports of mobile phones (though benefit domestic producers and encourage other foreign firms to set up manufacturing plants in India) and some of the revenue projections appear optimistic.

On balance though, this is a budget that recognises the most pressing challenges which India faces, and attempts to provide solutions to them.

This article was originally published in The Independent.

Arguments Over Innovation Capacity Miss How Much the US and China Are Intertwined Expert comment sysadmin 30 May 2018

Most discussions of current US–China trade tensions fundamentally misrepresent the globalized nature of innovation.

Among the many issues at play in the ongoing economic and trade tensions between the US and China are questions of technological capability and innovation.

Two of the main complaints in the US Section 301 report were that American companies have been forced to transfer technology to China and been the subject of cyber espionage. The presentation of the issues in this report has been disputed, but behind it lies concern in the US that Chinese innovative and technological capability is catching up with that in the US, thanks partly to the support of state policies set out in the Made in China 2025 initiative.

One important feature of the package of measures announced by the US last month is that it was designed to contain China’s technological development as much as to reduce the trade deficit, even though the latter has been the focus of President Donald Trump’s rhetoric.

(Some have cast doubt on this picture of Chinese innovation, suggesting that China is more of a ‘fat tech dragon’ whose massive inputs into research and development do not translate into real innovative capacity.)

The problem with the debate comparing Chinese and American technological capability is that it misunderstands or misrepresents the globalized nature of innovation in today’s world.

Contrary to the economic nationalist rhetoric emanating mainly from Washington, and to a lesser extent from Beijing, the US and China are not two separate economies competing for economic hegemony. As part of the globalization of manufacturing and production over the last 40 years and the more recent globalization of consumption, the shape and structure of innovation has also changed.

As we argue in a new paper, the key to understanding this is to think of innovation as being carried out through global or transnational networks linking economic actors, not within separated economies. What the recent phase of globalization has demonstrated is that innovation is achieved most effectively and efficiently when those engaged in innovation are connected not just within national borders but across them.

China has become integrated into these global innovation networks in ways which reflect its relative strengths and weaknesses in research and development. China’s extensive manufacturing ecosystem has enabled its companies to perform well in production-related and efficiency-driven innovation. Moreover the rapid growth in its large and dynamic consumer market provides fertile ground for consumer-related innovation by Chinese and foreign-invested enterprises alike. The rapidly increasing talent pool in China also provides additional human capital for innovation and technology.

Apart from the increased emphasis by Chinese enterprises on innovation, multinationals have also been stepping up their research and development (R&D) efforts in China. These now consitute a significant part of China’s R&D landscape, and are an increasingly important part of the global innovation by multinationals.

Things are of course changing. China’s overall innovation capacity is improving, and there are concerns in both in the US and Europe that Chinese policy is moving backwards towards the promotion of ‘indigenous innovation’ – or self-reliant innovation – and away from openness. In other words, we may be seeing a more ‘techno-nationalist’ China as well as a protectionist US.

China has also been criticized for inadequate protection of intellectual property rights, though the establishment of special courts for such disputes marks a commitment to improve – and the rights of Chinese companies increasingly need protection too.

As the benefits of globalization increasingly come under question, and with some degree of nationalist political pressure in both the West and China, it is not going to be possible – or politically desirable – to do away with national borders when it comes to innovation. But at the same time, the extent to which businesses and consumers have globalized means that fully ‘indigenous’ innovation is not possible, even if it were politically desirable.

EU-China innovation relations, as well as those between Washington and Beijing, therefore need careful management. But both Americans and Europeans should have more confidence in their innovation capability, given the relative strengths and weaknesses of Chinese innovation.

Americans and Europeans should acknowledge and promote the opportunities that come from globally networked innovation processes. Taking advantage of the comparative advantage of all the players in these networks means working with China as an innovation partner.

China: End of the Reform Era 20 July 2018 — 12:30PM TO 1:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 30 May 2018 Chatham House, London

The speaker will argue that China’s reform era is ending, and that core factors which characterized it - including political stability, ideological openness and rapid economic growth - are unravelling.

Since the 1990s, Beijing’s leaders have firmly rejected any fundamental reform of their authoritarian one-party political system, even as a decades-long boom has reshaped China’s economy and society. On the surface, their efforts have been a success, but Carl Minzner says a closer look at China’s reform era reveals a different truth.

He outlines how over the past three decades, a frozen political system has fuelled both the rise of entrenched interests within the Communist Party and the systematic underdevelopment of institutions of governance among state and society at large. Economic gaps have widened, social unrest has worsened and ideological polarization has deepened.

The speaker will discuss how China’s leaders are attempting to address these looming challenges, including institutional reforms and a shift back towards single-man rule. The speaker will also consider the question of regime stability given that China’s era of ‘reform and opening up’ is ending and there is now a renewed uncertainty over Beijing’s future.

THIS EVENT IS NOW FULL AND REGISTRATION HAS CLOSED.

China Needs to Make the Belt and Road Initiative More Transparent and Predictable Expert comment sysadmin 29 April 2019

The global infrastructure project must move beyond mish-mash of opaque bilateral deals

As China welcomes dozens of world leaders to Beijing for its second Belt and Road forum, it has one simple aim: relaunching President Xi Jinping’s controversial global infrastructure drive.

Since it began five years ago, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has sunk hundreds of billions into port, railway and power projects stretching from south-east Asia to central Europe. But its path has been bumpy, drawing sharp criticism over the ruinous debts that some countries have racked up amid Chinese largesse.

Xi will stress sustainable financing and transparency this week, amid the usual talk of ‘win win’ cooperation. Yet BRI’s problems are structural, not presentational. For any pledges to be meaningful, China must move beyond its present mish-mash of opaque, bilateral deals.

After bad headlines last year, BRI has in fact enjoyed a good run in recent weeks. Malaysia announced it would resume a previously cancelled high-speed rail project, while Italy’s decision to join up last month marked a further European incursion. Indeed, if attendance is any guide to success, BRI looks in fine fettle. The first forum in 2017 attracted 29 world leaders. China says 37 will turn up this week. Phillip Hammond, UK chancellor, arrives hunting deals too, just a day after news that Chinese technology group Huawei will be allowed to help build 5G networks in Britain.

Even so, three interlinked problems remain at the heart of President Xi’s pet project, all of which must be addressed if BRI is to move beyond the pitfalls that have damaged its reputation.

The first and most obvious is debt. Critics allege that China ‘traps’ its BRI partners financially, often pointing to a debt-for-equity deal that handed China control of a port in Sri Lanka. These claims are exaggerated — few other projects have ended up this way. Yet poorer nations from Laos to Tajikistan are still signing up to vastly expensive Chinese schemes that offer poor value for money while straining their public finances.

The second problem is transparency. Despite its grand scale there is still no reliable list of BRI projects, no disclosure of the lending standards China follows, nor even the amount China has invested. Beijing claims more than $1 trillion; independent estimates suggest perhaps a few hundred billion. Either way, it will be hard for China to convince doubters on debts until it is open about the criteria it uses in deciding who to lend to and why.

BRI’s third and most important challenge is its muddled organization. Despite BRI’s image as a centrally run mega-project, China has allowed many deals to be struck locally, via a mix of state-backed companies, public sector banks and freewheeling regional governments. And it is here that the problems began.

Infrastructure deals are notoriously complex, especially for transnational projects like high-speed rail. Renegotiations are common, even for experienced bodies like the World Bank. Yet BRI has repeatedly seen terms negotiated behind closed doors, in countries such as Malaysia and Pakistan, come unstuck in the face of public outcry.

Rather than seeking to trap others with debt, China’s central government more often has to step in to fix dubious projects agreed by underlings lower down the chain.

These negotiations go one of two ways. Either China’s partners complain and win terms, as was true in Malaysia and in Myanmar over a multibillion-dollar deep-sea port. Or, as in the case of Sri Lanka, the renegotiations go in China’s favour, but at the cost of accusations of debt trickery. In both cases China looks bad.

Speaking last year, Xi responded to criticism of BRI by describing it as ‘an open platform for cooperation’. Yet, so far, he has proved resistant to the step that would deliver on that vision — namely turning BRI into an institution with open standards and international partners.

The reasons for his reluctance are obvious. Ending BRI’s reliance on loose bilateral deals would limit Beijing’s room for geopolitical manoeuvre. Yet what might be lost in political flexibility could easily be gained in economic credibility, while avoiding some of the painful renegotiations that have dogged many BRI projects.

At a time when China’s economy is slowing and its current account surplus is shrinking, formalising and institutionalising, BRI could also help avoid wasting scarce public resources on white elephant projects. China even has an easy template in the form of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the Beijing-based institution that has won plaudits for its project quality and openness since it started in 2016.

Whichever model is chosen, a dose of Chinese-style central planning is called for, along with more openness. Without it, the oddly chaotic and decentralised model pioneered in BRI’s first five years is unlikely to help the project thrive over the next five.

This article was originally published in the Financial Times.

How Women are Transforming Indonesia Interview sysadmin 20 May 2019

In a series exploring women in international affairs, Isabel Dunstan speaks to Gitika Bhardwaj about the rise of the women’s movement in Indonesia.

Southeast Asia has one of the highest records of gender-based violence in the world and Indonesia was recently ranked as the second most dangerous place for women in the Asia-Pacific. What is the state of women’s rights and gender equality in Indonesia?

It is true that Indonesia has high rates of violence against women, however, it’s difficult to know the realities of women’s experiences because in the past the data has been somewhat unreliable. This has been due to reasons such as a lack of reporting mechanisms available to survivors of violence and the fact that discussing sexual violence is a taboo and, if reported, can result in stigmatization which limits the number of survivors who have come forward.

However, the first reliable nationwide survey on gendered violence in Indonesia was conducted in 2017 by the Indonesian Ministry of Women and Child Protection and the United Nations Population Fund. Interestingly, it showed that Indonesia’s rates of violence against women are on par with the global rate which is that 1 in 3 women are affected by sexual violence in their lifetime.

It’s therefore difficult to generalize that Indonesia is an unsafe place for women because it’s an extremely diverse country. There is a growing middle class while there is pervasive poverty. There is religious diversity where the eastern-most province of Aceh is the only province in the country where Sharia law is enforced, whereas in the western-most province of West Papua, the dominant religion is Christianity and the ways of life are completely different.

Nevertheless, violence against women is high in Indonesia and can happen in all places – rich or poor, east or west – and has different manifestations from street harassment and trafficking to domestic violence and workplace harassment.

In some parts of the country there are high rates of child marriage too and, according to UNICEF, 14 per cent of girls in Indonesia are married by the time they turn 18 which is shocking when we think about how child marriage limits girls’ access to education and makes them more vulnerable to sexual violence and therefore restricts their futures.

Child marriage is high in Indonesia in part due to rooted gender norms, low levels of education and discriminating legislation, such as the marriage law, which states that, although it is legal to marry at 21, girls can marry at 16 and boys can marry at 19 with parental consent. But this can be even lower meaning parents could get their daughters married at as young as 13. So the law is fundamentally unfair between girls and boys and the women’s movement in Indonesia has been fighting extremely hard to reform legislation that discriminates against women and girls.

From the country’s first female president, Megawati Sukarnoputri​, to incumbent finance minister Sri Mulyani Indrawati – who was voted ‘Best Minister in the World’ in 2018 – and maritime​ and fisheries minister Susi Pudjiastuti – who has become notorious for her tough stance against illegal fishing activities – how are women progressing in Indonesian politics?

Indonesia has come a long way since becoming a democracy in 1998. Before that, the second president and dictator, Suharto, ruled the country for almost 32 years and increased the inequality gap between men and women during his reign.

Since the fall of Suharto, however, gender equality is explicitly enshrined in Indonesia’s constitution and the country has ratified the Convention on the Elimination of Violence Against Women.

The country has also been undergoing a process of democratization which has involved slowly decentralizing its power. This means that greater authority has been distributed to the 34 provincial governments outside of the capital of Jakarta.

Furthermore, to aid gender equality, a quota system requiring political parties to be made up of 30 per cent women has been put in place, although remnants of Suharto’s old system of cronyism remain, limiting the impact of the quotas translating to more women in provincial parliaments.

But the defining approach to furthering gender equality in Indonesia has been through gender mainstreaming and gender-responsive budgeting which can be seen throughout provincial administrations in the country.

This means there is the intention to ensure infrastructure, health and education outcomes include results that address specific gender equality gaps. The challenge for effective gender mainstreaming, however, is the political will to translate the approach into well-resourced programmes from one province to another.

Nevertheless, we have just seen Indonesia go through the most incredible presidential and legislative elections last month – won by the current president, Joko Widodo, who has often been called the ‘Barack Obama of Southeast Asia’ and whose existing cabinet has the highest number of women in the country’s history. This is not simply a matter of filling seats in the cabinet with women – such as the wives and sisters of male politicians – because it’s required by law. But, rather, there are some incredible female political figures who are there because they are strong, smart and capable.

You’ve rightly mentioned Minister of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, Susi Pudjiastuti, who is a fabulous role model for a lot of women particularly women who have not had tertiary education because she entered politics through an unorthodox route.

Then there’s Minister of Finance, Sri Mulyani Indrawati, who is also the former leader of the World Bank and is such an inspiration to a lot of women who are looking to work in public life because of her experience as well as her work to include gender mainstreaming in state budgets.

There is also Minister of Women’s Empowerment and Child Protection, Yohana Susana Yembise, who is a Papuan woman, as well as many more female public figures.

Network Power in the Asia-Pacific: Making Sense of the New Regionalism and Opportunities for Cooperation 7 February 2020 — 9:45AM TO 5:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 17 January 2020 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

The Asia-Pacific region continues to increase in geopolitical and geoeconomic importance. The rise of China and tensions with the US are affecting bilateral relationships and traditional alliances in the region. Whether seen from the perspective of the Quad – Australia, India, Japan and the US – or the Indo-Pacific concept embraced by a wide range of countries but with no shared consensus on scope and objectives or with ASEAN who insists on the importance of its own centrality, the region is redefining and reconceptualising itself.

With a diverse range of initiatives – including the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) – there are a plethora of regional agreements and institutional groupings that add further complexity.

As the Bretton Woods architecture continues to be dominated by Western powers, China is also spearheading parallel governance initiatives such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the Belt and Road Initiative and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as a means of enhancing its geopolitical and geoeconomic influence.

This one-day conference will focus on how such networks and alliances have been built, and sustained, in the Asia-Pacific region. In order to understand how new regional initiatives might open up opportunities for new forms of international cooperation, the conference will focus on the themes of cyber-technology and innovation, sustainable development and mitigating the impacts of climate change and new infrastructure initiatives. It will assess whether there is a zero-sum conflict between competing networks and agendas or whether a common approach can be developed.