Policy for Recovery in Africa: Rethinking Energy Solutions for Universal Electricity Access 10 December 2020 — 5:00PM TO 6:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 20 November 2020 Online

Approximately three quarters of Africa’s population do not have access to clean cooking fuel and face costs to their health. Speakers explore policy opportunities to bridge this gap, the key barriers that remain and the transformative potential of energy transition in delivering sustainable access for all.

Speakers explore policy opportunities to bridge the energy access gap, the key barriers that remain and the transformative potential of energy transition in delivering sustainable access for all.

African countries face an uphill battle as they confront the shocks of the coronavirus pandemic, seeking recovery in the context of global socio-economic difficulty and fragmented geopolitics.

With deficits in terms of governance, public health systems, social protection, and basic service delivery presenting challenges even before the outbreak, careful analysis and creative evidence-based policy solutions, as well as emphasis on implementation, will be crucial if Africa is to progress towards the SDGs and Agenda 2063.

The Policy for Recovery in Africa series brings together expert speakers and decision makers to examine and exchange on key challenges, potential solutions, and approaches for implementation.

The energy access gap in Africa presents one of the most serious obstacles to the long-term pandemic recovery effort, with almost half of the continent’s population estimated to still lack access to electricity, creating a negative annual GDP impact estimated to be over 25 billion USD.

The Indo-Pacific: Geostrategic Perspectives until 2024 – Japanese perceptions 24 February 2020 — 9:00AM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 22 March 2021 Chatham House

The roundtable brought together stakeholders within Japan’s strategic and policymaking communities to explore Japanese perceptions of evolving strategic shifts in the Indo-Pacific until 2024. The roundtable took place in Tokyo and was organized in partnership with the Indo-Pacific Studies Group.

The report below contains a summary of the discussions and an essay by Hiroki Sekine, Visiting Fellow, Asia-Pacific Programme, Chatham House.

Read a summary and essay

Nuclear proliferation in a fragmenting world 13 September 2022 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 5 September 2022 Online

Where does the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) stand in 2022?

With the war in Ukraine and China–US tensions rising, the threat of a nuclear arms race has never been as high since the Cold War.

Global efforts to control the appropriation and use of nuclear weapons are strained with the war in Ukraine, US–Russia and US–China tension, Iran on the nuclear threshold, instability in Pakistan and the ongoing threat from North Korea.

The Review Conference of the NPT that took place in New York this August sought to deal with the multiple nuclear threats, but new missile technology such as hypersonic glide vehicles and torpedoes are not covered by a treaty.

Russia and the US are in a development phase for a host of new technologies and delivery systems, especially after both withdrew from various arms-control treaties in the 2000s and 2010s. Now the nuclear stockpile is growing again and major superpowers are adopting confrontational geostrategic positions.

As the world’s established orders and system fragment, there is a possibility the nine countries with confirmed nuclear weapons could grow. Events in Ukraine highlight the need for a new, modern agreement on nuclear weapons control, needed today more than ever.

The panel of experts discuss key questions including:

• What did ‘RevCon’ in New York tell us about the adoption or update to the NPT?

• Will the war in Ukraine deter or prevent any agreement between nations or does nuclear weapons control represent an area of potential multilateral harmony?

• Are we likely to see a new arms race akin to the Cold War? Where does China fit into this race?

• How has technology changed the arms control landscape?

 As with all Chatham House member events, questions from members drive the conversation.

In conversation with Ursula Burns 27 September 2022 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 15 September 2022 Chatham House and Online

Ursula Burns and Fred P. Hochberg share insights on American business and corporate life.

In the next of our conversations with CEOs, Ursula Burns, former CEO of the Xerox corporation, joins Fred P. Hochberg, former chairman of the Export-Import Bank of the United States, to share her insights on American business and corporate life.

Drawing from her recent book, Where You Are is not Who You Are, Burns will offer her reflections on the challenges leadership faces in a corporate world with rapidly changing technology and creating a diverse work environment. Hochberg and Burns will also discuss her views on racial and economic justice, as well as prospects for future business and economic growth.

Why America’s midterm elections matter for the world The World Today mhiggins.drupal 28 September 2022

The outcome could threaten the fight against climate change and the future of democracy itself, warns Leslie Vinjamuri.

As the November 8 midterm elections in the United States approach, the sense of urgency among the Democrats and Republicans is escalating. Early voter turnout is on track to surpass the 2018 midterms, when a record 122 million Americans voted ahead of election day. The midterms – when congressional, state and local seats are determined – used to pass almost unnoticed, especially outside the US.

Since 2018, though, they have become a matter of global concern. The 2022 midterm elections will be the first major elections in the US since the January 6 insurrection at the US Capitol. As such, they will be the first real litmus test for the continued relevance of Donald Trump and Trumpism.

For both parties, winning is more important than ever and it is not only a matter of policy. Today, a majority of members of both parties – 72 per cent of Republicans and 63 per cent of Democrats – see those belonging to the opposing party as immoral, according to a Pew Research Center poll in September, representing a significant rise since 2016.

In many states, the midterms will have a direct impact on the 2024 presidential elections, influencing who decides how voting takes place, how votes are counted and, especially, who controls the certification of election results.

Given this context, the stakes in elections are especially high. The winners will have the upper hand not only in defining many procedural rules but also the values that constitute the nation, such as on abortion rights, education and healthcare.

Republicans and Democrats align on most key foreign policy

Though foreign policy will bear a strong resemblance to its former self even if Republicans gain a majority in the House of Representatives, as many anticipate, the outcome of the elections on US global influence could impact efforts to combat climate change and to support the defence of Ukraine.

The Republican Party has become known for its embrace of climate deniers and the radicalized anti-immigrant rhetoric of many of its party’s most established figures. The failure to address rampant gun violence – and, instead, to defend a historically suspect interpretation of the right to bear arms – and the push for a national abortion ban mean that the party is imposing a version of America onto itself that is out-of-step with virtually all other rich democratic countries.

The choices voters make in November are likely to shape the values that come to the fore in the US, and with this the affinity that America’s closest partners feel for it.

Domestic policy is likely to be more heavily affected by the elections. A Republican majority in the House would stall progress on President Joe Biden’s domestic agenda and undercut his ability to raise the taxes he needs to pay for his spending plans. The drive to hold the former President Trump accountable will also be affected by the choices voters make in November.

A Republican majority in the House would spell an end to congressional investigations of Donald Trump. Instead, Republicans would use their electoral gains to launch their investigations into the Democrats.

One anti-Trump Republican on the January 6 committee investigating the storming of the Capitol building last year warned of a vengeful and obstructive turn against Biden from his Republican colleagues if they took the House. ‘They’re going to demand an impeachment vote on President Biden every week,’ said congressman Adam Kinzinger. It is under this shadow that the January 6 Committee is pressing ahead to finish its proceedings and publish its report.

On foreign policy, the parties are more aligned than divided on most of the key issues. Their differences are a matter of diplomacy, which matters, and degree. Support for Ukraine has had bipartisan backing, but in recent weeks the issue has become politicized. Some congressional Republicans are more hawkish than their Democratic counterparts in their ambition to support Ukraine. Yet, the congressman set to be Speaker of the House if Republicans gain a majority, Kevin McCarthy, is leading an effort to exercise far stronger oversight of any additional funds for Ukraine.

Ultimately, though, the president and his advisers maintain considerable control over foreign policy.  

Bipartisan support for a tougher stance on China was consolidated under Trump. He mobilized US voters by blaming China for the loss of manufacturing jobs. Later he held China responsible for the outbreak of Covid and for covering it up. China’s crackdown on democracy in Hong Kong, its assertiveness in the South China Seas, tensions over Taiwan and reports of human rights abuse against the Uighur in Xinjiang have cemented a bipartisan consensus on America’s China policy. But a more empowered Republican base looks likely to lead to a more ideologically driven anti-China rhetoric. 

The ground has also shifted over Russia. During President Trump’s tenure, Republican attitudes towards Vladimir Putin softened. But the Russian president’s aggressive invasion of Ukraine has entrenched American opposition to him and bolstered support for NATO.

Democrats and Republicans are also more aligned on policy towards Iran today than they were before Trump abandoned the Iran Deal negotiating the Middle Eastern country’s nuclear programme. On some contentious issues, such as immigration reform, progress is already stalled and that is unlikely to change.

US climate change policy may depend on the results

The upshot of all this is that the president is unlikely to make radical changes to US foreign policy regardless of the results of the midterms. The most important exception to this is climate change, which continues to be the unwanted stepchild of the Republican Party. Domestic infighting in the US would inevitably detract even further from the bold policy that is needed.

Republicans are unlikely to get the two-thirds majority needed to pass legislation that would undermine President Biden’s climate bill. Republican control of House committees, however, would add more politically driven oversight of any climate spending, including what has already been authorized by the Inflation Reduction Act. 

Policy convergence and clear executive authority cannot mitigate the sheer disruption that would be unleashed if the Republicans were to gain majorities in both the Senate and the House, however. For the rest of the world, and especially within Europe, this would send warning signs about the future trajectory of US foreign policy commitments and set off alarm bells that an ‘America First’ president might return to the White House after 2024.

A Republican majority in the House with a Democratic majority in the Senate would be disruptive, if less so, but would probably spell the end of business as usual, unsettling people, states and markets. All of this is unfolding at a time when many of the world’s rich democracies face internal divisions, rising inequality and populist challenges at home and so are ill-equipped to lead.

Democracies face a trust deficit. This is especially apparent in the US where only 43 per cent of Americans have trust in US institutions, according to the 2022 Edelman Trust Barometer.

Internal threats to democracy also unsettle the promise of US global leadership at a time when concerted and determined leadership is needed to maintain a strong and united response to Russia, and to tackle global food insecurity and the energy, climate and debt crises. In addition, the failure to lead a global response that can help developing countries is feeding a trust deficit between rich and poor countries.

The midterms will reveal a greater truth about the future of the Republican Party. Even more so, it will reveal the values held by the American electorate. In the run-up to the 2020 US presidential elections, Europeans frequently said that they would not give Americans a pass if they voted for Donald Trump twice – and indeed only 17 per cent of those in European Union countries would have cast a vote for Trump if they could.

A Republican midterm victory in both the Senate and the House of Representatives would have ripple effects across the Atlantic at a time when the threat from Russia has intensified.

The US is judged around the world for what it does, but also for who it is. The perception that democracy is failing in America creates a permissive environment for aspiring autocrats. At a time when democracy has been in decline around the world for more than 15 years, it is essential that the US fix its own democracy and that it demonstrates to the rest of the world that democracy can deliver.

The midterms will signal to the world what Americans value, sending a message about what it can expect from the US.

This article was updated on October 31, 2022 to reflect developments such as early voting turnout, and the impact of the midterms on the 2024 presidential election, support for Ukraine and climate change spending.

International relations: The ‘how not to’ guide Expert comment NCapeling 11 October 2022

A centenary special issue of International Affairs explores past foreign policy failures to help policymakers avoid future catastrophes.

Policy decisions in international relations frequently have a long-lasting effect on the world order, shaping the lives of millions. Often acting under pressure and severe time constraints, decision-makers must rely on their own experience and the best expertise available. And so, despite many striving for a more peaceful and prosperous world, policy failures are all too common.

The second of International Affairs’ centenary special issues – devised and guest-edited by Amrita Narlikar and Daniel W. Drezner – is a ‘how not to guide’ for international relations. Focusing on historic failures, 14 experts examine what went wrong, and how policy practitioners and researchers can get it right together.

Between theory and outcome fall two ‘shadows’: one of decision-makers not taking advantage of sound academic policy advice – in some cases ignoring it because they think they already know best – and a second of bias in academic analyses and researchers simply erring, or erring on the side of their own self-importance. Between these two, there lies a joint path toward better policies.

The special issue provides policymakers with cautionary lessons, transforming well-known cases into a guide of what not to do in international politics. Building on that, the collection also suggests ways forward, including borrowing the medical Hippocratic Oath of ‘do no harm’, which in international relations serves as a cautionary warning against action merely for action’s sake, and then going decidedly beyond this minimum requirement.

A series of comics also accompanies the articles, produced in collaboration with Sequential Potential comics.

In their introduction, Drezner and Narlikar draw out four overarching factors which increase the likelihood of foreign policy failure – these are a focus on short-term successes, underestimating the power of narratives, hubris, and technocratic bubbles. If academics and policymakers can work together with these careful considerations, perhaps mistakes can avoid being repeated.

Richard Toye examines three pivotal moments in the UK’s history – the Munich crisis of 1938, the Suez crisis and war of 1956, and the Iraq war of 2003. He finds that in these cases the failures were over-determined, a consequence of Britain’s relative decline rather than its cause.

Daniel W. Drezner reviews two high profile failures of sanction use – United Nations (UN) sanctions on Iraq during the two Gulf wars, and the US re-imposition of sanctions on Iran in 2018. In both cases the main goals were not achieved and the costs were great. Drezner highlights ten ‘do’s and don’ts’ for sanctions as a result.

Amrita Narlikar shows how the World Trade Organization (WTO) has become an almost perfect example of how not to negotiate, even when taking into account recent limited successes. She identifies three broad categories of bargaining failures and explores the impact of narratives on the course of events, giving a clear list of do’s and don’ts for international negotiation.

Harold James also looks at three historic moments, the financial crises in 1931, 1997, and 2008. While responses to the crises initially looked successful, ironically in each case the drive to avoid past mistakes opened the door for the next crisis.

Cecilia Emma Sottilotta considers recent disasters in the European Union (EU) – the eurozone crisis and COVID-19 pandemic – and recommends for policymakers to find a middle ground between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism in crisis situations.

The growth of Chinese influence is a key issue in international relations today. Various articles in the special issue explain how not to deal with a rising China, coming from different angles. Exploring the US-China relationship, Janice Gross Stein is critical of the narrative around US decline and Chinese growth. The world should look beyond GDP as an indicator of a country’s growth and pay attention to strategic choices made by leaders in both states.

Joseph S. Nye Jr also provides a US perspective, arguing that while some historic analogies are misleading, the US should contemplate the cautionary narrative of sleepwalking into World War One when thinking about its relationship with China.

Amitabh Mattoo gives a south Asian view, asserting there is a need to understand Chinese policies in the region. Through examining China’s relations with India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka he concludes that because China is adopting aggressive policies in the region, states must start cooperating with like-minded allies.

Yuen Foong Khong answers two questions in his paper tackling which ‘how not to’s’ are relevant when learning from history, and whether policymakers are aware of them. His research points to four things to avoid, which he then applies to how the Cold War analogy is used to understand contemporary US-China relations.

On the theme of foreign interference, Igor Istomin looks at the Soviet support for Mao Zedong’s Communist Party in the 1920s to 1940s. He argues strongly against interfering with major powers, as short-term gains cannot last.

From Iraq and Afghanistan to Somalia and the Balkans, there have been many failed interventions by the West since the end of the Cold War. Stephanie Carvin asserts the overreliance on automated weaponry has allowed supposedly ‘easy wars’ to turn into ‘forever wars’ – and this is not likely to stop.

Why burning biomass is not zero-carbon Explainer Video NCapeling 17 October 2022

Short animation explaining why burning biomass produces more carbon dioxide per unit of energy generated than almost all fossil fuels.

The climate emergency requires countries to transition away from fossil fuels, but it is important to be careful about the alternative energy sources chosen.

In particular, concern is growing over the use of biomass for energy, which is generated when wood or other plant material is burnt to generate heat and electricity. Many governments treat biomass energy as zero-carbon at the point of combustion, and subsidize it in the same way as renewables such as solar or wind, resulting in a large increase in the use of biomass for energy in the UK and the European Union (EU) over the past 15 years.

The treatment of biomass as zero-carbon in policy frameworks rests on the argument that biomass emissions will be reabsorbed by forest growth, particularly from trees planted to replace those cut down to burn.

But growing trees to maturity takes many years and, depending on the feedstock used, biomass burning increases global warming for decades to centuries. This is called the ‘carbon payback period’ – the time it takes for carbon dioxide levels to return to what they would have been if biomass had not been used.

New research from Chatham House and the Woodwell Climate Research Center calculated the real climate impact of burning US wood pellets in the UK and EU. In 2019, according to this analysis, US-sourced pellets burned for energy in the UK were responsible for between 13 million and 16 million tonnes of carbon dioxide, equivalent to the annual greenhouse gas emissions from 6-7 million passenger vehicles.

But because biomass is treated as zero-carbon, almost none of these emissions were included in the UK’s national greenhouse gas reports. And the removal of forest carbon from US forests is not included accurately in US reports, either.

Transatlantic Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific

This project aims to recommend ways for the US, UK and EU member-states to work together more effectively to achieve shared aims in the Indo-Pacific.

This project is Phase II of a wider research collaboration with the Royal United Services Institute: “An Evolving Transatlantic Agenda to Meet the Challenge of China in the Indo-Pacific”. The work is funded by the Carnegie Corporation of New York.

Through interviews with policymakers and workshops, the project will:

• Identify specific areas of policy convergence and divergence;
• Establish practical recommendations for how the US, UK and EU member-states can better align and coordinate their activities in the Indo-Pacific.

The project is led at Chatham House by the Asia-Pacific Programme, working with the Global Economy and Finance Programme and the Europe Programme.

The researchers are Ben Bland (project lead), Dr Yu Jie, Dr Gareth Price, Marianne Schneider-Petsinger, and Alice Billon-Galland.

The project builds on research from Phase I, a Transatlantic Dialogue on China, which explored how transatlantic partners are responding to China’s rise and its effects in the Indo-Pacific.

Next steps for EU-US cooperation on trade and technology 8 December 2022 — 3:00PM TO 4:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 21 November 2022 Online

How can the EU and US increase cooperation on AI, semi-conductors and funding information communication technology services?

On trade and technology policy, the EU and the US are making meaningful progress towards cooperation while at the same time navigating tensions. As senior officials meet on 5 December for the third meeting of the Trade and Technology Council (TTC), both sides have vowed to move towards concrete results. But can the US and EU increase cooperation on artificial intelligence, semiconductors, and funding information communication technology services? 

This event draws on insights from a forthcoming Briefing Paper by Marianne Schneider-Petsinger that explores next steps for US-EU cooperation on trade and technology, which is part of a project supported by the Hanns Seidel Foundation. 

Critical elections and the future of American politics 14 December 2022 — 9:00AM TO 10:15AM Anonymous (not verified) 8 December 2022 Chatham House

This event explores whether the United States is undergoing a critical change in the composition of the Republican and Democratic parties.

Drawing on current and historical events, Paul E. Peterson joins us to examine whether the United States is undergoing a critical change in the composition of the Republican and Democratic parties.

Key questions to consider include:

• What factors might be driving such an evolution within both parties?

• How could these dynamics affect the balance of power in Washington and in states?

This event is co-hosted with the Centre on US Politics at UCL, and the US and Americas programme at Chatham House would like to thank the British Association for American Studies for their generous support of this event.

Reflections at 100: Women in international affairs Audio MVieira 19 December 2022

How have women contributed to international relations?

The last episode of Reflections at 100, marking the centenary of International Affairs, looks at women’s contributions to international thought.

Isabel and Krisztina speak to Dr Katharina Rietzler about women’s contributions to the journal and international relations, especially in the UK. Then, Krisztina speaks to Professor Barbara Savage about Black women’s contributions to international relations in the US. To wrap up this episode, Leah de Haan sheds light on Chatham House’s Equality, Diversity and Inclusion (EDI) initiative and Jo Hills shares their thoughts about putting together the archive collections.   

Reflections at 100 is a mini-series accompanying the journal’s centenary Archive Collections. The collections bring together articles from our archive which speak to the past, present and future of current affairs issues. In each podcast episode, we speak to contributors from a specific collection and explore what the research tells us about policy-making today. 

Explore the Archive Collection freely until the end of December 2022, including Katharina’s introduction: 100 years of women in International Affairs.

International Affairs was started at Chatham House in 1922 to communicate research to members who could not attend in person. Over the last 100 years it has transformed into a journal that publishes academically rigorous and policy relevant research. It is published for Chatham House by Oxford University Press. Read the latest issue here. 

The near death and uncertain future of the US National Security Council 27 January 2023 — 9:00AM TO 10:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 9 January 2023 Chatham House

What role should the US National Security Council play in an era of great power competition?

Please plan to arrive at Chatham House from 08:45 GMT as the event will begin promptly at 09:00 GMT

Over the last three years, the US National Security Council (NSC) has gone from being neglected to necessary again, in Washington.

After former US President Donald Trump ignored and then tried to dismantle the NSC, current US President Joe Biden has restored the body but chosen not to reform it.

Born in the days before the Cold War and empowered during the War on Terror, what role should the NSC play in an era of great power competition?

Plus, how must it, and the rest of Washington, evolve to meet the challenges and opportunities that remain in the 21st century?

National security and transatlantic unity top Biden’s agenda Expert comment NCapeling 1 February 2023

The timing of the State of the Union address is significant as Joe Biden tries to maintain focus on Ukraine and China while navigating partisanship at home.

Although primarily a domestic affair, the president’s remarks in the annual State of the Union (SOTU) telegraph the US’s foreign policy priorities to the rest of the world. They reveal the prism through which the US understands its national security and its role in the world.

The 2023 address comes as the first anniversary of the Ukraine invasion rapidly approaches, and the US is also trying to build international support for tough economic measures towards China. Domestically, Republican control of the House of Representatives will exert new pressure on US foreign policy choices. Electoral pressures are also around the corner and Joe Biden should announce soon whether he plans to run for president in 2024.

Alliances and partnerships are a driving force for Biden. As pressure to end the war in Ukraine intensifies, maintaining transatlantic unity on Ukraine will be a key priority for the president. And as US electoral politics rise to the fore, ensuring the visibility of Europe’s role as a security provider in its own backyard will be essential.

For a US president who sees China and the Indo-Pacific as America’s most significant long-term geopolitical challenge – and the only peer competitor to the US – transatlantic unity on China will also come under pressure.

Ukraine, China, and controlling domestic division

Republican leaders who now chair key committees in the House of Representatives continue to signal support for Ukraine, and polling shows a majority of US public opinion (54 per cent) favours sending either weapons or air defence systems.

But recent polls also reveal a growing gap between Democrat and Republican supporters with a slight majority of Republicans (52 per cent) now opposing further support for Ukraine.

Biden’s ability to demonstrate that America and its European partners remain unified in their policy towards Ukraine and Russia will help him ward off partisanship at home. Congressional approval of $45 billion for Ukraine in its end of year spending budget will help the president remain above the fray of partisan politics for now. But if there is an absence of clear signs Ukraine is succeeding in its war aims, the challenge of maintaining domestic support could become more difficult.

A greater US focus on China, India, and on the Indo-Pacific in 2023 is also likely. Bipartisanship is strong on China, Republicans are more singular and hawkish in their approach to China than the US president, and the public support tough measures. At a time of war in Europe, the president will place great emphasis on the need to maintain transatlantic unity and to work with a broader coalition of partners in the Indo-Pacific.

The groundwork for focus on China has already been laid. Throughout 2022, the Biden administration worked steadily, but quietly, to set out its China policy. Just before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the US released its new US-Indo Pacific Strategy stressing regional partnerships – especially the Quad and ASEAN – and it’s determination to shape essential norms for the region.

It stated boldly – albeit in a document which was largely unnoticed – that the objective is not to change China but to ‘shape the strategic environment in which it operates’, a policy which signifies a clear departure from the more ideological approach pursued by the US during Donald Trump’s final year in office. And in May, the US announced its economic strategy for the region, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework.

Now the terrain for competition with China and alignment with US partners and allies is heavily focused on technology and the daylight between national security and economic strategy in US China policy is rapidly disappearing. Biden’s policy focus of ‘invest (at home), align (with allies and partners), and compete (with China)’ has overshadowed earlier talk of cooperation between the US and China.

But as China opens its doors and Europe looks to bolster its economies, the US will have to work far harder to maintain transatlantic unity. Japan and the Netherlands embracing the US adoption of export controls on semiconductor chips is a positive sign, but the US’s economic strategy towards China may present harder choices to come for Europe. If China leans into its diplomacy, the pressure on transatlantic unity will also grow.

The new US Congress will only sharpen the president’s tough stance on China. Some Republican leaders still deny climate change and have demonstrated little interest in cooperating with China on debt relief for developing countries. The prospects for addressing critical global challenges appear dim without China’s collaboration, and the UK and Europe should work with the US president and Congress to correct this.

President Biden has clearly recognized that diplomacy will be critical in the months ahead. At a time of growing tensions, the potential for misperceptions or misunderstandings to create conflict will also increase, and so a US – and also European – commitment to broadening and deepening diplomacy with China is urgent but it also needs to be patient and sustained.

A new American industrial policy?

Those listening carefully to the State of the Union and who have followed US policy will also note the unchallenged hegemony of neoliberalism is rapidly vanishing. The American state appeared to be disturbingly absent in the early months of the US pandemic response – but now it is back and, in a surprising turn of events, is being cast as a solution not a problem.

Directors Briefing: Constraints on US foreign policy 20 February 2023 — 8:00AM TO 9:15AM Anonymous (not verified) 8 February 2023 Chatham House

In conversation with Dr Richard Haass.

The US is facing external threats from foreign actors including Russia, China and North Korea. Alongside geopolitical challenges, the US is also experiencing threats from within. Though the US has a long history of enshrining civic rights and democratic freedoms, the institutions of democracy are being weakened through polarization and disinformation. To combat this challenge, the idea of citizenship must be revised and expanded to allow for a functioning, and even a flourishing, democracy.

• What are the implications of a weakening democracy at home for US foreign policy?
• How can civic rights in the US be reimagined to reduce divisions within America and protect the future of democracy?

World economy is fracturing, not deglobalizing Expert comment LJefferson 8 February 2023

Geopolitics are creating a more uncertain economic environment as the global economy splinters into competing blocs.

There is now broad agreement among economists and commentators that the world has reached peak globalization, but there is little consensus about what comes next. One view is that we are entering a period of ‘deglobalization’, in which global trade volumes decline and cross-border capital flows recede. An alternative and more likely outcome is that the global economy starts to splinter into competing blocs.

This would result in an altogether more volatile macroeconomic and market environment which would pose a formidable challenge to some countries and companies operating in vulnerable sectors. But this process needn’t involve any significant shrinkage of international flows of goods, services and capital, nor a broad reversal of other gains of globalization.

This most recent era of globalization was underpinned by a belief that economic integration would lead to China and the former Eastern Bloc countries becoming what former World Bank Chief Robert Zoellick termed ‘responsible stakeholders’ within the global system.

But China has instead emerged as a strategic rival to the US. This strategic rivalry is already forcing others to pick sides as the world splinters into two blocs: one that aligns primarily with the US and another that aligns primarily with China.

Increasingly, policy choices within these blocs will be shaped by geopolitical considerations. This process can be thought of as ‘global fracturing’. Whereas the period of globalization was driven by governments and companies working in unison, fracturing is being driven by governments alone. 

The effects of fracturing

Viewed this way, ‘deglobalization’ is by no means inevitable. There are few compelling geopolitical reasons why the US or Europe should stop importing the majority of consumer goods from China. Roll the clock forward ten years and it is likely that the West will still be buying toys and furniture from China. Instead, fracturing between the blocs will take place along fault lines that are geopolitically important.

In some aspects, the effects of fracturing will be profound. But in other areas, warnings of a seismic reordering of the global economy and financial system will prove wide of the mark.

For example, the politically-driven nature of fracturing will have a significant impact on the operating environment for US and European firms in those sectors that are most exposed to restrictions on trade, such as technology and pharmaceuticals. And all firms and investors will be operating in a different environment in which geopolitical considerations play a greater role in decisions over the allocation of resources.

But where production is moved to alternative locations, this is likely to only involve the manufacture of goods that are deemed to be strategically significant. This may include those with substantial technological and/or intellectual property components: think iPhones, pharmaceuticals, or high-end engineering products.

What’s more, in cases where production does shift location, it is likely to be to other low-cost centres that align more clearly with the US. There will be no great ‘reshoring’ of manufacturing jobs.

Within this process, trade linkages will be reordered, rather than severed. This will result in trade’s share of global GDP flatlining in the coming years, rather than shrinking outright, as is being forecast under many attempts to quantify deglobalization’s potential impact.

Finances of global fracturing

There will be a substantial financial component to global fracturing, but once again the implications are likely to be more nuanced than the current debate suggests. Cross-border financial links are likely to grow more slowly, and the overall stock of cross-border claims will plateau relative to global GDP. But whereas the first era of globalization in the 1870s was followed by a broad retreat in global capital flows during the interwar years, the same is unlikely to happen today.

Similarly, while financial fracturing will fuel growing speculation about the dollar’s role as the world’s reserve currency, reports of its impending demise are exaggerated. Beijing will increasingly push its partners to settle trade in renminbi but three factors suggest that this is unlikely to seriously challenge the dollar’s position.

First, while trade between China and its partners is growing, it still accounts for only six per cent of global trade. Most trade still happens between US-aligned countries, and will continue to be denominated in US dollars (see chart).

Second, China runs a large current account surplus, which will make it harder for the renminbi to supplant the dollar. High demand for reserve assets means that reserve countries tend to run current account deficits. 

Finally, the dollar still has several things working in its favour. For a currency to be widely used as an international medium of exchange, it must be readily and cheaply available around the world. In turn, that depends on foreigners being willing to hold it in large volumes: in other words, it must function as a store of value. 

State of the Union has lessons for transatlantic unity Expert comment NCapeling 8 February 2023

Analysing key foreign policy aspects of President Joe Biden’s annual address, and what it means for the upcoming Munich Security Conference and the year ahead.

Trade and economics are key areas to watch

Daniel W. Drezner

Russia’s absence from the Munich Security Conference will allow US and European policymakers to brag about their flourishing partnership. The past year has seen repeated predictions of a fracturing transatlantic relationship – only to see repeated agreement on how to sanction Russia and which arms to ship to Ukraine.

Putin invaded because he thought the West was divided. Events have proven him wrong. When one takes a step back, however, and examines the Biden administration’s embrace of geoeconomics, Putin’s assumption becomes easier to comprehend.

The strongest throughline between the Trump and Biden administrations has been their shared mindset on weaponized interdependence. Both administrations have been wary of US interdependence with an increasingly autocratic China.

The primary difference has been that, while the Trump administration talked a good game, the Biden administration has passed laws and issued executive orders making the pivot away from trade liberalization a reality.

The passage of the CHIPS and Science Act, Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, and the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) amount to the most ambitious US attempt at industrial policy in decades, accompanied by multiple executive orders examining US supply chain resilience and imposing unprecedented export controls targeting China.

The Biden administration’s restrictions on exchange with China’s semiconductors includes the use of the ‘foreign direct product rule’, essentially a means of applying US export controls in an extraterritorial manner.

The Biden administration’s angry response to the WTO panel ruling against US steel and aluminum tariffs makes it clear the US will apply an expanded definition of national security to restrict trade. In many ways, the sanctions on Russia are a continuation of a US foreign economic policy grounded in geoeconomics.

Several of these measures have rankled European officials. The IRA massively subsidizes the North American production of environmentally-friendly cars, discriminating against European producers. And continued US hostility to the WTO leaves European officials wondering if they are the last bastion of multilateralism left in the world. In Washington and Davos last month, European policymakers made their displeasure clear.

The sanctions against Russia and export controls against China threaten to be additional sore subjects. During the strategic embargo of the Soviet Union, US officials wanted to maximize restrictions while European allies wanted more trade opportunities. Since then, Europeans have suspected that the US uses multilateral export controls regimes to advance its commercial interests, while Americans worry Europe underestimates the risks of business-as-usual with China.

The Biden administration has tried to finesse these trade tensions, and was successful at persuading the Netherlands to join the US in the export controls on China. More generally, Biden officials talk about ‘friendshoring’ and propose mechanisms for greater policy coordination, such as the US-EU Trade and Technology Council. But even in these gestures, US officials have taken greater market access off the table.

In the State of the Union address, Biden bragged about how the US ‘came together to defend a stronger and safer Europe’ as well as defending his ‘buy American’ plans and pledging to make sure the ‘supply chain for America begins in America’. At the upcoming Munich Security Conference, attention should be on how much officials talk about trade and economic issues. The more that topic comes up, the clearer it will be that both sides are subtweeting each other about the future of the transatlantic economic relationship.

Division on China now would bring a high price

Dr Leslie Vinjamuri

President Biden has made unity his guiding principle and chief objective, but it is a tall order. His State of the Union address touted past bipartisan backing for investments in infrastructure, climate-friendly technologies, and semiconductor chips, along with a focus on creating jobs for working-class Americans, especially in manufacturing.

Little was said that was explicitly about China, but the Biden administration has said that China is its pacing challenge, and competing with China has shaped the ambition behind these legislative successes.

In fact, the hallmark of the address was its foreign policy minimalism. Biden hailed unity in the US defence of democracy in Ukraine in the face of Russia’s aggression. And in defending US sovereignty in the face of China’s violations, this time with a balloon.

But the presidents temporary minimalism on foreign policy will be short-lived. And unity with America’s partners and allies will continue to be at the centre of Biden’s strategy. In the past 12 months, it is the yardstick by which he has measured America’s success with respect to Ukraine.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has so far served as a lubricant for the NATO alliance, and for the US relationship with its non-NATO allies.

This has not automatically sprung from the well of Russia’s aggression. NATO’s success, and transatlantic unity, has been achieved through the sheer force of diplomatic effort, not least by the US.

Now Biden is looking for unity on China. His administration has identified China as its pacing threat. While Ukraine will continue to demand and deserve attention, the US will be looking beyond the urgent to focus on other less urgent but crucially important challenges. That means China.

China’s balloon helps ensure unity will be an easy victory at home. For several days, the balloon floated across the US, captivating the American public, seizing the headlines, and hardening US attitudes towards its only peer competitor.

Republican leaders in Congress are determined to scrutinize US policy to ensure it is tough on China, especially on technology and deterrence. This intense domestic focus on China could put Biden in a bind as he seeks to resume diplomacy. It also explains why he was careful not to inflate the China threat in his address. Secretary Blinken’s visit to Beijing has already been postponed.

As the Munich Security Conference approaches, the president’s unity agenda will turn to Europe, but the timing is difficult. China is opening and a charm offensive across Europe is likely. Europe is vulnerable as it seeks to recover its economies, continue to hold Russia back, and inhibit greater alignment between Russia and China.

The risk for the US is that domestic pressure to take a harder line on China escalates and Europe refuses to keep up. But dividing on China would come at a high price, both for Europe and the US, so to avoid this, they should take a pragmatic and sequenced approach to cooperation.

The goal for now should be policy coordination, as success is vital to momentum and managing expectations in the current environment is critical. Alignment may be possible with discrete partners on specific topics. But the perfect should not be the enemy of the good.

The US has postponed, not cancelled, Blinken’s trip while Europe is preparing to ramp up its diplomacy with China. A collective but temporary and shared transatlantic pause on diplomacy would offer low hanging fruit to give momentum to transatlantic cooperation.

It would also signal to China a unity that has a power of its own. A clear and coordinated signal, soon, that Europe and the US are moving forward with diplomacy is essential.

Munich can move the talk into action on Ukraine

James Nixey

Russia’s excommunication from this year’s Munich Security Conference is an opportunity. The principle of inclusivity may have pros and cons, but the cons have been evident since at least 2007 – its use as a platform for Russia’s leadership to launch broadsides about ‘western injustice’ and a reflexive default to increasingly inappropriate and harmful diplomatic courtesies and allowances.

Without the distraction of listening to Russian lies, there is at least now the remote possibility of a more unified West agreeing to specific action beyond the talk. As at the recent Ramstein talks, it is unlikely Munich will result in an agreement to send F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine. That may prove a step too far for the West or it will need further Russian atrocities inflicted upon Ukrainians on a scale horrendous enough to prick consciences once again.

However, although President Biden’s State of the Union address has promised nothing new or innovative regarding Ukraine or Russia, it did re-establish the fundamentals of US support and so can serve as a ‘pre-read’ for a newfound resolve.

Although some European countries are a lost cause, others – Germany for example – have proved able to be guilted into action. The key lesson for everyone to understand is that Ukraine is sovereign. Or at least ‘nothing about Ukraine, without Ukraine’. The difference is moot but, from these simple precepts, all else flows.

Ukrainians will be their impassioned selves at Munich. But although publicly gracious and thankful, privately they are distraught at the West’s collective failure to affirm these principles and back them with the necessary support, not just to force a stalemate or a ‘frozen conflict’ but to engineer victory.

Most Ukrainian officials would privately argue that the danger to their country comes more from the West and forums such as the Munich Security Conference than it does from Russia, which can be defeated with the requisite tangible assistance. In Munich, beyond fine words of support – watertight from some, ambiguous from others – there lurks the ever-present danger of the politician who simply wants it all to go away by offering Putin an off-ramp.

The irony of the host city of this forum is that many times over the past year compromise ‘solutions’ have been described as having ‘a whiff of Munich’ about them – a reference of course to appeasement in 1938, which still haunts.

As it should, because the failure to ensure Ukraine’s victory with an outcome the Ukrainian government and people are content with and which convinces Russia it was a disastrous mistake to escalate, will lead to a global security collapse too catastrophic to contemplate.

Middle East security challenges must be dealt with

Dr Sanam Vakil

A trifecta of security concerns – Iran’s advancing nuclear programme, the export of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to support Russia in the war in Ukraine, and a heavy-handed response towards protests in Iran – has raised alarm bells in Washington, Europe and the UK. These intersecting challenges lay bare the lack of a broader Iran strategy and the deprioritization of Middle East security among transatlantic partners.

This downgrading of the Middle East was evident in President Biden’s State of the Union speech as, for the first time in decades, the region was not even mentioned. The upcoming Munich Security conference provides a much needed opportunity for the transatlantic community to align on next steps and multilateral policy responses.

Transatlantic partners have long relied on the prism of the JCPOA negotiations as the pathway to both separate and manage nuclear tensions from broader regional challenges associated with Iran’s export of lethal aid and sponsorship of proxy groups.

Despite repeated negotiation efforts led by the Biden administration since April 2021, the JCPOA has languished due to Tehran’s fears over another US retreat. The promise of sanctions relief has also failed to incentivise Iran’s return to the deal. Tehran’s nuclear programme has accelerated without the consistent IAEA oversight which was part of the initial deal and is now at a level where it can produce enough uranium enrichment for four nuclear weapons.

Tehran’s decision to send drones to support Moscow’s war effort has further elevated transatlantic concerns, and reports have circulated that Tehran may also export its missile capabilities and build a drone factory in Russia. In tandem, the two sanctioned states have begun to strengthen their economic arrangements.

Divided US support shows time is not on Ukraine’s side Expert comment LJefferson 17 February 2023

Growing public opinion evidence and uncertainty about the future of the war suggests that continued American support for aiding Ukraine should not be assumed.

One year into Russia’s war on Ukraine, fears that American support for Kyiv would rapidly wane have proven demonstrably wrong. Western financial and military backing has been robust thanks to allied unity and an unexpectedly mild winter. But, as financial analysts constantly remind us, past performance is no guarantee of future results.

People like to back winners. If the anticipated Russian spring offensive looks successful or the counterpart Ukrainian offensive is uninspiring, expect louder US voices calling for a negotiated settlement. The warning signs are already here.

American officials privately express growing apprehension that there will be an early resolution of the conflict. As one White House official recently observed to me, by the end of the year the war could well be about where it is today. And a plurality of Americans intuitively grasp this: 46 per cent believe neither Russia nor Ukraine currently has the advantage in the conflict.

Momentum matters  

In public opinion, perception of momentum matters. Americans’ support for the Vietnam War waned as the conflict persisted, falling from six-in-ten Americans in 1965 to four-in-ten in 1973.

Similarly, backing for the Iraq war fell from more than seven-in-ten in 2003 to barely four-in-ten in 2008. And with Afghanistan, as the war dragged on, support for US involvement fell from more than nine-in-ten in 2002 to less than five-in-ten in 2021. Notably, once the American public turned on these wars, support never returned.

Of course, Americans were fighting and dying in those wars, which is not the case in the Ukraine conflict. But initially the Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan war support was buoyed by the belief that continued US engagement was justified, otherwise American sons and daughters had died in vain. With no American lives at stake in Ukraine, only financial and military resources, there is a growing wariness of throwing good money after bad.

In the last year, the share of Americans who say the United States is doing too much for Ukraine has nearly quadrupled, from seven to 26 per cent. And the portion that believe Washington has not done enough has halved, from 49 per cent to 17 per cent.

Sentiment about Ukraine support has become increasingly partisan. In March 2022, nine per cent of Republicans and five per cent of Democrats said the US was doing too much for Ukraine. By January 2023, 40 per cent of Republicans but just 15 per cent of Democrats complained Washington was doing too much.

This erosion of Americans’ support for Ukraine does not bode well for the future. Less than half (48 per cent) of the public in November, compared to 58 per cent in July, believed Washington should support Ukraine for as long as it takes, even if it means American households have to pay higher gas and food prices as a consequence.

A similar share, 47 per cent – up from 38 per cent in July – said the United States should urge Ukraine to settle for peace as soon as possible so the costs aren’t so great for American households, even if that means Ukraine will lose some territory.

A partisan divide

The partisan divide over Ukraine is largely driven by Republican political rhetoric during and after the 2022 midterm elections. Current Republican Speaker of the House Kevin McCarthy observed last October: ‘I think people are going to be sitting in a recession and they’re not going to write a blank cheque to Ukraine.’

More recently, in the wake of Ukrainian president Zelenskyy’s December speech to Congress, Florida Republican Representative Matt Gaetz, whose vote was pivotal in making McCarthy Speaker, tweeted: ‘Hemorrhaging billions in taxpayer dollars for Ukraine while our country is in crisis is the definition of America last.’

In January, newly-elected Ohio Republican Senator J.D. Vance told a Cleveland radio station that it was ‘ultimately not in our national security interest’ to send M1 Abrams tanks to Ukraine, despite the fact that they will be built by his constituents in Ohio.

In addition, ten Republican members of the House of Representatives have introduced legislation asserting ‘that the United States must end its military and financial aid to Ukraine, and urges all combatants to reach a peace agreement.’ 

And this month former President Donald Trump said: ‘That war has to stop, and it has to stop now, and it’s easy to do’ and it ‘can be negotiated within 24 hours’. Why worry about continued support for the war if it’s about to be over?

The road to 2024

With the 2024 US presidential election already revving up, Americans’ appetite for continued backing for Ukraine may hinge on how voters judge the Biden administration’s handling of the conflict.

Democrats are more than twice as likely as Republicans (61 per cent versus 27 per cent) to approve of the Biden administration’s response to the Russia invasion, suggesting Ukraine will be yet another partisan talking point as the campaign heats up. Notably, men are much more likely than women to approve of Biden’s efforts, as are older Americans compared with younger Americans.

Reflections on Iraq since 2003 6 March 2023 — 11:00AM TO 12:15PM Anonymous (not verified) 20 February 2023 Chatham House

This event reflects on the legacy of the invasion and occupation for Iraq, the Middle East, and the West.

When a US-led coalition invaded Iraq and overthrew the Saddam Hussein regime 20 years ago, many Iraqis hoped that a more democratic, prosperous future lay ahead.

But in reality, their lives have been marred by different forms of violent conflict, fuelled by a corrupt system through which a new class of leaders gutted state finances and enriched themselves at the expense of the people.

Today, almost two-thirds of the Iraqi population are under 25 and have no memory of life under Saddam Hussein. For many, the legacy of the war is only a failed political system that kills every day by means of corruption and neglect.

At this roundtable, part of the Iraq Initiative, Chatham House welcomes journalist and author Ghaith Abdul-Ahad to discuss his book on this subject, called A Stranger in Your Own City: Travels in the Middle East’s Long War, alongside a panel of experts who will explore the profound legacy of the war for the Iraqi people.

This marks the first in a series of Chatham House Iraq Initiative events and analysis reflecting on the legacy of the invasion and occupation for Iraq, the Middle East and the West.

US and Europe Strategic Security Cooperation: The View from Washington 27 March 2023 — 9:00AM TO 10:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 9 March 2023 Chatham House

As the US prepares to enter the next presidential election cycle, can the transatlantic alliance stay the course, especially against a deepening Russia-China partnership?

Thank you for your interest in joining our event. Please plan to arrive at Chatham House from 08:45 GMT as the event will begin promptly at 09:00.

The Biden administration’s response to Russia’s war in Ukraine and the rise of a globally assertive China, as articulated in the 2022 US national strategy, is to ‘constrain Russia and out-compete China’. It needs Europe as a partner and ally for both – yet Europe is also an object and a battleground in this era of strategic competition.

As the US prepares to enter the next presidential election cycle, can the transatlantic alliance stay the course, especially against a deepening Russia-China partnership? Can Europeans, in particular, move from deepening dependency to greater agency and self-reliance? What is the role for Germany – and for the UK?

Europe's response to the US Inflation Reduction Act 27 March 2023 — 2:00PM TO 3:15PM Anonymous (not verified) 9 March 2023 Chatham House and Online

This event explores the implications of the US Inflation Reduction Act, how Europe can respond and what options the UK has.

While the US Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) has led to an outcry in the EU, member states have different concerns and preferences for how to respond. The European Commission’s proposed ‘Green Deal Industrial Plan’ includes the relaxation of state aid rules to drive funding. But will this lead to a ‘subsidies race’ between the US and EU and is a ‘green trade war’ brewing?  
 
The UK’s response to the IRA has been much more muted than the EU’s. But caught between US subsidies and EU subsidies, can the UK compete and create an independent response to the IRA? And what steps can be taken to facilitate global cooperation and to make trade work for the green transition?

Dr Martin Porter, Executive Chair at the Cambridge Institute for Sustainability Leadership, will kick off the discussion with short remarks followed by an interactive discussion among all participants

This discussion is part of the Chatham House Global Trade Policy Forum. We would like to take this opportunity to thank our founding partner and supporting partners for their generous support of the forum.  

The interconnected impacts of the Iraq war Expert comment LJefferson 22 March 2023

Relying on weak intelligence for invading Iraq has had a negative impact on US and UK credibility with several consequences that persist to this day.

20 years on from the fateful decision to invade Iraq, it is generally accepted that the US and UK governments overstated the evidence available for them to justify military action. The central claim to defend invading Iraq was that the country had continued its illicit nuclear weapons programme and had retained illegal stockpiles of biological and chemical weapons. None of these claims supported an imminent threat justification nor could any hidden caches of WMD be found by the US Iraq Survey Group after the invasion.  

In the US, President George W. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney hinted at additional evidence which could not be shared publicly to suggest that if only people knew what the government knew, they would agree that Iraq posed a significant threat to the West and needed to be disarmed.

In the UK, the Blair government acted similarly, focusing on a narrow interpretation of the evidence provided by the intelligence services and ignoring many of the dire warnings offered by academics and other experts. The Chilcot Inquiry found that the Blair government greatly exaggerated the threat Iraq posed to the UK, and that government arguments were based on the prime minister’s personal beliefs, as well as his promise to President Bush to support the US invasion. 

Relying on inadequate information and a biased analysis for invading Iraq has had a negative impact on US and UK credibility in the international security policy environment and domestically with ramifications that persist to this day.  

Impacts on soft power and trust

The invasion had an impact on US and UK soft power due to negative perceptions of the decision to go to war and the competence of the UK and US: public opinion polling by the Pew Center showed that perceptions of the US declined significantly as a result of the invasion of Iraq, especially in the Middle East and Central Asia.

This is undoubtedly a challenge for the US, but arguably an even bigger challenge for the UK, which due to its size and power relies much more on diplomacy and coalition-building in order to achieve its goals within various international treaty frameworks.   

Over nearly two decades, the US and the UK no longer seemed to enjoy the same foundation of trust, even with close allies, as they did previously. This changed in February 2022.

Towards the end of 2021, both the US and the UK were sounding the alarm about an impending Russian invasion of Ukraine based on information and analysis from their intelligence services. Despite the amassing of Russian troops, tanks and artillery on the border clearly visible from the air and by satellite imagery, several allies remained unconvinced until the invasion happened.  

This was in part due to their own assessments which indicated that Russia would stop short of an invasion, and in part because allies were unwilling to take US and UK statements on faith, without being able to assess the information themselves.

US officials found this frustrating as it meant that NATO and the EU were slower off the mark with support for Ukraine than they might otherwise have been. However, the accuracy of the US/UK intelligence on Russia’s invasion, coupled with their sharing it openly, may well have restored faith in their capabilities and analysis.  

A more open approach to intelligence  

Over the last few years, there seems to have been a change in accepted practice regarding sharing and using intelligence. The UK Ministry of Defence has taken a much more open approach to intelligence in the war in Ukraine, sharing the most recent defence information publicly in order to counter Russian disinformation.  

This is a positive step to ensure that intelligence can be discussed and assessed critically. Being more open about secret intelligence may also be linked to the increasing capabilities of open-source intelligence (OSINT). Non-governmental and international organizations and the media all now have access to data from, for example, imaging satellites and can independently verify information coming from governments. 

Perceived double standards 

A reduction of trust in US and UK intelligence was not the only impact of the invasion of Iraq. Russia and China have repeatedly called out the US and UK for acting without a second UN Security Council mandate. Putin uses the decision to invade Iraq, as well as the NATO humanitarian intervention in Kosovo, to justify Russia’s actions in Crimea. He invokes parallel language to spread disinformation about a ‘responsibility to protect life’ of the (‘ethnically Russian’) Crimean population. Russia has also repeatedly used the WMD trope to create false narratives around Ukrainian biosecurity laboratories to justify Russian military actions against Ukraine.  

Deciding to invade Iraq under what turned out to be a false pretext has weakened the application of the international rule of law and has led to a perceived double standard whereby powerful states can use UN processes in their favour, or completely disregard them if they do not deliver their goals.

As the Chilcot Inquiry found, there was very little preparation for the post-invasion period either in the US or the UK. Confirmation bias led not only to trusting shaky intelligence but also to believing in a best-case scenario and a ‘relatively benign security environment’ once the invasion had prevailed. Mismanaging the country’s occupation afterwards also led to the perception that the UK and US are less competent than projected. 

Problems for the international order  

The Iraq War has left many smaller and medium-sized states outside Europe and North America with the impression that powerful states are not committed to an equitable international system and instead will bend the rules to suit them while nonetheless holding other states to account. This dynamic poses a serious problem for the international system. 

It opens the door to ‘whataboutism’ in Russia’s false justifications for invading Ukraine and undermines faith in international law, destabilizing the international order in the longer term. Beyond the immediate challenges of dealing with the war in Ukraine, reforming and strengthening the international order to make it more equitable will be one of the most significant challenges the US and UK will face over the next decade. 

A trust deficit  

Domestically, for already disappointed citizens, the deceit over intelligence it is yet another piece of evidence which suggests that their government is not trustworthy and may not have their best interests at heart. This has profound implications for US and UK democracies, making it harder for governments to counter citizens’ susceptibilities to disinformation campaigns. 

World in brief: Ukraine and nuclear proliferation to dominate G7 The World Today mhiggins.drupal 28 March 2023

Following Russia’s ongoing intimidation, Japan will use its presidency of the G7 – and its history – to prioritize the dangers of nuclear threats, writes James Orr.

Two issues are expected to dominate the agenda as Japan hosts the G7 summit in Hiroshima from May 19-21. Central to talks will be the conflict in Ukraine, with member states eager to highlight a message of unity and resolve in the face of Russia’s continuing aggression.

Fumio Kishida, Japan’s prime minister, made an unannounced visit to Kyiv on March 21, meeting the Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy.  This coincided with a visit to Moscow by China’s leader Xi Jinping, who described Russian president Vladimir Putin as a friend and partner.

‘Absolutely unacceptable’

Hosting the G7 summit in Hiroshima is significant, too, with Kishida expected to emphasize the ‘absolutely unacceptable’ threat of nuclear proliferation. Ongoing tensions between China and Taiwan, together with recent North Korean ballistic missile tests, have heightened fears of a breakdown in security in the region.

Meanwhile, President Vladimir Putin’s menacing references to the use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine has raised the prospect of a potentially devastating conflict with NATO. ‘Kishida’s principal goal for the presidency of the G7 is to try to draw the world away from the path of destruction that is another nuclear conflict,’ said Duncan Bartlett, a research associate at SOAS, the School of Oriental and African Studies, in London.

‘Early last year, Putin warned of terrible consequences if NATO and the West interfered in the Ukraine conflict, and that was widely seen as being a nuclear threat. North Korea is also pursuing its nuclear weapons programme, and in February an intercontinental ballistic missile went into the sea just near the northern Japanese island of Hokkaido,’ said Bartlett.

After Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, Kishida has taken a firm position on Putin, in line with his G7 peers. President Zelenskyy has addressed the Japanese parliament via video link and Dmytro Kuleba, Ukraine’s minister of foreign affairs, was invited by his Japanese counterpart to a G7 meeting held during the Munich Security Conference earlier this year.

Kishida committed $600 million in financial support to Ukraine and his government may well announce the provision of further non-lethal assistance to Zelenskyy at the summit. The country’s constitution effectively outlaws the export of deadly weapons to foreign forces. On his visit to Kyiv, Kishida promised a further $30 million to Ukraine.

‘Kishida has revised key defence documents and is pursuing a radical and controversial expansion of Japan’s defence budget and capabilities,’ said Hugo Dobson, Professor of Japan’s International Relations at the University of Sheffield.

‘He and his G7 partners have signed historic defence agreements, pledged to strengthen ties or declared the inseparability of their security in light of actual conflict in Ukraine and potential conflict in East Asia. Kishida has linked the two by emphasizing that Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow,’ said Dobson.

Aside from security matters, Kishida will at the summit address issues on clean energy, climate change, global health and boosting multilateral cooperation to drive post-pandemic economic recovery.

Invitation to Nagasaki

He is understood to have invited President Joe Biden to visit Nagasaki, where the second of America’s two atomic bombs is estimated to have killed 60,000 people in August 1945. No sitting US president has ever visited the city, and Kishida, who grew up in Hiroshima, may see the visit as an opportunity to boost his flagging domestic approval ratings. It may also serve as a timely reminder to Russia and others that the G7 opposes any future nuclear weapon use.

The evolution of the Pepe the Frog meme The World Today rescobales.drupal 29 March 2023

From laidback comic book character to alt-right villain and more, the Pepe the Frog meme is emblematic of the relationship between politics and online culture.

The evolution of the Pepe the Frog meme provides a case study of how online meme culture can appropriate non-political imagery, codify it and redeploy it, sometimes for extreme political purposes. American artist Matt Furie created Pepe the Frog, with his catchphrase ‘Feels good man’, for his comic series Boy’s Club in 2005.

The laidback character was quickly adapted as a meme on internet forums such as 4chan and Reddit. By 2014 and 2015 politicized Pepe memes began appearing against Furie’s wishes, notably from the emerging ‘alt-right’. Late in 2015, Donald Trump retweeted a caricature of himself as Pepe at a US presidential lectern.

A stream of racist and anti-semitic Pepe renderings led to the meme being added to the Anti-Defamation League’s database of hate symbols in 2016. Three years later, democracy activists in Hong Kong began using images of Pepe in protests.

In their book, Meme Wars: The Untold Story of the Online Battles Upending Democracy in America, the authors Joan Donovan, Emily Dreyfuss and Brian Friedberg chart how democracy disrupters and conspiracy theorists use memes such as Pepe the Frog as weapons of mass disinformation. Donovan charted this timeline of his evolution from comic strip good guy to Covid anti-vaxxer.

2005: Pepe the Frog

2012: Sad Pepe

 2014: Smug Pepe

 2014: Rage Pepe

2014 & 2015: Nazi Pepe

 2015: Donald Trump as Pepe

2017: Pepe and the alt-right

2017: Groyper and Kekistan

2019: QAnon Pepe

2020: Hong Kong Pepe

2020: Covid-19 Pepe

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