POSTPONED: Zimbabwe Futures 2025: Financial Sector Expansion and Policy Priorities 15 November 2017 — 9:00AM TO 11:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 6 November 2017 Harare, Zimbabwe 

This roundtable will draw on current best practice and senior level expertise to identify policy options for financial stability and sector growth. A depoliticized analysis of the development agenda will highlight requisite conditions and prospective policies for a business-driven roadmap to the economic recovery of Zimbabwe, with a specific focus on the financial sector.

Participants will discuss macro-economic policy and stability, retail banking products and services, fintech, mobilizing domestic finance for national infrastructure and balancing consumer price index and inflation.

This event is being held in partnership with the Zimbabwe Business Club.

PLEASE NOTE, THIS EVENT HAS BEEN POSTPONED UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.

Business Development in Madagascar: How to Enable Entrepreneurialism 15 November 2017 — 12:00PM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 9 November 2017 Chatham House, London

Mugabe’s Departure Ushers in a Heady New Era for Zimbabwe Expert comment sysadmin 23 November 2017

The country is experiencing an almost unprecedented convergence, with traditional political, economic and social fault lines bridged as Zimbabweans make common cause for change.

The ecstatic scenes said it all – Zimbabweans around the world are celebrating the resignation of Robert Mugabe as president. In January 1980, hundreds of thousands of Zimbabweans thronged Zimbabwe Grounds stadium in Highfields township, Harare, to welcome Mugabe back from exile. In March 1980, with reggae icon Bob Marley and Britain’s Prince Charles in attendance, thousands filled Rufaro Stadium to witness the handover from Rhodesia to the new nation of Zimbabwe. Thirty-seven years later, the largest crowds Harare has ever witnessed flooded the streets once again; not to welcome Mugabe in, but to see him out. One simple, taut phrase summed up the day’s events: ‘This is our second independence day.’

How did it come to this?

History has been put on fast-forward, and left Zimbabwe – and the world – shaken. Just two weeks ago, it seemed to be the height of folly to think that Mugabe would leave office on any but his own terms. Emmerson Mnangagwa had been sacked as vice president, and his followers had been purged. Grace Mugabe, with ringing endorsements from the women’s and youth leagues, looked set to be elevated to the vice presidency at the ZANU-PF congress in less than a month’s time.

Mugabe was expected to stay until the 2018 elections, after which he would hand over the presidency to his wife. It was the prospect of Grace Mugabe becoming Zimbabwe’s next president which brought in the military. Aware that they had three weeks or less to prevent a dynastic succession and a looming purge of the military itself, Zimbabwe’s military chose, not the audacity of hope, but the hope of audacity, and launched Operation Restore Legacy to stop the rot.

What has happened in Zimbabwe is not a people’s revolution in the traditional sense. The Bourbons in France, the Romanov dynasty in Russia, the Shah of Iran, and the autocrats of north Africa’s Arab Spring were all felled by continuous street protests which ultimately received the support of the military.

In Zimbabwe it has been the military who have been the drivers of revolutionary change. What has happened is that an internal party-factional power struggle has inadvertently led to a military-guided popular revolution and the ousting of the Mugabes. Zimbabwe’s military, often seen as the guardians of the state, became instead the guardians of the people. They are seen, for now at least, as liberators, and national heroes. This has been a very Zimbabwean revolution.

So what next?

These are heady days. Zimbabwe is experiencing an almost unprecedented national convergence, with traditional political, economic and social fault lines bridged as Zimbabweans make common cause for change. It is not quite a ‘Zimbabwe Spring’, but it is perhaps a ‘Zimbabwe Sunrise’.

Parliament, which on Tuesday had met to impeach Robert Mugabe, is now installing, through constitutional procedures, Emmerson Mnangagwa as president, who will be given the mandate to form an interim government. Mnangagwa will be further ratified at the ZANU-PF Congress in December where he will be named and acclaimed as ZANU-PF’s candidate for the next general elections, which constitutionally are due by mid-2018 (although it is unclear whether this will indeed be the case).

Mnangagwa has a full in-tray. He needs to form a government quickly and has to balance the need for inclusivity and consultation, with the undoubted pressure to reward his followers. With Zimbabwe’s economy nearing paralysis, Zimbabwe’s new president will be under pressure to deliver. Although many are nervous about his history as Mugabe’s ally and his reputation for toughness, Mnangagwa is also an astute political survivor, and has been pro-business and supportive of Zimbabwe’s ongoing re-engagement with the global community.

Zimbabwe has become a cashless society not by design, but by default; with formal unemployment at 80 per cent and with a largely informalized economy in which much of Zimbabwe’s citizenry have been reduced to penury and classic short-termism, there is plenty for Zimbabwe’s next president to think about. Activists wonder whether he will try to introduce systemic change, or merely go through the motions. He may well face a binary choice between government or governance.

And yet there are also positives. Zimbabwe’s institutions have proven to be resilient, and there is still a reservoir of dedicated and competent professionals in both public and private sectors. Although still laggardly, Zimbabwe had begun to progress in ‘ease of doing business’ indices. There is a large diaspora who have continued to engage with Zimbabwe; and Zimbabwe’s recent ‘Look East’ and de facto ‘Look West’ re-engagement policies can be built upon.

Many are urging caution and saying that Zimbabwe needs a second, truly democratic revolution. Perhaps. But right now, Mnangagwa should be given a chance. Farai, a friend of mine in Harare, said this: ‘Yes we know this euphoria may be short-lived. But even if it turns out that we were only happy for a day, let’s make it a brilliant day. Rega tifare nhasi (Let us be happy today).’

A version of this article was first published by the Guardian.

Rebuilding Zimbabwe's Economy: Emmerson Mnangagwa’s Immediate Priorities Expert comment sysadmin 13 December 2017

Zimbabwe cannot expect to rebuild in the same economic model that brought previous prosperity.

Returning to Harare as Zimbabwe’s president-designate Emmerson Mnangagwa declared, ‘We want to grow our economy, we want peace, we want jobs, jobs, jobs.’

Robert Mugabe leaves a legacy of an independent Zimbabwe in a deep economic crisis. Much remains uncertain as to what a new government in Zimbabwe will look like, and there is sure to be continuity as well as considerable change.

What is clear is that a new administration under Mnangagwa will need to turn the economy around to garner support and legitimacy from the Zimbabwean people. Zimbabwe’s economic output halved over the period 1997–2008, and it has not recovered. With more than 80 per cent of Zimbabweans in the informal economy, and with social and economic resilience undermined by previous crises and decades of mismanagement, the stakes for the new leader are very high.

Reform will be difficult particularly because politically connected elites have acquired businesses through uncompetitive means. They will be reluctant to see significantly more competition. But they will also want an improved economic environment. And there is scope for the people of Zimbabwe to benefit from this.

An important change will be in the prioritization of economic stability. Mugabe demonstrated that he was willing to make political decisions irrespective of the economic consequences. Mnangagwa is thought to be less ideological and more of a pragmatist. For him, delivering economic recovery will be crucial to building political support.

The most pressing fiscal priority is the public wage bill. Employment costs account for over 80 per cent of government expenditure, crowding out spending on social programmes, health and education. But the fragility of the economy means that reform cannot be fast-tracked. The public wage bill accounts for over 20 per cent of GDP and is an essential driver of demand. Public sector workers are also politically influential. Another further priority is the reform of state-owned enterprises that are pressuring the fiscus.

A new administration will need to rebuild confidence. Policymakers have been operating in a low-confidence environment for a long time, but for any meaningful change to take root there has to be trust between the government, businesses and the people of Zimbabwe. Businesses and citizens will want to see a plan of action for remonetizing the economy. Zimbabwe faces an acute liquidity crisis. A shortage of US dollars and a lack of confidence in government-issued bond notes are testing resilience.

The financial system has recovered from a crisis of nonperforming loans – triggered by high debt amassed during the post-dollarization boom, and weak corporate governance. But the system remains highly fragile and swamped with government debt. Hard cash US dollar deposits fell from 49 per cent ($582 million) in 2009 to just six per cent ($269 million) in 2016. In 2015, industrial utilization stood at just 34.3 per cent of installed capacity, and it was estimated that just five per cent of the country’s businesses were viable.

The crux of the Zimbabwean economy is the linkage between agriculture and manufacturing. Commercial agriculture contributes approximately 12 per cent of the country’s GDP, and more than 60 per cent of inputs into the manufacturing sector. Tobacco in particular is a vital earner of much needed foreign exchange. Policies to support mid-scale farmers will have multiplier effects. They drive agricultural growth and generate jobs throughout the supply chain.

Zimbabwe also has world-class natural resource endowments including ferrochrome, gold, copper, iron ore, lithium, diamonds and platinum group metals. But longer investment-gestation periods and industry risk adversity will mean that payoffs from fresh investments in this sector will take longer to materialize.

Domestic finance will need to be mobilized to generate recovery, and this will need to be supported by international investment. But international investors entering the country must be cognizant of Zimbabwean’s expectations and also historical perceptions – especially around the scepticism of neoliberal economics as a result of failed structural adjustment programmes in the 1990s.

Zimbabweans have high social expectations for international investors. Educated, tech-savvy, internationally connected youth are at the core of the consumer class that investors will be targeting, to both sell products to but also to staff offices in country. But this cohort also has a greater expectation of international companies to adhere to the norms and standards that they abide by at home and not take advantage of weak governance or poor regulation to exploit citizens.

Investors in Zimbabwe must also recognize that behind the controversial Mugabe policies of land reform and indigenization – the empowerment of local citizens through shared ownership – was a popular desire for postcolonial economic transformation. This sentiment remains. Working in partnership with local entities and communicating the economic contribution made to society will be necessary to build a long-term presence in Zimbabwe, and reap the dividend of what many hope to be a new start for the country.

Fresh thinking is required from domestic policymakers and international partners. A skilled population and estimated 3-5 million-strong diaspora will bring international experience and make a considerable contribution to this process. Some of this thinking has been done. The Lima process of re-engagement with international financial institutions that was agreed at the end of 2015 has laid some of the groundwork, especially around international expectations regarding both economic and governance reform – the substance of which was analysed in a 2016 Chatham House paper. The implementation of recommendations of the well-regarded auditor-general’s report on SOE reform will also be a key prerequisite for long-term reform.

Zimbabweans are not alone in processing what has happened and how to react. Investors have long been poised to capitalize on what is perceived to be one of the continent’s best long-term prospects. A lot will remain unchanged following the transition. But significantly, for the first time in decades, there is a real opportunity to effect positive change and improve the livelihoods of millions of Zimbabweans.

This article was originally published at the Huffington Post.

South Africa's Land Reform Quandary: Scenarios and Policy 10 July 2018 — 10:00AM TO 11:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 13 June 2018 Chatham House, London

Slow delivery on expectations of land redistribution in South Africa has once again put the issue at the forefront of political debate in the country. A parliamentary public consultation process will consider whether constitutional change is required to accelerate expropriation without compensation. Policymakers face dual - often opposing - pressures due to investors’ fears of negative economic impacts as well as citizens’ frustrations over persistent inequality and hardship. State land and tribal trust land remain contentious issues for rural economic development, but with two thirds of the population now living in urban areas policy responses must be as cognizant of the country’s future as it is of its past.

At this meeting, Terence Corrigan, project manager at the South African Institute of Race Relations, will discuss the current debates on expropriation and present the institute’s latest research on future scenarios of land reform in South Africa.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

Zimbabwe's Elections Were Meant to Start a New Era Expert comment sysadmin 14 August 2018

Emmerson Mnangagwa has been declared president of Zimbabwe amid protests and violence but Zimbabweans are now in a post-political, economy-first mood, writes Knox Chitiyo.

Before Zimbabwe’s general election on 30 July, there was a lot of talk about there being ‘landmark change’ and ‘credibility.’ But in many ways it was déjà vu. President Emmerson Mnangagwa’s ruling ZANU-PF party won the parliamentary vote, taking a majority 144 seats out of 210. The opposition MDC Alliance, a seven-party coalition led by Nelson Chamisa, won 64 seats—an improvement on their 2013 showing of 44 seats, but still falling far short of expectations.

The presidential results were much closer. After clashes on Wednesday, the incumbent Mnangagwa was declared winner early Friday morning, taking 50.8 per cent of the vote against Chamisa’s 44.3 per cent. The 21 other independent presidential candidates polled less than 5 per cent between them.

The polls didn’t quite live up to the hype. There was much that was positive: the prelude and election day were peaceful, with a minimal military presence. Opposition candidates were able to hold nationwide rallies (including in ZANU-PF’s rural heartland) without interference—an electoral first. ZANU-PF leaders and the military called for a peaceful process. Four women candidates contested the presidential vote, another first. More than 5 million Zimbabweans registered out of an eligible voting population of 7.2 million, and there was a near record 75 per cent turnout on voting day. Zimbabwe invited official observers from 46 countries and 15 international organizations, and, for the first time since 2002, observers from the EU, the Commonwealth and the US were present.

But shortcomings included late public access to the imperfect biometric voters roll and controversies about the ballot papers. There were also misogynistic social media attacks and threats against female candidates and the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) chair Justice Priscilla Chigumba.

The three-day wait for presidential results saw a further decline in public trust in the ZEC, and the opposition’s premature announcement of a Chamisa victory only fanned the political flames.

On Wednesday, six unarmed civilians were shot dead by soldiers in Harare, with dozens more assaulted. A Joint International Observer Mission statement promptly condemned the violence and called for restraint.

The election process was a boon for democracy, but ironically the result has entrenched the two-party parliamentary system and marginalized alternative voices. Mnangagwa has been conciliatory in his post-election statements, saying that Nelson Chamisa has a ‘crucial role to play’ and calling for unity to ‘build a new Zimbabwe for all.’

But Chamisa’s MDC Alliance has refused to accept the results, calling them ‘fake’ and a ‘scandal.’ The MDC has raised genuine transparency concerns and will likely challenge the results in court, but much of this may be cosmetic—with little chance of a 2017 Kenya-style presidential re-run. There is no critical mass of opposition parties to sustain a challenge, nor is there a popular appetite for a protracted political feud.

Zimbabwe’s democracy agenda may be heading into the slow lane, and Chamisa may be pressured by his coalition partners to make a political accommodation with Mnangagwa. Nevertheless, despite setbacks, Zimbabwe’s opposition and civil society has a long history of resilience under pressure and the struggle for democracy will continue.

Mnangagwa has a full in-tray. He has to unite a fractious ZANU-PF and manage internal civil-military and generational faultlines. Beyond that, he may need a public reconciliation with Chamisa—similar to how in Kenya and Mozambique, similar incumbent-opposition quarrels were mended by public rapprochements.

But Zimbabweans are now in a post-political, economy-first mood. Resolving the cash crisis is crucial. Few Zimbabweans can withdraw more than $50 a day from banks or ATMs—and much of this is paid out in unpopular ‘bond coins.’ The formal sector has contracted to only 20 per cent of the economy, and the informal sector lacks the capacity to push an economic renewal.

Zimbabwe’s new internationalism is premised upon the 2015 Lima process economic reform pathway for debt arrears clearance. (The country has a $10 billion foreign debt.) There has been a modest increase in foreign and diaspora investment, but the big-money Chinese, Russian and other pledges are long-horizon projects. What Zimbabwe needs is a short-term economic stimulus—to support small and medium-sized businesses.

For this to happen, Mnangagwa has to stay the course on economic reform, ease of doing business and the anti-corruption agenda. The pivot from reform to transformation in Zimbabwe will require all hands on deck, including civil society, the opposition, Zimbabwe diaspora and foreign investors, in a partnership for development.

A positive global verdict on the elections could supercharge investment, but time will tell whether these polls have been a deal-maker or a deal-breaker.

Zimbabwe’s elections often split the global south and the global north, and this could be the case again. The EU will have to decide whether to continue their incremental rapprochement with Zimbabwe, or accelerate to the reciprocity-based, ‘Re-Engagement 2.0’ approach currently favoured by the UK although the US is unlikely to lift statutory sanctions anytime soon.

Zimbabwe’s possible return to the Commonwealth could also be divisive, given the broader global context of the perceived existential clash between beleaguered liberal democracy and the rise of populist—and popular—autocracies across the globe.

President Mnangagwa—along with South Africa’s President Cyril Ramaphosa, Mozambique’s Filipe Nyusi and others—belong to a pragmatic new wave of regional economic reformers nudging liberationism away from ideology. He now has an electoral mandate to lead a divided country. For sisters Chipo and Tendai, both businesswomen based in Harare who voted for Mnangagwa and Chamisa respectively, the future needs to come now. ‘There is too much talk,’ they said, ‘we live every day between hope and despair. We need cash and jobs. We are tired of being tired.’

This was originally published in TIME.

Higher Education in South Africa: Demands for Inclusion and the Challenges of Reform 17 October 2018 — 5:00PM TO 6:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 18 September 2018 Chatham House, London

Economic Reform and Recovery in Zimbabwe 8 October 2018 — 2:30PM TO 3:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 4 October 2018 Chatham House, London

Political Reform in Angola: Challenges and Priorities for Elected Officials 31 October 2018 — 4:00PM TO 5:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 26 October 2018 Chatham House, London

Angola’s reformulated National Assembly has passed a series of legislative reforms since elections in August 2017, in which the ruling MPLA won a majority of 150 seats to the 51 held by the UNITA leading opposition party.

Many of the changes have targeted the revitalization of an underperforming economy and improved governance: in June 2018 parliament approved a new private investment law aimed at diversifying Angola’s fiscal base beyond oil revenues while new legislation in May mandated the return of illicitly exported capital of over $100,000.

As the appetite for measurable progress across all sectors of society remains high, and with newly constituted municipal elections scheduled for 2020, inclusive and accountable political debate will remain critical to Angola’s future.

At the event, a cross-party delegation discuss the role of the National Assembly in affecting political change and the importance of maintaining open dialogue among opposing voices to address the challenges facing Angola.

Zimbabwe Futures 2030: Policy Priorities for Economic Expansion 28 February 2019 — 9:00AM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 7 February 2019 Harare, Zimbabwe

This roundtable draws on current best practice and senior level expertise to identify policy options for long term economic expansion in Zimbabwe and pathways for inclusive development.

Participants discuss the necessary policies and business strategies to enable and support the effective implementation of the Transitional Stabilization Programme and longer term national development plans.

The discussions highlight requisite conditions for a business-driven and inclusive process towards Zimbabwe’s long-term economic recovery.

This event was held in partnership with the Zimbabwe Business Club and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung.

Zimbabwe Futures 2030: Sector Priorities for Policy Implementation 4 June 2019 — 9:00AM TO 5:15PM Anonymous (not verified) 21 June 2019 Harare, Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe Futures 2030: Policy Priorities for Industrialization, Agri-Business and Tourism 6 June 2019 — 9:30AM TO 1:15PM Anonymous (not verified) 21 June 2019 Bulawayo, Zimbabwe

Hope, Peace and Reconciliation: Pope Francis in Mozambique Expert comment sysadmin 4 September 2019

A papal visit will highlight the importance of the recently signed peace agreement between the government and opposition.

Pope Francis’ visit to Mozambique on 4–6 September comes at a critical political moment. The theme for the papal Africa trip (which also includes Madagascar and Mauritius) is ‘pilgrim of hope, peace and reconciliation’. This is especially relevant for Mozambique, as this is the first week of the official campaign for Mozambique’s sixth national elections on 15 October.

It is also the one-month anniversary of the Maputo Accords for Peace and Reconciliation between the government and the armed opposition, RENAMO (and the fifth anniversary of the previous such agreement in 2014).

What is unusual is that the pope accepted to visit Mozambique just after a peace accord and in the run-up to national elections. Something similar has happened only once, when Pope John Paul II visited Angola in June 1992 (following the Bicesse Accords) prior to the country’s first ever national elections in September. Unfortunately Pope John Paul’s preaching of reconciliation and pluralism failed and civil war resumed some months later, following rejection of the preliminary election results. Angola’s civil war only finally ended a decade later in 2002.

The last papal visit to Mozambique was also by Pope John Paul II in 1988, when civil war was still ongoing, and the country was still a single party state. Despite the war, massive congregations attended and RENAMO reached local ceasefires and agreements to maintain electricity supply to honour the visit. Some of the seeds for the Rome peace process were laid during this trip – especially as it also represented a formal reconciliation of FRELIMO, the ruling party, with the Catholic Church.

This papal visit to Mozambique is equally anticipated, as was highlighted several times during speeches at the 6 August peace agreement signing in Maputo. When I was in Maputo last month, sales of papal-pictured capulanas (a Mozambican sarong) were brisk and Mozambican television carried countdown clocks on many programmes for the touchdown of Pope Francis on national soil.

The Catholic Church has played an instrumental role in promoting peace in Mozambique over the years. The 1977–92 civil war ended through negotiations hosted at the Sant’ Egidio lay community in Rome, and the current Archbishop of Bologna, Dom Matteo Zuppi (who led the Sant’ Egido negotiations in 1992 and is soon to be made a cardinal) was an official witness to 6 August accords signing.

When targeted armed conflict resumed in 2013, faith groups once more re-engaged and in 2016 Sant’ Egidio once more co-led mediation efforts, less successfully than in 1991–92. Sant’ Egidio (including during a presidential visit to Rome in July) contributed to convincing the Vatican that this papal visit should occur before the October elections.

President Filipe Nyusi anxiously wanted this visit to occur before the elections. He is seeking re-election for his second and final term and a papal visit should help win some votes. His party, FRELIMO, is also worried about securing a majority in the national assembly, as it has been weakened by patchy delivery of services and ongoing high-level corruption scandals.

This year, President Nyusi’s priorities have been to show that he can attract international investment (such as Andarko’s recently announced final investment decision on its gas project), a peace agreement with RENAMO (the August agreements) and a papal visit, so a successful trip would complete his goals.

The pope’s ‘hope, peace and reconciliation’ message of his visit is important. Twice previously, the FRELIMO-led government and RENAMO have reached definitive agreements, in Rome (1992) and Maputo (2014), but failed to fully end bloodshed. This new August 2019 agreement is the third attempt, and if it is to last, it will require political goodwill, compromise and an acceptance of more inclusive national politics by both parties.

There are two immediate threats to this agreement. The first is the forthcoming 15 October elections and their conduct could make or break it. Accepting reconciliation and greater pluralism underpins this agreement, but RENAMO expects to increase its share of the parliamentary vote and win a majority in some provinces (and therefore indirectly elect their choice for governor).

A second threat is the ‘Military Junta’, a RENAMO splinter group that claims to be 500 strong, but probably accounts for 80 armed persons. It rejects the 6 August agreement and warns that it could disrupt the elections. This group has asked for mediation, and hopefully can be accommodated in a side deal to the main one agreed in August, which already provides for the reintegration of over 5,000 RENAMO supporters and combatants.

A recent Chatham House research paper on elite bargains in Mozambique concluded that the October elections will be the first immediate test of the August agreement. If the elections pass without significant electoral manipulation or violence and this August deal sticks on the third attempt, the domestic focus should then move onto poverty reduction, combating inequality, education and solving the new security crisis with Islamic militants in Cabo Delgado province.

Zimbabwe Futures 2030: A Vision for Inclusive Long-Term Economic Recovery 10 October 2019 — 10:00AM TO 12:15PM Anonymous (not verified) 5 September 2019 Harare, Zimbabwe

In its Vision 2030, the government of Zimbabwe committed itself to facilitating an open market and stable economy through strategies such as the Transitional Stabilization Programme (TSP) and new industrialization policy. The private sector is pivotal to these objectives and creating an environment conducive to inclusive and job-creating economic growth. Economic growth can only be achieved with a conducive policy environment and government support to underpin markets with provision of public goods, entrepreneurial incentives and protect contract enforcement and dispute resolution mechanisms.

This event will launch a new Chatham House Africa Programme publication on Zimbabwe’s Vision 2030. The paper is the culmination of an inclusive research process that has drawn on senior private sector expertise, civil society, academics, technocratic elements of government and other experts to develop policy recommendations that will support inclusive economic growth in Zimbabwe.

This event is held in partnership with the Zimbabwe Business Club and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS). It is supported by KAS and the Dulverton Trust.

Economic Recovery and Anticorruption in South Africa: Assessing Progress on the Reform Agenda 4 December 2019 — 3:00PM TO 4:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 25 November 2019 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

South Africa has significant economic potential based on its resource endowment, quality human capital and well-developed infrastructure compared to the region. However, the country’s economic growth rate has not topped 2 per cent since 2013, and in 2018, was below 1 per cent. This has put a strain on citizens and communities in a country that still suffers from structural inequality, poverty and high unemployment. Economic recovery and anti-corruption were the central pillars of President Cyril Ramaphosa’s 2019 electoral campaign and he has set an investment target of $100 billion. However, voters and investors alike are demanding faster and more visible progress from the country’s enigmatic leader who has a reputation for caution and calculation.

At this event, Professor Nick Binedell will discuss the progress of and opposition to the president’s economic reform agenda and the opportunities for international investment to support long term inclusive and sustainable growth in South Africa.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

Can Liberation Movements Really Rid Southern Africa of Corruption? Expert comment sysadmin 16 December 2019

Southern Africa’s national liberation movements have survived ‘end of decade’ elections across the region. Combating corruption has been at the heart of many of the campaigns, but the question is can they succeed?

Swapo’s victory in Namibia two weeks ago was the last in a series of recent ‘end of decade’ elections that have returned dominant parties to power across Southern Africa. However, the “enduring appeal of liberation” is wearing thin.

Experiences across the region show that if governments are to deliver on their electoral promises, they must empower institutions, actively promote a culture of accountability and transparency within their party ranks and pursue economic reforms that untangle the web of party-state-business alliances. Such actions are critical for the survival of national liberation movements as the dominant force in the politics of Southern Africa – but will be difficult to implement.

Avoid political factionalism

South Africa, Botswana, Angola and Zimbabwe all saw new presidents take over just before elections. All used the rhetoric of anti-corruption to distance themselves from the tainted image of their predecessors. But acting on this requires a shift in mind-set in parties that have always preferred to deal with their problems behind closed doors. High profile adversaries from past regimes make tempting targets but could also drive party divisions.

In Angola, the transition of power was safeguarded by an agreement that former president José Eduardo dos Santos would be immune from prosecution. But this week his son faced corruption charges before the country’s supreme court, a high-profile example of a wave of anti-corruption cases across Southern Africa, driven by dominant parties wary of their future.

The allegations against José Filemino De Sousa Dos Santos, nickname ‘Zenu’, include a $500-million fraud involving the country’s central bank. Pressure is also mounting on Zenu’s sister Isabel — once prominent in Angola, she is now absent from public life.

Other leaders have had to tread more carefully. Immunity was a luxury Cyril Ramaphosa was neither willing nor politically able to grant Jacob Zuma in South Africa. Reliant on a few close allies at the top of the party, Ramaphosa lacks foot soldiers at the grassroots level, and his campaign against corruption within the ANC has faced persistent opposition.

Rebuilding institutions and empowering authorities takes time, and with few high-profile cases to point to, people are getting restless. This is also the case in Zimbabwe, where a worsening economic situation has left policy reformers politically isolated.

Party, state, and business

Long term incumbency has blurred the distinction between the party and the state. Liberation movements have created vast party-linked business empires. Political allegiance grants access to economic resources through appointments to lucrative positions in state-owned enterprises, preferential bids for tenders and licenses, and direct access to decision makers.

In Angola, this was fuelled by oil revenues. In South Africa, state capture flourished in an environment where the ANC and its constituent elements had significant power on the panels that chose leaders for state-owned enterprises (SOEs). In Namibia, an Icelandic fishing company paid backhanders to officials for fishing rights in what has become known as the ‘Fishrot’ scandal. Zanu-PF officials’ access to preferential foreign exchange rates present them with lucrative opportunities in Zimbabwe.

Ending this bureaucratic rent seeking goes beyond appointing ‘clean’ officials, which has been central to the anti-corruption campaigns in Angola and South Africa. Governments must also allow scrutiny of the state and empower those institutions designed for that role, such as the National Prosecuting Authority and the Public Protector in South Africa. Zimbabwe’s auditor general has published an in-depth report of the state of corruption in the country’s SOEs.

Companies must also be held to account for their role in aiding, and at worst directly benefitting, from state graft. International businesses have actively sought to benefit from corruption. They are now starting to face the consequences. A former Credit Suisse banker has pleaded guilty in the US over handling alleged kickbacks in Mozambique’s $2-billion “tuna bond” scandal. Global banks and consultancies continue to feel the squeeze for their complicity in state capture in South Africa.

Competition and pluralism

National liberation movements may only have a limited window within which to act. Across the region civil society campaigns and investigative journalists have shed light on some of the worst abuses of power. Anti-corruption campaigns are starting to bite. The state will continue to play a central role in Southern African economies, an important arbiter of economic transformation able to balance the region’s highly unequal and resource-dependent economies.

But opposition, civil society and the media are also critical for the progression towards democratic competition and pluralism in Southern Africa. Parliaments remain vital for holding rulers to account. Long used to unchallenged dominance, liberation movements have significant adjustments to make to rise to the challenge of a new era.

This article was originally published in the Mail and Guardian.

Angola's Business Promise: Evaluating the Progress of Privatization and Other Economic Reforms 21 January 2020 — 2:30PM TO 3:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 16 January 2020 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Minister Nunes Júnior will discuss the progress of the Angolan government’s economic stabilization plans and business reform agenda including the privatization of some state-owned enterprises. These reforms could expand Angola’s exports beyond oil and stimulate new industries and more inclusive economic growth.

THIS EVENT IS NOW FULL AND REGISTRATION HAS CLOSED.

POSTPONED: Pursuing Economic Reform and Growth in South Africa: the view from the African National Congress 18 March 2020 — 10:30AM TO 11:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 3 March 2020 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

The government of South Africa is pursuing a programme of reform to revitalize the economy, strengthen institutions and combat corruption. The State of the Nation Address (SONA) on 13 February and the budget speech of 26 February represent the most significant articulation of the government’s economic strategy. Central to this is the government’s plans for the energy sector, which is fundamental for reviving the economy, and the reform of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs). But questions remain about possible divergence of the approach taken by government ministers from the policy position of the ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC), and what this might mean for the sustainability and progress of reform.

At this event, Paul Mashatile, Treasurer General of the ANC, will discuss the party’s assessment of reform efforts to date and priorities for delivering on inclusive growth.

PLEASE NOTE THIS EVENT IS POSTPONED UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.

COVID-19 in South Africa: Leadership, Resilience and Inequality Expert comment sysadmin 7 May 2020

In a world looking for leadership, South Africa’s president Cyril Ramaphosa has been remarkable. One year after he carried the time-worn ANC through a national election, South Africans are crying out for more.

In the COVID-19 crisis so far, Cyril Ramaphosa has been widely praised for displaying the decisive leadership so many hoped for when they cast their ballot for him in May 2019. Buttressed by others such as health minister Dr Zweli Mkhize, and on a simple objective to prevent transmission, South Africa has been a lesson to the world. Act fast. Act hard.

Former president Thabo Mbeki’s disastrous response to the HIV crisis cast a long shadow over his legacy, and Ramaphosa has taken note. South Africa has had one of the tightest lockdowns in the world. No exercise. No cigarettes. No alcohol.

The lockdown was imposed when the country had only around 1,000 recorded cases and just two deaths. As a result, transmission from returning travellers has not yet led to an exponential infection rate within the community. The government’s swift reaction has bought much needed time with the peak now seemingly delayed to September or October.

Continental and national leadership

Ramaphosa has also emerged as a key focal point for Africa-wide responses. As current chair of the African Union (AU) he leads the continental engagement with the World Health Organization (WHO), and the various international finance institutions, while South African officials are working with the AU and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) on a push for African debt restructuring.

He has also been active in trouble shooting to unlock external assistance to the continent, including from China and Russia. Appointing special envoys is typical of his boardroom-honed leadership style.

International and regional partnerships are vital for resilience and the arrival of 217 Cuban doctors to South Africa is strongly reminiscent of the liberationist solidarity of the Cold War era. And regional economies remain dependent on South Africa to protect their own vulnerable citizens. Following the 2008 financial crisis, it was South Africa’s regional trading relationships that remained robust, while trade with its main global partners in China and the US dropped.

Despite the plaudits, Ramaphosa remains vulnerable to challenge at home, notably around his failure to stimulate South Africa’s moribund economy. On the eve of lockdown, Moody’s joined its peers Standard and Poor’s and Fitch in giving South Africa a below investment grade credit rating. The move was a long time coming. Long mooted economic reforms were slow to materialise, and South Africa had fallen into recession.

Ramaphosa depends on a small core of close advisors and allies, initially united in apparent opposition to the kleptocratic rule of President Jacob Zuma and the deep patronage networks he created within both the party and the state. But this allegiance is being tested by economic reality. Support within the party was already drifting prior to the crisis.

Disagreements are not just technocratic – there are big ideological questions in play around the role of the state in the economy, the level of intervention, and its affordability, with key government figures sceptical of rapid market reforms. Energy minister and former union stalwart Gwede Mantashe is wary of job losses, and minister of public enterprises Pravin Gordhan protective of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Before coronavirus hit, Ramaphosa seemed content to allow these policy disputes to play themselves out with little decisive intervention.

Slow progress on reform, against worsening economic performance, left Ramaphosa and his allies exposed. In January the president missed the UK’s African Investment Summit in order to assert control over a party meeting at which it was expected his detractors would seek to remove Gordhan.

COVID-19 has sharpened thinking

As the independently assertive - and eminently quotable - pro-market reformist finance minister Tito Mboweni stated, ‘you can’t eat ideology’. Accelerated reform and restructuring is required if the government turns to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for assistance.

For the first time, Gordhan has been forced to deny a bailout to beleaguered state airline South African Airways (SAA), and the government’s lockdown bailout of R500 billion has been applauded by business. Much like the fiscal stimulus and recovery plan of 2018, it relies on smart spending, targeting sectors with high multiplier effects. It also includes significant reserve bank loans.

But it has been criticised for not doing enough to help the most vulnerable. There is considerable fear of what could happen when the virus takes hold in South Africa’s townships and informal settlements where social distancing is almost impossible, basic toilet facilities are shared, and HIV and TB rates high.

There are mounting concerns of the humanitarian cost of a prolonged lockdown, and the government has been faster than others in implementing a tiered lockdown system, trying to get people back to work and keep the economy afloat.

South Africa has been criticized by the UN for the use of lethal force by security forces in enforcing lockdown and, in a society plagued by corruption, there are fears legislation to stop the spread of false information could be used to restrict legitimate reporting on the virus response or other issues.

COVID-19 shines a spotlight on societies’ fault-lines worldwide. South Africa is often touted as having one of the highest levels of inequality in the world but, in a globalized economy, these divisions are international as much as they are local.

Resilience comes from within, but also depends on regional and global trading and financial systems. South Africans and international partners have long recognised Ramaphosa’s leadership qualities as an impressive voice for the global south.

But he must also be an advocate for South Africa’s poor. This crisis could accelerate implementation of his landmark pro-poor National Health Insurance and Universal Health Care programmes. Or the hit of COVID-19 on top of South Africa’s existing economic woes could see them derailed entirely. Ramaphosa must push through economic reforms at the same time as managing COVID-19 and rebuilding trust in his government.

Webinar: South Africa's Economic Recovery Beyond COVID-19 27 May 2020 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 18 May 2020

Mozambique’s Peace and National Reconciliation Agreement: One Year On 6 August 2020 — 2:30PM TO 4:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 29 July 2020 Online

August 6, 2020 marks one year since the Peace and National Reconciliation Agreement was signed in Maputo. The agreement, signed by the President of Mozambique Filipe Nyusi and RENAMO leader Ossufo Momade, and witnessed by regional and international political and religious leaders, ended the return to conflict that started in 2013.

It also paved the way for Mozambique’s national elections in October 2019. Since the agreement, the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) won a landslide victory in the elections, weakening RENAMO, and a splinter group has conducted targeted armed violence in Manica and Sofala provinces. Yet, the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) process has made progress.

At this event, senior figures reflect on the peace agreement and the key factors of its success. The event also draws upon insights from the authors of recent publications on the latest peace agreement in the context of longer term trends of democratization and peace-building in Mozambique.

A Chatham House Africa Programme research paper published in August 2019, Prospects for a Sustainable Elite Bargain in Mozambique: Third Time Lucky?, examined how the deal was achieved. The Portuguese version includes the full text of the peace accord. Read the research paper in Portuguese or English here.

South Africa's Economic Reform and Employment in the Context of the Coronavirus Pandemic 3 September 2020 — 3:00PM TO 4:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 26 August 2020 Online

President of COSATU, Zingiswa Losi, discusses the organization’s priorities for protecting jobs and workers, and working with other stakeholders to build a sustainable post-pandemic economy.

Employment in South Africa fell by an estimated 18 per cent between February and April 2020. The measures imposed to control the spread of COVID-19 suffocated an already weak economy and unemployment has hit a new high.

The stated aims of the government’s economic reform plans include the support of job creation in labour intensive industries, but the reform of the state and rebalancing of the economy and fiscus could lead to further job losses in state agencies and enterprises.

Protecting jobs while ensuring the health and safety of workers are dual priorities, and require the joint commitment and ‘social compact’ of labour, business and government.

Zimbabwe’s Economic Governance and Regional Integration 17 November 2020 — 12:00PM TO 1:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 6 November 2020 Online

Panellists discuss policy and governance for long-term economic prosperity in Zimbabwe, reflecting on the role of institutional change and regional integration in the context of the shocks caused by the coronavirus pandemic.

At this virtual event, panellists and participants will discuss policy and governance for long-term economic prosperity in Zimbabwe, reflecting on the role of institutional change and regional integration.

The government of Zimbabwe has emphasized its commitment to economic reform and its ambition to achieve upper-middle-income status by 2030, but there are considerable challenges to overcome.

The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated existing economic fragility. Improving the business climate to attract international private-sector investment will be contingent on clear, consistent and coherent policy and implementation, including targeting abuse and corruption.

Zimbabwe has, in recent years, successfully strengthened its regional trade integration, although some trade frictions remain. This is an important factor not only for catalysing economic growth in Zimbabwe, but for supporting regional prosperity and post-COVID recovery.

This webinar is the second in a series of events held in partnership with the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung on Zimbabwe’s economic reform and recovery.

Read a meeting summary

This event will also be broadcast live on the Africa Programme Facebook page.

South Africa’s foreign policy: Reflections on the United Nations Security Council and the African Union 20 January 2021 — 2:00PM TO 3:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 8 January 2021 Online

HE Dr Naledi Pandor, South Africa’s Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, discusses South Africa’s role in pursuing its regional and global goals.

To receive joining instructions, please finalise your registration by clicking the link below. Once you have registered you will receive a confirmation email from Zoom, which will include the unique joining link you will need to attend.

In 2019-2020, South Africa served its third term as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, seeking to strengthen its role as a bridge-builder and further justify a more permanent role for the country and continent on the body.

In February 2021, South Africa will also conclude its time as Chair of the African Union, having used its tenure to promote peace and security issues, including closer cooperation with the UNSC, and advance regional economic integration.

South Africa took up these roles at a time of global and regional upheaval. As COVID-19 tested countries’ commitment to cooperation over isolation, South Africa coordinated regional responses to address the challenges of stressed public health systems, vaccine strategies, and economic stimulus and debt support across Africa.

Its leadership has been further tested by ongoing and emerging insecurity in the Sahel, and in Cabo Delgado in neighbouring Mozambique. The crux of its regional strategy remains squaring the circle between promoting regional economic cooperation while protecting its own domestic economic priorities.

At this event, HE Dr Naledi Pandor, Minister of International Relations and Cooperation of the Republic of South Africa, reflects on the country’s two years on the UNSC and one year of chairing the AU, and discuss South Africa’s role in pursuing regional and global goals.

This event will also be broadcast live on the Chatham House Africa Programme’s Facebook page.

Read event transcript. 

Angola Forum 2021: Policy options to support economic recovery in Angola 7 October 2021 — 2:00PM TO 5:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 22 September 2021 Online

Speakers discuss policy options to support economic recovery in Angola as the country transitions away from a state-led oil economy to a private-sector-led growth model.

The government of Angola has made some progress on a range of policies targeting macroeconomic stability and structural reform. However, the country has been suffering from a recurring economic recession for six consecutive years, with the last positive annual GDP growth rate posted in 2015 at 0.9 per cent.

The national budget remains dependent on oil revenue, leaving the country highly exposed to volatile oil prices particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic. While revenues collapsed, increased spending was needed to respond to the health crisis and estimates of Angola’s debt spike range from 130 to 150 per cent of its GDP by the close of 2020.

At this virtual Angola Forum, speakers discuss policy options to support economic recovery in Angola as the country transitions away from a state-led oil economy to a private-sector-led growth model.

The Forum launches the English translation of the Angola Economic Report 2019-20 by the Centro de Estudos de Investigação (CEIC) of the Catholic University of Angola in partnership with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS), and the findings of Afrobarometer’s first ever survey in Angola, Ovilongwa – Estudos de Opinião Pública, which interviewed 2,400 adult Angolans and sampled individual perceptions on democracy and economic reform in Angola.

This event will be held in English and Portuguese with simultaneous interpretation.

The Forum will also be broadcast live on the Africa Programme Facebook page.

Zambia’s political and economic reform and recovery 5 November 2021 — 11:30AM TO 12:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 2 November 2021 Chatham House and Online

At this event, HE Hakainde Hichilema, president of the Republic of Zambia, discusses his vision for Zambia’s development and long-term political and economic reform and recovery.

Zambia’s new administration, following the general elections of August 2021, faces a daunting challenge of reversing economic contraction, lowering income-eroding inflation, and addressing the unsustainable national debt.

The country has been one of the few to seek debt restructuring under the G20’s new Common Framework for Debt Treatments, and its immediate priorities include a prospective agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Young Zambians are eager for jobs and improved living standards. But the government’s ambition to create more jobs and achieve middle-income status will depend on both attracting new investment into its copper sector and pursuing a programme of economic diversification supporting growth beyond the mining industry.

Addressing these economic concerns will also need to be supported by a programme of political reform and rehabilitation of citizens’ trust in the state.

South Africa’s ANC party policy conference 2022: Outcomes and prospects 10 August 2022 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 4 August 2022 Online

Paul Mashatile, Treasurer-General of the African National Congress (ANC), discusses the outcomes of the 6th ANC Policy Conference 2022.

The African National Congress (ANC) recently concluded its 6th National Policy Conference in Johannesburg, in the year that the ANC has declared ‘The Year of Unity and Renewal to Defend and Advance South Africa’s Democratic Gains’. The conference was a precursor to the party’s 55th National Elective Conference to be held in December.

The conference has come less than a year after municipal polls in which the ANC garnered less than 50 per cent of votes, its lowest since 1994. Many believe internal factionalism is impeding party reform and hampering its ability to address unemployment and entrenched inequality.

At this webinar, Paul Mashatile, Treasurer-General of the ANC, will discuss the outcomes of the ANC Policy Conference 2022, including measures to accelerate inclusive growth, job creation and a just energy transition.

This event will also be broadcast live on the Chatham House Africa Programme’s Facebook page.

Angola forum 2022: Prospects for Angola's social and economic future 15 December 2022 — 1:00PM TO 4:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 28 November 2022 Online

At this online Angola forum, experts will discuss Angola’s social and economic future, and what to expect from 2023.

At this virtual Angola Forum, speakers will discuss Angola’s social and economic future and what to expect from 2023.

Angola experienced positive economic momentum in 2022 allowing it to exit its six-year recession, with the economy taking centre stage in the August national multiparty elections. Increased oil prices and high levels of production have driven Angola’s economic growth and improved macroeconomic conditions, as well as helping the country to reduce its public debt to 56.5 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (down from 79.7 per cent in 2021).

However, a global economic downturn in 2023, with increased inflation, means Angola’s re-elected MPLA government will need to focus on job creation, greater economic inclusivity and diversifying away from an oil-led economy. It will also require Angola to navigate its international partnerships more effectively in this era of heightened geopolitical rivalries.  

At this online Angola forum, experts will discuss Angola’s social and economic future and what to expect from 2023. Speakers will reflect on the social and economic trends seen in 2021-22 and explore election trends, human rights and international relations.

This Angola Forum is supported by the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung.