Transatlantic Tech Talks: Cooperation or sovereignty? Audio bhorton.drupal 15 December 2021

A new mini-series from Undercurrents explores international cooperation on regulating the tech sector.

Transatlantic Tech Talks is a three part mini-series on the Undercurrents podcast feed, produced with the support of Microsoft, which explores the state of international cooperation on digital governance between the United States, the UK and Europe.

As technological innovation accelerates, and new digital tools and business models arise, governments are working to develop a framework of regulations to safeguard the rights and interests of their citizens. Not all stakeholders agree, however, on the best way to achieve this. While some advocate a ‘digital cooperation’ approach based on transparency and data-sharing, others are more concerned with maintaining ‘digital sovereignty’.

In the first episode of this series, Ben is joined by Casper Klynge, Harriet Moynihan and Marianne Schneider-Petsinger, who set out the broad context for these debates. They assess where the major government, private sector and civil society actors stand on the question of digital governance, and how they are approaching the international negotiations.

Elizabeth Wilmshurst CMG appointed Honorary Queen’s Counsel News release jon.wallace 14 January 2022

Founder of the International Law Programme at Chatham House recognized for her major contribution to the law of England and Wales.

Elizabeth Wilmshurst CMG, distinguished fellow of Chatham House’s International Law Programme, has been awarded the title of Honorary Queen’s Counsel (QC Honoris Causa), recognizing her major contribution to the law of England and Wales, outside practice in the courts. The Lord Chancellor will preside over an appointment ceremony at Westminster Hall on 21 March 2022.

Elizabeth founded the International Law Programme at Chatham House and is an academic expert member of Doughty Street Chambers. She was a legal adviser in the United Kingdom diplomatic service between 1974 and 2003. Between 1994 and 1997 she was the Legal Adviser to the United Kingdom mission to the United Nations in New York. She also took part in the negotiations for the establishment of the International Criminal Court.

Throughout her career, Elizabeth has worked to strengthen the role of international law in reducing global tensions, addressing cross-border challenges and promoting individual liberty, including through influential publications at the Institute such as The Chatham House Principles of International Law on the Use of Force in Self-Defence. 

Robin Niblett CMG, Director and Chief Executive of Chatham House said:

‘We are delighted by this award which recognizes Elizabeth’s outstanding contribution to the field of international law, both in government and – on a continuing basis – through the International Law Programme at Chatham House.’

Ukraine: Debunking Russia’s legal justifications Expert comment NCapeling 24 February 2022

Russia is violating international law in Ukraine using baseless allegations, and states’ responses should be guided accordingly.

Russia has begun a large-scale military attack on Ukraine, having first declared it recognizes Donetsk and Luhansk as separate states. It scarcely needs saying Russia is violating international law – violating the prohibition in the United Nations (UN) Charter on the use of force, violating the obligation to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other states, and violating the prohibition on intervention.

But Russia is using the language of the law to defend its actions. In all the recent verbiage of President Vladimir Putin, some attempts at legal arguments can be elicited – but they do not stand up to scrutiny.

Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits the threat or use of force with the only two Charter exceptions to this prohibition being self-defence and action mandated by the UN Security Council. In his speech on 23 February, Putin points to two grounds on which Russia relies on self-defence – defence in aid of the two breakaway republics and self-defence in the light of threats against Russia itself.

Donetsk, Luhansk, and collective self-defence

Putin said ‘the people’s republics of Donbass turned to Russia with a request for help’ and went on to seek to justify his military action under Article 51 of the Charter. But it is only in respect of states that the right of collective self-defence exists – humanitarian intervention on behalf of individuals in a state has not gained a place in international law. And it is only Russia which has recognized the statehood of the two regions.

Putin repeated on 23 February his earlier allegation that the people of the two breakaway republics are being repressed by the Ukraine government, and even that genocide is being committed against them. This baseless allegation is relevant not only to the claim of self-defence on behalf of these regions but also to Russia’s ‘recognition’ of them as separate states.

International law does not give the inhabitants of a part of a state the right to secede from that state. The aspect of self-determination which allows for independence of a ‘people’ applies to peoples in colonies and other overseas territories under the occupation of another state. The other aspect of self-determination is ‘internal’ and comprises the right to freely choose political status and pursue economic, social, and cultural development within the state – as the Minsk accords sought to provide for Donetsk and Luhansk.

There is a somewhat controversial theory in international law that would give a right of secession from a state if the people in question were subject to extreme abuse of human rights and systematic oppression. This is the theory of remedial secession, which some countries, such as Switzerland, used in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in relation to Kosovo’s declaration of independence from Serbia – an independence still not recognized by Russia.

But the theory has no support from the international courts and, even if it did, Russia itself has stated previously that a right of remedial secession is ‘limited to truly extreme circumstances, such as an outright armed attack by the parent State, threatening the very existence of the people in question’ (see Russia’s submissions to the ICJ in the Kosovo case, para 88).

The facts do not substantiate Russia’s claims anyway. The law is as stated on behalf of the UN Secretary-General on 21 February – that Russia’s decision to recognize the independence of the breakaway regions is a ‘violation of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine and inconsistent with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.’ There are no ‘states’ which can request the use of military force.

Is Ukraine a threat against Russia?

Putin refers to the ‘further expansion of the infrastructure of the North Atlantic Alliance, the military development of the territories of Ukraine’ as creating an ‘anti-Russia’ comprising a ‘real threat not just to our interests, but to the very existence of our state, its sovereignty’.

Article 51 allows for self-defence ‘if an armed attack occurs’. This has been interpreted by many states to include defence against the threat of an imminent attack – for example, there is no requirement to wait until a nuclear strike has begun. But under no interpretation of ‘imminence’ can the situation in Ukraine constitute a threat to Russia. There have been no threats of force against Russia from Ukraine nor from NATO member states. There is nothing to support a legal justification for Russia’s military attack against Ukraine.

The myth of Ukraine never having had ‘real statehood’ also does not give any legal justification for Russian aggression. The UN is based on the ‘principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members’ (Art. 2(1) of the UN Charter). Ukraine retained its membership in the UN at the dissolution of the USSR, having been one of the founding members of the UN as the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

What are the legal consequences of Russia’s actions?

Within the UN, it is the Security Council which has the mandate to uphold international peace and security, and act when there is a threat to the peace. But there will be no help from there with Russia’s status as a permanent member holding a veto.

The UN General Assembly may act instead. Since 2014 it has adopted a series of resolutions (the latest on 9 December 2021) requiring Russia to withdraw immediately and unconditionally from Crimea. But the General Assembly does not have the powers of the Security Council, and cannot mandate peacekeepers or the use of force.

In due course there may be the need for a UN Human Rights Commission of Inquiry to be launched if there are breaches of human rights law and international humanitarian law, and human rights cases may be brought against Russia at the European Court of Human Rights. But international institutions do not have the necessary powers to stop what is going on right now.

International law gives the right to Ukraine, being attacked, to call for support from other states. And as well as imposing sanctions, states may wish to consider cyber countermeasures. Some of the recent cyber activity against Ukraine has been attributed by the US, UK, and Australia to the Russian Main Intelligence Unit (GRU).

Sanctions must not prevent humanitarian work in Ukraine Expert comment NCapeling 30 May 2022

Restrictions on supply of certain items and financial sanctions can impede vital relief unless adequate safeguards are put in place such as exceptions or general licences.

Sanctions play a major role in the response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The United Nations (UN) has not imposed sanctions, but an important number of states have done so. They have imposed a wide array of restrictions and the number of targeted – or ‘designated’ – persons is unprecedented.

The public has been captivated by the freezing of oligarchs’ assets. There is ongoing discussion about seizing them to provide compensation for war damage. Debate continues about how far to ban oil and gas imports.

One aspect of the sanctions has received far less attention, even though it can exacerbate the effect of the conflict on civilians. Some of the trade restrictions and financial sanctions pose immediate and concrete challenges to the capacity of humanitarian organizations to work in Ukraine and in neighbouring states.

Trade sanctions imposed by the European Union (EU) and UK prohibit the export or supply of certain goods and technology in the transport, telecommunications, energy, and oil or mineral exploration sectors to non-government-controlled areas of the Donetsk or Luhansk oblasts, or for use there.

Restricted items include technical equipment which is necessary for humanitarian operations, such as water pumps and refrigerating equipment, but also far more mundane items such as vehicles for transport of persons and goods, and office equipment that are necessary for humanitarian organizations trying to work in the region.

Designations can reduce options for support

Financial sanctions also raise problems. Some are immediately apparent. Significantly for humanitarian operations, the two de facto republics of Donetsk and Luhansk are designated by the EU, the UK, and the US. Consequently, it is prohibited to make funds or assets available to them directly or indirectly.

This prohibition covers the payment of any taxes, licences, and other fees to these authorities, as well as the provision of assets to ministries under their control in the course of humanitarian operations, such as ministries of health and education.

Designations of other entities may also be relevant, such as Russian ‘state enterprises’ which operate in these areas and are the sole providers of commodities necessary for humanitarian response, such as heating fuel.

These are the designations which most obviously impact humanitarian response. However, more than 1,000 persons and entities have been designated and humanitarian organizations must avoid purchasing goods and services from them.

Risk-averse commercial partners

Commercial actors – such as banks, insurers, freight companies and commodity providers – whose services are required by humanitarian organizations must also comply with the sanctions. Experience shows that the due diligence measures adopted by humanitarian organizations do not always allay concerns of risk-averse sectors such as banks.

Fears of violating the sanctions, coupled with the fact humanitarian organizations are rarely profitable clients, have led them to severely restrict the services they provide.

This is not the first occasion the problem has arisen. What is different in relation to Ukraine is the number of designated persons and the ‘sanctions packages’ adopted in quick succession. As compliance officers struggle to keep abreast, their institutions become even more risk-averse.

For UK banks, the situation is exacerbated by the adoption of the Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Act 2022. This amends existing rules by removing the requirement for the UK Treasury to prove knowledge or reasonable cause to suspect that a transaction violated sanctions, imposing strict liability for sanctions violations.

Time for the UK to follow others

The EU, the US, Switzerland, and other states which have imposed sanctions have sought to mitigate their adverse effects by including safeguards for humanitarian action. Although the UK has largely replicated the measures adopted by the EU in terms of restrictions and designations, it lags behind in including such safeguards.

The UK trade restrictions and financial sanctions do not include exceptions for humanitarian action. While several general licences have been issued, none relate to humanitarian operations.

Instead, the UK measures foresee only the possibility of applying for specific licences – from the Treasury in the case of financial sanctions and the Department of International Trade for trade restrictions. But obtaining specific licences is a time-consuming process which is simply not appropriate for emergency response.

If the UK is to show it is serious about responding to the immense needs caused by the invasion it must introduce appropriate safeguards in its sanctions – either in the form of exceptions or general licences.

What matters is they cover all key humanitarian organizations responding to the Ukraine crisis that are subject to UK sanctions – either because they are UK persons or because their funding agreements with the UK government require them to comply with UK measures.

These include UN agencies, funds and programmes, components of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) responding to the crisis in Ukraine and neighbouring states. The provision must also clearly extend to commercial entities which provide necessary services for humanitarian operations.

Given the UK recently adopted an exception along similar lines in relation to the Afghanistan sanctions, there is a valuable precedent for Ukraine.

Geopolitical corporate responsibility can drive change Expert comment NCapeling 26 July 2022

Russia’s long invasion of Ukraine is testing the commitment of business, but this could see the emergence of a new pillar of support for the rules-based international order.

The massive exit of more than 1,000 international companies from Russia has surpassed – by a factor of nearly ten in merely four months – the number which pulled out of apartheid-led South Africa over an entire decade.

These company exits extend beyond those industries targeted for sanctions – oil and gas, banks and financial services, aerospace, and certain technology sectors – to include hundreds in consumer products ranging from Levi’s and H&M clothing to Coca-Cola and McDonalds. Many of these companies may wish to return to a post-conflict – or post-Putin – Russia, while a few have already sold their Russian operations, as McDonald’s has to an existing Siberian licensee.

Both reputational and operational factors are driving the huge exodus: reputational as companies have chosen to disassociate themselves from Putin’s regime; operational as transportation routes and supply chains have been interrupted.

Few of these companies have made explicit the principles at stake, while many still face ‘tricky legal, operational and ethical considerations’ and some have kept operations in place. But the collective impact of the exit in response to Russia’s affront to international law has sent shockwaves around the world.

Current issues and future implications

Minds now turn to whether this exodus sets a blueprint for the future, and how companies having to make complex and sensitive risk assessments and global business planning decisions can address both current issues as well as similar future challenges.

The new Declaration from the Business for Ukraine Coalition – an international civil society initiative of organizations and individuals – encourages companies to reinforce ‘responsible exit’ from Russia ‘in response to its unprovoked, full-scale war on Ukraine’.

The declaration’s objective is to ‘block access to the economic and financial resources enabling Russian aggression’ and it urgently calls on companies that have terminated or suspended their business operations and relationships to ‘stand by those commitments until the territorial sovereignty of Ukraine within internationally recognized borders is restored.’

It also states companies yet to terminate or suspend operations in Russia should do so unless they can demonstrate through due diligence that their provision of ‘essential’ services or products – such as medicines – meet critical humanitarian needs.

The 2022 Edelman Trust Barometer Special Report: The Geopolitical Business suggests Ukraine represents an inflection point posing ‘a new test’ for business. According to an online survey of 14,000 respondents in 14 countries, including employees, NGOs, and other stakeholders, there is a ‘rising call’ for business to be more engaged in geopolitics, with CEOs ‘expected to shape policy’ on societal and geopolitical issues.

Such expectations have been intensifying with the impetus of the combined stakeholder capitalism and corporate purpose agenda, even as a political backlash in the US against the environmental, social, and governance (ESG) movement linking institutional investors and multinational corporations gains momentum.

The emergence of corporate activism is a further development – partly driven by employees and accelerated during the pandemic – on issues of economic inequality, racial injustice, and gender equality, as well as the climate crisis.

When considering what broader purpose should drive this corporate geopolitical engagement, the Business for Ukraine Declaration offers an answer, calling Russia’s aggression ‘an attack on the rules-based international order which must be protected to ‘safeguard the international community and the global economy.’

This points to broader interests and values at stake in the Russian war on Ukraine because supporting the rules-based international order can become the basis of a new geopolitical corporate responsibility. Business, especially multinational corporations and institutional investors, fundamentally depend on and have enormously benefitted from this order.

Economic development needs a stable rules-based international order

Trade and investment, entrepreneurship, and innovation – the sinews of economic development – depend on predictable, rational behaviour by states at home and abroad. Individual companies and entire industries share a stake in upholding this order at a time when its stability and even legitimacy is undergoing a severe challenge.

The rules-based international order has evolved since the adoption of the UN Charter in 1945, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, and the establishment of the standards, norms and institutions that reflect and reinforce these lodestars. It defines the international community, the rule of law, accountable governance, civic freedoms, and human rights within nations. It also supports national self-determination, sovereignty, and the disavowal of the use of force to alter borders among nations, and it provides accountability for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.

Business has a fundamental stake in the international order as the framework for stability, prosperity, open societies, and markets.

A new geopolitical corporate responsibility does not need to become a doctrine but can instead be an agenda to support the international rules-based order under stress. Such an agenda may help multinationals deal with expectations they already face, such as:

Avoiding situations where they cause, contribute, or are directly linked to human rights abuses. This objective is enshrined in the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and companies can be further informed by the new UN Guide to Heightened Human Rights Due Diligence for Business in Conflict-Affected Contexts.

Committing to the ‘shared space’ of the rule of law, accountable governance, civic freedoms, and human rights. These are both the enablers of civil society and the underpinning of sustainable and profitable business and investment environments. The Chatham House synthesis paper The role of the private sector in protecting civic space sets forth the rationale for companies to defend these vital elements.

Supporting peace, justice, and strong institutions both within nations and across the international community as set forth by UN Sustainable Development Goal 16. The SDG 16 Business Framework: Inspiring Transformational Governance shows how companies, as well as national governments and international institutions, can contribute to these building blocks of stability and prosperity.

Demonstrating corporate responsibility at the national and geopolitical levels to enhance equity, transparency, and accountability. Multinationals are already challenged to accept minimum corporate taxation within and across jurisdictions, curb excessive executive compensation, endorse mandatory disclosure of environmental and human rights due diligence, and strengthen corporate governance of ESG risks and responsibilities, including with respect to human rights.

Diminishing inequality by tackling poverty and ensuring sustainability by arresting the climate crisis. Alongside governments and international institutions, the business community already faces increasing pressure to improve its efforts in these areas.

Cyberspace governance at the United Nations 18 January 2023 — 3:00PM TO 4:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 30 November 2022 Online

How can member states achieve lasting, adaptable, and meaningful success in cyberspace governance at the United Nations?

Now in its second iteration, the Open-ended Working Group on Information and Communications Technologies (OEWG) has been a space for United Nations member states to discuss the use, regulation and governance of cyberspace since 2019.

The progress of this forum in shaping cyberspace and its governance is evidenced by two consensus reports including a framework for responsible state behaviour in cyberspace and, more recently, plans for a Programme of Action. 
 
However, the true impact of these UN processes in limiting the threats of ICTs to international peace and security is contingent upon operationalizing the consensus at the international level and reflecting it in national policies and practices.

Pervasive challenges continue to hamper operationalization efforts, including differences in national capacities and capabilities, and divergences in national perspectives regarding the application of international law to cyberspace.

So, how can member states overcome these challenges and set this vital forum up for lasting, adaptable and meaningful success? What role does ‘multi-stakeholderism’ play in realizing responsible state behaviour in cyberspace?

With a dual focus on cyber capacity building and international law, this event considers how these two elements interact and intersect, how discussions on them could progress in the UN space and outside it and how the two contribute to a safer and more secure cyberspace for all. 
 
This event is organized jointly by the International Security and International Law Programmes at Chatham House to launch Phase 2 of the project ‘Cyberspace4All: Towards an inclusive approach to cyber governance’ which is funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands.

Humanitarian exceptions: A turning point in UN sanctions Expert comment LJefferson 20 December 2022

The UN Security Council has adopted a cross-cutting exception for humanitarian action in UN sanctions. What does it cover? What must happen next?

The UN Security Council has removed an obstacle to humanitarian work. On 9 December 2022, it adopted a resolution establishing a cross-cutting exception to existing – and future – UN financial sanctions for funds or assets necessary for humanitarian assistance and activities to meet basic human needs. In a coup for multilateralism, the council has been able to act, even when the Russian invasion of Ukraine has caused paralysis in other areas.

Resolution 2664 – introduced by Ireland and the US, co-sponsored by 53 states, and adopted by 14 votes in favour, with India abstaining – is the culmination of a decade of engagement between humanitarian organizations and states to find ways of avoiding the adverse impact of sanctions on the most vulnerable: people relying on humanitarian action for survival.

A reminder of the problem

Whilst sanctions are not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for civilian populations, aid agencies have argued for years that they do just this. UN financial sanctions prohibit making funds or other assets available directly or indirectly to designated persons or entities. Without adequate safeguards, incidental payments made during humanitarian operations, or relief consignments that are diverted and end up in the hands of such persons or entities can violate this prohibition.

Exceptions in Afghanistan and Haiti sanctions pave the way

Humanitarian actors have been decrying and documenting the impact of sanctions on their operations for years. Ensuring that sanctions did not hinder the COVID-19 response was a turning point in states’ willingness to address the issue.

Movement at Security Council level was gradual, starting off with demands in the renewals of certain country-specific sanctions that measures taken by member states to give effect to them comply with international law. The return to power of the Taliban called for a more radical approach.

In December 2021, the Council adopted a broad exception to the Afghanistan financial sanctions, covering the provision, payment and processing of funds and assets necessary for humanitarian action and for activities to meet basic human needs. A similar exception was adopted – almost unnoticed – in October 2022 in the newly-established Haiti sanctions.

These developments, coupled with the determination of elected Council member Ireland to find solutions, paved the way for the adoption of SCR 2664.

The scope of the humanitarian exception

SCR 2664 introduces a clear and broad exception that addresses the key challenges financial sanctions pose to humanitarian action. The exception expressly refers to the different ways in which funds or assets are allowed to reach designated persons or entities: by the provision of goods or payment of funds by humanitarian actors themselves; by the processing of funds by financial institutions; and by the provision of goods and services by other commercial actors whose services are necessary for humanitarian action such as insurers and freight companies.

The exception is broad in terms of the excluded activities: the provision of funds and assets necessary for humanitarian assistance and activities to meet basic human needs. The UN Somalia sanctions – the first, and for a decade the only, regime to include an express exception – exclude funds necessary for ‘humanitarian assistance’.

SCR 2615 on Afghanistan added the expression ‘activities to meet basic human needs’.  These go beyond humanitarian assistance, and have been interpreted as including activities necessary to sustain essential social services such as health and education, preserve essential community systems, and promote livelihoods and social cohesion.  These are essentially development programmes.  ‘Activities that support basic needs’ should be understood in a similar manner in SCR 2664.

SCR 2664 is not, however, a ‘blanket’ exception.  It only applies to financial sanctions.  These are not the only type of restriction in UN sanctions that can hinder humanitarian action. For example, organizations that send commodities into the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea must still go through the notoriously slow procedure of authorization by the sanctions committee.  Similarly, authorizations are still required for import of demining materials that fall within the scope of arms embargoes.

Opportunities for further engagement and additional safeguards

Recognizing that additional challenges remain, SCR 2664 requests the UN Secretary-General to draft a report on unintended adverse humanitarian consequences of all types of restrictions in UN sanctions. He is asked to include recommendations for minimizing and such unintended consequences, including by the adoption of additional cross-cutting exceptions.

Humanitarian organizations have played a pivotal role in advancing the agenda. SCR 2664 is the result of their relentless engagement with the Security Council. It is not the end of the road. Other restrictions raise problems, and the Council has left the door open to finding ways of addressing them.

Humanitarian actors should seize this opportunity to provide information, identifying the problematic types of restrictions and their consequences on their operations as specifically as possible.

What happens next?

It is UN member states that implement UN sanctions. For SCR 2664 to be truly effective, it is imperative that states give effect to it in domestic law and practice. In doing so, they must not narrow the scope of the exception.

Recent experience in Afghanistan has shown that even in situations when significant safeguards exist, key actors may be unaware of them or unclear as to their precise scope. Financial institutions in particular are fast to de-risk when sanctions are imposed, and remain wary of conducting transactions that they perceive as high-risk even though exceptions permit this.

OFAC – the Office of Foreign Assets Control in the US Treasury – has issued extensive guidance on the Afghanistan sanctions in the form of frequently asked questions.  These have played an extremely important role in ensuring full advantage is taken of the exceptions.

States should follow this example, and adopt guidance to raise awareness of the exception in SCR 2664 and to clarify its scope.

A valuable precedent for autonomous sanctions

SCR 2664 only applies to sanctions adopted by the UN Security Council. It does not extend to autonomous sanctions adopted by states or relevant international organizations such as the EU.

Seven ways Russia’s war on Ukraine has changed the world Feature jon.wallace 17 February 2023

Chatham House experts examine the shifts in geopolitical alliances, security, energy, and supply chains and whether these changes are likely to be long-lasting.

President Vladimir Putin’s decision to launch a full-scale re-invasion of Ukraine one year ago was a global shock which ‘marked an abrupt end to 30 years of globalization and all the international co-operation that made that possible’ with serious implications for countries around the world, outlined Chatham House director Bronwen Maddox in her inaugural lecture.

Not only has the war threatened the stability of Europe but it has also impacted food and energy security globally including in the Middle East and Africa, creating shock waves in a world barely recovering from the COVID-19 pandemic.

The ICC response to Russia’s war gives hope for justice Expert comment NCapeling 19 March 2023

The ICC’s arrest warrants against Putin and Lvova-Belova show the commission of international crimes is not without consequences.

Warrants of arrest for Russian president Vladimir Putin and Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova, commissioner for children’s rights in the president’s office, have been issued because the Pre-Trial Chamber II of the International Criminal Court (ICC) has reasonable grounds to believe they have committed war crimes.

Following an independent investigation and evidence-gathering by the ICC prosecutor Karim Khan in his first new case since taking office, the pair are accused of committing two different war crimes – the unlawful deportation of children from Ukraine to Russia, and the unlawful transfer of children from occupied areas of Ukraine to the Russian Federation.

The focus on those two war crimes is likely due to clear evidence that deportation and forcible transfer of thousands of Ukrainian children have occurred, as the Russian government was overt about its policy of taking Ukrainian children to Russia and placing them in camps or putting them up for adoption by Russian families.

Furthermore, in line with the Office of the Prosecutor’s policy on children, crimes against children are prioritized given their particularly vulnerable status.

Jurisdiction and enforcement

The ICC does not have jurisdiction over crimes committed fully in Russia by Russian nationals, as Russia is not a party to the Rome Statute which created the ICC.

However, it does have jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide committed in Ukraine irrespective of who committed them, pursuant to two declarations lodged by Ukraine in 2014 accepting the Court’s jurisdiction over its territory from November 2013.

Although a prosecution has been initiated, it is ultimately for the judges of the ICC to decide on the accused’s fate. But the chances of Putin getting arrested or tried for these offences are slim.

The ICC lacks enforcement or police powers and depends on state cooperation to execute arrest warrants. Also, because it cannot try individuals in their absence, a trial or conviction cannot occur without Putin and Lvova-Belova being in custody.

But by issuing and unsealing these arrest warrants, the ICC is relying on the symbolic function of international criminal law – it is publicly naming and shaming Putin and Lvova-Belova for the commission of serious atrocities, and it is sending a message to other leaders and the international community that such actions are not without consequence.

The arrest warrants also give victims some form of vindication or recognition for their suffering and hope for justice in the future. And making the warrants public enables the ICC to reclaim itself as a key avenue for ensuring accountability for international crimes, following a wave of criticism and disenchantment about its work in Africa and delays in advancing its investigation on Afghanistan.

International courts gearing into action

This ICC case is the latest in a series of ongoing cases related to Russia’s war in Ukraine before different international courts and tribunals. Others include at least four cases before the European Court of Human Rights for events that occurred before Russia was excluded from the Council of Europe, such as the MH17 flight case and the annexation of Crimea.

Two cases have also been brought by Ukraine against Russia before the International Court of Justice – in 2017 and 2022 – with hearings scheduled for June. An unprecedented number of states parties have sought to intervene in one or more of these cases.

Each case must be considered on its own merits and the decisions cannot be prejudged. But they showcase an important feature of the global legal system and its judicial architecture that cannot be underestimated – the ability to quickly swing into action in response to violations of international law. In this case, the response was prompted by Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in breach of the United Nations Charter and fundamental principles of international law.

A starting point for a bigger case

The ICC prosecutor already has a broader investigation into other international crimes committed in Ukraine since 21 November 2013. So this is likely to be just the starting point of a much bigger case against Putin and other senior Russian officials for international crimes committed in the context of the war in Ukraine and within the ICC’s jurisdiction.

These potentially include other war crimes such as the indiscriminate or disproportionate targeting of civilians, crimes against humanity, and genocide.

Mammalian circadian clocks are driven by transcription/translation feedback loops composed of positive transcriptional activators (BMAL1 and CLOCK) and negative repressors (CRYPTOCHROMEs (CRYs) and PERIODs (PERs)). CRYs, in complex with PERs, bind to the BMAL1/CLOCK complex and repress E-box–driven transcription of clock-associated genes. There are two individual CRYs, with CRY1 exhibiting higher affinity to the BMAL1/CLOCK complex than CRY2. It is known that this differential binding is regulated by a dynamic serine-rich loop adjacent to the secondary pocket of both CRYs, but the underlying features controlling loop dynamics are not known. Here we report that allosteric regulation of the serine-rich loop is mediated by Arg-293 of CRY1, identified as a rare CRY1 SNP in the Ensembl and 1000 Genomes databases. The p.Arg293His CRY1 variant caused a shortened circadian period in a Cry1−/−Cry2−/− double knockout mouse embryonic fibroblast cell line. Moreover, the variant displayed reduced repressor activity on BMAL1/CLOCK driven transcription, which is explained by reduced affinity to BMAL1/CLOCK in the absence of PER2 compared with CRY1. Molecular dynamics simulations revealed that the p.Arg293His CRY1 variant altered a communication pathway between Arg-293 and the serine loop by reducing its dynamicity. Collectively, this study provides direct evidence that allosterism in CRY1 is critical for the regulation of circadian rhythm.

Zika virus (ZIKV) is a neurotropic flavivirus that causes several diseases including birth defects such as microcephaly. Intrinsic immunity is known to be a frontline defense against viruses through host anti-viral restriction factors. Limited knowledge is available on intrinsic immunity against ZIKV in brains. Amyloid precursor protein (APP) is predominantly expressed in brains and implicated in the pathogenesis of Alzheimer's diseases. We have found that ZIKV interacts with APP, and viral infection increases APP expression via enhancing protein stability. Moreover, we identified the viral peptide, HGSQHSGMIVNDTGHETDENRAKVEITPNSPRAEATLGGFGSLGL, which is capable of en-hancing APP expression. We observed that aging brain tissues with APP had protective effects on ZIKV infection by reducing the availability of the viruses. Also, knockdown of APP expression or blocking ZIKV-APP interactions enhanced ZIKV replication in human neural progenitor/stem cells. Finally, intracranial infection of ZIKV in APP-null neonatal mice resulted in higher mortality and viral yields. Taken together, these findings suggest that APP is a restriction factor that protects against ZIKV by serving as a decoy receptor, and plays a protective role in ZIKV-mediated brain injuries.

CARM1 is a protein arginine methyltransferase (PRMT) that acts as a coactivator in a number of transcriptional programs. CARM1 orchestrates this coactivator activity in part by depositing the H3R17me2a histone mark in the vicinity of gene promoters that it regulates. However, the gross levels of H3R17me2a in CARM1 KO mice did not significantly decrease, indicating that other PRMT(s) may compensate for this loss. We thus performed a screen of type I PRMTs, which revealed that PRMT6 can also deposit the H3R17me2a mark in vitro. CARM1 knockout mice are perinatally lethal and display a reduced fetal size, whereas PRMT6 null mice are viable, which permits the generation of double knockouts. Embryos that are null for both CARM1 and PRMT6 are noticeably smaller than CARM1 null embryos, providing in vivo evidence of redundancy. Mouse embryonic fibroblasts (MEFs) from the double knockout embryos display an absence of the H3R17me2a mark during mitosis and increased signs of DNA damage. Moreover, using the combination of CARM1 and PRMT6 inhibitors suppresses the cell proliferation of WT MEFs, suggesting a synergistic effect between CARM1 and PRMT6 inhibitions. These studies provide direct evidence that PRMT6 also deposits the H3R17me2a mark and acts redundantly with CARM1.

Stop codon read-through (SCR) is a process of continuation of translation beyond a stop codon. This phenomenon, which occurs only in certain mRNAs under specific conditions, leads to a longer isoform with properties different from that of the canonical isoform. MTCH2, which encodes a mitochondrial protein that regulates mitochondrial metabolism, was selected as a potential read-through candidate based on evolutionary conservation observed in the proximal region of its 3' UTR. Here, we demonstrate translational read-through across two evolutionarily conserved, in-frame stop codons of MTCH2 using luminescence- and fluorescence-based assays, and by analyzing ribosome-profiling and mass spectrometry (MS) data. This phenomenon generates two isoforms, MTCH2x and MTCH2xx (single- and double-SCR products, respectively), in addition to the canonical isoform MTCH2, from the same mRNA. Our experiments revealed that a cis-acting 12-nucleotide sequence in the proximal 3' UTR of MTCH2 is the necessary signal for SCR. Functional characterization showed that MTCH2 and MTCH2x were localized to mitochondria with a long t1/2 (>36 h). However, MTCH2xx was found predominantly in the cytoplasm. This mislocalization and its unique C terminus led to increased degradation, as shown by greatly reduced t1/2 (<1 h). MTCH2 read-through–deficient cells, generated using CRISPR-Cas9, showed increased MTCH2 expression and, consistent with this, decreased mitochondrial membrane potential. Thus, double-SCR of MTCH2 regulates its own expression levels contributing toward the maintenance of normal mitochondrial membrane potential.

Hepatocyte nuclear factor-1β (HNF-1β) is a tissue-specific transcription factor that is required for normal kidney development and renal epithelial differentiation. Mutations of HNF-1β produce congenital kidney abnormalities and inherited renal tubulopathies. Here, we show that ablation of HNF-1β in mIMCD3 renal epithelial cells results in activation of β-catenin and increased expression of lymphoid enhancer–binding factor 1 (LEF1), a downstream effector in the canonical Wnt signaling pathway. Increased expression and nuclear localization of LEF1 are also observed in cystic kidneys from Hnf1b mutant mice. Expression of dominant-negative mutant HNF-1β in mIMCD3 cells produces hyperresponsiveness to exogenous Wnt ligands, which is inhibited by siRNA-mediated knockdown of Lef1. WT HNF-1β binds to two evolutionarily conserved sites located 94 and 30 kb from the mouse Lef1 promoter. Ablation of HNF-1β decreases H3K27 trimethylation repressive marks and increases β-catenin occupancy at a site 4 kb upstream to Lef1. Mechanistically, WT HNF-1β recruits the polycomb-repressive complex 2 that catalyzes H3K27 trimethylation. Deletion of the β-catenin–binding domain of LEF1 in HNF-1β–deficient cells abolishes the increase in Lef1 transcription and decreases the expression of downstream Wnt target genes. The canonical Wnt target gene, Axin2, is also a direct transcriptional target of HNF-1β through binding to negative regulatory elements in the gene promoter. These findings demonstrate that HNF-1β regulates canonical Wnt target genes through long-range effects on histone methylation at Wnt enhancers and reveal a new mode of active transcriptional repression by HNF-1β.

Evolving evidence suggests that nicotine may contribute to impaired asthma control by stimulating expression of nerve growth factor (NGF), a neurotrophin associated with airway remodeling and airway hyperresponsiveness. We explored the hypothesis that nicotine increases NGF by reducing lung fibroblast (LF) microRNA-98 (miR-98) and PPARγ levels, thus promoting airway remodeling. Levels of NGF, miR-98, PPARγ, fibronectin 1 (FN1), endothelin-1 (EDN1, herein referred to as ET-1), and collagen (COL1A1 and COL3A1) were measured in human LFs isolated from smoking donors, in mouse primary LFs exposed to nicotine (50 μg/ml), and in whole lung homogenates from mice chronically exposed to nicotine (100 μg/ml) in the drinking water. In selected studies, these pathways were manipulated in LFs with miR-98 inhibitor (anti-miR-98), miR-98 overexpression (miR-98 mimic), or the PPARγ agonist rosiglitazone. Compared with unexposed controls, nicotine increased NGF, FN1, ET-1, COL1A1, and COL3A1 expression in human and mouse LFs and mouse lung homogenates. In contrast, nicotine reduced miR-98 levels in LFs in vitro and in lung homogenates in vivo. Treatment with anti-miR-98 alone was sufficient to recapitulate increases in NGF, FN1, and ET-1, whereas treatment with a miR-98 mimic significantly suppressed luciferase expression in cells transfected with a luciferase reporter linked to the putative seed sequence in the NGF 3'UTR and also abrogated nicotine-induced increases in NGF, FN1, and ET-1 in LFs. Similarly, rosiglitazone increased miR-98 and reversed nicotine-induced increases in NGF, FN1, and ET-1. Taken together, these findings demonstrate that nicotine-induced increases in NGF and other markers of airway remodeling are negatively regulated by miR-98.

The molecular mechanisms of reduced frataxin (FXN) expression in Friedreich's ataxia (FRDA) are linked to epigenetic modification of the FXN locus caused by the disease-associated GAA expansion. Here, we identify that SUV4-20 histone methyltransferases, specifically SUV4-20 H1, play an important role in the regulation of FXN expression and represent a novel therapeutic target. Using a human FXN–GAA–Luciferase repeat expansion genomic DNA reporter model of FRDA, we screened the Structural Genomics Consortium epigenetic probe collection. We found that pharmacological inhibition of the SUV4-20 methyltransferases by the tool compound A-196 increased the expression of FXN by ∼1.5-fold in the reporter cell line. In several FRDA cell lines and patient-derived primary peripheral blood mononuclear cells, A-196 increased FXN expression by up to 2-fold, an effect not seen in WT cells. SUV4-20 inhibition was accompanied by a reduction in H4K20me2 and H4K20me3 and an increase in H4K20me1, but only modest (1.4–7.8%) perturbation in genome-wide expression was observed. Finally, based on the structural activity relationship and crystal structure of A-196, novel small molecule A-196 analogs were synthesized and shown to give a 20-fold increase in potency for increasing FXN expression. Overall, our results suggest that histone methylation is important in the regulation of FXN expression and highlight SUV4-20 H1 as a potential novel therapeutic target for FRDA.

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Histone recognition by “reader” modules serves as a fundamental mechanism in epigenetic regulation. Previous studies have shown that Spindlin1 is a reader of histone H3K4me3 as well as “K4me3-R8me2a” and promotes transcription of rDNA or Wnt/TCF4 target genes. Here we show that Spindlin1 also acts as a potent reader of histone H3 “K4me3-K9me3/2” bivalent methylation pattern. Calorimetric titration revealed a binding affinity of 16 nm between Spindlin1 and H3 “K4me3-K9me3” peptide, which is one to three orders of magnitude stronger than most other histone readout events at peptide level. Structural studies revealed concurrent recognition of H3K4me3 and H3K9me3/2 by aromatic pockets 2 and 1 of Spindlin1, respectively. Epigenomic profiling studies showed that Spindlin1 colocalizes with both H3K4me3 and H3K9me3 peaks in a subset of genes enriched in biological processes of transcription and its regulation. Moreover, the distribution of Spindlin1 peaks is primarily associated with H3K4me3 but not H3K9me3, which suggests that Spindlin1 is a downstream effector of H3K4me3 generated in heterochromatic regions. Collectively, our work calls attention to an intriguing function of Spindlin1 as a potent H3 “K4me3-K9me3/2” bivalent mark reader, thereby balancing gene expression and silencing in H3K9me3/2-enriched regions.

The functional mechanisms of multidomain proteins often exploit interdomain interactions, or “cross-talk.” An example is human Pin1, an essential mitotic regulator consisting of a Trp–Trp (WW) domain flexibly tethered to a peptidyl-prolyl isomerase (PPIase) domain, resulting in interdomain interactions important for Pin1 function. Substrate binding to the WW domain alters its transient contacts with the PPIase domain via means that are only partially understood. Accordingly, we have investigated Pin1 interdomain interactions using NMR paramagnetic relaxation enhancement (PRE) and molecular dynamics (MD) simulations. The PREs show that apo-Pin1 samples interdomain contacts beyond the range suggested by previous structural studies. They further show that substrate binding to the WW domain simultaneously alters interdomain separation and the internal conformation of the WW domain. A 4.5-μs all-atom MD simulation of apo-Pin1 suggests that the fluctuations of interdomain distances are correlated with fluctuations of WW domain interresidue contacts involved in substrate binding. Thus, the interdomain/WW domain conformations sampled by apo-Pin1 may already include a range of conformations appropriate for binding Pin1's numerous substrates. The proposed coupling between intra-/interdomain conformational fluctuations is a consequence of the dynamic modular architecture of Pin1. Such modular architecture is common among cell-cycle proteins; thus, the WW–PPIase domain cross-talk mechanisms of Pin1 may be relevant for their mechanisms as well.

Phospholipase Cε (PLCε) is activated downstream of G protein–coupled receptors and receptor tyrosine kinases through direct interactions with small GTPases, including Rap1A and Ras. Although Ras has been reported to allosterically activate the lipase, it is not known whether Rap1A has the same ability or what its molecular mechanism might be. Rap1A activates PLCε in response to the stimulation of β-adrenergic receptors, translocating the complex to the perinuclear membrane. Because the C-terminal Ras association (RA2) domain of PLCε was proposed to the primary binding site for Rap1A, we first confirmed using purified proteins that the RA2 domain is indeed essential for activation by Rap1A. However, we also showed that the PLCε pleckstrin homology (PH) domain and first two EF hands (EF1/2) are required for Rap1A activation and identified hydrophobic residues on the surface of the RA2 domain that are also necessary. Small-angle X-ray scattering showed that Rap1A binding induces and stabilizes discrete conformational states in PLCε variants that can be activated by the GTPase. These data, together with the recent structure of a catalytically active fragment of PLCε, provide the first evidence that Rap1A, and by extension Ras, allosterically activate the lipase by promoting and stabilizing interactions between the RA2 domain and the PLCε core.

In animals, the response to chronic hypoxia is mediated by prolyl hydroxylases (PHDs) that regulate the levels of hypoxia-inducible transcription factor α (HIFα). PHD homologues exist in other types of eukaryotes and prokaryotes where they act on non HIF substrates. To gain insight into the factors underlying different PHD substrates and properties, we carried out biochemical and biophysical studies on PHD homologues from the cellular slime mold, Dictyostelium discoideum, and the protozoan parasite, Toxoplasma gondii, both lacking HIF. The respective prolyl-hydroxylases (DdPhyA and TgPhyA) catalyze prolyl-hydroxylation of S-phase kinase-associated protein 1 (Skp1), a reaction enabling adaptation to different dioxygen availability. Assays with full-length Skp1 substrates reveal substantial differences in the kinetic properties of DdPhyA and TgPhyA, both with respect to each other and compared with human PHD2; consistent with cellular studies, TgPhyA is more active at low dioxygen concentrations than DdPhyA. TgSkp1 is a DdPhyA substrate and DdSkp1 is a TgPhyA substrate. No cross-reactivity was detected between DdPhyA/TgPhyA substrates and human PHD2. The human Skp1 E147P variant is a DdPhyA and TgPhyA substrate, suggesting some retention of ancestral interactions. Crystallographic analysis of DdPhyA enables comparisons with homologues from humans, Trichoplax adhaerens, and prokaryotes, informing on differences in mobile elements involved in substrate binding and catalysis. In DdPhyA, two mobile loops that enclose substrates in the PHDs are conserved, but the C-terminal helix of the PHDs is strikingly absent. The combined results support the proposal that PHD homologues have evolved kinetic and structural features suited to their specific sensing roles.

DNA polymerases are today used throughout scientific research, biotechnology, and medicine, in part for their ability to interact with unnatural forms of DNA created by synthetic biologists. Here especially, natural DNA polymerases often do not have the “performance specifications” needed for transformative technologies. This creates a need for science-guided rational (or semi-rational) engineering to identify variants that replicate unnatural base pairs (UBPs), unnatural backbones, tags, or other evolutionarily novel features of unnatural DNA. In this review, we provide a brief overview of the chemistry and properties of replicative DNA polymerases and their evolved variants, focusing on the Klenow fragment of Taq DNA polymerase (Klentaq). We describe comparative structural, enzymatic, and molecular dynamics studies of WT and Klentaq variants, complexed with natural or noncanonical substrates. Combining these methods provides insight into how specific amino acid substitutions distant from the active site in a Klentaq DNA polymerase variant (ZP Klentaq) contribute to its ability to replicate UBPs with improved efficiency compared with Klentaq. This approach can therefore serve to guide any future rational engineering of replicative DNA polymerases.

RecQ family helicases are highly conserved from bacteria to humans and have essential roles in maintaining genome stability. Mutations in three human RecQ helicases cause severe diseases with the main features of premature aging and cancer predisposition. Most RecQ helicases shared a conserved domain arrangement which comprises a helicase core, an RecQ C-terminal domain, and an auxiliary element helicase and RNaseD C-terminal (HRDC) domain, the functions of which are poorly understood. In this study, we systematically characterized the roles of the HRDC domain in E. coli RecQ in various DNA transactions by single-molecule FRET. We found that RecQ repetitively unwinds the 3'-partial duplex and fork DNA with a moderate processivity and periodically patrols on the ssDNA in the 5'-partial duplex by translocation. The HRDC domain significantly suppresses RecQ activities in the above transactions. In sharp contrast, the HRDC domain is essential for the deep and long-time unfolding of the G4 DNA structure by RecQ. Based on the observations that the HRDC domain dynamically switches between RecA core- and ssDNA-binding modes after RecQ association with DNA, we proposed a model to explain the modulation mechanism of the HRDC domain. Our findings not only provide new insights into the activities of RecQ on different substrates but also highlight the novel functions of the HRDC domain in DNA metabolisms.