Ten conflicts to watch in 2023 11 January 2023 — 6:00PM TO 7:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 8 December 2022 Chatham House and Online

This event examines the most dangerous wars and crises through the lens of the International Crisis Group’s flagship annual report ‘10 Conflicts to watch in 2023’.

Each year, International Crisis Group compiles a list of the ten conflicts to watch that examines key conflicts across the globe. Please join us for this event at which Dr Comfort Ero, International Crisis Group president and CEO, discusses today’s and tomorrow’s most impactful wars and crises.

Key questions to consider include:

• What far-reaching repercussions and knock-on effects of Russia’s war on Ukraine will have for Europe and the rest of the world?

• Which crises beyond Ukraine warrant collective attention in the year ahead?

• How do rising tensions among major powers impact multilateral efforts to resolve these conflicts, impede progress on global challenges and impact institutions working on crisis prevention?

As with all members events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

Read the transcript. 

Crisis in the international order 23 January 2023 — 6:00PM TO 7:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 8 December 2022 Chatham House and Online

Why societies are challenging the international order?

Major global challenges, including the climate, refugee crises and the global pandemic, are increasingly revealing shortcomings in our international system and are bringing to the forefront calls for a more just world. But what is justice? 
 
Calls for justice come in many forms and from many directions - from the fair distribution of resources to the recognition of indigenous rights. While for some there is consensus on the importance of multilateral cooperation to tackle global issues, there is a sharp North/South divide at the centre of debates on issues such as the climate crisis, racial justice, and international law. Countries from the global South are demanding more equitable and redistributive solutions, for example in the distribution of COVID-19 vaccines, while the Global North seek the status quo. 
 
North/South division slows progress on reform. Some political actors are starting to challenge the very foundations of our global order, a move that could dramatically change the global system as we know it. 

Key questions to consider include:

• Why are there tensions between the global North and South?
• How can these issues be addressed?
• Does the global North ‘owe’ the global South some form of justice? Which form of justice?
• If these issues are not addressed, what are the implications for the current international order?

This event is held in conjunction with International Affairs.

As with all members events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

Read the transcript.

The state of the union? US foreign policy and a new US Congress 30 January 2023 — 5:30PM TO 6:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 11 January 2023 Chatham House and Online

As a new Congress takes shape, what is the impact for US foreign policy?  

The recent US 2022 midterm elections have led to a split with Republicans in command of the US House of Representatives and Democrats retaining a slim majority in the Senate.

Following a gruelling selection process for the new Speaker of the House, the new Congress took its seats in January 2023, but President Joe Biden no longer enjoys single-party control of Congress.

• What will be the implications of this for US leadership and US foreign policy?
• How will domestic politics constrain foreign policy objectives?
• Can policymakers across government set aside political differences to tackle global challenges?

This panel also unpacks insights into the following questions:

• What will this Congress view as foreign policy priorities?
• Will policies that are tough on China ramp up?
• Can the US continue its support for Ukraine with a split Congress?
• Will the next two years lead to any considerable foreign policy pivots with a general election on the horizon?

As with all members events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

Read the transcript.

The future of the Russia-China relationship 9 February 2023 — 6:00PM TO 7:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 26 January 2023 Chatham House and Online

What lies ahead for the ‘unlimited friendship’ between Moscow and Beijing?

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has raised new questions about the nature of the relationship between Russia and China, with the war seen as having the potential to shift Russia from a close ally to a liability in the eyes of the Chinese government.

This event explores the latest developments in extent of the relationship and interactions between the two: new convergences and divergences, energy links and limitations, declared alliances and private disagreements.

Experts on the panel explore:

• How has the relationship changed since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine?
• What do the Russian and Chinese people make of the relationship?
• How could a war-weakened Russia be viewed by China?

As with all members events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

Read the transcript.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine: How it changed the world 21 February 2023 — 6:00PM TO 7:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 1 February 2023 Chatham House and Online

Chatham House experts examine how the world has changed since 24 February 2022.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine prompted serious soul-searching about European security, what it means to be European and the futures of the two principal protagonists. However, practical questions have developed throughout the war in surprising ways.

Chatham House is producing a multi-author feature reflecting on seven things Russia’s war has changed in the world. The article assesses the impact of the war one year on, the long-term changes this has catalyzed and unpacks why these changes are significant for the future of international affairs.

This event examines key themes with the research directors who authored the piece. Alliances, national resiliency for both Ukraine and Russia and sanctions are examined including the following questions:

• How did the war change Ukraine?

• What alliances have been forged over the past year? 

• How long can ‘fortress Russia’ weather the storm and what has it revealed about Russia’s integration into the international system? 

• What have countries done to mitigate the impact on supply chains and markets? Who, for example, has been most affected by the grain crisis?

• What have we learnt about Vladimir Putin and Volodymyr Zelensky that we didn’t know before 24 February 2022?

As with all members events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

Linked article: ‘Seven ways Russia’s war on Ukraine has changed the world’, read the featured piece here.

Read the transcript. 

Disruptive technologies by nation states and malign cyber actors – the US response 16 February 2023 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 2 February 2023 Chatham House and Online

Lisa Monaco, the US deputy attorney general, discusses how autocratic governments and malign cyber actors use disruptive technologies to project power and engage in illicit activity.

Weaponizing data, ransomware attacks and other illicit cyber activity represent significant threats to national security. 

Governments and malicious cyber actors around the world exploit disruptive technology to engage in criminal activity, track citizens and coerce other countries thereby weakening the rules-based order and fundamental principles of democracy. 

Lisa Monaco discusses how the world is at an inflection point when it comes to meeting this challenge and describes how the US and partner nations are responding to protect their citizens and the broader international community.

Key questions to discuss include:

• What steps does the US government need to take to properly address this threat?
• How are countries coordinating policies to confront the problem?
• To what extent does this challenge go beyond US-China competition?

As with all member events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

Read the transcript.

The era of ‘reglobalization’ 15 June 2023 — 6:00PM TO 7:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 14 February 2023 Chatham House and Online

How to balance international trade with efforts to enhance domestic economic resilience?

The global trade outlook remains challenging in 2023. Geopolitical tensions and national security concerns are playing a greater role in trade policy with a focus on strengthening supply chain resilience and reducing economic dependencies. In addition, the turn towards industrial policies has raised concerns about unfair trade practices and protectionism.

The debate about the future of globalization has only therefore deepened. While ‘deglobalization’ dominates the current public discourse on trade, is ‘reglobalization’ a better term to describe patterns of economic integration and fracturing across different economies and sectors?

The panel of experts discuss:

• To what extent are efforts to meet climate goals and maintain technological leadership intertwined with industrial policy and national security objectives?

• What do recent measures by the US – including the Inflation Reduction Act and a push on semiconductors – mean for cooperation with like-minded partners such as the EU?

• Are any countries resisting the protectionist trend and continuing to champion open trade?

• What steps can be taken to strengthen strategic and sensitive supply chains, for example, for critical minerals, high-capacity batteries and semiconductors?

• Is it possible to develop and advance a positive trade agenda for a reglobalized world? If so, what would it look like?

As with all member events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

In conversation with Rahul Gandhi 6 March 2023 — 6:00PM TO 7:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 27 February 2023 Chatham House and Online

The former president of the Indian National Congress discusses how today’s world will set the path for the world’s biggest democracy.

Soon to be the world’s largest population, and with a rapidly growing economy and an increasing presence in global affairs, India’s place in the world is changing.

Hosting the G20 this year, the New Delhi summit in September 2023 is a symbol of India’s growing might, moving from emerging to prominent player on the world stage.

However, challenges faced by the country are substantial. Frosty relations with China, ongoing tension with Pakistan, climate catastrophe, and food insecurity all represent significant global concerns to India.

Internally, the hurdles are imposing. Millions still live below the poverty line and demographic instability poses risks to the country. The state of democracy across the country is consistently questioned.

At this event, Rahul Gandhi explores key questions including:

• How does India see the impact of the war in Ukraine?
• Will New Delhi be able to balance relations between the West and Russia?
• Can India offer an alternative vision for Asia that challenges China?
• Internally, to what extent is democracy in India under strain?
• Can India’s economy evolve to create a wide-reaching, prosperous nation in the coming years?

As with all member events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

Is China's economy on the rebound? 5 April 2023 — 6:00PM TO 7:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 28 February 2023 Chatham House and Online

Exploring the domestic and international signals from the first annual session of the 14th National People’s Congress.

2022 proved to be a difficult year for China. War, COVID-19 and economic turbulence presented a cocktail of significant challenges for the ruling CCP in China. Having dispensed of the infamous zero-COVID-19 policy, China is apparently back open for business.

On the international front, continued tensions with the West, war in Europe and climate change are just some of the obstacles standing in the way of Chinese economic recovery. 

Domestically, China must find ways to reinvigorate demand and move on from a low of 3 per cent GDP growth in 2022. With a frustrated population, people are also keen to be freed from the shackles of a stream of lockdowns and quarantining.

The in-tray for the 14th National People’s Congress, as it begins its first session, is substantial. The implications, at home and abroad, from its recent summit in Beijing reverberate around the world.

The experts on the panel discuss:

• What has been the true extent of COVID-related damage to China’s economy and wider society?
• What economic scars are visible post-recovery?
• Will there be longer-term implications for China’s economic and diplomatic footprint globally post-COVID? 

As with all member events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

In conversation with Ehud Barak 27 March 2023 — 12:00PM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 21 March 2023 Chatham House and Online

The former prime minister of Israel discusses his country’s political outlook and foreign policy priorities.

On the eve of its 75th independence anniversary, Israel is at a critical crossroads. Weeks of long, intense protests surrounding judicial reforms pursued by the current government have widened the debate over the role played by the, so far independent, judiciary, notably the Supreme Court.

Supporters on both sides of the argument are fighting over different visions of Israel – a true liberal-democracy, or a much-reduced version of a democratic system. Whichever side of the argument people fall, the debate symbolizes tension in Israel’s society and decline in trust of its political and constitutional institutions.

Abroad, the situation remains intricate. Israel-Iran relations remain on a knife edge while the Abraham Accords normalized relations with parts of the Gulf. Then there are the continual issues surrounding relations with the Palestinians and their right to self-determination and statehood.

Old international challenges are now rubbing up against the new. Israel is part of a changing power dynamic in the Middle East, the result of a much-reduced US footprint. Furthermore, it must now contend with the other global superpower in China and continue to work on its response to the war in Ukraine.

Amid its domestic struggle to maintain its democratic character, fast-moving regional and international developments are in need of addressing. Friends and allies are deeply concerned with the country’s constitutional crisis, potentially re-evaluating their relations with the Jewish state.

Former prime minister of Israel Ehud Barak lays out his views on the complexities of domestic and international challenges facing Israel today.

Questions covered include:

• What are the main root causes of the current constitutional crisis, and how could it be best resolved?
• Could the current situation lead to a breakdown of the political system, even widespread violence?
• How could the current circumstances in Israel and Palestine affect relations between the two and any prospect for peace negotiations?
• How will US-Israel relations stand up against China’s influence in the region?
• What is Israel’s interpretation of the war in Ukraine and how is the country affected?

As with all member events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

Russia’s aggression and a crisis for multilateralism 30 March 2023 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 23 March 2023 Chatham House and Online

In conversation with Dmytro Kuleba, minister of foreign affairs of Ukraine, about how multilateral organizations struggle to respond adequately to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, Russia pursues this war in defiance of the umbrella organization’s multiple resolutions condemning the invasion, along with its war crimes, annexation of territory, deliberate targeting of civilian nuclear infrastructure, cultural extermination, and global disinformation campaign. 

This event explores the following questions: 

• How should the response of the UN to Russian aggression be assessed? 
• What can be done to uphold the guiding principles of the UN Charter? 
• Is there a ‘UN problem’ or a ‘Russia problem’? 
• How can trust and the legitimacy of multilateral cooperation be restored in times of strategic rivalry and rising global tensions?
• Who can drive such an effort? 
• Is post-Soviet transfer of the UN Security Council seat to Russia a cause of current impunity? 

This event features a live in-person audience in Kyiv as well as in London and online.

Chatham House exhibition - In conversation with the future 19 April 2023 — 6:00PM TO 8:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 31 March 2023 Chatham House

Hear from the innovative leaders and companies driving change towards a more sustainable future.

This event is an opportunity to hear from the innovative leaders and companies driving change towards a more sustainable future.

The evening begins with a panel discussion then, over sustainably sourced drinks and canapés, you are invited to walk through Chatham House and explore the innovative and experimental ideas enabling radical shifts to allow us to prosper without exhausting our planet’s resources.

Our exhibiting partners include Earthshot Prize winner NotPla, Hawkins Brown, Polymateria, and BEEN London. 

Bronwen Maddox, director of Chatham House, opens the evening at 6pm and introduces our panel of experts, chaired by Ana Yang, head of Chatham House’s Sustainability Accelerator. 

Please note that this event is operating a ballot for in-person attendance. Your place will be confirmed by Wednesday 12 April if you are successful.

Can rhetoric match reality? Britain’s international development future 27 April 2023 — 9:00AM TO 10:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 12 April 2023 Chatham House and Online

In conversation with Andrew Mitchell, minister of state, UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office. 

Last month’s updated Integrated Review positioned international development as a key pillar of British foreign policy which sets out the importance of the UK’s efforts to shape the ‘global strategic environment’.

Focusing heavily on Africa and the Indo-Pacific, international development will be central to the ambition of a ‘Global Britain’.

The Integrated Review outlines seven priority areas to revitalize the drive to meet the Global Goals, with a climate security strategy at its heart, while seeking to go beyond official development assistance (ODA).

However, there are major challenges ahead. Since 2021, the UK’s ODA has been cut from 0.7 per cent to 0.5 per cent gross national income (GNI). Some are concerned that since being subsumed by the UK Foreign Office, the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office has diluted the effectiveness of UK international development. Then there is the question of the strength of British public support for development assistance at a time of domestic economic hardship.

Can rhetoric match reality?

This event tackles questions including:

• What does the UK’s vision for international development mean in practice?
• Will aid and development help push Britain’s influence around the world?
• Can policymakers and politicians garner domestic support for international aid in times of economic uncertainty, and if so, how?
• Can the UK rebuild its reputation in the world while it doesn’t meet its 0.7 per cent GNI target?

This event will be balloted for in-person attendance. Register your interest to join and a confirmation email will be sent to you on Tuesday 25 May at 12:00 BST to confirm your place at the event.

As with all member events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

A coffee reception will immediately follow this event.

General practice leaders in Wales have voted unanimously to reject the Welsh government’s GP contract offer for 2024-25.The BMA’s ​General Practitioners Committee Wales said the government’s general medical services contract offer for the current financial year “fails to provide a credible and sustainable future” for general practice.GPs in Wales will now vote on whether to accept or reject the contract in a referendum that will open later this month.Gareth Oelmann, chair of the committee, said, “The decision to disregard the serious concerns and valuable contribution of general practice in Wales is beyond insulting, it is dangerous, leaving more surgeries and their patients in peril. We are concerned that this offer will leave more practices with no option but to close. GPs are being denied the resources they need to deliver vital services to the population.”The BMA said it was not yet able to disclose any details on the offer, and...

I’m often asked if I miss working in the House of Commons. Of course I do; it’s one of the most amazing places in the world and remains the cockpit of our nation.There are obviously days I miss it more than others, usually around the big national moments. Whatever your view of Kim Leadbeater’s private member’s bill—the Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill—its second reading this month will be one of those big moments.Kim is a friend of mine, and we spoke before she decided to put her bill forward after it topped the private members’ ballot at the start of the new parliament. My advice was to proceed with great care, to remember that this will take over your career in many ways, and to read the report produced earlier this year by the Health and Social Care Committee, which I chaired, on the subject of assisted dying/assisted...

Memory politics: the challenge of commemoration in post-Soviet Eastern Europe and the Caucasus 5 October 2021 — 1:00PM TO 2:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 21 September 2021 Online

This event explores how to address memory and commemoration in the former Soviet states, considering their role in political processes and violent conflict. 

How the past is remembered and commemorated plays a large role – perhaps too large – in contemporary political debates and in how conflicts are negotiated.

Perceptions of history influence people’s actions and are used to judge or dismiss the actions of others. Nowhere is this more so than in the political, territorial and social debates and disputes across the former Soviet Union.
 
This event examines how to address the problems caused by entrenched memory debates – and proposes a framework for ‘ethical political commemoration’ for use across historical enquiry, political processes, and conflict transformation initiatives.

The speakers explore the topic through the context of Turkey and the Armenian genocide, as well as more broadly through their own experiences in conflict transformation and peace processes.

Undercurrents: Europe's far-right educational institutions Audio bhorton.drupal 8 October 2021

In Hungary, France and Spain, new political movements from the far-right are attempting to reshape their education systems.

Under the supportive eye of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, the recently established National University of Public Service seeks to embed nationalist illiberal values in a new generation of Hungarian students. Meanwhile in France and Spain, far-right public figure Marion Maréchal has turned away from the electoral politics of the Front Nationale to set up a new conservative research institute, ISSEP.

Both of these developments represent a challenge to the liberal values which underpin the existing international order. To find out more, Ben spoke with Professor Dorit Geva and Dr Felipe Santos, whose recent article in International Affairs considers the implications of this illiberal educational turn. 

The law as a tool for EU integration could be ending Expert comment NCapeling 15 October 2021

Poland is not the only EU member state challenging the supremacy of European law, as historic change is happening in how European integration functions.

The Polish Constitutional Tribunal’s ruling that several articles of the European treaties are incompatible with the Polish constitution is prompting much debate, especially in terms of both the similarities and differences between it and rulings by the German constitutional court which have also challenged the European Court of Justice (ECJ).

Pro-Europeans are keen to draw a sharp distinction between the reasoning deployed by the two courts. They see the Polish court’s challenge as an exceptional case which the European Union (EU) cannot ‘tolerate’ because it would lead to the ‘demolition of the EU’s legal order from within’ and argue the EU must take a tough approach to Poland by re-asserting the supremacy of EU law.

But this view misses a bigger long-term shift in the EU. Both the German and Polish cases illustrate some of the basic conflicts within the EU’s legal system for decades. What is being challenged increasingly openly – even since the UK left the EU – is the idea of the EU as a de facto federation in which non-majoritarian institutions such as the ECJ have final say about the quality of democracy in member states.

ECJ’s quiet revolution

Historically ‘integration through law’ was central to the European project and the ECJ was a key institution driving forward integration – usually benefiting from what Erik Stein called ‘benign neglect by the powers that be and the mass media’. Even when European integration in the form of treaties stalled in the 1960s and 1970s, ‘judicial integration’ through the ECJ continued, including its notable 1964 decision that EU law was supreme.

This self-empowerment of the ECJ – what another scholar of European constitutionalism Joseph Weiler calls ‘a quiet revolution’ – was possible because there was a ‘permissive consensus’ in member states which allowed judicial integration to continue largely unchallenged. But this has now changed as both politicians and national courts are more willing to challenge what they see as judicial overreach.

There are important differences between the approach of the German and the Polish constitutional courts. The Law and Justice Party has politicized the Polish court, packing it with judges sympathetic to that party, whereas the German court is more independent.

In addition, whereas the German court made qualified and subdued objections to measures taken in response to the euro crisis during the past decade and, in particular, the steps towards the mutualization of eurozone debt – but often backed down with ‘all bark and no bite’ as Christoph Schmid put it – the Polish court is driven by political considerations and has challenged the supremacy of EU law in a more direct and general way.

However, the German court has made it clear it is the guardian of the German constitution and seeks to impose limits on the ECJ’s self-empowerment by arguing Europe is not a federation. According to the German court’s theory of ‘constitutional pluralism’, there is in effect a constant dialogue and accommodation between the national and EU level rather than a simple primacy of EU law over national law.

The court sees itself as the ultimate arbiter of whether steps in European integration are consistent with the German constitution, and is likely to challenge any further steps in fiscal integration even if the ECJ deems them in accordance with the treaties – as it did with the European Central Bank’s quantitative easing programme.

Supremacy of EU law is under pressure

Right across Europe, courts and politicians are increasingly challenging the ECJ and questioning the supremacy of EU law. Michel Barnier called for France to regain ‘legal sovereignty’ and should no longer be subject to the judgments of the ECJ – an extraordinary demand from the EU Brexit negotiator who regularly lectured the UK about the sanctity of the EU’s legal order.

Other possible French presidential candidates such as Valérie Pécresse and Eric Zemmour are also openly challenging the primacy of EU law. The UK, of course, is fighting its own battle with the EU about the ECJ’s role in the Northern Ireland Protocol.

It was not the current Polish government but the people of France and the Netherlands who blocked the attempt at explicit constitutionalisation of the EU in a referendum just one year after the 2004 enlargement. Whereas the Constitutional Treaty ‘would have codified the doctrine of EU legal supremacy’, that provision was dropped from its successor the Lisbon Treaty, again indicating consensus on EU legal supremacy is not as strong as is often claimed.

How do Eurasian kleptocracies earn and use their money? 9 November 2021 — 1:00PM TO 2:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 22 October 2021 Chatham House and Online

This event explores the presence of corrupt funds from Eurasia in Western democracies, what they are used for, and how they can be constrained.

The Pandora Papers once again shone the spotlight on the UK being home to corrupt funds from kleptocracies, where the ruling elite abuse their political power for private gain.

In recent years much focus has been placed on this term, and the possible effects such money could have on Western democracies.

• How do such states create this wealth in the first place?
• How do these funds make their way to the UK?
• Is the term kleptocracy appropriate for the majority of countries in Eurasia?
• What evidence is there that such funds are ‘weaponized’ to achieve foreign policy goals?

This event discusses the term, how it can be applied, and the differences between how ’grey’ funds are used by various countries. It also highlights how the UK and the wider international community can counteract these flows, both from a legal point of view, and via other methods.

Crisis on Europe’s doorstep 2 February 2022 — 4:00PM TO 5:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 4 January 2022 Online

Domestic instability and foreign interference is destabilizing Bosnia, with the declining strength of the 1995 Dayton Agreement symbolic of the troubles growing within the country. 

Milorad Dodik’s continuing efforts to remove the international judicial and security presence in Bosnia, along with calls for the secession of Republic Sprska and increasing Russian efforts to destabilize the country are concerning many, particularly nearby European Union (EU) member states.

On 3 November 2021, the United Nations (UN) Security Council voted unanimously to extend the EU-led multinational stabilization force for another year, as well as NATO Headquarters Sarajevo.

However, the role played by the Office of High Representative was absent from the outcome and leaves the implementation of civilian aspects emanating from the Dayton Accords in a position of uncertainty.

Against a background of ongoing troubles in the country and the growing proxy conflict between the West and Russia, the situation in Bosnia is worrying.

The expert panel discusses:

• Why has the situation in Bosnia been allowed to deteriorate to such a condition?
• What is Europe’s best solution to resolve issues in Bosnia and how is it acting to remedy them?
• How have international efforts been hampered to support development in Bosnia?
• What are Russia’s aims in the country? 
• Does US foreign policy recognize Bosnia as a strategic partner?

Read the transcript

This event forms part of Chatham House’s work on Reinvigorating Multilateralism.

Ukraine response reveals Europe’s security is changing Expert comment NCapeling 8 February 2022

Recent events regarding Ukraine show an active UK responding quickly while EU powers deliberate. But pulling ahead of the pack is not the same as leadership.

Britain’s relationship with Ukraine appears to be thriving, with Ukrainian defence journalist Illia Ponomarenko recently tweeting the ‘British are just unstoppable these days’ and that the UK finds itself ‘on the right side of history’ while one Ukrainian wine bar has started offering free drinks to British nationals.

Ponomarenko’s remarks and the wine bar offer – certainly one post-Brexit benefit of having a British passport – are down to the UK decision to send anti-tank weapons to support Ukraine’s forces against a potential Russian attack.

The UK’s quick response was praised by Ponomarenko as being ‘wise enough not to be lured into going the easiest way, which is always the fastest lane straight to hell’ and strikes a clear contrast with that of Germany, whose typically moderated approach to geopolitical tensions went down badly in Kyiv.

The chief of Germany’s navy was forced to resign after saying Russian president Vladimir Putin ‘deserved respect’ and that Ukraine will never win back annexed Crimea. The German government also sought an energy exception to proposed US sanctions, so that gas can continue to flow into Europe.

France’s response was somewhat stronger but rather confusing as Emmanuel Macron initially called for European Union (EU) member states to ‘conduct their own dialogue’ with Russia, seemingly as an alternative to supporting the US-led NATO response.

Risks of a ‘bullying’ Russia

Although positioning himself as the convener of a transatlantic response to the Ukraine crisis brings welcome respite for UK prime minister Boris Johnson from his domestic ‘partygate’ fiasco, he is also reported as saying some world leaders ‘may not appreciate the deteriorating picture on the Ukrainian border, or fully comprehend the risks posed by a bullying Russia’.

One particular image sums up the difference in approach between the UK and the EU, as a flight path shows a British RAF plane flying around Germany before taking a detour over Denmark on route to Ukraine.

Given that Germany later blocked the export of NATO ally Estonia’s weapons to Ukraine, this image gives ‘Global Britain’ advocates a strong symbol of apparent British reliability and resourcefulness in the face of supposed European deliberation and disunity.

But although the UK’s response to the Ukraine crisis has rightly been credited as swift and substantial, it also reveals deeper developments in the current European security landscape as EU countries had worried Britain might choose to become absent post-Brexit.

Losing one of its two main military powers would certainly have been a blow to Europe, particularly as Russia’s threat has grown in recent years, so there will be relief that the Ukraine crisis shows Britain is undoubtedly committed to the region. Now the question for leaders in Paris, Berlin, and Brussels is how to deal with an active Britain committed to Europe but under no obligation to work within EU processes.

The UK already has an interesting network of bilateral and mini-lateral relationships with European allies. Its Joint Expeditionary Force brings together ten European countries – including Scandinavian and Baltic states – and is well-placed to support NATO activities while also remaining flexible and independent. In the past year, the UK worked with Norway in the Arctic region, provided military engineers support to Poland, and worked directly with France and Germany through the E3 grouping – once again bypassing EU institutions.

The UK also brings a unique diplomatic, technology, and intelligence-sharing relationship with the US which is unavoidably important in dealing with the threat from Russia. As the US sees European security through a NATO lens – rather than an EU one – this makes Britain a leading player as one of the few countries meeting its NATO spending commitments.

UK must do more to win trust

But despite such creative partnerships transcending the constraints of Brexit, the UK must do more to win the trust of the EU’s biggest players France and Germany to be a permanent power in the region. And relations with France have deteriorated following disputes over fishing, a lack of cooperation on migrants, and the AUKUS defence technology agreement between the UK, US, and Australia.

When it comes to Germany, the UK must not use the Ukraine crisis as an opportunity for geopolitical point-scoring. There are good historical reasons for Germany’s cautious approach to military engagement, even if these do constrain the country’s response to this challenge.

In dealing with Russia, some members of Germany’s ruling SPD sincerely believe their party’s less confrontational posture was central to de-escalating conflict during the Cold War. And although some historians may dispute that belief, it is still a distinct and more noble motivation for ‘dovishness’ than pure economic self-interest.

Cooperation always requires some compromise on all sides. Germany must accept some level of economic risk if sanctions against Russia are to be meaningful and France has to accept the necessity of the UK and US’s involvement and that the most effective dialogue is unlikely to be achieved through EU institutions.

Meanwhile, the UK must accept some role for the two biggest EU players, particularly as the Normandy Format which includes Russia, Ukraine, France, and Germany has proved productive in the past. And the UK needs to clamp down on its own economic ties with Russia.

Limited expectations as Scholz heads to Kyiv and Moscow Expert comment NCapeling 14 February 2022

After heavy criticism for an initially timid response, the approach of Germany’s new government to the Ukraine crisis is improving as its position on Russia evolves.

Olaf Scholz is a famously quiet and cautious communicator and, as concerns mounted in Washington and London about the possibility of a Russian invasion of Ukraine, the new German chancellor remained silent.

This time his silence reflected the fact that his government was unprepared for its first major foreign policy test, with marked divisions between the SPD and the Greens on how to manage a rapidly deteriorating relationship with Russia.

When he did speak, Scholz caused dismay in several NATO capitals by defending the controversial Nord Stream 2 pipeline. He called it ‘a purely private economic project’ even though the company building the pipeline is a subsidiary of Russia’s state-owned Gazprom.

The absence of crisis management from Berlin was a stark reminder of the gap left by Angela Merkel. Her knowledge of Russia and Ukraine, and her personal experience of dealing with Vladimir Putin, were key assets in 2014 in developing a unified western response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its destabilization of south-eastern Ukraine.

Germany has coordinated with its allies

Scholz has prepared the ground carefully for his visits to Kyiv and Moscow, extensively coordinating with NATO allies, such as France and Poland – as part of the Weimar Triangle – and the three Baltic states. His inaugural visit to Washington helped align positions on US-EU efforts to develop an economic deterrent against further Russian intervention in Ukraine.

Scholz has also repeated Merkel’s language from 2014 to signal to Moscow that Germany and its partners are ‘united and determined’ to stand their ground. And he has spoken of Germany’s continuing double strategy of ‘clear announcements’ to Moscow of the price it would pay for further aggression accompanied by a readiness to use all possible channels of dialogue to preserve peace.

The continuation of Germany’s established policy will not surprise Moscow. But under the surface Germany’s discourse on Russia is evolving as the political class internalizes the fact that the current Russian leadership is openly threatening to use military force to impose its will on Ukraine and re-configure Europe’s security arrangements.

Despite deep concerns about Germany’s dependence on Russian gas – more than half of the gas it consumes comes from Russia – there is broad acceptance that Nord Stream 2 cannot go ahead if Russia invades Ukraine. But typically, Scholz has not yet said as much publicly, limiting himself to stating ‘all options are on the table.’

Robert Habeck, Germany’s vice-chancellor as well as economic affairs and climate action minister, says the ‘geopolitical situation’ requires Germany to diversify its gas supplies and infrastructure for importing gas. For years, a strong pro-Russian gas lobby has dominated the thinking of the Economics Ministry and one consequence is the complete absence of facilities to import liquefied natural gas.

The German debate on Russia is shifting

A public debate has also started about weapons deliveries to Ukraine, even though this runs counter to deeply embedded pacifist tendencies in German society. Some MPs, former diplomats, and experts have begun to make the case for Germany to supply weapons to Ukraine so it can exercise its right to self-defence and deter military attack.

Christoph Heusgen, a former long-standing foreign policy adviser in the Federal Chancellery, says Berlin’s decision not to deliver arms to Ukraine to avoid endangering the Minsk peace process requires revision now Moscow has abandoned the path of negotiation.

Despite its mantra that there is no alternative to the Minsk Agreements, Berlin now admits these currently offer no prospect of resolving the war in Donbas because Russia is not prepared to implement them properly.

Other taboos are also being broken inside Germany. Heavyweight left-of-centre Die Zeit published the first results of its investigation into the SPD’s links with Russia and their place in Russia’s channels of influence in Germany. And even the SPD’s Sigmar Gabriel, an outspoken champion of Nord Stream 2 during his time as a government minister, has raised the question of Germany terminating energy imports from Russia if there is a drastic deterioration of the security situation.

Why a no-fly zone risks escalating the Ukraine conflict Expert comment NCapeling 13 March 2022

The US rejection of Poland’s offer to send fighter jets as a boost to Ukraine’s air defence shows just how uneasy nations are about direct combat with Russia.

The Pentagon’s decision to turn down the proposal by its fellow NATO member Poland to put Russian-made MiG-29 jets at its disposal demonstrates again how keen the US and allies are to avoid risking major confrontation with Russian forces.

The US Department of Defense says the offer to locate jets at bases in Germany was ‘not tenable’ as this risks flying into contested airspace over Ukraine – a non-NATO member – raising ‘serious concerns for the entire NATO alliance’ and echoing the continuing rejection of calls to implement no-fly zones (NFZs) as a way of easing the devastation being faced by trapped Ukraine civilians.

NFZs restrict any aircraft, including drones, from flying over a pre-defined region and can be used for both military and civilian purposes. But the implementation of NFZs is difficult to enforce and – most significantly – is unlikely to achieve the intended effect on the ground.

In conflict situations, they are usually implemented under the remit of United Nations (UN) peace support operations, requiring authorization under Article 42 of the UN Charter. This details that if all possible methods have proven ineffective in responding to a threat, countries ‘may take such action by air, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security’.

Protection but with limitations

NFZs provide both protection from attack and surveillance but do have limitations. They must be monitored and enforced which requires committing to fighter jet patrols with the explicit task of defending the area from the air by whatever means necessary.

This could mean jets firing upon Russian planes and drones so, if NATO allies and partners were to enforce a NFZ, it would represent an escalation of measures which is a step that would most likely provoke an unpredictable Vladimir Putin into further escalation – in short, it is highly likely to be seen as an act of war.

UK defence secretary Ben Wallace – among others – has repeatedly dispelled the idea, saying that enforcing NFZs would mean deploying ‘British fighter jets directly against Russian fighter jets’. In relation to moves such as the Polish jets, the Kremlin has warned that any countries offering airfields to Ukraine for attacks on Russia may be viewed as having entered the conflict.

There have only been three past instances of military NFZs. In Bosnia, as part of Operation Deny Flight from 1993-1995, a NFZ was enforced as part of a strategy which also including the provision of close air support and approved air strikes.

In Iraq, an NFZ endured for 12 years from 1991 and was succcesful in preventing Saddam Hussein from attacking Kurdish and Shia Muslim civilians. And in Libya in 2011, a NFZ was deployed to prevent the destruction of military infrastructure and the Libyan regime – although this quickly morphed into the provision of close air support.

So it is unclear just how successful NFZs are at providing protection. In Iraq and Libya, NFZ cover protection was provided but neither Saddam Hussein or Colonel Gaddafi were able to effectively target victims through their ground forces whereas, in Bosnia, Slobodan Milosevic infamously used ground troops to slaughter 8,000 Bosnian men and boys at Srebrenica.

Putin would still be able to continue to use both ground forces and artillery to assault Ukrainian cities with or without a NFZ – in fact, his sparse use of his Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) has been one of the surprising features of the war so far. Under a NFZ, missile attacks could also continue, there is nothing in the record of no-fly zones to suggest the provision of safe areas for non-combatants would work.

And NFZs have only been successful against vastly inferior forces such as in Iraq, Bosnia, and Libya. But Russia has an air force second only in size to the US and has a vast range of defences including the potent S-400 Triumf at its disposal. Not only would an NFZ be ineffective, it might also not be possible to enforce without risking significant losses to the peace operations force.

It is due to a combination of these reasons that NFZs have not been used more in previous conflicts. The most recent consideration for a NFZ was in Syria but President Bashar al-Assad’s Syrian forces, protected by Russian air cover, could still have targeted their intended victims despite air policing so a NFZ was not used.

In the long-term, under the terms of a ceasefire agreement, it may be possible to include a NFZ under a UN or joint OSCE-UN peace terms. However, the forces involved should exclude NATO allies and partners or any states with Russian alliances to avoid further conflict.

This leaves few suitable countries with the capacity, willingness, and political stance to be called on. Two of the world’s most militarily capable states – China and India – abstained in the Uniting for Peace vote in the UN General Assembly (UNGA). Whether another willing state with the military capability – such as a Gulf state – could be considered acceptable to all sides remains to be tested.

Notable successes with SAMs

Many military commentators also note that currently Ukrainian forces are having notable success without jets, downing Russian aircraft using sophisticated surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) such as Stinger and Javelin, and NATO countries continue to supply those in their thousands.

War on Ukraine: Exploring the humanitarian response to the conflict 12 April 2022 — 12:00PM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 6 April 2022 Online

This event explores the implications of the humanitarian realities from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the largest ground campaign in Europe since World War Two.

Reports from humanitarian organizations working in Ukraine are dire and reveal that a humanitarian disaster on an epic scale is unfolding.

The United Nations (UN) and other organizations estimate 12 million of Ukraine’s population are in need of assistance, 4.1 million have been displaced to neighbouring countries, and 6.4 million have become internally displaced.

Gillian Triggs, the assistant secretary-general and assistant high commissioner for protection at the UNHCR, joins other experts to discuss the humanitarian situation in Ukraine.

The panel considers:

• What are the greatest needs in Ukraine now?
• How can aid agencies meet those needs?
• What are the short and long-term implications of the crisis for Ukraine and Europe?
• How do international organizations work with local NGOs to provide food, medical aid and shelter?

This event is part of a regular series of events offering insight and analysis from experts and policymakers on how the war is affecting Ukraine, the region and the world.

This event is part of Chatham House’s ongoing work on the future of conflict.

Read the transcript

New research on 21st-century conflict 25 April 2022 — 5:00PM TO 6:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 11 April 2022 Online

This International Affairs webinar shares research on US special operations, urban warfare, and digital activism in recent conflicts.

Given the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine, and continuing conflicts in Myanmar, Yemen, and other countries, it is important to understand the changing nature of conflict in the 21st century.

In this webinar, authors from the March 2022 issue of International Affairs share research on the transformation of Western special forces, the impact of army size in urban warfare, and the use of social media and online activism in war.

The speakers in this event drew on the following research:

• US Special Forces transformation: post-Fordism and the limits of networked warfare (https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiab213)
• Urban insurgency in the twenty-first century: smaller militaries and increased conflict in cities (https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiac007)
• Diasporas as cyberwarriors: infopolitics, participatory warfare and the 2020 Karabakh war (https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiac015)

International Affairs was started at Chatham House in 1922 to communicate research to members who could not attend in person. Over the past 100 years, it has transformed into a journal that publishes academically rigorous and policy-relevant research. It is published for Chatham House by Oxford University Press. Read the latest issue here.

Putin’s Eurasian dream may soon become a nightmare Expert comment NCapeling 3 May 2022

The Ukraine invasion has detrimental consequences for the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union, a project which has been stumbling since its inception.

The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) – consisting of Russia with Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan – represents the culmination of Russia’s pursuit of regional integration with its post-Soviet neighbours.

Officially, the Union has an ambitious economic goal – the creation of a market based on common rules for its five member states and their 180 million citizens – and Russia likes to portray the EAEU as an Eurasian replica of the European Union (EU).

But although a common market was placed at the heart of the EAEU as a way to appeal to member states, it is of marginal importance for the Russian economy. For Moscow, the EAEU is primarily a geopolitical tool to help re-assert its regional and global role.

In a world of evermore powerful trading blocs, Moscow wants to use the EAEU to establish its own economic power base in the new polycentric world order. But Russia’s limited interest in the technocratic intricacies needed for the economic union to live up to its lofty proclamations exposes the real geopolitical ambitions.

The Kremlin has no qualms about disregarding the common rules when they clash with Russia’s own foreign policy, and it soon became evident the EAEU was a means to an end rather than an equitable institution within which Russia would accept constraints on its unilateral behaviour.

A crisis in the making

Although the EAEU has enabled some internal trade liberalization as well as the movement of people and labour to the benefit of its members reliant on labour migrant remittances, it has failed to tackle institutional barriers or promote growth and development policies.

It has been hampered by weak common institutions and a lack of institutional capacity of its member states, while Russia’s dubious commitment is also problematic. The EAEU lacks the institutional features of a genuine common market and any attempts to address these shortcomings have been essentially empty promises.

EAEU membership does benefit the political elites of its member states, because its hub-and-spoke model relies on bilateral high-level political deals between Russia and each member state individually. And by using the enticement of security guarantees and both political and financial support, Moscow has succeeded in attracting new members to join.

But a member’s political survival – or defence against political and economic reform – is dependent on military, economic, financial, and political support from Russia. This has been evidenced by the Armenian-Azerbaijan conflict, and by Russia’s backing of the Lukashenka regime in Belarus and the Tokayev government in Kazakhstan.

The design of the EAEU ties it to Russia’s own fate, and so the impact of harsh sanctions imposed on Russia for invading Ukraine are in stark evidence across its member states. Both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are reeling from the adverse effects on their domestic currencies and remittances, and the trade bans of key commodities.

And although the ban Russia imposed on grain export to EAEU members has softened, it shows the extent to which Russia was prepared to disregard the rules and sacrifice the EAEU to rescue its own economy. Members are incurring direct economic losses from Putin’s war against Ukraine and the fluctuation of the rouble has created a major impediment to trade with Russia.

Russia seems to increasingly view the Union as a convenient tool to bypass sanctions, with massive implications for its partner countries. And the supposed advantages of EAEU membership – enhanced trade, growth, and modernization – have simply not materialized.

Due to the rapid economic decline of Russia – a fall of 10-15 per cent is anticipated for 2022 – the EAEU is even less likely to deliver the promised economic benefits, while also putting members at risk of secondary sanctions.

The Ukraine invasion has also reignited domestic sensitivities and regional tensions. In Kazakhstan, Tokayev has failed to endorse Russia’s justification for the invasion and refuses to recognize the ‘independence’ of the separatist LNR and DNR.

Meanwhile Azerbaijan has pursued territorial gains in Nagorno-Karabakh while Russia is distracted by its invasion of Ukraine, and has requested the withdrawal of Russian peacekeeping from the disputed territory.

Russia is keen for partner countries to help mitigate the economic impact of sanctions by providing alternative transit routes for imports to Russia. But the EAEU faces challenges even at its most basic level because the sharing of custom duties among member states was denominated in dollars, which Russia now wants to move away from.

No easy escape

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine clearly reduces the benefits of Eurasian integration even further than before and imposes higher cost on the partner countries than were envisaged when they joined. They have been dragged into a geopolitical calamity over which they have no control – the inability of EAEU institutions to mediate or constrain Russia’s behaviour is stark.

Africa and Europe: Cooperation on digital transitions and new technologies 26 May 2022 — 8:00AM TO 12:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 12 May 2022 Online

The 11th Africa Day International Conference takes place under the auspices of the president of the Republic of Slovenia, HE Mr Borut Pahor, and within the framework of the Bled Strategic Forum.

Slovenia’s annual high-level Africa event seeks to improve policy outcomes for citizens in Europe and Africa as a result of a mutual understanding and strengthened cooperation between the two regions.

The event is co-hosted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Slovenia, the Chatham House Africa Programme and the European Commission.

Expert discussions at this year’s edition will examine collaborative links between Africa and Europe in promoting responsible innovation and governance of emerging technologies, as well as the role of technology in shaping creative and cultural economies.

The conference will be broadcast live on this website, on the Slovenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs website and on the Africa Programme Facebook page.

Review: One-man bandwagons The World Today rsoppelsa.drupal 25 May 2022

The ills of strongman politics are diagnosed sharply in this accessible overview – but a cure is nowhere to be found, says Natasha Lindstaedt

The Age of the Strongman: How the Cult of the Leader Threatens Democracy around the World
Gideon Rachman, Bodley Head, £20.00

For anyone reading the headlines, it should come as no surprise that democracy has regressed to where it was in 1989. The profound geopolitical and technological changes in the post-Cold World era have led to chaos, polarization, nationalist backlash and nostalgia for strong leadership in democracies. 

Countries such as Russia and China have provided a new model for leadership that has become frighteningly infectious – the strongman. 

Gideon Rachman charts this new era, offering an accessible overview of 14 examples, including Britain’s Boris Johnson, Donald Trump of the United States, Narendra Modi of India, Jair Bolsonaro of Brazil, Viktor Orbán of Hungary, Xi Jinping of China and – the archetype – Vladmir Putin of Russia.

The idea that we are living in the age of strongman politics is not particularly novel. Scholars of authoritarian politics have noted for years that there has been a steady rise in ‘personalist’ dictatorship and personalism in democracy in general. Nearly 40 per cent of all dictatorships are personalist, meaning domination by a single person, compared with 23 per cent in 1988. Autocracies have become increasingly aggressive, using sharp power to undermine democracy, which signals a shift. 

Autocracies used to focus on their own stability and didn’t interfere with democracies.

Rachman focuses on this threat that the strongman poses to democracy while macho one-man rule spreads across the globe. He provides a well-written, clear overview of why each leader fits the strongman label, what explains their appeal and what informs their worldview. 

Where Rachman is effective is in weaving together the commonalities of these strongmen – and they are all men – and their relationship to each other. Despite their ultra-nationalism, they have created an unofficial, multilateral network of mutual support. This includes leaders whose religious convictions may appear to be in conflict – such as Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel and Muhammed bin Salman of Saudi Arabia. 

This is not just a network of dictators – autocratic-style leaders of democratic countries have been welcomed to the club. In this system, strongmen openly admire each other, revel in their disdain for liberalism and human rights, and share advice and inspiration. 

This contrasts with western European leaders who fail to build such iron-clad bonds.

Each chapter is peppered with anecdotes about Rachman’s first-hand impressions of some of these leaders and other notables in positions of power gained from his decades as a foreign correspondent and analyst. His colourful commentary complements his understanding of how they operate. 

A common theme throughout is that the strongman’s appeal appears as a breath of fresh air for democracy, liberalism or peace. They are often labelled as anti-elitist and men of the people. This honeymoon period ends when each leader shows their true colours: attacking political opponents, sometimes in ruthless purges, disregarding the rule of law, weakening the courts and vilifying or controlling the media. 

A well-placed quote from Recep Erdogan sums this up: ‘Democracy is like a tram you ride until you arrive at your destination.’

Genuine public support exists for these manoeuvres. Dislocation from unmanaged globalization and economic crises has created an audience for political entrepreneurs. Strongman leaders have earned the distinction of being relatable and telling it like it is, despite many being considered to be liars and often filthy rich. 

Their ability to tap into people’s fears of the West, crime, immigrants or other ethnic and religious groups has helped gain them a fiercely loyal following. According to Rachman, strongman politics is linked to fear that a majority group that was once dominant is being threatened – something leaders such as Donald Trump have astutely tapped into.

Unlike some of the kleptocratic regimes of the 1970s and 1980s that were the embodiment of venal opportunists – think of Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines, Mobutu of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Jean-Claude Duvalier of Haiti – the strongmen of today have been inspired by the ideology of hyper-nationalism and anti-liberalism. 

Rachman links strongmen to the work of Carl Schmitt, a Nazi Party member, who was a vociferous critic of parliamentary democracy and cosmopolitanism, while touting the importance of illiberal norms to exercise power. Rachman argues that we are in a war of ideas, with liberalism under attack. He hones in on the perennial target George Soros, and how his support for liberal democracy has garnered the unwanted attention from the world’s right-wing ideologues and strongmen.

Social media has been usurped by these leaders and their regimes to forge closer, direct relationships with their supporters, to churn out fake news and create dangerous echo chambers. They are snake oil salesmen, making huge promises but offering very little in practice. They are never as they initially appear, and their images are carefully crafted.

Another theme emerges on the career pathway. Many served as a mayor of a cosmopolitan city. An interesting chapter on Johnson explains how he comes across like a relatable ‘good chap’, being able to handle embarrassing photo-ops. He was also a devoted Europhile, attended Eton and Oxford, and championed multi-culturalism as Mayor of London. Always the opportunist, Johnson had few qualms about campaigning for Brexit, and then later breaking the law to make it happen.

Yet there are some gaps in Rachman’s analysis.

It is never made clear why leaders such as Abdel Fattah el-Sisi of Egypt, Nicolás Maduro of Venezuela and Kim Jong-un of North Korea are largely missing, or a number of other strongman dictators in sub-Saharan Africa. 

Though there is a chapter devoted to Abiy Ahmed of Ethiopia, along with a few paragraphs devoted to Paul Kagame of Rwanda, Meles Zenawi also of Ethiopia, Emmerson Mnangagwa of Zimbabwe and Jacob Zuma of South Africa, the chapter on African strongmen does not acknowledge that this is the only continent where the regional trend is not as depressing. 

Rachman only occasionally engages with data on dictatorships to verify some of the patterns that he explores in the book. And his work would benefit from an examination of the institutional factors that may explain the rise of strongman politics, such as the pre-existing weakness of parties, parliaments and courts. 

Nor does he go in depth into how strongmen interact with their institutions and what the implications of this brand of politics are for conflict and development. The failures of strongmen to address Covid-19 are mentioned, but it is never explained why they may be so poorly equipped to govern. 

So, is democracy dead? Though Rachman is largely pessimistic, he acknowledges that politics tends to go in waves. There is little advice about how the West can expedite the end of this particular wave. 

The one positive Rachman offers is that strongman rule cannot deal with succession. This is largely true, though handovers have taken place, such as with the Kim dynasty. 

But there are definitely more questions raised than answers provided. What is left after strongmen are no longer in power? What must democracies do to undermine strongmen or prevent their rise? Where will the next strongman appear? 

Rachman’s book doesn’t provide these answers, but he does offer an interesting overview of the leaders dominating the headlines.
 

NATO must now transform old missions into new strategy Expert comment NCapeling 21 June 2022

As the war in Ukraine becomes prolonged and unpredictable, risks for the transatlantic alliance will increase, as will the global shockwaves of the conflict.

As a revitalized NATO alliance deals with a crisis that has major economic and humanitarian as well as military dimensions, the need for it to develop both a European and a global containment strategy grows ever more urgent.

Bolstering NATO’s defences so as to provide the capability to repel any form of Russian attack on land, at sea, in the air, or through space and cyberspace is a key aspect of this strategy as, in recent weeks, more combat forces able to defend territory have taken the form of additional troops, ships, and aircraft reinforcing the Baltic states and the Black Sea coastlines of Poland and Romania.

Ten allies have so far contributed to this effort, placing 40,000 troops under direct NATO command. Those sceptical about the future of the transatlantic security relationship have been confounded by the major role the US has played in this effort, sending parts of the 82nd Airborne Division and 3rd Armoured Division to Poland, and redeploying US Stryker brigades from Germany and Italy to the Baltic states and Romania.

Although many other allies have sent useful assets – such as French and UK aircraft to Romania or German and Netherlands Patriot batteries to Slovakia – the US contribution still surpasses all European efforts put together. The US now has 100,000 troops in Europe, the most it has deployed there since the mid-1990s.

Transitioning from temporary to permanent deployment

NATO has also mobilized its high-readiness Reaction Force for the first time and aims to establish four new multinational battalions in the Black Sea region – with France offering to lead the one in Romania, Italy in Bulgaria, and the Czech Republic in Slovakia. Most of these deployments are on a temporary basis, but the receiving allies would understandably like them to stay longer and for NATO to commit to permanent stationed forces.

Although this would oblige the alliance to break formally from the pledge it made to Moscow in 1997 not to station substantial combat forces or nuclear weapons or build military infrastructure on the territory of its new member states in eastern Europe, this was a political undertaking linked to circumstances prevailing at the time.

Given Russia’s behaviour, there is no reason why NATO should not now abandon it. There is also a question over whether NATO could also repeal the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the NATO-Russia Council, or simply leave them in suspension for a future, more cooperative, and less bellicose Russian regime.

Beyond showing the flag along its eastern flank, NATO does face longer-term issues which need to be clarified in its new Strategic Concept. First is whether to abandon its current strategy of reinforcement and military mobility across Europe – known as the Enhanced Forward Presence in the NATO jargon – in favour of the deployment of heavy armoured brigades or even divisions in fixed positions close to borders.

This will be expensive in the long-run and deprive allies of the flexibility they have enjoyed since the end of the Cold War to use their forces as and where they wish – from deployments in the Sahel or Afghanistan to fighting forest fires or building emergency hospitals for COVID-19 patients at home. The only exception is when they have put forces on rotation into the NATO high readiness forces or the European Union (EU) Battle Groups.

Germany’s commitment gives NATO more options

The decision of Germany to increase its defence spending to two per cent of GDP and to devote €100 billion to modernizing the Bundeswehr makes it technically possible for NATO to move to a Cold War-style forward, armoured defence. But it is unclear how quickly Berlin could raise its new divisions given its problems with procurement and government/industry relations in the defence sector.

It may make more sense for Germany not to launch new acquisition programmes but to buy existing off-the-shelf capabilities – as it has recently done with its decision to buy 35 US F35 aircraft – which other European countries are also acquiring, offering economies of scale and cheaper operating and maintenance costs.

But if Germany abandons ambitious defence projects with France – which prefers a ‘buy European’ approach – such as the Future European Air Combat System, the relationship with France will become strained and French plans for EU self-reliance in the military field put at risk.

As a country averse to war fighting and narrow military approaches to security, it is uncertain how much of the conventional defence burden in NATO Germany would be willing to take on, so this could be the opportunity to create more integrated European units with France, the Benelux, Poland, and Italy, even with the post-Brexit UK.

The UK has doubled the size of its forces in Estonia and sent 1,000 troops to Poland, as well as devoting a substantial portion of its army, navy, and airforce to regular NATO exercises in the Baltic region. London was also the first ally to grant Sweden and Finland a temporary security guarantee pending full integration into the alliance.

NATO will likely settle on a compromise, increasing the size of its battalions on its eastern flank – turning them into battle groups – but giving each one a larger reserve force which will remain in Germany or other European allied countries.

A NATO strategic plan is now needed

The other issue for NATO is to develop a single theatre-wide strategic plan managed by the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) and the NATO command structure. In reinforcing the alliance’s eastern flank, allies have sent forces to wherever they like and largely under national command, but this would not work in a real war.

NATO must revise its exercises to prepare and train for the new threat level, ensuring its forward deployed forces are fully integrated with local forces and the police and border guards to anticipate and respond to any Russian hybrid war tactics. It also needs to step up its joint planning and interoperability with Sweden and Finland and bring their territories into its standing defence plans.

One thing NATO has done well in this crisis is its political messaging. As Russia has become more threatening and reckless, it has been essential for NATO to be consistent and predictable. Re-affirming its core defensive purpose, calmly rejecting Putin’s nuclear posturing, and refusing to put NATO forces in Ukraine may be frustrating for some but it is vital not to play into Putin’s playbook regarding an ‘aggressive NATO’ or give him the sense he is being pushed into a corner. However, NATO strategic ambiguity can be useful when considering how to respond to a Russian escalation in Ukraine itself, such as using chemical weapons.

The key questions for NATO are:

• What should be the balance between permanently deployed and rotational forces in NATO’s new posture?
• What should be the balance of US/Canadian and European forces in this posture?
• How can the capability development programmes under EU Strategic Autonomy (such as PESCO and the European Defence Fund) be geared to support the European role and responsibility in the alliance? Air and missile defence would seem to be priorities given Russia’s reliance on long range strikes.
• How can the EU’s Strategic Compass, NATO’s next Strategic Concept and the third NATO-EU Joint Declaration be harmonized to bring the two institutions more closely together in responding to Russian hybrid operations and influence campaigns, and in assisting both Ukraine and others such as Georgia and Moldova?
• What should be the balance between forces for collective defence with heavy armour and directed artillery fire, and those for expeditionary missions beyond Europe such as counterterrorism, stabilization and peacekeeping?

NATO is revived and refocused

Although the Russian invasion of Ukraine is a catastrophe for Ukraine and Europe more generally, the multilateral system has discovered a new energy and sense of purpose as NATO has been revived and refocused on its core mission.

The EU and the US have pulled together with daily coordination of their policies and actions, and the EU is also facing up to its geo-political role, as recognizing the EU aspirations of Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia as well as the countries of the western Balkans shows its responsibility for the security and economic integration of the whole of Europe.

President Maia Sandu on democracy and politics in Moldova Video jon.wallace 4 July 2022

The president covers Moldova’s challenges as it seeks closer integration with the European Union.

President Maia Sandu discusses challenges to Moldovan democracy and society during an interview at Chatham House’s 2022 London Conference.

She covers issues including corruption, the presence of Russian troops in the Transnistria region, neutrality in Moldova’s constitution, popular support for EU membership and refugees from Russian aggression in Ukraine.

America's abortion ban will hurt women everywhere The World Today mhiggins.drupal 9 August 2022

In the final part of a series on the impact of the Roe v Wade ruling, Nina van der Mark assesses the global impact of America’s reverse on reproductive rights.

In overturning the constitutional right to an abortion established by Roe v Wade, the Supreme Court of the United States placed the US alongside Poland, El Salvador and Nicaragua as countries that have restricted access to abortion in recent decades. While the Dobbs ruling is a domestic reversal, the US remains the largest funder of global health, family planning and reproductive health services. There is a lot at stake for women and girls around the world. 

Here are four potential global impacts to consider.

Millions of women will be at greater risk 

The Guttmacher Institute, a research and policy organization that aims to improve sexual and reproductive health worldwide, calculated that in 2021 American international family planning assistance saw an estimated 27.2 million women and couples receive contraceptive services, some 12 million pregnancies averted, four million unsafe abortions prevented and 19,000 maternal deaths avoided. These outcomes help to improve gender equity as well as increase women’s education and employment opportunities and boost economic growth. 

This happens despite US funding for international family planning being in decline over the past decade. It peaked during the Obama administration at $715 million in 2010 but since 2017 averaged about $607 million a year. Using US aid to directly fund abortions as a method of family planning is prohibited under the terms of the Helms Amendment of 1973.

In America, the Dobbs ruling has so far led 14 Republican-controlled states to enact anti-abortion legislation. This, in turn, has motivated pro-choice campaigners – on August 2, a referendum in the staunchly conservative state of Kansas returned a decisive vote to preserve abortion rights. That result gives hope to abortion-rights groups that the issue will cut across traditional political loyalties and bring swing voters to their cause in the mid-term congressional elections in November.  

That is important because Congress decides on the level of funding for America’s global health programmes, including family planning and reproductive health. The stakes are high. For instance, Kenya, Nigeria and Ethiopia, with a combined population of more than 370 million, are among the top 10 recipients of US Overseas Development Assistance, most of which goes to health programmes. Nigeria, for instance, received $794 million in such funding from America in 2019-2020. 

A sudden policy reversal affecting funding for reproductive health would lead to clinic closures, reduced access to help and shortages of essential family planning commodities. The result would be more unintended pregnancies, more unsafe abortions and a potential increase in maternal mortality. 

Women will have more unsafe abortions

The Helms Amendment, which prevents recipients of American aid directly funding abortion services, was passed by Congress in 1973 following the Roe v Wade decision. The Global Gag Rule, first enacted by Ronald Reagan in 1984, goes further, forbidding NGOs abroad in receipt of American aid from promoting or counselling abortion as a form of family planning, even when using their own funds. Since its introduction, Republican administrations have enforced the rule while Democratic administrations have rescinded it, as Biden did in January 2021.  

Restricting access to safe abortion services increases the number of unsafe abortions, whereas legalizing abortion services reduces them. During the Bush administration, the Global Gag Rule prompted a 12-per-cent increase in pregnancies in rural Ghana, which led to an additional 200,000 abortions. 

Another study found a substantial increase in abortions, a decline in contraceptive use and an increase in pregnancies in 26 countries in sub-Saharan Africa affected by the rule across three US administrations. It’s estimated that 77 per cent of abortions in the region are unsafe. In 2019 that translated into 6.2 million unsafe abortions.

The failure of America to consistently support safe abortion services contributes to the more than 35 million unsafe abortions that take place each year across 132 lower middle-income countries.  

Under the Trump administration, the Global Gag Rule was extended from family planning funding to cover all US global health assistance, increasing the level of US funding affected from around $600 million to $8.8 billion. Were a Republican administration to be elected in 2024 there is little doubt the rule would be reinstated, possibly in the most restrictive form that Trump enforced. 

Anti-abortion movements will double their efforts 

The repeal of Roe v Wade has not occurred in a silo, nor are its effects contained within the US.

News of the Dobbs ruling, which overturned Roe v Wade, prompted One of Us, a European anti-abortion platform, to mount an immediate, 20,000-strong anti-abortion demonstration in Spain, including leaders of the conservative Vox party.  On Twitter, Sara Larin, an anti-abortion activist from El Salvador, likened the Dobbs ruling to the abolition of slavery in the US, calling it ‘the beginning of the end for abortion [worldwide]’. 

Countries have based their legal protections for abortion access on Roe v Wade or cited it in their case law, which now opens them up to legal challenge domestically. A Christian anti-abortion group in Kenya is legally challenging a pro-choice ruling based on Roe v Wade. Such challenges may increase: anti-choice groups in Mexico and Peru cited the Dobbs ruling as an encouraging development. 

Many American Christian right-wing groups fund anti-abortion activities abroad. OpenDemocracy, an independent global media platform, recently reported that 28 Christian right-wing organizations spent more than $280 million internationally between 2007-2018 on anti-choice activities, targeting Europe primarily, followed by Africa and Asia.  

The American right is not afraid to take direct legal action abroad either. The European Center for Law and Justice, an offshoot of the Trump-backed American Center for Law and Justice, has made interventions in dozens of court cases on sexual and reproductive health and rights in the European Court, including in the case that overturned abortion rights in Poland.   

The European parliament in its most recent motion on the topic expressed concern about the potential for the Dobbs ruling to prompt a surge in the flow of money to anti-choice groups around the world.  

America’s global standing will take a hit 

The Dobbs ruling immediately attracted criticism from many world leaders.  ‘Watching the removal of a woman’s fundamental right to make decisions over their own body is incredibly upsetting,’ said Jacinda Ardern, the New Zealand prime minister. ‘To see that principle now lost in the United States feels like a loss for women everywhere.’  

President Emmanuel Macron of France tweeted: ‘I wish to express my solidarity with the women whose liberties are being undermined by the Supreme Court of the United States.’ 

The ruling is in conspicuous opposition to the Biden administration’s more progressive stance on sexual and reproductive health and rights and its advocacy abroad. It sends a clear message from the world’s most powerful democracy that these rights are not guaranteed. 

While many world leaders reacted to the Dobbs ruling with dismay, other senior figures from the conservative right welcomed it, including the Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro’s son, Eduardo, and Javier Milei, a potential candidate in Argentina’s presidential election next year.  

In 2020, the Trump administration co-sponsored the ‘Geneva Consensus Declaration on Promoting Women’s Health and Strengthening the Family,’ declaring that there was ‘no international right to abortion.’ It was signed by more than 30 countries, including autocratic and right-wing governments in Brazil, Poland, Hungary and Saudi Arabia.  

The Biden administration withdrew from it – but its signatories are the governments who may yet take advantage of America’s self-inflicted erosion of authority on reproductive rights.  

The Dobbs ruling exposes the limitation of the American executive to act within the US legal system while opening up questions on American support of, and dedication to, fundamental rights.

Read the other two articles in this series: ‘Empowering women aids climate resilience’ and ‘Counting the cost of the abortion ban’

Russia's war: How will it shape the region's future? 1 December 2022 — 9:00AM TO 6:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 17 August 2022 Chatham House and Online

This conference takes a deep-dive into the implications of the war for the wider region.

You will receive an email in advance of the conference with further details on accessing the event.

The video on this page is of the opening session only. To view all the session videos, please visit the conference playlist on YouTube.

How will Russia’s war shape the region’s future?

Russia’s latest invasion of Ukraine is on such a scale that it will have a seismic effect on all the countries that once formed the Soviet empire. Vladimir Putin’s decisions have accelerated trends across the region leading to unintended consequences.

Now it is more crucial than ever – not only for those concerned with the region’s economic and democratic development, but for all those with a stake in the future security of Europe.

For some states, this will mean a faster break from the legacy of the USSR and from Russia’s ‘Geopathological embrace‘ while, for others, maybe even a fresh start at democracy and good governance.

In isolated cases, the war will conceivably hasten assimilation with Russia. But the two principal combatants, Ukraine and Russia, will diverge even further. Ukraine, though fighting for its survival now, will at least get the opportunity to ‘build back better’ if it achieves some form of victory.

Whatever the course of the war, however, Russia’s aspirations to be a global power again are doomed as it is gradually deglobalized from Western structures.

This conference analyses:

• How Russia’s war will affect the broader regional economy and whether this will hasten Vladimir Putin’s exit
• What to hope for, what to fear and the key trends that will dominate the region going forward.
• Unique expertise in an independent forum on what’s at stake for Europe. 

Gorbachev's complex legacy is beyond the popular belief Expert comment NCapeling 3 September 2022

The last major figure with a decisive Cold War role, Mikhail Gorbachev was not as bad as Putin’s Russia portrays him, but also not as heroic as the West thinks.

Arguably the worst year of the Cold War since the Cuban Missile Crisis was 1983, with three major incidents which escalated East-West tensions – and any one of them could have led to a full-scale war.

The first was the Korean Airline KAL007 being shot down by an SU15 fighter aircraft for straying into Soviet airspace, killing all 269 passengers and crew. Then came the identification of signals from Soviet satellites as being incoming US intercontinental ballistic missiles – Colonel Stanislav Petrov, going against all protocols, thankfully decided to report them as a false alarm before he could be sure.

The third was perhaps the most dangerous, being the misinterpretation of a live-fire NATO exercise which was believed by some in both East Germany and Russia to be a front for an imminent attack.

All three incidents occurred in the few months following the infamous March 1983 ‘Star Wars’ speech by US president Ronald Reagan, in which he talked about nuclear arms control and laid out the US case for a ballistic missile defence programme.

At that time Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev was the youngest serving member of the USSR Politburo, known to be a favourite of Soviet leader Yuri Andropov, and it is highly likely he had been aware of these close calls and was part of discussions within Kremlin decision-making circles.

A changemaker both inside and outside the USSR

Following the deaths of Andropov in 1984 and his replacement Konstantin Chernenko in 1985, Gorbachev’s appointment as general secretary of the Communist Party saw him immediately begin to change the Soviet Union from within – and also change relationships with the major Western powers, especially the US, Germany, and the UK.

His policies of glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring) were primarily aimed at internal reforms but translated into a major reset of international relations and international security. During his six years as leader, Gorbachev initiated many arms control negotiations which resulted in treaties and increased both the transparency and the confidence between the USSR and the US.

These included the 1986 Stockholm Accord which emanated from the Helsinki Process and allowed for the observation and inspection of large-scale military exercises, the 1985 resumption of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks which lead to START I, and the 1987 INF Treaty in which the USSR ‘out-yessed’ the US – the most open and transparent disarmament treaty in terms of notification and verification measures ever agreed.

There was also a reciprocal moratorium on nuclear weapons tests starting from 1985 – which laid the groundwork for the 1996 CTBT – the 1991 Chemical Weapons Convention, and the 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty.

The most dramatic moment of all was when Gorbachev and Reagan met at a summit in Reykjavik and came close to deciding to eliminate nuclear weapons – but the initiative failed to reach agreement, mainly because Reagan could not drop his commitment to ballistic missile defences and Gorbachev could not accept the offer of joint development.

Nonetheless, all these nuclear arms control treaties led the way for their descendants which have kept nuclear weapons in check ever since and are still in place in the form of the New START agreement.

But despite these outstanding achievements, Gorbachev had blind spots – such as enabling rather than destroying the USSR bioweapons programme, unlike the US which had dismantled its own bioweapons offensive capability by 1973.

And it is now known that, despite negotiating the Chemical Weapons Convention, Russia withheld information on new chemical weapons agents – Novichoks – which have since been used to lethal effect by Russia in Salisbury and against figures opposing the current regime.

His misguided faith in a Soviet future

Gorbachev was markedly different to his predecessors as secretary general. He was neither as decrepit nor as hardline, and he understood from the outset that the Soviet Union was, by the 1980s, finally dying.

Using the intellectual abilities of Aleksandr Yakovlev, he forced through the reforms which simultaneously captured the imagination of the free world and liberated his countrymen and women.

But although he built solid relationships – even friendships – with the world’s major heads of state and improved the USSR’s human rights, releasing dissidents such as Andrei Sakharov, but many – especially Ukrainian dissidents – continued to languish in camps.

The greatest disappointment in Gorbachev’s legacy was he completely believed the USSR could be reformed and still survive as an entity while others, such as Boris Yeltsin and Ronald Reagan, understood it had to be dismantled.

This shortcoming is especially uncomfortable as today’s Russia continues to insist it has a given right to control other former Soviet states, to the extent it is willing to destroy them if they do not concede.

Central and Eastern Europe become hawkish on China Expert comment LJefferson 16 September 2022

The recent withdrawal of the Baltic countries from the ‘17+1’ format displays changing perceptions of China due to its ambiguity towards the war in Ukraine.

While the Russian invasion of Ukraine only confirmed Central and Eastern Europe’s views of Russia, it is also affecting their relations with China. Although the relationship was already complicated due to unfulfilled Chinese economic promises to CEE countries and growing indications of efforts to influence their domestic politics, China’s support for Russia is pushing Central and Eastern Europeans even further away.

This shift was highlighted, and formalized, recently by several countries in the region leaving the ‘17+1’ format, through which China cooperates with a group of countries from the region. The shifting attitudes towards China will also influence the relationship between the European Union as a whole and China.

A Trojan Horse that never was

When the format was launched in 2012 between 16 CEE countries at the time and China, the countries jumping on board expected a wave of Chinese investment and an opportunity to diversify mostly west-bound trade.

These hopes never fully materialized as Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in CEE has been generally lower compared to the rest of Europe and China never became an important export destination for any of the countries. The growing disillusionment and concern about Chinese security threats has led to some of the countries speaking up about the perceived perils of closer cooperation.

The first to withdraw from what had become ‘17+1’ by 2021 was Lithuania, which also took an interest in strengthening ties with Taiwan and allowed it to open a Taiwanese representative office in Vilnius. This triggered a breakdown in the bilateral relations with China. As a retaliatory response, China blocked Lithuanian imports and imports from other EU states containing inputs from Lithuania, leading the EU to launch an official dispute at the WTO.

War in Ukraine

Since the invasion started, CEE countries have been dealing with large numbers of Ukrainian refugees, organizing shipments of military equipment to Ukraine, and at the same time worrying whether they could be next on Russia’s list.

However, the concerns and security environment that these countries face seems to be almost entirely disregarded by China. On the sidelines of the 2022 Winter Olympics in Beijing, Xi and Putin signed the joint communiqué in which China backed Moscow’s demands to reverse NATO borders to the pre-1997 situation, completely disregarding CEE’s security interests.

China’s implicit support for Russia after the invasion has sowed deep mistrust of its respect for the sovereignty of other nations. The Chinese diplomatic apparatus clearly noticed this changing mood among CEE governments and sent a special envoy to eight capitals in April-May tasked with ‘eliminating misunderstandings regarding Russia-Ukraine conflict’.

However, the trip was not particularly successful. The delegation failed to secure high-level meetings, with the most prominent case being the Polish minister of foreign affairs declining to meet Huo Yuzhen, the Chinese Special Councilor for CEEC cooperation. Given that Andrzej Duda, President of Poland, was the only head of an EU state who attended the Beijing Olympics opening ceremony just before the Russian invasion in February, the change in attitudes is clear.

Following the envoy’s visit to the Czech Republic, the Czech parliament’s foreign affairs committee unanimously approved a resolution calling for the country to quit the ‘16+1’ format and the government is expected to act upon it in the near future. Meanwhile, Latvia and Estonia recently jointly announced that they would no longer be participating in the cooperation framework, turning it into ‘14+1’.

Why the UK must deliver on Nordic-Baltic security Expert comment NCapeling 16 December 2022

Hard choices are needed but it is crucial the UK provides security and leadership to its European partners given the wider context of the war in Ukraine.

The UK’s role in Nordic-Baltic security has been growing over the past decade. The region is key to core British strategic interest and engagement, and UK threat assessment closely aligns with long-held regional perspectives – the 2021 Integrated Review defines Russia as ‘the most acute threat to our security’.

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the UK’s strong stance towards Moscow and the concrete steps taken to assist Ukraine and strengthen defence and deterrence on NATO’s eastern flank have been widely appreciated in the Nordic-Baltic region.

The UK is seen as a reliable partner but, for it to continue to deliver in the region, difficult choices must be made with regards to UK defence spending and military capabilities, and London’s more global ambitions.

The UK is a major contributor to NATO’s deterrence posture on the eastern flank, serving as a framework nation for NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) battlegroup in Estonia, and contributing to another battlegroup in Poland.

UK remains crucial to regional security

Coupled with its contribution to NATO’s Baltic Air Policing mission and maritime forces in the area, the UK is a crucial security partner both in the region and in a broader arch across Europe.

Over the past decade and a half, the UK has been developing a dense network of bilateral and minilateral relations in the region which are major assets in the current security environment.

It leads the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) which is a military cooperation format highly valued for its flexibility in responding to the needs of the participating nations – including non-NATO Sweden and Finland – and is increasingly focused on the North Atlantic, High North and wider Baltic areas. The UK has also seen increased bilateral defence cooperation with Norway, Denmark, Estonia, and other regional allies and partners.

There are reasonable expectations that Germany or France may at some point assume a greater role in this part of Europe, building on France’s participation in the EFP in Estonia, and Germany’s lead of the EFP in Lithuania.

However, while Paris remains more focused on NATO’s southern (and south-eastern) flank and building the European Union’s defence role, Berlin often underperforms as a leading or an organizing power of collaborative efforts across Europe.

Both also have a credibility problem in the Nordic-Baltic region due to their past policies towards Russia that occasionally reappear when discussing military support to Ukraine or how to treat Russia in the post-war European security order.

By contrast, the UK offers military capability, strong political will, a long-standing tradition of engagement in the Nordic-Baltic area, and fast decision-making.

The latter is exemplified by the bilateral security guarantees provided to Sweden and Finland during their accession to NATO, and the surge of assets sent to the region in the wake of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine such as an additional battlegroup and Chinook helicopters to Estonia, as well as forward-deployed elements of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters to Latvia and Lithuania as part of the JEF.

Such pragmatic and resolute engagement help substantiate the UK’s post-Brexit claim that although it left the EU, it did not leave Europe. London also understands and facilitates the pivotal role that the US plays in European security – a shared perspective with the Nordic-Baltic partners.

Only the US – which has just recently decided to step up its military presence in the Baltics – has a greater appeal than the UK as a major ally. But Washington’s truly global responsibilities make it more difficult for it to play a regional leadership role.

With the context of the war in Ukraine, the centre of gravity of European security is moving east. The Nordic-Baltic region is likely to feature more prominently in the upcoming refresh of the UK’s Integrated Review, as the war in Ukraine and NATO’s new forward defence approach will focus UK attention and military capabilities on Europe for the foreseeable future.

But the UK still has limited resources and, despite the worsening security environment, there is currently no commitment by the Rishi Sunak government to increase defence spending beyond two per cent of GDP, as set out in the recently-published Autumn Statement.

This difficult fiscal reality contrasts UK ambition to also increase its footprint and engagement in the Indo-Pacific, a region highlighted by Rishi Sunak in his first foreign policy speech. London is already confronted with increasing expectations from its Nordic and Baltic partners, which are rattled by Russia’s aggression and seek more engagement and commitments from larger and more resourceful allies, and are insisting on prompt implementation of NATO’s new defence and deterrence plans.

This all comes on top of the resources that further assistance to Ukraine will require in the coming months and years. Balancing competing priorities and demands from partners is routine for a major power with global ambition but, in the current context, if the UK government fails to prioritize and increase resources, over-extension is in sight for its armed forces.

The war in Ukraine confirms that, beyond the rhetoric around the ‘Indo-Pacific tilt’, the Euro-Atlantic is – and will remain – the priority theatre of engagement for the UK. To keep delivering in the Nordic-Baltic region and remain a reliable partner, UK ambitions should be set clearly, and expectations managed with regional partners.

A good example is the recent UK-Estonia joint statement and defence roadmap, which is an attempt to reconcile London’s vision of modern deterrence with Tallinn’s preference for ‘more boots on the ground’.

The joint statement also clarifies initial misunderstandings regarding the upcoming withdrawal of the second UK battlegroup deployed to Estonia in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine – support Tallinn expected to continue ‘as long as necessary’ but London saw as temporary. It offsets the poor political ‘optics’ of the withdrawal while providing solid ground for deepening the common agenda in the near future.

By the 2023 NATO summit in Vilnius, progress on implementing the roadmap will be a crucial measure of success for the bilateral relationship, and for the UK’s broader regional role. It should serve as an opportunity for the UK to reflect on its force development priorities and balance, with Baltic partners arguing in favour of the UK rebuilding some mass in its armed forces and providing more resources to the land component.

Much to gain for the UK

The UK gains many benefits from deepening and widening its engagement in the Nordic-Baltic region, and not only by showcasing its regional leadership at a time of dire need or having more weight in Europe and across the Atlantic in strategic debates about future security architecture.

In conversation with Edi Rama, prime minister of Albania 23 March 2023 — 5:30PM TO 6:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 13 March 2023 Chatham House and Online

From migration to Russia and China, how is Albania responding to the geopolitical challenges of today?

In late 2022, the UK government made a pointed remark that many of the illegal migrants attempting to get into the country were from Albania. In response, Albania prime minister Edi Rama replied that targeting Albanians as the cause of Britain’s crime and border problems ‘makes for easy rhetoric but ignores hard fact’. 

This nuanced response demonstrated the challenges and complexities that Albania faces, the same as many other countries. As well as being embroiled in the major challenge of international migration, Albania has suffered from a serious cyber-attack in July 2022 from Iran. Government networks were compromised for a month with Tirana removing the Iranian embassy in the capital.

Then there is the ongoing threat from Russia and China. Nestled in the already volatile Balkans, Albania has been at the heart of international affairs in recent months.

Prime Minister Rama speaks at Chatham House to discuss:

• How is Albania responding to Russian aggression and what is its stance on Ukraine?
• Where does Tirana believe China poses the most serious threat?
• How can countries in Europe best respond to illegal migration and better control the flow of people?
• How is the region of the Western Balkans effected by the war in Ukraine and how can it contribute to the security challenges posed by the war?

As with all member events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

Eurovision, war and the geopolitics of pop The World Today mhiggins.drupal 28 March 2023

Europe’s great song competition may strive for continental harmony, but bitter conflicts and voting blocs often drag it off key, writes Saskia Postema.

In May, the city that spawned the Beatles will add another notch to its cultural belt as Liverpool hosts the Eurovision Song Contest.

The pop competition has been celebrating extravagance, dramatic acts and lots of glitter since 1956. It is expressly designed to be non-political, with performers barred from promoting political interests, yet it exists for a specific political purpose – to promote European unity.

The organizer, the European Broadcasting Union (EBU), has certainly succeeded in part with its mission. While Europe Day on May 9 comes and goes without much fanfare, Eurovision is an eagerly anticipated fixture on the cultural calendar.

Cultural diplomacy

While some may dismiss it as simply an extravagant party, there is more to it than that: it is a form of cultural diplomacy. Beyond artistry, acts are expected to bring their cultural identity to the stage as they bid for douze points, Eurovision’s highest score, from national juries.

Like any popular forum, it reflects popular opinion. So, when war threatens the European harmony Eurovision is meant to exude, politics inevitably manifests itself.

This was evident last year. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February, Eurovision’s organizers reiterated their apolitical stance stating both countries would be allowed to participate. But when various countries threatened to withdraw if Russia was allowed to compete, the EBU changed its tune and broke off ties with Russian broadcasting agencies indefinitely. As reluctant as it was to act in this capacity, the organization still inadvertently highlighted its role as a political gatekeeper and confirmed Eurovision does function as a political arena.

Unsurprisingly, all eyes were on the Ukrainian entry that year. Kalush Orchestra’s Stefania, presenting a blend of traditional Ukrainian folk music with hip hop beats, went on to win the contest resoundingly.

And while the winning nation normally hosts next year’s competition, due to the war this honour passed to the runner-up, the United Kingdom. Britain, coincidentally, has been one of the most visible supporters of Kyiv’s war efforts. Boris Johnson, the former prime minister, was among the first leaders to visit Kyiv after the Russian invasion.

Last year’s second place ended a long spate of poor results for the UK in the competition. The first year it scored nul points was 2003 when the UK entry was Cry Baby by the duo Jemini. The result was seen widely as a backlash against Britain’s entry into the Iraq war earlier that year.

In the intervening years it has been placed last twice and received nul points again in 2021 when the entry was Embers sung by James Newman. With last year’s second place for Sam Ryder’s Space Man, the UK redeemed itself and will get to host Eurovision in Liverpool, a city twinned with Odesa since 1957.

It is not the first time that Russia’s geopolitical relations have led to Eurovision controversy. In 2008, following the Russo-Georgian war, Russia recognized the self-proclaimed independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia which had broken away from Georgia.

As a result, Georgia initially refused to take part in the 2009 Eurovision as it was to be held in Moscow. It changed its mind, however, submitting a song by Stefane and 3G called We Don’t Wanna Put In. The submission was rejected by the EBU, which said it contained obvious references to the Russian leader, something Georgia denied.

In 2015, Ukraine withdrew from Eurovision following the Russian annexation of Crimea. The following year the EBU was faced with a similar problem when Ukraine submitted a song, 1944,sung by Jamala, which told the story of her great-grandmother who lived through the mass deportation of Crimean Tatars in the Soviet Union under Josef Stalin. This time the EBU allowed the entry, despite the Russian Duma calling for its rejection. The song went on to win.