Editor's note: By any measurable standard, Egypt is more vulnerable to violence and insurgency today than it had been before the Arab Spring. Since the overthrow of former President Mohammed Morsi in 2013, Egypt has seen shocking levels of repression. In Shadi Hamid's August 6 piece in Foreign Policy, Hamid makes the argument that the end result of the Egyptian coup turned out to be a gift to the Islamic State group.

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi came to power on a classic strongman platform. He was no liberal or democrat — and didn’t claim to be — but promised stability and security at a time when most Egyptians had grown exhausted from the uncertainties of the Arab Spring.

Increasingly, U.S. President Barack Obama’s administration seems to accept this premise. In the span of the past week, the United States has delivered eight F-16s to Egypt, relaunched the U.S.-Egypt “strategic dialogue,” and said it would resume “Bright Star,” the joint military exercise suspended after the military coup of July 3, 2013.

Sisi’s raison d’être of security and stability, however, has been undermined with each passing month. By any measurable standard, Egypt is more vulnerable to violence and insurgency today than it had been before. On July 1, as many as 64 soldiers were killed in coordinated attacks by Egypt’s Islamic State affiliate, which calls itself the Province of Sinai. It was the worst death toll in decades, and came just days after the country’s chief prosecutor, Hisham Barakat, was assassinated.

If this is what a “stability-first” approach looks like, Egypt’s future is dark indeed. Of course, it shouldn’t be surprising that the country is growing less secure: Since the overthrow of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohamed Morsi on July 3, 2013, Egypt has seen shocking levels of repression. On Aug. 14, 2013, it witnessed the worst mass killing in its modern history, with at least 800 killed in mere hours when security forces violently dispersed two pro-Morsi sit-ins in Cairo. WikiThawra, a project of the Egyptian Center for Economic and Social Rights, estimates that nearly 36,500 people were arrested or detained from the day of the coup through May 15, 2014 — one can only imagine how high that figure has grown a year later.

Since April 2015, meanwhile, at least 163 Egyptians have “disappeared.” As one prisoner recalled of his time at Azouli, a military jail which can’t be seen by civilians: “There is no documentation that says you are there. If you die at Azouli, no one would know.”

This repression, which targets not just Islamists but also secular and liberal opposition activists, makes the resort to violence and terror more likely among at least some Egyptians. There is a growing trend of academic literature pointing to the link between tyranny and terror: In a widely cited 2003 study, for example, academics Alan Krueger and Jitka Maleckova conclude, “The only variable that was consistently associated with the number of terrorists was the Freedom House index of political rights and civil liberties.”

Not all repression is created equal, however. I have argued that low-to-moderate levels of repression do not necessarily have a radicalizing effect. What we are seeing in Egypt today, however, is not your run-of-the-mill authoritarianism but something deeper and more frightening. This is eradication, driven, no less, by popular and populist sentiment.

The end result is that the Egyptian coup turned out to be a gift to the Islamic State. You don’t have to take my word for this: The jihadi group itself clearly thinks it benefited from Morsi’s overthrow. In its first statement after the coup, Islamic State spokesman Abu Mohamed al-Adnani, addressing the Muslim Brotherhood and other mainstream Islamists, says, “You have been exposed in Egypt.” He refers to “democracy” and the Brotherhood as “the two idols [which] have fallen.”

Of course, jihadis had long been making this argument, particularly after the Muslim Brotherhood in Iraq took part in successive U.S.-backed governments after the 2003 Iraq war. Al Qaeda and its ilk gleefully described the Muslim Brotherhood as al-Ikhwan al-Muflisun, or the Bankrupt Brotherhood — a play on its Arabic name. But while al Qaeda may have achieved a measure of sympathy in the Middle East after the Sept. 11 attacks, it was never, and never could be, a real threat to the Brotherhood’s model of political change. It was proficient at staging terrorist attacks but proved unable to carry its successes into the realm of governance. More importantly, al Qaeda’s vision for state building, to the extent that it had one, failed to capture the attention of the world or the imagination of tens of thousands of would-be fighters and fellow travelers.

The same cannot be said about the Islamic State, whose seemingly irrational apocalyptic vision coexists with an unusually pronounced interest in governance. As Yale University’s Andrew March and Mara Revkin laid out in considerable detail, the group has, in fact, developed fairly elaborate institutional structures. In the ideological and theological realms, the Islamic State is not just Baathist brutality in Islamic garb: Rather, it has articulated a policy toward Christian minorities based on a 7th-century pact, an approach to Islamic economic jurisprudence, and even a theory of international relations.

The Islamic State’s unlikely successes in governance undermine a key premise of mainstream Islamists — that because of their gradualism, pragmatism, and “competence,” they, rather than extremists, are better suited to delivering on bread-and-butter issues. In fact, the opposite appeared to be true: Brotherhood-style gradualism and a willingness to work through the democratic process hadn’t worked. One senior Brotherhood official told me, as we sat in a café on the outskirts of Istanbul, “If I look at the list of mistakes the Brotherhood made, this is the biggest one: trying to fix the system from inside gradually.”

Even those who otherwise abhor the Islamic State’s ideology might find themselves susceptible to the argument that violence “worked,” while peaceful participation didn’t. It’s an argument that the Islamic State and its affiliates have repeatedly tried to drive home: In one recruitment video, a young Egyptian man — a judge in one of the Islamic State’s sharia courts — tells the camera that “[Islamist groups that participate in elections] do not possess the military power or the means to defend the gains they have achieved through elections. After they win, they are put in prison, they are killed in the squares, as if they’d never even won … as if they had never campaigned for their candidates.”

Needless to say, this particular pitch wouldn’t have been possible in 2013, when Morsi was still in power, or even in 2012, when the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces was in charge. In short, the Egyptian coup — coupled with the subsequent massacres and never-ending crackdown — has given the arguments made by al Qaeda in the 2000s more power than ever before.

There’s no denying that violence surged following the coup. According to the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, the month of the coup, July 2013, saw a massive uptick in violence, from 13 attacks the month before to 95 attacks. The number of attacks dipped in subsequent months — to 69 in August and 56 in September — but remained significantly higher than before the coup. The pre- and post-coup discrepancy becomes even more obvious when we zoom out further: From July 2013 to May 2015, there were a total of 1,223 attacks over 23 months, an average of 53.2 attacks per month. In the 23 months prior to June 2013, there were a mere 78 attacks, an average of 3.4 attacks per month.

If the coup had nothing or little to do with this, it would stand as one of the more remarkable coincidences in the recent history of Middle East politics. Of course, other variables may have contributed to this surge in violence. The flow of arms from Libya and the Islamic State’s growing international stature, for instance, would have played a destabilizing role no matter what happened with Egypt’s domestic politics. But neither of those developments can account for such a sharp increase in attacks over such a relatively short period of time. Civil conflict in Libya resulted in a more porous border and an increase in arms smuggling as early as 2012, while the Islamic State’s expansion didn’t register in a serious way in the broader region until the summer of 2014, when the group took over the Iraqi city of Mosul.

That leaves us with the coup and what it wrought — namely the Sisi regime’s increasingly repressive measures — as the key event that helped spark the wave of violence. How many people, who otherwise wouldn’t have taken up arms, took up arms because of the coup and the subsequent crackdown? Obviously, there is no way to know for sure. The strength of Ansar Beit al-Maqdis, the group that eventually pledged allegiance to the Islamic State and renamed itself Province of Sinai, is estimated to be in the thousands, so even a tiny increase of, say, 500 militants — representing 0.00055 percent of Egypt’s overall population — would have an outsized effect. Recruitment, however, takes time, so it is unlikely this would have mattered in the days immediately after the coup.

The more likely short-term explanation is that militants viewed the coup as an opportune moment to intensify their activities. They would have done so for two main reasons: First, the Egyptian military — an organization, like any other, with finite resources — was preoccupied with securing major urban centers and clamping down on the Brotherhood. Second, militants likely wagered that they could seize on the wave of Islamist anger and anti-military sentiment.

Ansar Beit al-Maqdis exploited the “narrative” of the local Sinai population, which was already predisposed to distrust state institutions after years of economic neglect and heavy-handed security policies. Not surprisingly, then, residents were more likely to oppose the coup than most other Egyptians. The founders of Ansar Beit al-Maqdis, many of whom hail from North Sinai, knew this as well as anyone. The jihadi group, before pledging allegiance to the Islamic State in November 2014, was almost entirely focused on police and military targets, and would generally couch such attacks as “revenge for the security forces’ suppression of Islamist dissidents.”

Electoral results from 2011 to 2014 offer additional insight into patterns of political support in the Sinai. South Sinai has generally been more pro-regime and less supportive of militant activity, due in part to its economic dependence on the tourism industry. North Sinai, however, is a different story: In each of the four major electoral contests during the transition period, voters there supported Islamist positions and candidates at a significantly higher percentage than the national average. For example, in the 2012 presidential election, 61.5 percent of North Sinai voters cast their ballots for Morsi, compared to 51.7 percent nationally.

While the coup and its brutal aftermath contributed to a sustained increase in monthly attacks — as well as an increase in the lethality of attacks — we still see considerable variation in militant activity. From November 2013 to July 2014, for example, there is a dip, with the monthly average falling to about 22 attacks per month. Yet, even at this lower point, the average number of attacks is still more than 640 percent above the monthly pre-coup average. Starting in January 2015, militant activity jumps up sharply again to 107 attacks, from only nine in December. Again, there are any number of factors that could have played a role in this new surge in violence, but there is only one factor that changes dramatically during this period and that can account for such an unusual uptick in attacks: the military’s hasty creation of a “security zone” along the border with Gaza.

On Oct. 24, 2014, at least 33 Egyptian soldiers were killed, in what was, until then, the deadliest attack on security personnel since the coup. Ansar Beit al-Maqdis claimed responsibility. In response, Egyptian authorities moved to establish a buffer zone, forcing up to 10,000 residents to evacuate their homes, some with only 48 hours notice. The Egyptians military’s narrow security lens and harsh tactics have, in effect, further alienated local residents and helped fuel the insurgency. Shortly after the army began “relocating” villages, the number of attacks increased once again, but this time to previously unheard-of levels. The first five months of 2015 saw an average of 114.6 attacks, with an all-time high of 138 attacks in May.

This is not to say that the creation of a buffer zone transformed people into ideological hard-liners in a matter of weeks, but, rather, that groups like the Islamic State seek to exploit local grievances and depend on local sympathy to stage successful attacks. Zack Gold, a researcher who specializes on the Sinai, wrote that due to the army’s scorched-earth tactics, “whole swaths of North Sinai civilization no longer exist.” One resident of the border town of Rafah, after learning his home would be destroyed, said: “I won’t lie. I’m more afraid of the army than the jihadis. When you’re oppressed, anyone who fights your oppression gets your sympathy.” Another Sinai resident, according to journalist Mohannad Sabry, said that after 90 percent of his village was destroyed in a security campaign, around 40 people took up arms, where through 2013, he knew of only five Ansar Beit al-Maqdis members in the village.

It might be hard to imagine why the Egyptian army would appear so intent on alienating the very citizens whose help it needs to defeat the insurgency. Yet, this appears to be Sisi’s approach to conflict resolution across the country — more state power, more control, and more repression. As the saying goes, when all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail. Because authoritarian regimes are forged and sustained by force, they are perhaps the worst candidates to develop a nuanced, holistic counterinsurgency strategy.

Then again, Egypt starts from a different set of assumptions than the United States does. At the most basic level, the Egyptian government fails the first test of counterterrorism, which requires correctly identifying who the actual terrorists are. It continues to act as if the Islamic State and the Muslim Brotherhood are interchangeable — something that no Western intelligence agency takes seriously. As a result, Egypt has made itself a burden. The Egyptian regime is not — and, more importantly, cannot be — a reliable counterterrorism partner. This is no accident of circumstance. Hoping and claiming to fight terrorism, Egypt, however unwittingly, is fueling an insurgency.

A months-long political crisis in Kiev came to an end on April 14, when Ukraine’s Rada (parliament) approved a new prime minister. Expectations that the government will move on needed reforms and anti-corruption measures, however, are low.

Kamikaze prime minister?

The previous prime minister, Arseniy Yatsenyuk, had served since the Maidan Revolution in February 2014. Early on, Yatsenyuk equated his tenure to a kamikaze mission, noting that the reforms the government would adopt would carry heavy political costs. He proved right. By early 2016, his National Front party, which won over 22 percent in the October 2014 party-list vote in the Rada elections, polled in the low single digits. 

Reports of a widening rift between Yatsenyuk and President Petro Poroshenko grew last autumn, though they still had reason to stay together. The National Front party and Poroshenko Bloc formed the core of the majority coalition in the Rada, and neither party could expect to fare well in early parliamentary elections.

Early on, Yatsenyuk equated his tenure to a kamikaze mission, noting that the reforms the government would adopt would carry heavy political costs.

The crisis took a twist in mid-February, when the Rada passed a resolution expressing disapproval of the work of Yatsenyuk and his cabinet…but then failed to pass a vote of no-confidence that would have led to Yatsenyuk’s dismissal.

Speculation nevertheless intensified over his looming replacement, with American-born Finance Minister Natalie Jaresko mooted as a possibility. Volodymyr Hroysman’s name also came into play. Hroysman, a member of the Poroshenko Bloc, is closely connected to the president. He had a reputation as a reformer and effective mayor of the city of Vinnytsia, though his performance as Rada speaker was mixed. For example, he opposed the finance ministry’s proposed tax reform, even though it was a requirement of Ukraine’s program with the International Monetary Fund. 

When Yatsenyuk announced his resignation on April 10, Hroysman appeared the front-runner to succeed him. His appointment took longer than expected, however, as he reportedly rejected some suggestions from the president’s camp for ministers, seeking to put in place his own people instead. Backroom negotiations and a fair amount of horse-trading as parties jockeyed for ministerial positions took place April 11 to 13. Finally, the Rada approved Hroysman on April 14.

Low reform expectations

At first glance, the composition of the new cabinet is a far more political group than its predecessor, which comprised many technocrats. It is devoid of names with established reputations for pressing reform or fighting corruption. My conversations on the margins of the Kiev Security Forum on April 14 to 15 turned up few expectations that the new cabinet will proceed with the kinds of reform actions and, in particular, measures to combat corruption that the country needs.

The International Monetary Fund will watch the cabinet’s actions before it considers releasing an additional tranche of funding for Ukraine. One unsettling sign: The incoming finance minister suggested that some adjustments might be sought in the IMF’s criteria. Historically, when Ukrainian finance ministers seek adjustments to IMF criteria and programs, they do not aim for changes that will accelerate reform.

At first glance, the composition of the new cabinet is a far more political group than its predecessor.

Some in Kiev worry about the close relationship between Hroysman and Poroshenko. But that relationship may have one upside: it ties Poroshenko more closely to the prime minister and his success or failure. Too often in the past, Ukrainian presidents have stood some distance from the prime minister, positioning themselves to escape responsibility for difficult government policies rather than throwing their full political weight behind the prime minister’s efforts.

Poroshenko did not fully back Yatsenyuk. As one Ukrainian observer put it, the president often seemed more interested in explaining or rationalizing the status quo rather than trying to change it. Now, if Hroysman and the new cabinet fail to deliver, it will reflect more directly on Poroshenko.

A friendly push

If my Ukrainian interlocutors are correct, the new government will pursue the needed reforms at best only half-heartedly. Among other things, that could leave in place the current system in which oligarchs exercise outsized and unhealthy political influence. That will impede Ukraine’s prospects of getting on the path to becoming a modern European state. 

The International Monetary Fund, United States, and European Union should help the Ukrainian president and prime minister make the right decisions: to press forward a program of genuine reform and, at long last, a real anti-corruption campaign. The West should make clear that further assistance will depend on such actions. 

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An American drone strike that killed leader of the Afghan Taliban Mullah Akhtar Mohammed Mansour may seem like a fillip for the United States’ ally, the embattled government of Afghanistan’s President Ashraf Ghani. But as Vanda Felbab-Brown writes in a new op-ed for The New York Times, it is unlikely to improve Kabul’s immediate national security problems—and may create more difficulties than it solves.

The White House has argued that because Mansour became opposed to peace talks with the Afghan government, removing him became necessary to facilitate new talks. Yet, as Vanda writes in the op-ed, “the notion that the United States can drone-strike its way through the leadership of the Afghan Taliban until it finds an acceptable interlocutor seems optimistic, at best.”

[T]he notion that the United States can drone-strike its way through the leadership of the Afghan Taliban until it finds an acceptable interlocutor seems optimistic, at best.

Mullah Mansour's death does not inevitably translate into substantial weakening of the Taliban's operational capacity or a reprieve from what is shaping up to be a bloody summer in Afghanistan. Any fragmentation of the Taliban to come does not ipso facto imply stronger Afghan security forces or a reduction of violent conflict. Even if Mansour's demise eventually turns out to be an inflection point in the conflict and the Taliban does seriously fragment, such an outcome may only add complexity to the conflict. A lot of other factors, including crucially Afghan politics, influence the capacity of the Afghan security forces and their battlefield performance.

Nor will Mansour’s death motivate the Taliban to start negotiating. That did not happen when it was revealed last July’s the group’s previous leader and founder, Mullah Mohammad Omar, had died in 2013. To the contrary, the Taliban’s subsequent military push has been its strongest in a decade—with its most violent faction, the Haqqani network, striking the heart of Kabul. Mansour had empowered the violent Haqqanis following Omar’s death as a means to reconsolidate the Taliban, and their continued presence portends future violence. Mansour's successor, Mawlawi Haibatullah Akhundzada, the Taliban’s former minister of justice who loved to issue execution orders, is unlikely to be in a position to negotiate (if he even wants to) for a considerable time as he seeks to gain control and create legitimacy within the movement.

The United States has sent a strong signal to Pakistan, which continues to deny the presence of the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani network within its borders. Motivated by a fear of provoking the groups against itself, Pakistan continues to show no willingness to take them on, despite the conditions on U.S. aid.

Disrupting the group’s leadership by drone-strike decapitation is tempting militarily. But it can be too blunt an instrument, since negotiations and reconciliation ultimately depend on political processes. In decapitation targeting, the U.S. leadership must think critically about whether the likely successor will be better or worse for the counterinsurgency endgame.

On the invitation of House Speaker Paul Ryan, who stated that “[t]he friendship between the United States and India is a pillar of stability in an important region of the world,” Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi will be addressing a joint meeting of the U.S. Congress on June 8. There have been five Indian prime ministers who’ve given such remarks: Jawaharlal Nehru (1949, to separate House and Senate gatherings), Rajiv Gandhi (1985), P.V. Narashima Rao (1994), Atal Bihari Vajpayee (2000) and Manmohan Singh (2005). Their speeches were reflective of the contemporary global context and the state of the U.S.-India relationship, but they did share some themes as well. Modi will likely emphasize that he is transforming India (as these other prime ministers asserted as well) and want to highlight the change he is bringing, but his speech might also echo some of these past themes. Below is a look back at what India’s prime ministers have said to Congress—a past glimpse that is also instructive in terms of how much the U.S.-India relationship has changed.

On October 13, 1949, two years of India’s independence (and a few days after the communists had taken over China), Jawaharlal Nehru addressed back-to-back meetings of the House and Senate. Declaring that “Nehru puts India on freedom’s side,” The New York Times noted in a front-page story that "Pandit Nehru expressed pride for India's past, hope for her future, but acute awareness of her present economic difficulties."

On June 13, 1985, Rajiv Gandhi, Nehru’s grandson who had won a major electoral victory the previous year, became the first Indian premier to address a joint meeting of Congress. In an above-the-fold story featuring a photo of a smiling Gandhi, Vice President George H.W. Bush and House Speaker Tip O’ Neill, The New York Times particularly remarked on the 40-year-old prime minister’s youthfulness and remarks on Afghanistan.

On May 18, 1994, a few years after the collapse of the Soviet Union and after having introduced a wave of economic reforms, P.V. Narasimha Rao addressed Congress. Ten days before that The New York Times featured a story on his finance minister Manmohan Singh and the reforms the two leaders were undertaking. Reflecting the relative disinterest in India in the U.S. at the time, the Times did not, however, cover Rao’s speech.

On September 14, 2000, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, India’s first prime minister from the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) addressed the U.S. Congress. His two years in power till then had seen India conduct nuclear tests, a crisis with Pakistan seen as a turning point in U.S.-India relations because the U.S. called out Pakistan for its actions, and a U.S. presidential visit to India after two decades. A jovial photo of the prime minister and President Clinton made the front page a couple of days later, but the speech itself did not get coverage in the newspaper of record.

On July 19, 2005, Manmohan Singh, who’d just reached a civil nuclear agreement with President Bush, addressed Congress. His visit—and that agreement—received front-page coverage, but the speech itself was not covered separately.

In his speech, Prime Minister Modi will likely stress the challenge that terrorism poses globally and regionally, and highlight U.S.-India the counter-terrorism cooperation. The last three Indian premiers have addressed this challenge as well.

President Obama reiterated U.S. support for Indian membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and encouraged other members to welcome Indian into the group. The U.S. and India have come a long way on a subject that has come up in every prime minister’s speech since Rajiv Gandhi.

Every prime minister has outlined their economic policy objectives and achievements—more recent ones, have highlighted the opportunity India represents. While this was the focus of Modi’s speech to the U.S.-India Business Council, expect this to be a subject he covers in his remarks to Congress as well.

Indian prime ministers have seen the U.S. as a crucial source of technology, and often made the case for technological assistance or transfers or collaboration.

There has also been the linkage between democracy and development in various ways: highlighting the development task India is undertaking in a democratic context, stressing that democracies are better placed over the long-run to innovate and develop equitably, and suggesting that the U.S. has an interest in helping India’s democratic experiment—now democratic engine—succeed.

Whether to address concerns in Congress, note the similarities between India and the U.S., or stress India’s multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, multi-lingual and multi-religious nature, each prime minister has talked about diversity, equality and freedom.

In their speeches, each of the prime ministers have noted the contributions of the growing numbers of Indian-Americans and non-resident Indians in the United States. Modi has made the diaspora a key focus; expect him to emphasize its role.

A week before his speech to Congress, Vajpayee famously asserted that “India and the USA are natural allies.” He’s not the only one to have noted the “natural” character of the relationship, though there’s been different reasoning behind that assertion or hope.

The development community issued a collective sigh of relief last week when the U.S. Senate, after a seven-month delay, finally confirmed a new Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). In addition to dealing with the many global development issues, Gayle Smith also has the task of making good on the Obama administration’s commitment to make USAID a preeminent 21st century development agency.

While a year might seem a short time for anyone to make a difference in a new government position, Gayle Smith assuming the lead in USAID should be seen more as the capstone of a seven-year tenure guiding U.S. global development policy.  She led the interagency process that produced the 2010 Presidential Policy Determination on Development (PDD), and has been involved in every administration development policy initiative since, including major reforms inside USAID.

The five items below are suggestions on how Smith can institutionalize and take to the next level reforms and initiatives that have been part of the development agenda of which she has been a principal architect.

The PPD lays out key elements for making our assistance programs more accountable, including “greater transparency” and “more substantial investment of resources in monitoring and evaluation.”

USAID staff have designed a well thought out Cost Program Management Plan to advance the public availability of its data and to fulfill the U.S. commitment to the International Assistance Transparency Initiative (IATI). What this plan needs is a little boost from the new administrator, her explicit endorsement and energy, and maybe the freeing-up of more resources so phases two and three to get more and better USAID data into the IATI registry can be completed by the end of 2016 rather than slipping over into the next administration. In addition, the fourth and final phase of the plan needs to be approved so data transparency is integrated into the planned Development Information Solution (DIS), which will provide a comprehensive integration of program and financial information. 

Meanwhile, in January 2011 USAID adopted an evaluation policy that was praised by the American Evaluation Association as a model for other government agencies. In FY 2014, the agency completed 224 evaluations. The new administrator could provide leadership in several areas that would raise the quality and use of USAID’s evaluations. She should weigh in on the sometimes theological debate over what type of evaluation works best by being clear that there is no single, all-purpose type of evaluation. Evaluations need to fit the context and question to be addressed, from most significant change (focusing solely on the most significant change generated by a project), to performance evaluation, to impact evaluation.   

Second, evaluation is an expertise that is not quickly acquired. Some 2,000 USAID staff have been trained, but mainly through short-term courses. The training needs to be broadened to all staff and deepened in content. This will contribute to a cultural change whereby USAID staff learn not just how to conduct evaluations, but how to value and use the findings.

Third, evaluations need to be translated into learning. The E3 Bureau (Bureau for Economic Growth, Education and Environment) has set the model of analyzing and incorporating evaluation findings into its policies and programs, and a few missions have bought evaluations into their program cycle. This needs to be done throughout the agency. Further, USAID should use its convening power to share its findings with other U.S. government agencies, other donors, and the broader development community.

Current USAID processes are considered rigid and time-consuming. This is not uncommon to large institutions, but in recent years the agency has been seeking more innovative, flexible instruments. The USAID Global Development Lab is experimenting with what is alternatively referred to as the Development Innovation Accelerator (DIA) or Broad Agency Announcement (BAA), whereby it invites ideas on a specific development problem and then selects the authors of the best, most relevant, to join USAID staff in co-creating solutions—something the corporate sector has been calling for—to be involved at the beginning of problem-solving. Similarly, the Policy, Planning, and Learning Bureau is in the midst of redesigning the program cycle to introduce adaptive management, allowing for greater collaboration and real-time response to new information and evolving local circumstances. Adaptive management would allow for more customized approaches and learning based on local context.

Again, the PPD calls for “innovation.” As with accountability, an expression of interest and support from the new administrator, and an articulation of the need to inculcate innovation into the USAID culture, could move these endeavors from tentative experiment to practice.

Gayle Smith has been immersed in guiding U.S. policy in unstable, fragile states. She knows the territory well and cares. The U.S. has been an active participant and leader in the New Deal for Fragile States. The New Deal framework is a thoughtful, comprehensive structure for moving fragile states to stability, but recent analyses indicate that neither members of the G7+ countries nor donors are following the explicit steps. They are not dealing with national and local politics, which are the essential levers through which to bring stability to a country, and are not adequately including civil society. Maybe the New Deal structures are too complicated for a country that has minimal governance. Certainly, there has been insufficient senior-level leadership from donors and buy-in from G7+ leaders and stakeholders. With her deep knowledge of the dynamics in fragile states, Smith could bring sorely needed U.S. leadership to this arena.

The PPD calls for “robust policy, budget, planning, and evaluation capabilities.” USAID moved quickly on these objectives, not just in restoring USAID former capabilities in evaluation, but also in policy and budget through the resurrection of the planning and policy function (Policy, Planning, and Learning Bureau, or PPL) and the budget function (Office of Bureau and Resource Management, or BRM). PPL has reestablished USAID’s former policy function, but USAID’s budget authority has only been partially restored.

Gayle Smith needs to take the next obvious step. Budget is policy. The integration of policy and budget is an essential foundation of evidence-based policymaking. The two need to be joined so these functions can support each other rather than operating in isolated cones. Budget deliberations are not just about numbers; policies get set by budget decisions, so policy and budget need to be integrated so budget decisions are informed by strategy and policy knowledge.

I go back to the model of the late 1970s when Alex Shakow was head of the Policy, Planning, and Coordination Bureau (PPC), which encompassed both policy and budget. Here you had in one senior official someone who was knowledgeable about policy and budget and understood how the two interact. He was the go-to-person the agency sent to Capitol Hill. He could deal with the range of issues that always unexpectedly arise during congressional committee hearings and markups. He could effectively deal with the State Department and interagency meetings on a broad sweep of policy and program matters. He could represent the U.S. globally, such as at the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and other international development meetings.

With the expansion of the development agenda and frequency of interagency and international meetings, such a person is in even greater need today. USAID needs three or four senior officials—administrator, deputy administrator, associate administrator, and the head of a joined-up policy/budget function —to cover the demand domestically and internationally for senior USAID leadership with a deep knowledge of the broad scope of USAID programs.    

The arguments for the need to reform U.S. food assistance programs are incontrovertible and have been hashed hundreds of times, so no need to repeat them here. But it is clearly in the interests of the tens of millions of people globally who each year face hunger and starvation for the U.S. to maximize the use of its resources by moving its food aid from an antiquated 1950s model to current market realities. There is leadership for this on the Hill in the Food for Peace Reform Act of 2015, introduced by Senators Bob Corker and Chris Coons. Gayle Smith could help build the momentum for this bill and contribute to an important Obama legacy, whether enactment happens in 2016 or under a new administration and Congress in 2017.

Gayle knows better than anyone the Obama development agenda. These ideas are humbly presented as an outside observer’s suggestions of how to solidify key administration aid effectiveness initiatives. 

The EU and Turkey have reached agreement on the broad outlines of a coordinated strategy to respond to the migration crisis. According to the plan, discussed at an emergency summit on Monday in Brussels, all migrants crossing from Turkey into the Greek islands would be returned. For every migrant Turkey readmits, the EU would resettle one registered refugee from a U.N.-administered camp, effectively establishing a single legal migration pathway.

The deal, which has not been finalized, includes a pledge to speed up disbursement of a 3-billion-euro fund ($3.3 billion) aimed to help Turkey shelter the roughly 2.5 million Syrian refugees currently on its soil, and to decide on additional support. Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu has requested that Europe double its funding to 6 billion euro ($6.6 billion) over three years. He also called on European leaders to speed up the timetable on lifting visa requirements for Turkish citizens and to kick-start stalled accession talks.

Rough road ahead

Establishing a framework is an important step forward in the effort to forge a common approach to the mounting crisis. German Chancellor Angela Merkel—facing discontent at home over her open door policy—welcomed the tentative deal as a potential breakthrough. So did Britain’s Prime Minister David Cameron.

However, key details remain unresolved: First, it is not clear that all EU countries would agree to take part in such a relocation scheme, given strong opposition to compulsory migrant quotas. On Monday night, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán vowed to veto any commitment to resettle asylum seekers. 

[K]ey details remain unresolved.

Second, Ankara’s demands regarding EU membership and visa waivers are likely to be contested. Turkey’s bid for accession has long been controversial, and will only be made more so by the court-ordered seizure of the opposition newspaper Zaman late last week. Visa-free access for Turkish citizens is likewise contentious. Already, leaders of Germany’s conservative Christian Social Union party have vowed “massive resistance” to any such measure.

Third, human rights groups have called into question the plan’s legality. The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees raised concerns about its legitimacy under EU and international law, expressing unease over the blanket return of foreigners from one country to another. Amnesty International called the proposal a “death blow” to refugee rights. While Europe believes the legal questions can be resolved by declaring Turkey a “safe third country,” Amnesty has cast doubt on the concept. 

And so?

Talks will continue ahead of the EU migration summit, which will take place on March 17 and 18. Meanwhile, NATO will begin carrying out operations in the territorial waters of Greece and Turkey to locate migrant boats. According to Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, those efforts will focus on “collecting information and conducting monitoring” in an endeavor to stop the smuggling.

In recent weeks, as many as 2,000 migrants each day have been arriving on Greece’s shores. They join more than 35,000 migrants already stranded there, unable to travel north due to border closures along the Western Balkans route. Those closures cast in doubt the future of the continent’s open border regime—and with it, the unity of Europe.

Mayor Coleman says Ohio''s metropolitan areas are the incubators of success and the anchors of prosperity for entire state.

On September 8, Brookings Senior Fellow Vanda Felbab-Brown participated in a Center for International Policy and Washington Office on Latin America event, “Using Militaries as Police in Latin America: A Discussion on Citizen Security and the Way Forward.” Felbab-Brown was joined on the panel by Adam Blackwell, secretary for multidimensional security at the Organization of American States; Richard Downie, executive vice president for global strategies at OMNITRU; and Adam Isacson, senior associate for regional security policy at the Washington Office on Latin America. Sarah Kinosian, lead researcher on Latin America at the Center for International Policy, moderated the event.

Felbab-Brown argued that police reform across Latin America over the past two decades has often been at best deficient or has failed outright. The lack of rule of law characterizes many countries in the region, including continually Mexico. Police forces are often not only corrupt, but highly abusive, and both police forces and military forces deployed for policing engage in major human rights violations. Even assumed exemplary experiments, such as the Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora (UPP) approach in Rio, have struggled to execute an effective handover from heavily-armed takeover forces to regular policing.

If governments choose to deploy their militaries in local policing roles, suboptimal as that is, the forces should adopt population-centric strategies, immediately develop concrete handover plans to police forces, and operate under a civilian coordinator. A key requirement for military forces is to respect human rights and due process and diligently prosecute perpetrators. Ultimately both police and military forces need to understand that their role is to protect society.

To some extent, Felbab-Brown argues, the resort to military forces for policing purposes is compounded by the lack of expeditionary police capacity by outside partners and donors, who overwhelmingly tend to deploy military forces for training policing. However, if the United States and outside donors want to make their policing assistance more effective, they should consider developing expeditionary police forces for such training purposes as well as a range of stabilization operations.

The most important factor for security efforts is citizen support. Marginalization, exclusion, and abuse from policing forces—be they police or military ones—have often prevented local populations from cooperating with law enforcement units and buying into rule of law: security or insecurity is co-produced as much as by citizens as by the police or military.

In this interview, Vanda Felbab-Brown addresses issues of terrorism, organized crime, and state responses within the context of Boko Haram’s terrorism, insurgency, and militancy in the Niger Delta. She was interviewed by Jide Akintunde, Managing Editor of Financial Nigeria magazine.

Q: The Boko Haram menace has been with Nigeria for seven years. Why is it that the group does not appear to have run out of resources?

A: Boko Haram has been able to sufficiently plunder resources in the north to keep going. It has accumulated weapons and ammunition from seized stocks. It also taxes smuggling in the north. But its resources are not unlimited. And unlike other militant and terrorist groups, such as ISIS or the Taliban, Boko Haram faces far more acute resource constraints.

Q: Boko Haram is both an insurgent and a terrorist group. Does this explain why it is arguably the deadliest non-state actor in the world and the group that has used women for suicide bombings the most in history?

A: Boko Haram’s record in 2015 of being the deadliest group is a coincidence. Very many other militant groups have combined characteristics of an insurgency and a terrorist group. Its violence belies its weaknesses as much as its capacities.

Boko Haram’s resort to terrorism, often unrestrained terrorism and unrestrained plunder, reflect its loss of territory and most limited strategy calibration and governance skills. Its terrorist attacks, including by female suicide bombers, also reflect the limitation of the military COIN (counter-insurgency) strategy. For instance, after the international clearing, little effective control and “holding” is still exercised by the Nigerian military or its international partners.

Q: Although many views have rejected economic deprivation or poverty as the root cause of the insurgency, almost everyone agrees that military victory over the group would not help much if economic improvement is not brought to bear in the Northeastern Nigeria – the theatre of the insurgent activities. Is this necessarily contradictory?

A: Economic deprivation is hardly ever the sole factor stimulating militancy. There are many poor places, even those in relative decline compared to other parts of the country, where an insurgency does not emerge. But relative economic deprivation often becomes an important rallying cause. And indeed, there are many reasons for focusing on the economic development of the north, including effectively suppressing militancy but it also goes beyond that. Improving agriculture, including by investing in infrastructure and eliminating problematic and distortive subsidies in other sectors, would help combat insurgency and prevent its reemergence.

Q: While Nigerians remain befuddled about the grievances of Boko Haram, we are clear about the gripes of the militants in the oil-rich Niger Delta: they want resource control, since the Nigerian state has been unable to develop the area that produces 70 per cent of the federal government’s revenue. So, is the state always just and right in suppressing militant groups?

A: Indeed not; the state is hardly always just in suppressing militancy, even as suppressing militancy is its key imperative. Economic grievances, discriminations, and lack of equity and access are serious problems that any society should want to tackle. Even if there are “no legitimate grievances,” the state does not have a license to combat militancy in any way it chooses. Its own brutality will be discrediting and can be deeply counterproductive.

The Nigerian state’s approach to MEND (Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta) is fascinating: essentially the cooptation of MEND leaders through payoffs, but without addressing the underlying root causes. The insurgency quieted down, but the state’s approach is hardly normatively satisfactory nor necessarily sustainable unless new buyoffs to MEND leaders are again handed over. But that compounds problems of corruption, accountability, transparency, and inclusion.

Q: We can raise the same issue about economic justice in the way criminal and terrorist organizations operate their underground economies. How flawed have you found the alternative social orders that the leaders of criminal and terrorist organizations claim to foster?

A: The governance – the normative, political, and economic orders -- that militant groups provide are often highly flawed. They often underdeliver economically and they lack accountability mechanisms, even when they outperform the state in being less corrupt and providing swifter justice.

However, the choice that populations face is not whether the order that militants provide is optimal or satisfactory. The choice that matters to people is whether that order is stable and better than that provided by the state. So the vast majority of people in Afghanistan, for example, say they don’t like the Taliban. But they don’t like corrupt warlords or corrupt government officials even. It’s not the absolute ideal but the relative realities that determine allegiances or at least the (lack of) willingness to support one or the other.

Moreover, the worst outcome is constant contestation and military instability. A stable brutality is easier to adjust to and develop coping mechanisms for than capriciousness and unstable military contestation.

Q: The Nigerian amnesty programme seemed to be a model in resolving issues between the state and the non-state actors in the Niger Delta, given the quiet in that region in the past few years of the programme. But since the political power changed at the federal level, we are seeing signs of the return of sabotage of oil installations. What models, say in Latin America or elsewhere, can help foster more sustainable peace between governments and non-state actor militant groups?

A: I don’t think that the MEND programme is a model, precisely because of the narrow cooptation I alluded to. Many of the middle-level MEND commanders as well as foot soldiers are dissatisfied with the deal. And much of the population in the Delta still suffers the same level of deprivation and exclusion as before. The deal was a bandage without healing the wounds underneath. It’s a question how long it will continue sticking. Despite its many urgent and burning tasks and a real need to focus on the north, the Nigerian government should use the relative peace in the Delta to move beyond the plaster and start addressing the root causes of militancy and dissatisfaction there. 

This interview was originally published by Financial Nigeria.

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Global warming is changing environmental conditions in the Arctic and opening new opportunities for resource extraction. Greenland, long thought to have excellent potential for iron ore, copper, zinc, lead, gold, rubies, rare earth elements and oil, has looked to strengthen its economy through the development of these resources. For many in Greenland, including the current government, resource extraction is seen as a necessary step toward the ultimate goal of independence from Denmark.

On September 24, the Energy Security Initiative (ESI) and the John L. Thornton China Center at Brookings hosted Premier Aleqa Hammond of Greenland for an Alan and Jane Batkin International Leaders Forum address on the future of natural resource extraction in Greenland. Following her address, a panel discussion highlighted the findings of a new Brookings report, “The Greenland Gold Rush: Promise and Pitfalls of Greenland’s Energy and Mineral Resources.” Report co-author Kevin Foley, a doctoral candidate at Cornell University, was joined on the panel by ESI Director Charles Ebinger and University of Copenhagen Professor Minik Rosing, who served as a discussant. The panel was moderated by Jonathan Pollack, a senior fellow with the China Center and Center for East Asia Policy Studies at Brookings.

This event was part of the Alan and Jane Batkin International Leaders Forum Series, a new event series hosted by Foreign Policy at Brookings which brings global political, diplomatic and thought leaders to Washington, D.C. for major policy addresses.

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• Natural Resource Development in Greenland: An Alan and Jane Batkin International Leaders Forum with Greenland's Premier Aleqa Hammond

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In September 2014, we released a study on mineral and energy resources in Greenland and were honored to have Aleqa Hammond, then the Premier of Greenland, with us at Brookings for the launch event. Since gaining political autonomy from the Kingdom of Denmark in 2009, successive governments in Greenland have been aggressively promoting the development of a mining industry as a solution to its deep and worsening economic woes. Our study concluded that Greenland was likely to develop large-scale mining and energy projects eventually, but that the pace of development would be much slower than the government of Greenland anticipated due to steep declines in iron ore prices and unrealistic expectations of demand for rare earth elements.

A lot has changed since then, but our original conclusions still hold. While there has been progress on smaller mines such as the Aappaluttoq ruby and sapphire project in southwest Greenland, it appears increasingly unlikely that any of the large-scale mining and energy projects that Greenland has been counting on will get off the ground in the near term. Global events beyond Greenland’s control have conspired in recent months to reduce the incentives for investment in mining and offshore oil and gas projects.

Political Crisis in Nuuk, But Siumut Remains in Control

Following her trip to Washington, Premier Hammond became embroiled in a political scandal concerning the misuse of public funds. She resigned from office and an election was called. Hammond’s incumbent Siumut party, now under the leadership of former Environment Minister Kim Kielsen, held on to power against its main rival by a tiny margin of 326 votes.

All major political parties in Greenland support the development of a mining industry, but the two main parties are divided on the issue of uranium mining, with the opposition Inuit Ataqatigiit (IA) party opposed on environmental grounds. However, following the election Siumut successfully negotiated a coalition government, bringing together rival parties (the Democrat party and Atassut) that support uranium mining.

Ebola Outbreak Leads London Mining to Bankruptcy

Global events continued to conspire against Greenland’s efforts to develop a mining industry. Just before the November elections London Mining, the British company developing the Isua iron ore mine, went bankrupt and was placed into receivership after incurring heavy losses at its Sierra Leone mine due to the Ebola crisis.

As we noted in our report, London Mining’s project in Greenland sought to attract investments, labor and engineering support from Chinese partners, but the company was not successful in its efforts to secure that support given the high costs of the project (estimated at about $2 billion) and the unique engineering challenges associated with the project. Nevertheless, the company’s plan to bring nearly two thousand foreign workers to Greenland along with the government of Greenland’s efforts to pass legislation that would exempt workers on large projects from Greenland’s minimum labor standards sparked an enormous controversy in Denmark over the scope of Greenland’s autonomy. It also led some commentators in Denmark and elsewhere to suggest that this investment was part of a larger strategic plan by Beijing to establish a foothold in the Arctic region. We concluded in our study that there was no evidence of any such geopolitical connection and emphasized that, contrary to many reports, there was in fact no Chinese investment in Greenland.

Last week, London Mining’s Greenland operations were purchased by a Chinese investment and trading group based in Hong Kong. Like London Mining, the project’s new owners are unlikely to develop the Isua project unless they can locate a major Chinese mining company willing to provide capital, labor and engineering. This would seem unlikely in the near term given the precipitous drop in iron ore prices since 2012 and increased production by the international mining majors.

The buyer, General Nice, is a privately held trading and investment conglomerate with subsidiaries in mainland China, Hong Kong, India, Singapore and South Africa. The company’s corporate background is unclear. It was founded in 1992, but a quick search reveals no information about the group’s activities prior to 2006, when General Nice acquired Singapore-listed Abterra. This listed subsidiary has reportedly come under scrutiny in Singapore for its lack of transparency concerning unusual investments in coal mines in Shanxi province. General Nice has made a handful of financial investments in overseas mines, all in partnership with major mining companies from mainland China. The company does not appear to have experience operating iron mines.

China Cancels Its Rare Earth Production Quotas

China’s decision last week to drop export quotas on rare earth elements is another bad sign for Greenland’s plans to develop mining projects. Investment in rare earth projects outside of China has largely been driven by expectations of limited supply from China, where production capacity has been restricted by quotas on both production and export. The removal of the export quotas may reduce interest in international rare earth projects, including the two projects in Greenland.

Security concerns expressed in Denmark over the mining of uranium and rare earth have not yet been resolved. A working group established in early 2014 between Greenland and the Danish government to resolve these issues was scheduled to conclude in late 2014, but these talks have been interrupted by the change in government. While the new coalition supports uranium mining, these issues will have to be worked out before mining can move forward. This is particularly important for the development of the Kvanefjeld rare earth project, which contains significant levels of uranium, but may also be a factor for the Kringlerne rare earth project—which does not contain uranium – as Denmark has reserved the right to reject proposed rare earth projects on security grounds regardless of uranium content.

In addition, several rare earth element projects outside China (but not in Greenland) have in fact moved ahead, further reducing the urgency to develop a project in Greenland.

Falling Oil Prices

Oil extraction was always at best a long-term prospect for Greenland due to harsh conditions, limited infrastructure and the wide availability of cheaper alternative supplies. As oil prices started falling in June 2014 and global demand growth slowed, arguably the need for exploration in high-cost areas like Greenland further diminished. Thus, in September we concluded that under the most optimistic scenario it would take at least ten years before commercial oil production would take place in Greenland. Oil prices have continued to fall, and if prices remain low the timeline for exploration in Greenland is likely to be further extended.

Dim Economic Prospects

None of this is good news for Greenland, which has hoped to meet anticipated budget shortfalls with revenue from new mines. This week the new government publicly acknowledged the difficulty in securing major investments in the near term and will place more emphasis on developing infrastructure to support the tourism industry, which now appears to be Greenland’s best hope for economic development. One such project is a proposed new airport serving the tourist hub Illulissat. Any such measures will be important as the government faces a growing gap between expenses and the annual block grant from Denmark, which is likely to increase further as the population ages.

The city of Chicago is increasing retrofits by using stimulus dollars to expand the opportunity for energy efficient living to low-income residents of large multi-family rental buildings. To aid this target demographic, often left underserved by existing programs, the city’s new Multi-Family Energy Retrofit Program introduces an innovative model for retrofit delivery that relies on private sector financing and energy service companies.

Chicago’s new Multi-Family Energy Retrofit Program draws on multi-sector collaboration, with an emphasis on private sector involvement supported by public and nonprofit resources. Essentially, the program applies the model of private energy service companies (ESCOs), long-used in the public sector, to the affordable, multi-family housing market. In this framework, ESCOs conduct assessments of building energy performance, identify and oversee implementation of cost-effective retrofit measures, and guarantee energy savings to use as a source of loan repayment.

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Last month, a team from the Metropolitan Policy Program, along with a delegation from the city of Chicago, traveled to Mexico City as part of the Global Cities Economic Partnership (GCEP). Launched at a 2013 event sponsored by the Global Cities Initiative (GCI), this novel partnership aims to expand growth and job creation in both cities  by building on complementary economic assets and opportunities.

Together with representatives from World Business Chicago, the Illinois governor’s office, and members of Chicago’s tech startup scene (organized by TechBridge), the Brookings team arrived in Mexico City just as, after a 20 year debate, reforms to devolve greater autonomy and powers to the largest metropolitan area in the Western Hemisphere were finalized.  Central to that reform is Mexico City’s enhanced ability to plan and implement its own economic development policy, underscoring the growing importance of city-regions assuming roles once solely the province of state and national governments: fostering trade, investment, and economic growth.

Chicago and Mexico City illustrate this trend through the GCEP. Emerging from a GCI analysis that identified unique economic, demographic and and social connections between the cities, Chicago Mayor Rahm Emanuel and Mexico City Mayor Miguel Angel Mancera established a novel city-to-city collaboration. Since signing the agreement, government, business, and civic leaders in both cities have been experimenting with new approaches to jointly grow their economies.  They have tried to foster more trade and investment within shared industry clusters; link economic development support services; and leverage similar strengths in research, innovation, and human capital.

This trip to Mexico City focused on one of GCEP’s early outcomes, a formal partnership between Chicago tech business incubator 1871 and Mexico City incubator Startup Mexico (SUM) that facilitates the early internationalization of firms in both cities. Both organizations advanced the creation of a residency program that will enable entrepreneurs from both incubators to have a presence in each other’s markets.

The GCEP approach of city-to-city global engagement has inspired other GCI participants to try their own models, forming economic alliances to ease global navigation and engagement. San Antonio, Phoenix, and Los Angeles also crafted agreements with Mexico City, each focused on different opportunities built off their distinctive economic assets and relationships. Portland and Bristol have investigated how to leverage their comparable “green city” reputations in the U.S. and U.K., connecting mid-size firms in their unique sustainability clusters for collaboration on research and joint ventures. Similarly, San Diego and London are testing how to promote synergies among companies, academic centers, investors, and workers in their shared life sciences subsectors such as cell and gene therapy.

Home to half of the world’s population, cities generate about three quarters of the world’s GDP, and now serve as the hubs for the growth in global flows of trade, capital, visitors, and information. The future prosperity and vitality of city-regions demands finding new approaches that take full advantage of these global connections.  

The Global Cities Economic Partnership emerged from work supported by the Global Cities Initiative: A Joint Project of Brookings and JPMorgan Chase. Brookings recognizes that the value it provides is in its absolute commitment to quality, independence, and impact. Activities supported by its donors reflect this commitment and the analysis and recommendations are solely determined by the scholar

Image courtesy of Maura Gaughan

ABSTRACT

Of the many regulatory responses to climate change, cap-and-trade is the only one currently endorsed by large segments of the scientific, economic and political establishments. Under this type of system, regulators set the overall path of carbon dioxide (CO2) reductions, allocate or auction the appropriate number of emissions allowances to regulated entities and – through trading – allow the market to converge upon the least expensive set of abatement opportunities. As a result, the trading price of allowances is not set by the regulator as it would be under a tax system, but instead evolves over time to reflect the underlying supply and demand for allowances. In this paper, I develop a simple theory that relates the initial clearing price of CO2 allowances to the marginal cost premium of carbon-free technology, the maximum rate of energy capital replacement and the market interest rate. This theory suggests that the initial clearing price may be lower than the canonical range of CO2 prices found in static technology assessments. Consequently, these results have broad implications for the design of a comprehensive regulatory solution to the climate problem, providing, for example, some intuition about the proper value of a possible CO2 price trigger in a future cap-and-trade system.

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ABSTRACT

The overall economic efficiency of a quantity-based approach to greenhouse gas mitigation depends strongly on the extent to which such a program provides opportunities for compliance flexibility, particularly with regard to the timing of emissions abatement. Here I consider a program in which annual targets are determined by choosing the optimal time path of reductions consistent with an exogenously prescribed cumulative reduction target and fixed technology set. I then show that if the availability of low-carbon technology is initially more constrained than anticipated, the optimal reduction path shifts abatement toward later compliance periods. For this reason, a rigid policy in which fixed annual targets are strictly enforced in every year yields a cumulative environmental outcome identical to the optimal policy but an economic outcome worse than the optimal policy. On the other hand, a policy that aligns actual prices (or equivalently, costs) with expected prices by simply imposing an explicit price ceiling (often referred to as a "safety valve") yields the opposite result. Comparison among these multiple scenarios implies that there are significant gains to realizing the optimal path but that further refinement of the actual regulatory instrument will be necessary to achieve that goal in a real cap-and-trade system.

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On September 23, 2015, close on the heels of the U.S.-India Strategic and Commercial Dialogue, India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi will arrive in New York on his second trip to the United States in that role. Along with his presence at the U.N. General Assembly opening and bilateral meetings, his trip will also include a visit to California. His agenda there will include meetings with several technology companies and interactions with the Indian diaspora.

On September 25, The India Project at Brookings hosted an event to discuss Modi’s visit and assess developments in India and the U.S.-India relationship in the year, his last U.S. visit. The panel explored the state of the Indian economy and foreign policy, the political landscape, and how the Modi government is perceived at home and abroad. Panelists will also outline the next few months in terms of Indian domestic politics and policy, as well as its foreign policy.

Join the conversation on Twitter using #ModiInUS

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• Prime Minister Modi returns to the U.S.

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• Prime Minister Modi returns to the U.S.

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• Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

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• 20150925_modi_india_us_transcript

On his fourth trip to the U.S. as Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi will spend some quality time on Capitol Hill on Wednesday, where he'll address a joint meeting of the U.S. Congress. House Speaker Paul Ryan will also host the Indian premier for a lunch, which will be followed by a reception hosted jointly by the House and Senate Foreign Relations Committees and the India Caucus. What's the significance of this Congressional engagement and what might be Modi's message? 

Given that all the most-recent Indian leaders who've held five-year terms have addressed such joint meetings of Congress, some have asked whether Ryan's invitation to Modi is a big deal. The answer is, yes, it is an honour and not one extended all that often. Since 1934, there have been only 117 such speeches. Leaders from France, Israel and the United Kingdom have addressed joint meetings the most times (8 each), followed by Mexico (7), and Ireland, Italy and South Korea (6 each). With this speech, India will join Germany on the list with leaders having addressed 5 joint meetings of Congress: Rajiv Gandhi in 1985, P.V. Narashima Rao in 1994, Atal Bihari Vajpayee in 2000 and Manmohan Singh in 2005. India's first premier, Jawaharlal Nehru, spoke to the House and Senate in separate back-to-back sessions in 1949 as well. 

Congress is a key stakeholder in the U.S.-India relationship and can play a significant supportive or spoiler role. While American presidents have a lot more lee-way on foreign policy than domestic policy, Congress is not without influence on U.S. foreign relations, and shapes the context for American engagement abroad. Moreover, the breadth and depth of the U.S.-India relationship, as well as the blurring of the line between what constitutes domestic and foreign policy these days means that India's options can be affected by American legislative decisions or the political mood on a range of issues from trade to immigration, energy to defense. 

The Indian Foreign Secretary recently said that the U.S. legislature was at "very much at the heart" of the relationship today. He noted it has been "very supportive" and "even in some more difficult days where actually the Congress has been the part of the US polity which has been very sympathetic to India." But India's had rocky experiences on the Hill as well--which only heightens the need to engage members of Congress at the highest levels. 

The speech and the other interactions offer Modi an opportunity to acknowledge the role of Congress in building bilateral relations, highlight shared interests and values, outline his vision for India and the relationship, as well as tackle some Congressional concerns and note some of India's own. He'll be speaking to multiple audiences in Congress, with members there either because of the strategic imperative for the relationship, others because of the economic potential, yet others because of the values imperative--and then there are those who'll be there because it is important to their constituents, whether business or the Indian diaspora. There is also the audience outside Congress, including in India, where the speech will play in primetime. What will Modi's message be? A glimpse at previous speeches might offer some clues, though Modi is likely also to want to emphasize change. 

The speeches that came before

The speeches of previous prime ministers have addressed some common themes. They've acknowledged shared democratic values. They've mentioned the two-way flow of inspiration and ideas with individuals like Henry David Thoreau, Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King getting multiple mentions. They've noted the influence of American founding documents or fathers on the Indian constitution. They've highlighted India's achievements, while stressing that much remains to be done. 

They've noted their country's diversity, and the almost-unique task Indian leaders have had--to achieve development for hundreds of millions in a democratic context. Since Gandhi, each has mentioned the Indian diaspora, noting its contributions to the U.S. Each prime minister has also expressed gratitude for American support or the contribution the U.S. partnership has made to India's development and security. They've acknowledged differences, without dwelling on them. They've addressed contemporary Congressional concerns that existed about Indian policy--in some cases offering a defense of them, in others' explaining the reason behind the policy.

Many of the premiers called for Congress to understand that India, while a democracy like the U.S. and sharing many common interests, would not necessarily achieve its objectives the same way as the U.S. And each subtly has asked for time and space, accommodation and support to achieve their goals--and argued it's in American interests to see a strong, stable, prosperous, democratic India.

In terms of subjects, each previous speech has mentioned economic growth and development as a key government priority, highlighting what policymakers were doing to achieve them. Since Gandhi, all have mentioned nuclear weapons though with different emphases: he spoke of disarmament; Rao of de-nuclearization and concerns about proliferation; two years after India's nuclear test, Vajpayee noted India's voluntary moratorium on testing and tried to reassure Congress about Indian intentions; and speaking in the context of the U.S.-India civil nuclear talks, Singh noted the importance of civil nuclear energy and defended India's track record on nuclear non-proliferation.

Since Rao, every prime minister has mentioned the challenge that terrorism posed for both the U.S. and India, with Vajpayee and Singh implicitly noting the challenge that a neighboring country poses in this regard from India's perspective. And Rao and Singh made the case for India to get a permanent seat on the U. N. Security Council.

The style of the speeches has changed, as has the tone. Earlier speeches were littered with quotes from sources like Christopher Columbus, Swami Vivekananda, Abraham Lincoln, Lala Lajpat Rai and the Rig Veda. Perhaps that was reflective of the style of speechwriting in those eras, but perhaps it was also because there were fewer concrete issues in the bilateral relationship to address. The evolution in the areas of cooperation is evident in the speeches. 

Rao's speech about two decades ago, for instance, listed U.S.-India common interests as peacekeeping, environmental crises, and combating international terrorism and international narcotics trafficking. Compare that to Singh's address which talked of cooperation on a range of issues from counterterrorism, the economy, agriculture, energy security, healthy policy, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), democracy promotion, and global governance.

The speech yet to come

Modi will likely strike some similar themes, acknowledging the role that the U.S. Congress has played in shaping the relationship and expressing gratitude for its support. Like Vajpayee, particularly in a U.S. election year, Modi might note the bipartisan support the relationship has enjoyed in recent years. He'll undoubtedly talk about shared democratic values in America's "temple of democracy"--a phrase he used for the Indian parliament when he first entered it after his 2014 election victory. Modi will not necessarily mention the concerns about human rights, trade and investment policies, non-proliferation or India's Iran policy that have arisen on the Hill, but he will likely address them indirectly. 

For example, by emphasizing India's pluralism and diversity and the protection its Constitution gives to minorities, or the constructive role the country could play regionally (he might give examples such as the recently inaugurated dam in Afghanistan). Given the issues on the bilateral agenda, he'll likely mention the strategic convergence, his economic policy plans, terrorism, India's non-proliferation record, defense and security cooperation, and perhaps--like Vajpayee--the Asia-Pacific (without directly mentioning China). And like Vajpayee, he might be more upfront about Indian concerns and the need to accommodate them. 

While he might strike some similar themes as his predecessors and highlight aspects of continuity, Modi will also want to emphasize that it's not business as usual. He'll likely try to outline the change that he has brought and wants to bring. In the past, he has noted the generational shift that he himself represents as the first Indian prime minister born after independence and the Modi government's latest tag line is, of course, "Transforming India." And he might emphasize that this changed India represents an opportunity for the U.S.

He won't wade directly into American election issues, but might note the importance of U.S. global engagement. He might also try to address some of the angst in the U.S. about other countries taking advantage of it and being "takers." He could do this by making the case that India is not a free rider--that through its businesses, market, talent and diaspora it is contributing to American economy and society, through its economic development it will contribute to global growth, and through Indian prosperity, security and a more proactive international role--with a different approach than another Asian country has taken--it'll contribute to regional stability and order. He might also suggest ways that the U.S. can facilitate India playing such a role.

Unlike previous leaders, he has not tended to appeal to others not to ask India to do more regionally and globally because it's just a developing country and needs to focus internally. The Modi government has been highlighting the contributions of India and Indians to global and regional peace and prosperity--through peacekeeping, the millions that fought in the World Wars, HADR operations in its neighborhood, evacuation operations in Yemen in which it rescued not just Indian citizens, but Americans as well.

His government has been more vocal in joint contexts of expressing its views on the importance of a rules-based order in the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions--and we might hear more on this in his address. Overall, a theme will likely be that India is not just a "taker," and will be a responsible, collaborative stakeholder.

It'll be interesting to see whether the Indian prime minister notes the role that his predecessors have played in getting the relationship to this point. With some exceptions--for example, he acknowledged Manmohan Singh's contribution during President Obama's visit to India last year--he has not tended to do so. But there's a case to be made for doing so--it can reassure members of Congress that the relationship transcends one person or party and is based on a strategic rationale, thus making it more sustainable. Such an acknowledgement could be in the context of noting that it's not just Delhi and Washington that have built and are building this relationship, but the two countries' states, private sectors, educational institutions and people. 

This wouldn't prevent Modi from highlighting the heightened intensity of the last two years, particularly the progress in defense and security cooperation. (From a more political perspective, given that there has been criticism in some quarters of India-U.S. relations becoming closer, it can also serve as a reminder that the Congress party-led government followed a similar path).

Modi will be competing for media attention in the U.S. thanks to the focus in the U.S. on the Democratic primaries this week, but he'll have Congressional attention. But it's worth remembering that Indian prime ministers have been feted before, but if they don't deliver on the promise of India and India-U.S. relations that they often outline, disillusionment sets in. Modi will have to convince them that India is a strategic bet worth making--one that will pay off.

This piece was originally published by Huffington Post India.

One year from the 2014 midterm congressional elections, the Center for Effective Public Management will host a panel previewing those races. Joining CEPM scholars Elaine Kamarck and John Hudak are Charlie Cook (Cook Political Report), Susan Page (USA Today), and Robert Boatright (Clark University).

Join us at 10AM for a live webcast of the event. We will discuss the congressional elections, gubernatorial races, and what the implications are for policymaking in the coming years.

We welcome questions via Twitter using the hashtag #2014Midterms.

Editor's Note: For full disclosure, Tom Mann (joined by Norm Ornstein) filed an amicus curiae brief in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission.

James Madison would be pleased. The 5-4 decision announced today by the Supreme Court upholding Arizona’s use of the initiative to establish an independent redistricting commission is a model of constitutional reasoning and statutory interpretation. It underscores the essential connection between republican government and popular sovereignty, in which the people have the ultimate authority over who shall represent them in public office. The majority opinion quotes Madison to powerful effect: “The genius of republican liberty seems to demand . . . not only that all power should be derived from the people, but those entrusted with it should be kept in dependence on the people.”

Madison worried about the dangers of the manipulation of electoral rules to serve the immediate interests of political actors. He was himself the target of a gerrymander designed (unsuccessfully) to deny him a seat in the first Congress. The Elections Clause of the Constitution, by granting Congress the power to override state actions setting the time, place and manner of elections, was designed partly as a safety valve to contain the abuse of power by those in a position to determine which voters will hold them accountable.

Today’s intensely polarized politics drive major partisan campaigns to seize control of the redistricting authority in the states and to wield that power to boost prospects for majority standing in the House. Partisan gerrymandering is not the major source of our dysfunctional politics but it surely reinforces and exacerbates the tribal wars between the parties. A number of states have used the initiative device provided in their constitutions to establish independent commissions to replace or supplement the regular state legislative process in redrawing congressional and/or state legislative district boundaries. Such commissions are no panacea for partisan gerrymandering. Their composition and rules vary in ways that can shape the outcome. But the evidence suggests they can mitigate the conflicts of interest that are a part of the regular process and produce more timely plans less subject to judicial preemption.

The Court has upheld the right of those states to legislate electoral rules through a popular vote. Had the minority position prevailed, state laws governing many aspects of the electoral process would have been subject to constitutional challenge. And an important safety value available to the people of the states for responding to abuses of power by those in public office has been preserved.

This should not be read more broadly as a triumph of direct democracy over representative government. Many scholars who provided expert opinion supporting the majority opinion retain serious concerns about the overuse and misuse of initiatives and referendums. Instead, the decision strengthens the legitimacy of representative democracy by reinforcing the essential link between republican government and popular sovereignty.

Event Information

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) adopted by Iran and the P5+1 partners in July 2015 was an effort not only to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons but also to avert a nuclear arms competition in the Middle East. But uncertainties surrounding the future of the Iran nuclear deal, including the question of what Iran will do when key JCPOA restrictions on its nuclear program expire after 15 years, could provide incentives for some of its neighbors to keep their nuclear options open.

In their Brookings Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Series monograph, “The Iran Nuclear Deal: Prelude to Proliferation in the Middle East?,” Robert Einhorn and Richard Nephew assess the current status of the JCPOA and explore the likelihood that, in the wake of the agreement, regional countries will pursue their own nuclear weapons programs or at least latent nuclear weapons capabilities. Drawing on interviews with senior government officials and non-government experts from the region, they focus in depth on the possible motivations and capabilities of Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates for pursuing nuclear weapons. The monograph also offers recommendations for policies to reinforce the JCPOA and reduce the likelihood that countries of the region will seek nuclear weapons.

On May 31, the Brookings Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative hosted a panel to discuss the impact of the JCPOA on prospects for nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. Brookings Senior Fellow and Deputy Director of Foreign Policy Suzanne Maloney served as moderator. Panelists included H.E. Yousef Al Otaiba, ambassador of the United Arab Emirates to the United States; Derek Chollet, counselor and senior advisor for security and defense policy at the German Marshall Fund; Brookings Senior Fellow Robert Einhorn; and Brookings Nonresident Senior Fellow Richard Nephew.

Join the conversation on Twitter using #IranDeal

Video

• Introduction
• Discussion

Audio

• The Iran nuclear deal: Prelude to proliferation in the Middle East?

Transcript

• Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

• 20160531_iran_nuclear_deal_transcript

When Iran and the P5+1 signed a deal over Tehran’s nuclear program last July, members of Congress, Middle East analysts, and Arab Gulf governments all warned that the agreement would prompt Iran’s rivals in the region to race for the bomb.

In a report that Bob Einhorn and I released this week, we assessed this risk of a so-called proliferation cascade. We look at four states in particular—Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Turkey—and Bob briefly explores each case in another blog post out today. In the paper, we argue that although the likelihood of a proliferation cascade in the Middle East is fairly low, and certainly lower than a number of critics of the Iran deal would have you believe, it is not zero. Given that, here are eight steps that leaders in Washington should take to head off that possibility:

1. Ensure that the JCPOA is rigorously monitored, strictly enforced, and faithfully implemented;
2. Strengthen U.S. intelligence collection on Iranian proliferation-related activities and intelligence-sharing on those activities with key partners;
3. Deter a future Iranian decision to produce nuclear weapons;
4. Seek to incorporate key monitoring and verification provisions of the JCPOA into routine IAEA safeguards as applied elsewhere in the Middle East and in the global nonproliferation regime;
5. Pursue U.S. civil nuclear cooperation with Middle East governments on terms that are realistic and serve U.S. nonproliferation interests;
6. Promote regional arrangements that restrain fuel cycle developments and build confidence in the peaceful use of regional nuclear programs;
7. Strengthen security assurances to U.S. partners in the Middle East; and
8. Promote a stable regional security environment.

Taken together, these steps deal with three core challenges the United States faces in shoring up the nonproliferation regime in the region.

The first is that the central test of nonproliferation in the Middle East will come from how the JCPOA is believed to be meeting its core objective of preventing Iranian nuclear weapons development and Iranian establishment of regional hegemony. It cannot be stressed enough that the decision to pursue nuclear weapons by any state, including those in the region, starts with a sense of vulnerability to core security threats and an inability to address those threats through any other means. The history of nuclear proliferation is one of tit-for-tat armament in the face of overriding security imperatives. Both finished and aborted nuclear programs bear the hallmarks of a security dilemma impelling states to make the political, economic, and security investments into nuclear weapons.

This is no less true for countries across the region than for Iran. To the extent that the overall security environment can be stabilized, there will be less impetus for any Middle Eastern state to develop nuclear weapons. The United States should focus on:

• Fully implementing and enforcing all sides of the JCPOA (nuclear restrictions, transparency, and sanctions relief);
• Creating a strong sense of deterrence toward Iran, manifest most clearly in the passage of a standing Authorization to Use Military Force if Iran is determined to be breaking out toward acquisition of a nuclear weapon;
• Providing security assurances and backing them up with the mechanisms to make them actionable like joint exercises, logistical planning, and cooperation with a range of regional and extra-regional actors; and,
• Working to promote a more stable regional environment by seeking the resolution of simmering conflicts.

But, these latter two factors also point to another resonant theme in our research: the need for the United States to be a player. After decades of involvement in the region, the United States has yet to settle upon the right balance between involvement and remove. Yet, establishing this equilibrium is essential. States in the region need predictability in their affairs with the United States, including knowing the degree to which our assurances will stand the test of time.

States in the region need predictability in their affairs with the United States, including knowing the degree to which our assurances will stand the test of time.

In part for this reason, the United States should not only pursue deeper security relationships, but also civil nuclear cooperation with interested states throughout the region. Such a relationship both ensures a closer link between the United States and its partners and discourages the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technology by disincentivizing countries from “going it alone.” In the Middle East, the United States would need to find a formulation that offers some flexibility (such as by building in language that would permit the United States to terminate any nuclear cooperation arrangements in the face of sensitive fuel cycle development by the other side).

The United States should also share intelligence more closely with its partners in the region. This is helpful in the short term, of course, but also helps the United States understand the mindset of and intelligence picture of its regional partners in a broader sense. It also helps leaders in Washington address concerns brought about by unfounded rumors or speculation as to Iran’s intentions or capabilities.

Changing how we do business

Even more important than how the JCPOA was negotiated will be how we transition from its restrictions and transparency mechanisms into a new world in 15 to 20 years. 

The United States seek to incorporate elements of the JCPOA into normal international monitoring practices and should negotiate new arrangements to help govern the future development of nuclear technology in the region. 

To achieve the former, the IAEA will need to make some changes to how it does business. For example, the IAEA determines how best to implement its monitoring mission, contingent on acceptance by the country being inspected. The United States and its partners should work with the IAEA (and other countries with significant nuclear activities) to make some parts of the JCPOA standard operating practice, such as online monitoring of enrichment levels. Other elements of the JCPOA may require agreements at the IAEA and beyond for how nuclear-related activities, including those that could have value for nuclear weaponization, are handled. It might be hard to get agreement, not least because there is clear language in the JCPOA that states that it will not be seen as a precedent for future nuclear nonproliferation efforts. However, it should still be the ambition of the United States to make such steps part of the norm. 

A far more difficult lift would be organizing a regional approach to the nuclear fuel cycle. This is not the same as creating a multilateral fuel cycle, though some elements that approach would be helpful. Rather, the United States should find ways to craft regional agreements or, failing that, moratoria on aspects of the fuel cycle that others in the region would find threatening. It would be easier to negotiate constraints some aspects than others. For example, spent fuel reprocessing is rare in the Middle East, with only Israel having been known to do it to a significant degree. It may therefore be an attractive first place to begin. Enrichment would be altogether more difficult, but it may be possible to convince states in the region to forego the expansion of their enrichment programs beyond their status quo. For Iran, it would continue to possess uranium enrichment but with constraints that limit the utility of this program for weapons production; its incentive would be to avoid creating the rationale for regional competition. For other countries in the region, it would involve holding off on enrichment, but also on the financial and political investment enrichment would involve—as well refraining from creating a security dilemma for Iran that could produce miscalculation in the future.

While some of these recommendations are more challenging (and may prove impossible), others are potentially easier. By taking a multifaceted approach, the United States increases the chances that no further weapons of mass destruction proliferate in the Middle East down the road. 

Editors’ Note: Richard Nephew and Bob Einhorn spoke about their new report at a recent Brookings event. You can see the video from the event here.

Donald Trump has made waves during this year’s election cycle by taking a hard line on illegal immigration. This, however, builds on years of heated debate among policymakers. It is also an enduring hot-button issue in Arizona, which has passed several immigration laws over the years.  In 2010, the passage of SB 1070 brought national attention to this debate.  Deemed the strictest immigration law to date, SB 1070 sought to achieve “attrition [of illegal immigrants] through enforcement” by requiring law enforcement to detain any person whom they believed to be residing in the country illegally. Although SB 1070’s effects on individuals and families have been well documented, little is known about its impact on students and schools. To this end, we sought to estimate the relationship between the passage of SB 1070 and school-level student achievement.

We anticipated that anti-immigration policies would primarily affect children from the families of undocumented immigrants. Such effects could be observed in different ways. For instance, the emotional and psychological distress of these children could result in a decline in average test scores at the school-level. On the other hand, students might have left the country or the state under the threat of being deported in which case school-level test scores would rise (since these students often perform below their peers). To this end, we considered three scenarios: 

1. Immigrant children remain in the state but experience higher levels of stress.  As a result, average school-level test scores will drop while Hispanic enrollment remains the same.
2. Children of undocumented immigrants leave the state, which results in a drop in Hispanic enrollment accompanied by an increase in school-level test scores.
3. Or, the first two scenarios occur simultaneously and we do not observe any change in test scores since the two effects would cancel each other, but note a slight decrease in Hispanic enrollment.

In order to see which of these hypothetical scenarios is supported by the data, we first estimated the relationship between the passage of SB 1070 and average school-level reading test scores. We then attempted to unpack the mechanism through which such an effect might have taken place. To this end, we used publicly available data on school-level achievement and enrollment collected by the Arizona Department of Education (ADE). Given the targeted nature of the policy and the demographics of immigrants in Arizona, the majority of whom are of Hispanic or Mexican descent, we focused on schools that traditionally enroll large proportions of Hispanic students. We identified schools with high (more than 75 percent) shares of Hispanic students as those whose average achievement and student composition are most likely to be affected by immigration reform. We contrasted changes in school-level achievement and enrollment in those schools with schools that enroll less than 25 percent Hispanic students, as these schools are less likely to experience any changes as a result of tightening immigration laws.

Figures 1 and 2 show trends in the average percentage of students passing the state reading test and average Hispanic enrollment at these schools between 2006-2007 and 2011-2012.           

Figure 1. Average Percent of Students Passing AIMS Reading

Figure 2. Average Hispanic Student Enrollment

Clearly, the rate of growth in school-level reading scores was much higher for high Hispanic schools after the passage of SB 1070 in 2010 (Figure 1). At the same time, there was a significant decrease in Hispanic enrollment in these schools (Figure 2). Thus, it appears the second scenario is likely driving the patterns we observe.

The data also suggest that the trends for high Hispanic and low Hispanic schools started diverging before the passage of SB 1070 - after the 2007-2008 school year.  This happens to be the year that Arizona passed an even more restrictive, though less controversial, immigration law – the Legal Arizona Workers Act (LAWA). LAWA required Arizona business owners to verify the legal status of their employees using E-Verify, an online tool managed by the federal government. Although LAWA used a different mechanism, similar to SB 1070 it sought to achieve the attrition of undocumented immigrants from the state. 

We then would anticipate both laws to have similar effects on school-level achievement and Hispanic enrollment. Indeed, we estimated that LAWA likely led to an average increase of roughly 4 percent of students passing the state reading test at high Hispanic schools. This was accompanied by an average loss of 38 Hispanic students per school. Because the passage of SB 1070 was preceded by the passage LAWA as well as a language policy that would have affected treatment schools, disentangling the effects of these two policies is not straightforward. However, based on our analysis, we estimate that SB 1070 is associated with an average increase of between 1.5 percent and 4.5 percent of students passing the state reading test at the school-level accompanied by an average loss of between 14 and 40 Hispanic students. 

Despite the fact that we cannot pin down the exact magnitude of SB 1070’s effect on school-level achievement, our analysis shows that when Arizona passed restrictive immigration laws in 2008 and 2010, it looked as if the state’s lowest performing schools were improving rapidly. This, however, likely had more to do with the changing composition of schools as an indirect though anticipated effect of immigration policies than with policies aimed at improving student achievement. 

Despite this, the Arizona Department of Education took credit for these gains. Similarly, Arizona was recently recognized as one of the nation’s leaders in growth on the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) over the last ten years. Although wrongly attributing these gains may seem harmless at first glance, it is important to remember that Arizona is viewed by many as a model for controversial education reforms like school choice and high-stakes accountability. It is easy to imagine how policymakers might look at increasing test scores in Arizona and wrongly attribute them to these kinds of reforms. That’s not to say that these policies don’t have merit. However, if other states adopt education policy reforms under the assumption that they worked in Arizona, then they might find that these policies fail to deliver.