Antimicrobial resistance is one of the most significant threats to public health globally. It will worsen in the coming decades without concerted efforts to spur the development of new antibiotics, while ensuring the appropriate use of existing antibiotics. Antimicrobial therapy is essential for treating and preventing bacterial infections, some of which can be life-threatening and acquired as a result of
critical medical interventions, including surgery, chemotherapy and dialysis. However, the international rise in antimicrobial resistance has weakened our antibiotic armamentarium and multi-resistant bacteria now cause over 150,000 deaths annually in hospitals around the world (WHO, 2013). Unfortunately, the evolution of drug-resistant pathogens is unavoidable due to random genetic changes in the pathogens that can render antibiotics ineffective. While antibiotic therapy can succeed in killing susceptible pathogens, it also inadvertently selects for organisms that are resistant. Because each exposure to antibiotics contributes to this process, efforts to restrict antibiotic usage only slow the development of resistance. Ultimately, innovative antimicrobial drugs with diverse mechanisms of action will be needed to treat emerging resistant pathogens.

Combating resistance

Inappropriate use of antibiotics contributes significantly to the acceleration of resistance. Needlessly exposing patients to antibiotics (for example, for viral or mild infections likely to resolve on their own), the use of overly broad-spectrum antibiotics and suboptimal doses of appropriate therapy hasten the evolution of resistant pathogens. While affordable, rapid and accurate point-of-care diagnostics are essential for determining appropriate therapy for many bacterial diseases, routine clinical use will be limited if the tests are too expensive or not accessible during routine clinical encounters. In the absence of a clear diagnostic result, many health care providers prescribe empiric broadspectrum therapy without knowing exactly what they are treating. Although inappropriate use is widespread in many parts of the world, where antibiotics are available without a prescription or oversight by a health care provider or stewardship team, overuse abounds even where antibiotic prescribing is more tightly regulated.

Studies conducted in the USA indicate that around 258 million courses of antibiotics are dispensed annually for outpatient use (Hicks, 2013) and up to 75 per cent of ambulatory antibiotic prescriptions are for the treatment of common respiratory infections, which may or may not be bacterial in origin (McCaig,1995). Recent evidence suggests that over half of these prescriptions are not medically indicated. For example, 60 per cent of US adults with a sore throat receive an antibiotic prescription after visiting a primary care practice or emergency department, despite the fact that only ten per cent require treatment with antibiotics. This is particularly troubling given the availability of rapid tests that can detect Group A Streptococcus, the bacteria responsible for the ten per cent of cases that require antibiotic treatment.

The overuse of antibiotics has been driven largely by their low cost and clinical effectiveness, which has led many patients to view them as cure-alls with few risks. This perception is reinforced by the fact that antibiotics are curative in nature and used for short durations. However, the clinical effectiveness of these drugs decreases over time, as resistance naturally increases, and this process is accelerated with inappropriate use. Moreover, there are numerous consequences associated with the use of antibiotics, including over 140,000 emergency department visits yearly in the USA for adverse incidents (mostly allergic reactions; CDC, 2013a). In addition, antibiotics can eliminate protective bacteria in the gut,
leaving patients vulnerable to infection with Clostridium difficile, which causes diarrhoeal illness that results in 14,000 deaths every year in the USA (CDC, 2013b). It is estimated that antimicrobial resistance costs the US health care system over US$20 billion annually in excess care and an additional $35 billion in lost productivity (Roberts et al., 2009).

The inappropriate use of antimicrobial drugs is particularly concerning because highly resistant pathogens can easily cross national borders and rapidly spread around the globe. In recent years, strains of highly drug-resistant tuberculosis, carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae and other resistant pathogens have spread outside their countries of origin within several years of their detection. Because resistant bacteria are unlikely to stay isolated, stewardship efforts must be improved globally and international attention is needed to improve surveillance of emerging pathogens and resistance patterns.

A major challenge for clinicians and regulators will be to find stewardship interventions that can be scaled-up and involve multiple stakeholders, including providers, drug manufacturers, health care purchasers (insurers), governments and patients themselves. Such interventions should include practical and costeffective educational programmes targeted towards providers and patients that shift expectations for antibiotic prescriptions to a mutual understanding of the benefits and risks of these drugs.

Educational programmes alone, however, will not be sufficient to lower prescribing rates to recommended levels. Pushing down the inappropriate use of antibiotics also warrants stronger mechanisms that leverage the critical relationships between the stakeholders. For example, health care purchasers can play an important role by using financial disincentives to align prescribing habits with clinical guidelines that are developed by infectious disease specialists in the private and public sectors. This type of approach has the potential to be effective because it includes multiple stakeholders that share responsibility for the appropriate use of antibiotics and, ultimately, patient care.

Key obstacles to antibiotic development

The continual natural selection for resistant pathogens despite efforts to limit antibiotic use underscores the need for new antibiotics with novel mechanisms of action. To date, antimicrobial drug innovation and development have not kept pace with resistance. The number of approved new molecular entities (NME) to treat systemic infections has been steadily declining for decades (see Figure 1). Some infections are not susceptible to any antibiotic and in some cases the only effective drugs may cause serious side effects, or be contra-indicated due to a patient’s allergies or comorbidities (e.g. renal failure). There is significant unmet medical need for therapies that treat serious and life-threatening bacterial diseases caused by resistant pathogens, as well as some less serious infections where there are few treatment alternatives available (e.g. gonorrhoea).

Antibiotic development for these areas of unmet medical need has been sidelined by a number of scientific, regulatory and economic obstacles. While the costs and complexity of any clinical trial necessary for approval by drug regulators can be substantial, in part due to the large study samples needed to demonstrate safety and efficacy, the infectious disease space faces a number of unique clinical challenges. Patients with serious drug-resistant infections may be in need of urgent antibiotic therapy, which can preclude efficient consent and timely trial enrolment procedures; prior therapy can also confound treatment effects if the patient is later enrolled in a trial for an experimental drug. In addition, many patients with these pathogens are likely to have a history of longterm exposure to the health care setting and may have significant comorbidities that render them less likely to meet inclusion criteria for clinical trials.

Emerging infections for which there are few or no treatment options also tend to be relatively rare. This makes it difficult to conduct adequate and well-controlled trials, which typically enrol large numbers of patients. However, clinical drug development can take many years and waiting until such infections are more common is not feasible. Another issue is that it may also not be possible to conclusively identify the pathogen and its susceptibility at the point of enrolment due to the lack of rapid diagnostic technologies. Ultimately, uncertainty about the aetiology of an infection may necessitate trials with larger numbers of patients in order to achieve sufficient statistical power, further compounding the challenge of enrolling seriously ill infectious disease patients in the first place.

The need to conduct large trials involving acutely ill patients that are difficult to identify can make antibiotic development prohibitively expensive for drug developers, especially given that antibiotics are relatively inexpensive and offer limited opportunities to generate returns. Unlike treatments for chronic diseases, antibiotic therapy tends to last no longer than a few weeks, and these drugs lose efficacy over time as resistance develops, leading to diminishing returns. The decline in antimicrobial drug innovation is largely due to these economic obstacles, which have led developers to seek more durable and profitable markets (e.g. cancer or chronic disease) in recent decades. There are only a handful of companies currently in the market and the development pipeline is very thin. Changes to research infrastructure, drug reimbursement and regulation are all potentially needed to revitalise antibiotic innovation.

Opportunities to streamline innovative antibiotic development

In the USA, several proposals have been made to expedite the development and regulatory review of antibiotics while ensuring that safety and efficacy requirements are met. In 2012, the US President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology recommended that the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) create a ‘special medical use’ (SMU) designation for the review of drugs for subpopulations of patients with unmet medical need. Drug sponsors would be required to demonstrate that clinical trials in a larger patient population would need much more time to complete or not be feasible. A drug approved under the SMU designation could be studied in subgroups of patients that are critically ill, as opposed to the broader population, under the condition that the drug’s indication would be limited to the narrow study population. The SMU designation was discussed at an expert workshop convened by the Brookings Institution in August 2013. Many participants at the meeting agreed that there is a pressing need to develop novel antibiotics and that such a limited-use pathway could support the appropriate use of newly approved drugs.

The Infectious Diseases Society of America developed a related drug development pathway called the Limited Population Antibacterial Drug (LPAD) approval mechanism. The LPAD approach calls for smaller, faster and less costly clinical trials to study antibiotics that treat resistant bacteria that cause serious infections. Both the SMU and LPAD approaches would allow drug developers to demonstrate product safety and efficacy in smaller patient subpopulations and provide regulatory clarity about acceptable benefit–risk profiles for antibiotics that treat serious bacterial diseases. The US House of Representatives is currently considering a bill¹ that incorporates these concepts.

A recent proposal from the drug manufacturer industry for streamlined antibiotic development is to establish a tiered regulatory framework to assess narrow-spectrum antibiotics (e.g. active versus a specific bacterial genus and species or a group of related bacteria) that target resistant pathogens that pose the greatest threat to public health (Rex, 2013: pp. 269–275). This is termed a ‘pathogen-focused’ approach because the level of clinical evidence required for approval would be correlated with the threat level and feasibility of studying a specific pathogen or group of pathogens. The pathogen-focused approach was also highlighted at a recent workshop at the Brookings Institution (Brookings Institution, 2014). Some experts felt that the approach is promising but emphasised that each pathogen and experimental drug is unique and that it could be challenging to place them in a particular tier of a regulatory framework. Given that pathogen-focused drugs would likely be marketed internationally, it will be important for drug sponsors to have regular interactions and multiple levels of discussion with regulators to find areas of agreement that would facilitate the approval of these drugs.

Antibiotics with very narrow indications could potentially support stewardship as well by limiting use to the most seriously ill patients. Safe use of these drugs would likely depend on diagnostics, significant provider education, labelling about the benefits and risks of the product, and the scope of clinical evidence behind its approval. Because these antibiotics would be used in a very limited manner, changes would potentially need to be made to how they are priced and reimbursed to ensure that companies are still able to generate returns on their investment. That said, a more focused drug development programme with regulatory clarity could greatly increase their odds of success and, combined with appropriate pricing and safe use provisions, could succeed in incentivising antimicrobial drug development for emerging infections.

Endnote
1 H.R. 3742 – Antibiotic Development to Advance Patient Treatment (ADAPT) Act of 2013.

References
Barnett, M. L. and Linder, J. A., 2014. ‘Antibiotic prescribing to adults with sore throat in the United States, 1997–2010’. JAMA Internal Medicine, 174(1), pp. 138–140.

Brookings Institution, 2013. Special Medical Use: Limited Use for Drugs Developed in an Expedited Manner to Meet an UnmetMedical Need. Brookings Institution. Available at: www.brookings.edu/events/2013/08/01-special-medical-use

Brookings Institution, 2014. Modernizing Antibacterial Drug Development and Promoting Stewardship. Available at: www.brookings.edu/events/2014/02/07-modernizing-antibacterialdrug-development [Accessed 11 March 2014].

CDC, 2013a. Antibiotic resistance threats in the United States,2013 [PDF] CDC. Available at: www.cdc.gov/drugresistance/threatreport-2013/pdf/ar-threats-2013-508.pdf#page=25 [Accessed 16 January 2014].

CDC, 2013b. Clostridium difficile. Antibiotic resistance threats in the United States, 2013 [PDF] CDC. Available at: www.cdc.gov/drugresistance/threat-report-2013/pdf/ar-threats-2013-508.pdf#page=50 [Accessed 16 January 2014].

Hicks, L. A. et al., 2013. ‘US Outpatient Antibiotic Prescribing, 2010’. New England Journal of Medicine, 368(15), pp. 1461–1463.
Infectious Disease Society of America, 2012.

Limited Population Antibacterial Drug (LPAD) Approval Mechanism. Available at: www.idsociety.org/uploadedFiles/IDSA/News_and_Publications/IDSA_News_Releases/2012/LPAD%20one%20pager.pdf [Accessed 5 March 2014].

Infectious Disease Society of America, 2012. Limited Population Antibacterial Drug (LPAD) Approval Mechanism [PDF] Infectious
Disease Society of America. Available at: www.idsociety.org/uploadedFiles/IDSA/News_and_Publications/IDSA_News_Releases/2012/LPAD%20one%20pager.pdf  [Accessed 18 January 2013].

Kumarasamy, K. K., Toleman, M. A., Walsh, T. R. et al.,2010. ‘Emergence of a new antibiotic resistance mechanism in India,
Pakistan, and the UK: A molecular, biological, and epidemiological study’. Lancet Infectious Diseases, 10(9), pp. 597–602.

McCaig, L. F. and Hughes, J. M., 1995. ‘Trends in antimicrobial drug prescribing among office-based physicians in the United
States’. Journal of the American Medical Association, 273(3), pp. 214–219.

President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, 2012. Report to the President on Propelling Innovation in Drug
Discovery, Development and Evaluation. Available at:www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/pcast-fdafinal.pdf    [Accessed 5 March 2014].

Rex, J. H. et al., 2013. ‘A comprehensive regulatory framework to address the unmet need for new antibacterial treatments’. Lancet Infectious Diseases, 13(3), pp. 269–275.

Roberts, R. R., Hota, B., Ahmad, I. et al., 2009. ‘Hospital and societal costs of antimicrobial – Resistant infections in a Chicago
teaching hospital: Implications for antibiotic stewardship’. Clinical Infectious Diseases, 49(8), pp. 1175–1184.

WHO (World Health Organization), 2010. Fact Sheet: Rational Use of Medicines [webpage] WHO. Available at:
www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs338/en [Accessed 28 February 2014].

WHO (World Health Organization), 2013. Antimicrobial Drug Resistance [PDF] WHO. Available at: http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/EB134/B134_37-en.pdf [Accessed 6 March 2014].

WHO (World Health Organization), 2013. Notified MDR-TB cases (number per 100,000 population), 2005–12. WHO. Available at:
https://extranet.who.int/sree/Reports?op=vs&path=/WHO_HQ_Reports/G2/PROD/EXT/MDRTB_Indicators_map [Accessed 28 February 2014].

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On February 29, the Africa Security Initiative at Brookings held a discussion on Nigeria, nine months after the inauguration of President Muhammadu Buhari, the country’s first president to take office in a peaceful transition of power from one party to another. President Buhari, who previously ruled Nigeria in the mid-1980s after a military coup, inherits a country facing burgeoning population, low oil prices for its top export, and the Boko Haram extremist insurgency in the northeast. Buhari also inherited other problems such as unrest in the country’s delta and southeast regions, and a culture of corruption and human rights abuse and impunity throughout much of the country’s armed forces and police.

Less than a year into his presidency, Buhari has made progress in reforming the military, sacking some military leaders and injecting a bit more energy into the counter-Boko Haram campaign. But has he chosen the right priorities for Nigeria and fundamentally headed in the right direction, and what has been the impact on civilians, particularly in the northeastern part of the country? What additional role, if any, could the United States and the broader international community play to support additional reform?

We convened a panel to discuss these subjects. The panel, made up of independent experts with deep knowledge ranging from human rights to economics and finance to broader political and security sector reform, included EJ Hogendoorn of the International Crisis Group, Madeline Rose from Mercy Corps, Mausi Segun of Human Rights Watch, and Amadou Sy from The Brookings Institution. Senior Fellow Michael O’Hanlon, who directs the Africa Security Initiative at Brookings, moderated the discussion.

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Editors’ Note: It is time to establish a regional reconstruction strategy for the Middle East, argues Sultan Barakat, that involves collective vision, broad participation, smart security, equality, and other key elements.This post originally appeared in Huffington Post.

The World Bank is hosting its annual Fragility Forum this week with the aim of making progress on the post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals. This week has also seen a fragile ceasefire in Syria, potentially landmark elections in Iran, and a violent clash between Jordanian security and so-called Islamic State members. Together these developments have prompted me to reassess what needs to be done to resolve the issues of conflict and fragility in the Middle East.

For the Middle East, the starting point should be to move away from any process that reinforces the image of the West devising solutions and proposing "new" visions to the region. Such approaches are reminiscent of the Sykes-Picot agreement or the neoconservatives' "grand strategy" of the early 2000s and do not appreciate that the Middle East has changed fundamentally since 2011. The region, at all levels, now expects to be treated with dignity and to be the driving force behind its own development.

It is high time to pull together to establish a "Regional Reconstruction Strategy" that can address all sorts of violence, not just Islamist-related conflict. The region needs an ever-evolving strategy that maintains a holistic, problem-solving outlook while drawing on various forms of intervention (e.g. community driven development, inter-regional development projects, targeted counterinsurgency operations, stabilization, statebuilding, etc.) without being straightjacketed by any one toolkit or template. Novel approaches rooted in genuine regional leadership, broad participation, youth engagement, and the utilization of technology will increasingly need to be applied. The pillars of such a strategy should be a collective regional vision, effective local participation, smart security, reconciliation and justice, equity, reconstruction and development, and capacity.

Collective Vision: With the aspirations of the Arab Spring unrealized and many countries descending into sectarianism, what is needed now is a collective vision that goes beyond national borders. This would include pooling the region's resources, specifically all the ingredients for large-scale development, such as human resources, an educated population, capital, mobility, and nature. We could then look to the day when region-wide development is synergistic and not predatory or a zero-sum game. What Morocco has achieved with solar energy is a shining example—a visionary investment has addressed regional developmental and environmental challenges, stimulated employment, and raised confidence that hi-tech and innovative sectors can thrive in the Middle East. Such a broad vision is crucial if the region is to leapfrog into the twenty-first century and not remain in a vicious cycle of conflict and failed development.

Key to an inclusive and non-adversarial vision will be both accepting and embracing Islam as a majority religion while building on human security as an area of common ground. For this to happen some real changes are required in places such as Iran and Saudi Arabia—which would enable both to exercise their regional leadership in coalescing a constructive collective vision rather than perpetuating sectarian hostility.

Broad Participation: It is important that the regional vision recognizes that development requires an active civil society, a free media, and rooting action and ideas at the local level and with popular participation. The process of engaging in a region-wide consultation where contributions are coming from schools, villages, city halls, political parties, unions, and many other civic forums can help the region start dreaming about what it wants to look like in the 50 years to come.

Smart Security: Instead of a collective vision for development we have one for defense, formed with the excuse of the Islamic State group. All appreciate that a minimum level of security is important for implementing reconstruction, but a lack of security cannot be a pretext to do nothing. Experience has shown that delaying reconstruction efforts pushes people down the slope of conflict and violence and leads to dependence on humanitarian assistance. The region needs to find ways of better understanding the granular texture of security at local and regional levels so that strategies can be developed in which localized insecurity does not hold back development in other areas. This could support "spot reconstruction" efforts that create exemplars of what a degree of stability combined with reconstruction intervention can achieve in the midst of larger instability.

Reconciliation and Justice: No long-term investment in reconstruction can be protected without genuine reconciliation across the region. Twenty years ago the main fault line was Israel-Palestine. Today, there are many additional fault lines that need to be addressed, including Muslim-Christian tensions, tensions between displaced and host communities, and tensions between Sunni and Shiite communities. The most fundamental way to initiate reconciliation is to make sure that the rule of law applies to all and that everyone has access to justice regardless of the mechanism. On this a lot can be built on local and traditional systems for achieving justice and reconciliation.

Equity: A common mistake with reconstruction is that it proceeds without sufficient regulation and monitoring to ensure that benefits are equitably distributed. This region has repeatedly seen how easily reconstruction "lords" (most of whom were previously warlords) can emerge to line their pockets at the expense of the general public, thus perpetuating that country's crisis. World Bank arguments for the private sector to take the lead in reconstruction in Afghanistan and elsewhere have done nothing but strengthen this model. Assad's efforts to liberalize Syria's economy prior to 2011 led to the further enrichment of a corrupt elite, contributing to what we see today. Going forward, reconstruction efforts must take into consideration the poorest and least capable—so that nobody is left out.

Reconstruction and Development: There is an urgent need to find new ways of inducing development through international engagement with the region. The current instability has shifted spending toward security and away from the basics of development. As a result, some of the most important development indicators—freedom of expression, women's participation, poverty, quality of education—have taken a step back. All this is happening when the region is facing financial challenges due to severely reduced oil prices. This may prove to be an opportunity as some countries needed a good wake-up call to the pernicious effects of a model of capital development in which billions of dollars are invested in the West, generating jobs and stabilizing economies thousands of miles away at the expense of the region. If the West wants to help the region it should seek to focus minds within the Arab world on the value of investment in addressing regional problems in a mutually beneficial way. Ultimately a more stable region will lead to more prosperous neighbors both in the East and the West.

Building Capacity: To do this we must invest enormous amounts in fostering sustainable capacity at regional, national, and local levels. It is essential to invest in education at all levels, in particular going beyond primary education to support the young men and women that will become leaders with the conviction and capabilities to rebuild the region. In a rush to capture development, we have focused on the hard sciences, engineering, business studies, and computer science while ignoring our own culture, languages, and history. We must correct this imbalance, and it is time we develop our ideas in our own language and not rely on translation.

For all this to happen, fragility must be addressed within a coherent regional vision, not individual national plans. It would be constructive if the international community and donors would try to view the region as a whole—as one canvas in which to facilitate cross-border mobility of population, capital, ideas, and labor—and encourage regional responsibility with different countries leading in their areas of competency. International partners can support this with new and innovative forms of funding that utilize collateral guarantees from the region, not just individual countries. If we can embrace a truly regional approach, there may be a day when we elevate human dignity and human development above petty politics and sectarianism.

Food safety is not a problem unique to China, though it is certainly one of the country’s most pressing and persistent challenges. On April 28, 2016, the John L. Thornton China Center hosted a public event to discuss food safety in China and what new regulations might mean for consumers and businesses.

Revised food safety law a step in the right direction

China’s revised Food Safety Law, enacted in October 2015, is intended to strengthen the regulation of food companies in China and enhance oversight along the supply chain. The law imposes tougher consequences on violators of food safety regulations. The revised Food Safety Law is a step in the right direction, but improving food safety will require more than just new regulations. Greater inter-agency coordination is needed among the various government entities with regulatory responsibility for food safety, including the China Food and Drug Administration, the Ministry of Agriculture, the National Health and Planning Commission, and the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine.

China has done relatively better in enforcing food safety and quality standards for its food exports than it has for its domestic food market. A disparity between export quality and what is found in local markets is not uncommon in developing countries. But after several large-scale food safety incidents, domestic Chinese consumers are now paying close attention to the quality of their food and are no longer willing to accept such a disparity. Setting and enforcing higher food safety standards domestically is important for maintaining public health and for increasing consumer confidence. The latter will take time but is an indispensable component of the consumption-driven economy that China seeks.

Industry consolidation needed

One of the biggest obstacles facing Chinese food safety regulators is a still-fragmented domestic food industry with many small players. The increase in regulatory requirements and inspections mandated by the new law will raise the costs of doing business and likely lead to industry consolidation, which would help make the domestic Chinese food industry more manageable from a regulatory perspective. Emerging trends that see consumers buying food products from small and perhaps unverified retailers online actually make the jobs of regulators more difficult. This is because products are harder to trace—and, if there is a problem, to recall—when transactions occur through nontraditional retail channels. Traceability is critical to ensuring food safety because it allows problematic food items to be identified. The responsible firm can then correct the situation and each actor in the supply chain can be held accountable.

The Chinese government is already supporting initiatives that aggregate production units at the farm level. These farmer production bases enable farmers to coordinate food production and marketing to larger retailers. Participating farms have been provided with safe pesticides and guidelines on pesticide application; they are also able to sell to large retailers directly. These direct farmer-retailer relationships allow for greater traceability and facilitate the spot-checking that is necessary for verification. This model holds promise for improving food safety, especially as it pertains to pesticide application, but it will need to be scaled up to have a meaningful impact on China’s domestic food market.

What can China learn from other countries?

Since China is not alone in facing food safety challenges, it can learn lessons from the experiences of other countries. According to Vivian Hoffmann of the International Food Policy Research Institute, “there are many ways in which the public sector can harness the capacity and energy of the private sector to make food safety regulation more efficient.” For instance, China could consider greater co-regulation, which is a strategy that involves the private sector in regulation. Allowing firms to give input when regulators are setting standards can help prevent situations where unattainable standards are either crippling for companies or just ignored altogether. Hoffman is clear to note that allowing firms to give input does not mean compromising on consumer safety. Rather, it would create a more transparent process that would allow companies time to work up to higher standards if necessary. Private companies could be involved in testing their own products, but verification testing would still be needed.

Open communication with consumers is also important. The risk-based approach to food safety, which is the international norm and which China has also adopted, entails a particular challenge: Sometimes what consumers think is the most dangerous aspect of the food supply is different from scientists’ perceptions and knowledge of risk. For example, scientists may focus on biological contaminants while consumers worry about pesticides and additives. The concerns of consumers should be taken into account when setting priorities, but experts also need to explain why their concerns may be different. Communication and transparency are essential for bridging this disconnect. Chenglin Liu of St. Mary’s School of Law similarly stresses transparency as a key ingredient in improving China’s food safety situation. Broader capacity building efforts—as it relates to rule of law, an independent judiciary, and independent journalism—will help improve the enforcement of regulations.

The country’s revised Food Safety Law is a step in the right direction, but it is not enough to resolve China’s food safety woes. Regulatory enforcement remains a challenge. Fortunately, it is by no means an insurmountable one. Vigilant consumers will continue to demand higher-quality and more-traceable food products, a trend that puts increasing pressure on regulators to enforce high standards and that also presents great opportunities for proactive businesses.

On Thursday, July 7, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) revised its economic outlook for South Africa. Despite “considerable economic and social progress” since 1994, the IMF report cited high income inequality, among other factors, in its projection of slow growth and increased unemployment in the medium term. Earlier this year, in the Brookings Africa Growth Initiative’s Foresight Africa 2016, we explored this pressing problem—high income inequality—across the continent. The initial takeaway was that sub-Saharan Africa has greater in-country income inequality than other developing countries around the world. However, after separating seven outlier economies—Angola, the Central African Republic, Botswana, Zambia, Namibia, Comoros, and South Africa—we noted that income inequality, measured by the Gini coefficient, in the rest of the region actually mirrors the rest of the developing world, which currently stands at 0.39. All seven outlier economies have Gini coefficients above 0.55, a level reached by only four other countries worldwide: Suriname, Haiti, Colombia, and Honduras. 

It is important to explore precisely why this disparity exists. Notably, sub-Saharan Africa is not only an outlier in income inequality, but also in the relationship between economic growth and poverty reduction. Generally, in the developing world, every 1 percent of growth reduces poverty 4 percent. In sub-Saharan Africa, however, every 1 percent of growth only reduces poverty by 3 percent. In Foresight Africa 2016, Brookings Nonresident Senior Fellow Haroon Bhorat suggests that this disparity may be because of the commodity booms that have sustained growth periods in African economies, which bring extraordinary returns to capital but limited job growth. Alternatively, these commodity booms may have accompanied a fall in manufacturing output; growth is thus concentrated in the low-productivity services sector. In any case, this graph forces us to consider exactly what type of structural transformation is necessary for continued economic growth and acknowledge that inequality in sub-Saharan Africa might require different solutions in different countries.

For a more in-depth discussion on this issue, see Foresight Africa 2016 and Bhorat’s discussion of African inequality in relation to the Sustainable Development Goals.

Omid Abrishamchian contributed to this post.

Editors’ Note: To salvage his Middle East legacy, advance American interests in the Arab world, and align with the position of the international community on this conflict, Ibrahim Fraihat argues, President Obama must make the long overdue decision of recognizing a sovereign and independent Palestinian state before leaving office. This post originally appeared on Middle East Eye.

Driven by the search for his legacy in the Middle East, it seems President Barack Obama has decided to spend additional political capital on reviving Israeli-Palestinian talks before the end of his second term in office.

Last month, the Wall Street Journal reported that the White House is working on a renewed peace push, including a possible Security Council resolution or other initiatives such as “a presidential speech and a joint statement from the Middle East Quartet.”

While it is still unclear where President Obama is going with this renewed effort, he must understand that using the same old techniques of U.S. mediation will only exacerbate the crisis, consequently tarnishing his legacy in the Middle East. To salvage his Middle East legacy, advance American interests in the Arab world, and align with the position of the international community on this conflict, he must make the long overdue decision of recognizing a sovereign and independent Palestinian state before leaving office.

[U]sing the same old techniques of U.S. mediation will only exacerbate the crisis, consequently tarnishing [Obama's] legacy in the Middle East.

First, Obama should learn from the mistakes of his predecessors, George W. Bush and Bill Clinton, who also tried to reach a mutually acceptable agreement between the Palestinian and Israelis with only a few months left in office.

Reaching an agreement between the two parties under severe time pressure will not work. A party that is not interested in a peace agreement can easily maneuver by using delaying tactics until Obama’s term ends. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu already utilized this strategy when he publicly rejected an invitation from Obama to visit the White House to talk peace because he wanted to “avoid any perceived influence” in the forthcoming U.S. presidential election. These remarks came from the same person who meddled in domestic American affairs by aggressively lobbying against Obama during the last U.S. presidential election.

Obama has already put in the effort by working with the parties, but now he needs to make decisions. Unlike many American presidents, Obama made the resolution of this conflict a top priority. Despite the brutal civil wars engulfing the Middle East region in the past five years, Obama demonstrated a firm commitment and allocated the needed political capital to make a breakthrough in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. During his time in office, Secretary of State John Kerry spent more time on Israeli-Palestinian negotiations than any other international conflict. However, the outcome of the Obama administration’s intensive diplomatic efforts has been a total failure. These negotiations ended without an accord or even a memorandum of understanding, agreements that could have built on Obama’s legacy in the Middle East.

Nonetheless, Obama knows very well who made him fail. Netanyahu repeatedly defied Obama: In Congress, he refused to engage in serious negotiations that could have led to an agreement, and he publicly lobbied against Obama’s election for a second term. Obama should not expect Netanyahu to change his position and cooperate on any renewed efforts that could save Obama’s failed legacy in the Middle East. This is the same Netanyahu whom Obama increasingly grew frustrated with throughout his presidency.

With the remaining few months in office, the time has come for Obama to shape his legacy in the Middle East the way he wants it, not the way that Netanyahu has lobbied to characterize it. Obama has an opportunity to take his place in history as the first American president to officially recognize an independent Palestinian state.

Obama has an opportunity to take his place in history as the first American president to officially recognize an independent Palestinian state.

Sooner or later, there will be a Palestinian state and the United States will recognize it. Obama knows that very well. So why should he miss this opportunity and let another president recognize it in the future? Obama should worry about his own legacy, not Netanyahu’s extremist views. Obama should never allow Netanyahu to shape his legacy in the Middle East and leave it stained with failure.

Obama’s Middle East legacy is equally bleak in other parts of the region. Syria could become Obama’s Rwanda; Benghazi and the late Ambassador Chris Stevens are witnesses to his legacy in Libya; al-Qaeda in Yemen is much stronger today than when Obama intensified his drone policy against the organization; only history will tell how the Iran nuclear deal turns out in the future. Unfortunately, Obama cannot change the facts in any of these countries with the limited time remaining for him in office. However, he can still restore his legacy in the Middle East by recognizing a Palestinian state.

By recognizing a Palestinian state now, Obama will have seized an historical opportunity to impact the future and establish a foundation for the next American administration in the Middle East. No matter who comes to the White House, they will have to deal with this new fact. Obama has the international community on his side in recognizing Palestine. France recently stated that it will recognize an independent Palestinian state if a final effort to bring about peace fails. Additionally, Sweden has officially recognized Palestine.

American diplomats have a tradition of balancing their views after they leave office as they become free from the pressure of the Israel lobby and domestic politics. President Jimmy Carter is a one example of this.

Obama should not fall into this trap. No matter how he adjusts his views after leaving office, he will never save his legacy in the Middle East and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict if he does not recognize a Palestinian state while he still has the power to do so. The time is now and he must act rather than regretting it later.

President Obama, if not for your legacy, at least recognize Palestine for the Nobel Peace Prize that you received in advance. The committee trusted you and awarded you the prize before you achieved any real peace; do not disappoint them. Make sure you earn the prize, Mr. President. If not for your legacy or the prestigious prize, then please do something for your own personal pride and be the one who laughs last, not Benjamin Netanyahu.

Mr. President, recognize Palestine now.

On May 17, Egyptian President Abdel-Fatah el-Sissi did something Egyptian presidents have done many times before: he urged Israel and the Palestinians to renew negotiations for peace, this time by backing an international conference promoted by the French foreign minister.

But what made Sissi’s call particularly interesting is that he called on not just the leaders but also political "parties" to seize what he called “a real opportunity to find a long-awaited solution.” Sissi's call offered Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu an opportunity to accommodate Israel's newest best friend, Sissi, rather than the French themselves. It would not have brought peace, of course: though an international conference would offer a glimmer of hope to change some of the worst aspects of the current diplomatic deadlock, it would not solve any of the outstanding substantive issues between Israelis and Palestinians.

Sissi's reference to political parties was no coincidence: it fit perfectly with the domestic political needs of Netanyahu and of Opposition Leader Isaac Herzog, who were angling to bring the Zionist Union joint list into the government and give Netanyahu a much-needed parliamentary cushion beyond his current razor-thin coalition. 

Herzog first had to convince his own highly-reluctant party of the need to join its rival Netanyahu—and if peace was about to break out, how could they refuse? For about 48 hours it seemed like Herzog was indeed about to announce his decision to join the coalition, face the battle in his party, and become Israel's foreign minister.

Then something else happened. Rather than appointing Herzog as foreign minister, Netanyahu is now poised to bring back Avigdor Lieberman, a former foreign minister and Israel's least diplomatic politician. Lieberman won't be returning to diplomacy, however. Instead, he will get a significantly more powerful position, second only to the prime minister: minister of defense. In response, current Minister of Defense Moshe Ya’alon today resigned from the cabinet and the Knesset, refusing to take another cabinet position. He gave a scathing speech, saying that "[E]xtremist and dangerous forces have taken over Israel and the Likud movement."

In what can only be considered brilliant politicking—and reckless policy—Netanyahu jettisoned Ya’alon and Herzog in favor of his former associate and bitter personal rival, Lieberman.

In what can only be considered brilliant politicking—and reckless policy—Netanyahu jettisoned Ya’alon and Herzog in favor of his former associate and bitter personal rival, Lieberman. Herzog is left wounded and humiliated, played for a fool—the gravest sin in Israeli political culture. Netanyahu finds himself at the helm of an enlarged coalition (Lieberman brings with him five members of Knesset, after one member of his faction left the party today in protest of the move), safer from parliamentary shocks and from attacks from the right (the whole right wing is now inside the coalition. Lieberman will still likely criticize Netanyahu from within the government, but not quite as fiercely). 

A cynics’ cynic

Lieberman's pending appointment has been met with astonishment by the opposition in Israel, by many in the military which he will oversee, and indeed here in Washington—and with good reason.

Just these past few months, Lieberman has viciously attacked both Netanyahu and the military brass for what he claimed was a weak response to terrorist attacks. In but one example of many, Lieberman came to the defense of a soldier who the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) had decided to prosecute for killing a Palestinian assailant who had already been thoroughly subdued. The contrast to current Minister of Defense Moshe Ya’alon is striking: Ya’alon defended the military's decision and stressed the importance of ethical norms and of rules of engagement in the military. Ya’alon is very right wing on the Palestinian issue, but he has consistently shown an honorable stance in the face of attacks on democratic norms. 

Lieberman is ostensibly less right-wing on the Palestinian issue—sometimes. Though he is a settler himself, he has endorsed a two-state solution in very general theory, noting he would even move if peace necessitated it. His endorsement, however, has always been couched in the toughest language possible and in utter mistrust of Palestinian intentions or the chances of peace ever materializing. On the niceties of democratic norms, including military law, he is a cynics' cynic. Benny Begin, another former Likud minister and an avowed hawk, has called Lieberman's appointment “delirious.”

As minister of defense, these positions will be highly consequential. Not only will he be in charge of the military brass and its promotion, but he will have statutory authority over many affairs in the West Bank, which is under military rule. Any attempt to improve the daily lives of Palestinians (such as a project just announced to streamline checkpoints for Palestinians) will be under his purview. His open calls to bring down Hamas through a ground invasion of Gaza if there is another round of fighting with Hamas—voiced even while he was a cabinet member during the last round of fighting—will now carry the weight of the minister of defense.

What was Herzog thinking? 

For the past year, since Netanyahu formed his fourth government, Herzog had denied time and again that he was aiming to join Netanyahu rather than replace him. He bemoaned the cynicism of those who simply would not believe him. This week the masks came off. Negotiations between the sides were accelerated and Herzog began a difficult intra-party fight to justify such a move. "National unity" governments are quite common in Israel, starting with the emergency cabinet of 1967, on the eve of the Six-Day War, when a sense of imminent doom swept the country. 

These governments, however, are usually justified by either an acute crisis, like in 1967, or in order to resolve a political deadlock, such as between Shimon Peres' Labor and Yitzhak Shamir's Likud in 1984. Peres and Shamir even "rotated" the post of prime minister. Though the government was incapable of any meaningful diplomatic advances, on which it was divided, it succeeded in tackling hugely important challenges in the economy—bringing inflation down from an annual rate of over 444 percent (not a typo) in 1984, and in defense—extricating Israel from most of Lebanon, following the first Israeli Lebanon War. 

What would be the logic this time? Herzog was promising three things to his party members: a host of portfolios (jobs and titles but also influence on a range of domestic policy issues); a veto on some aspects of policy which Labor finds most damaging, including remote settlement construction and legislation seen as limiting democratic discourse in Israel; and a leading role in any negotiations with the Palestinians, staring with the French peace conference. 

The jobs for Labor would have been real. A veto on policy could have been important—Tzipi Livni, Herzog's non-Labor partner in the Zionist Union, played a crucial role in protecting democratic norms as minister of justice in Netanyahu's previous government. 

On peace, however, Herzog was offering fool's gold. Put it this way: if you think Herzog would have real autonomy to run negotiations with the Palestinians while Netanyahu is prime minister, I have two suggestions. First, ask Tzipi Livni, who had that exact task in the previous government and was accompanied to every negotiation by Netanyahu’s personal lawyer, Yitzhak Molcho. Livni, incidentally, was strongly opposed to joining Netanyahu this time around. 

Second, I have some great real-estate in a swamp in Florida I'd like to discuss with you.

Herzog had a political rationale as well. He is a natural minister and backroom politician: smart, hardworking and prone to pragmatic compromises. He is not a natural public politician. As Leader of the Opposition he has wowed no one with his charisma or ability to stand up to Netanyahu and offer a bold alternative. Better to be in the halls of power than in the open arena. With the prospects of a fierce leadership challenge in his own Labor Party, moreover, he would have bolstered his bona fides as a national leader and therefore give himself a bit more time—the most a politician in Israel can really hope for. 

If there was a political benefit to Herzog personally, the outlook for his Labor Party would have been dismal.

If there was a political benefit to Herzog personally, the outlook for his Labor Party would have been dismal. Having joined Netanyahu, it would have been very hard to present the party as an alternative to his rule. 

What now?

Netanyahu can now feel slightly more secure in his coalition, though once again at the mercy of the mercurial Lieberman. Lieberman will enjoy a powerful post that usually bestows its occupant with new popularity in Israel (the converse is true of the finance ministry). Finance Minister Moshe Kahlon will enjoy a wider coalition to pass his domestic legislation and budget; indeed he'd been pushing for enlarging the coalition since it was formed. 

In the opposition, Herzog is weaker than ever. After being led on by Netanyahu for months, breaking his own word on the negotiations and then losing his gamble, he is severely exposed to challenges within Labor. His party's image has taken a serious hit as well.

Herzog's weakness will allow others in the opposition to claim the mantle of alternative to Netanyahu. Already, Yair Lapid’s centrist Yesh Atid party is the main beneficiary, but others may emerge as well, especially from the ranks of former generals like Gabi Ashkenazi. 

Most importantly, Israel's actual policy may be affected significantly by this move. Of all the governmental posts, defense is the one that has the most effect on the crucial questions of security for Israelis (and on the daily lives of Palestinians). Instead of grand peace plans Herzog was selling, Netanyahu's political brilliance has wrought one of the most hardline governments Israel has ever had.

Event Information

Under the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act (FDAAA) of 2007, the FDA has the authority to require pharmaceutical manufacturers to develop Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS) for drugs or biologics that carry serious potential or known risks. Since that time, the REMS program has become an important tool in ensuring that riskier drugs are used safely, and it has allowed FDA to facilitate access to a host of drugs that may not otherwise have been approved. However, concerns have arisen regarding the effects of REMS programs on patient access to products, as well as the undue burden that the requirements place on the health care system. In response to these concerns, FDA has initiated reform efforts aimed at improving the standardization, assessment, and integration of REMS within the health care system. As part of this broader initiative, the agency is pursuing four priority projects, one of which focuses on improving provider-patient benefit-risk counseling for drugs that have a REMS attached.

Under a cooperative agreement with FDA, the Center for Health Policy at Brookings held an expert workshop on July 24 titled, “Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS): Building a Framework for Effective Patient Counseling on Medication Risks and Benefits”. This workshop was the first in a series of convening activities that will seek input from stakeholders across academia, industry, health systems, and patient advocacy groups, among others. Through these activities, Brookings and FDA will further develop and refine an evidence-based framework of best practices and principles that can be used to inform the development and effective use of REMS tools and processes.

Event Materials

• REMS_PBRC_Meeting_Agenda
• REMS BR Speaker Bios
• REMS BenefitRisk Meeting Summary
• REMS BenefitRisk communication white paper

Overview

Increasing educational attainment is likely to reduce conflict risk, especially in countries like Pakistan that have very low levels of primary and secondary school enrollment. Education quality, relevance and content also have a role to play in mitigating violence. Education reform must therefore be a higher priority for all stakeholders interested in a more peaceful and stable Pakistan. Debate within the country about education reform should not be left only to education policymakers and experts, but ought to figure front and center in national dialogues about how to foster security. The price of ignoring Pakistan’s education challenges is simply too great in a country where half the population is under the age of 17.

There has been much debate concerning the roots of militancy in Pakistan, and multiple factors clearly come into play. One risk factor that has attracted much attention both inside Pakistan and abroad is the dismal state of the national education sector. Despite recent progress, current school attainment and literacy levels remain strikingly low, as does education spending. The Pakistani education sector, like much of the country’s public infrastructure, has been in decline over recent decades. The question of how limited access to quality education may contribute to militancy in Pakistan is more salient now than ever, given the rising national and international security implications of continued violence.

The second half of 2009 witnessed not only the Pakistani government stepping up action against insurgents but also the release of a new Pakistan National Education Policy that aspires to far-reaching and important reforms, including a commitment to increase investment in education—from 2 to 7 percent of gross domestic product. Hundreds of millions of dollars in international education aid have been newly pledged by donor countries. This renewed emphasis on education represents a substantial opportunity to seek to improve security in Pakistan and potentially also globally over the medium to long term. Policymakers both inside and outside Pakistan should give careful consideration to whether and how education investments can promote peace and stability, taking into account what we now know about the state of the education sector and the roots of militancy.

This report takes a fresh look at the connection between schools, including but not limited to Pakistan’s religious seminaries, known as “madrasas,” and the rising militancy across the country. Poor school performance across Pakistan would seem an obvious area of inquiry as a risk factor for conflict. Yet to date, the focus has been almost exclusively on madrasas and their role in the mounting violence. Outside Pakistan, relatively little attention has been given to whether and how the education sector as a whole may be fueling violence, over and above the role of the minority of militant madrasas.

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INTRODUCTION

In August, 2010 the government of Kenya adopted a new constitution. This followed a referendum in which an overwhelming majority of Kenyans voted for change. The decisive impetus for reform came from the widespread violence and political crisis that followed the 2007 election. While claims of electoral fraud provided the immediate catalyst for violence, the deeper causes were to be found in the interaction of a highly centralized ‘winner-take-all’ political system with deep social disparities based in part on group identity (Hanson 2008).

Provisions for equity figure prominently in the new constitution. Backed by a bill of rights that opens the door to legal enforcement, citizenship rights have been strengthened in many areas,including access to basic services. ‘Equitable sharing’ has been introduced as a guiding principle for public spending. National and devolved governments are now constitutionally required to redress social disparities, target disadvantaged areas and provide affirmative action for marginalized groups.

Translating these provisions into tangible outcomes will not be straightforward. Equity is a principle that would be readily endorsed by most policymakers in Kenya and Kenya’s citizens have provided their own endorsement through the referendum. However, there is an ongoing debate over what the commitment to equity means in practice, as well as over the pace and direction of reform. Much of that debate has centered on the constitutional injunction requiring ‘equitable sharing’ in public spending.

On most measures of human development, Kenya registers average outcomes considerably above those for sub-Saharan Africa as a region. Yet the national average masks extreme disparities—and the benefits of increased prosperity have been unequally shared.

There are compelling grounds for a strengthened focus on equity in Kenya. In recent years, the country has maintained a respectable, if less than spectacular, record on economic growth. Social indicators are also on an upward trend. On most measures of human development, Kenya registers average outcomes considerably above those for sub-Saharan Africa as a region. Yet the national average masks extreme disparities—and the benefits of increased prosperity have been unequally shared. Some regions and social groups face levels of deprivation that rank alongside the worst in Africa. Moreover, the deep fault lines running through society are widely perceived as a source of injustice and potential political instability.

High levels of inequality in Kenya raise wider concerns. There has been a tendency in domestic debates to see ‘equitable sharing’ as a guiding principle for social justice, rather than as a condition for accelerated growth and enhanced economic efficiency. Yet international evidence strongly suggests that extreme inequality—especially in opportunities for education— is profoundly damaging for economic growth. It follows that redistributive public spending has the potential to support growth.

The current paper focuses on a group of 12 counties located in Kenya’s Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASALs). They are among the most disadvantaged in the country. Most are characterized by high levels of income poverty, chronic food insecurity and acute deprivation across a wide range of social indicators.

Nowhere is the deprivation starker than in education. The ASAL counties account for a disproportionately large share of Kenya’s out-of-school children, pointing to problems in access and school retention. Gender disparities in education are among the widest in the country. Learning outcomes for the small number of children who get through primary school are for the most part abysmal, even by the generally low national average standards.

Unequal public spending patterns have played no small part in creating the disparities that separate the ASAL counties from the rest of Kenya—and ‘equitable sharing’ could play a role in closing the gap. But what would a more equitable approach to public spending look like in practice?

This paper addresses that question. It looks in some detail at education for two reasons. First, good quality education is itself a powerful motor of enhanced equity. It has the potential to equip children and youth with the skills and competencies that they need to break out of cycles of poverty and to participate more fully in national prosperity. If Kenya is to embark on a more equitable pattern of development, there are strong grounds for prioritizing the creation of more equal opportunities in education. Second, the education sector illustrates many of the wider challenges and debates that Kenya’s policymakers will have to address as they seek to translate constitutional provisions into public spending strategies. In particular, it highlights the importance of weighting for indicators that reflect need in designing formulae for budget allocations.

Our broad conclusion is that, while Kenya clearly needs to avoid public spending reforms that jeopardize service delivery in wealthier counties, redistributive measures are justified on the grounds of efficiency and equity.

The paper is organized as follows. Part 1 provides an overview of the approach to equity enshrined in the constitution. While the spirit of the constitution is unequivocal, the letter is open to a vast array of interpretations. We briefly explore the implications of a range of approaches. Our broad conclusion is that, while Kenya clearly needs to avoid public spending reforms that jeopardize service delivery in wealthier counties, redistributive measures are justified on the grounds of efficiency and equity. Although this paper focuses principally on basic services, we caution against approaches that treat equity as a matter of social sector financing to the exclusion of growth-oriented productive investment.

Part 2 provides an analysis of some key indicators on poverty, health and nutrition. Drawing on household expenditure data, the report locates the 12 ASAL counties in the national league table for the incidence and depth of poverty. Data on health outcomes and access to basic services provide another indicator of the state of human development. While there are some marked variations across counties and indicators, most of the 12 counties register levels of deprivation in poverty and basic health far in excess of those found in other areas.

Part 3 shifts the focus to education. Over the past decade, Kenya has made considerable progress in improving access to basic education. Enrollment rates in primary education have increased sharply since the elimination of school fees in 2003. Transition rates to secondary school are also rising. The record on learning achievement is less impressive. While Kenya lacks a comprehensive national learning assessment, survey evidence points to systemic problems in education quality. In both access and learning, children in the ASAL counties—especially female children—are at a considerable disadvantage. After setting out the national picture, the paper explores the distinctive problems facing these counties.

In Part 4 we look beyond Kenya to wider international experience. Many countries have grappled with the challenge of reducing disparities between less-favored and more-favored regions. There are no blueprints on offer. However, there are some useful lessons and guidelines that may be of some relevance to the policy debate in Kenya. The experience of South Africa may be particularly instructive given the weight attached to equity in the post-apartheid constitution.

Part 5 of the paper explores a range of approaches to financial allocations. Converting constitutional principle into operational practice will require the development of formulae-based approaches. From an equitable financing perspective there is no perfect model. Any formula that is adopted will involve trade-offs between different goals. Policymakers have to determine what weight to attach to different dimensions of equity (for example, gender, income, education and health), the time frame for achieving stated policy goals, and whether to frame targets in terms of outcomes or inputs. These questions go beyond devolved financing. The Kenyan constitution is unequivocal in stipulating that the ‘equitable sharing’ provision applies to all public spending. We therefore undertake a series of formula-based exercises illustrating the allocation patterns that would emerge under different formulae, with specific reference to the 12 ASAL focus counties and to education.

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May’s jobs gains, released this morning, show that only 38,000 new jobs were added this May, down from an average of 178,000 over the first four months of the year, and the least new jobs added since September 2010.

This year’s monthly job gains and losses can indicate how the economy is doing once they are corrected to account for the pattern we already expect in a process called seasonal adjustment. The approach for this seasonal adjustment that is presently used by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) puts very heavy weight on the current and last two years of data in assessing what are the typical patterns for each month.

In my paper “Unseasonal Seasonals?” I argue that a longer window should be used to estimate seasonal effects. I found that using a different seasonal filter, known as the 3x9 filter, produces better results and more accurate forecasts by emphasizing more years of data. The 3x9 filter spreads weight over the most recent six years in estimating seasonal patterns, which makes them more stable over time than in the current BLS seasonal adjustment method.

I calculate the month-over-month change in total nonfarm payrolls, seasonally adjusted by the 3x9 filter, for the most recent month. The corresponding data as published by the BLS are shown for comparison purposes. According to the alternative seasonal adjustment, the economy actually lost about 4,000 jobs in May (column Wright SA), compared to the official BLS total of 38,000 gained (column BLS Official).

In addition to seasonal effects, abnormal weather can also affect month-to-month fluctuations in job growth. In my paper “Weather-Adjusting Economic Data” I and my coauthor Michael Boldin implement a statistical methodology for adjusting employment data for the effects of deviations in weather from seasonal norms. This is distinct from seasonal adjustment, which only controls for the normal variation in weather across the year. We use several indicators of weather, including temperature and snowfall.

We calculate that weather in May had a negligible effect on employment, bringing up the total by only 4,000 jobs (column Weather Effect). Our weather-adjusted total, therefore, is 34,000 jobs added for May (column Boldin-Wright SWA). This is not surprising, given that weather in May was in line with seasonal norms.

Unfortunately, neither the alternative seasonal adjustment, nor the weather adjustment, makes todays jobs report any more hopeful. They make little difference and, if anything, make the picture more gloomy.

a. Applies a longer window estimate of seasonal effects (see Wright 2013).
b. Includes seasonal and weather adjustments, where seasonal adjustments are estimated using the BLS window specifications (see Boldin & Wright 2015). The incremental weather effect in the last column is the BLS official number less the SWA number.

Editor’s note: In the "Becoming Brilliant" blog series, experts explore the six competencies that reflect how children learn and grow as laid out by Kathy Hirsh-Pasek and Roberta Golinkoff in their new book "Becoming Brilliant."

The world is morphing into a place that no one can foresee. How can we prepare students to live and work in that place?

Not long ago, people could learn job skills and use them indefinitely, but now jobs and skill sets are becoming obsolete at an alarming rate. This means that students, and later adults, need to expect and thrive on challenges and know how to turn failures into stepping stones to a brighter future.

When I was a beginning researcher I wanted to see how children coped with setbacks, so I gave 5th graders simple problems followed by hard problems—ones they couldn’t solve. Some hated the hard ones, some tolerated them, but, to my surprise, some relished them. One unforgettable child rubbed his hands together, smacked his lips, and declared, “I love a challenge!” Another said, “I was hoping this would be informative.” They didn’t think they were failing, they thought they were learning. Although this was years ago, they were already 21st century kids.

I knew then that I had to figure out their secret and, if possible, bottle it. With help from my graduate students, figure it out we did. And we are learning how to bottle it too. 

So, what was their secret?

Our research has shown that these children tend to have a “growth mindset.” They believe that their basic abilities, even their intelligence, can be developed through learning. That’s why they love challenges and remain confident through setbacks. Their more vulnerable counterparts, however, have more of a “fixed mindset.” They believe their basic abilities are just fixed—set in stone­. So their key goal is to look and feel smart (and never dumb). To accomplish this they often seek easy over hard tasks. And when they do encounter setbacks, they tend to feel inept and lose confidence. Research shows that even exerting effort can make them feel unintelligent. If you’re really good at something, they believe, you shouldn’t have to work at it.

These mindsets make a difference. In one study we tracked hundreds of students across the difficult transition to seventh grade, akin to entering a new world with harder work, higher standards, and a whole new structure. Those who entered with more of a growth mindset (the belief that they could develop their intelligence) fared better. Their math grades quickly jumped ahead of those of students with a fixed mindset and the gap became wider and wider over the next two years. This was true even though the two groups entered with equivalent past achievement test scores.

Recently, we were able to study all the 10th-graders in the country of Chile. We found that at every socioeconomic level students with a growth mindset were outperforming their peers with a fixed mindset. What was most striking was that when the poorest students held growth mindsets they were performing at the level of far richer students with fixed mindsets.

What’s exciting is that we have been able to teach a growth mindset to students through carefully designed workshops. In these workshops, students learn that their brain can grow new, stronger connections when they take on hard learning tasks and stick to them. They learn to avoid categorical smart-dumb thinking and instead focus on their own improvement over time. They hear from other students who have benefitted from learning a growth mindset. And they learn how to apply growth mindset thinking to their schoolwork. In these workshops students also do exercises, such as mentoring a struggling peer using what they learned about the growth mindset. Such workshops have been delivered both in person and online and have typically led to an increase in students’ motivation and achievement, particularly among students who are encountering challenges—such as difficult courses, school transitions, or negative stereotypes.

We have also studied how teachers and parents can foster a growth mindset in children. Sadly, many do not—even many of those who hold a growth mindset themselves! This is because adults, in their eagerness to motivate children and build their confidence, can tend to do things that foster a fixed mindset.

Here is what we’ve found:

• Praising children’s intelligence conveys that intelligence is fixed and promotes a fixed mindset and its vulnerabilities. Praising the children’s learning process—their strategies, hard work, and focus—and linking it to their progress conveys a growth mindset.

• Reacting to children’s failures with anxiety, false reassurances, or comfort for their lesser ability (“Don’t worry, not everyone can be good at math”) can foster a fixed mindset. Reacting with compassionate questions and plans for future learning conveys a growth mindset.

• Research shows that how math teachers react to their students when the students are stuck is critical. Teachers can help students develop growth mindsets by sitting with them, trying to understand their thinking, and then collaborating with them on how to move forward and what to try next.

But how can teachers themselves develop more of a growth mindset?

In some quarters, a growth mindset became a “requirement.” This led many educators to claim a growth mindset without really understanding what it is or how to develop it. We have suggested that educators understand, first, that a growth mindset is the belief that everyone can develop their abilities. It is not simply about being open-minded or flexible. Second, they must understand that all people have both mindsets and that many situations, such as struggles or setbacks, can trigger a fixed mindset. Finally, they must learn how their own fixed mindset is triggered so that they can work to stay in a growth mindset more often.

As we prepare students to thrive in the new world, we can influence whether they see that world as overwhelming and threatening or whether they greet it with the confident words “I love a challenge.” The latter are the ones who can make the world, whatever it’s like, a better place.  

Issuing work permits to refugees in return for donor support for jobs is seen as a “win-win-win” for refugees, host countries, and the international community. It would stem the flow of refugees to Europe, decrease the dangers of radicalization, and prevent the exploitation of refugees as a source of cheap labor. At last February’s “Supporting Syria and the Region” conference co-hosted by the U.K., Germany, Kuwait, Norway, and the United Nations, former British Foreign Secretary David Miliband called for a million work permits to be made available to Syrians, 200,000 each in Jordan and Lebanon and 600,000 in Turkey.

Turkey issued a decree in January 2016 allowing work permits for Syrians. Jordan also agreed to provide work permits for up to 200,000 Syrians over a number of years in exchange for aid and the opening of European markets to goods produced or special economic zones—all this to lead to jobs for one million Jordanians as well when other aid and spending is added in. Lebanon, whose fragile confessional politics makes the one million plus Sunni refugees a more palpable threat, has chosen not to issue work permits. Yet, according to the International Labor Organization (ILO), “around half of (working age) Syrian refugees are economically active and just one-third have access to overwhelmingly informal and low-skilled employment.” That’s around 165, 000 employed informally. The number is around 160,000 in Jordan  with 1.3 million Syrians and over 400,000 in Turkey with 2.7 million Syrian refugees.  

In Turkey and Jordan, as elsewhere, work permits are tied to employers who apply on behalf of employees once residency, registration, and health requirements are met. In both countries, employers must pay the legal minimum wage and social security payments. The permits are renewed annually. But, for the majority of Syrians working in labor markets with an abundance of local and foreign low-skill, low-wage workers, the pay is nowhere near the minimum wage. As to the promised jobs in the special zones, those will take time to materialize, and we already know that, at least in the garment sector, up to 80 percent of the workers are young women from South Asia, largely residing in dorms but at least receiving the minimum wage. Whether Syrians can adapt to this model remains to be seen. In both Jordan and Turkey, there are certain limits on the percentage of Syrians versus locals in many manufacturing and services jobs; in Jordan there is some evidence that “ghost” Jordanian workers are used to get around this requirement.

Jordan already has over 240,000 foreign workers, mainly Egyptians and Asians, who have work permits, with the total number including those working illegally may be as high as a million. There is a move to get Syrians to replace the foreign workers with permits but that seems a bit uncertain. It seems unlikely that employers will be eager to replace employees, often of long standing and for whom they have gone to the expense of getting work permits.  In Turkey, with fewer foreign workers, many locals work informally, though they tend to get paid significantly more than Syrians. The chances of employers hiking up wages to legalize Syrian employees, whether in Jordan or Turkey, are slim and the record to date appears to confirm this.   

In Jordan, the government provided a three-month grace period for workers to receive permits free of charge. Less than 2,000 permits had been granted by April. An ILO survey in Jordan, which looked at workers in the construction and agriculture sectors, noted that while 90 percent of workers had heard about the grace period, none in the agriculture sector and only 85 percent in construction had work permits, though almost all knew that getting caught might mean detention at the Azraq refugee camp. And an inability to pay social security constituted a major barrier. Often a concern is to go through employers to get the permit.  

In Turkey, the numbers are not encouraging either: By May, only 10,000 had actually registered for work permits. Refugees International reports that Turkey’s work permit program may end up benefitting 40,000 Syrians or roughly 10 percent of those actually working. The government, though, thinks that the program will eventually help all those currently working informally.

The ILO, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and Refugees’ International have praised the Jordanian and Turkish governments for granting work permits. The decision was not easy and was politically charged in both countries. But the political and psychological significance of providing an opening for Syrians to slowly integrate themselves and move towards a stable future is certainly worth pursuing, even if it doesn’t bring immediate rewards. Already, Turkey allows Syrian doctors and medical personnel to work in health centers serving refugees. Over 4000 Syrian teachers have received stipends from a Ministry of Education program funded by UNICEF and western donors. And agricultural workers no longer need work permits so long as provincial governors give their approval.

Eventually delinking work permits from employers will help, and the ILO urges Jordan to do so for agricultural and construction workers. In both Jordan and Turkey, lowering social security payments would also smooth the transition. More support to vocational training, health care, education for children are other ideas being pursued. While making work permits available is not the same as a blanket “right-to-work” law for refugees, a right protected under the U.N. 1951 Refugee Convention but accepted in full neither by Jordan nor Turkey (however, the key international treaty that protects the right to work in binding form is the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to which Jordan and Turkey are signatories), this is an opening and one that the international community should monitor and support. Aside from the February conference, other agreements—such as the one between the EU and Turkey and the upcoming EU deal with Lebanon and Jordan—provide suitable platforms towards improving on this initial phase.   

Unlike prime-age Americans, who have experienced declines in employment and labor force participation since the onset of the Great Recession, Americans past 60 have seen their employment and labor force participation rates increase.

In order to understand the contrasting labor force developments among the old, on the one hand, and the prime-aged, on the other, this paper develops and analyzes a new data file containing information on monthly labor force changes of adults interviewed in the Current Population Survey (CPS).

The paper documents notable differences among age groups with respect to the changes in labor force transition rates that have occurred over the past two decades. What is crucial for understanding the surprising strength of old-age labor force participation and employment are changes in labor force transition probabilities within and across age groups. The paper identifies several shifts that help account for the increase in old-age employment and labor force participation:

• Like workers in all age groups, workers in older groups saw a surge in monthly transitions from employment to unemployment in the Great Recession.
• Unlike workers in prime-age and younger groups, however, older workers also saw a sizeable decline in exits to nonparticipation during and after the recession. While the surge in exits from employment to unemployment tended to reduce the employment rates of all age groups, the drop in employment exits to nonparticipation among the aged tended to hold up labor force participation rates and employment rates among the elderly compared with the nonelderly. Among the elderly, but not the nonelderly, the exit rate from employment into nonparticipation fell more than the exit rate from employment into unemployment increased.
• The Great Recession and slow recovery from that recession made it harder for the unemployed to transition into employment. Exit rates from unemployment into employment fell sharply in all age groups, old and young.
• In contrast to unemployed workers in younger age groups, the unemployed in the oldest age groups also saw a drop in their exits to nonparticipation. Compared with the nonaged, this tended to help maintain the labor force participation rates of the old.
• Flows from out-of-the-labor-force status into employment have declined for most age groups, but they have declined the least or have actually increased modestly among older nonparticipants.

Some of the favorable trends seen in older age groups are likely to be explained, in part, by the substantial improvement in older Americans’ educational attainment. Better educated older people tend to have lower monthly flows from employment into unemployment and nonparticipation, and they have higher monthly flows from nonparticipant status into employment compared with less educated workers.

The policy implications of the paper are:

• A serious recession inflicts severe and immediate harm on workers and potential workers in all age groups, in the form of layoffs and depressed prospects for finding work.
• Unlike younger age groups, however, workers in older groups have high rates of voluntary exit from employment and the workforce, even when labor markets are strong. Consequently, reduced rates of voluntary exit from employment and the labor force can have an outsize impact on their employment and participation rates.
• The aged, as a whole, can therefore experience rising employment and participation rates even as a minority of aged workers suffer severe harm as a result of permanent job loss at an unexpectedly early age and exceptional difficulty finding a new job.
• Between 2001 and 2015, the old-age employment and participation rates rose, apparently signaling that older workers did not suffer severe harm in the Great Recession.
• Analysis of the gross flow data suggests, however, that the apparent improvements were the combined result of continued declines in age-specific voluntary exit rates, mostly from the ranks of the employed, and worsening reemployment rates among the unemployed. The older workers who suffered involuntary layoffs were more numerous than before the Great Recession, and they found it much harder to get reemployed than laid off workers in years before 2008. The turnover data show that it has proved much harder for these workers to recover from the loss of their late-career job loss.

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An economic analysis of a sample of neighborhoods in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area using walkability measures finds that:

• More walkable places perform better economically. For neighborhoods within metropolitan Washington, as the number of environmental features that facilitate walkability and attract pedestrians increase, so do office, residential, and retail rents, retail revenues, and for-sale residential values.

• Walkable places benefit from being near other walkable places. On average, walkable neighborhoods in metropolitan Washington that cluster and form walkable districts exhibit higher rents and home values than stand-alone walkable places.

• Residents of more walkable places have lower transportation costs and higher transit access, but also higher housing costs. Residents of more walkable neighborhoods in metropolitan Washington generally spend around 12 percent of their income on transportation and 30 percent on housing. In comparison, residents of places with fewer environmental features that encourage walkability spend around 15 percent on transportation and 18 percent on housing.

• Residents of places with poor walkability are generally less affluent and have lower educational attainment than places with good walkability. Places with more walkability features have also become more gentrified over the past decade. However, there is no significant difference in terms of transit access to jobs between poor and good walkable places.

The findings of this study offer useful insights for a diverse set of interests. Lenders, for example, should find cause to integrate walkability into their underwriting standards. Developers and investors should consider walkability when assessing prospects for the region and acquiring property. Local and regional planning agencies should incorporate assessments of walkability into their strategic economic development plans and eliminate barriers to walkable development. Finally, private foundations and government agencies that provide funding to further sustainability practices should consider walkability (especially as it relates to social equity) when allocating funds and incorporate such measures into their accountability standards.

The Great Recession highlighted the need to change the prevailing real estate development paradigm, particularly in housing. High-risk financial products and practices, “teaser” underwriting terms, steadily low-interest rates, and speculation in housing were some of the most significant contributors to the housing bubble and burst that catalyzed the recession. But an oversupply of residential housing also fueled the economic crisis.

However, a closer look at the post-recession housing numbers paints a more nuanced picture. While U.S. home values dropped steadily between 2008 and 2011, distant suburbs experienced the starkest price decreases while more close-in neighborhoods either held steady or in some cases saw price increases. This distinction in housing proximity is particularly important since it appears that the United States may be at the beginning of a structural real estate market shift. Emerging evidence points to a preference for mixed-use, compact, amenity-rich, transit-accessible neighborhoods or walkable places.

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Exactly one year after U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry’s last multi-country tour of sub-Saharan Africa, he is preparing for another visit to the continent—to Kenya and Djibouti from May 3 to 5, 2015. In Kenya, Kerry and a U.S. delegation including Linda Thomas-Greenfield, assistant secretary of state for African affairs, will engage in talks with senior Kenyan officials on U.S.-Kenya security cooperation, which the U.S. formalized through its Security Governance Initiative (SGI) at the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit last August. Over the past several years, the U.S. has increased its military assistance to Kenya and African Union (AU) troops to combat the Somali extremist group al-Shabab and has conducted targeted drone strikes against the group’s top leaders.  In the wake of the attack on Kenya’s Garissa University by al-Shabab, President Obama pledged U.S. support for Kenya, and Foreign Minister Amina Mohamed has stated that Kenya is currently seeking additional assistance from the U.S. to strengthen its military and intelligence capabilities.

Kerry will also meet with a wide array of leaders from Kenya’s private sector, civil society, humanitarian organizations, and political opposition regarding the two countries’ “common goals, including accelerating economic growth, strengthening democratic institutions, and improving regional security,” according to a U.S. State Department spokesperson. These meetings are expected to build the foundation for President Obama’s trip to Kenya for the Global Entrepreneurship Summit in July of this year.

On Tuesday, May 5, Kerry will become the first sitting secretary of state to travel to Djibouti. There, he will meet with government officials regarding the evacuation of civilians from Yemen and also visit Camp Lemonnier, the U.S. military base from which it coordinates its counterterror operations in the Horn of Africa region.

This week saw the proliferation of anti-government street demonstrations as current President Pierre Nkurunziza declared his candidacy for a third term, after being in office for ten years.  The opposition has deemed this move as “unconstitutional” and in violation of the 2006 Arusha peace deal which ended the civil war. Since the announcement, hundreds of civilians took to the streets of Bujumbura, despite a strong military presence. At least six people have been killed in clashes between police forces and civilians. 

Since the protests erupted, leading human rights activist Pierre-Claver Mbonimpa has been arrested alongside more than 200 protesters. One of Burundi’s main independent radio stations was also suspended as they were covering the protests.  On Wednesday, the government blocked social media platforms, including Twitter and Facebook, declaring them important tools in implementing and organizing protests. Thursday, amid continuing political protests, Burundi closed its national university and students were sent home. 

Amid the recent protests, Burundi’s constitutional court will examine the president’s third term bid. Meanwhile, U.N. secretary general Ban Ki-moon has sent his special envoy for the Great Lakes Region to hold a dialogue with president Nkurunziza and other government authorities. Senior U.S. diplomat Tom Malinowski also arrived in Bujumbura on Thursday to help defuse the biggest crisis the country has seen in the last few years, expressing disappointment over Nkurunziza’s decision to run for a third term.

Since the early 2000s, China has become an increasingly significant source of financing for African infrastructure projects, as noted in a recent Brookings paper, “Financing African infrastructure: Can the world deliver?” This week, observers have seen an additional spike in African infrastructure investments from Chinese firms, as three major railway, real estate, and other infrastructure deals were struck on the continent, totaling nearly $7.5 billion in investments.

On Monday, April 27, the state-owned China Railway Construction Corp announced that it will construct a $3.5 billion railway line in Nigeria, as well as a $1.9 billion real estate project in Zimbabwe. Then on Wednesday, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (one of the country’s largest lenders) signed a $2 billion deal with the government of Equatorial Guinea in order to carry out a number of infrastructure projects throughout the country. These deals align with China’s “One Belt, One Road” strategy of building infrastructure in Africa and throughout the developing world in order to further integrate their economies, stimulate economic growth, and ultimately increase demand for Chinese exports. For more insight into China’s infrastructure lending in Africa and the implications of these investments for the region’s economies, please see the following piece by Africa Growth Initiative Nonresident Fellow Yun Sun: “Inserting Africa into China’s One Belt, One Road strategy: A new opportunity for jobs and infrastructure?”

What if I told you I’d found a surefire way to decrease community involvement in our local schools while at the same time increasing the costs of providing education for taxpayers? Probably not a political winner, eh? And yet, for well over 100 years we’ve adopted such an approach to governing America’s public schools.

I’m talking of course, about the widespread and increasingly questionable practice of local school district governments holding their school board elections “off-cycle” so that they are contested apart from regular national elections.

Just how significant and widespread are “off-cycle” school board elections? And what are the consequences of using off-cycle elections for the tone and direction of education policy? UC Berkeley Political Scientist Sarah Anzia recently penned a terrific book examining the causes and consequences of off-cycle elections in American politics in which she finds that 90 percent of states hold at least some municipal races apart from major national elections and three quarters of states do so for school board elections. Data from the National School Boards Association seem to confirm Anzia’s descriptive account on the prevalence of these elections.

By exploiting the occasional episode in which a change in state law forced localities to move their elections “on cycle,” Anzia is able to provide some pretty rigorous causal evidence that off-cycle elections decrease voter turnout and equip organized interests (e.g. teachers unions) to obtain more favorable policy outcomes. Anzia’s findings mesh nicely with other work done by University of Pennsylvania Political Scientist, Marc Meredith, who found that when school boards are given the authority to choose election dates for raising revenue (e.g. bond elections) boards will “manipulate” the timing of elections in predictable ways to ensure an electorate that is most favorable to increased school spending.

"While most citizens are tuned into the presidential primary contests this year, the important reality is that thousands of school board members will be 'elected' by tiny and unrepresentative electorates prior to next November’s general election."

While most citizens are tuned into the presidential primary contests this year, the important reality is that thousands of school board members will be “elected” by tiny and unrepresentative electorates prior to next November’s general election. This isn’t an accident or an oversight. The helpless position of today’s “education voter” is a predictable consequence of Progressive era reforms that sought to “take politics out of education.” As Columbia Professor, Jeffrey Henig, explains in his insightful and wide-ranging book, The End of Exceptionalism in American Education, the widespread use of single-purpose governments that are insulated from the electorate has been a hallmark of American school governance that is only recently beginning to come undone.

Advocates of off-cycle elections sometimes contend that holding school elections apart from major federal elections helps foster a more informed electorate. But shouldn’t the onus be on those who defend off-cycle elections to demonstrate better outcomes in districts that cling to a policy that often results in higher costs to taxpayers and diminishes small-d democracy. Of course it’s fair and important to ask, “How much democracy is good for our schools?” However, there are at least three reasons to be skeptical that the benefits of using “off-cycle” elections outweigh the costs:

First, I’m unaware of any scholarly evidence that the voters who participate in off-cycle elections are significantly more informed than the electorates participating in on-cycle elections. More importantly, I am not aware of any scholarly research that demonstrates a linkage between off-cycle elections and better student achievement outcomes. To the contrary, my friend and collaborator Arnie Shober (Lawrence University) and I found a strong association between a district’s relative academic performance and the use of on-cycle elections in a 2014 analysis that we undertook for the Fordham Institute. Although that report could not establish any causal relationship between on-cycle elections and better student achievement (clearly we could not randomly assign on-cycle elections), the fact that we found a positive correlation between on-cycle school board elections and a district’s academic performance arguably puts the ball back in the court of those who would prefer diminished citizen participation and higher fiscal costs.

Second, on the subject of higher costs, consider the takeaway from a recent piece in Governing Magazine that quotes Rice University Political Scientist and local elections expert, Melissa Marschall.  It paraphrases Marschall, saying “There's no doubt about it. Holding concurrent elections is bound to increase turnout…Holding elections less frequently should save them [local governments] money.” In short, even if some benefits (a marginally more informed electorate?) could in theory be demonstrated, one would also need to account for known costs: lower citizen participation and more frequent elections that school districts cannot piggyback onto national or statewide elections.

Third and finally, as Eitan Hersh explains in a hard-hitting recent post on FiveThirtyEight, there’s more than a tinge of hypocrisy when it comes to those who defend off-cycle elections. Ironically, while the Democratic Party and organized labor often advocate for policies that enhance workplace democracy and reduce barriers to voter participation (i.e., opposing voter ID laws, supporting same day registration and vote by mail), these two groups have, according to Hersh, led the charge to retain off-cycle school board elections that all but assure lower and more unrepresentative turnout.  

Admittedly, there’s no perfect approach to governing American K-12 education. And, governance “reform” is hardly a panacea for improving our schools. Nonetheless, as Noel Epstein wisely observed in her 2004 volume, Who’s in Charge Here?, when education governance is fragmented ordinary citizens are challenged to hold policy-makers accountable because it is difficult for the public to mobilize and readily identify which political authority or authorities are responsible. The bottom line: we don’t do the electorate any additional favors by purposefully staggering school board races across multiple off-year election cycles. Consolidating the school election calendar is a small, but nonetheless sensible step in the right direction.  

According to multiple press reports, European Union leaders are poised to choose Italy’s Foreign Minister Federica Mogherini as the EU’s next foreign policy chief at a summit on Saturday. A previous summit to discuss the position ended in deadlock in July when the Baltics and several Eastern European states objected to Mogherini due to concerns that she was too soft on Russia and lacked foreign policy experience, as she has only been in her position since January.

Now decision day has arrived and Italy’s Prime Minister Matteo Renzi is determined to push her candidacy through even if some disagree. As one EU diplomat told the Financial Times, “You still have a group of countries who will be quite unsatisfied, but they don’t have a blocking minority.” In a comment that could have been made by Stringer Bell in “The Wire,” Italian Minister Sandro Gozi previewed this strategy in July, saying, “The possibility of a majority vote ... is part of the game and cannot be ruled out.”

This highly consequential foreign policy decision is being made on the basis of criteria that have nothing to do with foreign policy. No one claims that Mogherini is the best person to deal with Russia but asking who is is not seen as a relevant question. The sharing of the spoils of several top jobs between the parties means that it must go to a socialist and Europe’s socialist leaders want to help Renzi. There is pressure to appoint a woman because EU leaders have failed to nominate women for other top posts or for the rest of the commission. Merkel had concerns but she is apparently willing to let it slide if it means stopping Italy from diluting the EU’s budget rules. Others are doing their own deals. The bottom line is that foreign policy is almost entirely absent from the discussion.

In normal times, this would be a bit unseemly but not outrageous. These are not normal times however. It is easily forgotten in Rome and Paris but Russia poses a real and near-term threat to some EU members—Latvia, Estonia and maybe even Lithuania. These states have asked for more assistance and support from their allies in NATO and from other EU members. They are deeply concerned by Mogherini’s nomination. Italy has strong economic ties with Russia and has frequently opposed tougher sanctions. Mogherini’s visit to Moscow early this year and her language of respecting Russian interests raised concerns about exactly what those interests are and whether she understands where the fault lies.

In a clear reference to Mogherini, Lithuania's President Dalia Grybauskaitė said that the EU must not pick someone who is “pro-Kremlin”—an exaggerated charge, perhaps, but indicative of the sensitivity and concern her candidacy has caused. But above all is the view that others are better qualified to deal with the Russian challenge—not just in terms of years clocked on the foreign policy beat but in the substance of what they say and do about it. Carl Bildt, Sweden’s foreign minister, is a leading example. Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Radek Sikorski is another. Bulgaria’s Kristalina Georgieva, currently EU commissioner for humanitarian aid, would be a good compromise candidate.

One would think that the views of these member states would be taken extremely seriously by the rest of the EU. Instead, isolating and defeating them is just another “part of the political game.” Needless to say, this is not a game. It is the most serious security threat Europe has faced in over two decades. Two hundred and twelve EU citizens were killed by a Russian missile fired by Russian backed separatists in July. Thousands have died in Ukraine as a result of the war Russia started. And in recent weeks, Russian forces have begun a formal invasion of Ukraine.

It is mind-boggling that in a week when Russia opened a third front in Ukraine, European leaders are even considering appointing anyone other than someone with a proven track record of understanding and meeting Russia’s challenge, let alone a person who has consistently underestimated the risk. It’s as if a climate skeptic from the oil industry was to be appointed as environment minister.

It is true, of course, that the foreign policy chief, whoever he or she is, will not make EU policy. That will continue to be the domain of individual member states, especially Germany. But appointing the wrong person will do no good and may do some harm. Appointing the right person could serve the purpose of rallying the member states, pressuring them to stick to their previous declarations, and being a powerful voice for Europe’s values and its interests in a peaceful and free continent.

The EU owes it to its own citizens to make a decision of this magnitude solely on foreign policy grounds. It should not sell out the Baltics to keep the gravy train flowing. This is no time for business as usual.

Next Sunday’s first round of the Tunisian presidential election is unlikely to produce an outright winner but the country can already lay claim to the most democratic success story in the uncertain post-Arab Spring period.

Earlier this year, the Islamist-led National Constituent Assembly in Tunis produced a pluralist constitution that set the stage for a parliamentary contest on October 26 in which the incumbents lost. That simple fact of political alternation is a historic milestone: Ennahda is not the only Islamist party to lose the confidence of its initial protest-vote electorate, but it is the first to live to tell the tale.

Islamist participation in the democratic process

The birthplace of the Arab Spring offers a tantalizing third way toward Islamist participation in the democratic process: a Goldilocks outcome between Turkish majoritarianism and Egyptian militarism. Tunisia is different: it is smaller, lacks a hegemonic army, and Ennahda doesn’t have anywhere near a majority of votes.

The alluring tableau, however, conceals a fragmented elite and a scattered electorate. Twenty-seven parties declared candidates for president, although a handful have dropped out. Last month, more than 15,000 candidates running on over 1,300 party lists vied for 217 parliamentary seats. Only two-fifths of eligible adults registered to vote and less than two-thirds of them actually voted.

The main pattern to emerge from parliamentary elections is the same that has defined the country for decades: an existential battle between Islamists and anti-Islamists with a majority for neither. The Islamists lost six percentage points (32 percent) but the secularists were not exactly embraced. Taking into account non-registration and abstention, the victorious party Nidaa Tounes’s share of the legislative vote (38 percent) corresponds to roughly one out of five eligible voters.

These results accurately reflect a highly polarized society. Nidaa Tounes is led by presidential frontrunner Beji Caïd Essebsi, an 87-year-old who served under every regime since 1956 independence and who stoked voters’ fear of Ennahda’s “seventh century project” during the campaign. Ennahda’s leadership framed the election as a contest “between supporters of the revolution and supporters of the counter-revolution.” It is the only Muslim-majority country where nearly half of the population claims to never step foot in a mosque.

Do Tunisians favor “authoritarian government”?

For the first time since the 2011 revolution, polling this summer showed a majority of Tunisians favoring “authoritarian government” over an “unstable” democratic government. Also for the first time, Ennahda declined to field a presidential candidate to contain apprehensions about them. While Essebsi mostly enjoys an untainted reputation his party, Nidaa Tounes is a loose coalition including many holdovers from the previous regime.

The last time electoral democracies experienced a comparable juncture was not in 2013 Cairo or Gezi Park, but rather Rome during the tense 1970s. In 1976, the Italian Communist Party received one-third of the votes, making it the largest Communist electoral bloc west of the Iron Curtain. Frequent small-scale terrorist attacks took place against the backdrop of global tensions between NATO and Warsaw Pact members.

It is hard to remember a time when the term “socialism” provoked as much angst as “Sharia” does today, but Tunisia stands at a crossroads analogous to the old Cold War alternatives of Washington and Moscow, with Qatar and other Gulf states filling the shoes of the old “evil empire.”

Recognizing that Italy was too divided to govern alone, party leader Enrico Berlinguer proposed a historic compromise (compromesso storico) with the archenemy Christian Democrats to bridge a seemingly impassible cultural-political gap.

Ennahda party faces doubts

Today’s Ennahda party faces the same doubts as Communist leaders in postwar Europe: are they truly pluralist democrats? Do they accept power sharing? The executive director of Nidaa Tounes, Mondher Belhadj Ali, said in an interview in Tunis earlier this year that Ennahda must undergo the equivalent process of the various leftist parties in Europe during the Cold War. The party needs to renounce its “jihadist logic,” Belhadj said, in the same way that the German left distanced itself from international Marxist-Leninist creed at Bad Godesberg in 1959.^[1]

To be considered trustworthy despite its association with a revolutionary ideology, the Italian Communist Party (Partito Comunista Italiano, or PCI) underwent key shifts. Its leadership broke with the international Comintern by supporting Italy’s NATO membership. They also refused Moscow’s order of “intransigence” through silent partnership with a Christian Democrat-led government, giving way to the “via Italiana” – an Italian path – to socialism.

Why did the PCI pursue this path at a moment of rising strength, when their share of the vote was peaking at 32 percent? Italian Communists had no doubt noticed that NATO countries were willing to forego democratic outcomes in Chile three years earlier in the name of political stability and anti-communism.

“Alternative to the Islamic State”

It is also apparent that Ennahda’s leadership has correctly interpreted the West’s silence after the arrest of Egypt’s first democratically elected president last year. The party’s agreement to omit the word “Sharia” from the constitution, its decision to ban the extremist group Ansar Echaria and its voluntary departure from political posts in 2013 have been taken as early signs of a willingness to compromise. There is no exact Islamist equivalent to Moscow and the Comintern, but Ennahda has offered itself up as “the alternative to the Islamic State.” Ennahda has also adopted an official party line not to govern alone but only in alliance with other parties. Party leader Rached Ghannouchi said he hopes to avoid “the repetition of the Egyptian bilateral polarizing model.”

Political pressure already forced Ennahda and its partners to wage not merely ideological but also actual military war on violent Islamist extremism. The martyrs of the Tunisian Revolution now include not only the two secular politicians who were assassinated in the first half of 2013 but also the 39 Tunisian soldiers who have been killed since then – including five in an attack earlier this month.

The interim government has not hesitated to combat religious enemies of the state. President Moncef Marzouki, a human rights activist, looked ashen in an interview in his office this summer: “I deeply regret it: it means killing and arresting people but I have to defend this state” – at times leading to the deaths of a dozen combatants per month, including six on election weekend.^[2]

In the years since the revolution, through a mixture of coercion and conviction, the religious affairs ministry whittled down the number of prayer spaces under the control of Salafi extremists from over 1000 in 2011 to under 100 today. This summer, the government fired an imam who refused to say prayers for a soldier who died in a raid on an Islamist cell.”^[3]

Like Berlinguer before him, Ghannouchi has made timely visits to meet with American officials and offer democratic reassurances – but to far greater effect than the Italian Communists ever managed. Washington’s reception of the PCI is captured by the chiaroscuro headshot of Berlinguer on a June 1976 cover of Time declaiming “The Red Threat.” In 2012, the magazine named Ghannouchi one of the “World’s Most Influential People,” someone who offers “a vision of a moderate, modern and inclusive political movement.”

Critics will point out that shortly after the compromesso storico, the Communist Party’s electoral base bottomed out. Left-wing terrorism did taper off but not before the Red Brigades kidnapped and executed the Communists’ main Christian Democratic interlocutor, former Prime Minister Aldo Moro, in 1978.

Compromise may lead to national unity

With counterterrorism support to resist such extremist violence on the fringes and more enthusiastic backing from Western capitals, however, a Tunisian historic compromise may yet deliver the national unity that the country needs to advance to self-confident partisan rule – and mutual faith in political alternation. The recent announcement of joint U.S.-Tunisian counter-terrorism exercises and a gift of $14 million worth of equipment and supplies are small in scale but their timing conveys a broader reassurance.

The lack of a clear political mandate may turn out to be the hidden advantage of this inaugural election season in Tunisia. The country’s political parties can now use the first full presidency and parliamentary session of a democratic Tunisia to blaze a third way between military rule and majoritarian Islamist democracy.

Just as Italian communism was a different animal than the Soviet Communist Party, Tunisian exceptionalism is a real thing. The accelerated modernization period under Independence leader Habib Bourguiba after decolonization left behind the lowest illiteracy rate and lowest birthrate in the neighborhood. Its relatively peaceful democratic revolution has now passed several institutional milestones. As President Moncef Marzouki put it, “if the experiment in Islamic democracy doesn’t work here then it’s unlikely to work anywhere.”^[4]

The Italian Communist Party voted to dissolve itself almost 24 years ago, not long after the Berlin Wall fell and sealed its obsolescence. An equivalent geopolitical shift in Sunni Islam – away from the hegemony of ideologically rigid Gulf States – is as unimaginable now as was the thaw of November 1989. But a great compromise between the region’s modern nemeses – secularist and Islamist – could well dislodge the first brick.

Last Friday’s summit between Italy and the United States was an occasion for American President Barack Obama and Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi to discuss issues of mutual concerns, particularly Russia and Libya, and consolidate the personal bond they laid the ground for during their first meeting in Rome last year. 

The United States wants assurances that Italy will continue to support U.S.-European Union efforts to press Russia, including via sanctions, to stop fomenting unrest in Ukraine. Last March, EU countries committed to keeping sanctions in place until the second Minsk Memorandum—the Ukrainian-Russian peace deal brokered by France and Germany in February 2015—is fully implemented later this year. Yet, EU leaders will not make a formal decision on whether to extend financial, energy and defense sanctions against Russia before next June. Russia has been courting EU member states whose commercial interests have been most affected by sanctions. These include countries in financial distress, such as Greece and Cyprus, as well as countries where Russia-leaning governments are in power, such as Hungary.  

If Italy were to add its weight to this group, the intra-EU consensus supporting sanctions could begin to erode. Italy has, after all, strong trade, energy, and political interests at stake. Its businesses have paid a heavy price because of sanctions. Its energy policy has suffered as well, particularly due to the Kremlin’s decision to drop South Stream, a gas pipeline under the Black Sea that Russia’s energy giant Gazprom was developing in cooperation with a subsidiary of Italian energy company Eni. Above all, however, the Ukraine crisis has shattered Italy’s longstanding plans to establish a constructive relationship with Russia, which Rome sees as an indispensable interlocutor to preserve Europe’s long-term security and manage issues of international concern. 

Concerns about Italy’s position on Russia are, then, understandable. Yet, as much as Italy would like Russia and the West to mend fences, the chances that Renzi will break ranks with the United States' and Rome’s most important EU partners are low. What Italy will do is instead to insist on the need to reach out to Russia on those issues on which cooperation is still possible. Renzi made this clear during his visit to Moscow last month, where he reiterated Italy’s commitment to the Minsk II Memorandum but also insisted that Russia can make a positive contribution to ending crises in the Mediterranean, particularly in Libya. 

Libya has lately emerged as Italy’s most urgent foreign policy concern—which is why Renzi is seeking U.S. support to address the crisis there. The country is in a state of quasi-anarchy, with two rival governments—one in Tobruk, the other one in Tripoli—fighting for control over national resources. Libyan oil shipments to Italy have shrunk, while migration flows towards Sicily have exploded. Furthermore, groups pledging allegiance to the Islamic State (or ISIS) have started operating in the coastal cities of Derna and Sirte. The Italian government has signaled its willingness to take part in a multinational force, even in a leading role, to restore a degree of stability in Libya and contain the expansion of ISIS activities there (which, for the time being, are however quite limited). 

To this end, U.S. political backing and logistical assistance is key. Yet, Italy’s stated resolve to take action has not been matched with a well thought-out initiative aimed at clarify the scope, objective and mandate of such an international action. For an intervention in Libya to have any chance of success, it is of paramount importance that United Nations (U.N.) efforts to broker a deal over a national unity government between Tripoli and Tobruk succeed. Only in that context would the idea of sending in a multinational force supporting the national unity government make sense. Italy would then be best advised to seek greater U.S. involvement in the U.N. process, including by exerting pressure on the Tobruk government—and its key supporters, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates—to accept a compromise. 

The meaning of the Renzi-Obama summit extends well beyond security issues. For Renzi, Obama’s support to his reform agenda lends more substance to his claim that his plans to reform the economy would boost not only Italy’s economic prospects but also its international credibility. This is of critical importance for Renzi as his reform agenda—which includes a comprehensive labor market reform as well as plans to overhaul Italy’s constitutional set-up and electoral law—are controversial both within Renzi’s own center-left Democratic Party (PD) and with the population at large, most notably with such key leftist constituencies as the main trade unions. 

For his part, Obama appreciates Renzi’s resolve to moderate German fixation on fiscal consolidation as the most appropriate response to eurozone financial troubles—a course of action the U.S. administration thinks has caused more harm than good to Europe’s, and indirectly America’s, economy. Lately, the German-led camp of EU member states supporting austerity has lost some (but just some) ground, particularly after the European Central Bank started its own quantitative easing program. But the U.S. president is convinced that EU countries need not only expansive monetary policy, but also more fiscal leeway to boost domestic demands. In strongly pro-EU and reform-committed Renzi, Obama has a valuable ally to make the case with the austerity camp that Europe needs growth more than balanced budgets.

In the three months since the EU-Turkey migrant pact came into force, the number of migrants arriving on Greek shores has dropped precipitously. But the number of migrants making the even more dangerous crossing to Italy has increased substantially. After months of chaos, Rome—having adopted a variety of measures in partnership with European authorities—is now much better prepared than last summer to deal with a new migrant surge. But, despite its efforts, Italy—like its peers—cannot possibly cope on its own with a new wave of migration on the order of magnitude as the one witnessed last summer.

Yet that possibility is real. With almost 19,000 arriving from Libya in the first three months of this year, an EU-Libya migration compact is urgently needed. But for it to work, Europe as a whole must engage with Libya comprehensively and across policy areas. That will require time—and an interim solution in the meantime. 

Fewer arrivals in Greece, more in Italy

Notwithstanding its many flaws, the EU-Turkey deal appears to be working at deterring people from making the treacherous crossing from Turkey to Greece. Although weather conditions have improved, the number of migrants reaching Greece dropped by 90 percent in April, to less than 2,700. Syrians, Pakistanis, Afghans, and Iraqis made up the bulk of new arrivals, as has been the case for the last few months. Further north, along the Western Balkans route, the number of migrants reaching Europe’s borders in April dropped by 25 percent, down to 3,830. In this case, Macedonia’s de facto closure of its southern border with Greece clearly contributed to stemming the flow. 

With the Eastern Mediterranean and the Western Balkans routes sealed, the Central Mediterranean pathway presents new and worrying trends. In the month of April alone, 9,149 migrants arrived in Italy. As in the past, they were overwhelmingly from Sub-Saharan Africa (mostly Nigeria), many of them economic migrants unlikely to be granted asylum. For the first time since May 2015, more migrants are now reaching Italy than Greece. Many more are likely to have lost their lives trying to do so. 

For the first time since May 2015, more migrants are now reaching Italy than Greece.

Learning from past mistakes 

Italy is doing its homework. A revamped headquarters for the European Union Regional Task Force (EURTF) overseeing migrant arrivals across the Central Mediterranean opened at the end of April in the town of Catania. Five of its six hotspots—first reception centers fully equipped to process new arrivals—are now in place, with a combined reception capacity for 2,100 people and the involvement of Frontex, the European Asylum Support Office, Europol, Eurojust, the International Organization for Migration, and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Fingerprinting rates have now reached virtually 100 percent at all active hotspots. Long-term reception capacity across the country is currently at 111,081, and plans are in place to boost this to 124,579. This would probably not be enough to host the share that the country could be expected to take under a permanent and fair pan-European relocation mechanism. And yet, at least for the time being, the European Commission judged the Italian reception system to be more than sufficient.

Within this context, European partners seem to be slowly becoming more confident in Rome’s willingness to take up its responsibilities. It is no coincidence that on the same day that German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble invited Vienna to support Italy in its efforts to control migrant movements within the Schengen area, Austria’s Interior Minister Wolfgang Sobotka announced that work on building a “migrants protection fence” at the Italy-Austria border was halted. 

A sustainable solution before it’s too late

Still, should a new massive migrant wave reach its shores, Italy could not cope on its own. Indeed, no single European country could. Should such a new wave materialize, Libya would be by far the most likely country of origin. Italy is the key to fighting ISIS and stabilizing Libya, but it would be unrealistic to expect Italy to do so on its own. 

The current European migrant crisis is part of a broader global refugee crisis and Europe has a shared interest and responsibility in dealing with it. Because of that, an EU-Libya deal is now necessary. This must—and can—be better than the agreement between the EU and Turkey. But a strategic pan-European approach is urgently needed. As Mattia Toaldo recently highlighted, a joint EU-Libya migration plan would be one of five priority areas for Libya. These would also include supporting a Libyan joint command to fight ISIS, a diplomatic offensive in support of the recently-established unity government, a reconciliation of local militias through power devolution, and the re-launch of the country’s economy. In April, Italy shared proposals with its European partners for a new migration compact with Libya but which also involves the broader region. That might be wise: since Europe is certainly unable to stabilize Libya in the short term, its leaders should start thinking about the country as a variable within a far broader equation. 

What can Italy do in the meantime?

The European Union should step up its support for Italy and an interim solution to migrant crisis in the Central Mediterranean must be found. Meanwhile, Italy has to brace itself for the potential arrival of over 800,000 migrants currently in Libya and waiting to cross the Mediterranean. While Rome could never cope with such a surge in migrant flows on its own, it still can—and must—plan for such an eventuality.

Three measures could be taken to address this challenge. First of all, Italy could consider setting up a seventh—and possibly even an eight—hotspot. This would be an important step given that an idea Italian Interior Minister Angelino Alfano floated—to set up “hotspots at sea”–is unlikely to be viable on both legal and humanitarian grounds. Second, Italy should increase its long-term reception capacity to around 150,000 people. The exact number would depend on the calculations that the European Commission is currently finalizing. Crucially, this should mirror the number of individuals beyond which an emergency relocation mechanism would be activated to re-distribute asylum seekers from Italy to another EU member state. Finally and should a sudden surge in the number of arrivals materialize, Italy could prepare contingency plans to mobilize virtually its entire navy to support ongoing EU efforts with its Operation Sophia. These policy proposals involve a significant effort in terms of state capacity. Yet, Italy has both a moral responsibility as well as a vested interest in implementing them. 

Last Friday’s summit between Italy and the United States was an occasion for American President Barack Obama and Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi to discuss issues of mutual concerns, particularly Russia and Libya, and consolidate the personal bond they laid the ground for during their first meeting in Rome last year. 

The United States wants assurances that Italy will continue to support U.S.-European Union efforts to press Russia, including via sanctions, to stop fomenting unrest in Ukraine. Last March, EU countries committed to keeping sanctions in place until the second Minsk Memorandum—the Ukrainian-Russian peace deal brokered by France and Germany in February 2015—is fully implemented later this year. Yet, EU leaders will not make a formal decision on whether to extend financial, energy and defense sanctions against Russia before next June. Russia has been courting EU member states whose commercial interests have been most affected by sanctions. These include countries in financial distress, such as Greece and Cyprus, as well as countries where Russia-leaning governments are in power, such as Hungary.  

If Italy were to add its weight to this group, the intra-EU consensus supporting sanctions could begin to erode. Italy has, after all, strong trade, energy, and political interests at stake. Its businesses have paid a heavy price because of sanctions. Its energy policy has suffered as well, particularly due to the Kremlin’s decision to drop South Stream, a gas pipeline under the Black Sea that Russia’s energy giant Gazprom was developing in cooperation with a subsidiary of Italian energy company Eni. Above all, however, the Ukraine crisis has shattered Italy’s longstanding plans to establish a constructive relationship with Russia, which Rome sees as an indispensable interlocutor to preserve Europe’s long-term security and manage issues of international concern. 

Concerns about Italy’s position on Russia are, then, understandable. Yet, as much as Italy would like Russia and the West to mend fences, the chances that Renzi will break ranks with the United States' and Rome’s most important EU partners are low. What Italy will do is instead to insist on the need to reach out to Russia on those issues on which cooperation is still possible. Renzi made this clear during his visit to Moscow last month, where he reiterated Italy’s commitment to the Minsk II Memorandum but also insisted that Russia can make a positive contribution to ending crises in the Mediterranean, particularly in Libya. 

Libya has lately emerged as Italy’s most urgent foreign policy concern—which is why Renzi is seeking U.S. support to address the crisis there. The country is in a state of quasi-anarchy, with two rival governments—one in Tobruk, the other one in Tripoli—fighting for control over national resources. Libyan oil shipments to Italy have shrunk, while migration flows towards Sicily have exploded. Furthermore, groups pledging allegiance to the Islamic State (or ISIS) have started operating in the coastal cities of Derna and Sirte. The Italian government has signaled its willingness to take part in a multinational force, even in a leading role, to restore a degree of stability in Libya and contain the expansion of ISIS activities there (which, for the time being, are however quite limited). 

To this end, U.S. political backing and logistical assistance is key. Yet, Italy’s stated resolve to take action has not been matched with a well thought-out initiative aimed at clarify the scope, objective and mandate of such an international action. For an intervention in Libya to have any chance of success, it is of paramount importance that United Nations (U.N.) efforts to broker a deal over a national unity government between Tripoli and Tobruk succeed. Only in that context would the idea of sending in a multinational force supporting the national unity government make sense. Italy would then be best advised to seek greater U.S. involvement in the U.N. process, including by exerting pressure on the Tobruk government—and its key supporters, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates—to accept a compromise. 

The meaning of the Renzi-Obama summit extends well beyond security issues. For Renzi, Obama’s support to his reform agenda lends more substance to his claim that his plans to reform the economy would boost not only Italy’s economic prospects but also its international credibility. This is of critical importance for Renzi as his reform agenda—which includes a comprehensive labor market reform as well as plans to overhaul Italy’s constitutional set-up and electoral law—are controversial both within Renzi’s own center-left Democratic Party (PD) and with the population at large, most notably with such key leftist constituencies as the main trade unions. 

For his part, Obama appreciates Renzi’s resolve to moderate German fixation on fiscal consolidation as the most appropriate response to eurozone financial troubles—a course of action the U.S. administration thinks has caused more harm than good to Europe’s, and indirectly America’s, economy. Lately, the German-led camp of EU member states supporting austerity has lost some (but just some) ground, particularly after the European Central Bank started its own quantitative easing program. But the U.S. president is convinced that EU countries need not only expansive monetary policy, but also more fiscal leeway to boost domestic demands. In strongly pro-EU and reform-committed Renzi, Obama has a valuable ally to make the case with the austerity camp that Europe needs growth more than balanced budgets.

Editor's Note: This article originally appeared on Lawfare.

Faced with the breakdown of national armies in Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Yemen, Arab states have increasingly turned toward alliances with armed militias to ensure security. Popular, anti-government protests and insurgencies for the most part precipitated the breakdown of regime military institutions, yet pre-existing internal ethnic, clan, and ideological cleavages helped to hasten the breakdown. The beleaguered state security forces have now entered into a variety of alliances—tacit or active—with militias they deem sympathetic to their interests, often organized on the basis of entrenched ethno-sectarian or tribal identities. Such militia forces supplement and at times even stand in for the weak or absent army and police as providers of local security.

On the one hand, militia forces have in certain circumstances proven effective at counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. On the other hand, they have also committed atrocities against civilians that hamper long-term efforts to build trust and stability. Their greatest risk is that, by eroding the central government’s monopolization on force, they jeopardize the territorial cohesion of the state.

In Iraq, the rise of powerful communal militias has paralleled the growth of the threat from the Islamic State. This has presented the United States with a quandary: how to combat the Islamic State by mobilizing local Sunnis while at the same time safeguarding the broader integrity of the Iraqi state and its security institutions. The national guard concept, which successive Iraqi governments have tried in the past, was seen as one way to do this. A national guard force would retain the militias’ local knowledge and roots, both unique tools necessary for a successful counterinsurgency against the Islamic State. At the same time, the guard would (at least in theory) be subject to increased oversight and control by the central government.

Other fractured Arab states, most notably Libya, have tried to implement a national guard model as a way to harness militia power, but this too has failed. Variations of hybrid, provincially-organized military forces exist in Yemen and Syria. While each case is different, the failure of national guards bears certain similarities. Examining the Iraqi case in particular can highlight the potential utility of national guards but also the parallel political and institutional reforms that are necessary to make the concept work.

The idea of creating a national guard in Iraq has been a centerpiece of U.S. engagement since the dramatic advance of the Islamic State on Tikrit and Mosul in 2014. President Obama specifically mentioned U.S. support for a national guard as a means to help Iraqi Sunnis “secure their own freedom” from the Islamic State. Much of U.S. thinking about the Iraqi National Guard (ING) was guided by the example of the Sunni Awakening of 2006 and 2007, when the United States actively recruited and “flipped” Sunni tribes that had supported the al-Qaeda-inspired insurgency. In return for guarantees of autonomy and military, financial, and political backing, the Sunni tribes were able to turn the tables on the insurgent fighters and impose a measure of peace and stability. The 2014 initiative essentially sought to reproduce this arrangement. The idea was that given proper incentives, the Sunni tribes would again fight the radical Islamists who threatened their supremacy. Over the long term, such national guard forces could be integrated formally as auxiliary troops in a federal structure, comparable in many ways to the U.S. National Guard.

Yet the Awakening analogy failed on a number of levels. The Shi’i-dominated Iraqi central government had never been enthusiastic about empowering Sunni tribes in the first place. With the dismantling of the Iraqi army in 2003, security had effectively devolved to party, tribal, and sectarian militias. Many Iraqis wondered why the United States would seek to create new militias, especially ones recently tied to al-Qaeda and other terrorists. As Iraq scholar Adeed Dawisha described, the gains in security came“not because of the state, but in spite of it.”

As the U.S. began withdrawing from Iraq in 2009 and 2010, then-Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki quickly moved to dismantle the Awakening-associated militias. Only a handful of former militia fighters received their promised positions in the police, army, or civil services. Some former militia leaders were arrested on seemingly politically-motivated charges of terrorism or subversion. Efforts to enact a Sunni-dominated super-region comparable to the federal status of the Kurdish Regional Government in the north were rebuffed, despite the provisions of Iraq’s constitution that allowed for the creation of such an entity. Politically marginalized, some Sunnis returned to their alliance with the radical mujahideen.

The election of the new prime minister Haydar al-Abadi in 2014 raised the promise of renewed Sunni-Shi’i reconciliation. Abadi expressed support for the national guard initiative and forwarded a bill to parliament in 2014. Thousands of volunteers came forward from the Sunni tribes in the west and U.S. and Iraqi officials met with tribal leaders to help solidify support. The United States began to enlist support from Iraq’s Sunni neighbors to provide training and support for the ING.

Yet resistance within Abadi’s own political coalition stymied these efforts. The National Guard bill foundered in parliamentary committee, with open questions about the extent of control vested in provincial governors and the chain of command subordinating the ING to the ministries of interior, defense, or the prime minister himself. Officers of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) regarded the militias as unfit for duty and as rivals for budget and resources. Iraq’s constitution specifically prohibited the formation of militias outside the framework of the armed forces (with an exception of the peshmergaforces of the Kurdish Regional Government). Moreover, there was concern that once the Sunnis were authorized to organize a militia, other ethno-sectarian communities, such as Christians or Turkomen,might try to follow suit out of fear of falling under the mercy of their more powerful neighbors. The ING, then, could undercut any pretense of the Iraqi state possessing a monopoly over the use of force.

At base, though, many of Iraq’s Shi’i leaders simply believed that they didn’t need Sunni support. With the ING initiative stalled in parliament, the Shi’i factions have actively cultivated Shi’i militias as part of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF, or Hashd al-Shaabi). The origins of the PMF can be traced to a statement by Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, Iraq’s senior Shi’i cleric, which explicitly called on the faithful to take up arms to defend Iraq in the face of the Islamic State onslaught in 2014. Muqtada al-Sadr’s Jaysh al-Mahdi, the Badr Organization, and other political factions quickly took the opportunity to reconstitute or expand their private armies.

Backed by Iran’s expeditionary al-Qods Force, PMF militias played a prominent role in the spring 2015 offensive against the Islamic State in Tikrit. By spring 2015, PMF counted around 60,000 men under arms. Still, the performance of these militias has been less than stellar. In the spring 2015 offensive on Tikrit, PMF forces failed repeatedly to dislodge Islamic State resistance, despite enjoying superiority in numbers. U.S. air support proved critical to allowing the offensive to proceed. Some PMF units quit the fight instead of working under American air cover. Others were involved in a campaign of terror against Sunnis, looting, kidnapping, and killing those suspected of collaborating with the Islamic State.

The prospects for the mobilization of Iraq’s Sunnis are not dead—yet. A handful of Sunni tribes joined the PMF during the Tikrit offensive. In Anbar, likely the next front in the campaign against the Islamic State, U.S. and Iraqi officials have cultivated ties with local Sunni tribes and organized some 8,000 men into Sunni PMF units. Some tribes have made their service conditional on guarantees of greater autonomy and the removal of Shi’i militia forces. Yet the intake for training programs remains slow and drop-out rates high. On the one hand, tribes continue to resent the central government. On the other hand, they fear retribution should the Islamic State return.

Abadi’s visit to Washington in April 2015 focused on expanding and enhancing security cooperation with the United States. The United States has insisted that the PMF be brought more fully under the control of the Iraqi Security Forces and that PMF units reflect the demographics of the provinces and districts in which they operate. This would mean that in ethnically-mixed areas, such as in Nineveh or Babil, each ethnic group would have its own militia proportional to its size in the locality. The Iraq Train and Equip Program (ITEP) is slowly coming online, funneling American money and weapons to various local militia forces as well as ISF.

Cooperating with the United States has been a delicate balancing act for Abadi. While Kurdish and Sunni leaders see U.S. military support as a means to their own ends, Abadi’s own Shi’i political camp—as well as his allies in Tehran—are far more wary. When the U.S. Congress passed a bill in May 2015 effectively mandating the Defense Department to bypass Baghdad and provide support for Sunni and Kurdish fighters directly, Abadi protested that this constituted a grave violation of Iraqi sovereignty.

Still, reliance on the ragtag PMF alone is not sustainable in the long term. Operating far from home and with limited training, these overwhelmingly Shi’i forces cannot be expected to become an army of occupation in Sunni areas like Tikrit or Fallujah. Ultimately, local partners will be necessary to build and maintain peace and stability. The national guard, then, may well re-emerge as a more sustainable structure for administrative and security devolution.

While analysts and policymakers naturally focus on cases of success, there are important lessons to be learned from Iraq’s failures. For countries like Iraq where central armies have more or less broken down and a bevy of militias has emerged in its stead, as in Libya, Yemen, and Syria, the national guard could represent a path to reconstituting fragile state authority.

But for this to happen, several broad principles need to be heeded:

• National guards cannot simply be conceived as short-term, improvised solutions to immediate security crises. Rather, the creation of national guards is part of the impetus of security-sector reform (SSR) and post-conflict demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) of armed groups.
• National guards must overcome the legacies of past authoritarian experiences where pro-government militias were often seen as mere thugs for the regime, not a disciplined professional fighting force. In particular, the older officer class of regular forces may see them as competitors. To build trust among the population and other military institutions, national guards should be accompanied by revisions to chain of command establishing clear relationships of authority between the guards, the police, the army, and other security agencies, and subordinating all security services to civilian authorities.
• National guard initiatives must also be accompanied by moves toward political power-sharing arrangements. The success of national guards ultimately depends not just on their short-term tactical effectiveness but on the degree of local buy-in. Constitutions can provide a structure for bolstering confidence between a central government and subnational militia forces. Since militia membership and cohesion is often based on geographic linkages—to town, municipality or province—national guards may well be a part of federalist power devolution, especially in countries with overlapping ethno-sectarian and regional cleavages.
• Western governments can assist in setting up and training national guards, but they must ensure that proper political and institutional reforms are also undertaken. In many cases, Western states provide models for how decentralized, federally-organized military forces can complement national armies and local police. The United States, for instance, has a great deal of experience with its own federalized national guard structure and can draw on this example in its train-and-equip programs. There are other potentially useful models as well, including the British Territorial Army, a part-time, volunteer force that was integrated into the British Army in the early twentieth century; the Danish Home Guard, which incorporated anti-Nazi resistance militias into a national command structure after World War II; or the Italian Carabineri, which is often discussed as a potential model for dealing with Libya’s unique security challenges.

Outside assistance to national guards must avoid exacerbating existing communal and political fault lines. Helping peripheral and minority groups set up their own armed forces can, on one hand, embolden these groups to resist the central government and, on the other hand, spur resentment from the central government and fear of future disloyalty or rebellion. These concerns become even more acute when national guards are seen as proxies for outside powers. With this in mind, the U.S. and outside powers should calibrate their assistance to both regionally-based national guards and central government forces to ensure rough parity between the two. This could entail making funding, equipment and training for the central security services contingent on a proportional commitment to strengthen the guards.

National guards are political institutions, not just military instruments. They can have far-ranging consequences for political stability and cohesion. While no panacea for the challenge of building effective states, they can play an important role in addressing security concerns and moving toward more meaningful power sharing.

In the three months since the EU-Turkey migrant pact came into force, the number of migrants arriving on Greek shores has dropped precipitously. But the number of migrants making the even more dangerous crossing to Italy has increased substantially. After months of chaos, Rome—having adopted a variety of measures in partnership with European authorities—is now much better prepared than last summer to deal with a new migrant surge. But, despite its efforts, Italy—like its peers—cannot possibly cope on its own with a new wave of migration on the order of magnitude as the one witnessed last summer.

Yet that possibility is real. With almost 19,000 arriving from Libya in the first three months of this year, an EU-Libya migration compact is urgently needed. But for it to work, Europe as a whole must engage with Libya comprehensively and across policy areas. That will require time—and an interim solution in the meantime. 

Fewer arrivals in Greece, more in Italy

Notwithstanding its many flaws, the EU-Turkey deal appears to be working at deterring people from making the treacherous crossing from Turkey to Greece. Although weather conditions have improved, the number of migrants reaching Greece dropped by 90 percent in April, to less than 2,700. Syrians, Pakistanis, Afghans, and Iraqis made up the bulk of new arrivals, as has been the case for the last few months. Further north, along the Western Balkans route, the number of migrants reaching Europe’s borders in April dropped by 25 percent, down to 3,830. In this case, Macedonia’s de facto closure of its southern border with Greece clearly contributed to stemming the flow. 

With the Eastern Mediterranean and the Western Balkans routes sealed, the Central Mediterranean pathway presents new and worrying trends. In the month of April alone, 9,149 migrants arrived in Italy. As in the past, they were overwhelmingly from Sub-Saharan Africa (mostly Nigeria), many of them economic migrants unlikely to be granted asylum. For the first time since May 2015, more migrants are now reaching Italy than Greece. Many more are likely to have lost their lives trying to do so. 

For the first time since May 2015, more migrants are now reaching Italy than Greece.

Learning from past mistakes 

Italy is doing its homework. A revamped headquarters for the European Union Regional Task Force (EURTF) overseeing migrant arrivals across the Central Mediterranean opened at the end of April in the town of Catania. Five of its six hotspots—first reception centers fully equipped to process new arrivals—are now in place, with a combined reception capacity for 2,100 people and the involvement of Frontex, the European Asylum Support Office, Europol, Eurojust, the International Organization for Migration, and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Fingerprinting rates have now reached virtually 100 percent at all active hotspots. Long-term reception capacity across the country is currently at 111,081, and plans are in place to boost this to 124,579. This would probably not be enough to host the share that the country could be expected to take under a permanent and fair pan-European relocation mechanism. And yet, at least for the time being, the European Commission judged the Italian reception system to be more than sufficient.

Within this context, European partners seem to be slowly becoming more confident in Rome’s willingness to take up its responsibilities. It is no coincidence that on the same day that German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble invited Vienna to support Italy in its efforts to control migrant movements within the Schengen area, Austria’s Interior Minister Wolfgang Sobotka announced that work on building a “migrants protection fence” at the Italy-Austria border was halted. 

A sustainable solution before it’s too late

Still, should a new massive migrant wave reach its shores, Italy could not cope on its own. Indeed, no single European country could. Should such a new wave materialize, Libya would be by far the most likely country of origin. Italy is the key to fighting ISIS and stabilizing Libya, but it would be unrealistic to expect Italy to do so on its own. 

The current European migrant crisis is part of a broader global refugee crisis and Europe has a shared interest and responsibility in dealing with it. Because of that, an EU-Libya deal is now necessary. This must—and can—be better than the agreement between the EU and Turkey. But a strategic pan-European approach is urgently needed. As Mattia Toaldo recently highlighted, a joint EU-Libya migration plan would be one of five priority areas for Libya. These would also include supporting a Libyan joint command to fight ISIS, a diplomatic offensive in support of the recently-established unity government, a reconciliation of local militias through power devolution, and the re-launch of the country’s economy. In April, Italy shared proposals with its European partners for a new migration compact with Libya but which also involves the broader region. That might be wise: since Europe is certainly unable to stabilize Libya in the short term, its leaders should start thinking about the country as a variable within a far broader equation. 

What can Italy do in the meantime?

The European Union should step up its support for Italy and an interim solution to migrant crisis in the Central Mediterranean must be found. Meanwhile, Italy has to brace itself for the potential arrival of over 800,000 migrants currently in Libya and waiting to cross the Mediterranean. While Rome could never cope with such a surge in migrant flows on its own, it still can—and must—plan for such an eventuality.

Three measures could be taken to address this challenge. First of all, Italy could consider setting up a seventh—and possibly even an eight—hotspot. This would be an important step given that an idea Italian Interior Minister Angelino Alfano floated—to set up “hotspots at sea”–is unlikely to be viable on both legal and humanitarian grounds. Second, Italy should increase its long-term reception capacity to around 150,000 people. The exact number would depend on the calculations that the European Commission is currently finalizing. Crucially, this should mirror the number of individuals beyond which an emergency relocation mechanism would be activated to re-distribute asylum seekers from Italy to another EU member state. Finally and should a sudden surge in the number of arrivals materialize, Italy could prepare contingency plans to mobilize virtually its entire navy to support ongoing EU efforts with its Operation Sophia. These policy proposals involve a significant effort in terms of state capacity. Yet, Italy has both a moral responsibility as well as a vested interest in implementing them.