The most noticeable trend under the leadership of Xi Jinping since the 2012 National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been the continuing consolidation of power. In particular, the military has been a key forum in which Xi has strengthened both his personal power and his new administration’s authority. Xi has adopted several approaches and political tactics to achieve this, including purging the two highest-ranking generals under the previous administration for corruption and other charges; arresting 52 senior military officers on various charges of wrongdoing; reshuffling generals between regions, departments, and services; attempting to systematically reform the PLA’s structure and operations; and, last but not least, rapidly promoting “young guards” (少壮派) in the Chinese military.

These bold moves will have profound implications—not only for Xi’s political standing in the lead-up to the next leadership turnover in 2017, but also for the development of civilian-military relations in the country and for the trajectory of China’s military modernization. The third installment in this series focuses on personnel changes that have occurred during the early phase of military reform.

Who are the rising stars in the PLA following the recent reorganization and reshuffling? What are the distinguishing characteristics of the “young guards”? What are possible explanations for and implications of some of the highest-level personnel changes, such as the retirement of the heavyweight military figure General Liu Yuan and the marginalization of Xi’s confidant General Cai Yingting? How does Xi successfully perform the delicate balancing act in personnel appointments by aggressively promoting his own long-time protégés and new loyalists while avoiding making too many enemies?

This is part three of a series that will appear in the upcoming issue of the China Leadership Monitor. Download the article in full below. The first paper in the series can be found here: Promoting "young guards": The recent high turnover in the PLA leadership (Part 1: Purges and reshuffles), and the second paper here: Promoting “young guards”: The recent high turnover in the PLA leadership (Part II: Expansion and escalation).

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• Promoting "Young Guards": The Recent High Turnover in the PLA Leadership (Part III: Personal and Political)

China’s approach to Europe is a contrasting mix of economic opportunism and strategic vision.

A continent gripped by economic weakness and debt is crying out for Chinese investment, and Chinese state enterprises and funds are eagerly participating in the sale of the century, buying up ports, prime real estate and technology firms from Greece to the U.K.

At the same time, Beijing views Europe as the terminus for its massively ambitious “One Belt, One Road” project – a string of ports, logistics hubs and other trading infrastructure stretching all the way from Southeast Asia to the north of England.

Yet a populist backlash against China is building in Europe: recent street demonstrations by European workers over Chinese steel dumping have highlighted the risks of a relationship that increasingly looks troubled.

In their book “China’s Offensive in Europe,” Philippe Le Corre, a visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution, and Alain Sepulchre, a senior adviser with BCG in Hong Kong, analyze China’s rapidly expanding footprint on the continent — and what it means in global terms. They set out some of their thinking in a written Q&A with China Real Time:

You title your book “China’s Offensive in Europe.” This sounds somewhat alarming. Should we be worried?

It may have sounded slightly alarming a few years ago, but China’s economic intentions toward Europe are not just about creating jobs and value: they are about spreading influence on a weakened and somewhat divided continent (the U.K. being perhaps the most obvious example) that is also far away from the U.S., the country seen by China as the ultimate competitor. Europe is part of “the West” where China is willing to leave more than footprints.

Overall, how do you assess the relationship between the EU and China? What are the opportunities and the risks?

On one hand, China has offered to take part in major EU projects such as the European Strategic Investment Fund, launched by the European Commission to relaunch European infrastructure. It will probably become the biggest non-European stakeholder in the ESIF. But on the other hand, there is an attempt by China to divide the EU at various levels. A typical example is the “16+1” group created by China and sixteen Eastern and Central European countries in 2011. Once a year, leaders of these countries meet with Chinese Premier Li Keqiang. Last year in Suzhou, they also met with President Xi Jinjping. Seven countries signed memorandums of understanding with China on “one-belt, one-road.” Three of them hosted Mr. Xi recently, and were offered substantial Chinese investment promises. China has also tried to establish similar platforms with Southern Europe and Nordic countries, so far without success, but there is a risk that a large number of smaller countries (some of them non-EU members, a good example being Serbia which is getting a Chinese-made high-speed railway) will take a separate approach from the rest of Europe when dealing with China. This is not what Europe needs now.

How coordinated is Chinese investment in Europe? Is there a master plan in Beijing?

There is no “master plan” to take over Europe. First, Europe was part of the “China goes out” [investment] policy in the late 1990s. It then started accelerating with opportunities in 2008-2009 during the euro-debt crisis (and thanks to a favorable exchange rate), when China bought eurobonds and started buying into European infrastructure such as Athens’ Piraeus Harbor (which it now controls). Now, Chinese investment is taking a different dimension through the cultivation of individual European countries via the “one belt, one road” initiative as was demonstrated by Mr. Xi’s visits to the Czech Republic in May, and to Poland and Serbia more recently. Although many aspects of OBOR remain unclear, Europe is definitely a final destination for this project.

Would “Brexit” make the U.K. a less attractive destination for Chinese capital?

As a financial center, London would remain attractive to Chinese investors who would still use it as an renminbi trading hub – but they would also use Frankfurt, Paris and Luxembourg, where they have started trading, too. As for the British market, it would be treated as a medium-sized economy with some prospects but a much less important group than the 450-million consumer common market. For all its flaws, the EU is a powerful trade block with clear interlocutors on issues of importance to China, such as the Market Economy Status. Finally, it is not clear if the U.K. would remain a top destination for Chinese investments. Real estate is one thing, but projects such as the “Northern Power House,” a massive development plan in the north of England, have little chance to receive Chinese financial support if the U.K. votes to exit the EU on Thursday.

Chinese companies are on a buying spree in Europe. This is good news for job creation, yet it also creates anxiety, particularly in Germany, about the loss of key technologies. How do you see this playing out?

Overall, the mood within European elites is about welcoming Chinese investments providing they play the European way. So far Chinese investors have been targeting primarily nonsensitive sectors or companies in financial trouble. The case of [German robot maker Kuka being acquired by Chinese home appliance giant Midea] is quite unique as it involves some specific high-tech content in a sector which is of huge potential. The fact that the Chinese acquirer is perceived as low-tech and very aggressive in its domestic and international expansion strengthens the anti-China Inc. feeling.

Is there a danger of a real populist backlash in Europe against perceived unfair Chinese trading practices, including steel dumping?

It is already happening with the recent (nonbinding, but overwhelming) vote on May 12 by the European Parliament against granting market economy status to China by the end of 2016. Members of the European Parliament are directly elected by the European people, and they reflect the continent’s worries over unfair trade practices from China. These are sensitive times in Europe, and China’s message is obviously not popular with European grassroots where people worry about jobs and the future of the continent’s economy.

What is behind the debate on giving China market economy status?

It is a complicated issue for Europeans as the EU itself is based on the rule of law. In this case, the law is the 2001 World Trade Organization agreement that says that China should receive MES by December 2016. Economics and politics are two other factors European leaders cannot avoid: both France and Germany are facing general elections in 2017 and populism is on the rise everywhere. It would be suicidal to grant the status to China now, as almost none of the criteria to be a market economy have been met – except perhaps the upcoming deadline. A compromise will be needed with mitigating measures at the very least, and in the current political context, it will obviously take time.

Europe complains that while its markets are wide open to Chinese investment, China is closing up. German Chancellor Angela Merkel has called for greater reciprocity. How can China be persuaded to level the playing field?

European cumulative overseas direct investment into China is far bigger than what China has been investing so far into Europe. China is still considered an emerging market, typically showing some kind of protectionism. At the same time, China is often not sympathetic to reciprocity be it in politics or business. Two ways could be considered to pressure China. One way – as we have just heard from Chancellor Merkel – is to be offensive by blocking some Chinese investments in deemed sensitive areas (similarly to what is taking place in the US through the CFIUS mechanism) and by finding alternative suitors to firms like Kuka that China wants to acquire. Another way would be to use the pan-European card. In many cases, European businesses and / or political bodies have been battling each other for Chinese investments. This has been going on for years, and it is time for Europeans to partner vis-a-vis China.

On her recent visits to China, Ms. Merkel has spoken out strongly on issues from human rights to the South China Sea. This compares quite markedly with the approach to China adopted by Britain, which tends to avoid sensitive issues. What accounts for Ms. Merkel’s frankness?

There is still a Chinese fascination for Germany’s economic and technological model, which has no equivalent in Europe. Although the German trade surplus with China is shrinking, many German industrial brands are recognized and vastly respected in China (Audi, Siemens, BMW, BASF…). German technology and brands give Germany an incentive. In addition, Ms. Merkel, who has been in power for almost 11 years, is seen by Beijing as Europe’s clear leader. David Cameron is only considered as his country’s prime minister, with little influence on decisions taken within the EU. The fact Ms. Merkel has spoken frankly and repeatedly about sensitive issues has not weakened her – it is the opposite. A good lesson for others, perhaps?

What is the experience so far of European companies bought by Chinese firms?

The experience so far has been a mixed bag. On the workforce front, most companies have been expanding rather than the opposite, but some have been downsizing their labor force at least initially. A typical challenge lies more at the top management / governance level: Chinese owners tend to over-manage or under-manage dispatching too many or too few skilled managers, governing too tightly or too loosely. The right balance has not been found yet. The most ‘non value-added’ factor is probably on the transfer of technology side. In many instances, Chinese investors have not been able to fully leverage the European technology content into their domestic operations. 

This interview originally appeared in the Wall Street Journal. 

For years China has been known as a destination for foreign direct invest- ment, as multinationals flocked there to build export platforms and take advantage of its fast-growing market. Now, however, it is China’s outbound foreign direct investment (OFDI) that is shaping the world. In the first quarter of 2015, China claimed its largest-ever share of global mergers and acquisitions (M&A), with mainland companies’ takeovers of foreign firms amounting to US$101bn, or 15% of the US$682bn of announced global deals. In three months, China recorded more outbound investment transac- tions than in the whole of 2015, when US$109bn in deals were announced.

These figures probably overstate the true level of capital flows, since some announced deals inevitably fail to reach fruition. But whatever the levels, it is clear that China’s outbound investment is rapidly growing, and that its share of global direct investment flows is among the largest of any country.

The rise in China’s direct investment in Europe is especially striking. According to a recent report by law firm Baker & McKenzie and consultancy Rhodium Group, the total stock of Chinese investment in Europe increased almost ten-fold from US$6bn in 2010 to US$55bn in 2014. In 2015 alone, Chinese OFDI in Europe increased by 44 percent (with deals such as Italian tire manufacturer Pirelli’s US$7.7bn takeover by ChemChina). Total flow of US$23bn exceeded China’s investments in the US, which were US$17bn in the same year. This year could see an even more dramatic jump, if ChemChina’s pro- posed US$46bn takeover of Swiss agro-technology firm Syngenta is approved by regulators.

There are two main reasons why Chinese investors favor Europe over the US. First, the issue of Chinese direct investment is less politicized in Europe. A handful of high-profile Chinese investments in the US have been blocked for political reasons, and the national security review process of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States poses an obstacle for some types of acquisitions, especially by Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Europe lacks a similar review process, and this perhaps explains why SOEs represent nearly 70% of Chinese OFDI in Europe, but less than half in the US. Second, Europe’s ongoing economic and financial difficulties since the global financial crisis of 2008 mean there has been a hunger for Chinese cash to finance infrastructure or bail out debt-ridden firms.The flows are impressive, but it is important to remember that on a stock basis, China’s aggregate investment in Europe is still fairly modest. By the end of 2014, China’s cumulative OFDI represented only 3-4% of all FDI in Europe, and the pool of workers directly affected by Chinese FDI was a mere 2% of the number of Europeans working in American-owned firms in Europe. The rising trend of Chinese investment, however, raises some interesting economic and political questions for European leaders.

Moving up the value chain…

What motives, aside from the sheer availability of cash, are driving this enormous wave of Chinese outward investment? A review of China’s OFDI in Europe over the past decade points to five distinct strategies. Some of these are similar to the strategies seen in earlier waves of cross-border investment by Western, Japanese and South Korean companies; others seem to be more China-specific. They also display widely divergent reliance on political leverage—with SOE investments, unsurprisingly, being the most politically driven.

Authors research

The first strategy is driven by a desire to move from cheap products to more sophisticated ones. An exemplar is Haier, the world’s largest white goods manufacturer. Haier’s development closely tracks that of Japanese and South Korean consumer appliance makers: it first concentrated on making cheap copies of established products, for sale in the Chinese market. It gradually moved up to more sophisticated and innovate products and services and began to export more aggressively.

Haier came to cross-border M&A relatively late, and has used it main- ly to scale up its core “made-in-China” portfolio and accelerate its move up the value chain. Its first acquisitions came in 2012, when it bought a part of Sanyo’s Asian operations and New Zealand’s Fisher & Paykel. After a failed effort to acquire bankrupt European white-goods firm FagorBrandt in 2014, it bought GE’s consumer appliances business for US$5.4bn in January 2016. Political backing for Haier’s overseas expansion has been limited, probably because of the low political importance of the white goods sector.

A second strategy, exemplified by telecoms equipment maker Huawei Technologies, is a straightforward effort to raise margins by diversifying out of the low-margin Chinese market into higher-margin foreign ones. Huawei has derived more than half its sales from abroad for over a decade, and has gradually increased its presence in European markets, in part through loose alliances with major clients such as BT, Orange, Deutsche Telekom, and Telefónica. It has also moved quickly into the device sector. From tablets to smartphones and 3G keys, its products are now spreading across Europe, as are its greenfield investments in European R&D centers. Its efforts to expand through M&A have been hampered by its image as an arm of the Chinese state—although privately owned, it has benefited from huge lines of credit from Chinese policy banks, and has never put to rest rumors of close ties with the People’s Liberation Army.

…and acquiring technology

The third model essentially involves technology acquisition that enables a Chinese firm both to bolster its position at home and create strategic opportunities abroad. Notable examples include personal computer maker Lenovo (which bought IBM’s PC division), carmaker Geely (which acquired Volvo’s passenger-car unit), and more recently ChemChina (with its purchases of Pirelli and Syngenta). The technology-acquisition strategy is much more characteristic of Chinese firms than of Japanese or South Korean companies, which mainly preferred to build up their technological know-how internally, or through licensing arrangements. Even though many of the Chinese acquirers in these deals are private, they are often able to mobilize enormous state support in the form of generous and low-cost financing.

The fourth internationalization model is characteristic of the hospi- tality industry and is one we dub (perhaps controversially) “Orientalist.” Essentially this involves the acquisition of established high-end hotel and leisure brands, with the ultimate aim of reorienting them to cater to a growing Asian—and especially Chinese—clientele. Examples include Shanghai-based Jinjiang International’s recent purchase of the Louvre Hotels group and of 11.7% of Accor’s hotel business. Hong Kong hotel chains Shangri-La, Mandarin and Peninsula have focused their expansion over the past three years in Europe, buying high-end assets in Paris and London. Dalian Wanda, a conglomerate with interests in real estate, retail and cinemas has plans for a series of major mixed-use projects in the UK and France. Like many such projects in China, these are designed to offer a combination of commercial, residential, shopping and recreational facilities. These culturally-oriented acquirers have also benefited from generous financing from China’s state-owned banks.

Heritage Foundation, media reports

The final strategy is a “national champions” model, under which big SOEs use political and financial support from the government to make acquisitions that they hope will vault them into positions of global market leadership. A noteworthy recent example in Europe Dongfeng Motor’s purchase of 14% of PSA, the parent company of Peugeot.

The wave of Chinese investment creates several challenges for European companies and policymakers. For firms, the sudden appearance of hungry and well-financed Chinese acquirers has prompted incumbent multinationals to step up their own M&A efforts, in order to maintain their market dominance. Moves into the European market by China’s leading construction equipment firms, Zoomlion and Sany, most likely prompted the purchase of Finnish crane company Konecranes by its American rival Terex. Similarly, ChemChina’s unexpected bid for Syngenta has caused disquiet among European chemical firms, and probably motivated Bayer’s subsequent bid to take over Monsanto.

In the policy arena, two issues stand out. The narrower one relates to reciprocity: Chinese firms are pretty much free to buy companies in any sector in Europe, without restriction; foreign firms by contrast are barred from investment or majority control in a host of sectors in China, including banking, insurance, telecom, media, logistics, construction, and healthcare. One potential solution is to include reciprocity provisions in the EU-China bilateral investment treaty now under negotiation.

The broader question for Europe is whether some broader geopoliti- cal strategy lies behind China’s outward investment surge, and if so what to do about it. There can be little doubt that in recent years China has increased its political leverage in Europe, and has done so via a “divide and rule” approach of dealing as little as possible with the EU as a whole and as much as possible with individual states. Another tactic has been to create new multilateral forums in configurations favorable to China, the most prominent example being the “16+1,” which consists of 16 central and eastern European nations plus China. Beijing has tried—so far with- out success—to develop similar forums with the Nordic and Southern European countries.

Anxiety along the Belt and Road

A related issue is to what extent Europe should welcome Chinese investment that comes in the form of infrastructure spending. Part of China’s “Belt and Road Initiative” is about increasing connectivity between China and Europe, and this comes with clear financial benefits: China has pledged, for instance, to contribute to the European Commission’s European Strategic Infrastructure Fund; and Chinese-led logistics platforms such as Athens’ Piraeus Port are proliferating. 

But with increased connectivity comes an increased flow of Chinese goods—and especially a flood of low-priced products from China’s excess capacity industries such as steel and building materials. In response to the apparent dumping of Chinese industrial goods in Europe, the European Parliament on May 12 adopted a non-binding but pointed resolution asking the European Commission to reject China’s claim to “market economy status” in the World Trade Organization (WTO). That status—which China says should come to it automatically in December this year under the terms of its 2001 WTO accession—would make it much harder for the EU to impose anti-dumping duties on Chinese imports. The Commission now faces the delicate choice of accepting China’s claim (to the detriment of European producers) or rejecting it (an action that is likely to invite some form of economic retaliation from Beijing). A possible middle way would be to recognize China’s market economy status but to carve out a set of exceptions to protect key European industries. However this dispute plays out, it will simply mark the beginning of a long and complicated relationship between Europe and its fastest-growing investor.

The piece originally appeared in China Economic Quarterly. 

In “Designing Pan-Atlantic and International Anti-Crime Cooperation,” a chapter for the new book, Dark Networks in the Atlantic Basin: Emerging Trends and Implications for Human Security (Center for Transatlantic Relations, January 2015), Vanda Felbab-Brown discusses the context and challenges of designing policies to counter organized crime and illicit economies in West Africa. She argues that although large-scale illicit economies and organized crime have received intense attention from governments and international organizations since the end of the Cold War, the strategies designed to combat these developments have been ineffective and, at times, counterproductive. Many populations experiencing inadequate state presence, great poverty, and social and political marginalization are dependent on illicit economies; and policies prioritizing suppression of these economies can, paradoxically, increase the economic and political capital of criminal or militant groups.

The recent drug trade epidemic and the connections between various illicit economies and terrorism have cast a spotlight on West Africa, Felbab-Brown explains. But in analyzing how the drug trade affects West Africa, it is important to note that preexisting institutional and governance deficiencies crucially amplify the destabilizing effects of the drug trade. Neither the  drug trade nor the entrenchment of political corruption and misgovernance in West Africa are new phenomena emerging in the wake of cocaine flows through the region. Rather, political contestation in West Africa has long centered on the capture of rents from legal, semi-illegal, or outright illegal economies such as diamonds, gold, timber, cacao, human trafficking, and illegal fishing, resulting in a pervasive culture of illegality, in which society expects that laws will be broken, enforcement evaded, and that the state will be the source of rents rather than an equitable provider of public goods. A long history of rentier economies, illicit activity, smuggling, endemic corruption, weak institutions, and governance as mafia rule—that provides exceptions from law enforcement to the ruler's clique—has left West Africa with what Felbab-Brown terms the technology of illegality and the state as mafia bazaar.

This context makes West Africa a particularly vexing area for policymakers and international donors who want to combat militancy or organized crime in West Africa. The United States and international community should consider any intervention in the region strategically, calibrating assistance packages to the absorptive capacity of the partner country, focusing on broad state-building, and fostering good governance. The priority of the United States must be to combat the most disruptive and dangerous networks of organized crime and belligerency, recognizing that anti-crime interventions cannot eradicate the majority of organized crime, illicit economies, and drug trafficking in the region. Moreover, efforts by external donors, such as Colombia or Brazil, to transfer policy practices to West African countries need to carefully consider which external lessons and policies are suited for local contexts.

The full book, Dark Networks in the Atlantic Basin: Emerging Trends and Implications for Human Security, is available for purchase from The Brookings Institution Press.

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• Designing pan-Atlantic and international anti-crime cooperation

Updated, 11/14/14 with new content.

President Obama is traveling this week in the Asia-Pacific region. He is attending the APEC Summit in Beijing Monday and Tuesday; the ASEAN Summit and the East Asia Summit in Myanmar Tuesday; and the G-20 Summit in Brisbane Saturday and Sunday. Brookings experts have offered significant commentary on the president's agenda and challenges during this trip:

Richard Bush, director of the Center for East Asia Policy Studies and the Michael H. Armacost Chair, reflects on what Presidents Obama and Xi said about the situation in Hong Kong during their summit.

Charles Freeman, a nonresident senior fellow in the John L. Thornton China Center, reflects on Chinese President Xi's address to business executives during APEC during which Xi discussed the "new normal" of Chinese economic growth and more open visa policies. His remarks, Freeman notes, "sounded a contrasting note to those he made just a month earlier" and "were also out of tune with the well-chronicled anxieties of foreign investors about the souring business environment they face in China."

Neil Ruiz, a senior policy analyst and associate fellow in the Metropolitan Policy Program, says that the new visa rules agreed to by Presidents Obama and Xi "is an important step in building economic bridges between Chinese cities and U.S. metropolitan areas."

Senior Fellow Michael O'Hanlon, the Sydney Stein, Jr. Chair in International Security, focuses on two prospective agreements on military matters, dealing with confidence-building and operational safety issues, reached between the U.S. and China. "The Obama and Xi teams should be proud of a good summit," writes O'Hanlon, "But situating these accords in a broader framework underscores how much work remains to be done."

On the U.S.-China climate agreement to cut greenhouse gas emissions: Brookings Managing Director William Antholis calls it "dramatic" for both diplomatic and domestic political reasons; and Fellow Tim Boersma, acting director of the Energy Security Initiative, says it is "a big deal."

Miriam Sapiro, a visiting fellow and former deputy U.S. trade representative, says that the trip "gives the White House the chance to emphasize foreign and economic policy goals that can be broadly embraced by Democrats and Republicans." Sapiro also commented on the importance of trade policy, including the Trans-Pacific Partnership, in a recent Brookings Cafeteria podcast.

Experts recently joined together in a full-day conference to examine the economic, environmental, political, and security implications of President Obama's trip to China and his interactions with President Xi Jinping. Full audio, video, and a transcript of remarks by former U.S. National Security Advisor Thomas Donilon are available.

Six experts from the John L. Thornton China Center recently offered their views on how President Obama can have a productive visit with President Xi. Their comments covered issues including Hong Kong, trade, and domestic Chinese reforms, among others.

Lynn Kuok, a nonresident fellow with the Center for East Asia Policy Studies, offers her perspectives on Obama's trip to Myanmar. 

In Think Tank 20, experts from Brookings and around the world address interrelated debates about growth, convergence, and income distribution—three elements likely to shape policy debates beyond the G-20 Summit. Use the handy globe interactive to navigate to countries and regions.

Kemal Derviş—vice president and director of Global Economy and Development and the Edward M. Bernstein Scholar—and Peter Drysdale—emeritus professor of economics at Australian National University—are the editors of a new volume on the G-20 summit at five years. They explore questions including, Will these summits add ongoing value to global economic governance, or will they will become purely ceremonial gatherings, which continue to take place because of the inertia in such processes?

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As China presides over the G-20 for the first time, the country has the significant opportunity to impact a system of global governance under increasing stress. At the same time, while enduring the costs and realizing the benefits of its leadership role, China can address critical issues including innovation, global security, infrastructure development, and climate change. Even as China recently has made its own forays into regional institution-building with the launch of the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank and the “One Belt, One Road” initiative, its G-20 presidency presents a new platform from which the country can advance its own agenda as part of a broader global agenda. As the first and second largest economies in the world, the United States and China can benefit enormously by understanding each other’s perspective.

Think tanks like the Brookings-Tsinghua Center have been playing an important role in this bilateral and multilateral exchange of views. On March 22, in celebration of the 10th anniversaries of the Brookings-Tsinghua Center and the John L. Thornton China Center at Brookings, Tsinghua University hosted a conference to examine how China can realize the 2016 G-20 theme of “an innovative, invigorated, interconnected, and inclusive world economy.” The event began with introductory keynote remarks on the substantive advancements China and the United States have made in think tank development and people-to-people diplomacy, followed by an additional set of keynote remarks and panel discussions presenting Chinese and American perspectives on the G-20 agenda and the state of global governance.

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• Chinas G20 Presidency Transcript

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In an era of fluid geopolitics and geoeconomics, challenges to the global order abound: from ever-changing terrorism, to massive refugee flows, a stubbornly sluggish world economy, and the specter of global pandemics. Against this backdrop, the question of whether leader summitry—either the G-7 or G-20 incarnations—can supply needed international governance is all the more relevant. This question is particularly significant for East Asia this year as Japan and China, two economic giants that are sometimes perceived as political rivals, respectively host the G-7 and G-20 summits. 

On April 18, the Center for East Asia Policy Studies and the Project on International Order and Strategy co-hosted a discussion on the continued relevancy and efficacy of the leader summit framework, Japan’s and China’s priorities as summit hosts, and whether these East Asian neighbors will hold parallel but completely separate summits or utilize these summits as an opportunity to cooperate on issues of mutual, and global, interest.

Join the conversation on Twitter using #G7G20Asia

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• Japan’s G-7 and China’s G-20 chairmanships: Bridges or stovepipes in leader summitry?

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• Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

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• 20160418_g7g20_transcript

Introduction:  The sinking of the Deepwater Horizon drilling platform and the resulting discharge of millions of gallons of crude oil into the sea demonstrated graphically the challenge of environmental protection in the ocean waters shared by Cuba and the United States.

While the quest for deepwater drilling of oil and gas may slow as a result of the latest calamity, it is unlikely to stop. It came as little surprise, for example, that Repsol recently announced plans to move forward with exploratory oil drilling in Cuban territorial waters later this year.

As Cuba continues to develop its deepwater oil and natural gas reserves, the consequence to the United States of a similar mishap occurring in Cuban waters moves from the theoretical to the actual. The sobering fact that a Cuban spill could foul hundreds of miles of American coastline and do profound harm to important marine habitats demands cooperative and proactive planning by Washington and Havana to minimize or avoid such a calamity. Also important is the planning necessary to prevent and, if necessary, respond to incidents arising from this country’s oil industry that, through the action of currents and wind, threaten Cuban waters and shorelines.

While Washington is working to prevent future disasters in U.S. waters like the Deepwater Horizon, its current policies foreclose the ability to respond effectively to future oil disasters—whether that disaster is caused by companies at work in Cuban waters, or is the result of companies operating in U.S. waters.

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INTRODUCTION 

Last year, President Obama delivered the first step in his promise to reach out to the Cuban people and support their desire for freedom and self-determination. Premised on the belief that Cuban Americans are our best ambassadors for freedom in Cuba, the Obama administration lifted restrictions on travel and remittances by Cuban Americans. The pent-up demand for Cuban American contact with the island revealed itself: within three months of the new policy, 300,000 Cuban Americans traveled to Havana -- 50,000 more than for all of the previous year.  Experts estimate that over $600 million in annual remittances has flowed from the United States to Cuba in 2008 and 2009 and informal flows of consumer goods is expanding rapidly.

The administration’s new policy has the potential to create new conditions for change in Cuba. However, if U.S. policy is to be truly forward looking it must further expand its focus from the Castro government to the well-being of the Cuban people. Recent developments on the island, including the ongoing release of dozens of political prisoners, have helped create the right political moment to take action.  The administration should institute a cultural diplomacy strategy that authorizes a broad cross-section of American private citizens and civil society to travel to the island to engage Cuban society and share their experiences as citizens of a democratic country.  Reducing restrictions on people-to-people contact is not a “concession,” but a strategic tool to advance U.S. policy objectives to support the emergence of a Cuban nation in which the Cuban people determine their political and economic future.

The President has the authority to reinstate a wide range of “purposeful,” non-touristic travel to Cuba in order to implement a cultural diplomacy strategy. Under President Clinton, the Baltimore Orioles played baseball in Havana and in return the Cuban national team was invited to Baltimore. U.S. students studied abroad in Cuba and engaged in lively discussions with their fellow students and host families. U.S. religious groups provided food and medicines to community organizations, helping them assist their membership.  However, in 2004, such travel was curtailed, severely limiting U.S. insights about the needs, interests and organizational capacities of community groups and grassroots organizations. Today, visitors traveling under an educational license, for example, number a meager 2,000 annually.

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Global poverty and climate change are two of the most pressing challenges for global policymakers today, and require policy prescriptions that address their interrelated issues. Effective climate solutions must empower development by improving livelihoods, health and economic prospects while poverty alleviation must become a central strategy for both mitigating emissions and reducing the poor’s vulnerability to climate change.

In its fifth annual gathering, led by Lael Brainard and co-chaired by Strobe Talbott and Richard C. Blum, the Brookings Blum Roundtable addressed the challenges of climate change and development and convened leaders from both the development and climate change communities from August 1-3, 2008, to discuss and debate policy ideas that could benefit both fronts. By examining common challenges—accountability, effective deployment of resources, agenda-setting, mobilizing the public and financial resources, and achieving scale and sustainability—the Roundtable established a solid foundation for collaboration among the climate change and development communities and fostered ideas for policy action.

Keynote Sessions

Keynote Panel: “Noble Nobels: Solutions to Save the Planet”

• Steven Chu, University of California, Berkeley
• Al Gore, Generation Investment Management; 45^th Vice President of the United States

Keynote Panel: Legal Empowerment of the Poor

• Mary Robinson, Realizing Rights: The Ethical Globalization Initiative
• Madeline Albright, The Albright Group; Former U.S. Secretary of State

Keynote Panel: “How Do We Achieve Climate Justice?”

• Kumi Naidoo, CIVICUS and the Global Call to Action Against Poverty
• Mary Robinson, Realizing Rights: The Ethical Globalization Initiative
  
  

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The context for aid is changing. Globalization has spurred economic convergence, upending the twentieth century economic balance and creating a smaller world where both problems and solutions spill across national borders more readily. This has given rise to a legion of new development actors, including emerging economies, NGOs, private businesses, and coordinating networks, who have brought fresh energy and resources to the field while rendering the prospect of genuine donor coordination ever more difficult. Global integration and competition for resources has raised the prominence of global public goods, whose equitable and sustainable provision requires international collective action. Meanwhile, poor countries are demanding a new form of partnership with the international community, built upon the principles of country ownership and mutual accountability.

From G-20 meetings and the upcoming High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Korea to unfolding events in the Middle East and North Africa, leadership from the United States is crucial, placing pressure on the Obama administration to deliver on its promise of far-reaching reforms to U.S. global development efforts. And amidst this shifting global landscape is the issue of effectively communicating the importance of global development cooperation to both a national and global public, at a time when budget pressures are being felt across many of the world’s major economies

At the eighth annual Brookings Blum Roundtable, co-chaired by Kemal Derviş and Richard C. Blum, 50 thought-leaders in international development came together to discuss a new role for global development cooperation, one that employs inclusive and innovative approaches for tackling contemporary development problems and that leverages the resources of a large field of actors.

Roundtable Agenda

Wednesday, August 3, 2011

Welcome: 8:40 a.m. – 9:00 a.m.
Open Remarks
• Richard C. Blum, Blum Capital Partners, LP and Founder of the Blum Center for 
Developing Economies at Berkeley
• Mark Suzman, Global Development Program, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation
• Kemal Derviş, Global Economy and Development, Brookings

Statement of Purpose, Scene Setter, Comments on the Agenda
• Homi Kharas, Brookings

Session I: 9:00AM - 10:30AM
Reframing Development Cooperation
In almost any discussion of international development, foreign aid takes center stage. But while 
aid can certainly be a catalyst for development, it does not work in isolation. Participants will 
discuss the key objectives of development cooperation, consider what measures of development 
cooperation are most valuable for recipients, and explore an effective balance of roles and 
responsibilities - including both public and private players - in today’s evolving development 
landscape.

Moderator
• Walter Isaacson, Aspen Institute

Introductory Remarks
• Owen Barder, Center for Global Development
• Donald Kaberuka, African Development Bank Group
• Ananya Roy, University of California, Berkeley
• Elizabeth Littlefield, Overseas Private Investment Corporation

Session II: 10:50AM - 12:20PM
The G-20's Development Agenda
Last year’s G-20 meeting in Seoul marked the first time the group formally took up the issue of development. There they announced the Seoul Development Consensus for Shared Growth and the Multi-Year Action Plan for Development: two far-reaching policies which are expected to guide the G20’s future agenda. What is the G-20’s comparative advantage vis-à-vis development, and how can the group’s development efforts be strengthened and supported?

Moderator
• Mark Suzman, Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation

Introductory Remarks
• Alan Hirsch, The Presidency, South Africa
• Suman Bery, International Growth Centre
• Homi Kharas, Brookings

Dinner Program: 6:00PM - 9:00PM
A Conversation with Al Gore and Mary Robinson
Topic: "Energy Security and Climate Justice"

Moderator
• Kemal Derviş, Global Economy and Development, Brookings

Thursday, August 4, 2012 

Session III: 9:00AM - 10:30AM 
The Road to Buscan
In November, participants from over 150 countries, including ministers of developing and developed countries, heads of bilateral and multilateral development institutions, and civil society representatives, will take part in the fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan, South Korea. The forum is intended to take account of the development community’s progress in achieving greater impact through aid and to redefine the aid effectiveness agenda to adjust to a changing global landscape. What would constitute success or failure at Busan?

Moderator
• Raymond Offenheiser, Oxfam America

Introductory Remarks
• J. Brian Atwood, Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development, 
Development Assistance Committee 
• Wonhyuk Lim, Korean Development Institute
• Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, World Bank 
• Steven Radelet, U.S. Agency for International Development 

Session IV: 10:50AM - 12:20PM 
Lessons from the Middle East on Governance and Aid
Popular protests across the Middle East against authoritarian regimes have prompted reflection 
on the role of aid to non-democratic and poorly governed countries. Some critics believe that aid 
should only be given to relatively well-governed countries where it is more likely to be effective, 
but for others, this amounts to collective punishment for the people who suffer under such 
governments. Do aid allocation models need to change and what role can the development 
community now play in supporting peaceful, democratic reform in the Middle East?

Moderator
• Madeleine K. Albright, Albright Stonebridge Group

Introductory Remarks
• Ragui Assaad, University of Minnesota
• Sheila Herrling, Millennium Challenge Corporation
• Tarik Yousef, Silatech

Lunch Program: 12:30PM - 2:00PM
A Conversation with Thomas R. Nides, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources

Moderator
• Richard C. Blum, Blum Capital Partners, LP and Founder of the Blum Center for Developing Economies at Berkeley

Session V: 9:00AM - 10:30AM
Implementing U.S. Development Reforms 
The end of 2010 saw the completion of two major policy reviews in Washington concerned with 
international development: the Presidential Policy Directive on Global Development and the 
Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review. Progress on implementation has been 
significant in many respects and meager in others. Additionally, despite directives to deliver on 
many valuable priorities for improvement, essential components of fundamental reform are still 
in need of address. Casting a shadow across the exercise, or alternatively serving as a spur to 
focus, the budget environment has soured.

Moderator
• Jim Kolbe, German Marshall Fund of the United States

Introductory Remarks
• Rajiv Shah, U.S. Agency for International Development
• Samina Ahmed, International Crisis Group
• Robert Mosbacher, Jr., Mosbacher Energy Company

Session VI: 10:50AM - 12:20PM
Communicating Development Cooperation
Public interest in and support for aid matter. Yet in many aid giving countries, there is 
widespread cynicism as to what end aid programs serve and ignorance as to what activities they 
actually involve. What are the best examples of development efforts which have been 
communicated successfully and what can we learn from this to shore up support for 
development cooperation now and in the future?

Moderator 
• Liz Schrayer, U.S. Global Leadership Coalition

Introductory Remarks 
• Steven Kull, Program on International Policy Attitudes
• Joshua Bolten, ONE
• S. Shankar Sastry, University of California, Berkeley
• Jack Leslie, Weber Shandwick

Closing Remarks: 12:20PM- 12:30PM
• Richard C. Blum, Blum Capital Partners, LP and Founder of the Blum Center for 
Developing Economies at Berkeley
• Kemal Derviş, Global Economy and Development, Brookings

Public Event: 4:00PM - 5:30PM
Brookings and the Aspen Institute present “Development as National Security?”: A Conversation with Rajiv Shah, U.S. Agency for International Development; Sylvia Mathews Burwell, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation; Richard J. Danzig, Center for a New American Security; and Susan C. Schwab, University of Maryland.

Moderator
• Jessica Tuchman Mathews, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Welcome and Introductions
• Kemal Derviş, Brookings

Hosts
• Richard C. Blum and Senator Dianne Feinstein

During the height of the Ebola crisis in September 2014 there were 21 confirmed cases of the virus and 8 deaths in Nigeria. The African nation has the continent’s largest population, a high poverty rate, and the government spends relatively little on health care. At the time many were worried about a scenario where the virus spread throughout Nigeria. But, the Nigerian Minister of Health Onyebuchi Chukwu disagreed with that assessment. He commented to Forbes, “Nigeria will be as clean as any other country as far as Ebola virus disease is concerned.” His comments were proven to be accurate in the coming months. There were a variety of factors that contributed to Nigeria’s success at combating the disease. One important factor was the use of mobile electronic health records programs.

How mobile fights disease

1. Training Healthcare Workers

Training health care providers was a priority at the beginning of the Ebola outbreak. A survey found that 85 percent of health care workers in the country believed you could avoid Ebola by abstaining from handshakes or touching. Correcting these myths about the disease was a critical part of the response effort, especially for health care workers.

2. Rapid Deployment

One of the virtues of mHealth is its speed and flexibility. Mobile allows officials to quickly disseminate the latest information to front line health care workers. Increasing the speed of communication is a general boon to any large public health response.

3. Virtual Records

Ebola Treatment Units (ETU) greatly benefitted from using digital rather than paper records. Paper records cannot be removed from an ETU. Deborah Theobald co-founder of Vecna Technologies that created the mHealth platform in Nigeria has pointed out that, “If the patient is isolated, so is their paperwork”. Electronic records are easy to share and also lower the risk of infection for health care workers.

Mobile health policy challenges

Despite the potential benefits of mHealth, barriers in some countries prevent the full positive impact of these technologies from coming into effect. Many developing nations lack the electrical infrastructure that is necessary to power mobile devices. Health care regulations are often too overly bureaucratic and burdensome. This makes it difficult for innovators to develop and equip workers with mobile tools and applications. It often takes an emergency situation like the Ebola crisis to make substantive changes. Success in the long term is only possible if leaders create an environment that is more hospitable to mHealth.

Mobile interventions have also demonstrated potential to address important public health issues. Recently experts gathered at the Brookings Institution to discuss how mHealth can improve health outcomes. Apps like Mobile Midwife and Text4Baby can encourage healthy pregnancies by providing valuable tips to expecting mothers. Mobile health platforms are successful because they directly inform caregivers. The proliferation of mobile phones through the developing world presents a health opportunity to communicate with the people who need help.

Mobile devices are making a big difference in the lives of billions of people around the world who use them every day. Internet-enabled smartphones and tablets provide access to information and a channel of communication for users. Building wireless networks to support mobile devices requires large capital investments from wireless carriers who must purchase wireless spectrum and infrastructure. To ensure that mobile services are reliable and affordable, national governments must allocate enough wireless spectrum to commercial carriers to satisfy demand. This is the subject of a new paper from Shamika Ravi and Darrell M. West titled “Spectrum Policy in India."

A scarce resource

Mobile devices typically operate on frequencies from 30 kHz to 300 GHz on the radio spectrum. Unless spectrum is allocated efficiently, the scarcity of available frequencies leads to poor quality and high costs for mobile broadband. The growing demand for mobile service in India currently exceeds the amount of spectrum available to wireless carriers. The scarcity of wireless spectrum limits reliable Internet access for mobile subscribers who have no alternative point of access. According to the Cellular Operators Association of India, nearly 60 percent of Internet users only have access through their mobile phones.

Mobile service in India is relatively expensive for many consumers because the Indian military reserves so much spectrum for their own use. Much of this spectrum goes underutilized, even as commercial carriers plead for more spectrum to be released. When the Indian government does release spectrum, it is typically through auctions with high starting bids. Setting high starting bids for blocks of spectrum can lead to high selling prices that force wireless carriers to take out large loans. Higher prices for spectrum raise costs for consumers and reduce private sector investment in wireless infrastructure. Rather than make spectrum artificially scarce, the Indian government should work with wireless carriers to lower the prices for consumers. 

Investing in India’s future

Reliable mobile service has the potential to greatly enhance economic growth in India. Analysis from the Boston Consulting Group found that the India’s mobile sector grew at 12.4 percent annually from 2009-2014; it now accounts for 2.2 percent of India’s gross domestic product. Potential growth comes from filling gaps in educational and health care spending in rural communities. Innovative mobile applications provide a low cost method of sending education and health care resources to underserved rural communities that lack physical infrastructure. In India’s rapidly growing cities, mobile services are seen as a way to improve the quality of government services and promote entrepreneurship. Prime Minister Narendra Modi recently designated 100 “smart cities” that would use technology to overcome the challenges of India’s rapid urbanization.

India could free up spectrum by adopting the “NATO Band” of spectrum for military uses and auctioning off the remaining spectrum.  The NATO band is used by the militaries of NATO member countries and several of their allies, and it already overlaps with much of the Indian military’s spectrum.  Furthermore, the Indian government must lower the minimum bids at spectrum auctions and lower taxes so that wireless carriers have enough profits to build their networks.  Mobile technologies are rapidly evolving, and each new generation has greater demands for spectrum. Regulators in India will not only have to maintain affordable prices for the current generation of mobile technology, but also anticipate upgrades that will deliver more data at faster speeds.

In a new paper, Shamika Ravi and Darrell West examine mobile technology in India, particularly the crucial role spectrum policy plays in facilitating wireless growth. The availability of devices, high telecommunications costs, and taxes on mobile usage make it difficult for consumers and businesses to take full advantage of the mobile revolution. India has enormous potential for growth in mobile applications as is reflected in its massive number of mobile customers.

While smartphone use has risen in the developing world, increasing access and capacity in key areas like education, health care, transportation, and commerce, countries are finding increased wireless utilization running up against the constraints of radio spectrum available. The frequencies necessary to keep mobile devices connected represent for many countries a scarce natural resource often used for defined purposes that cannot be used for other purposes. Without adequate spectrum, consumers in developing countries in particular may face dropped calls, reduced wireless availability, or high prices, causing slower mobile growth in many countries.

Ravi and West recommend that India open up spectrum space, revamp auctions, make sure that costs are affordable so that consumers don’t pay high telecom prices, enable the trading and management of spectrum, and harmonize regional rules. Without this commitment to a viable digital ecosystem, mobile growth will stagnate and it will be difficult to obtain the benefits of the mobile revolution.

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• Download the paper

Abstract

Independent workers typically work with intermediaries who match workers to customers. The independent worker and the intermediary have some elements of the arms-length independent business relationships that characterize “independent contractor” status, and some elements of a traditional employee-employer relationship. On the one hand, independent workers have the ability to choose when to work, and whether to work at all. They may work with multiple intermediaries simultaneously, or conduct personal tasks while they are working with an intermediary. It is thus impossible in many circumstances to attribute independent workers’ work hours to any employer. In this critical respect, independent workers are similar to independent businesses. On the other hand, the intermediary retains some control over the way independent workers perform their work, such as by setting their fees or fee caps, and they may “fire” workers by prohibiting them from using their service. In these respects, independent workers are similar to traditional employees.

Evidence is presented suggesting that about 600,000 workers, or 0.4 percent of total U.S. employment, work with an online intermediary in the gig economy. Although there are probably many more workers who currently work with an offline intermediary who would qualify for independent worker status than there are who work with an online intermediary, the number of workers participating in the online gig economy is growing very rapidly.

In our proposal, independent workers — regardless of whether they work through an online or offline intermediary — would qualify for many, although not all, of the benefits and protections that employees receive, including the freedom to organize and collectively bargain, civil rights protections, tax withholding, and employer contributions for payroll taxes. Because it is conceptually impossible to attribute their work hours to any single intermediary, however, independent workers would not qualify for hours-based benefits, including overtime or minimum wage requirements. Further, because independent workers would rarely, if ever, qualify for unemployment insurance benefits given the discretion they have to choose whether to work through an intermediary, they would not be covered by the program or be required to contribute taxes to fund that program. However, intermediaries would be permitted to pool independent workers for purposes of purchasing and providing insurance and other benefits at lower cost and higher quality without the risk that their relationship will be transformed into an employment relationship.

Our proposal seeks to structure benefits to make independent worker status neutral when compared with employee status, as well as to enhance the efficiency of the operation of the labor market. By extending many of the legal benefits and protections found in employment relationships to independent workers, our proposal would protect and extend the social compact between workers and employers, and reduce the legal uncertainty and legal costs that currently beset many independent worker relationships.

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Last month, we experienced yet another breakthrough in the epic battle of man against machine. Google’s AlphaGo won against the reigning Go champion Lee Sedol. This success, however, was different than that of IBM’s Deep Blue against Gary Kasparov in 1987. While Deep Blue still applied “brute force” to calculate all possible options ahead, AlphaGo was learning as the game progressed. And through this computing breakthrough that we can learn how to better leverage the data revolution.

In the game of Go, brute-force strategies don’t help because the total number of possible combinations exceeds the number of atoms in the universe. Some games, including some we played since childhood, were immune to computing “firepower” for a long time. For example, Connect Four wasn’t solved until 1995 with the conclusion being the first player can force a win. And checkers wasn’t until 2007, when Jonathan Schaeffer determined that in a perfect game, both sides could force a draw. For chess, a safe strategy has yet to be developed, meaning that we don’t know yet if white could force a win or, like in checkers, black could manage to hold on to a draw.

But most real-life situations are more complicated than chess, precisely because the universe of options is unlimited and solving them requires learning. If computers are to help, beyond their use as glorified calculators, they need to be able to learn. This is the starting point of the artificial intelligence movement.  In a world where perfection is impossible, you need well-informed intuition in order to advance. The first breakthrough in this space occurred when IBM’s Watson beat America’s Jeopardy! champions in 2011. These new intelligent machines operate in probabilities, not in certainty.

That being said, perfection remains important, especially when it comes to matters of life and death such as flying airplanes, constructing houses, or conducting heart surgery, as these areas require as much attention to detail as possible. At the same time, in many realms of life and policymaking we fall into a perfection trap. We often generate obsolete knowledge by attempting to explain things perfectly, when effective problem solving would have been better served by real-time estimates. We strive for exactitude when rough results, more often than not, are good enough.

By contrast, some of today’s breakthroughs are based on approximation. Think of Google Translate and Google’s search engine itself. The results are typically quite bad, but compared to the alternative of not having them at all, or spending hours leafing through an encyclopedia, they are wonderful. Moreover, once these imperfect breakthroughs are available, one can improve them iteratively. Only once the first IBM and Apple PCs were put on the market in the 1980s did the cycle of upgrading start, which still continues today.

In the realm of social and economic data, we have yet to reach this stage of “managed imperfection” and continuous upgrading. We are producing social and economic forecasts with solid 20th century methods. With extreme care we conduct poverty assessments and maps, usually taking at least a year to produce as they involve hundreds of enumerators, lengthy interviews and laborious data entry. Through these methods we are able to perfectly explain past events, but we fail to estimate current trends—even imperfectly.

The paradox of today’s big data era is that most of that data is poor and messy, even though the possibilities for improving it are unlimited. Almost every report from development institutions starts with a disclaimer highlighting “severe data limitations.” This is because only 0.5 percent of all the available data is actually being curated to be made usable. If data is the oil of the 21st century, we need data refineries to convert the raw product into something that can be consumed by the average person.

Thanks to the prevalence of mobile device and rapid advances in satellite technology, it is possible to produce more data faster, better, and cheaper. High-frequency data also makes it possible to make big data personal, which also increases the likelihood that people act on it. Ultimately, the breakthroughs in big data for development will be driven by managerial cultures, as has been the case with other successful ventures. Risk averse cultures pay great attention to perfection. They nurture the fear of mistakes and losing. Modern management accepts failure, encourages trial and error, and reaches progress through interaction and continuous upgrading.

Event Information

The government and opposition in Georgia remain locked in political stalemate. The opposition continues to hold rallies and to call for President Saakashvili to step down, and the opposition and government thus far have found no common basis for moving forward. All this plays out against a backdrop of lingering tensions in relations between Georgia and Russia in the aftermath of the August 2008 conflict.

On June 17, the Center on the United States and Europe (CUSE) at Brookings hosted Irakli Alasania, former Georgian permanent representative to the United Nations and currently the head of the Alliance for Georgia opposition group, for a discussion on the political crisis in Georgia and the prospects for resolution. After a decade of important positions in the Georgian government, Ambassador Alasania resigned from his position at the United Nations in December 2008 and has since been actively involved in the Georgian opposition. Brookings senior fellow Carlos Pascual introduced Ambassador Alasania and moderated the discussion.

Audio

• The Political Crisis in Georgia: Prospects for Resolution

Transcript

• Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

• 20090617_georgia

Chairperson, Excellencies, distinguished Delegates, Ladies and Gentlemen,

I have come to New York from Kampala where I attended last week’s African Union Special Summit of Heads of State and Government on refugees, returnees and internally displaced persons in Africa. There, I witnessed the historic moment of the adoption of the AU Convention on the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa. The importance of this Convention cannot be underestimated. Building on the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement it is the first legally binding IDP-specific treaty covering an entire continent. The Convention is a tremendous achievement and a beacon of hope for the almost 12 million people in Africa internally displaced by conflict and the many more internally displaced by natural disasters, and hopefully serves as a model for other regions, too.  

I commend the African Union for its leadership in developing this Convention. I urge all African states to ratify it and implement its provisions, and I call on the international community to seize this momentum and to lend all support needed to its implementation. 

Mr. Chairperson, 

Reflecting on my mandate’s activities over the past 12 months, I would first like to highlight three topics: climate change and natural disasters, internal displacement and peace processes and the search for durable solutions for internally displaced persons. 

Climate Change and Internal Displacement

Climate change increases the frequency and magnitude of climate related disasters, both sudden-onset disasters like flooding and hurricanes and slow-onset disasters such as desertification. The negative impact of these disasters can be mitigated by adopting disaster risk reduction measures. Yet, it is expected that the number of persons displaced by climate related disasters will increase. Most of these people will remain within their own country; hence they will be internally displaced persons to whom the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement apply. It is therefore crucial to enhance capacities of governments and humanitarian actors to provide protection and assistance to these persons. I strongly call on states to ensure that the adaptation and risk management regime of the new UNFCCC framework agreement covers forced displacement. 

Internal Displacement and Peace Processes

Finding durable solutions for internally displaced persons is an essential element of a successful peace process. The way the issue is addressed in peace agreements often predetermines how internal displacement is dealt with in the aftermath of conflicts. Many peace agreements reflect the issue of internal displacement insufficiently or haphazardly. Therefore, over the past 18 months and in close cooperation with the Mediation Support Unit of the Department for Political Affairs of the UN and humanitarian, human rights and mediation experts, I developed a guide on internal displacement and peace processes for mediators. This guide provides advice on how to consult with internally displaced persons and engage them in the different phases of a peace process even if they do not sit at the negotiation table and on what kind of key displacement-specific issues should be addressed in the text of a peace agreement. It will be published later this year.[1] 

I deepened my engagement with the Peacebuilding Commission through a country-based engagement on Central African Republic. I am pleased to see that the country specific strategic framework reflects many of the recommendations that I submitted on the basis of a working visit to this country last February. I plan to remain engaged with the Peacebuilding Commission in the course of the coming year. 

I call on all actors presently involved in peace and peacebuilding processes to adequately address the specific needs of IDPs in the aftermath of armed conflicts. 

Durable Solutions for IDPs

In the many missions I carried out over the past five years, I noticed that finding durable solutions for IDPs is always a tremendous challenge. It is a multi-faceted, long, complex and often expensive process, which requires the coordination and cooperation of a variety of actors from among national and local authorities, and the humanitarian and the development communities. With policy guidance such as that provided by the Framework for Durable Solutions—a document developed by my office and the Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement a few years ago and presently being revised in close cooperation with relevant stakeholders[2]—we know what should be done, but we must improve on the ground. Too often the coordination between humanitarian and development actors is insufficient, the funding for early recovery activities is lacking or IDPs are simply not a priority in recovery, reconstruction and development plans resulting in gaps jeopardizing the sustainability of returns or local integration of the displaced when the humanitarian actors phase out and the development partners are not yet able to show tangible progress in restoring infrastructure, services and livelihoods. Based on my observations in many countries, I have come to the conclusion that the practical problems in this area are a consequence of systemic failures in bringing humanitarian and development actors together to work hand in hand at an early stage of recovery. In addition to differences in approaches and cultures, these failures can to a large extent be attributed to a lack of flexible funding mechanisms for early recovery and reconstruction in spite of some recent steps in the right direction, including the creation of the peace-building fund.  

Country Situations  

Mr. Chairperson, 

The second pillar of my mandate is the engagement in a constructive dialogue with governments. I am grateful that with a few exceptions the countries that I approached during this reporting period were open to engage with my mandate. 

Allow me to provide you with an update on important developments since the completion of my written report to the General Assembly:  

I carried out a mission to Somalia from 14 – 21 October. Lack of humanitarian access, security risks for humanitarian workers, and the sharp decline in donor contributions exacerbate this long-standing humanitarian crisis, and international attention to the plight of IDPs is largely insufficient. I was shocked by the degree of violence the civilian population and in particular internally displaced persons in South and Central Somalia suffer. Serious violations of international humanitarian and human rights law are committed in an environment of impunity. Such acts are a major cause of the displacement of 1.5 million persons, the majority of whom are women and children. They remain highly vulnerable and exposed to serious human rights violations, in particular sexual violence, during flight and in IDP settlements. Many of the displaced try to reach safety in Puntland or Somaliland, where the high number of internally displaced persons puts enormous strain on the limited existing resources and basic services available. Reception capacities for new internally displaced persons must be strengthened and basic services expanded to reduce the burden on host communities. Further robust development interventions are needed to transform humanitarian action into sustainable livelihoods and investing into education and job opportunities for the youth is a must in an environment where recruitment by radical forces is often the only opportunity offered to them. Present efforts by the authorities, humanitarian, development and human rights actors are largely insufficient to bring urgently needed change. I urgently call on the international community to strengthen these efforts and to reaffirm its commitment to Somalia. 

I was twice in Sri Lanka over the past six months; in April, shortly before the end of hostilities, and again in September at a time the security situation had vastly improved, although over 250,000 internally displaced were still held in closed camps. Restoration of their freedom of movement has become a matter of urgency, and immediate and substantial progress in this regard is an imperative for Sri Lanka to comply with its commitments under international law. I discussed a three-pronged strategy for decongesting the camps with the government, which is based on returns of IDPs to their homes, release of IDPs to host families and transfer of IDPs to small open welfare centers in the region of return as a transitional solution until return is possible. I urged the Government to pursue these options in parallel with highest priority, to speed up the screening procedures, and to immediately release those not deemed to pose a security threat. Since my visit, this process has started. I acknowledge the progress made so far in demining and reconstructing returnee areas and releasing and returning a good number of displaced people to Jaffna and Mannar, Trincomalee and Batticaloa as well as to Vavuniya and Killinochi. I underline that this return needs to happen according to international standards. At the same time, I continue to reiterate that the ultimate goal is the restoration of freedom of movement and finding durable solutions for all IDPs. 

During my visit to Georgia of last autumn, I reiterated that there should be no discrimination between different persons internally displaced in Georgia’s different waves of displacement. The approximately 220,000 individuals who have been displaced over the long-term in Georgia should be able to avail themselves of the same possibilities to improve their living conditions as are enjoyed by those more recently displaced. I welcome that in the meantime the government has adopted an action plan to improve the housing situation of the long-term displaced and started to implement it. I am also grateful that a solution was found allowing me to visit the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia region next week. 

I remain engaged on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In March 2010, six other special procedures and I will report to the Human Rights Council on progress the DRC made in implementing a series of recommendations we previously made on how to tangibly improve the situation on the ground. Despite encouraging returns of 110,000 persons in North Kivu Province over the last two months, I remain concerned about the overall deterioration of the humanitarian situation due to the continued attacks on civilian populations carried out by LRA (Lord’s Resistance Army) militias and the impact of the military operations against the FDLR (Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda) armed group and the FDLR’s reprisals against the civilian population triggering new displacements.  

My working visits to Uganda and Serbia had a special focus on durable solutions. In Uganda, I was impressed to see that the majority of the formerly 1.8 million internally displaced persons have returned to their villages and I expressed my appreciation to the Government for its continued efforts. Sustaining returns remains a challenge that must be addressed by quick impact recovery and development activities, which requires stronger action by development agencies and support of donors. Despite the huge progress made thus far, the fate of a considerable number of particularly vulnerable individuals left behind in camps or living in transit sites as well as a general lack of synchronicity between the phasing out of humanitarian assistance and the increase of development activities in returnee areas continue to be a source of concern. 

Many of the 200,000 persons internally displaced from and within Kosovo (I am using the term in accordance with the U.N. position of strict neutrality on the status question) have not yet found a durable solution. I note with appreciation that all relevant authorities in Pristina expressed their commitment to facilitate returns of displaced persons, regardless of their ethnicity. However, due to entrenched patterns of discrimination in every sector of life and also a lack of support, in particular at the municipal level, there have only been a few sustainable returns. At the same time, I wish to reemphasize that the right for a dignified life and the right to return are not mutually exclusive. In this respect, I would like to commend the increased efforts of the Government of Serbia to improve the living conditions of internally displaced persons who have not returned.  

Mr. Chairperson, 

This is my last report which I present personally in my capacity as Representative of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly. Over the past five years, I have seen encouraging trends.  The UN Guiding Principles are now firmly rooted as the relevant framework for the protection of internally displaced persons, legislation and policies have been developed at national and regional level and the cluster approach has led to an improved humanitarian response. Overall, states and humanitarian and developmental actors are better prepared and equipped today to address the plight of the more than 50 million persons displaced within their countries. This is badly needed as the effects of climate change will lead to new displacement. At the same time, it is worrying to see that armed conflict are conducted with utter disregard for the civilian populations in several parts of the world, the humanitarian space is shrinking in many countries, and many displacement situations that were protracted when I assumed this mandate remain unchanged. 

A new mandate-holder will be named next summer and I trust that he or she will also benefit from the particular strengths that currently characterize my mandate. As a Representative of the Secretary-General, I enjoy excellent access to Governments and other important stakeholders, I receive remarkable support of the relevant entities of the United Nations and from donors, and my participation as a standing invitee to the Inter-Agency Standing Committee is key to reach out to the wider humanitarian community.  

Thank you.

Introduction

Guaranteeing the right to vote and to participate in public and political affairs for all citizens is an important responsibility. Given the precarious position that IDPs can find themselves in and considering the extent to which they may need to rely on national authorities for assistance, IDPs have a legitimate and a heightened interest in influencing the decisions that affect their lives by participating in elections.   

Internally displaced persons often exist on the margins of society and are subject to a number of vulnerabilities because of their displacement. For instance, IDPs face an immediate need for protection and assistance in finding adequate shelter, food, and health care. Over time, they can suffer discrimination in accessing public services and finding employment on account of being an IDP from another region or town. IDPs also face an especially high risk of losing ownership of their housing, property, and land, something which can lead to loss of livelihoods and economic security as well as physical security. Women and children, who often make up the majority of IDP populations, face an acute risk of sexual exploitation and abuse.  

In addition to influencing public policy, elections can also be about reconciliation and addressing divisions and inequities that exist within society. For these reasons and others, IDPs should be afforded an opportunity to fully participate in elections as voters and as candidates.   

As noted in a press release of the Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons following an official mission to Georgia in December 2005, 

“[IDP] participation in public life, including elections, needs promotion and support. Supporting internally displaced persons in their pursuit of a normal life does not exclude, but actually reinforces, the option of eventual return. … Well integrated people are more likely to be productive and contribute to society, which in turn gives them the strength to return once the time is right."[1]

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Editor's Note: This is the second part of a two piece series on internal displacement that originally appeared online in TerraNullius. The first part is available here.
 
This post continues our discussion of the study entitled "From Responsibility to Response: Assessing National Response to Internal Displacement" recently released by the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement.

Addressing housing, land, and property (HLP) issues is a key component of national responsibility. Principle 29 of the non-binding but widely accepted Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement emphasizes that competent authorities have a duty to assist IDPs to recover their property and possessions or, when recovery is not possible, to obtain appropriate compensation or another form of just reparation.

The 2005 Framework for National Responsibility – which set the benchmarks we applied in our current study – reaffirms this responsibility (in Benchmark 10, “support durable solutions”) and flags a number of the challenges that often arise, such as IDPs’ lack of formal title or other documentary evidence of land and property ownership; the destruction of any such records due to conflict or natural disaster; and discrimination against women in laws and customs regulating property ownership and inheritance. The Framework for National Responsibility stresses that, “Government authorities should anticipate these problems and address them in line with international human rights standards and in an equitable and non-discriminatory manner.”

The extent to which a government has safeguarded HLP rights, including by assisting IDPs to recover their housing, land, and property thus was among the indicators by which we evaluated the efforts of each of the 15 governments examined in our study. Our findings emphasized the importance of both an adequate legal and policy framework for addressing displacement related HLP issues and the role that bodies charged with adjudication and monitoring can play in ensuring implementation.

HLP Law and Policy Frameworks

One of the most encouraging signs of governments taking seriously their responsibility to address internal displacement has been the development, adoption and implementation in all regions of the world of specific laws and policies that respect the rights of IDPs. Some of the countries surveyed have developed laws, decrees, orders, and policies that protect IDPs’ HLP rights, but these measures are also not without their limits and challenges. A few examples are presented below.

In Colombia, while Law 387 on Internal Displacement (1997) stipulates the right of IDPs to compensation and restitution (Article 10), the government has been hard-pressed to establish measures enabling them to realize that right (see further, below). In Colombia, the constitutional complaint process – the acción de tutela petition procedure – has made the government accountable to IDPs and has influenced government policy toward IDPs, including the policy of allocation of government assistance such as housing subsidies.

In Georgia, the legal framework for IDP protection includes a property restitution law for IDPs from South Ossetia, adopted in 2007, which provided for the establishment of a Commission on Restitution and Compensation; however, this body never became operational and the status of the law is unclear following the August 2008 conflict. The State Strategy on IDPs, also adopted in 2007, protects IDPs against “arbitrary/illegitimate eviction” and sets out a large-scale program for improving the living conditions of IDPs in their place of displacement, all the while reaffirming their right to property restitution.[1]

Displaced families whose homes were destroyed or damaged during the August 2008 received $15,000 from the government to rebuild their homes, although many IDPs have held off reconstruction efforts due to concerns about insecurity. The RSG on IDPs recommended in 2009 the established of a comprehensive mechanism for resolving HLP claims for both the South Ossetia and Abkhazia conflicts. In addition, in 2010, Georgia adopted procedures for vacating and reallocating IDP housing, which, among other things, addresses those cases in which removal of IDPs from a collective center is ordered by the government and may require an eviction, and spells out safeguards for guaranteeing the right of IDPs.[2]

Iraq’s 2005 Constitution protects Iraqis against forced displacement (Article 44(2)). Through its Property Claims Commission, formerly the Commission on the Resolution of Real Property Disputes established by Order No. 2 (2006), Iraq has sought to recover property seized between 1968 and 2003, although significant gaps and challenges remain. For those internally displaced between 2006 and 2008, Prime Ministerial Order 101 (2008) sets out a framework for providing property restitution for registered IDPs with a view to encouraging and facilitating their return to Baghdad governorate, the origin of the majority of post-2006 IDPs and the location of the majority of post-2006 returnees. However, there have been few claims; many IDPs lack the necessary documentation, do not trust government institutions, fear retribution or cannot afford the requisite costs.[3]

In Afghanistan, where national authorities have not yet defined “internally displaced persons,” property and land rights of IDPs are either specifically addressed or generally implicated in substantive and procedural provisions found in a series of executive acts that have been issued since 2001, including the most IDP-specific of them, Presidential Decree No. 104 on Land Distribution for Settlement to Eligible Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons (2005). This decree sets forth a basic framework for distributing government land to both IDPs and returnees as a means of addressing their housing needs. However, IDPs seeking access to land are required to provide their national identity cards (tazkera) and documentation proving their internal displacement status—documentation which they may have lost. Moreover, the decree does not recognize other fundamental rights or needs of the internally displaced; it is valid only in areas of origin; and its implementation has been marred by inefficiency and corruption within the very weak ministry that is tasked with its implementation.

Although the 2006 peace agreement in Nepal  included a commitment to return occupied land and property and to allow for the return of displaced persons, four years after the peace agreement (and three years after the adoption of a national policy), between 50,000 and 70,000 people remained displaced.  Nearly half of the returnees interviewed by the Nepal IDP Working Group reported serious land, housing and property problems.  Of the more than 10,000 claims for compensation for property filed in 2007 only 2,000 families had received support to reconstruct or repair their houses by 2009.  It is widely reported that IDPs with non-Maoist political affiliations have been the least likely to recover land and property.

In Turkey, the government has yet to take full responsibility for displacement caused by its security forces against a largely Kurdish population. In its Law 5233 on Compensation of Damages That Occurred Due to Terror and the Fight against Terror (27 July 2004) and its Return to Village and Rehabilitation Program, displacement is defined in terms of “terrorism” or the “fight” against it. This law does not specifically focus on internal displacement, but it does benefit IDPs among other affected populations. Law 5233 and its related amendments and regulations compensate for “material damages suffered by persons due to terrorist acts or activities undertaken during the fight against terror” between 1987 and 2004. Compensation is provided for three types of damage: loss of property; physical injuries, disabilities, medical treatment, death and funerals; and inability to access property due to measures taken during “the fight against terrorism.”

According to the law, compensation is to be determined by damage assessment commissions (DACs) at the provincial level, with funding provided by the Ministry of the Interior. From 2004 to August 2009, the commissions received just over 360,000 applications. Of those, over 190,000 claims were decided: 120,000 were approved and the claimants awarded compensation; the remaining 70,000 were denied. Around $1.4 billion in compensation was awarded, of which close to $1.1 billion has been paid.[4] The existing legal and policy framework do not adequately address the obstacles to return, including the village guard system, insecurity and the presence of landmines and unexploded ordnance.

In Kenya, the government’s promotion of return included a National Humanitarian Emergency Fund for Mitigation and Resettlement of Victims of 2007 Post-Election Violence which was to meet the full costs of resettlement of IDPs, including reconstruction of basic housing, replacement of household effects and rehabilitation of infrastructure. But in practice, the government has been criticized for promoting return before conditions were safe. The government has also tended to focus on IDPs who own land and to attach durable solutions to land; there is no clear strategy for dealing with landless IDPs, such as squatters and non-farmers.

Awareness among IDPs as to their housing, land, and property rights under existing law – where there is law addressing those rights – is inadequate in many instances. For example, in Turkey, about half of IDPs surveyed in 2006 were not aware of their entitlements under the Return to Village and Rehabilitation Program or the Law on Compensation. [5]

National Human Rights Institutions and Constitutional Courts

In some cases, national human rights institutions (NHRIs) and constitutional courts have a critically important role to play in supporting as well as in holding governments accountable to guarantee the rights of IDPs. In a number of the countries our study examined, the work of NHRIs on internal displacement has included a focus on HLP issues.

In Georgia, for example, the Public Defender has been actively monitoring and reporting on the country-wide housing program begun in 2009 and has raised concerns about evictions of IDPs and the quality of housing in relocation sites. The Public Defender’s office also has undertaken a study on the conditions of the hidden majority of IDPs living in private accommodation rather than in collective centers.

The Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission has reported on and raised concerns about the large number of IDPs living in urban slums and informal settlements and about the fact that many IDPs were unable to return to their homes due to disputes over land and property.

Constitutional courts have in some instances played a role in strengthening the national legal framework for protecting the property rights of IDPs. Notably, Colombia’s activist Constitutional Court, in its Decision T-821 in October 2007, ordered the government to ensure respect for IDPs’ right to reparation and property restitution. In January 2009, the Constitutional Court ordered the government to comprehensively address land rights issues and to establish mechanisms to prevent future violations.

Subsequently, the government has sought to ensure these rights by adopting in 2011 the historic and ambitious Law 1448, known as the Victims and Land Restitution Law. In this law, government acknowledges for the first time ever the existence of an internal armed conflict in Colombia, and recognizes as “victims” those individuals or communities whose rights were violated under international humanitarian law or international human rights law. The law regulates reparations for all victims of the armed conflict since 1985 – numbering over 5 million – including through land restitution or compensation for IDPs which is to occur over the next decade.

However, restitution of land does not guarantee returnees’ security and may even endanger people given that land disputes and seizures remain a driving force of displacement. Aiming to prevent further victimization of returnees as a result of insecurity and violence, the government established a new security body, the Integrated Center of Intelligence for Land Restitution (Centro Integrado de Inteligencia para la Restitución de Tierras, also known as CI2-RT) within the Ministry of Defense. Additional participants include the Office of the Vice President, the Ministry of Justice and Interior, the Department of Administrative Security (DAS), Social Action (Acción Social), Incoder, and organizations representing victims of violence. Time will tell how successful the implementation of this ambitious law will be.

In Georgia, the Constitutional Court has also played an important role by recognizing the rights of IDPs to purchase property without losing their IDP status or in any way jeopardizing their right to return.

Conclusion

Securing HLP rights for IDPs is, of course, a key component of finding durable solutions to displacement. The study found that land and property disputes are almost always sources or manifestations of lingering conflict and often an obstacle to IDPs’ free exercise of their right to return.  While some governments have made efforts to provide mechanisms for property restitution or compensation, those mechanisms have rarely been adequate to deal—at least in a timely manner—with the scale and complexity of the problem. National human rights institutions and constitutional courts can play a key role in holding governments accountable for HLP and other rights and freedoms of IDPs.

[1] Government of Georgia, State Strategy for Internally Displaced Persons–Persecuted Persons, Chapter V.

[2] The Standard Operating Procedures for Vacation and Reallocation of IDPs for Durable Housing Solutions (2010) (www.mra.gov.ge)

[3] IDMC, Iraq: Little New Displacement but around 2.8 Million Iraqis Remain Internally Displaced: A Profile of the Internal Displacement Situation, 4 March, 2010, p. 240 (www.internal-displacement.org)

[4] IDMC, Turkey: Need for Continued Improvement in Response to Protracted Displacement: A Profile of the Internal Displacement Situation, 26 October 2009, p. 12, citing correspondence with the government of Turkey, 17 September 2009 (www.internal-displacement.org)

[5] Hacettepe University, Institute of Population Studies, "Findings of the Turkey Migration and Internally Displaced Population Survey," press release, 6 December 2006, cited in IDMC, Turkey: Need for Continued Improvement in Response to Protracted Displacement: A Profile of the Internal Displacement Situation, 26 October 2009, p. 11 (www.internal-displacement.org)

Event Information

Stability in Europe’s eastern neighborhood, already precarious, is being further strained. The political prospects of several countries, including Ukraine, Georgia, Turkey and Russia, remain unclear. The region is grappling with the fallout of the economic crisis, and Russia and Turkey, in particular, are threatened by the turmoil in the Arab world.

On April 13, the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings (CUSE) hosted former European Union High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana for a discussion on how the European Union (EU) and NATO should engage with Europe’s strategic partners in the East and Southeast. As a former secretary general of NATO and secretary-general of the Council of the European Union, Solana offered insight into the prospects for future EU and NATO enlargement, the potential impact of the eurozone crisis on the region and how Europeans should attempt to cooperate with their neighbors in tackling global challenges.

Brookings President Strobe Talbott provided introductory remarks and moderated the discussion.

Video

• Syria, Russia and Iran
• Global Governance Can Work
• Turkey and Cyprus

Audio

• Europe's Eastern Frontiers: A Conversation with Javier Solana

Transcript

• Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

• 20120413_eastern_europe

Today, the Center on the United States and Europe (CUSE) at Brookings hosted Georgian Defense Minister Irakli Alasania for an address on Georgia's vision for Euro-Atlantic integration during a period of increased insecurity in the region. In his remarks, Minister Alasania shared his insights on the upcoming NATO summit and Georgia's approach to enhancing its relations with the West while attempting to normalize relations with Russia to lower tensions still simmering from the war six years ago.

Minister Alasania said that his country's "path toward NATO and European integration is unchanged" and offered next steps on "how we're going to make sure that the credibility of the west, the credibility of NATO as an organization will continue to be relevant to safeguard the values that we all cherish: freedom, democracy, and a Europe whole and free."

"We are acting like a NATO country," he said. Continuing:

We are acting like a European country, because we believe that our future is within Europe. And we regard ourselves as a future member. And this is why we are preparing ourselves institution-wise, in terms of freedom, in terms of democracy, and the military capabilities when ... the historical opportunity will open up to Georgia to join NATO and the EU.

The defense minister added that "We are looking at the future." We:

cannot be dragged back to the confrontation of the early 1990s. And we want to make sure that our policies, our economic policies, our foreign policy, [are] specifically working to make sure that the Georgian people who elected us are now moving closer and closer to the European way of living standards. And this only can be done if the efforts that Georgia is making will be validated, will be appreciated by the NATO and the European countries.

One of the things we are looking forward to is the signing of the association agreement. The next step obviously is the NATO summit. And what the NATO summit will decide is how effectively they can assure the allies, but also the partners, like Georgia.

On Russia, Minister Alasania spoke in both hopeful and realistic terms, saying that:

We are now approaching foreign policy and specifically the issue with Russia with a rather mature approach. We don't have any illusions that Russia will change its behavior or policies toward Georgia's territorial integrity or NATO aspirations. But we do hope the diffusion of tensions, the decrease of the military rhetoric between the two countries, will serve Georgia's interests best.

And it will give us more space to develop ourselves, to develop our relationship with the Abkhazia and South Ossetian areas. This is the cornerstone of our policy actually. Be uncompromising on the territorial integrity. Be uncompromising on NATO aspiration, membership in NATO and the EU. But at the same time be sure that we are not going give a pretext to anybody in the region, specifically to Russians, to attack us politically or otherwise.

Listen to audio of the event below or on the event's web page to get the full conversation, which was moderated by CUSE Director Fiona Hill.

Audio

• Georgia's Euro-Atlantic Aspirations and Regional Security