2016 is shaping up to be a potentially critical year for Afghanistan. ISIS is rising there, the Taliban is gaining ground, the stability of the Afghan government is deteriorating by the day, and national elections are coming in October. The US, China, Pakistan, and the Afghan government are currently holding talks aimed at bringing the Taliban to the table to try negotiate an end to the war.

Of those countries, it's Pakistan that is the most significant. Pakistan has probably the most influence of anyone over whether those talks will succeed in getting the Taliban to agree to sit down and negotiate a peace agreement with the Afghan government. But there's a lot more going on with the peace talks that are perhaps the country's best or only remaining hope.

To understand how this works and why it matters, I spoke to Vanda Felbab-Brown, a senior fellow in the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence at the Brookings Institution and an expert on Afghanistan. What follows is a transcript of our conversation, lightly edited for clarity and length.

Jennifer Williams: Could you start by just explaining how Pakistan has been involved in the conflict between the Taliban and Afghanistan historically?

Vanda Felbab-Brown: That goes back to the creation of independent Pakistan, with issues having to do with the Pashtun minority in Pakistan, which is also the majority population of Afghanistan, and irredentist claims by Afghan Pashtun politicians, as well as the Cold War rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States, who at different times supported either Pakistan or Afghanistan and played the two against each other.

Then you have the Taliban emerging in the 1990s, and Pakistan fully supports the Taliban: They help equip it, they provide intelligence, advisers, and during the Taliban era when they ruled country, Pakistan is one of only three countries that recognize the Taliban regime.

They continued supporting the Taliban throughout the past decade, and US-Pakistan relations became very fraught and complicated. It's never been easy. Pakistanis sometimes use the expression that the United States treats Pakistan like a condom: uses it when they need it then discards it when they are finished with it. It's a fairly common saying in Pakistan, especially in the military. So there is a sense of betrayal on the part of the United States, untrustworthiness, that it's an exploitative relationship on the part of the US toward Pakistan.

I should also say that Pakistan has long supported many Islamic extremist groups as part of its asymmetric policy toward India, and some of these groups have now mutated, or they slipped Pakistan's full control.

Even with respect to the Afghan Taliban, there is a lot of support from the Pakistani state intelligence services and military to the Afghan Taliban. At the same time, Pakistan has been under enormous US and international pressure to act against them, and so they will take the occasional action against the Afghan Taliban as well. But those actions are mostly seen as halfhearted, incomplete window dressing.

JW: So what role is Pakistan playing today? I know that they just had the four-party talks and that Pakistan has been insisting that these talks take place in Pakistan. Are they trying to speak for the Taliban?

VFB: I'm not sure that it's a fair characterization that they are speaking for the Taliban. Certainly the Afghan government, including in the latest talks, often insinuates or alleges that Pakistan speaks for the Taliban. But they clearly do not.

The relationship between the Taliban and Pakistan is hardly smooth and perfect. Many members of the Afghan Taliban deeply resent the level of Pakistani interference, even as the group has been supported by Pakistan. There is a lot of Afghan Pashtun nationalism also among the Taliban that deeply resents the influence and attempts at control by the Pakistani state.

Part of the key issue in the relationship is that although Pakistan supports the Afghan Taliban, and although it has historically supported other extremist groups, it does not have perfect control. And arguably, its control is diminishing. And so they posture, they do their double game. They want to appear strong, and so they posture that they have much greater control than they have, but at the same time they deny that they have any nefarious role.

In reality, they are playing both sides against the middle, and they often have much less capacity to control and rein in the extremist groups, including the Afghan Taliban, than many assume. The widespread criticism of Pakistan is one of its duplicity and its nefarious activity and its lack of willingness to act against the Afghan Taliban. Those are true, but they are also coupled with limits to their capacity. They are riding a tiger that they cannot control fully.

So they have been hosting these four-way talks that involve them, the US government, the Afghan government, and the Chinese government. The Afghan government is desperate to achieve some sort of negotiated deal with the Taliban. It feels under tremendous pressure, the military is taking a pounding from the Taliban, and the government lacks legitimacy.

The US has similar views on the notion that the way out of the predicament in Afghanistan is a negotiated deal. The Chinese also like the idea. They have their own influence in Pakistan. China would very much like to say that they finally achieved what the US failed to do over the past decade, that they will bring peace to Afghanistan, and that they will do it by enabling the negotiations.

Pakistan is responsive to China. Their relationship with China is much stronger than their relationship with the United States. They often tell the US that China is their old friend, that China is the country that hasn't betrayed them, unlike the United States. China has promised massive economic development in Pakistan at $40 billion. The Pakistanis often say to the US that the Pakistan-China relationship is "greater than the Himalayas and deeper than the ocean." Very flowery.

JW: What's the relationship like between the Afghan government and Pakistan today?

VFB: The crucial man there really is the Pakistani chief of the army staff Raheel Sharif; no relation to [Prime Minister] Nawaz Sharif. I think that there is sort of goodwill and motivation right now, even on the army staff — but that is juxtaposed with, again, the limits of control even the chief has. With almost clockwork regularity you have a round of negotiations in Pakistan or you have a meeting between Raheel Sharif and [Afghan President Ashraf] Ghani, and the next day a bomb goes off in Kabul and people die, or the Indian consulate is attacked.

All those ploys are meant to destroy any beginning of a more positive relationship and have been very effective in subverting the process. The same goes on between Pakistan and India. Meanwhile, Ghani is taking an enormously risky strategy with respect to the negotiations. It's vastly unpopular in Afghanistan, and many, many Afghans hate Pakistan and blame it for all of their troubles.

They use Pakistan as the explanation of everything that ever goes wrong in Afghanistan. And the Pakistanis are responsible for a lot, but there's much, much blame and responsibility that lies on Afghan politicians and Afghan people.

So Ghani's outreach and engagement with Pakistan is extremely unpopular. He's spending an extreme amount of political capital, and does not have support from his partner in the government, Abdullah Abdullah, and the northern Tajik factions that hate Pakistan with great vitriol. So the more Pakistan is unable to deliver things like the Haqqani network, reducing or stopping its attacks in Kabul, the more politically impossible for Ghani the process will be.

JW: So what does that mean in terms of the stability of Afghanistan's unity government?

VFB: The unity government is extremely strained. "Unity" it isn't. The Pakistani negotiation angle is just too big for the strain. It might be strategically important. It might be a very significant element in getting any negotiation going, but it's also extremely politically costly, and the longer it doesn't produce anything, the more politically costly and unsustainable it will be.

In October, there are supposed to be parliamentary elections and district elections in Afghanistan, and, more important, this loya jirga [a national assembly of Afghan elders]. And unless there is some sort of major breakthrough by the summer, a lot of the negotiations and political process with both the Taliban and Pakistan will be put on ice, because it will just be politically impossible in the context of the loya jirga and the elections.

So they really have until the summer to make some sort of breakthrough, and then you will have months of morass and extreme political instability in Afghanistan, but it will also not be conducive in any way to improving either the relationship with Pakistan or the negotiations.

JW: How does Pakistan fit into the rise of ISIS in Afghanistan? What's the relationship there? And how might this affect the peace negotiations?

VFB: The rise of ISIS-Khorasan is one of the most interesting developments. It complicates the negotiations for the Taliban. They oppose the negotiations, and they're a big problem for Mullah Mansour and those who want to negotiate. They enable defections, make them easy, and make them costly.

At the same time, it is interesting because ISIS does not have the same linkages to Pakistan that the Afghan Taliban had, even though ISIS includes many defectors from the Taliban. They quite specifically reject what they call the "yoke" that Pakistan has put on the Afghan Taliban, and they call the Afghan Taliban leadership traitors because of the close relationship with Pakistan.

Moreover, ISIS-Khorasan also has quite a few members of various Pakistani extremist groups like Lashkar-e Taiba and members of TTP [Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan]. So there is also a lot of resentment and hostility toward Pakistan.

I think the rise of ISIS might make Pakistan be cooperative to some extent, but on the other hand, I think it will also reinforce in the mind of many Pakistan security controllers that it's important to cultivate the Afghan Taliban as friends against the bigger danger of ISIS.

JW: Now that ISIS-Khorasan has directly targeted Pakistan, the consulate in Jalalabad, do you think Pakistan will take action?

VFB: I think they'll take action against ISIS and groups like Tehrik-e Taliban. I don't think it will produce more resolve to go after the Afghan Taliban. That's my view. Others are hoping that they will finally accept the realities and really believe that they have to fight all of the insurgents, all of the terrorists, and that they cannot differentiate among them. I am not persuaded that that will, in fact, happen.

JW: So what does this all mean for the prospects for peace? Are you hopeful at all?

VFB: I think the peace negotiations are important, but I am skeptical that anything will happen quickly.

I think that if by summer the Taliban has been willing to join the negotiating table, that will be an important breakthrough, but nothing will be agreed. The summer will be very bloody, and then there will be the political [wrangling] associated with the loya jirga and the elections.

In my view, even if the Taliban comes to the negotiating table, we are looking at years of negotiations, and certainly no breakthrough before 2017 and likely much longer.

And so the question is whether we, the United States, are prepared to stand by with Afghanistan for that long and whether the Afghans will have the resolve. So it's really important that the military and the police fight as hard as they can, because the weaker they fight, the more they defect, the more intimidated they are, the more brain drain that flows from Afghanistan, the stronger the Taliban is viewed and the more intransigent they will be in the negotiations. Now the negotiations will be very much about the military battlefield as much as they will about what's happening at the table for a long time.

This interview was originally published by Vox.

       

       

       

       

       

       

Is it possible to isolate the well-established mode of Arctic cooperation from the disruptive impact of the Ukraine crisis? Many stake-holders in cooperative projects with Russia keep insisting on an affirmative answer and seek to bracket out tensions emanating from such obscure locations as Debaltsevo or Mariupol. The European Union (EU), which is due to adopt a new Arctic Policy by the end of the year, would have been content to maintain the focus on environmental protection and economic development; the discussions in Brussels, however, have increasingly shifted to far less appealing “hard security” matters. Officials from the European Commission seem deeply reluctant to deal with Russia’s military activities in the high north but have to acknowledge that they are making it much more difficult to cooperate with Russia. As April’s Arctic Council ministerial meetings approach, the United States and Europe must be realistic about the ways in which far away events will negatively affect the possible achievement of their goals. 

Moscow is expanding rather than camouflaging the scope of exercises undertaken by its newly-formed Arctic Joint Strategic Command. Russian President Vladimir Putin used to proudly proclaim Russia’s abiding interest in Arctic cooperation, but even the most pro-engagement Arctic partners cannot fail to see that Russia’s interest is clearly slackening. This may be partly due to the disappearing attractiveness of exploration of the Arctic resources, since the estimated production costs of the off-shore platforms go far beyond the expected returns on the current level of oil prices. Another reason may be the disappointment in the commercial prospects of the Northern Sea Route (or Sevmorput), where maritime transit contracted by an astounding 77 percent in 2014, after several years of promising growth. A further reason may be Moscow’s recognition that the much trumpeted (and still not submitted) claim for expanding its “ownership” over the Arctic shelf cannot be legally approved because Denmark has presented its own claim, and the U.N. Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf cannot make any recommendations on clashing claims.

It is hard to find an active lobby in Russia for sustaining cooperative projects or at least the joint work in the Arctic Council, as many actors who promoted the Barents Cooperation in the 1990s, are either on a short leash (as is the case with regional governors) or branded as “foreign agents” (the NGOs that want to avoid such branding have to curtail or cut ties with Western colleagues). The appointment of Dmitri Rogozin as a chair of the new government commission on Arctic matters bodes ill for the cooperative endeavors because this firebrand “patriot” deservedly holds a spot on U.S., EU, and Canadian sanctions lists. 

The Russian Foreign Ministry is still circulating a message of commitment to the Arctic dialogue. The forthcoming session of the Arctic Council ministers in Iqaluit, Nunavut, Canada, might test this commitment with the issue of granting observer status to the EU. It was Canada who blocked the resolution of this issue at the previous meeting in Kiruna, Sweden, in 2013, but the controversy about seal products has been resolved, and Canada is ready to put the question on the agenda as its chairmanship of the Council expires. European Commission officials expect that during the 2015 meeting, Russia will raise objections because the EU is now seen as an antagonist, but EU officials still feel it is important to force Moscow to put their opposition on the record.

One external party that aims at enhancing and also at reformatting the Arctic cooperation is China, and while Moscow has to show eager attention to Beijing’s opinions, it cannot be comfortable with this “encroachment.” Russia’s traditional position has been that Arctic matters were the responsibility of the littoral states, but China insists on having a say and even entertains notions of the high north as a “global common,” a prospect which Moscow finds hard to swallow. 

It is indeed futile to praise the value of cooperative ties when seven members of the Arctic Council are compelled to tighten step by step the regime of sanctions against the eighth member, which is sinking into a deep economic crisis but persists in building its power projection capabilities in the High North. The usefulness of engaging Russia is beyond doubt, but it would be irresponsible to expect that joint projects in monitoring climate change could reduce the risks from expanding Russian military activities. The high north is one area where Moscow fancies itself to be in a position of power, but so far it has not found a way to enjoy it. It is not my intention to give the Kremlin war-mongers ideas about putting this military advantage to good political use, but when the likes of Rogozin or Nikolai Patrushev (secretary of the Security Council and former head of the Russian Federal Security Service) profess particular interest in the Arctic, it is only prudent to expect a brainstorm of sorts. The technique of “hybrid war” is not only the continuation but also a driver of Putin’s politics of confrontation, and this drive transforms the unique Arctic landscapes into just another “theater.”

      

This weekend the United States will assume the chairmanship of the Arctic Council for a two-year term. While the Obama administration has been preparing for this for several years, it remains to be seen how the president will balance the concerns of most Arctic residents who view development of the region as vital to improving their economic and social livelihood and those individuals inside and outside the administration who want to limit development out of concern for the how economic development may cause local environmental degradation while also accelerating climate change.

The National Strategy for the Arctic Region

As part of this preparation, in May 2013, the president launched a new National Strategy for the Arctic Region based on three principles

1. Advancement of U.S. security interests defined as ensuring the ability of our aircraft and vessels to operate, in a manner consistent with international law through, under, and over the airspace and waters of the Arctic; to support lawful commerce; to achieve greater awareness of activities in the region; and to intelligently evolve our Arctic infrastructure and capabilities including ice-capable platforms as needed;
2. Pursue responsible Arctic regional stewardship defined as protection of the Arctic environment and conservation of its resources, establishment of an integrated Arctic management framework, charting of the Arctic region, and employment of scientific research and traditional knowledge to increase understanding of the Arctic;
3. Strengthen international cooperation defined as working through bilateral relationships and multilateral institutions, including the Arctic Council, to advance collective interests, promote shared Arctic state prosperity, protect the Arctic environment, and enhance regional security, and to work toward U.S. accession to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

Undergirding these principles were commitments to make decisions using the best available information, to foster cooperation with the state of Alaska, other international partners, the private sector, and to consult and coordinate with Alaskan natives to gain traditional knowledge. As part of this new strategy, the president appointed Admiral Robert J. Papp Jr. as the U.S. special representative for the Arctic in July 2014. Shortly after his appointment, and in several major speeches since, including one at Brookings, the admiral has stated that the administration’s agenda centers on stewardship of the Arctic Ocean including insuring its safety and security, improving economic and living conditions for the regions’ inhabitants, and addressing the impacts of climate change on the region. 

The administration’s new policy was buttressed in January 2015 by an executive order designed to enhance coordination of all the various agencies responsible for different aspects of federal oversight of the Arctic (Alaska). Paradoxically, however, the fact that the reorganization came nearly in tandem with the announcement of new wilderness restrictions on the exploration of oil and gas in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) and the Arctic Coastal Plain. This announcement left many Alaskans skeptical on how further restrictions on development of the state’s resources could be viewed as improving economic and living conditions of people in the region. In a February 2015 meeting of Arctic Council Senior Arctic Officials (SAOs) in Yellowknife, Canada, the administration looked to put meat on the bones of what it intended to pursue upon assumption of the chairmanship of the Arctic Council. This resulted in an additional elucidation of 15 broad themes that had originally been presented in a Virtual Stakeholder Outreach Forum on December 2, 2014 in Washington, D.C..

Streamlining Arctic policy and key questions

The announced reorganization of government agencies and lines of authority dealing with U.S. Arctic and Arctic Council policy has done little or nothing to streamline the overlapping and sometimes conflicting policies governing natural resource development or energy projects in Alaska. These overlapping jurisdictions are well highlighted in a major new National Petroleum Council (NPC) report, Arctic Potential: Realizing the Promise of U.S. Arctic Oil and Gas Resources. This report was prepared at the request of Energy Secretary Moniz to address how best to pursue prudent development of Alaska’s offshore oil and gas resources and ironically issued shortly after the president’s closing of ANWR. Whether or not the White House was even aware of the NPC’s report, which represented months of substantive work by many people, remains open to question.

The Arctic reorganization plan did little to resolve some key questions as to actually who is in charge of Arctic policy in the United States. While Admiral Papp was named “Coordinator” of the U.S. Arctic Council Chairmanship, this position is not listed in the Council’s enabling documents. Historically, the foreign minister or the secretary of state of the country chairs the Council while a career diplomat chairs the meetings of the senior officials dealing with the day-to-day activities of the Council. It appears that Admiral Papp has neither of these positions. In any case, it looks from the organizational chart that the White House science advisor will be the real coordinator of U.S. Arctic policy.

The chief problem that U.S. Arctic policy must resolve is that while in the Arctic Council we have to address issues affecting the entire Circumpolar North, our domestic Arctic policy centers only on Alaska, where a slew of domestic agencies have overlapping and often conflicting oversight and regulatory responsibilities. The situation is made still more complex by the large amount of the state that is owned by the federal government. This makes it almost inevitable that any resource development project by private or state interests will run into federal government restrictions, in terms of needing to cross federal land to get a resource to market, permitting to ensure that water resources are not polluted, or making sure that fish and wildlife habitats are not disturbed, etc.

Our Arctic policy also suffers from an acute lack of awareness by most Americans that we are an Arctic nation with a huge maritime boundary and very limited resources (ice-worthy ships, proper navigation charts and aids, lack of port facilities, lack of search and rescue capabilities, lack of knowledge of what fishery resources we possess) to protect it. While many of these issues lie outside the scope of the Arctic Council, many are cross-cutting with our Arctic neighbors, most notably with increased traffic in the region (from tourism, fishing, energy development, and shipping) comes the increased possibility of an accident. Currently, the United States does not have the capable means (both in terms of timely response and adequate infrastructure) to respond to an accident in the Arctic, which could be catastrophic, as all of these industries are active and gaining popularity every day.

Core questions for the administration

As the United States takes the helm of the Arctic Council, there are several core issues that the administration must address. Some critical questions are: What is the U.S. position on the development of the Arctic’s oil, gas, mineral, and fishery resources? What specific action is the United States prepared to support in the Arctic Council to uplift the standard of living of Arctic people across the Circumpolar North? Given that each icebreaker costs at least $700 million and that we only have one in operation, what resources are we prepared to expand to build a fleet capable to respond to events in the Arctic? Should any of these expenses be viewed as vital to our national security and defense, and if so, which budget should they be taken out of? What role does the United States in its chairmanship role see for closer interaction between the Arctic Council and the Arctic Economic Council? Would the United States support the closing off of certain ecologically sensitive parts of the Arctic to all commercial exploitation? Finally, how does the administration in its Arctic Council leadership role get its Arctic policy in sync with that of the state of Alaska in its recently released Alaska Arctic Policy Implementation Plan?

Other Arctic nations surpass the United States in terms of Arctic policies. Norway, Russia, Canada, and even Denmark (through complicated ties with Greenland’s claim on the Arctic) all have the Arctic at the front and center of policymaking decisions. I hope to see these issues addressed as the United States moves to enact effective policy on the Arctic over the next two years as the alternative is too great a risk and too great a wasted opportunity. 

      

During his address at the U.S. Coast Guard Academy graduation this week, President Obama highlighted climate change as “a serious threat to global security, an immediate risk to (U.S.) national security.” Is President Obama right? Are the national security threats from climate change real?

When I listen to the “know-nothing” crowd and their front men in Congress who actively ignore ever-stronger scientific evidence about the pace of climate change, I want to quit my day job and organize civic action to close them down. The celebration of anti-knowledge, the denial of science, the treatment of advanced education as a mark of ignominy rather than the building block of American innovation and citizenship—these are as grave a threat to America’s future as any I can identify. So I’m sympathetic to the Obama administration’s desire to take a bludgeon to climate deniers. But is “national security” the right stick to move the naysayers forward? 

The Danger of Overstating for Effect

The White House’s report on the national security implications of climate change is actually pretty measured and largely avoids waving red flags, but it overstates for effect, as do the President’s remarks to the Coast Guard Academy. 

The report gets right the notion that climate change will hit hardest where governance is weakest and that this will exacerbate the challenge of weak states; but it’s a pre-existing challenge and almost all weak states are already embroiled in forms of internal war—climate change may exacerbate this problem, but it certainly won’t create it. The White House report also asserts a link to terrorist havens, and of course there are risks here—but it’s far from a 1:1 relationship, and there’s little evidence that the countries where climate will hit governance worst are the places where the terrorism problem is most serious. 

The report also highlights the Arctic as a region most dramatically effected by climate change, and that is true—but so far what we’re seeing in the Arctic is that receding ice is triggering commercial competition and governance cooperation; not conflict. The security challenge from the Arctic is modest: the climate challenge of melting ice caps and potential release of trapped greenhouse gases is potential very serious indeed. 

Then there are the domestic effects. The report highlights that the armed services may be drawn in more to dealing with coastal flooding and similar crises, and that’s a fair point—though it’s a National Guard point more than its an armed forces point. That is to say, it’s about the question of whether we have enough domestic disaster response capacity: an important question, not obviously a national security question. And it oddly passes over what’s likely to be the most important consequence of climate change in the United States, namely declining agricultural productivity in the American heartland. America’s farmers, not just its coastal cities, are in the front lines here. 

All of these are real issues and the U.S. government will have to plan for lots of them, including in the armed services; all fair. But is national security really the right way to frame this? Is linking it directly to the capacities needed for America’s armed services the right way to mobilize support for more serious action on climate change? 

Of course the term “security” has been evolving, and has long since extended beyond the limited purview of nuclear risks and great power conflict. Civil wars and weak governance and rising sea leaves are certainly a security issue to somebody, and we’re sure to be involved—whether it’s in dealing with refugee flows, or more acute crises where severe impacts overlay on pre-existing tensions. These are global security issues for someone, to be sure; I’m not sure they are “immediate risks to our national security.

Words Matter

Why does the rhetoric matter? Am I glad that we have a President who cares about climate change? Yes. Do I want the Obama administration to be focusing on mobilizing the American public on this? Yes. So why does it bother me if they use a national security lens? A national security framework implicitly does several things: it invokes a sense of direct threat, which I think distorts the nature of the challenge; it puts military responses front forward, which is the wrong emphasis; and although the report doesn’t get into this question, if the President highlights the immediate national security risk from climate, it displaces other security threats that we confront and truly require U.S. strategic planning, preparedness, and resources. None of this is totally wrong, but surely there are other ways to mobilize the American public to an erosion of our natural and agricultural environment than to invoke the security frame? 

Every piece of evidence I’ve seen about the state of temperature change; the real pathway we are on in terms of carbon-based fuels consumption (despite optimistic pledges in the lead up to the Paris climate conference); realistic projections of growth in renewable energies; and demand growth in the developing world (especially India) tells me that we’re rapidly blowing past the two degree target for limiting the rise in average global temperatures, and we’re well on our way to a four degree shift. 

We need urgently to pivot our scientific establishment away from the now well-trod field of predicting temperature shift to getting a much more granular understanding about the ways in which changing temperature will affect water sources, agricultural productivity, biodiversity, and dramatic weather events. And we need to treat those who willfully deny science—in climate and other areas—as a serious threat to our nation’s  future. I’m just not convinced that national security is the right or best way to frame the arguments and mobilize the America public’s will around this critically important issue.

       

President Obama should be congratulated for highlighting the growing links between U.S. national security and climate change in his address before the U.S. Coast Guard Academy’s graduation ceremony earlier this week. The president’s speech drew upon earlier administration documents (the Third National Climate Assessment, the White House’s 2015 National Security Strategy, the Department of Defense’s 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, and the 2014 Department of Homeland Security’s Quadrennial Homeland Security Review) to highlight the numerous challenges posed to our nation and the world by climate change, including:

• Threats to the world’s coastal infrastructure
• Rising temperatures and extreme weather
• Creation of failed states
• Degradation to the marine environment and critical ecological regions around the globe
• Threats to our energy production and delivery systems
• The devastating impact on native Arctic inhabitants

While these issues are important and deserve attention, the president was singularly silent on how best to manage threats, posed to the Arctic and the global environment by the rush to develop or utilize its resources (including energy, minerals, fish, and tourism) as the region opens with the melting of sea ice. I raise none of these issues to disagree with the president’s policies, or to suggest we should not develop the region’s resources or allow enhanced international maritime trade through our waters. In fact, I have often called for the economic development of Alaska with high safety standards for oil and gas production. If we allow these activities to proceed, we must be willing to provide the resources for infrastructure of all kinds: pipelines, onshore and offshore, and including ports, airfields, housing, etc., in order to be prepared for all contingencies.

Additionally, the president did not make any mention of the financial demands posed to the country to even meet the challenges in our own Arctic region of Alaska, let alone the many commitments we have already made in the Arctic Council, vis-à-vis instituting a true search and rescue capability and an oil spill prevention and response mechanism. The sad reality is that for all intents and purposes the United States has one heavy icebreaker to patrol our entire Arctic region. With cruise ships now sailing into very dangerous areas without adequate sea mapping, the prospect of a disaster occurring at least 800 miles from our nearest port in the Aleutians looms large. Were a cruise ship to run into ice, there is no logistical infrastructure in Northwest Alaska even to off lift passengers to on shore by helicopter. With icebreakers likely to cost at least $800 million to $1.5 billion each and take many years to build, where is the president's clarion call to the Congress on the need for more revenue for our Coast Guard to deal with the challenges highlighted in his speech?

Likewise, with many Asian nations interested in the fish resources of the Arctic, where are the funds both to determine what fish exist in Arctic waters including fish migrating from the Pacific as well as their volumes and assessments of how to insure their sustainability? If the president is serious about the threat of climate change on America’s front door to the Arctic, where are the U.S. Coast Guard and the State of Alaska as well as the myriad of federal agencies responsible for various activities in Alaska going to get the requisite resources to carry out their mandates?

Lacking preparedness and response

As a result of the administration’s commendable recent decision, Shell will be allowed to proceed with drilling several wells in the Chukchi Sea, allowing for development that benefits not only Alaskans but also the entire United States. While Shell will be subject to stringent regulatory oversight, Russia also plans to drill in its area of the Chukchi as well. What would happen if the Russians had an accident and the current brought oil into Alaskan waters? Would the United States, in concert with the Russians have the capability to contain it? Similarly, if there were a major maritime disaster in the Bering Strait where a South Korean ship literally disappeared several years ago, what response capability would we have if a ship containing hazardous cargo sank? While I applaud the decision of the administration to allow Shell to drill in the Chukchi, I am apprehensive of the U.S. commitment and ability to respond to any matter of national security in the Arctic, in part due to the severe lack of federal funds going to support this region.

Consequently, while recognizing that the American and broader Arctic is only a small part of the myriad of issues you identified in your Coast Guard address, I would urge that you begin to inform Congress and the American people of the large costs we may have to incur to protect ourselves against the forthcoming economic and social ravages of climate change.

Recommendations for Arctic funding

As a first step to begin to prepare for the direct “existential” challenges posed to Alaska and our broader responsibilities as chair of the Arctic Council, I would recommend the following:

1. A request to Congress for $1.2 billion dollars a year for 10 years to build a new fleet of ice worthy ships to deal with various contingencies in the Arctic (as defined by the Coast Guard) financed by an overall increase in the gasoline tax of $0.20/gallon of which $0.02 would go for Arctic infrastructure development;
2. As an interim step before these ships can be built, the appropriation of funds for the leasing of two Arctic worthy vessels per year;
3. An increase in alcohol and tobacco taxes (or perhaps a tax alongside the legalization of marijuana at the federal level) totaling $500 million dollars a year for 10 years for ancillary infrastructure development of ports, airfields, roads, etc. in Alaska to improve our ability to responds to climate contingencies both in  Alaska and throughout the circumpolar north;
4. A surcharge of one percent on all adjusted federal taxable incomes in excess of $200,000 and two percent on incomes above $500,000.

While there will be hews and cries by climate deniers and other opponents of any tax increase if as the president says the changing climate poses graves threat to our own and other nations security, these are modest proposals (particularly in comparison to an outright price on carbon) and should be passed with the greatest urgency.

       

In the summer of 1978, my grandfather George Washington Timmons, my cousin George, and I took the train from the Midwest across Canada and the ferry up the Pacific coast to Alaska. There we met up with my brother Steve, who was living in Anchorage. It was the trip of a lifetime: hiking, and fishing for grayling, salmon and halibut in Denali park, on the Kenai peninsula, Glacier Bay, and above the Arctic Circle in a frontier town called Fort Yukon, camping everywhere, and cooking on the back gate of my brother’s pickup truck. 

That Gramps had a Teddy Roosevelt moustache and a gruff demeanor gave the adventure a “Rough Riders” flavor. Like Teddy, the almost-indomitable GWT had given me a view of how experiencing a majestic land was a crucial part of becoming a robust American man. When we got home, he was diagnosed with lung cancer and died just a few months later.

We project all kinds of cultural images and values on the green screen of the American landscape. Those endless late June sunsets in the Crazy Mountains and the sun on the ragged peaks of the Wrangell Mountains represent for me a sense of the vastness of the state of Alaska and the need to balance preservation there with the needs of its people for resources and income. Certainly there is enough space in Alaska to drill for oil and protect large swaths in wildlife refuges and national parks. As leaders of the Inupiat Eskimo corporation put it in a letter to Obama, “History has shown us that the responsible energy development, which is the lifeblood of our economy, can exist in tandem with and significantly enhance our traditional way of life.”

Unfortunately, this view is outdated: that was the case in Alaska, but there is a new, global problem that changes the calculus. As President Obama wraps up his historic visit to Alaska and meeting with the Arctic climate resilience summit (GLACIER Conference), he is walking a razor’s edge, delivering a delicately crafted missive for two audiences. Each view is coherent by itself, but together they create a contradictory message that reflects the cognitive dissonance of this administration on climate change.

Balancing a way of life with the future

For the majority of Alaska and for businesses and more conservative audiences, Obama is proclaiming that Alaskan resources are part of our energy future. With oil providing 90 percent of state government revenues, that’s the message many Alaskans most ardently want to hear.

For environmentalists and to the nations of the world, Obama is making another argument. His stops were chosen to provide compelling visual evidence now written across Alaska’s landscape that climate change is real, it is here, Alaskans are already suffering, and we must act aggressively to address it. “Climate change is no longer some far-off problem; it is happening here, it is happening now … We’re not acting fast enough.”

This is a razor’s edge to walk: the Obama administration is criticized by both sides for favoring the other. Those favoring development of “all of the above” energy sources say that Obama’s Clean Power Plan has restricted coal use in America and that future stages will make fossil fuel development even tougher in future years.  These critics believe Obama is driving up energy costs and hurting America’s economic development, even as oil prices drop to their lowest prices in years.

“Climate hawks” on the other hand worry that we are already venturing into perilous territory in dumping gigatons of carbon dioxide and other gases causing the greenhouse effect into the atmosphere. The scientific consensus has shown for a decade that raising global concentrations of CO2 over 450 parts per million would send us over 3.6 degrees F of warming (2 degrees C) and into “dangerous climate change.” The arctic is warming twice as fast as this global average, and though we are still below 1.8 degrees F of warming, many systems may be reaching tipping points already.

Already melting permafrost in Alaska releases the potent greenhouse gas methane, and wreaks havoc for communities adapted to that cold. Foundations collapse and roads can sink and crumble. The melting of offshore ice makes coastal communities more vulnerable to coastal erosion, and allows sunbeams to warm the darker water below, leading to further warming.

The difficulty is that we have a limit to how much greenhouse gases we can pump into the atmosphere before we surpass the “carbon budget” and push the system over 3.6 degrees F. Which fossil reserves can be exploited and how much of which ones must be kept in the ground if we are to stay within that budget? Realistic and credible plans have to be advanced to limit extraction and combustion of fossil fuels until we have legitimate means of capturing and sequestering all that surplus carbon somewhere safe. It is a dubious and risky proposition to say that we can continue to expand production here in America, and that only other countries and regions should cap their extraction.

Obama got elected partly due to his not rejecting natural gas and even coal development. He kept quiet about climate change during his entire first term and he and Mitt Romney had a virtual compact of silence on the issue during the 2012 campaign. But in his second term, Obama has become a global leader on the issue, seeking to inspire other countries to make and keep commitments to sharply reduce emissions. This work has yielded fruit, with major joint announcements with China last November, with Mexico in March, and a series of other nations coming in with pledges. The administration has been seeking to push the pledging process to keep our global total emissions below 3.6 degrees F.

However a just-released UNEP report shows that all the pledges so far—representing 60 percent of all global emissions—add up to 4-8 gigatons of carbon reduction in what would have been emitted. That’s progress, but the report goes on to show that we are still 14 gigatons short of where we need to be to stay under 3.6 degrees F. Indeed, Climateactiontracker.org reports that we are still headed to 5.5 degrees F of warming (3.1 C) with these pledges, down from 7 degrees without the pledges.

Each on their climate change razor

This puts the administration and U.N. officials in the position of having to decide which message to put out there—the hopeful message that emissions are being reduced, or the more frustrating one that they are not being reduced nearly enough. Environmentalists are in a similar position with Obama in Alaska—do they criticize him for allowing Shell to drill in the Arctic, or praise him for being generally constructive in this year’s effort to reach a meaningful treaty in Paris in December? Is it possible to kiss Obama on one cheek while slapping him on the other?

This is the delicate political moment in which we find ourselves. Fossil fuel projects continue to be built that will lock us in to carbon emissions for decades to come. They will certainly push us over the “carbon budget” we know exists and beyond which human civilization may be untenable on this planet. But these projects are advanced by extremely strong economic actors with mighty lobbying and public relations machines, and flatly opposing them is likely to lead to one’s portrayal as a Luddite seeking to send humanity back to the stone age. Clean energy alternatives exist, and they are increasingly affordable and reliable. Logically, we need to be spending the remaining carbon budget to make the transition to a net zero emissions economy, not to continuing the wasteful one we have now.

Players on both sides of this debate will seek to deploy Alaska’s majestic landscape to win their case. I’m fairly sure on which side my grandfather George Washington Timmons would have stood: he was a building contractor and would sometimes estimate the number of 2x4s one could harvest from a giant tree. But he didn’t know about the global carbon budget—he loved his children and grandchildren, and I think he would have supported living within our means if he was fully aware of this problem. The original Rough Rider Teddy Roosevelt himself went from avid hunter to devoted conservationist as he learned of the damage over-cutting was causing American forests. As Obama said in Alaska, “Let’s be honest; there’s always been an argument against taking action … We don’t want our lifestyles disrupted. The irony, of course, is that few things will disrupt our lives as profoundly as climate change.”

That is the political razor’s edge the president—and all of us—have to walk today, as we make the inevitable transition away from fossil fuel development.

       

Can the United States and Russia actually cooperate in the Arctic? It might seem like wishful thinking, given that Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev asserted that there is in fact a “New Cold War” between the two countries in a speech at the Munich Security Conference. Many people—at that conference and elsewhere—see the idea as far-fetched. Sure, Russia is launching air strikes in what has become an all-out proxy war in Syria, continues to be aggressive against Ukraine, and has increased its military build-up in the High North. To many observers, the notion of cooperating with Russia in the Arctic was a non-starter as recently as the mid-2015. There have been, however, significant changes in Russia’s behavior in the last several months—so, maybe it is possible to bracket the Arctic out of the evolving confrontation.

These and other matters were the subject of discussion at a recent conference at the Harriman Institute of Columbia University in New York, in which we had the pleasure to partake last week.

Moscow learns its limitations

Russia steadily increased its military activities and deployments in the High North until autumn 2015, including by creating a new Arctic Joint Strategic Command. There have been, however, indirect but accumulating signs of a possible break from this trend. Instead of moving forward with building the Arctic brigades, Russian top brass now aim at reconstituting three divisions and a tank army headquarters at the “Western front” in Russia. News from the newly-reactivated airbases in Novaya Zemlya and other remote locations are primarily about workers’ protests due to non-payments and non-delivery of supplies. Snap exercises that used to be so worrisome for Finland and Norway are now conducted in the Southern military district, which faces acute security challenges. Russia’s new National Security Strategy approved by President Vladimir Putin on the last day of 2015 elaborates at length on the threat from NATO and the chaos of “color revolutions,” but says next to nothing about the Arctic.

The shift of attention away from the Arctic coincided with the launch of Russia’s military intervention in Syria, and was strengthened by the sharp conflict with Turkey. Deputy Prime Minister Dmitri Rogozin—who used to preside over the military build-up in the High North—is these days travelling to Baghdad, instead. Sustaining the Syrian intervention is a serious logistical challenge on its own—add low oil prices into the mix, which threw the Russian state budget and funding for major rearmament programs into disarray, and it’s clear that Russia is in trouble. 

The shift of attention away from the Arctic coincided with the launch of Russia’s military intervention in Syria, and was strengthened by the sharp conflict with Turkey.

The government is struggling with allocating painful cuts in cash flow, and many ambitious projects in the High North are apparently being curtailed. In the squabbles for dwindling resources, some in the Russian bureaucracy point to the high geopolitical stakes in the Arctic—but that argument has lost convincing power. The threats to Russian Arctic interests are in fact quite low, and its claim to expanding its control over the continental shelf (presented at the U.N. earlier this month) depends upon consent from its Arctic neighbors.

Let’s work together

Chances for cooperation in the Arctic are numerous, as we and our colleagues have described in previous studies. The current economic climate (i.e. falling oil prices, which makes additional energy resource extraction in most of the Arctic a distant-future scenario), geopolitical climate (sanctions on Russia targeting, amongst others, Arctic energy extraction), and budget constraints on both ends (Russia for obvious reasons, the United States because it chooses not to prioritize Arctic matters) urge us to prioritize realistically.

• Improving vessel emergency response mechanisms. Though many analysts like to focus on upcoming resource struggles in the Arctic, the chief concern of naval and coast guard forces there is actually increased tourism. Conditions are very harsh most of the year and can change dramatically and unexpectedly. Given the limited capacity of all Arctic states to navigate Arctic waters, a tourist vessel in distress is probably the main nightmare scenario for the short term. Increased cooperation to optimize search and rescue capabilities is one way to prepare as much as possible for such an undesirable event. 
• Additional research on climate change and methane leakage. Many questions remain regarding the changing climate, its effects on local flora and fauna, and long-term consequences for indigenous communities. Increasingly appreciated in the scientific community, an elephant in the room is trapped methane in permafrost layers. As the Arctic ice thaws, significant amounts of methane may be released into the atmosphere, further exacerbating global warming.
• Expanding oil emergency response preparedness. The current oil price slump likely put the brakes on most Arctic exploration in the short term. We also believe that, unless all long-term demand forecasts are false, an additional 15 million barrels of oil per day will be needed by 2035 or so—the Arctic is still viewed as one of the last frontiers where this precious resource may be found. At the moment, Arctic states are ill-prepared to deal with a future oil spill, and more has to be learned about, for instance, oil recovery on ice and in snow. The Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic was an important first step.
• Preparing Bering Strait for increased sea traffic. As the Arctic warms, increased sea traffic is only a matter of time. The Bering Strait, which is only 50 miles wide at its narrowest point, lacks basic communication infrastructure, sea lane designation, and other critical features. This marks another important and urgent area of cooperation between the United States and Russia, even if dialogue at the highest political level is constrained. 

Can the Arctic be siloed?

There is no doubt that the current cooled climate between Russia and the other Arctic states, in particular the United States, complicates an ongoing dialogue. It is even true that it may prohibit a meaningful conversation about certain issues that have already been discussed. 

Skeptics will argue that it is unrealistic to isolate the Arctic from the wider realm of international relations. Though we agree, we don’t think leaders should shy away from political dialogue altogether. To the contrary, in complicated political times, the stakes are even higher: Leaders should continue existing dialogues where possible and go the extra mile to preserve what can be preserved. Russia’s desire for expanding its control over the Arctic shelf is entirely legitimate—and opens promising opportunities for conversations on issues of concern for many states, including China, for that matter.

Realists in the United States prefer to focus on expanding American military capabilities, their prime argument being that Russia has significantly more capacity in the Arctic. While we would surely agree that America’s current Arctic capabilities are woefully poor, as our colleagues have described, an exclusive focus on that shortcoming may send the wrong signal. 

We would therefore argue in favor of a combined strategy: making additional investments in U.S. Arctic capabilities while doubling down on diplomatic efforts to preserve the U.S.-Russian dialogue in the Arctic. That may not be easy, but given the tremendous success of a constructive approach in the Arctic in recent years, this is something worth fighting for. Figuratively speaking, that is.

       

Cities and suburbs occupy well-defined roles within the discussion of poverty, opportunity, and social welfare policy in metropolitan America. Research exploring issues of poverty typically has focused on central-city neighborhoods, where poverty and joblessness have been most concentrated. As a result, place-based U.S. antipoverty policies focus primarily on ameliorating concentrated poverty in inner-city (and, in some cases, rural) areas. Suburbs, by con­trast, are seen as destinations of opportunity for quality schools, safe neighborhoods, or good jobs.

Several recent trends have begun to upset this familiar urban-suburban narrative about poverty and opportunity in metropolitan America. In 1999, large U.S. cities and their suburbs had roughly equal numbers of poor residents, but by 2008 the number of suburban poor exceeded the poor in central cities by 1.5 million. Although poverty rates remain higher in central cities than in suburbs (18.2 per­cent versus 9.5 percent in 2008), poverty rates have increased at a quicker pace in suburban areas.

Watch video of co-author Scott Allard explaining the report's findings » (video courtesy of the University of Chicago)

This report examines data from the Census Bureau and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), along with in-depth interviews and a new survey of social services providers in suburban communities surrounding Chicago, IL; Los Angeles, CA; and Washington, D.C. to assess the challenges that rising suburban poverty poses for local safety nets and community-based organizations. It finds that:

Suburban jurisdictions outside of Chicago, Los Angeles, and Washington, D.C. vary sig­nificantly in their levels of poverty, recent poverty trends, and racial/ethnic profiles, both among and within these metro areas. Several suburban counties outside of Chicago experi­enced more than 40 percent increases of poor residents from 2000 to 2008, as did portions of counties in suburban Maryland and northern Virginia. Yet poverty rates declined for subur­ban counties in metropolitan Los Angeles. While several suburban Los Angeles municipalities are majority Hispanic and a handful of Chicago suburbs have sizeable Hispanic populations, many Washington, D.C. suburbs have substantial black and Asian populations as well.

Suburban safety nets rely on relatively few social services organizations, and tend to stretch operations across much larger service delivery areas than their urban counter­parts. Thirty-four percent of nonprofits surveyed reported operating in more than one subur­ban county, and 60 percent offered services in more than one suburban municipality. The size and capacity of the nonprofit social service sector varies widely across suburbs, with 357 poor residents per nonprofit provider in Montgomery County, MD, to 1,627 in Riverside County, CA. Place of residence may greatly affect one’s access to certain types of help.

In the wake of the Great Recession, demand is up significantly for the typical suburban provider, and almost three-quarters (73 percent) of suburban nonprofits are seeing more clients with no previous connection to safety net programs. Needs have changed as well, with nearly 80 percent of suburban nonprofits surveyed seeing families with food needs more often than one year prior, and nearly 60 percent reporting more frequent requests for help with mortgage or rent payments.

Almost half of suburban nonprofits surveyed (47 percent) reported a loss in a key rev­enue source last year, with more funding cuts anticipated in the year to come. Due in large part to this bleak fiscal situation, more than one in five suburban nonprofits has reduced services available since the start of the recession and one in seven has actively cut caseloads. Nearly 30 percent of nonprofits have laid off full-time and part-time staff as a result of lost program grants or to reduce operating costs.

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The growth of suburban poverty over the past two decades raises questions about the ability of nonprofit organizations to adapt to this relatively new geography of metropolitan poverty. These organizations play multiple roles, including providing basic safety net services, connecting residents to new opportunities, and serving as advocates (and sometimes as organizers) for low-income communities.

Although federal, state, and local governments are often the primary funders of nonprofits, governments do not often take the lead in creating new organizational capacities or in coordinating capacity across political jurisdictions. In many regions, the local philanthropic community has become aware of these gaps in services for the poor and has sought to assist the nonprofit community in building capacity and expanding activities. Local foundations are experimenting with various strategies to address the growing dispersion of poverty.

This analysis combines an original data set of foundation grants for social services with in-depth interviews to assess the role of foundations in supporting the suburban social safety net in the Atlanta, Chicago, Denver, and Detroit regions. It finds that:

Suburban community foundations in the four regions studied are newer and smaller than those in core cities, despite faster growth of suburban poor populations. In the regions studied, most suburban community foundations began operating in the 1990s, and have not accumulated significant asset bases. Some larger city-based foundations have taken a regional approach, but face restrictions on the extent to which they can address growing need in poor suburban communities.

The share of foundation dollars targeted to organizations serving low-income residents varies widely across regions, but relatively few of those dollars are devoted to building organizational capacity in the suburbs. Chicago saw the largest share of foundation grant dollars go to organizations serving low-income people (60 percent), while Atlanta posted the lowest share (19 percent). Detroit was the only region where total grants to suburban-based human service providers were relatively comparable to their city-based counterparts.

Suburbs with high rates of poverty have substantially fewer grantees and grant dollars per poor person than either central cities or lower-poverty suburbs. Though metropolitan Atlanta has the highest rate of suburban poverty among the regions studied, it has the lowest rate of suburban grant-making per poor person. Denver’s results are a mirror image of Atlanta’s, with the lowest poverty rate and highest suburban grant-making per poor person.

Four types of strategies to build and strengthen the capacity of the suburban safety net are showing promise in these regions. Each region is engaging in four types of capacity building strategies: supporting existing regional organizations, creating new regional organizations, supporting regional networks, and establishing new suburban community foundations.

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Event Information

A Brookings online discussion reviewing the 2015-2016 Indian budget.

On March 4, The India Project at Brookings hosted an online panel discussion to review the first full-year budget released by Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government on February 28, 2015. Panelists discussed the significance of the budget, key takeaways, the hits, and misses, as well as what actions they would like to see the Indian government take vis-à-vis the Indian economy over the next few months. Panelists included James Crabtree, Mumbai bureau chief for the Financial Times; Eswar Prasad, the New Century Chair in International Trade and Economics at the Brookings Institution and senior fellow in Brookings’s Global Economy and Development program; and Shamika Ravi, fellow at the Brookings India Center in Delhi, in the Development Assistance and Governance Initiative at Brookings, and in Brookings’s Global Economy and Development program. Tanvi Madan, fellow in the Foreign Policy program and director of The India Project at Brookings, moderated the discussion.

Join the conversation on Twitter using #IndiaBudget

      

       

       

       

       

Voters are supposed to choose their representatives, but the flawed redistricting process in our nation too often allows representatives to choose their voters. This rigged game is in full flower in Virginia, which has an accelerated redistricting process this year because elections for its House of Delegates and Senate take place in November. State Senate Majority Leader Richard Saslaw (D) was stunningly candid in a recent radio interview in describing the process politicians would follow to redraw the lines:

“The House does theirs. The Senate does theirs. And I’m not gonna interfere with the lines the House draws for the House. And they’re not gonna interfere with the lines I draw for the Senate. And I would simply say, well, you know, our goal is to make the Democratic districts, particularly the marginal ones, a little bit better than they are now. I’m not greedy. I’m not trying to put all the Republicans out of business by any stretch. They didn’t do that to us 10 years ago. And we’re not gonna do that to them.”

Saslaw described a classic bipartisan incumbent gerrymander; the majority Democrats in the state Senate would let the majority Republicans in the state House stack the deck for its incumbents, and vice versa. The biggest losers? The voters of Virginia, denied competitive elections in which the outcomes reflect their collective preferences.

The situation is different but just as smelly for the redrawing of lines for Virginia’s 11 congressional seats. As Politico described last week, the 11 incumbents — three Democrats and eight Republicans — cut a deal to protect each other, solidifying the GOP’s 8-to-3 edge by making several competitive seats strongly Republican while allowing Democrats to make a sinecure out of the seat of Rep. Gerry Connolly, who barely won in 2010.

Around the country, comparable deals will be cut by pols intent on protecting each other or maximizing the number of seats a party controls (in a way that distorts the actual partisan balance in the state). Thanks to the Supreme Court, the only restraint, other than adhering to the requirements of the Voting Rights Act, is to make sure that all the districts are virtually equal in population. With the aid of sophisticated software, the one-person, one-vote rule allows ample scope for the self-interested manipulation of district boundaries.

Politicians could get away with this in the past because few others had access to the tools to create districts using official census data and past election returns.

No more.

Michael McDonald of George Mason University and Micah Altman of the Institute for Quantitative Social Science at Harvard, working in conjunction with our two think tanks, have created the Public Mapping Project, an open-source software package that enables anybody to create districts for any state that balance such desirable qualities as compactness and the protection of communities of interest with competitiveness and partisan fairness, all while satisfying one-person, one-vote and the Voting Rights Act.

The first important use of the software is coming in Virginia. To his credit, Gov. Bob McDonnell (R) has created an independent redistricting commission that can recommend more objective and public-interest-oriented plans than the ones produced by the pols. Unfortunately, McDonnell’s commission has no teeth beyond its public profile and ability to showcase plans that can point up, by their quality, the folly of rigged plans. The commission has agreed to give serious weight to the best plans produced by a competition created by George Mason and Christopher Newport universities. Teams of students from 13 colleges and universities in Virginia produced 57 plans for Congress, the House of Delegates and the state Senate. Unlike the plans politicians are crafting behind closed doors, all of the student plans are online (at districtbuilder.varedistrictingcompetition.org).

The two of us judged the plans (awards will be presented in Richmond on Tuesday) and were deeply impressed with what these students — most of them undergraduates but including a team from William and Mary Law School — accomplished. They weighed how to draw district maps that respected federal and state requirements without bending to the interests of incumbent officeholders or political parties. They created two sets of maps: one, through a politically blind process that prioritized contiguous and compact districts respecting Virginia’s communities of interest, including cities and counties, and sensitive to the representation of minorities; the other, by adding to these standards an explicit effort to create as many competitive districts as possible and to fairly reflect public support for the two parties. This was not easy, given the substantial changes in Virginia’s population since the last census, the need to create districts that are virtually equal in population and the trade-offs required when redistricting criteria conflict.

The best student plans show that it is possible to create more legitimate and responsive districts — and that with the right tools, citizens anywhere can create better plans to choose their representatives than the representatives do to protect their own careers. While politicians may fight to keep the process closed, the tools are available to enable us to do better. Virginia’s college students have demonstrated that. The challenge is to replicate their efforts across the country and to harness informed and empowered public participation to improve the quality of our democracy.

       

INTRODUCTION

Elections that follow dramatic downfalls of authoritarian regimes present policymakers with difficult choices. They are an opportunity to establish a sound basis for democratization, putting in place institutions and strengthening actors that help guarantee free and fair elections. Yet such elections are part of a high-stakes conflict over the future that takes place in a context of enormous uncertainty, as new actors emerge, old elites remake themselves, and the public engages in politics in new and unpredictable ways.

Assisting elections in the Arab world today is made more challenging by two factors that have thus far distinguished the region from others. First, transitions are made more difficult by extraordinarily strong demands to uproot the old regime. Fears that former regime elements will undermine ongoing revolutions along with demands for justice after decades of wrongdoing invariably create pressures to exclude former elites. In other regions, reformers within autocratic regimes, like Boris Yeltsin and South Africa’s F.W. DeKlerk, split from hardliners to spearhead reforms, muting demands for excluding old regime allies writ large. In the Middle East, however, old regime elites have been unable to credibly commit to reforms, partly given decades-long histories of empty promises and oppositions that remain largely determined to accept nothing less than Ben Ali-like departures. Room for compromise is difficult to find.

Second, for an international community hoping to support Arab transitions, widespread distrust of outside forces compounds these problems. Such distrust is inevitable in all post-colonial states; however, skepticism is particularly high in the Arab world, especially toward the United States. Cynicism about American intentions has been fed by U.S. support for Israel, its continued backing of Arab autocrats for nearly two decades after the Cold War, and, more recently, its unwillingness to take stronger stands against Mubarak, Asad, and others early on in the uprisings. Even if transitioning elites believe international expertise can help smooth the election process and enhance faith in the outcomes, they find it difficult to embrace in the context of heightened nationalism and a strong desire to assert sovereignty.

In light of these challenges, this paper explores how the international community can best engage in “founding” elections in the Arab world. Examining Egypt and Tunisia, the first two Arab states to hold elections, it focuses on challenges in leveling the playing field, managing electoral processes, and creating just and sustainable outcomes. These cases are undoubtedly unique in many ways and – as in any transition – remain in flux. Nevertheless, examining their early experience yields insights into how international actors can best approach those cases that may follow (e.g., Libya, Syria, and Yemen).

Most notably, these cases suggest that the democracy promotion community should approach first elections differently than it does subsequent ones. It should prioritize different goals and activities, in some cases even leaving off the agenda well-intentioned and generally constructive programs in order to focus on more urgent activities critical to strengthening electoral processes. Recognizing the enormous fear and uncertainty with which democrats approach first elections, international actors should resist the understandable urge to seek immediate, permanent democratic arrangements and “favorable” electoral outcomes. They should also encourage revolutionary forces to resist understandable, but counterproductive, urges to exclude allies of the former regime from new democratic processes. Rather, democracy promoters should suggest interim measures, encourage tolerance toward “unfavorable” results, and, in so doing, support democrats as they make their way through a long, imperfect process.

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After decades of abuse under the old regime, how can the civilian government of President Mohamed Morsi turn Egypt’s security apparatus into one befitting a new democracy? What are the necessary steps in overcoming institutional barriers to reform and creating an Egyptian police force in the service of its citizens?

In a new "Project on Arab Transitions" paper from the Brookings Doha Center and Stanford University’s Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law (CDDRL), From Good Cop to Bad Cop: The Challenge of Security Sector Reform in Egypt, nonresident fellow Omar Ashour discusses the political dynamics of transforming Egypt’s security establishment.

Based on months of interviews with current and former officers and generals in the police, army, and intelligence services, Ashour lays out the workings of the Mubarak regime’s repressive security apparatus and assesses current reform initiatives, drawing on lessons from other transitions in the Arab world and beyond. He offers a set of policy proposals for establishing an accountable, civilian-led security sector, ranging from a presidential commission on reform to new oversight mechanisms. Ashour cites the brutality and abuse of Egypt’s police as a key catalyst of the January 25 Revolution; the success of that revolution, he says, will hinge on effective security sector reform.

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Nearly three years after the fall of the Qaddafi regime, Libya’s revolution has stalled. Militias continue to run rampant as the government struggles to perform basic functions. Theoretically to protect the revolution, Libya passed its Political Isolation Law (PIL) in May 2013, effectively banning anyone involved in Qaddafi’s regime from the new government. The law has raised serious questions: Does it contribute to effective governance and reconciliation? Does it respect human rights and further transitional justice? Will it undermine Libya’s prospects for a successful democratic transition?

In this Brookings Doha Center-Stanford "Project on Arab Transitions" Paper, Roman David and Houda Mzioudet examine the controversy over Libya’s PIL and the law’s likely effects. Drawing on interviews with key Libyan actors, the authors find that the PIL has been manipulated for political purposes and that its application is actually weakening, not protecting, Libya. They caution that the PIL threatens to deprive Libya of competent leaders, undermine badly needed reconciliation, and perpetuate human rights violations.

David and Mzioudet go on to compare the PIL to the personnel reform approaches of Eastern European states and South Africa. Ultimately, they argue that Libyans would be better served if the PIL were replaced with a law based on inclusion rather than exclusion and on reconciliation rather than revenge. They maintain that Libya’s democratic transition would benefit from an approach that gives exonerated former regime personnel a conditional second chance instead of blindly excluding potentially valuable contributors.

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The U.S. military will carry out a major modernization of its strategic nuclear forces in the 2020s.

It will cover all three legs of the strategic triad.

Much of the planned program makes sense. The long-range standoff (LRSO) — a new nuclear-armed cruise missile to outfit strategic bombers — does not.

The primary reason for the modernization program is that many US strategic weapons systems are aging out, and American policy is that, as long as there are nuclear weapons, the United States will maintain a safe, secure and robust nuclear deterrent.

The Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines will begin to hit the end of their service life in the late 2020s, and the Navy will need new submarines. Submarines and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) make up the most survivable leg of the triad, and they carry the bulk of deployed US strategic warheads.

The service life of the Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) runs out in 2030. The Air Force seeks a replacement ICBM. At a minimum, keeping an ICBM leg of the triad would require another life extension program for existing Minuteman III missiles.

As for the air-breathing leg of the triad, the Air Force wants to procure 80 to 100 B-21 bombers. Plans are shrouded in secrecy but reportedly will incorporate stealth features and advanced electronic warfare capabilities to allow the aircraft to penetrate contested air space. The Air Force is also modernizing the B61 nuclear gravity bomb for use on strategic bombers.

One can and should question the Pentagon’s desired numbers for these programs. That is especially the case given the projected costs of strategic modernization, which Pentagon officials openly admit they do not know how to fund.

It is not clear why the United States will need to replace 400 deployed ICBMs on a one-for-one basis, particularly as the Air Force several years ago was prepared to go down to 300. A force of 200-300 ICBMs would suffice and result in significant cost savings. Likewise, one can challenge the requirement for 12 new ballistic missile submarines, as opposed to nine or 10.

The biggest question, however, arises over the LRSO, with a projected cost of $20 billion to $30 billion. The Air Force originally developed nuclear-armed air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) in the 1970s because the B-52 — then the mainstay of the strategic bomber fleet — presented a big target for adversary radars. That would make it hard for the aircraft to penetrate air defenses. A B-52 armed with ALCMs could remain outside of radar range and release its cruise missiles.

The B-2, with its stealth features, was designed to restore a penetrating capability. The Air Force plans to use stealth and electronic warfare capabilities to give the B-21 a penetrating capability as well. If these bombers can defeat and penetrate air defenses, that makes the LRSO redundant. (Moreover, unlike in the 1970s, the Air Force today has very capable long-range conventionally armed cruise missiles that provide a standoff capability for bombers.)

If, on the other hand, the stealth of the B-21 will be compromised in the not-too-distant future, then one has to question the wisdom of spending $60 billion to $80 billion — and perhaps more — to procure the B-21. If we believe the B-21 would soon encounter problems penetrating air defenses, scrap that program. Buy instead modified Boeing 767s, a variant of which will serve as the Air Force’s new aerial tanker, and arm them with the LRSO.

The Air Force’s evident attachment to the B-21 suggests, however, that it believes that the aircraft will be able to defeat adversary air defenses for some time to come. That means that the LRSO would add little capability to the US strategic force mix.

If one were to argue for the redundant capability provided by the LRSO, the number of new ALCMs that the Pentagon proposes to purchase — 1,000 to 1,100 — is difficult to understand. Even allowing for extra cruise missiles for test purposes, the number seems excessively high.

In its 2010 annual report to Congress on implementation of the Strategic Offensive Arms Reduction Treaty (SORT), the State Department advised that, as of Dec. 31, 2009, the United States had 1,968 operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads. That figure captured the actual number of nuclear warheads atop SLBMs and ICBMs plus the number of nuclear bombs and ALCMs at air bases for use by bombers.

On June 1, 2011, a State Department fact sheet showed the number of deployed US strategic warheads as 1,800 as of Feb. 5, 2011, when the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) went into force. A Dec. 1, 2011, fact sheet provided a more detailed breakdown of US strategic forces. It stated that, as of Sept. 1, 2011, the United States had 1,790 deployed strategic warheads and 125 deployed strategic bombers. Like SORT, New START counts each warhead on a deployed ballistic missile as a deployed warhead. But New START counts bomber weapons differently from SORT. New START attributes each deployed bomber as one warhead, regardless of the number that it can carry or the number of weapons that may be at bomber bases.

The 125 deployed bombers on Sept. 1, 2011, would have counted as 125 under New START’s deployed strategic warhead total. Reducing 1,790 by 125 yields 1,665 — the number of deployed warheads then on US SLBMs and ICBMs.

Comparing the SORT and New START numbers is a bit of an apples-and-oranges comparison, but it gives some idea of the number of bomber weapons at US strategic bomber bases. Unless there was a dramatic increase in the number of warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs between the end of 2009 and September 2011 — and there is no reason to think that there was — comparing SORT’s 1,968 figure (end of 2009) to the 1,665 deployed warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs (under New START counting rules in September 2011) suggests some 300 nuclear bombs and ALCMs were at bomber bases. The B-2s would have been armed with bombs, which indicates a maximum of 200-250 ALCMs. The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) also estimates that there are about 300 nuclear weapons at strategic bomber bases, of which 200 are nuclear-armed ALCMs. FAS believes an additional 375 ALCM airframes are held in reserve.

This comparison raises the question: Why would 1,000-1,100 ALCM airframes be needed to support a couple of hundred deployed ALCMs?

The United States should sensibly modernize its strategic deterrent, particularly in a time of tight defense budgets. The case for the LRSO is demonstrably weak, especially for the planned size of the program. The LRSO should be shelved.

This piece was originally published in Defense News.

      

In last summer’s congressional debate over the Iran nuclear deal—the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—one of the more hotly debated issues was whether the deal would decrease or increase the likelihood that countries in the Middle East would pursue nuclear weapons.

Supporters of the JCPOA argued that, by removing the risk of a nuclear-armed Iran, it will reduce incentives for countries of the region to acquire nuclear arms. Opponents of the deal—not just in the United States but also abroad, especially Israel—claimed that the JCPOA would increase those incentives because it would legitimize enrichment in Iran, allow Iran to ramp up its nuclear capacity when key restrictions expire after 10 and 15 years, and boost the Iranian economy and the resources Iran could devote to a weapons program.

I strongly believe the JCPOA will significantly reduce prospects for proliferation in the Middle East (and as my colleague Richard Nephew explains in another post out today, there are things the United States and other powers can do to help reduce that prospect further). But uncertainties about the future of the JCPOA and the region will persist for quite some time—and these uncertainties could motivate regional countries to keep their nuclear options open. They may ask themselves a variety of questions in the years ahead: Will the JCPOA be sustainable over time? Will it unravel over concerns about compliance? Will it withstand challenges by opponents in Tehran and Washington? Will it survive leadership transitions in the United States and Iran? Will Iran ramp up its fissile material production capacities when key restrictions expire? Will it then break out of the JCPOA and seek to build nuclear weapons? Will Iran continue to threaten the security of its neighbors in the years ahead? And will the United States maintain a strong regional military presence and be seen by its partners as a reliable guarantor of their security?

I strongly believe the JCPOA will significantly reduce prospects for proliferation in the Middle East.

Richard and I studied how these and other questions might affect nuclear decision-making in the Middle East. In particular, we evaluated the likelihood that key states will pursue nuclear weapons, or at least enrichment or reprocessing programs that could give them a latent nuclear weapons capability. We focused on four states often regarded as potential candidates to join the nuclear club: Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Turkey.

Saudi Arabia

Of the four, Saudi Arabia is the most highly motivated to pursue nuclear weapons. It sees Iran as an implacable foe that is intent on destabilizing its neighbors, achieving regional hegemony, and upending the Kingdom’s internal order. At the same time, the Saudis have lost much confidence in the U.S. commitment to the security of its regional partners. In part as a result, the new Saudi leadership has taken a more assertive, independent role in regional conflicts, especially in Yemen. But despite their reservations about the United States, the Saudis know they have no choice but to rely heavily on Washington for their security—and they know they would place that vital relationship in jeopardy if they pursued nuclear weapons.

The Saudis clearly have sufficient financial resources to make a run at nuclear weapons. But acquiring the necessary human and physical infrastructure to pursue an indigenous nuclear program would take many years.

Given the Kingdom’s difficulty in developing an indigenous nuclear weapons capability, speculation has turned to the possibility that it would receive support from a foreign power, usually Pakistan, which received generous financial support from Saudi Arabia in acquiring its own nuclear arsenal. But while rumors abound about a Pakistani commitment to help Saudi Arabia acquire nuclear weapons, the truth is hard to pin down. If such a Saudi-Pakistani agreement was ever reached, it was probably a vague, unwritten assurance long ago between a Pakistani leader and Saudi king, without operational details or the circumstances in which it would be activated. In any event, the Saudis would find it hard to rely on such an assurance today, when Pakistanis are trying to put the legacy of A.Q. Khan behind them and join the international nonproliferation mainstream. 

United Arab Emirates (UAE)

Like Saudi Arabia, the UAE believes Iran poses a severe threat to regional security and has become more aggressive since the completion of the JCPOA. And like the Saudis, the Emiratis have lost considerable confidence in the reliability of the United States as a security guarantor. But also like the Saudis, the Emiratis are reluctant to put their vital security ties to the United States in jeopardy.

[L]ike the Saudis, the Emiratis have lost considerable confidence in the reliability of the United States as a security guarantor.

Moreover, the Emiratis are heavily invested in their ambitious nuclear energy program—with efforts currently underway, with the help of a South Korean-led consortium, to construct four nuclear power reactors—and they know this project would be dead in the water if they opted for nuclear weapons.

The Emiratis have also been a leading regional supporter of nonproliferation. In their bilateral agreement for civil nuclear cooperation with the United States, they formally renounced the acquisition of enrichment or reprocessing capabilities (the so-called “gold standard”), effectively precluding the pursuit of nuclear weapons. After the JCPOA permitted Iran to retain its enrichment program, the UAE, faced with criticism domestically and from some Arab governments for having given up its nuclear “rights,” said it may reconsider its formal renunciation of enrichment. But subsequently, Emirati officials have made clear that their nuclear energy plans have not changed and that they have no intention to pursue enrichment or reprocessing.

Egypt

Egypt is on everyone’s short list of potential nuclear aspirants—in part because of its former role as leader of the Arab world and its flirtation with nuclear weapons in the Gamal Abdel Nasser years. But while Egypt and Iran have often been regional rivals, Egypt does not view Iran as a direct military threat. Instead, Egypt’s main concerns include extremist activities in the Sinai, the fragmentation of Iraq and Syria, disarray in Libya—and the adverse impact of these developments on Egypt’s internal security. The Egyptians recognize that none of these threats can be addressed by the possession of nuclear weapons.

Although Russia is committed to work with Egypt on its first nuclear power reactor, Cairo’s nuclear energy plans have experienced many false starts before, and there is little reason to believe the outcome will be different this time around, especially given the severe economic challenges the Egyptian government currently faces. Moreover, although Egypt trained a substantial number of nuclear scientists in the 1950s and 1960s, its human nuclear infrastructure atrophied when ambitious nuclear energy plans never materialized.

Turkey

Because of its emergence in the last decade as a rising power, its large and growing scientific and industrial basis, and its ambition to be an influential regional player, Turkey is also on everyone’s short list of potential nuclear-armed states. But Turkey has maintained reasonably good relations with Tehran, even during the height of the sanctions campaign against Iran. Although the two countries have taken opposing sides in the Syria civil war, Turkey, like Egypt, does not regard Iran as a direct military threat. Indeed, Ankara sees instability and terrorism emanating from the Syrian conflict as its main security concerns—and nuclear weapons are not viewed as relevant to dealing with those concerns.

Current tensions with Russia over Turkey’s November 2015 shoot-down of a Russian fighter jet are another source of concern in Ankara. But the best means of addressing that concern is to rely on the security guarantee Turkey enjoys as a member of NATO. While Turkish confidence in NATO has waxed and waned in recent decades, most Turks, especially in the military, believe they can count on NATO in a crisis, and they would be reluctant to put their relationship with NATO at risk by pursuing nuclear weapons.

Former nuclear aspirants

For the sake of completeness, our study also looked at regional countries that once actively pursued nuclear weapons but were forced to abandon their programs: Iraq, Libya, and Syria. But we concluded that, given the civil strife tearing those countries apart, none of them was in a position to pursue a sustained, disciplined nuclear weapons effort.

Bottom line

Our study found that the Iran nuclear deal has significantly reduced incentives for countries of the Middle East to reconsider their nuclear options. At least for the foreseeable future, none of them is likely to pursue nuclear weapons or even latent nuclear weapons capabilities—or to succeed if they do. 

Editors’ Note: Bob Einhorn and Richard Nephew spoke about their new report at a recent Brookings event. You can see the video from the event here.

      

The Pentagon is embarking on a modernization of U.S. strategic nuclear forces that will cost hundreds of billions of dollars. Much of it makes sense, as key elements of the strategic triad age out and require replacement. As long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States should maintain a robust triad. However, the long-range stand-off weapon (LRSO), a new nuclear-armed air-launched cruise missile, does not make sense.

The U.S. strategic triad consists of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and strategic bombers. This mix gives the Pentagon the ability to hold at risk things that a potential adversary values. The inherent ability to destroy those things provides the basis for deterrence.

ICBMs can hold at risk targets 6,000 miles away. As they are based on mobile ballistic missile submarines, SLBMs can reach targets anywhere on earth. The same is true for weapons carried by the B-2 and B-52 and, in the future, the B-21. With aerial refueling, U.S. strategic bombers have global reach.

So the question arises: What unique target set could the LRSO hold at risk that cannot be threatened by ICBMs, SLBMs, or gravity bombs delivered by stealthy strategic bombers? At a recent panel discussion on the LRSO, the best answer to this question was “certain things”—but the proponent could not articulate what those “things” were. That explains much of the questioning about the LRSO. No one seems able to offer a plausible explanation for what the LRSO could do that other strategic nuclear systems cannot.

The weapon’s justification often seems to boil down to: The Pentagon is replacing other strategic systems because they are old, so it should replace the old nuclear-armed air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) as well. Does that logic hold?

The Air Force developed nuclear-armed ALCMs in the 1970s because the B-52 presented a big target on radar screens. Concern grew that the B-52 could not penetrate Soviet air defenses. A B-52 armed with ALCMs could launch its missiles from well beyond the reach of those air defenses.

Today, however, the Air Force has the stealthy B-2 bomber. It is in the process of procuring 80 to 100 B-21 bombers, which reportedly will incorporate stealth and advanced electronic warfare capabilities. The Department of Energy is already well along in the program to modernize the B61 nuclear gravity bomb. The modernized bomb will be highly accurate and have a variable yield. B-2 and B-21 bombers that can penetrate advanced air defenses and deliver B61 bombs against targets make the LRSO redundant.

Some suggest the LRSO hedges against a compromise of the B-21’s stealth. If that argument has merit, Congress ought to reexamine the wisdom of spending $60 to $80 billion—or perhaps $100 billion—on the bomber. Converted KC-46s (military refueling variants of the Boeing 767) with LRSOs would offer a far cheaper option. The Pentagon, however, seems to believe the B-21 will be capable of defeating advanced air defenses.

That being so, the case for the LRSO is weak. It will cost taxpayers $20 to $30 billion. True, that is a relatively small cost compared to what the Pentagon will pay to replace the Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines or build the B-21. But it is not chump change.

Some LRSO proponents cite the relatively “small” cost to argue that the defense budget can afford it. Current Pentagon officials, however, say they have no idea how to pay for everything they want for strategic modernization. Given the rising cost of mandatory spending such as social security and Medicare, and the pressure to hold down the deficit, the budget problem will not become easier in the 2020s, when the “bow-wave” of strategic modernization spending arrives. The Air Force will likely find itself having to choose between B-21s, KC-46 tankers, F-35 fighters, and the LRSO. It also wants to buy a new ICBM then. It is hard to see how all of that will be affordable.

Funding the LRSO now contributes to a budget time-bomb that the current administration and Congress will leave to their successors. The LRSO seems a redundant weapon without a mission. Shelving the program would defuse part of that time-bomb.

       

One year after its conclusion, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) remains controversial in Tehran and Washington, with opponents unreconciled to the deal and determined to derail it. Republican attacks against the deal will keep the controversy alive for most of this election year.

But opponents have had to scale back their criticism, in large part because the JCPOA, at least so far, has delivered on its principal goal—blocking Iran’s path to nuclear weapons for an extended period of time. No one can dispute that Tehran has sharply reduced its capacity to produce fissile materials for nuclear weapons and would need at least a year to rebuild enough capacity to produce a single bomb.

Iran’s positive compliance record has not given opponents much ammunition. The IAEA found Iran in compliance in its two quarterly reports issued in 2016. True, Iran temporarily exceeded the agreed ceiling on heavy water but quickly rectified the infraction, which most observers attributed to the practical difficulty of ensuring that production overages are exported in a timely way rather than to an intention to circumvent the limit. Critics have also pounced on a German report that Iran’s illicit attempts to procure nuclear and missile items continued in 2015. But Tehran’s requirement to import all nuclear items for its permitted civil nuclear program through the JCPOA’s procurement channel—and stop procuring items outside the channel—did not kick in until January 2016, and neither Washington nor Berlin has information that illicit efforts continued after that time.

Murky missile issue

Iran’s ballistic missile tests present a more complicated compliance issue. Due to a compromise reached in the negotiations, missile activities are not covered in the JCPOA and Security Council resolution 2231 simply ”calls upon” but does not legally require Iran to cease those activities (as did the U.N. Security Council resolutions replaced by 2231). As a result, Iranians argue they are not legally bound to cease missile testing, and Russia and China essentially support their argument. 

The administration and Congress are right to oppose Iran’s provocative and destabilizing missile activities. But they are not on strong legal or political grounds to treat the issue as a compliance violation. Rather than invoking the Iran nuclear deal, Washington and its partners will need to counter Iran’s missile programs with other policy tools, including interdictions of procurement attempts, Missile Technology Control Regime restrictions, U.S. diplomatic efforts with suppliers, missile defenses, and sanctions.

An uncertain path ahead

So, from the standpoint of Iran implementing and complying with its nuclear commitments, the JCPOA has operated well for its first year. But challenges to the smooth operation and even the longevity of the deal are already apparent.

A real threat to the JCPOA is that Iran will blame the slow recovery of its economy on U.S. failure to conscientiously fulfill its sanctions relief commitments and, using that as a pretext, will curtail or even end its own implementation of the deal. Iranians are understandably frustrated that the benefits of sanctions relief have not materialized as quickly as expected. But international banks and businesses have been reluctant to engage Iran not because they have been discouraged by the United States but because they have their own business-related reasons to be cautious, including the inadequate regulatory standards of Iran’s financial system, low oil prices in an oil-dependent economy, and fear of running afoul of remaining U.S. sanctions. In an effort to ensure that Iran will reap the economic rewards it deserves, the Obama administration has bent over backwards to inform foreign governments, banks, and businesses of what sanctions relief measures entitle them to do, but Iranian officials continue to complain that it is not doing enough.

[W]e can say the nuclear deal is off to a promising start...[s]till, it is already clear that the path ahead will not always be smooth.

Legislation proposed in Congress could also threaten the nuclear deal. Many proponents of new sanctions legislation genuinely seek to reinforce the deal—for example, by renewing the Iran Sanctions Act without attaching poison pills. But for some other members of Congress, the bills are designed to undercut the JCPOA. In a July 11 statement of policy, the administration threatened to veto three House bills, stating that they “would undermine the ability of the United States to meet our JCPOA commitments by reimposing certain secondary economic and financial sanctions lifted on ‘Implementation Day’ of the JCPOA.” For now, the administration is in a position to block new legislation that it believes would scuttle the nuclear deal.

But developments outside the JCPOA, especially Iran’s regional behavior and its crackdown on dissent at home, could weaken support for the JCPOA within the United States and give proponents of deal-killing legislation a boost. So far, however, there are no clear indications that the JCPOA has contributed either to more moderate or more provocative behavior. Indeed, consistent with statements by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, there have been few changes in Iran’s behavior toward its neighbors in the last year.

A potential wildcard for the future of the JCPOA is upcoming governing transitions in both Washington and Tehran. There will be more continuity in policy toward Iran and the JCPOA if Hillary Clinton becomes president, although she is likely to take a harder line than her predecessor. Donald Trump now says he will re-negotiate rather than scrap the deal, but in practice that could produce the same result because a better deal will not prove negotiable. With President Hassan Rouhani up for re-election next year and the health of the Supreme Leader questionable, Iran’s future policy toward the JCPOA cannot be confidently predicted.

A final verdict on the JCPOA is many years away, not just because of the challenges mentioned above but also because of the crucial uncertainly regarding what Iran will do when key restrictions on its ability to produce weapons-grade nuclear materials expire after 15 years. However, we can say the nuclear deal is off to a promising start, as even some of its early critics now concede. Still, it is already clear that the path ahead will not always be smooth, the longevity of the deal cannot be taken for granted, and keeping it on track will require constant focus in Washington and other interested capitals. 

       

       

       

       

       

The GOP presidential candidate said he would ban immigrants from sending money home to Mexico.

Donald Trump’s proposal to force Mexico to pay for a Wall guarding against the flux of immigrants into the U.S. made news this week, and rightfully so. Trump’s idea would be to curtail the ability of banks, credit unions, and wire transmission companies to send money abroad — a sharp departure from policy and law whose bipartisan aim has been to bring remittances to all countries into the financial mainstream and out from the shadowy illegal word of people moving cash in suitcases.

Encouraging remittances to go through the financial system benefits everyone: it enhances the ability to combat terrorist finance and money-laundering, it reduces crime in both the U.S. and abroad, it increases economic growth in the U.S. and overseas, and it provides for greater competition and market incentives to allow people to keep more of their hard-earned money to use as they see fit. Moving in the opposite direction would be a major mistake.

This is a big issue that affects a lot more people than one might think – more than just sending money to Mexico. In America today, more than 40 million people were born in other countries, a record number. This translates into just more than 1 in 8 Americans, a sharp increase from 1970 when fewer than 1 in 25 Americans were foreign born. Thus, it is not surprising that many people perceive America to have more foreign-born people than any time in their lifetime. However, that is not the case for the lifetime of America. Between the Civil War and the 1920s, America had as high — or higher — share of foreign born as we do today.

Remittances are not a new phenomenon. Most American families likely sent remittances at some point whenever their family first immigrated. My great-grand father sent money back to what is today the Czech Republic so that his wife and their children (including my grandmother) could come and join him and escape what became the Second World War. Today, remittance flows go toward the new generation of American immigrants and the children of those immigrants. More than $120 billion was sent abroad in 2012 according to the Pew Center and while it is true that Mexico received the largest amount at just under $23 billion, the rest of the top 5 countries may surprise you: China ($13 billion), India ($12 billion), Philippines ($10.5 billion), and Nigeria ($6 billion). And old habits remain as Germany ($2.5 billion) and France ($2 billion) are still among the top 15 countries that receive remittances from the United States.

This money comes in lots of small chunks, which can make sending it expensive. The typical new migrant worker sends money home around 14 times a year, which corresponds to once a month plus Mother’s Day and Christmas. These are usually small sums (less than $300) and represent an extraordinary level of savings given the worker’s income. The money goes through both the formal banking system including banks, credit unions, and wire transmitters who eventually use banks like Western Union and MoneyGram. Some goes through informal means, including “viajeros” who are people that literally carry cash in suitcases on planes that are often breaking the law and outside of the standard anti-money laundering and terrorist finance enforcement system. Why would anyone want to encourage that?

The idea of using this flow of funds to try to implement other policy objectives, such as border control, would be a sharp departure from current practice. The Patriot Act and subsequent federal law governing remittances in financial laws like the Dodd-Frank Act were never intended to be used to threaten to cut off the flow of migrant worker remittances. These laws were intended to track and crack down on the flow of money laundering or support for illegal and terrorist organizations while at the same time providing consumer protections to workers who are sending hard-earned cash back home to their parents, grandparents, and children. In fact, the bipartisan goal of policy concerning remittances has been to encourage the flow of money to come into the official system and to discourage the flow of funds through the underground network.

In 2004, then Federal Reserve Governor Ben Bernanke made clear that, “The Federal Reserve is attempting to support banks’ efforts to better serve immigrant populations, with remittances and other money transfers being a key area of interest.” House Financial Services Chairman Mike Oxley (R-OH) told President Bush’s then-Treasury Secretary John Snow, “Remittances between established and emerging economies foster growth in both types of economies simultaneously. I will be interested in hearing your views on how unnecessary costs can be eliminated in this area.” When Senator Paul S. Sarbanes (D-MD) introduced legislation that became the basis for today’s law that covers remittances, he had the simple goal to “increase transparency, competition and efficiency in the remittance market, while helping to bring more Americans into the financial mainstream.”

The longstanding bipartisan support for bringing remittances into the financial mainstream is based on the fact that most immigrants, regardless of whether they are U.S. citizens, legal residents, or undocumented, send remittances. A system that tried to assert proof of citizenship or legal status upon wiring money overseas would be burdensome, costly, and ineffective at best and if effective, it would simply drive more money into illegal transmission schemes while increasing crime here in the U.S. and abroad. Imagine if an entire community knew that someone would be walking through their immigrant neighborhood with a suitcase full of tens of thousands of dollars in cash.

Thought of another way, if I went to the bank to send money to my mother who lives in France part of the year, how would I prove that I’m a citizen? My driver’s license alone is not proof of legal status. Would I need to bring my passport? What if, like the majority of Americans, (62% according to the State Department) I don’t have a valid passport? Would I have to bring my birth certificate to the local Western Union? I guess the one positive thing from such a system is that it would help stop the email scams asking for money from a Nigerian Prince….

Aaron Klein is a fellow at the Brookings Institution and served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of the US Treasury Department from 2009 to 2012. He also serves as an unpaid member of the Clinton campaign’s Infrastructure Finance Working Group; he has not served as an advisor on any banking or finance issues.

Editor’s note: This piece originally appeared on Fortune.

      

When the priestly leaders of the Parsis, fleeing Persia for India after the Arab conquest of the 8th century, came before local ruler Jadhav Rana asking for sanctuary, Rana asked for a bowl of milk. The bowl was filled to the brim.  How could his kingdom accommodate more, asked Rana, without the bowl spilling over? The priestly leaders, the legend goes, slipped sugar in the milk, masterfully suggesting that the Parsis would dissolve into the existing population, sweetening their lives in the process.

As through history, we are once again faced with a situation where millions have left their homes, ravaged by violence and conflict, seeking sanctuary in foreign lands. And once again, the leaders of the promised lands worry about spilt milk.

Ever since labor economist David Card showed that the 1980 Mariel boatlift, which brought Cuban refugees to Miami, had no effect on local wages and employment, the academic wars have raged (for instance, see summaries and rebuttals here and here). People argue that labor demand curves always slope down—a shift in the supply of workers must decrease wages. Therefore, results that show otherwise are incorrect.

To resolve the debate, I find it useful to think of the ideal experiment. Refugees would come to a country and locate in communities chosen at random, so that there is no correlation between the economic characteristics of the community and its refugee population. Data would track the labor market outcomes of each and every “native,” regardless of where they moved. We could then compare the wages of the natives (wherever they are) who lived in communities that received refugees versus those who did not, yielding the causal impact of refugee populations on labor market outcomes of the natives.

For obvious reasons, this is hard to do. Leading researchers instead focus on “natural experiments” and “area-wide” estimates on the impact of refugees. That is, they examine what happens to wages in the communities where refugees settle using a clever way of teasing out the “natural randomness” in settlement patterns. But if the locals move or if the refugee population itself is badly measured, this could lead to a bias towards finding no results. In essence, the results are for the natives who chose to remain behind and therefore presumably had better job options to begin with. In addition, mismeasurement of the refugee population drives results towards zero—the iron law of econometrics.

But a recently published study from Denmark by economists Mette Foged and Giovanni Peri solves all these problems at once:

• They have data on each and every Danish worker between 1991 and 2008, so that they can track people wherever they go.
• The refugees came in two waves. In the first wave, they waited in a queue and as communities opened up spaces, they were allocated in groups from the same country. Since the department managing the transfers had no data on the skills of these refugees, this was like a random allocation. Later, between 1995 and 2003, the refugee flow from Somalia, Iraq, and Afghanistan increased—but they settled in the same communities that their fellow countrymen had gone to. This created large differences in refugee populations across communities that only grew over time. The authors present a number of very convincing tests that the “like-random” assumption truly holds in their data.
• Because they have fairly long-term data, they can assess both the immediate effects and the cumulative effects over time.

And the results?

Zip. Nada. Nothing. Kuch bhi nahin. No smoking gun showing that natives will be hurt when refugees enter.

More specifically, the authors generally find positive effects on the employment and wages of the natives who looked similar to the mostly unskilled refugees entering at this time. Quantitatively, they find that “a 1 percentage point increase in the share of low-skilled immigrants from refugee-sending countries increased wages for low-skilled native workers by 1 to 1.8 percent.” Nor do they find negative effects on employment—the fraction of the year that natives worked either remained the same or increased slightly, depending on the specification.

To interpret their findings, the authors say:

“The panel regressions suggest that refugee-country immigrants, who specialized mainly in manual, low-skilled jobs, encouraged low-skilled natives to take more complex occupations, decreasing the manual content of their jobs, especially when changing establishment and this contributed to produce a positive effect on their wages and employment. In no specification do we find crowding-out of native unskilled workers or depressing effects on their wages”.

Could it be that this was just because the refugees did not work? Nope. Over the time period of the data, the foreign-born share of employment in Denmark rose sharply, from 3 percent to just over 6 percent.

Could it be that the refugees were “like the Danes” and therefore fitted in better? Unlikely. Their estimates are driven by a surge in immigrants from Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq between 1995 and 2003. Hard to mistake them for Danes.

But the earlier “area” estimates were wrong, right? Nope. Actually it turns out that all the legwork Foged and Peri do pretty much replicates the simpler area estimates that have been saying this all along.

To be sure, more could be said. For instance, the paper could talk about the precise government policies that were put in place to help the refugees when they came and the associated costs. In fact, it would be good to show the per refugee cost to the government and compare this to the taxes that the refugees paid back to the system as they joined the labor force. Since there are no “spillovers” to natives, if the taxes are higher than the initial public costs, refugees are a net gain to the treasury. Bringing them in would actually increase government budgets over time, without hurting native wages. Of course, the wages and lives of the refugees will be immeasurably better, but we have known that for a while now.

When it comes to taking in refugees, there shouldn’t be worry about the effects on wages or employment of natives. On the contrary, refugees sweeten the deal, as the Parsi priests pointed out thirteen centuries ago.

      

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As the 2016 election draws near, issues related to immigration and broader cultural change continue to dominate the national political dialogue. Now, an extensive new survey sheds light on how Americans view these issues. How do they feel about the proposed policy to build a wall on the U.S.-Mexico border or a temporary ban on Muslims entering the country? The survey of more than 2,500 Americans explores opinions on these questions and others concerning the current immigration system, immigrants’ contributions to American culture, and the cultural and economic anxieties fueling Donald Trump’s success among core Republican constituencies.

On June 23, Governance Studies at Brookings and the Public Religion Research Institute released the PRRI/Brookings Immigration Survey and hosted a panel of experts to discuss its findings. Additional topics explored in the survey and by the panel included perceptions of discrimination against white Americans and Christians, and the extent to which Americans believe that the uncertain times demand an unconventional leader.

Join the conversation on Twitter at #immsurvey and @BrookingsGov

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• The battle over the border: Public opinion on immigration and cultural change at the forefront of the election

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• The battle over the border: Public opinion on immigration and cultural change at the forefront of the election

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• Transcript (.pdf)

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• 20160623_immigration_prri_transcript

       

Much ink will be spilled analyzing the results of the U.K. referendum on whether to leave the EU. Some will highlight the xenophobic edge to the “leave” campaign, and how the Brexiteers resorted brazenly to a politics of fear to exploit the public’s worries over immigration.

Not surprisingly, Turkey became the natural pick to serve as the Brexit campaign’s boogeyman. According to the “leave” campaign’s material, Turks are inherently prone to violence and criminality. If Britain remains in the European Union, the thinking goes, it will soon be overrun by flocks of Turks. Former Mayor of London Boris Johnson—one of the staunchest advocates of Brexit—remarked cynically that “he [would] not mind whether Turkey joins the EU, provided that the U.K. leaves the EU.” He has unabashedly stoked fears that EU membership means uncontrolled immigration into Britain, and that Turkish membership to the EU would only make that problem worse. 

Stoking fear of Turkey-the-boogeyman is a longstanding pastime in Europe, stretching back centuries. Turkey’s candidacy for the European Union breathed new life into the practice. When Turkey started to undertake reforms that set the country towards accession negotiations, it was met with mighty resistance in Europe—confirming the deep-seated skepticism in Turkey that “objective” criteria, also applied to Central and Eastern European countries, would not apply to it. The image of the “terrible Turk” appeared once again: to warn the European public of an impending Turkish invasion, and therefore to keep Turkey out of the European Union. 

Old habits die hard

It’s ironic that Boris Johnson—a great-grandson of an Ottoman minister and someone who has previously spoken proudly of his Turkish heritage—would succumb to Turkey-the-boogeyman scare tactics. But he has high political ambitions, which include chipping away at Prime Minister David Cameron’s leadership of the Conservative Party, and Johnson now seems to prefer pandering to populist, euro-skeptic forces. In an attempt to secure his right-side flank, Cameron (who had long supported Turkey’s EU membership, as long as the necessary conditions were met) had a sudden conversion just a few days ago and said that Turkey’s prospects for EU membership before the year 3000 were slim. So he too apparently believes, in some sense, that Turkey is a boogeyman—so Turkey has become a punching bag in the internal Conservative Party power struggle too. 

Mirror images?

It goes without saying that Turkey is not in the shape that it was a decade ago. It is no longer the darling of the international community with an enviable growth rate, and its soft power has waned dramatically. Instead, both its democracy and its economy are limping along, at best—though, to be fair, its economy is growing faster than the EU’s. And Turks are no strangers to the kinds of politics of fear we’ve seen in the U.K.—their increasingly authoritarian and repressive leader, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, is adept at stoking fear too. Meanwhile, he’s assumed a defiant posture towards Europe, threatening, for example, to lower the drawbridge on Greece and Bulgaria and unleash a repeat of last year’s migration crisis. These kinds of threats, of course, only bolster voices like Boris Johnson back in Britain. 

It’s quite remarkable that at the same time as prominent figures in both the “leave” and “remain” campaigns are engaging in forms of Turkey-bashing, they apparently borrow lexicon from the Turkish leader himself—employing a language of intolerance and xenophobia. This could not have been—and indeed, was not—what early promoters of European integration like Winston Churchill envisaged for their continent. They had seen the horrors that could come when politics of fear spun out of control. 

Regardless of the British referendum results, there has already been much damage inflicted on the West’s liberal image. This is why when ink is spilled in the coming days, discussing the vote’s results, we must also take a hard look at eroding liberal democratic standards and values. The very foundations of European—including British—democracies are being shaken: What will this mean for the European integration project? It seems surprising today, but there was actually a time when there were European leaders who pushed for Turkish membership in the EU—yes, Turkey the boogeyman—in order to strengthen this very project. Times and sentiments, as well as conceptions of democracy, have obviously changed. Welcome populism, welcome politics of fear, and pity to those Turks that genuinely believed in Europe’s strength as a bastion of liberal democracy and integration.

       

On June 23, Brookings hosted the release of the Immigrants, Immigration Reform, and 2016 Election Survey, a joint project with the Public Religion Research Institute (PRRI). The associated report entitled, How immigration and concern about cultural change are shaping the 2016 election finds an American public anxious and intensely divided on matters of immigration and cultural change at the forefront of the 2016 Election.

Dr. Robert Jones, CEO of PRRI, began the presentation by highlighting Americans’ feelings of anxiety and personal vulnerability. The poll found, no issue is more critical to Americans this election cycle than terrorism, with nearly seven in ten (66 percent) reporting that terrorism is a critical issue to them personally. And yet, Americans are sharply divided on questions of terrorism as it pertains to their personal safety. Six in ten (62 percent) Republicans report that they are at least somewhat worried about being personally affected by terrorism, while just 44 percent of Democrats say the same. 

On matters of cultural change, Jones painted a picture of a sharply divided America. Poll results indicate that a majority (55 percent) of Americans believe that the American way of life needs to be protected from foreign influence, while 44 percent disagree.  Responses illustrate a stark partisan divide:

74 percent of Republicans and 83 percent of Trump supporters believe that foreign influence over the American way of life needs to be curtailed.  Just 41 percent of Democrats agree, while a majority (56 percent) disagrees with this statement. Views among white Americans are sharply divided by social class, the report finds. While 68 percent of the white working class agrees that the American way of life needs to be protected, fewer than half (47 percent) of white college-educated Americans agree.

Jones identified Americans’ views on language and “reverse discrimination” as additional touchstones of cultural change. Americans are nearly evenly divided over how comfortable they feel when they encounter immigrants who do not speak English: 50 percent say this bothers them and 49 percent say it does not. 66 percent of Republicans and 77 percent of Trump supporters express discomfort when coming into contact with immigrants who do not speak English; just 35 percent of Democrats say the same.

 

Americans split evenly on the question of whether discrimination against whites, or “reverse discrimination,” is as big of a problem as discrimination against blacks and other minorities (49 percent agree, 49 percent disagree). Once again, the partisan differences are considerable: 72 percent of Republicans and 81 percent of Trump supporters agree that reverse discrimination is a problem, whereas more than two thirds (68 percent) of Democrats disagree.

On economic matters, survey results indicate that nearly seven in ten (69 percent) Americans support increasing the tax rate on wealthy Americans, defined as those earning over $250,000 a year. This represents a modest increase in the share of Americans who favor increasing the tax rate relative to 2012, but a dramatic increase in the number of Republicans who favor this position.

 

The share of  Republicans favoring increasing the tax rate on wealthy Americans jumped from 36 percent in 2012 to 54 percent in 2016—an 18 point increase. Democrats and Independents views on this position remained relatively constant, increasing from 80 to 84 percent and 61 to 68 percent approval respectively.

Finally, on matters of immigration, Americans are divided over whether immigrants are changing their communities for the better (50 percent) or for the worse (49 percent). Across party lines, however, Americans are more likely to think immigrants are changing American society as a whole than they are to think immigrants are changing the local community. This, Jones suggested, indicates that Americans’ views on immigration are motivated by partisan ideology more than by lived experience. 

At the conclusion of Dr. Jones’s presentation, Brookings senior fellow in Governance Studies, Dr. William Galston moderated a panel discussion of the poll’s findings. Karlyn Bowman, a senior fellow and research coordinator at the American Enterprise Institute, observed that cultural anxiety has long characterized Americans’ views on immigration. Never, Bowman remarked, has the share of Americans that favor immigrants outpaced the share of those who oppose immigrants. Turning to the results of the PRRI survey, Bowman highlighted the partisan divide influencing responses to the proposition that the United States place a temporary ban on Muslims. The strong level of Republican support for the proposal--64 percent support among Republicans--compared to just 23 percent support among Democrats has more to do with fear of terrorism than anxiety about immigration, she argued.

Henry Olsen, a senior fellow at the Ethics and Public Policy Center, remarked that many Americans feel that government should do more to ensure protection, prosperity, and security -- as evidenced by the large proportion of voters who feel that their way of life is under threat from terrorism (51%), crime (63%), or unemployment (65%).  In examining fractures within the Republican Party, Olsen considered the ways in which Trump voters differ from non-Trump voters, regardless of party affiliation. On questions of leadership, he suggested, the fact that 57% of all Republicans agree that we need a leader “willing to break some rules” is skewed by the high proportion of Trump supporters (72%) who agree with that statement. Indeed, just 49% of Republicans who did not vote for Trump agreed that the country needs a leader willing to break rules to set things right.

Joy Reid, National Correspondent at MSNBC, cited the survey’s findings that Americans are bitterly divided over whether American culture and way of life has changed for the better (49 percent) or the worse (50 percent) since the 1950s. More than two-thirds of Republicans (68 percent) and Donald Trump supporters (68 percent) believe the American way of life has changed for the worse since the 1950s. Connecting this nostalgia to survey results indicating anxiety about immigration and cultural change, Reid argued that culture—not economics—is the primary concern animating many Trump supporters.

       

My partner was caught at the Istanbul airport during the latest terrorist attack. She hid in a closet with a few people, including a small girl, disconcerted and afraid. And when the attack was over, she saw the blood, desolation, chaos, and tears of the aftermath. This was a horrific moment. Yet, it paled in comparison to what the injured and dead and their relatives had to suffer.

It seems that terrorism and political violence are becoming more prevalent and intense. They have been, however, long brewing and have affected many countries around the world. In the 1980s, my home country, Peru, suffered immensely from terrorism: The badly called “Shining Path” organization, with its communist ideology and ruthless tactics, terrorized first rural communities and then large cities with deadly bombs in crowded places and assassinations of official and civil society leaders.

A few years ago, Phil Keefer, lead economist at the World Bank, and I edited two books on what we perceived to be the main security threats of our time: terrorism and drug trafficking. We thought that the answers had to come from research, and we tried to gather the best available evidence and arguments to understand the links between these security threats and economic development.

After the myriad of recent terrorist attacks—in Istanbul, Munich, Nice, Bagdad, Brussels, and Paris, to name a few—we found it important to recap lessons learned. These lessons are not just academic: Understanding the root causes of terrorism can lead to policies for prevention and for reducing the severity of attacks. To defeat terrorism, a policy strategy should include three components: intelligence, integration, and development.

Intelligence. A terrorist attack is relatively easy to conduct. Modern societies offer many exposed and vulnerable targets: an airport, a crowded celebration by the beach, a bus station at peak hours, or a restaurant full of expats. And the potential weapons are too many to count: a squadron of suicide bombers, a big truck ramming through the streets, two or three comrades armed with semi-automatic guns. It is impossible to protect all flanks, and some of the measures taken to prevent the previous terrorist attacks are, well, frankly silly. For a strategy to have any chance against terrorism, it should be based on intelligence. Intelligence implies understanding the motivations, leadership structure, and modus operandi of terrorist organizations, and developing a plan that can anticipate and adapt to their constantly morphing operations. Importantly, the ideological dimension should not be ignored because it explains the extremes to which terrorists are willing to arrive: A suicide attack requires a person who has muted both his basic survival instinct and all sense of natural compassion for others. It was radical communism in the 1970s and 1980s; it is a perverted and fanatical misrepresentation of Islam nowadays. An intelligence strategy that targets the sources of terrorism, both the perpetrators and the social movements that underlie them, should be the first component of the campaign against terror.

Integration. Foreigners living in the U.S. like to make fun of Hollywood movies and the social rituals that Americans go through each year: Halloween and Thanksgiving are in many respects more popular than Christmas. Yet, thanks to these cultural norms along with widespread economic opportunities and equality under the law, the U.S. has mostly succeeded in what many countries, including some European ones, have failed: the integration of people of different ethnic, religious, and cultural backgrounds. The U.S. is no paradise of integration, but the social melting pot does work for immigrants: Within a generation or two, Mexican Americans, Italian Americans, Iranian Americans, and so forth are just Americans, with a single national identity and, at least by law, the same rights and obligations. In some European countries, in contrast, many immigrants feel like second-class citizens. There is little that can inflame more hatred than the feeling of being excluded, and a misguided search for a sense of belonging can be the trigger that incites religious, ethnic, and ideological radicalization. This may explain why France has suffered more from terrorist acts perpetrated by their own residents than the U.S. or U.K., that paradoxically are substantially more engaged in the war against ISIS and al-Qaeda. Social integration—especially of immigrants—through explicit and targeted programs from education at an early age to immigration and citizenship reforms is a key component in the fight against terrorism.       

Development. One of the puzzles in the evidence on terrorism is that while it tends to be led (and sometimes even perpetrated) by well-off and educated people, it represents the complaints and grievances of the disenfranchised, the poor, and the unemployed. The hundreds of thousands of unemployed and discouraged young men in places as diverse as Afghanistan, Somalia, South Africa, and Brazil are the potential armies of common and political violence. In South Africa and Brazil, lacking an overriding communal ideology, this violence is expressed in robberies, homicides, and common crime. In Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, the violence is mostly political, taking the shape or at least the cover of religious fundamentalism. Somehow in Somalia, violence has adopted both criminal and political expressions: We worry about Somali pirates as much as we do about Somali jihadists. (On the link between vulnerable youth and violence, it is telling that the name of the main terrorist organization in Somalia, al-Shabaab, means literally “The Youth”) But there is hope. A couple of decades ago, thousands of unemployed young people joined terrorist organizations in Cambodia, Colombia, and Peru, when these countries were fragile. Since their economies started growing and providing employment, these armies for criminal and political violence have started to fade away. Investing in development, conducting economic reforms, and providing (yes, equal) opportunities is the third component of a winning strategy against terrorism.

A sound military and police strategy is undoubtedly important to counter terrorism. However, it’s not sufficient in the long run. If we want to defeat terrorism permanently and completely, we need to tackle it comprehensively, using political and military intelligence, social integration, and economic development.

For more, please see Keefer, Philip and Norman Loayza, Editors. Terrorism, Economic Development, and Political Openness. Cambridge University Press. 2008.

       

For months, Europe has been dealing with the hectic, day-to-day struggles of managing a massive migrant crisis. While those challenges dominate in the short term, European leaders must also start thinking about medium- to long-term reforms to the European Union’s asylum and migration policies.

European governments have made clear that they want to reform the Common European Asylum System. The European Commission has proposed reforms of its own, which to become laws would need to be approved by both the Council and the European Parliament. But while these proposals are certainly steps in the right direction, they don’t go far enough in addressing structural weaknesses in Europe’s migration and asylum policies.

Positive momentum in a number of key areas

There are several areas where the Commission has already proposed good reforms:

1. The Commission is proposing to recast a directive aimed at standardizing the processing of asylum procedures across Europe into a fully-fledged regulation. This is good news. The persistent variation in the implementation of asylum procedures across the EU highlights this necessity. Unlike directives, which need to be transposed into national legislation, regulations are immediately and simultaneously enforceable across all member states. 
2. A directive specifying the grounds for granting international protection is to be replaced by a more stringent regulation, which is also a good thing. It’s problematic that asylum seekers from the same country of origin enjoy dramatically different acceptance rates across EU member states. Combined, these changes should force member states to comply with international standards on asylum procedures and increase opportunities for migrants to get asylum (particularly in countries that have applied more restrictive criteria).
3. The Eurodac system, which establishes a pan-European fingerprinting database, is now likely to be expanded as well. It would store data on third-country nationals who are not applicants for international protection. But implementation is again a challenge, since Croatia, Greece, Italy, and Malta already struggle to fingerprint new arrivals (something over which infringement proceedings are still ongoing). 
4. To attract highly skilled professionals, the Commission is working to make the EU Blue Card scheme more appealing. While member states will retain the right to set their own annual migrants quota, Blue Card procedures and rights will be harmonized across the EU. The minimum length of an initial contract offer will be lowered to six months, salary thresholds will be reduced, and the Blue Card will be offered to migrants granted asylum. Other measures—including a directive aimed at students and researchers and another facilitating intra-corporate transfers—are also steps in the right direction. 
5. Finally, the Commission has proposed making permanent a pan-European resettlement scheme that was launched during last summer’s migrant crisis. That’s also a good thing. The framework would harmonize resettlement procedures and financially incentivizes member states to favor the European framework over national ones. At the same time, it would allow asylum seekers to move to Europe without risking their lives trying to cross the Mediterranean. However, given that member states will still determine how many people to resettle annually, the long-term impact of the scheme remains to be seen. 

German Interior Minister Thomas de Maiziere watches as a migrant from Babel in Iraq has his fingerprints taken, during a visit to Patrick-Henry Village refugee centerin Heidelberg, Germany. Photo credit: Reuters/Kai Pfaffenbach.

Far more needed but little appetite among national capitals

There are several policy areas where far more should be done: 

1. There is at least one area where the EU is still planning reforms but of a far more limited nature, and that’s on the current directive on basic standards for housing, healthcare, and employment. In private conversations, EU officials stress that the sheer numbers of migrants make it hard for even the best-performing countries to implement this directive. Put simply, member states do not have the political will to do more than what they are already doing. The EU is therefore, understandably, proposing a more moderate reform: it aims to improve reception conditions throughout the EU without dictating to member states how to do so.
2. Less privileged migrants must be provided with safe avenues to contribute to Europe’s economy. Legislation allowing seasonal workers into the Union for a maximum of between five and nine months within any twelve-month period already goes in this direction. Forums connecting local industry associations and countries of origin to better match labor demand and supply would also be welcome. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cape Verde, Georgia, Morocco, Moldova, and Tunisia—which enjoy mobility partnerships with the EU—would benefit from such an approach. More can be done if the political will amongst European capitals is there.
3. Finally, Europeans must ensure that migrants feel welcome to stay. The EU is aware of the need to adequately integrate third-country nationals, but European capitals are in the driver’s seat when it comes to integration. Directives aimed at facilitating family reunifications, integrating long-term residents, and streamlining administrative processes do what they can in this respect. However, the paths to integration and to welcoming foreigners chosen by European countries are exceedingly different, and for the time being likely to remain so. Because of this and until policymakers put integration at the top of their national agendas, foreign nationals will likely continue to struggle. 

Dublin: Still the elephant in the room

The Dublin regulation, which outlines which member state should be responsible for handling asylum applications, still must be radically revised. This is the elephant in the room and the core of the current asylum refugee framework. Member states should consider the Commission’s proposals for a corrective mechanism in case of migrant surges, a new system for allocating applications across the EU based on a distribution key or, ideally, the centralization of competences to the European Asylum Support Office. 

Informal conversations with top national and European officials suggest that the corrective mechanism is the most likely proposal to be accepted by the member states and therefore adopted. Under such an agreement, Dublin would be maintained, but automatic relocations would start in case of exceptional migrant surges—with hefty fines imposed by the Commission on those member states refusing to play their part. Unfortunately, this is not good enough. Such an approach does not address the underlying structural unfairness and unsustainability of a system that leaves the burden of processing arrivals overwhelmingly on frontline states. 

The current situation exemplifies a significant failure of governance that harms the interests of migrants and member states alike. At present, the Dublin Convention largely ignores the needs of migrants in terms of family reunification, language skills, and cultural integration. Unfortunately, the corrective mechanism for the Dublin Convention does nothing more than provide some relief in case of acute emergencies. Meanwhile, it leaves frontline states to continue facing on their own a crisis that only Europe as a whole could solve. “European leaders” still think and act through national perspectives.

Moving along despite European governments

The European Commission faces both legal and political constraints that limit its scope of action. Whenever it can, it is pushing for a significant overhaul of European asylum and migration policies. However, once more, its initiatives are hampered by the so-called “interests” of the member states. For the time being, we are likely to see some degree of integration in the fields of asylum and migration policies. But because of national vetoes, progress is slow and proposals are often watered down.