I want to begin by saying how grateful we were at Brookings to partner with the Federal Reserve System on this concentrated poverty project. We like to think that at Brookings we know a lot about this subject, but it was only through this partnership with the Fed that we were able to ground this understanding in the experiences of the 16 communities across the United States that were the focus of the report’s case studies.

The report demonstrates that in addition to managing the macroeconomy, the Fed also possesses a unique and powerful understanding of the U.S. economy from the ground up, which is absolutely necessary for designing smart policy in turbulent times like these.

I want to also give special thanks to my colleagues David Erickson and Carolina Reid at the San Francisco Fed. They played several roles in this project for me: intellectual partners, co-conspirators, mood lighteners, and Fed sherpas. It can be tough for foreigners like myself to navigate this system, and they lightened my load throughout the project. I also want to thank my Brookings colleague Elizabeth Kneebone, who performed a lot of the data analysis for this project.

I want to argue three points, largely policy points, in my remarks this morning.

First, the current economic climate makes the issue of concentrated poverty, and our response, more relevant, not less.

Second, major near-term investments our country makes to resolve the economic crisis can and should provide meaningful opportunities for the most disadvantaged families and communities.

And third, our longer-run efforts to assist high-poverty areas and their residents must take account of the economic challenges and opportunities that manifest at the regional, metropolitan level.

To begin, let’s review where we were when the Fed and Brookings joined forces on this effort in May 2006.

• The unemployment rate was 4.7 percent, a five-year low.
• Payrolls were expanding every month for the third consecutive year.
• The poverty rate, while still above its low in 2000, was dropping.
• The federal deficit was a relatively manageable 2% of GDP.
• The Dow was above 11,000, and on its way up.
• And the 2008 general election promised a storied matchup between party favorites Hillary Clinton and Rudy Giuliani.

A lot can happen in 30 months!

In the wake of record house-price declines and financial market fallout, the economic outlook today is grim. The unemployment rate is 6.5 percent and rising. One projection suggests that the downturn could eventually increase the ranks of the nation’s poor by anywhere from 7 to 10 million. And amid declining revenues and increased expenditure needs, the U.S. budget deficit is expected to top $1 trillion this year.

In short, the situation for the lowest-income communities and their residents is not encouraging.

And neither is our starting point.

As Paul Jargowsky’s research has shown, the incidence of concentrated poverty in America dropped markedly during the 1990s, after two decades of increase. Some combination of a tight labor market and policy changes to promote work and break up the deepest concentrations of poverty seemed responsible for that decline.

But as Elizabeth and I found in a recent Brookings report, we may have given back much of that progress during the first half of this decade. The population in what we termed “high working poverty” communities rose by 40 percent between 1999 and 2005. This suggests that America’s high-poverty areas may have never really recovered from the modest downturn we experienced at the beginning of the decade.

Now, with all the turmoil in our economy, it would be easy to lose sight of these places and their residents, who even seem to have missed out on the benefits of recent growth.

But if we are to meet the enormous challenges facing our country—economic, social, and environmental—we simply can’t afford to take a blind eye to the continuing problem of concentrated poverty.

As decades of research and this report have shown, concentrated poverty magnifies the problems faced by the poor, and exacts a significant toll on the lives of families in its midst.

This report greatly enhances our understanding of how high-poverty communities of all stripes bear these costs. Moreover, it suggests that the contemporary circumstances of these communities owe not just to long-term market dynamics, but also to policy choices made over several decades’ time—some deliberate in their intent, and some producing unfortunate unintended consequences.

Today we’re at an important inflection point for policy. With the economy souring, we don’t have the luxury of using an “auto-pilot” strategy of macroeconomic growth to reach the most disadvantaged places and their residents. Quite the opposite—just as these communities are often “last in” for economic opportunity during boom times, they seem to be “first out” when things shift into reverse.

But the specific nature of the current crisis also poses added challenges for high-poverty communities.

That is because many of these areas were ground zero for risky subprime lending over the last several years. In many of the case-study communities in the report, half or more of recent home mortgages were high-cost subprime loans.

Now, they are on the front lines of the fallout. Our calculations of HUD data show that census tracts where the poverty rate was at least 40 percent in 2000—the conventional definition behind concentrated poverty—have an estimated foreclosure rate over 9 percent, roughly double the nationwide average.

This poses both an immediate and a long-term threat to what little stability these communities possess.

Over the short term, these areas face problems associated with heightened property neglect, vacancy, and abandonment. Not only can those conditions breed crime and disorder, but also they can accelerate a process of further disinvestment from high-poverty neighborhoods, which are all too familiar with that cycle of decline.

Over the long run, the public sector will work to return foreclosed properties in these neighborhoods to productive use. But there is a danger that we may once again re-concentrate poverty in these neighborhoods if these assets are not managed and deployed strategically.

In sum, recent trends and a perilous road ahead merit a meaningful policy response to the challenges facing areas of concentrated poverty and their residents.

This brings me to my second point, which is that near-term policy choices can ameliorate the impacts of the current crisis on areas of concentrated poverty.

In less than 50 days, a new administration will take office in Washington, facing economic challenges of a scale not seen in decades.

The president-elect and his advisors have signaled that they are ready to “do what it takes” to stimulate the economy, create and protect jobs, and catalyze investment in new sectors to spur longer-term growth.

I believe that policies advanced by the new administration and Congress in the first few weeks of the new year, if designed and executed well, could matter greatly for the fortunes of the nation’s high-poverty communities.

First, a comprehensive strategy to deal with the foreclosure crisis is sorely needed. This would feature, first and foremost, a broad plan to forestall the rising tide of mortgages, including many in high-poverty communities, headed for default due to falling home prices, economic dislocation, and poor underwriting.

However, even a sweeping, generous approach will not prevent the inevitable. Especially in high-poverty areas, more loans will fall into foreclosure, more people will lose their homes, and fiscally-strapped local governments will be left to manage the consequences of increasing vacancy and abandonment.

The Neighborhood Stabilization Program enacted by Congress and the Bush administration during the summer of 2008 represents an initial effort to arm state and local leaders with the resources to tackle the neighborhood impacts of rising foreclosures.

But significant deterioration of the economy in the intervening months suggests that the problem may now be of a much larger scale than was originally anticipated. What’s more, many local governments lack the capacity, expertise, and legal authorities to use existing or additional resources strategically.

So the new administration, and HUD in particular, will need to consider a further round of response—using some mix of fiscal, regulatory, capacity-building, and bully pulpit powers—to help cash-strapped local governments mitigate the impacts of foreclosure on their most vulnerable communities.

Second, there seems to be wide agreement that the economic recovery package should include a series of measures that inject money into the economy right away.

So the package will provide immediate assistance to families, communities, and governments hit hard by the downturn, in the likely form of extended unemployment and increased food stamp benefits, increased state and local aid, and low- to middle-income tax cuts, spending designed to make a real economic impact in the next several months.

A couple of details here are of real consequence to communities of concentrated poverty.

• Income tax cuts included in the package should be refundable, like the Earned Income Tax Credit, or EITC. Boosting the EITC, for instance, would provide additional help to workers most likely to be hit hard by the downturn, and target resources to families most likely to spend the additional cash immediately. As the report shows, at least 30 percent, and as many as 60 percent, of families in the case-study communities today benefit from the EITC.
• Unemployment insurance benefits should be extended, but also modernized. As the case studies showed, work among residents of high-poverty communities is often seasonal or part-time, even in a good economy. As a result, many laid-off workers from poor areas in several states may not qualify for benefits due to outmoded eligibility rules. Therefore, in addition to extending weeks of eligibility for UI, Congress and the new administration might also consider providing incentives to states to expand the pool of workers who could benefit from the program during the downturn.

Third, infrastructure will clearly figure prominently among the spending priorities in the recovery package.

Yet there is a significant risk that focusing dollars primarily on projects that states deem “shovel-ready,” as has been discussed, will repeat mistakes of the past. It would primarily subsidize road-building at the metropolitan fringe, and do little to enhance long-run economic growth, or provide better opportunities for low-income people and the places they live.

Infrastructure investments of the magnitude under consideration must not only create jobs, but also promote inclusive and sustainable growth. That means setting strict criteria for federal investment, including a real assessment of costs and benefits that considers economic, environmental, and social impacts. As the report shows, poor infrastructure often acts as a barrier to the economic integration of high-poverty communities into their larger municipal and regional areas.

To that end, we should also consider providing direct support for large, cash-strapped municipal governments that they could use to modernize and preserve roads, bridges, transit, water, sewer, and perhaps even broadband infrastructure. At the same time, we should hold them and grantees at all other levels of government accountable for connecting younger, disadvantaged workers and communities to the jobs that result.

In short, what happens in the first several weeks of the new year here in Washington could, if structured properly, provide meaningful support and opportunity for low-income areas and their residents. At a minimum, this might avert the sort of backsliding these communities suffered during the much milder recession we experienced earlier this decade.

So that brings me to my third and final point, which is that, over the longer term, we must advance policies that actively link the fortunes of poor communities to those of their regional neighbors. As you probably heard or read, our division at Brookings is named the “Metropolitan Policy Program.”

Our mission is to provide decision makers with cutting-edge research and policy ideas for improving the health and prosperity of cities and metropolitan areas.

You might ask, why metropolitan? After all, this is not a term that most Americans use, think about, or even recognize, even though 85 percent of us live in metropolitan areas. A friend of the program once told us that it sounded like a combination of “metrosexual” and “cosmopolitan.” Not exactly what we were going for.

More specifically, what relevance does “metropolitan” have for addressing the challenges of concentrated poverty?

Well, the report points to skills and employability problems that hold back residents of high-poverty communities. If the route to improving the lives of families affected by concentrated poverty runs in part through the labor market, then we must devise strategies and solutions that respect and respond to the geography of that market—which is metropolitan.

The report also points to housing problems, of various stripes, that segregate the poor in these communities and make their daily lives more difficult. Housing markets, too, are metropolitan—and housing dynamics in the wealthiest parts of each metro are inextricably linked to those in the poorest parts.

The fact is, our national economy—and that of most industrialized nations—is largely the aggregate of its individual metropolitan economies. In the United States, the 100 largest metro areas account for 12 percent of our land mass, hold 65 percent of our residents, and generate three-quarters of our Gross Domestic Product. They possess even greater shares of our innovative businesses, our most knowledgeable workers, the critical infrastructure that connects us to the global economy, and the quality places that attract, retain, and enhance the productivity of workers and firms.

And as the report shows, regions—both metropolitan and non-metropolitan—each retain distinctive clusters that shape their individual contributions to the national economic pie. Photonics in Rochester. Hospitality and tourism in Atlantic City and Miami. Manufacturing in Albany, Georgia. Agriculture and business services in Central California. These clusters do not possess equal strength or equal potential, but they define the starting point for thinking about the regional economic future of these areas, and economic opportunities for their residents.

Not only are the assets of our economy fundamentally metropolitan… increasingly, our challenges are, too. In 2006, we found that for the first time, more than half of the poor in metropolitan America lived in suburbs, not cities. While poor suburban families don’t yet concentrate at the levels seen in the communities in this report, they are trending in this direction. Between 1999 and 2005, the number of suburban tax filers living in “moderate” working poverty communities rose by nearly 50 percent.

So what does recognition of our metropolitan reality imply for longer-run policies to help the poorest communities and their residents?

Bruce has argued elsewhere that our nation must embrace a new, unified framework for addressing the needs of poor neighborhoods and their residents. He has termed this, Creating Neighborhoods of Choice and Connection. Neighborhoods of choice are communities in which lower-income people can both find a place to start, and as their incomes rise, a place to stay. They are also communities to which people of higher incomes can move, for their distinctiveness, amenities, or location. This requires an acceptance of economic integration as a goal of housing and neighborhood policy.

Neighborhoods of connection are communities that link families to opportunity, wherever in the metropolis that opportunity might be located. This requires a much more profound commitment to the “educational offer” in these communities and the larger areas of which they are a part. It also requires a pragmatic vision of the “geography of opportunity” with regard to jobs, housing, and other choices.

If we take this vision seriously, then our interventions must operate within, and relate to, the metro geography of our economy. This means viewing the conditions and prospects of poor areas through the lens of the broader economic regions of which they are a part, and explicitly gearing policy in that direction.

A simple example relates to the geography of work. In the Springfield, Massachusetts metro area, roughly 30 percent of the region’s jobs still cluster in the neighborhoods close to downtown, including Old Hill and Six Corners. In the Miami metro area, by contrast, only 9 percent of the region’s jobs lie close to its downtown, implying transportation needs of a quite different scale for Little Haiti’s residents. In response, we should empower metropolitan transportation planners to address the unique nature of these spatial divides, and measure their performance on creating inclusive systems that overcome them.

This metro lens applies to workforce development as well. Labor market intermediaries are some of the most promising mechanisms for bridging the information and skills divide between poor communities and regional economic opportunity. One of the highest performers, the Wisconsin Regional Training Partnership, works in the home region of one of our case-study communities, Milwaukee. If workforce policies and funding at all levels of government were to emphasize employer partnerships, provide greater flexibility, and reward performance, we could grow more capable institutions like these that serve the needs of low-income communities and regional firms alike.

A metro perspective can apply to school reform as well. We have called for a new focus at the Department of Education on supporting proven, successful educational entrepreneurs—charter management organizations like KIPP, human capital providers like Teach for America, student support organizations like College Summit. The demand for these entrepreneurial solutions extends well beyond the highest-poverty neighborhoods. Federal education policy should consider investing in these entrepreneurs at the metropolitan scale, to aggregate a critical mass of those organizations, serve a significant percentage of the area’s children, and drive positive changes in the entire public education environment.

Finally, our housing policies must embrace metro-wide economic diversity, which is a hallmark of neighborhoods of choice and connection.

This means expanding housing opportunities for middle-income families in deprived neighborhoods. We simply cannot continue to cluster low-income housing in already low-income areas, perpetuating the sort of economic segregation evident in so many of the case-study communities, and thereby consign another generation to a childhood amid concentrated poverty. Likewise, we must guard against the possibility that the current foreclosure crisis leads to a re-concentration of poor households in neighborhoods that were just beginning to achieve greater economic diversity.

But this is a two-way street. It also means creating more high-quality housing opportunities for low-income families in growing suburban job centers. Requiring or providing incentives to metropolitan areas to engage in regional housing planning, alongside regional transportation planning, may be a necessary first step. Those plans could also apply a more rational screen to the development choices that have fueled sprawl, and thereby added to the social and economic isolation of the lowest-income communities.

Let me end where I began.

This is both an auspicious and a challenging moment at which to wrestle with the problem of concentrated poverty in America.

Auspicious in that we are approaching the dawn of a new government in Washington that has signaled concern for our nation’s low-income residents and communities, recognition that metropolitan economies are the engines of our prosperity, and a pragmatic commitment to doing what works.

Challenging in that making progress against concentrated poverty, and improving opportunity for those in its midst, is a tall order when the macroeconomy isn’t cooperating.

But the current economic climate is not an excuse to avoid this problem; rather, it’s an imperative to act, strategically and purposefully.

That means doing the big near-term things the right way, so that low-income communities and their residents do not bear an excessive brunt of the downturn, and so that they participate meaningfully in our eventual economic recovery.

And it means getting the long-term vision right, so that policy advances sustainable, metro-led solutions that connect poor neighborhoods and poor families to opportunity in the wider economy around them.

The Federal Reserve System has tremendous, well-earned credibility for understanding and advancing dialogue around the future of our nation’s economic regions. I look forward to continuing to work with the Fed to increase public understanding of concentrated poverty, and to make tackling it a crucial element of strategies to promote regional and national prosperity.

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One of Cleveland's neighborhoods made the Washington scene earlier this month.

Alas, it wasn't up for a multibillion-dollar bailout.

Instead, the Central neighborhood and 15 other communities across the United States were the centerpiece of a new report published by the Federal Reserve System and the Brookings Institution.

These communities share a simple, disappointing characteristic. In 2000 - the peak of the last economic boom - at least 40 percent of their residents lived below the federal poverty line. That was about three times the national average.

No American needs to look very far to find places like these. Concentrated poverty affects manufacturing cities like Cleveland, and Albany, Ga.; immigrant gateways like Miami, Fla., and Fresno, Calif.; and rural areas like eastern Kentucky and northern Montana. About 4 million poor Americans live in these areas of extremely high poverty.

How did this happen? Policy decisions made decades ago - like clustering thousands of the Cleveland region's public housing units in the Central neighborhood - helped shape their trajectory. So too did economic changes, like the long-run loss of decent-paying manufacturing jobs, or - in rural areas - mining and agricultural jobs.

By allowing poverty to concentrate in these places, we've magnified the problems their poor residents face. For instance, many low-income children in these communities start school not yet "ready to learn." On top of that, though, they attend schools burdened with lots of other poor kids who face similar challenges, and deal with higher levels of neighborhood crime that affect their mental health and educational performance.

The challenges of concentrated poverty extend to many other areas: low adult work-force skills and employment, poor-quality housing and a lack of investment by mainstream businesses.

And that's in a good economy. Today, Central - and thousands of other high-poverty communities like it across the nation - faces even more significant challenges as the United States enters what may be its worst recession in decades.

So what should Washington do for these places and their residents in the face of such difficult circumstances?

First, we must not lose sight of them in the economic turmoil. That's especially true because the roots of this crisis, in the subprime mortgage market, grew in many very poor neighborhoods like Central. As a result, home foreclosure rates in high-poverty communities are more than double the national average.

To stabilize these hard-hit communities, Washington must adopt new measures to prevent foreclosure and provide additional resources and guidance for state and local governments to help them cope with the rising numbers of vacant properties.

Second, a forthcoming economic stimulus package from Washington that could amount to half a trillion dollars or more should not bypass these neighborhoods and their residents.

That implies the need for immediate federal aid to sustain basic public services in states like Ohio, where the deficit for this year already tops $1 billion. It also suggests providing direct assistance to struggling workers and their families, through enhanced unemployment benefits and tax credits.

At the same time, the infrastructure dollars in the package - which could amount to more than $100 billion - must be spent strategically. States should not be permitted to go on expanding highway capacity at the metropolitan fringe, to the detriment of poor communities near the urban core. Cities like Cleveland, and metropolitan organizations like the Northeast Ohio Areawide Coordinating Agency, should get their fair share of new transportation funds. And funds should be set aside for training programs that provide low-income residents with a pathway to decent jobs.

Third, we have to rethink neighborhood policy over the longer term.

For too long, government has funded housing, schools and economic development in these communities as though they were islands unto themselves.

That's not how the real economy works. These neighborhoods are part of larger regional labor and housing markets. Decisions made across the Cleveland region, such as where firms locate new jobs, or where families buy homes and send their kids to school, ultimately dictate whether neighborhoods like Central can become real neighborhoods of choice and better connected to economic opportunity.

Public policy must leverage that real economy for the benefit of lower-income residents, by building on smart regional strategies like the Fund for Our Economic Future and WIRE-Net in Northeast Ohio. It should diversify housing in poor communities, but also encourage affordable housing development in wealthier parts of metropolitan areas.

Cleveland's Central neighborhood, like other high-poverty communities across the United States, faces a tough road ahead. Short-term opportunities, and long-term strategies, are needed to help its next generation of residents overcome the challenges of concentrated poverty.

      

Public housing has long been criticized as a breeding ground for concentrated poverty, under-achieving schools and for its lack of access to services. As a means to expand opportunity to some of the nation’s most impoverished communities, the Obama administration has proposed the Choice Neighborhoods Initiative, a program that aims to take the current HOPE VI program beyond public housing by transforming these neighborhoods in a new way.

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Since December 2007, working families and communities across the country have faced an increasingly difficult economic reality. Growing unemployment and cutbacks in work hours and wages have made it harder and harder for people to make ends meet.

So the census numbers released in September really just confirmed what many Americans have already been feeling during this “Great Recession.” U.S. poverty is once again on the rise. In the first year of the downturn alone, the poor population grew by 2.6 million people to reach a total of 39.8 million, or 13.2 percent of the population.

But that’s not the whole story. The national lens obscures an important fact: place matters. Yes, 2008 brought a significant uptick in poverty, but whether or not your community was a part of this trend has a lot to do with where you live and what kind of jobs are located there.

Certain regions of the country have disproportionately borne the brunt of this recession. Areas hit hardest by the collapse of the housing market and those metro areas that depend on auto manufacturing have experienced the deepest downturns, while regions concentrated in more recession-proof industries – like educational and medical institutions or government – have fared better.

The 2008 poverty numbers reflect this varied experience. Out of the 100 largest metros areas, a little more than one in five saw a significant change in its poverty rate between 2007 and 2008, most of them increases (see map). Not surprisingly, many of these metro areas are located in California and Florida. The early timing of the burst of the housing bubble put these Sun Belt metro areas on the leading edge of what is sure to be a more widespread upward trend in poverty, reflecting a recession that deepened and spread in 2009. In contrast, metro areas like El Paso and Houston actually experienced a decline in poverty rates from 2007 to 2008, reflecting the later onset and milder effects of the downturn in much of Texas.

Although they represent regional economies, metro areas are themselves collections of cities and suburbs that do not necessarily experience poverty or respond to economic shocks uniformly.

Cities remain poorer places overall. In 2008, city residents in the 100 largest metro areas were almost twice as likely as their suburban counterparts to live in poverty—18.3 percent versus 9.5 percent. However, over the first year of the downturn, suburbs actually added more than twice as many poor people (578,000) as cities (218,000). Sun Belt suburbs – like those in the Florida metros of Lakeland, Palm Bay, Tampa, and Miami – led the list for increased poverty. These numbers reflect the fact that the suburbs are home to more people than their primary cities, but they also reflect the growing economic diversity of America’s suburbs.

In fact, an important shift has taken place in the geography of metropolitan poverty over the course of this decade. Between 2000 and 2008, the suburban poor population grew almost five times as fast as the city poor population, so that suburbs are now home to almost 1.9 million more poor people than their primary cities.

Brookings’ recent study on the “Landscape of Recession” within the country’s largest metro areas suggests that the current downturn will further accelerate the suburbanization of poverty.

More so than in the last recession, suburbs are bearing the brunt of this downturn alongside cities. City and suburban unemployment rates increased by nearly equal degrees and in May 2009 were separated by less than a percentage point—9.6 and 8.7 percent, respectively. And rather than concentrating in the older suburbs that surround cities, problems have spread to lower-density “exurbs” and “emerging suburbs” at the metropolitan fringe. These types of suburban communities showed the greatest spikes in their unemployed populations, with an increase of roughly 77 percent.

Clearly, city and suburban residents alike are experiencing increased economic stress, and the coming months and years will test the adequacy and availability of local safety net and emergency services. Here again, place makes a difference.

Case in point: as poverty increased in 2008, more families turned to food stamps (now called the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, or SNAP) to help make ends meet. Just as the poor population grew faster in the suburbs, so did SNAP receipt. And yet participation in the program remains much higher in urban counties (8.9 million recipients) than suburban counties (5.3 million recipients). This disparity raises questions about whether families in suburban communities know how to connect to safety net services like food stamps, and how accessible these services are in these communities.

Understanding the shifting local geography of poverty is a critical first step in effectively addressing its alleviation. In our largest metropolitan areas, safety net services and social service providers traditionally have been concentrated in central city neighborhoods. As the geography of metropolitan poverty continues to change, policymakers and service providers must ask whether or not the growing suburban poor population has access to the same kinds of services and programs that can help families weather downturns in the economic cycle or connect to opportunities to work their way out of poverty.

The Great Recession is only likely to exacerbate gaps between available services and growing need, as government programs and nonprofit providers struggle to do more with less. Knowing where the need is, and where it is growing fastest, can help regions more effectively align existing social services and programs to respond to the new map of metropolitan poverty.

Editor's Note: This article originally appeared in the online forum Spotlight on Poverty and Opportunity on October 19, 2009.

      

Martha Ross spoke to the Advisory Board of the Community Foundation for Prince George’s County, describing research on the suburbanization of poverty both nationally and in the Washington region.

Despite perceptions that economic distress is primarily a central city phenomenon, suburbs are home to increasing numbers of low-income families. She highlighted the need to strengthen the social service infrastructure in suburban areas.

Full Presentation on Poverty in the Washington-Area Suburbs » (PDF)

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As the first decade of the 2000s drew to a close, the two downturns that bookended the period, combined with slow job growth between, clearly took their toll on the nation’s less fortunate residents.

Over a ten-year span, the country saw the poor population grow by 12.3 million, driving the total number of Americans in poverty to a historic high of 46.2 million. By the end of the decade, over 15 percent of the nation’s population lived below the federal poverty line—$22,314 for a family of four in 2010—though these increases did not occur evenly throughout the country.

An analysis of data on neighborhood poverty from the 2005–09 American Community Surveys and Census 2000 reveals that:

After declining in the 1990s, the population in extreme-poverty neighborhoods—where at least 40 percent of individuals live below the poverty line—rose by one-third from 2000 to 2005–09. By the end of the period, 10.5 percent of poor people nationwide lived in such neighborhoods, up from 9.1 percent in 2000, but still well below the 14.1 percent rate in 1990.

Concentrated poverty nearly doubled in Midwestern metro areas from 2000 to 2005–09, and rose by one-third in Southern metro areas. The Great Lakes metro areas of Toledo, Youngstown, Detroit, and Dayton ranked among those experiencing the largest increases in concentrated poverty rates, while the South was home to metro areas posting both some of the largest increases (El Paso, Baton Rouge, and Jackson) and decreases (McAllen, Virginia Beach, and Charleston). At the same time, concentrated poverty declined in Western metro areas, a trend which may have reversed in the wake of the late 2000s housing crisis.

The population in extreme-poverty neighborhoods rose more than twice as fast in suburbs as in cities from 2000 to 2005–09. The same is true of poor residents in extreme-poverty tracts, who increased by 41 percent in suburbs, compared to 17 percent in cities. However, poor people in cities remain more than four times as likely to live in concentrated poverty as their suburban counterparts.

The shift of concentrated poverty to the Midwest and South in the 2000s altered the average demographic profile of extreme-poverty neighborhoods. Compared to 2000, residents of extreme-poverty neighborhoods in 2005–09 were more likely to be white, native-born, high school or college graduates, homeowners, and not receiving public assistance. However, black residents continued to comprise the largest share of the population in these neighborhoods (45 percent), and over two-thirds of residents had a high school diploma or less.

The recession-induced rise in poverty in the late 2000s likely further increased the concentration of poor individuals into neighborhoods of extreme poverty. While the concentrated poverty rate in large metro areas grew by half a percentage point between 2000 and 2005–09, estimates suggest the concentrated poverty rate rose by 3.5 percentage points in 2010 alone, to reach 15.1 percent. Some of the steepest estimated increases compared to 2005–09 occurred in Sun Belt metro areas like Cape Coral, Fresno, Modesto, and Palm Bay, and in Midwestern places like Indianapolis, Grand Rapids, and Akron.

These trends suggest the strong economy of the late 1990s did not permanently resolve the challenge of concentrated poverty. The slower economic growth of the 2000s, followed by the worst downturn in decades, led to increases in neighborhoods of extreme poverty once again throughout the nation, particularly in suburban and small metropolitan communities and in the Midwest. Policies that foster balanced and sustainable economic growth at the regional level, and that forge connections between growing clusters of low-income neighborhoods and regional economic opportunity, will be key to longer-term progress against concentrated disadvantage.

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Gentrification – the migration of wealthier people into poorer neighborhoods – is a contentious issue in most American cities. Many fear that even if gentrification helps a city in broad terms, for instance by improving the tax base, it will be bad news for low-income residents who are hit by rising rents or even displacement. But this received wisdom is only partially true.

The Problem of Concentrated Poverty

A recent study published by City Observatory, an urban policy think-tank, and written by economist and former Brookings scholar Joseph Cortright with Dillon Mahmoudi , challenges this prevailing pessimism.  Examining population and income changes between 1970 and 2010 in the largest cities, they find that the poverty concentration, rather than gentrification, is the real problem for the urban poor.  

Cortright and Mahmoudi examine more than 16,000 census tracts[1] – small, relatively stable, statistical subdivisions (smaller than the zip code), of a city – within ten miles of the central business districts of the 51 largest cities. Their key findings are:

1. High-poverty neighborhoods tripled between 1970 and 2010: The number of census tracts considered “high-poverty” rose from around 1,100 in 1970 to 3,100 in 2010. Surprisingly, of these newly-impoverished areas, more than half were healthy neighborhoods in 1970, before descending into “high-poverty” status by 2010. Our Brookings colleague Elizabeth Kneebone has documented similar patterns in the concentration of poverty around large cities.
2. Poverty is persistent: Two-thirds of the census tracts defined as “high-poverty” in 1970 (with greater than 30% of residents living below the poverty line), were still “high-poverty” areas in 2010. And another one-quarter of neighborhoods escaped “high-poverty” but remained poorer than the national average (about 15% of population below FPL )
3. Few high-poverty neighborhoods escape poverty: Only about 9 percent of the census tracts that were “high-poverty” in 1970 rebounded to levels of poverty below the national average in 2010.

The Damage of Concentrated Poverty

Being poor is obviously bad, but being poor in a really poor neighborhood is even worse. The work of urban sociologists like Harvard’s Robert J. Sampson and New York University’s Patrick Sharkey  highlights how persistent, concentrated neighborhood disadvantage has damaging effects on children that continue throughout a lifetime, often stifling upward mobility across generations.  When a community experiences uniform and deep poverty, with most streets characterized by dilapidated housing, failing schools, teenage pregnancy and heavy unemployment, it appears to create a culture of despair that can permanently blight a young person’s future.

Gentrification: Potentially Benign Disruption

So what has been the impact of gentrification in the few places where it has occurred? There is some evidence, crisply summarized in a recent article by John Buntin in Slate, that it might not be all bad news in terms of poverty. A degree of gentrification can begin to break up the homogenous poverty of neighborhoods in ways that can be good for all residents. New wealthier residents may demand improvements in schools and crime control. Retail offerings and services may improve for all residents – and bring new jobs, too. Gentrifiers can change neighborhoods in ways that begin to counteract the effects of uniform, persistent poverty.  On the other hand, gentrification can hurt low-income households by disrupting the social fabric of neighborhoods and potentially “pricing out” families. It depends on how it’s done. We’ll turn to that tomorrow. 

       

Poverty is heavily concentrated in a growing number of urban neighborhoods, which as we argued yesterday, is bad news for social mobility. By breaking up semi-permanent poverty patterns, a degree of gentrification can bring in new resources, energy and opportunities.

Gentrification and poverty: A contested relationship

As we noted yesterday, work by Cortright and Mahmoudi suggests that almost 10% of high-poverty neighborhoods escaped the poverty trap between 1970 and 2010—especially in Chicago, New York, and Washington D.C. Is this good or bad news for the residents of these formerly very poor neighborhoods?

Researchers disagree: the standard fear, supported by a considerable body of qualitative research, is that low-income families will be priced out and displaced out of improving neighborhoods. But there is growing evidence in the economics literature that casts doubt on prevailing views about the risks of displacement. These neighborhoods may become mixed neighborhoods rather than switching from homogenously poor to homogenously wealthy. This could be good news for the poor households who are now living in non-poor areas.

Gentrification: It depends how you do it

Whether gentrification benefits the poor depends in part on the nature of the process. Gentrification is not all the same. Gentrification can mean “walled-up” and gated communities for the wealthy and it can sometimes create damaging disruptions in the tenuous social fabric of neighborhoods, such that there are few beneficial spillover effects of from gentrification.

So while many neighborhoods previously mired in poverty may experience positive impacts from gentrification, others may be directly hurt by it. According to an extensive literature review by the Urban Institute, the impact of living in mixed-income communities for low-income families varies quite widely. Low-income families tend to benefit from improvements in neighborhood services, but the effects on their education and economic outcomes are unclear.   

Some cities, such as Washington DC, have started using their regulatory powers to require developers to preserve or expand modest-income housing alongside higher-priced housing. It is too early to assess the impact of these programs so, but such “smart” gentrification policies may be a good strategy to turn around chronically poor neighborhoods in ways that benefit the original population.

One advantage of the migration of wealthier people into depressed neighborhoods is the restoration and use of dilapidated buildings, which can have positive spillover effects throughout the community. But there are other ways to achieve this, including investments in charter or community schools and other community institutions that then become “hubs” for a range of medical and other services, as well as improved education.

Gentrification certainly comes with attendant dangers for low-income families, which policy makers should be on guard against. But it comes with potential benefits too, so we should be careful about simply “protecting” neighborhoods from the process.  Policies and regulations that insulate impoverished neighborhoods from gentrification could end up condemning these communities to yet another generation of deep poverty and segregation. 

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

Amid anger and protests in Baltimore following the death of 25-year-old Freddie Gray from a spinal injury sustained after being arrested by police, much of the discussion has focused on the poverty-ridden neighborhood in which Gray grew up (Sandtown-Winchester, on the city’s west side). Conversation has centered around the economic disadvantages that Gray, his peers, and so many young adults are facing in certain neighborhoods throughout Baltimore and in other U.S. metro areas.

Metropolitan Policy Program Fellow Jennifer Vey spoke yesterday with CNN’s Maggie Lake on the poverty and economic inequality prevalent in Baltimore—particularly in impoverished neighborhoods like that of Gray’s and throughout the country.

In the interview, Vey says that, “it’s important to look at the events of the last few days in Baltimore against a backdrop of poverty, of entrenched joblessness, of social disconnectedness that’s prevalent in many Baltimore neighborhoods…but that isn’t unique to Baltimore, and I think that’s a really important point here, that we really need to put these issues in a much broader national context.

“I think what this really indicates is we’ve been operating under an economic model for quite some time that clearly isn’t working for large numbers of people in this country.”

Vey also discusses how we can work to break the cycle:

“What we’re really focused on at Brookings is trying to understand how cities and metropolitan areas can really be trying to grow the types of advanced industries that create good jobs, that create more jobs, and also focusing on how then, people can connect back to that economy. What can we do to make sure that more people are participating in that economic growth as it happens?”

She goes on to say that investment in education, workforce programs, and infrastructure are all key in incorporating everyone into a prosperous economy.

To learn more about poverty in Baltimore, read this piece by Karl Alexander.

       

       

Last week, we showed how the share of the nation’s venture capital going to the Bay Area has actually increased over the last decade and posed the question: Are San Francisco and Silicon Valley good models for most cities to imitate? And with the answer being “no,” what strategies should cities employ to bolster local capital networks?

The answer depends upon regions’ technical strengths—different technologies imply different venture capital strategies. A common assumption is that most cities look like Silicon Valley with software monopolizing venture funding, but in many places a mix of different technologies are far more important. Metropolitan level venture capital data from 2005 to 2015 from Pitchbook illustrates how different cities require different strategies.

In Cleveland, for example, more than three-quarters of deals are in clinical care services and medical devices driven by Cleveland Clinic’s world-renowned success in identifying and funding companies creating novel health care technologies. However, software and medical technologies require very different venture capital strategies. Software companies need upfront funding but can scale quickly with few additional funding rounds. Medical technologies require FDA approval and clinical trials, costly and lengthy processes, implying the need to consider whether regional venture capital efforts can provide not only seed funding but multiple rounds. If not, promising health care companies may flame out or relocated elsewhere.

Pittsburgh, on the other hand, has a far more mixed portfolio than either Cleveland or the Bay Area, one of the most diverse in the country. Pittsburgh’s top 10 technologies funded over the last decade include laboratory services, energy exploration, battery storage, medical devices, software, and electronic equipment—with none making up more than one-fifth the metro area’s portfolio. Pittsburgh’s mix of educational and non-profit institutions like Carnegie Mellon University, University of Pittsburgh and UPMC support research in engineering, software, medical technologies, and therapeutics. In addition private companies like Google, Alcoa, and the shale gas boom have provided the region with a blend of market opportunities that are extremely different than that of the Bay Area.

Equally important to the type of technologies funded is how venture capital deals are funded. In the Bay Area private venture capital firms represent the vast majority of funding both in terms of numbers of deals and overall value. Deals from accelerators and universities together equal less than one-tenth of what is invested by private venture capital firms. Given the many private investment firms in the Bay Area, universities and accelerators are better at creating and incubating technologies instead of funding them. Unfortunately, other markets lack such private sector assets and try to jumpstart investments through other methods.

Over the last decade, Pittsburgh made just 3 percent as many total venture deals as the Bay Area, but breaking that figure down by the funding source, universities outperformed in Pittsburgh. There they funded nearly 30 percent as many deals as universities did in San Francisco and Silicon Valley, a rate 10 times as high as would be expected based the Bay Area “norm.” One reason for this is Pittsburgh is relatively new to venture funding and may have more research assets than private venture capital firms. Therefore, university funds could fill an important capital gap.

A common worry is these non-private sector deals are poor investments that private firms, with superior market intelligence, simply refused to make. This argument is most persuasive in regions like the Bay Area where there is no shortage of private capital to fund good ideas. However in other regions these investments can prove to be smart precursors to private funding. Also, rarely do public institutions make investment decisions. Instead, public dollars are funneled through private investment firms to kick start regional activity. For example, Philadelphia’s new StartUp PHL fund is paid for by taxpayer dollars but investment decisions are made by First Capital, the city’s largest private venture capital fund. The fund requires recipients to stay in the city for at least six months after funding, with the hope to increase the number of growing technology companies in Philadelphia.

Cleveland and Pittsburgh are specific examples of a general point. Cities have unique technology competencies and pathways to venture capital. Economic strategies to attract outside, and bolster local capital, should reflect those attributes and not simply default to what seems to have worked in the Bay Area. 

       

Last week, we showed how the share of the nation’s venture capital going to the Bay Area has actually increased over the last decade and posed the question: Are San Francisco and Silicon Valley good models for most cities to imitate? And with the answer being “no,” what strategies should cities employ to bolster local capital networks?

The answer depends upon regions’ technical strengths—different technologies imply different venture capital strategies. A common assumption is that most cities look like Silicon Valley with software monopolizing venture funding, but in many places a mix of different technologies are far more important. Metropolitan level venture capital data from 2005 to 2015 from Pitchbook illustrates how different cities require different strategies.

In Cleveland, for example, more than three-quarters of deals are in clinical care services and medical devices driven by Cleveland Clinic’s world-renowned success in identifying and funding companies creating novel health care technologies. However, software and medical technologies require very different venture capital strategies. Software companies need upfront funding but can scale quickly with few additional funding rounds. Medical technologies require FDA approval and clinical trials, costly and lengthy processes, implying the need to consider whether regional venture capital efforts can provide not only seed funding but multiple rounds. If not, promising health care companies may flame out or relocated elsewhere.

Pittsburgh, on the other hand, has a far more mixed portfolio than either Cleveland or the Bay Area, one of the most diverse in the country. Pittsburgh’s top 10 technologies funded over the last decade include laboratory services, energy exploration, battery storage, medical devices, software, and electronic equipment—with none making up more than one-fifth the metro area’s portfolio. Pittsburgh’s mix of educational and non-profit institutions like Carnegie Mellon University, University of Pittsburgh and UPMC support research in engineering, software, medical technologies, and therapeutics. In addition private companies like Google, Alcoa, and the shale gas boom have provided the region with a blend of market opportunities that are extremely different than that of the Bay Area.

Equally important to the type of technologies funded is how venture capital deals are funded. In the Bay Area private venture capital firms represent the vast majority of funding both in terms of numbers of deals and overall value. Deals from accelerators and universities together equal less than one-tenth of what is invested by private venture capital firms. Given the many private investment firms in the Bay Area, universities and accelerators are better at creating and incubating technologies instead of funding them. Unfortunately, other markets lack such private sector assets and try to jumpstart investments through other methods.

Over the last decade, Pittsburgh made just 3 percent as many total venture deals as the Bay Area, but breaking that figure down by the funding source, universities outperformed in Pittsburgh. There they funded nearly 30 percent as many deals as universities did in San Francisco and Silicon Valley, a rate 10 times as high as would be expected based the Bay Area “norm.” One reason for this is Pittsburgh is relatively new to venture funding and may have more research assets than private venture capital firms. Therefore, university funds could fill an important capital gap.

A common worry is these non-private sector deals are poor investments that private firms, with superior market intelligence, simply refused to make. This argument is most persuasive in regions like the Bay Area where there is no shortage of private capital to fund good ideas. However in other regions these investments can prove to be smart precursors to private funding. Also, rarely do public institutions make investment decisions. Instead, public dollars are funneled through private investment firms to kick start regional activity. For example, Philadelphia’s new StartUp PHL fund is paid for by taxpayer dollars but investment decisions are made by First Capital, the city’s largest private venture capital fund. The fund requires recipients to stay in the city for at least six months after funding, with the hope to increase the number of growing technology companies in Philadelphia.

Cleveland and Pittsburgh are specific examples of a general point. Cities have unique technology competencies and pathways to venture capital. Economic strategies to attract outside, and bolster local capital, should reflect those attributes and not simply default to what seems to have worked in the Bay Area. 

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

Human activity has dramatically accelerated the extinction of species. Man-made habitat alteration has been the leading cause, in combination with direct exploitation. Now climate change threatens to increase extinction rates even more. Adaptation to climate change requires integration of climate impacts in planning and action for biodiversity conservation, and the overall task requires funding and action similar to that discussed—but not yet delivered—under the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) or the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). Preservation in the wild—in situ—is the top priority, but it is clear that many more species will disappear and we will lose access to the genetic information they contain unless their DNA is also kept ex situ—in captivity, cultivation, or preserved storage.

A global network of facilities should be organized to preserve DNA for every known species and for new species as they are described. This “DNA Net Earth” will be a safety net for biodiversity that can provide genetic libraries for research and commerce, be used to recover species that are endangered, and offer the potential to selectively restore species that have gone extinct. Only a small fraction of the 1.9 million known species are currently maintained as living organisms in cultivation or captivity, or maintained frozen as viable seeds or cells. Just a fraction more species have DNA in dead cells or in an extracted form that are held in long-term frozen storage. Progress towards DNA Net Earth is limited by a lack of shared priorities. Three steps can provide a way forward: developing a website to track progress on preservation whose key information is managed directly by contributing facilities; establishing new incentives and mandates for contributing specimens, including grant, publication and permit requirements; and engaging the public in collection.

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SUMMARY

Replacing inefficient kerosene lighting with electric lighting or other clean alternatives can rapidly achieve development and energy access goals, save money and reduce climate warming. Many of the 250 million households that lack reliable access to electricity rely on inefficient and dangerous simple wick lamps and other kerosene-fueled light sources, using 4 to 25 billion liters of kerosene annually to meet basic lighting needs. Kerosene costs can be a significant household expense and subsidies are expensive. New information on kerosene lamp emissions reveals that their climate impacts are substantial. Eliminating current annual black carbon emissions would provide a climate benefit equivalent to 5 gigatons of carbon dioxide reductions over the next 20 years. Robust and low-cost technologies for supplanting simple wick and other kerosene-fueled lamps exist and are easily distributed and scalable. Improving household lighting offers a low-cost opportunity to improve development, cool the climate and reduce costs.

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Editor’s Note: An interactive feature, highlighting the key findings from this report, can be found here.

Over a billion people worldwide live on less than $1.25 a day. But that number is falling. This has given credence to the idea that extreme poverty can be eliminated in a generation. A new study by Brookings researchers examines the prospects for ending extreme poverty by 2030 and the factors that will determine progress toward this goal. Below are some of the key findings:

1. We are at a unique point in history where there are more people in the world living right around the $1.25 mark than at any other income level. This implies that equitable growth in the developing world will result in more movement of people across the poverty line than across any other level.

2. Sustaining the trend rate of global poverty reduction requires that each year a new set of individuals is primed to cross the international poverty line. This will become increasingly difficult as some of the poorest of the poor struggle to make enough progress to approach the $1.25 threshold over the next twenty years.

3. The period from 1990 to 2030 resembles a relay race in which responsibility for leading the charge on global poverty reduction passes between China, India and sub-Saharan Africa. China has driven progress over the last twenty years, but with its poverty rate now down in the single digits, the baton is being passed to India. India has the capacity to deliver sustained progress on global poverty reduction over the next decade based on modest assumptions of equitable growth. Once India’s poverty is largely exhausted, it will be up to sub-Saharan Africa to run the final relay leg and bring the baton home. This poses a significant challenge as most of Africa’s poor people start a long way behind the poverty line.

4. As global poverty approaches zero, it becomes increasingly concentrated in countries where the record of and prospects for poverty reduction are weakest. Today, a third of the world’s poor live in fragile states but this share could rise to half in 2018 and nearly two-thirds in 2030.

5. The World Bank has recently set a goal to reduce extreme poverty around the world to under 3 percent by 2030. It is unlikely that this goal can be achieved by stronger than expected growth across the developing world, or greater income equality within each developing country, alone. Both factors are needed simultaneously.

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In the United States, the official poverty rate for 2012 stood at 15 percent based on the national poverty line which is equivalent to around $16 per person per day. Of the 46.5 million Americans living in poverty, 20.4 million live under half the poverty line. This begs the question of just how poor America’s poorest people are.

Poverty, in one form or other, exists in every country. But the most acute, absolute manifestations of poverty are assumed to be limited to the developing world. This is reflected in the fact that rich countries tend to set higher poverty lines than poor countries, and that global poverty estimates have traditionally excluded industrialized countries and their populations altogether.

An important study on U.S. poverty by Luke Shaefer and Kathryn Edin gently challenges this assumption. Using an alternative dataset from the one employed for the official U.S. poverty measure, Shaefer and Edin show that millions of Americans live on less than $2 a day—a threshold commonly used to measure poverty in the developing world. Depending on the exact definitions used, they find that up to 5 percent of American households with children are shown to fall under this parsimonious poverty line.

Methodologies for measuring poverty differ wildly both within and across countries, so comparisons and their interpretation demand extreme care.

These numbers are intended to shock—and they succeed. The United States is known for having higher inequality and a less generous social safety net than many affluent countries in Europe, but the acute deprivations that flow from this are less understood. A crude comparison of Shaefer and Edin’s estimates with the World Bank’s official $2 a day poverty estimates for developing economies would place the United States level with or behind a large set of countries, including Russia (0.1 percent), the West Bank and Gaza (0.3 percent), Jordan (1.6 percent), Albania (1.7 percent), urban Argentina (1.9 percent), urban China (3.5 percent), and Thailand (4.1 percent). Many of these countries are recipients of American foreign aid. However, methodologies for measuring poverty differ wildly both within and across countries, so such comparisons and their interpretation demand extreme care.

This brief is organized into two parts. In the first part, we examine the welfare of America’s poorest people using a variety of different data sources and definitions. These generate estimates of the number of Americans living under $2 a day that range from 12 million all the way down to zero. This wide spectrum reflects not only a lack of agreement on how poverty can most reliably be measured, but the particular ways in which poverty is, and isn’t, manifested in the U.S.. In the second part, we reexamine America’s $2 a day poverty in the context of global poverty. We begin by identifying the source and definition of poverty that most faithfully replicates the World Bank’s official poverty measure for the developing world to allow a fairer comparison between the U.S. and developing nations. We then compare the characteristics of poverty in the U.S. and the developing world to provide a more complete picture of the nature of poverty in these different settings. Finally, we explain why comparisons of poverty in the U.S. and the developing world, despite their limitations and pitfalls, are likely to become more common.

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Should increasing exports be part of the solution to Greater Cleveland's -- and the nation's -- economic doldrums? Can export growth make this recovery job-filled rather than jobless?

That's a counterintuitive proposition, but one that is gaining traction in Northeast Ohio. Cleveland, Youngstown and other metros often see themselves on the losing end of globalization, as manufacturing has moved abroad and trade barriers and currency manipulations impede the entry of U.S.-made goods into foreign markets.

But exports bring tremendous benefits to workers, companies and the nation as a whole. Exporting companies tend to be more innovative. They pay higher wages across all skill levels. And they are a response to a new global reality: 95 percent of the world's customers live outside the United States.

Any successful export strategy, including the one that the Obama administration is developing, must start with where U.S. exports come from. Our major metropolitan areas are the nation's export hubs. In 2008, they produced about 64 percent of U.S. exports, including more than 62 percent of manufactured goods and 75 percent of services.

Northeast Ohio's major metros are leaders in exports, oriented toward global consumers in a way that most American regions are not. Exports contribute more than 12 percent of the gross metropolitan product in Akron, 13 percent in Cleveland, and a jaw-dropping 18 percent in Youngstown, compared to a national metro average of 10.9 percent.

Exports are also a source of much-needed jobs in these metros. As of 2008 (the most recent year for which we have data) there were 110,000 export jobs in the Cleveland metro and about 30,000 each in greater Akron and Youngstown. Every $1 billion in exports from the average metropolitan area in 2008 supported 5,800 jobs.

To leverage the powerful export activity already occurring in Cleveland and elsewhere, the Obama administration should connect its macroeconomic vision for export growth with the metro reality where the doubling will mostly occur.

For example, the president's export advisory council should include state and local leaders, and revamp export guidance and support to meet the needs of small firms, which find it hard to enter new markets.

But Northeast Ohio metros have their own work to do. The rate of export growth between 2003 and 2008 in Cleveland and Akron is lackluster when compared to the large metro average. U.S. companies dominate the global market in service exports, and the nation actually has a generous service trade surplus, but service exports' share of overall output in Northeast Ohio metros is smaller than the large metro average, and growth in service exports is slower.

Most troubling, Cleveland and its neighbors are underperforming when it comes to innovation, which is a critical ingredient for future international success. Metros that are manufacturing-oriented or export-intensive (or both) tend to create patents at a rate of just over five patents per 1,000 workers. But Cleveland, Akron and Youngstown fall short, with 2.8, 4.5, and 1 patent per 1,000 workers, respectively.

Northeast Ohio must accelerate its efforts to increase the region's innovation and export capacity, through regional organizations such as NorTech and JumpStart. Just as the president set an export goal for the nation, Northeast Ohio should embrace the opportunity to set its own aggressive export goals. Business groups, the Fund for Our Economic Future, universities and regional economic development organizations have made a start but need to devote more resources and collaborate to achieve those goals.

The region can make this happen. Organizations like the Manufacturing and Advocacy and Growth Network (MAGNET) and its partners, with support from the Fund and chambers, are working directly with companies to increase manufacturing innovation in Northeast Ohio, with increasing exports one of their major emphases.

For too long, the debate over export policy has been the exclusive domain of macro policymakers in Washington and a narrow clique of trade constituencies. It is time to include a larger portion of the business sector and, just as importantly, the places like Northeast Ohio, where exporting companies can thrive.

       

Last week, we showed how the share of the nation’s venture capital going to the Bay Area has actually increased over the last decade and posed the question: Are San Francisco and Silicon Valley good models for most cities to imitate? And with the answer being “no,” what strategies should cities employ to bolster local capital networks?

The answer depends upon regions’ technical strengths—different technologies imply different venture capital strategies. A common assumption is that most cities look like Silicon Valley with software monopolizing venture funding, but in many places a mix of different technologies are far more important. Metropolitan level venture capital data from 2005 to 2015 from Pitchbook illustrates how different cities require different strategies.

In Cleveland, for example, more than three-quarters of deals are in clinical care services and medical devices driven by Cleveland Clinic’s world-renowned success in identifying and funding companies creating novel health care technologies. However, software and medical technologies require very different venture capital strategies. Software companies need upfront funding but can scale quickly with few additional funding rounds. Medical technologies require FDA approval and clinical trials, costly and lengthy processes, implying the need to consider whether regional venture capital efforts can provide not only seed funding but multiple rounds. If not, promising health care companies may flame out or relocated elsewhere.

Pittsburgh, on the other hand, has a far more mixed portfolio than either Cleveland or the Bay Area, one of the most diverse in the country. Pittsburgh’s top 10 technologies funded over the last decade include laboratory services, energy exploration, battery storage, medical devices, software, and electronic equipment—with none making up more than one-fifth the metro area’s portfolio. Pittsburgh’s mix of educational and non-profit institutions like Carnegie Mellon University, University of Pittsburgh and UPMC support research in engineering, software, medical technologies, and therapeutics. In addition private companies like Google, Alcoa, and the shale gas boom have provided the region with a blend of market opportunities that are extremely different than that of the Bay Area.

Equally important to the type of technologies funded is how venture capital deals are funded. In the Bay Area private venture capital firms represent the vast majority of funding both in terms of numbers of deals and overall value. Deals from accelerators and universities together equal less than one-tenth of what is invested by private venture capital firms. Given the many private investment firms in the Bay Area, universities and accelerators are better at creating and incubating technologies instead of funding them. Unfortunately, other markets lack such private sector assets and try to jumpstart investments through other methods.

Over the last decade, Pittsburgh made just 3 percent as many total venture deals as the Bay Area, but breaking that figure down by the funding source, universities outperformed in Pittsburgh. There they funded nearly 30 percent as many deals as universities did in San Francisco and Silicon Valley, a rate 10 times as high as would be expected based the Bay Area “norm.” One reason for this is Pittsburgh is relatively new to venture funding and may have more research assets than private venture capital firms. Therefore, university funds could fill an important capital gap.

A common worry is these non-private sector deals are poor investments that private firms, with superior market intelligence, simply refused to make. This argument is most persuasive in regions like the Bay Area where there is no shortage of private capital to fund good ideas. However in other regions these investments can prove to be smart precursors to private funding. Also, rarely do public institutions make investment decisions. Instead, public dollars are funneled through private investment firms to kick start regional activity. For example, Philadelphia’s new StartUp PHL fund is paid for by taxpayer dollars but investment decisions are made by First Capital, the city’s largest private venture capital fund. The fund requires recipients to stay in the city for at least six months after funding, with the hope to increase the number of growing technology companies in Philadelphia.

Cleveland and Pittsburgh are specific examples of a general point. Cities have unique technology competencies and pathways to venture capital. Economic strategies to attract outside, and bolster local capital, should reflect those attributes and not simply default to what seems to have worked in the Bay Area. 

       

Last week, we showed how the share of the nation’s venture capital going to the Bay Area has actually increased over the last decade and posed the question: Are San Francisco and Silicon Valley good models for most cities to imitate? And with the answer being “no,” what strategies should cities employ to bolster local capital networks?

The answer depends upon regions’ technical strengths—different technologies imply different venture capital strategies. A common assumption is that most cities look like Silicon Valley with software monopolizing venture funding, but in many places a mix of different technologies are far more important. Metropolitan level venture capital data from 2005 to 2015 from Pitchbook illustrates how different cities require different strategies.

In Cleveland, for example, more than three-quarters of deals are in clinical care services and medical devices driven by Cleveland Clinic’s world-renowned success in identifying and funding companies creating novel health care technologies. However, software and medical technologies require very different venture capital strategies. Software companies need upfront funding but can scale quickly with few additional funding rounds. Medical technologies require FDA approval and clinical trials, costly and lengthy processes, implying the need to consider whether regional venture capital efforts can provide not only seed funding but multiple rounds. If not, promising health care companies may flame out or relocated elsewhere.

Pittsburgh, on the other hand, has a far more mixed portfolio than either Cleveland or the Bay Area, one of the most diverse in the country. Pittsburgh’s top 10 technologies funded over the last decade include laboratory services, energy exploration, battery storage, medical devices, software, and electronic equipment—with none making up more than one-fifth the metro area’s portfolio. Pittsburgh’s mix of educational and non-profit institutions like Carnegie Mellon University, University of Pittsburgh and UPMC support research in engineering, software, medical technologies, and therapeutics. In addition private companies like Google, Alcoa, and the shale gas boom have provided the region with a blend of market opportunities that are extremely different than that of the Bay Area.

Equally important to the type of technologies funded is how venture capital deals are funded. In the Bay Area private venture capital firms represent the vast majority of funding both in terms of numbers of deals and overall value. Deals from accelerators and universities together equal less than one-tenth of what is invested by private venture capital firms. Given the many private investment firms in the Bay Area, universities and accelerators are better at creating and incubating technologies instead of funding them. Unfortunately, other markets lack such private sector assets and try to jumpstart investments through other methods.

Over the last decade, Pittsburgh made just 3 percent as many total venture deals as the Bay Area, but breaking that figure down by the funding source, universities outperformed in Pittsburgh. There they funded nearly 30 percent as many deals as universities did in San Francisco and Silicon Valley, a rate 10 times as high as would be expected based the Bay Area “norm.” One reason for this is Pittsburgh is relatively new to venture funding and may have more research assets than private venture capital firms. Therefore, university funds could fill an important capital gap.

A common worry is these non-private sector deals are poor investments that private firms, with superior market intelligence, simply refused to make. This argument is most persuasive in regions like the Bay Area where there is no shortage of private capital to fund good ideas. However in other regions these investments can prove to be smart precursors to private funding. Also, rarely do public institutions make investment decisions. Instead, public dollars are funneled through private investment firms to kick start regional activity. For example, Philadelphia’s new StartUp PHL fund is paid for by taxpayer dollars but investment decisions are made by First Capital, the city’s largest private venture capital fund. The fund requires recipients to stay in the city for at least six months after funding, with the hope to increase the number of growing technology companies in Philadelphia.

Cleveland and Pittsburgh are specific examples of a general point. Cities have unique technology competencies and pathways to venture capital. Economic strategies to attract outside, and bolster local capital, should reflect those attributes and not simply default to what seems to have worked in the Bay Area.