Event Information

Para Español, hacer clic aquí

On December 17, 2014, President Barack Obama and President Raúl Castro announced that the United States and Cuba would seek to reestablish diplomatic relations. Since then, the two countries have engaged in bilateral negotiations in Havana and Washington, the United States has made several unilateral policy changes to facilitate greater trade and travel between the two countries, and bipartisan legislation has been introduced in the U.S. Congress to lift the travel ban. Meanwhile, conversations are ongoing about ending the 50-plus-year embargo and Cuba has continued the process of updating its economic system, including establishing new rules for foreign investment and the emerging private sector.

In light of the significant shifts underway in the U.S.-Cuba relationship, new questions arise about Cuba’s development model, and its economic relations with the region and the world. On Tuesday, June 2, the Latin America Initiative at Brookings hosted a series of panel discussions with various experts including economists, lawyers, academics, and practitioners to examine opportunities and challenges facing Cuba in this new context. Panels examined macroeconomic changes underway in Cuba, how to finance Cuba’s growth, the emerging private sector, and themes related to much-needed foreign investment.

Join the conversation on Twitter using #CubaGrowth

Video

• Panel 1: Trends in the Cuban economy in light of the new U.S.-Cuba context
• Panel 2: Financing Cuba’s growth, development, and trade
• Panel 3: Next steps for Cuba’s emerging private Sector–Cuentapropistas and cooperatives
• Panel 4: A New stage in foreign direct investment

Audio

• Rethinking Cuba: New opportunities for development - Part 1 (English)
• Rethinking Cuba: New opportunities for development - Part 2 (English)
• Rethinking Cuba: New opportunities for development - Part 1 (español)
• Rethinking Cuba: New opportunities for development - Part 2 (español)

Transcript

• Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

• 20150602_rethinking_cuba_transcript

Change is a complicated thing in Cuba. On the one hand, many Cubans remain frustrated with limits on economic and political opportunity, and millennials are emigrating in ever rising numbers. On the other, there is more space for entrepreneurship, and Havana is full of energy and promise today.

The island’s emerging private sector is growing—and along with it, start-up investment costs. Three years ago, Yamina Vicente opened her events planning firm, Decorazón, with a mere $500 in cash. Today she estimates she would need $5,000 to compete. New upscale restaurants are opening: Mery Cabrera returned from Ecuador to invest her savings in Café Presidente, a sleek bistro located on the busy Avenue of the Presidents. And lively bars at establishments like 304 O’Reilly feature bright mixologists doing brisk business.

Photo credit: Richard Feinberg.

Havana’s hotels are fully booked through the current high season. The overflow of tourists is welcome news for the thousands of bed-and-breakfasts flowering throughout the city (many of which are now networked through AirBnB). While most bed-and-breakfasts used to be one or two rooms rented out of people’s homes, Cubans today are renovating entire buildings to rent out. These are the green shoots of what will become boutique hotels, and Cubans are quitting their low-paying jobs in the public sector to become managers of their family’s rental offerings.

Another new sign: real estate agencies! Most Cubans own their own homes—really own them, mortgage-free. But only recently did President Raúl Castro authorize the sales of homes, suddenly giving Cubans a valuable financial asset. Many sell them to get cash to open a new business. Others, to immigrate to Miami.

WiFi hot spots are also growing in number. Rejecting an offer from Google to provide Internet access to the entire island, the Cuban government instead set up some 700 public access locations. This includes 65 WiFi hot spots in parks, hotels, or major thoroughfares, where mostly young Cubans gather to message friends or chat with relatives overseas.

Economic swings

2015 was a good year for the Cuban economy, relatively speaking. Growth rose from the disappointing 2 percent in recent years to (by official measures) 4 percent. The Brazilian joint venture cigarette company, Brascuba, reported a 17 percent jump in sales, and announced a new $120 million investment in the Mariel Economic Development Zone. Shoppers crowded state-run malls over the holiday season, too. 

Photo credit: Richard Feinberg.

Consumers still report chronic shortages in many commodities, ranging from beer to soap, and complain of inflation in food prices. Alarmed by the chronic crisis of low productivity in agriculture, the government announced tax breaks for farmers in 2016. The government is already forecasting a slower growth rate for 2016, attributed to lower commodity prices and a faltering Venezuelan economy. It’s likely to fall back to the average 2 percent rate that has characterized the past decade.

Pick up the pace

Cuban officials are looking forward to the 7th Conference of the Cuban Communist Party (CCP) in mid-April. There is little public discussion of the agenda, however. Potential initiatives include a new electoral law permitting direct election of members of the national assembly (who are currently chosen indirectly by regional assemblies or by CCP-related mass organizations); a timetable for unification of the currency (Cubans today must deal with two forms of money); some measures to empower provincial governments; and the development of a more coherent, forward-looking economic development strategy.

[T]here are now two brain drains: an internal brain drain, as government officials abandon the public sector for higher incomes in the growing private sector; and emigration overseas.

But for many younger Cubans, the pace of change is way too slow. The talk of the town remains the exit option. Converse with any well-educated millennial and they’ll tell you that half or more of their classmates are now living abroad. Indeed, there are now two brain drains: an internal brain drain, as government officials abandon the public sector for higher incomes in the growing private sector; and emigration overseas to the United States, but also to Spain, Canada, Mexico.

The challenge for the governing CCP is to give young people hope in the future. The White House has signaled that President Obama may visit Cuba this year. Such a visit by Obama—who is immensely popular on the island—could help. But the main task is essentially a Cuban one.

Richard Feinberg’s forthcoming book, “Open for Business: Building the New Cuban Economy,” will be published by Brookings Press later this year.

On April 2, 2011, Ethiopia embarked upon the construction of what is expected to be the biggest hydroelectric power plant in Africa.  Called the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), it will be located on the Blue Nile, 40 kilometers (25 miles) from the border with the Republic of Sudan and will have the capacity to produce 6,000 megawatts of electricity.  The GERD, once completed and made operational, is expected to ameliorate chronic domestic energy shortages, help the country’s households (especially those located in the rural areas) switch to cleaner forms of energy and allow the government to earn foreign exchange through the exportation of electricity to other countries in the region.  Although authorities in Addis Ababa believe that the dam will contribute  significantly to economic growth and development—not just in Ethiopia, but also in neighboring countries, such as Sudan—its construction has been very controversial.  The major controversies revolve around Ethiopia’s decision to fund the building of the dam from its own sources and the potential impacts of the dam on downstream countries, especially Egypt.  

Ethiopia opted to source funds for the construction of the GERD through selling bonds to citizens at home and abroad.  Government employees have been encouraged to devote as much as one or two months of their salaries to the purchasing of the GERD bonds.  Most public workers in Ethiopia earn relatively low wages and face a significantly high cost of living.  Hence, they are not likely to be able to sacrifice that much of their salaries to invest in this national project.  Nevertheless, many of them have been observed purchasing the GERD bonds, primarily because of pressure from the government and the belief that participation in this national project is a show of one’s patriotism.

The government of Ethiopia has also encouraged the private sector to invest in the GERD project.  Specifically, private domestic banks and other business enterprises are expected to purchase millions of Birr worth of these bonds.  The government also hopes that Ethiopians in the diaspora will contribute significantly to this massive effort to develop the country’s hydroelectric power resources.  However, many Ethiopians in the diaspora have not been willing to invest in the GERD project, citing pervasive corruption in the public sector and dictatorial government policies as reasons why they would not commit the resources necessary to move the project forward.  Additionally, Ethiopians living outside the country have argued that the present government in Addis Ababa continues to impede the country’s transition to democracy by making it virtually impossible for opposition parties to operate, using draconian laws (e.g., anti-terrorism laws) to silence legitimate protests and generally denying citizens the right to express themselves.  For these reasons, many of them have refused to invest in the GERD project.  Finally, Ethiopia’s traditional development partners, including such international organizations as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, appear to be unwilling to lend the country the necessary funds for the construction of the dam given the controversies surrounding the dam and their policies on the building of megadams.

Egypt has registered its opposition to the construction of the GERD.  In fact, before he was ousted, former Egyptian president Mohamed Morsi made it known to authorities in Addis Ababa that Egypt would not support the project.  The Egyptians, as they have done before, have invoked the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1929, which granted Egypt veto power over all construction projects on the Nile River and its tributaries.  According to Cairo, then, Ethiopia was supposed to obtain permission from Egypt before embarking on the GERD project.

In May 2010, five upstream riparian states (Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda and Tanzania) signed the Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA), which, they argue, would provide the mechanism for the equitable and fair use of Nile River waters.  On June 13, 2013, the Ethiopian Parliament ratified the CFA and incorporated it into domestic law.  The other four signatories have not yet ratified the treaty but plan to do so eventually.  Egypt and Sudan, however, have refused to sign the CFA and continue to argue that the 1929 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, as well as the 1959 bilateral agreement between Egypt and Sudan, represent the only legal mechanisms for Nile River governance.  Recently, however, the government of Sudan has indicated its support for the GERD, and South Sudan, which gained its independence from Khartoum on July 9, 2011, does not oppose the project either.

Significant increases in population in Egypt, the need for the country to expand its irrigated agricultural base, as well as other industrial needs have significantly increased the country’s demand for water.  Unfortunately for Egyptians, the only viable source of water in the country is the Nile River.  Thus, Egyptians, as made clear by their leaders, are not willing to relinquish even one drop of water.  The country’s bitter opposition to the GERD stems from the fact that it will reduce the flow of water into the Nile River and force Egyptians to live with less water than now.  Egyptian leaders are not willing to accept the assertion made by the Ethiopian government that the construction of the dam will not significantly reduce the flow of water from the Blue Nile into Egypt.  Thus, Cairo has hinted that it would employ all means available to stop the construction of the GERD.

The site of the GERD was identified during geological surveys conducted between 1956 and 1964 by the United States Bureau of Reclamation.  Although studies determining the feasibility of a dam on the Blue Nile were completed almost half a century ago, previous Ethiopian governments did not make any attempt to build such a structure on the Blue Nile.  This inaction may have been due to Egypt’s ability to lobby the international donor community and prevent it from providing Addis Ababa with the necessary financial resources to complete the project, Ethiopia’s chronic internal political instability, or Egypt’s military strength and its strong ties with neighboring Sudan (the latter shares the same interests as Egypt regarding the waters of the Nile River).  In fact, the 1929 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and the 1959 bilateral agreement between Sudan and Egypt granted both countries complete control of all the waters of the Nile River.

Since the ouster of Hosni Mubarak, Egypt has been weakened significantly, politically, economically and militarily.  The struggle between the military and civil society for control of the government has been a major distraction to the Egyptian military, and it is unlikely that it can effectively face a relatively strong and more assertive Ethiopian military.  Hence, it appears that this might be the most opportune time for Ethiopia to initiate such a construction project.  Perhaps more important is the fact that virtually all of the upstream riparian states are no longer willing to allow both Egypt and Sudan to continue to monopolize the waters of the Nile River.  In addition, Ethiopia is relatively at peace and maintains good relations with its neighbors, particularly the Republic of Sudan, which would be critical in any successful attack on Ethiopia by Egypt.  Of course, Addis Ababa has also invoked and relied on the Cooperative Framework Agreement which, besides Ethiopia, has been signed by four other upstream riparian States—the CFA favors the equitable and fair use of the waters of the Nile River.  Authorities in Addis Ababa believe that the GERD will contribute to such fair and equitable use; after all, the Blue Nile (which is located in Ethiopia) provides 86 percent of the water that flows into the Nile River.  Up to this point, Ethiopia has made virtually no use of that water, allowing Egypt and Sudan alone to dictate its usage.

Critics of the GERD, including some Ethiopians within and outside the country, argue that Addis Ababa initiated the building of the dam just to divert public attention away from internal political tensions associated with lack of religious freedom, human rights violations, suppression of the press, and the economic and political polarization that has become pervasive throughout the country during the last several decades. 

Given the economic significance of the Blue Nile for the source country (Ethiopia) and downstream countries (Egypt and Sudan), it is critical that these countries engage in constructive dialogue to find a mutually beneficial solution for the project.  Such negotiations should take into consideration the fact that the status quo, characterized by Egyptian monopolization of the waters of the Nile River and the exclusion of Ethiopia from exploiting its own water resources for its development, cannot be maintained.  Thus, the construction of the GERD should be taken as a given and the three countries—Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia—should find ways to maximize the benefits of the dam and minimize its negative impacts on the downstream countries.  As part of that negotiation, both Egypt and Sudan should abandon their opposition to the CFA, sign it and encourage their legislatures to ratify it.  The Nile River and its tributaries should be considered common property belonging to all Nile River Basin communities and should be managed from that perspective.

It appears that Omar al-Bashir’s regime in Khartoum may be counting down to its demise as internal and external pressures seem poised to boil over and finally wrest the country out of his control. While the international community has imposed painful trade sanctions and the International Criminal Court has sought to bring al-Bashir to justice for his role in the Darfur conflict, Sudan’s own citizens have been increasingly demonstrative of their dissatisfaction and desire for change. During the last few years, al-Bashir has faced growing opposition from restless urban youth who are no longer willing to live with the status quo. There have also been fears within the old guard—the military and hardcore Islamists—that Sudan could fall victim to uprisings like those in Egypt and Tunisia.

In addition to the significant dislocations to the Sudanese economy caused by trade sanctions by Western countries, Khartoum has also lost significant revenues from the sale of oil produced in South Sudan’s oil fields due to ongoing disputes. To deal with these large shortfalls, al-Bashir’s government has imposed severe austerity measures on the economy, including major reductions in government subsidies, most notably on food and fuel. In response, a broad cross-section of the population took to the streets in protest. In September of this year, like their counterparts in Egypt and Tunisia before them, large numbers of unemployed and restless Sudanese youth took to the streets to demand the ouster of al-Bashir and his government. Government security forces responded with a vengeance, arresting large numbers of protesters and either killing or causing the deaths of many of them.

Within the military, which, together with Islamists, has been the base of al-Bashir’s support since the 1989 coup, there is significant discontent. In addition, there is evidence that some members of al-Bashir’s party—the National Congress Party—are not happy with the president for his failure to deal effectively with the country’s multifarious problems. Today, Sudan’s economy is falling apart—there is galloping inflation, high unemployment, especially among urban youth, and many Sudanese live below the poverty level. In addition, Khartoum is still unable to deal properly with the demands of various ethnic minorities, which are waging violent protests to force the government to allow them to rule themselves. Many groups want genuine institutional reforms and a governing process that is truly democratic and characterized by the rule of law.

Added to the litany of problems Sudan faces is the fact that it remains embroiled in conflict with South Sudan over the future of the Abyei region and its rich oil reserves. The scheduled 2011 vote for Abyei citizens to decide between South Sudan and Sudan did not occur and just recently opposing stakeholders in the region have argued over when and how to hold the referendum with one group boycotting the other’s efforts. Thus, the region remains in limbo.

Hardcore Islamists, long in the president’s corner, are now warning al-Bashir that he is not likely to successfully solve Sudan’s complex problems by simply cracking down on protesters. The question now is: Will al-Bashir give in to the demands of his protesting fellow citizens and initiate the necessary democratic reforms, or will he continue to resist and eventually suffer a fate similar to the one that befell his counterparts in Egypt and Tunisia?

On January 30, 2011, al-Bashir’s vulnerability to a similar uprising was first made apparent when protesters took to the streets of Khartoum and Al-Ubayyid after using online social networking sites to coordinate demonstrations. The government response was swift and extremely brutal—several students were arrested and one was killed. Sporadic and uncoordinated protests, particularly among university students, were also witnessed in the coming months. Then, on September 23, 2013, riots broke out in response to the removal of state subsidies on fuel and cooking gas in Khartoum. The violence spread first across Khartoum and Omdurman in the heart of the regime’s power base, and then to other cities in the days that followed. Protesters, calling for the removal of al-Bashir, blocked roads and set government buildings on fire. As usual, the regime responded brutally, killing more than 50 protesters according to some witnesses and arresting thousands of Sudanese citizens.

Although the Sudanese situation in 2013 is similar to the 2011 situations of its North African neighbors in terms of social frustration over incumbent regimes, Sudan differs from them in three main ways.

First, the majority of Sudanese do not use social media; hence, it is much more difficult to coordinate protests using tools like Facebook and Twitter.

Second, the government has cracked down on the press and blocked the free flow of information, further disconnecting citizens from potentially valuable information.

Third, Bashir’s regime is much less tolerant of protests and demonstrations and has demonstrated a proclivity for using as much force as quickly as possible to snuff out public uprisings. Such efforts are likely to buy only temporary reprieve for the dying regime as it clutches to power, and such responses cannot force the people to give up their demands for improvements in their standard of living, as well as for respect of their fundamental rights.

Without a credible opposition party to coordinate and peacefully channel the frustrations of restless youth into a peaceful revolution, current events in Sudan are likely to force the country into another bloody civil war. There is, of course, a possibility that, given the fact that Sudan does not have the type of institutional arrangements (free and independent press; independent judiciary; regular, free, credible and fair elections) that can provide citizens with the tools to either change their government or petition the latter for relief from tyranny, Sudan could soon become another failed state, such as Somalia. It would then become, like Somalia, a magnet for terrorists and extremist groups seeking to destabilize the region. In addition, another civil war in Sudan would flood the region with refugees and exacerbate the problems now facing many countries in East Africa. Of course, unrest in Sudan could easily spill over into neighboring countries such as Eritrea, Ethiopia, South Sudan and Uganda and create a serious humanitarian crisis in the Horn of Africa.

Dictators and autocrats can be undone by their inability or unwillingness to learn from history, even if that history is not theirs. Given the fact that Sudan’s neighbors have been embroiled in revolutions initiated and carried out by young people frustrated by their countries’ failure to provide them with jobs and protect their fundamental rights, one wonders why al-Bashir thinks the same fate would not befall him and his regime. It has become apparent that al-Bashir is unwilling or unable to recognize the fact that the world is no longer willing to tolerate his regime’s disregard for basic human rights and that Sudan, if it hopes to regain its standing as an accepted member of the international community, cannot afford to serve as a hiding place for dictators.

At the moment, al-Bashir faces a lot of problems emanating from inside and outside the country. It would be wise for al-Bashir and his government to start constructive dialogue with the people of Sudan in an effort to develop the modalities to peacefully transition to democracy. A credible first step would be for al-Bashir to form a transitional government that includes opposition parties. One of the most important functions of such a government should be to engage all relevant stakeholder groups in democratic constitution making to develop and adopt institutional arrangements that guarantee the rule of law and, hence, provide citizens with a governing process that protects their fundamental rights and provides them with the tools for self-actualization. Of course, while institutional reforms are a long-term project, in the short term, the transitional government must put into place mechanisms to protect the fundamental rights of citizens, as well as improve relations with South Sudan in order to secure the peaceful coexistence that is critical for investment and economic growth.

Professor Riek Machar, former vice president of South Sudan and now leader of the rebel group that is fighting the government of South Sudan for control of the apparatus of the government, has publicly threatened to capture and take control of both the capital city of Juba and the oil-producing regions of the country. Branding South Sudan’s president, Salva Kiir, a “dictator” and arguing that he does not recognize the need to share power, Professor Machar stated that the present conflict, which has lasted for more than five months and resulted in the killing of many people and the destruction of a significant amount of property, will not end until Kiir is chased out of power.

Violent mobilization by groups loyal to Machar against the government in Juba began in December 2013. It was only after bloody confrontations between the two parties that targeted civilians based on their ethnicity had resulted in the deaths of many people (creating a major humanitarian crisis) that a cease-fire agreement was signed in Addis Ababa on January 23, 2014, with the hope of bringing to an end the brutal fighting. The cease-fire, however, was seen only as the first step towards negotiations that were supposed to help the country exit the violent conflict and secure institutional arrangements capable of guaranteeing peaceful coexistence.

If Machar and his supporters have the wherewithal to carry out the threats and successfully do so, there is no guarantee that peace would be brought to the country. For one thing, any violent overthrow of the government would only engender more violence as supporters of Kiir and his benefactors are likely to regroup and attempt to recapture their lost political positions. What South Sudan badly needs is an institutionalization of democracy and not a government led by political opportunists. In fact, an effective strategy to exit from this incessant violence must be centered around the election of an inclusive interim government—minus both Kiir and Machar—that would engage all of the country’s relevant stakeholders in negotiations to create a governing process that adequately constrains the state, establishes mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of conflict, enhances peaceful coexistence, and provides an enabling environment for the rapid creation of the wealth needed to deal with poverty and deprivation.

On March 9, 2012, less than a year after South Sudan gained independence, then-Vice President Machar met with several Brookings scholars, including myself, in New York City. The meeting was part of the new country’s efforts to seek assistance from its international partners to address complex and longstanding development challenges, including critical issues such as the effective management of the country’s natural resource endowments, gender equity, the building of government capacity to maintain law and order, the provision of other critical public goods and services, and poverty alleviation. Among participants in this critical consultation were Mwangi S. Kimenyi, senior fellow and director of the Africa Growth Initiative (AGI) at the Brookings Institution; Witney Schneidman, AGI nonresident fellow and former deputy assistant secretary of state for African Affairs; and me. The vice president, who appeared extremely energetic and optimistic about prospects for sustainable development in the new country, requested an analysis of the commitments and achievements that the government of South Sudan had made since independence and suggestions for a way forward. The scholars, working in close collaboration with their colleagues at Brookings, produced a policy report requested by the vice president. The report entitled, South Sudan: One Year After Independence—Opportunities and Obstacles for Africa’s Newest Country, was presented at a well-attended public event on July 28, 2012. Panelists included Peter Ajak, director of the Center for Strategic Analyses and Research in Juba; Ambassador Princeton Lyman, U.S. special envoy for South Sudan and Sudan; Nada Mustafa Ali scholar at the New School for Social Research; Mwangi S. Kimenyi and me.

The report provided a comprehensive review of the policy issues requested by the vice president—the provision of basic services; future engagement between South Sudan and the Republic of Sudan; efficient and equitable management of natural resources; ethnic diversity and peaceful coexistence; federalism; eradication of corruption; and the benefits of regional integration. Most important is the fact that the report placed emphasis on the need for the government of South Sudan to totally reconstruct the state inherited from the Khartoum government through democratic constitution making and produce a governing process that (i) guarantees the protection of human and fundamental rights, including those of vulnerable groups (e.g., women, minority ethnic groups); (ii) adequately constrains the government (so that impunity, corruption and rent seeking are minimized); (iii) enhances entrepreneurial activities and provides the wherewithal for wealth creation and economic growth; and (iv) establishes mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of conflict and creates an environment within which all of the country’s diverse population groups can coexist peacefully.

Unfortunately, when the report was completed, members of the ruling Sudan People’s Liberation Movement were already embroiled in a brutal power struggle that eventually led to President Kiir sacking his entire cabinet, including the vice president. The collapse of the government raised the prospects of violent and destructive mobilization by groups that felt the president’s actions were marginalizing them both economically and politically. The ensuing chaos created an environment that was hardly conducive to the implementation of policies such as those presented in the Brookings report.

The government of Sudan has failed to engage in the type of robust institutional reforms that would have effectively prevented President Kiir and his government from engaging in the various opportunistic policies that have been partly responsible for the violence that now pervades the country. South Sudan’s diverse ethnic groups put forth a united front in their war against Khartoum for self-determination. Following independence, the new government engaged in state formation processes that did not provide mechanisms for all individuals and groups to compete fairly for positions in the political and economic systems. Instead, the government’s approach to state formation politicized ethnic cleavages and made the ethnic group the basis and foundation for political, and to a certain extent, economic participation. This approach has created a "sure recipe for breeding ethnic antagonism," and has led to the crisis that currently consumes the country.

While the most important policy imperative in South Sudan today is the need to make certain that the cease-fire continues to hold, long-term prospects for peaceful coexistence and development call for comprehensive institutional reforms to provide the country with a governing process that guarantees the rule of law. Hence, both the opposition and the government—the two sides in the present conflict—should take advantage of the cease-fire and start putting together the framework that will eventually be used to put the state back together. A new interim government, without the participation of the two protagonists—Kiir and Machar—should be granted the power to bring together all of the country’s relevant stakeholders to reconstitute and reconstruct the state, including negotiating a permanent constitution.

The 26th Ordinary Session of the African Union (AU) Executive Council has just concluded in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, under the theme, “2016: African Year of Human Rights with a particular focus on the Rights of Women.” Addressing the delegates, who included some of the continent’s most important political leaders and a collection of distinguished foreign dignitaries, the chair of the AU Commission, Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, reminded delegates of the organization’s vision as embodied in Agenda 2063. This pledge, a blueprint for the social, political, and economic transformation of the continent, emphasizes a bottom-up, inclusive, participatory, and people-driven approach to development. As envisioned by the agenda’s architects, Africa’s diverse peoples should spearhead the continent’s transformation and direct its development. Dr. Zuma also made note of 2016’s theme, which is the protection of human rights, with particular emphasis on the rights of women.

Since it became operational, the AU has faced many challenges, some of them linked to problems that have plagued the continent for many decades (e.g., chronic poverty; political instability and violent mobilization by various subcultures; corruption and other forms of impunity) and others (e.g., terrorism and violent extremism) that have come to the fore since the turn of the century. At the recent Addis Ababa meeting, the AU leadership spoke specifically of “Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want,” which is heralded as a new development strategy that will enhance the ability of Africans to use their resource endowments fully and effectively for their own development. Although this 50-year initiative has many objectives, the overall aim is to encourage Africans to own their problems, take control of their resolution, and build, by themselves, a prosperous continent “based on inclusive growth and sustainable development.” [1] The AU’s 26th Ordinary Session gives us a chance to reflect on the continental organization’s recent performance and examine how much further it needs to go.

The challenges that the AU faces can be classed into two categories—those that require immediate attention and those whose resolutions can be undertaken through a long-term process. Although cooperation of the international community is critical for the effective resolution of many of the problems and challenges that Africa currently faces, it is important to reiterate the fact that full and effective resolution lies with the African countries themselves. The AU must not be timid but rather act boldly and aggressively, especially in situations of gross violations of human rights and where people are being massacred and others pushed into forced exile (e.g., Burundi, Darfur, Somalia) and provide the leadership needed to prevent genocide and minimize further deterioration in political and economic conditions in many communities throughout the continent.

Coordinating the fight against terrorism and violent extremism: Terrorism and rising violent extremism are major obstacles to peace efforts, national integration, nation building, and the effective management of diversity throughout the continent. From the destruction of economic infrastructures and the massacre of university students in Kenya by al-Shabab; the slaughter of villagers and the kidnapping of school girls in northeastern Nigeria by Boko Haram; the indiscriminate killing of people at hotels in Mali and Burkina Faso; and the downing of an airliner in Egypt, terrorism and violent extremism continue to constrain the ability of Africans to live together peacefully and create the wealth that they need to fight poverty and improve their living conditions. These affiliated and unaffiliated extremist groups—which also include the Lord’s Resistance Army, al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, the Islamic State, and others—are just a few of the entities that threaten to derail Africa’s transition to good governance and inclusive development, respect for human rights, and peaceful coexistence.

Fighting terrorism in the continent requires a coordinated effort at both the regional and national levels. The AU, through the Algiers Convention of 1999, has created a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy for the continent. Unfortunately, the atrocities listed above show that the AU’s counterterrorism framework does not seem to be working and is not being implemented timely and effectively at the level of individual countries. In fact, in addition to the years-long delay of the Algiers Protocol coming into force, less than a third of the African countries have ratified the convention. In addition, only a few African countries have enacted national legislation and restructured their legal and judicial systems to deal with terrorism. The AU must take bold steps to make sure that the necessary steps are taken at the national level to implement policies that significantly enhance the fighting of terrorism at the continental level (e.g., processes for information sharing and consultation; harmonization of immigration policies, etc.). Of course, the AU must also make certain that national leaders do not use anti-terrorism laws to oppress and exploit innocent citizens.

It is important to note that only inclusive economic growth and development and the establishment, within each African country, of governance systems that guarantee the rule of law, including respect for human rights, can deal fully with terrorism and other types of violent and destructive mobilization.

Analysts argue, however, that fighting terrorism effectively is a long-term effort. It is important to note that only inclusive economic growth and development and the establishment, within each African country, of governance systems that guarantee the rule of law, including respect for human rights, can deal fully with terrorism and other types of violent and destructive mobilization. African countries must fully address those issues (e.g., extreme poverty; severe inequality in access to opportunities for self-actualization, as well as in the distribution of income and wealth; and religious and ethnic persecution) that enhance radicalization and render joining extremist groups an attractive option for many of the continent’s youth.

Pressing South Sudanese leaders for peace: South Sudan gained independence on July 9, 2011 and was immediately faced with a multiplicity of problems. In addition to the fact that the new government lacked the capacity to deliver necessary public goods and services to all citizens, as well as the fact that the country faced significantly high levels of venality in the public sector, it was not able to manage diversity effectively. By the summer of 2013, the country had plunged into a major political crisis, which eventually deteriorated into civil war as President Salva Kiir fought forces loyal to his former vice president, Riek Machar, to remain the country’s chief executive. The struggle soon took on ethnic dimensions since Kiir gets significant support from the Dinkas, and Machar gets support from ethnic Nuer. Both parties signed a peace agreement in 2015 but have failed to meet a January 22, 2016 to form a Transitional Government of National Unity. It is important that South Sudan’s leaders place the interests and welfare of the people above their own and form an inclusive government, which can create the conditions necessary for effective state reconstruction. The AU should hold the country’s leaders accountable for meeting the commitments that they made in the peace agreement. Significant pressure must be put on these leaders by the international community, including especially the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), to act responsibly and form an inclusive government that would move the country forward in a peaceful and productive manner. 

Ending the crisis in Burundi: President Pierre Nkurunziza’s decision to defy the constitution and seek a third term in office unleashed violent and destructive mobilizations that have killed more than 400 people and created a major humanitarian crisis in the region. The United Nations says that since April 2015, as many as 240,000 people have fled the country into exile. Are we about to see a repeat of the past—that is, the manipulation of ethnicity by political demagogues that eventually produced a brutal civil war that killed as many as 300,000 people? Some analysts believe that without a quick stop to what the locals simply call “La Crise,” the country is on the verge of being visited by the ghosts of its violent past. The AU, which had planned to send 5,000 peacekeepers to secure the peace and help restore stability, has abandoned that initiative in view of fierce opposition from Nkurunziza. Even a visit from the U.N. Security Council was not enough to convince Nkurunziza to either allow the AU force to enter Burundi or for the government to engage in dialogue with opposition parties without preconditions.

After their recent visit to Burundi, members of the U.N. Security Council “stressed the urgency of addressing the situation” in the country “before it deteriorates further and possibly takes on ethnic dimensions, despite the position of the government of Burundi that the situation is not of such concern.” But can the AU deploy peacekeepers without Burundi’s approval? Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union grants the AU the right to intervene in any member country “pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.” However, a top diplomat at the AU has been quoted as saying that unilateral deployment would be an “unimaginable” act. In addition, it is ironic that at the same time the AU was opting not to act forcefully to secure the peace in Burundi and avert what could be another genocide, the incoming chairman of the AU (President Deby of Chad) was declaring that “[t]hrough diplomacy or by force...we must put an end to these tragedies of our time. We cannot make progress and talk of development if part of our body is sick. We should be the main actors in the search for solution to Africa’s crises.”

The AU and the Libyan crisis: The events of the Arab Spring represented a new modality of regime change that the AU had never before encountered. When military forces of the National Transitional Council (NTC) captured Tripoli on August 22, 2011 and drove away then Libyan President Muammar Qaddafi’s forces, members of the NATO-led military alliance that had been providing “aerial bombardment support to the NTC” immediately proceeded to pressure the African Union to recognize the NTC as the only legitimate government of Libya. Nevertheless, when the democratic uprising morphed into a de facto civil war, the AU’s response was a roadmap, which was informed by the organization’s long-established approach to dealing with intra-state conflicts, which called for a ceasefire and negotiations for an inclusive interim government.

The NTC, however, rejected the roadmap, arguing that it did not make allowance for Qaddafi’s immediate departure. The position taken by the NTC was significantly enhanced by the support that it was receiving from the NATO countries, the Arab League, the United Nations, and several African countries.

Although it denounced what it believed was an illegal regime change in Libya orchestrated by NATO powers supposedly to protect Libyan civilians, the AU went ahead, although reluctantly, and recognized the NTC as Libya’s legitimate government and granted the NTC the right to represent the country in the AU.

Some analysts have examined the AU’s failed efforts to mediate the peace in Libya’s political crisis and have argued that "the most important reason for this failure was the decision by France, the United Kingdom, and the United States to “undermine and sideline the AU.” Other reasons for the failure of the AU’s roadmap are said to include the inability of the AU to garner coherent support among African countries for its position on Libya and the fact that the AU never really gained the confidence of either the Qaddafi regime or the NTC.

Although Qaddafi’s regime was recognized as both oppressive and repressive towards the country’s citizens, the AU did not approve the decision by the NTC to transform a democratic uprising into a civil war. The AU became even more adamant about its non-violent approach to the Libyan crisis after the NATO countries effectively became agents of forceful regime change in Libya. However, some observers have argued that the AU’s emphasis on the fact that the regime change was unconstitutional must be weighed against the fact that the Qaddafi regime was not only unconcerned about democratic governance but promoted basic laws that were designed to perpetuate and entrench Qaddafi’s hold on power.

To retain its relevance, the AU must provide the leadership to fully and timely resolve various continental problems, such as democratic and popular uprisings, terrorism and violent extremism, armed conflicts, and of course, the necessary political and economic transformations to enhance inclusive growth and development and participatory governance.

It has been argued that the recognition of the NTC by the AU was inconsistent with the organization’s legal positions [2] regarding the illegal/unconstitutional changes of regime on the continent. But, what can be learned from the AU’s handling of the Libyan crisis? While the AU is quite clear about its opposition to unconstitutional regime changes on the continent, it is important for the organization to put in place clear and specific mechanisms to deal with popular uprisings such as those that occurred in North Africa, including Libya.

As much as resolving armed conflicts is important, the AU needs to actively engage in other transformative activities on the continent, including especially, those activities that fundamentally transform the critical domains (i.e., the political, administrative, and judicial foundations of the state) and provide institutional arrangements that foster inclusive economic growth, peaceful coexistence of each country’s various subcultures, and enhance participatory and inclusive governance. Perhaps, had the AU developed such a specific mechanism for dealing with popular uprisings, it would have been able to more effectively confront the present uprising in Burundi.

To retain its relevance, the AU must provide the leadership to fully and timely resolve various continental problems, such as democratic and popular uprisings, terrorism and  violent extremism, armed conflicts, and of course, the necessary political and economic transformations to enhance inclusive growth and development and participatory governance. African countries must not and should not continue to rely on intervention by external actors (e.g., the EU, the U.N., the ICC, and the United States) to help them resolve domestic problems.

Support good governance: While it is quite clear that countries such as Somalia, the Central African Republic, and South Sudan are in urgent need of institutional reforms to guarantee the rule of law, enhance the protection of human rights, and advance inclusive economic growth, it is important to note that even countries that appear peaceful are still suffering from governance systems that are pervaded by corruption, rent seeking, the lack of government accountability, and impunity. One long-term goal for the African Union should be to galvanize grassroots support throughout the continent for institutional reforms to produce (1) constitutions that cannot be easily manipulated by political elites (as occurred in Burundi and Burkina Faso) to prolong their stay in power; and (2) governing processes that are undergirded by some form of separation of powers, with checks and balances—at the minimum, judicial independence must be safeguarded and the legislative branch granted enough independence so that it can effectively check on what have been, in many African countries during the last several decades, imperial presidencies with virtually no check on the exercise of government power.

Create institutions for improving the livelihood of the average citizen: Institutional arrangements that provide citizens with the wherewithal to resolve conflicts peacefully, organize their private lives and engage in those activities (e.g., start and operate a business for profit; practice their chosen religion; get married and raise a family—that is, engage freely in self-actualizing activities) that enhance their ability to maximize their values and protect themselves from abuse by state- and non-state actors, as well as participate fully and effectively in governance, including being able to hold their governors accountable for their actions.

Strengthen the African Court of Justice and Human Rights: The court needs the authority to actually serve as an effective legal instrument for the protection of human rights in all countries in the continent, including dealing with crimes that are currently being referred to the International Criminal Court in The Hague.

Facilitate economic integration: Currently, many African countries have economies that are relatively small and not very viable and hence, are not capable of engaging in production processes that can effectively utilize and benefit from technological economies of scale. Integration can significantly increase the size of these economies and enhance their ability to produce goods that are competitive globally in both price and quality. In fact, integration at the regional level, especially if supported by the AU, for example, can help small countries more effectively construct and maintain infrastructures such as roads and bridges, universities and research centers, and other projects that require large initial investments but are characterized by significant scale economies.

Transform the AU from observer to actor: During the last several years, as the continent has been devastated and ravaged by terrorist attacks, the AU has remained essentially an observer. When it comes to the fight against terrorism, the AU should make the plight of the victims of these insidious crimes—not state claims of sovereignty and independence—the main basis for its decisions. The AU, of course, must work with national governments and regional organizations (e.g., ECOWAS in West Africa) but must not allow these local groups to constrain its ability to intervene when doing so would save lives or prevent situations that could deteriorate into mass pogroms. Thus, the AU should act purposefully and forcefully to develop an effective anti-terrorism framework that can deal effectively with terrorism and help member states target and address those issues that enhance extremism. The current one just doesn’t cut it.

Address poverty and inequality: Extreme poverty and unequal access to opportunities for self-actualization remain serious challenges for virtually all African countries. Already, in its Agenda 2063, the AU has promised to address these issues and enhance what it calls “inclusive economic growth and sustainable development.” [3] These issues, of course, are interrelated and tied to many of the recommendations listed above. For example, without peace, it is not likely that any African country will be able to engage in the types of entrepreneurial activities that enhance inclusive growth and development. Hence, it is important for the AU to promote the rule of law and thus create the enabling environment for the emergence of the entrepreneurial communities that offer all citizens the opportunities for self-actualization.

Respond effectively to pandemics: As evidenced by the response to the Ebola pandemic that devastated Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone beginning in March 2014, few African countries have health care systems that can effectively and fully respond to pandemics. In addition, there is no continent-wide framework that can timely deal with such health threats and effectively prevent them from becoming pandemics. The AU must take the lead in helping develop a continent-wide response framework to future health threats.

Ensure the equitable allocation of and access to water: The continuing struggle between Egypt and Sudan, on the one hand, and Ethiopia and the other upstream riparian states, on the other hand, over access to the waters of the Nile River, has reminded us of the need for African countries to develop effective legal frameworks for the equitable allocation of existing water resources. With increased demand for water for household use and for irrigated farming—due to rapid population increases, urbanization, and the effects of global warming—it has become evident that African countries must develop and adopt effective legal frameworks to govern the allocation of water resources, as well as deal with other water-related issues such as ecosystem degradation, conservation, and water treatment and reclamation. The AU can provide the mechanisms for regional discourses on water management and enhance the ability of member countries to develop and adopt effective systems to manage international watercourses.

The African Union is in a position to provide the leadership for Africa to develop into a much more effective competitor in the global economy and a full participant in global governance. To do so, the AU must move aggressively to deal with some pressing issues in order to secure peace and security in several countries and avert descend into anarchy and genocide. In the long-run, the AU should help its member countries develop and adopt institutional arrangements and governing processes that guarantee the rule of law, enhance the protection of human rights (including especially those of women and other vulnerable groups), and promote inclusive growth and development. The timid and extremely cautious approach that the AU is taking with respect to the crisis in Burundi is almost tantamount to a dereliction of duties. The AU leadership must not allow claims of sovereignty and independence made by the governments of member states to inform, and perhaps, cloud its decisions. Emphasis should be placed on the plight of the people who are being exploited, displaced and forced into homelessness and/or exile, maimed, and killed by the violence in these countries.

[1]Aspiration 1 of the AU’s Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want.

[2] The AU’s guiding principles can be found in the Lomé Declaration on Unconstitutional Changes in Government and the Constitutive Act of African Union, which prohibit unconstitutional changes in government. For example, Art. 30 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union states as follows: “Governments which shall come to power through unconstitutional means shall not be allowed to participate in the activities of the Union.” Also, Art. 4 states that “[t]he Union shall function in accordance with the following principles: “(p) condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes of government.” See Constitutive Act of the African Union, available at http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/ConstitutiveAct_EN.pdf (last visited on February 6, 2016).

[3] Aspiration 1 of the AU’s Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want.

Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusolu’s decision earlier this month to decline to participate in the Munich Security Conference due to Israeli ministerial participation marks a new low in the troubled Turkish-Israeli relationship.

And yet, the latest statistics released this week by the Israeli government document an overall volume of $5.44 billion dollars in Turkish-Israeli trade during 2014. This marks an all-time high point in Turkish-Israeli economic relations, up 11.5 percent from 2013, including $2.75 billion in Israeli exports to Turkey (a 10 percent year-to-year increase) and $2.68 billion in Turkish imports to Israel (13 percent higher than 2013).

This pattern of an almost non-existent political dialogue at the senior levels accompanied by robust bilateral trade has characterized the Turkish-Israeli relationship since 2011. Short of unexpected dramatic changes, the relations between the two former allies will likely continue in this pattern for the foreseeable future. 

Almost two years after Israel’s official apology to Turkey over the Mavi Marmara incident (which I wrote about in depth here), the two countries continue to move in different directions, despite sharing similar strategic concerns on a range of regional issues – the civil war in Syria, instability in Iraq and Iran’s nuclear program.

The main bone of contention between the AKP-led Turkish government and the Likud-led government in Israel remains the Palestinian issue. Turkey continues to speak out against Israeli occupation and settlement activity in the West Bank, as well as on Israeli human rights violations towards the Palestinian population. In addition, Turkey remains one of the main (very few) patrons of Hamas, providing the group with political and economic support and allowing the organization to maintain representation in Istanbul. Israel viewed with disdain Turkish attempts, together with Qatar, to facilitate a ceasefire with Hamas during the summer 2014 war. Anti-Turkish sentiments in Israeli public opinion skyrocketed in response to President Erdogan’s allegations that Israeli policies on Gaza are genocidal. 

Amidst rising tensions in the relationship, President Erdogan publicly vowed after his August 2014 election that as long as he’s in power, Turkey’s approach to Israel will not change. As a result, there are no serious expectations that any senior-level political dialogue will resume, and mutual representation is likely to remain at a junior diplomatic level (after ambassadors were withdrawn from Tel Aviv and Ankara in 2011).

The interesting aspect of the relationship continues to be the booming trade between the two countries, which despite political tensions continues to grow at a rapid pace. Clearly there is an interest on both sides to insulate the economic sphere from the political sphere. Robust trade serves both countries’ economic interests and during a very unstable period keeps the relationship afloat. Nevertheless, an Israeli – Turkish natural gas deal which was considered in the past as a likely scenario and possibly a regional and bilateral “game changer” seems at present to be “off the table.” Potential energy cooperation between Turkey and Israel around the Eastern Mediterranean natural gas discoveries may be possible only in the context of political rapprochement. 

The narratives on U.S. development aid to Pakistan—as well as Pakistan’s own development policy discussion—frequently invoke the conventional wisdom that more education and better economic opportunities result in lower extremism. In the debate surrounding the Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill in 2009, for instance, the late Ambassador Richard Holbrooke urged Congress to “target the economic and social roots of extremism in western Pakistan with more economic aid.”

But evidence across various contexts, including in Pakistan, has not supported this notion (see Alan Kreuger’s What Makes a Terrorist for a good overview of this evidence). We know that many terrorists are educated. And lack of education and economic opportunities do not appear to drive support for terrorism and terrorist groups. I have argued that we need to focus on the quality and content of the educational curricula—in Pakistan’s case, they are rife with biases and intolerance, and designed to foster an exclusionary identity—to understand the relationship between education and attitudes toward extremism.

My latest analysis with data from the March 2013 Pew Global Attitudes poll conducted in Pakistan sheds new light on the relationship between years of education and Pakistanis’ views of the Taliban, and lends supports to the conventional wisdom. The survey sampled 1,201 respondents throughout Pakistan, except the most insecure areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan. This was a time of mounting terror attacks by the Pakistani Taliban (a few months after their attack on Malala), and came at the tail end of the Pakistan People's Party’s term in power, before the May 2013 general elections.

On attitudes toward the Pakistani Taliban, or Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), 3 percent of respondents to the Pew poll said they had a very favorable view, 13 percent reported somewhat favorable views, while nearly 17 percent and 39 percent answered that they had somewhat unfavorable and very unfavorable views, respectively. A large percentage of respondents (28 percent) chose not to answer the question or said they did not know their views. This is typical with a sensitive survey question such as this one, in a context as insecure as Pakistan.

So overall levels of support for the TTP are low, and the majority of respondents report having unfavorable views. The non-responses could reflect those who have unfavorable views but choose not to respond because of fear, or those who may simply not have an opinion on the Pakistani Taliban.

The first part of my analysis cross-tabulates attitudes toward the TTP with education and income respectively. I look at the distribution of attitudes for each education and income category (with very and somewhat favorable views lumped together as favorable; similarly for unfavorable attitudes).

Figure 1. Pakistani views on the Pakistani Taliban, by education level, 2013

Figure 1 shows that an increasing percentage of respondents report unfavorable views of the Taliban as education levels rise; and there is a decreasing percentage of non-responses at higher education levels (suggesting that more educated people have more confidence in their views, stronger views, or less fear). However, the percentage of respondents with favorable views of the Taliban, hovering between 10-20 percent, is not that different across education levels, and does not vary monotonically with education. 

Figure 2. Pakistani views on the Pakistani Taliban, by income level, 2013

Figure 2 shows views on the Pakistani Taliban by income level. While the percentage of non-responses is highest for the lowest income category, the percentages responding favorably and unfavorably do not change monotonically with income. We see broadly similar distributions of attitudes across the four income levels.

But these cross-tabulations do not account for other factors that may affect attitudes: age, gender, and geographical location. Regressions (not shown here) accounting for these factors in addition to income and education show interesting results: relative to no education, higher education levels are associated with less favorable opinions of the Pakistani Taliban; these results are strongest for those with some university education, which is heartening. This confirms findings from focus groups I conducted with university students in Pakistan in May 2015. Students at public universities engaged in wide ranging political and social debates with each other on Pakistan and its identity, quoted Rousseau and Chomsky, and had more nuanced views on terrorism and the rest of the world relative to high school students I interviewed. This must at least partly be a result of the superior curriculum and variety of materials to which they are exposed at the college level.

My regressions also show that older people have more unfavorable opinions toward the Taliban, relative to younger people; this is concerning and is consistent with the trend toward rising extremist views in Pakistan’s younger population. The problems in Pakistan’s curriculum that began in the 1980s are likely to be at least partly responsible for this trend. Urban respondents seem to have more favorable opinions toward the Taliban than rural respondents; respondents from Punjab and Baluchistan have more favorable opinions toward the Taliban relative to those from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, which as a province has had a closer and more direct experience with terror. The regression shows no relationship of income with attitudes, as was suggested by Figure 2.

Overall, the Pew 2013 data show evidence of a positive relationship between more education and lack of support for the Taliban, suggesting that the persisting but increasingly discredited conventional wisdom on these issues may hold some truth after all. These results should be complemented with additional years of data. That is what I will work on next.