Part III of the 2015 Brown Center Report on American Education

Student engagement refers to the intensity with which students apply themselves to learning in school.  Traits such as motivation, enjoyment, and curiosity—characteristics that have interested researchers for a long time—have been joined recently by new terms such as, “grit,” which now approaches cliché status.  International assessments collect data from students on characteristics related to engagement.  This study looks at data from the Program for International Student Assessment (PISA), an international test given to fifteen-year-olds.  In the U.S., most PISA students are in the fall of their sophomore year.  The high school years are a time when many observers worry that students lose interest in school.

Compared to their peers around the world, how do U.S. students appear on measures of engagement?  Are national indicators of engagement related to achievement?  This analysis concludes that American students are about average in terms of engagement.  Data reveal that several countries noted for their superior ranking on PISA—e.g., Korea, Japan, Finland, Poland, and the Netherlands—score below the U.S. on measures of student engagement.  Thus, the relationship of achievement to student engagement is not clear cut, with some evidence pointing toward a weak positive relationship and other evidence indicating a modest negative relationship. 

Education studies differ in units of analysis.  Some studies report data on individuals, with each student serving as an observation.  Studies of new reading or math programs, for example, usually report an average gain score or effect size representing the impact of the program on the average student.  Others studies report aggregated data, in which test scores or other measurements are averaged to yield a group score. Test scores of schools, districts, states, or countries are constructed like that.  These scores represent the performance of groups, with each group serving as a single observation, but they are really just data from individuals that have been aggregated to the group level.

Aggregated units are particularly useful for policy analysts.  Analysts are interested in how Fairfax County or the state of Virginia or the United States is doing.  Governmental bodies govern those jurisdictions and policymakers craft policy for all of the citizens within the political jurisdiction—not for an individual.  

The analytical unit is especially important when investigating topics like student engagement and their relationships with achievement.  Those relationships are inherently individual, focusing on the interaction of psychological characteristics.  They are also prone to reverse causality, meaning that the direction of cause and effect cannot readily be determined.  Consider self-esteem and academic achievement.  Determining which one is cause and which is effect has been debated for decades.  Students who are good readers enjoy books, feel pretty good about their reading abilities, and spend more time reading than other kids.  The possibility of reverse causality is one reason that beginning statistics students learn an important rule:  correlation is not causation.

Starting with the first international assessments in the 1960s, a curious pattern has emerged. Data on students’ attitudes toward studying school subjects, when examined on a national level, often exhibit the opposite relationship with achievement than one would expect.  The 2006 Brown Center Report (BCR) investigated the phenomenon in a study of “the happiness factor” in learning.^[i]  Test scores of fourth graders in 25 countries and eighth graders in 46 countries were analyzed.  Students in countries with low math scores were more likely to report that they enjoyed math than students in high-scoring countries.  Correlation coefficients for the association of enjoyment and achievement were -0.67 at fourth grade and -0.75 at eighth grade. 

Confidence in math performance was also inversely related to achievement.  Correlation coefficients for national achievement and the percentage of students responding affirmatively to the statement, “I usually do well in mathematics,” were -0.58 among fourth graders and -0.64 among eighth graders.  Nations with the most confident math students tend to perform poorly on math tests; nations with the least confident students do quite well.   

That is odd.  What’s going on?  A comparison of Singapore and the U.S. helps unravel the puzzle.  The data in figure 3-1 are for eighth graders on the 2003 Trends in Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS).  U.S. students were very confident—84% either agreed a lot or a little (39% + 45%) with the statement that they usually do well in mathematics.  In Singapore, the figure was 64% (46% + 18%).  With a score of 605, however, Singaporean students registered about one full standard deviation (80 points) higher on the TIMSS math test compared to the U.S. score of 504. 

When within-country data are examined, the relationship exists in the expected direction.  In Singapore, highly confident students score 642, approximately 100 points above the least-confident students (551).  In the U.S., the gap between the most- and least-confident students was also about 100 points—but at a much lower level on the TIMSS scale, at 541 and 448.  Note that the least-confident Singaporean eighth grader still outscores the most-confident American, 551 to 541.

The lesson is that the unit of analysis must be considered when examining data on students’ psychological characteristics and their relationship to achievement.  If presented with country-level associations, one should wonder what the within-country associations are.  And vice versa.  Let’s keep that caution in mind as we now turn to data on fifteen-year-olds’ intrinsic motivation and how nations scored on the 2012 PISA.

PISA’s index of intrinsic motivation to learn mathematics comprises responses to four items on the student questionnaire:  1) I enjoy reading about mathematics; 2) I look forward to my mathematics lessons; 3) I do mathematics because I enjoy it; and 4) I am interested in the things I learn in mathematics.  Figure 3-2 shows the percentage of students in OECD countries—thirty of the most economically developed nations in the world—responding that they agree or strongly agree with the statements.  A little less than one-third (30.6%) of students responded favorably to reading about math, 35.5% responded favorably to looking forward to math lessons, 38.2% reported doing math because they enjoy it, and 52.9% said they were interested in the things they learn in math.  A ballpark estimate, then, is that one-third to one-half of students respond affirmatively to the individual components of PISA’s intrinsic motivation index.

Table 3-1 presents national scores on the 2012 index of intrinsic motivation to learn mathematics.  The index is scaled with an average of 0.00 and a standard deviation of 1.00.  Student index scores are averaged to produce a national score.  The scores of 39 nations are reported—29 OECD countries and 10 partner countries.^[ii]  Indonesia appears to have the most intrinsically motivated students in the world (0.80), followed by Thailand (0.77), Mexico (0.67), and Tunisia (0.59).  It is striking that developing countries top the list.  Universal education at the elementary level is only a recent reality in these countries, and they are still struggling to deliver universally accessible high schools, especially in rural areas and especially to girls.  The students who sat for PISA may be an unusually motivated group.  They also may be deeply appreciative of having an opportunity that their parents never had.

The U.S. scores about average (0.08) on the index, statistically about the same as New Zealand, Australia, Ireland, and Canada.  The bottom of the table is extremely interesting.  Among the countries with the least intrinsically motivated kids are some PISA high flyers.  Austria has the least motivated students (-0.35), but that is not statistically significantly different from the score for the Netherlands (-0.33).  What’s surprising is that Korea (-0.20), Finland (-0.22), Japan (-0.23), and Belgium (-0.24) score at the bottom of the intrinsic motivation index even though they historically do quite well on the PISA math test.

Let’s now dig a little deeper into the intrinsic motivation index.  Two components of the index are how students respond to “I do mathematics because I enjoy it” and “I look forward to my mathematics lessons.”  These sentiments are directly related to schooling.  Whether students enjoy math or look forward to math lessons is surely influenced by factors such as teachers and curriculum.  Table 3-2 rank orders PISA countries by the percentage of students who “agree” or “strongly agree” with the questionnaire prompts.  The nations’ 2012 PISA math scores are also tabled.  Indonesia scores at the top of both rankings, with 78.3% enjoying math and 72.3% looking forward to studying the subject.  However, Indonesia’s PISA math score of 375 is more than one full standard deviation below the international mean of 494 (standard deviation of 92).  The tops of the tables are primarily dominated by low-performing countries, but not exclusively so.  Denmark is an average-performing nation that has high rankings on both sentiments.  Liechtenstein, Hong Kong-China, and Switzerland do well on the PISA math test and appear to have contented, positively-oriented students.

Several nations of interest are shaded.  The bar across the middle of the tables, encompassing Australia and Germany, demarcates the median of the two lists, with 19 countries above and 19 below that position.  The United States registers above the median on looking forward to math lessons (45.4%) and a bit below the median on enjoyment (36.6%).  A similar proportion of students in Poland—a country recently celebrated in popular media and in Amanda Ripley’s book, The Smartest Kids in the World,^[iii] for making great strides on PISA tests—enjoy math (36.1%), but only 21.3% of Polish kids look forward to their math lessons, very near the bottom of the list, anchored by Netherlands at 19.8%. 

Korea also appears in Ripley’s book.  It scores poorly on both items.  Only 30.7% of Korean students enjoy math, and less than that, 21.8%, look forward to studying the subject.  Korean education is depicted unflatteringly in Ripley’s book—as an academic pressure cooker lacking joy or purpose—so its standing here is not surprising.  But Finland is another matter.  It is portrayed as laid-back and student-centered, concerned with making students feel relaxed and engaged.  Yet, only 28.8% of Finnish students say that they study mathematics because they enjoy it (among the bottom four countries) and only 24.8% report that they look forward to math lessons (among the bottom seven countries).  Korea, the pressure cooker, and Finland, the laid-back paradise, look about the same on these dimensions.

Another country that is admired for its educational system, Japan, does not fare well on these measures.  Only 30.8% of students in Japan enjoy mathematics, despite the boisterous, enthusiastic classrooms that appear in Elizabeth Green’s recent book, Building a Better Teacher.^[iv]  Japan does better on the percentage of students looking forward to their math lessons (33.7%), but still places far below the U.S.  Green’s book describes classrooms with younger students, but even so, surveys of Japanese fourth and eighth graders’ attitudes toward studying mathematics report results similar to those presented here.  American students say that they enjoy their math classes and studying math more than students in Finland, Japan, and Korea.

It is clear from Table 3-2 that at the national level, enjoying math is not positively related to math achievement.  Nor is looking forward to one’s math lessons.  The correlation coefficients reported in the last row of the table quantify the magnitude of the inverse relationships.  The -0.58 and -0.57 coefficients indicate a moderately negative association, meaning, in plain English, that countries with students who enjoy math or look forward to math lessons tend to score below average on the PISA math test.  And high-scoring nations tend to register below average on these measures of student engagement.  Country-level associations, however, should be augmented with student-level associations that are calculated within each country.

The 2012 PISA volume on student engagement does not present within-country correlation coefficients on intrinsic motivation or its components.  But it does offer within-country correlations of math achievement with three other characteristics relevant to student engagement. Table 3-3 displays statistics for students’ responses to: 1) if they feel like they belong at school; 2) their attitudes toward school, an index composed of four factors;^[v] and 3) whether they had arrived late for school in the two weeks prior to the PISA test. These measures reflect an excellent mix of behaviors and dispositions.

The within-country correlations trend in the direction expected but they are small in magnitude.  Correlation coefficients for math performance and a sense of belonging at school range from -0.02 to 0.18, meaning that the country exhibiting the strongest relationship between achievement and a sense of belonging—Thailand, with a 0.18 correlation coefficient—isn’t registering a strong relationship at all.  The OECD average is 0.08, which is trivial.  The U.S. correlation coefficient, 0.07, is also trivial.  The relationship of achievement with attitudes toward school is slightly stronger (OECD average of 0.11), but is still weak.

Of the three characteristics, arriving late for school shows the strongest correlation, an unsurprising inverse relationship of -0.14 in OECD countries and -0.20 in the U.S.  Students who tend to be tardy also tend to score lower on math tests.  But, again, the magnitude is surprisingly small.  The coefficients are statistically significant because of large sample sizes, but in a real world “would I notice this if it were in my face?” sense, no, the correlation coefficients are suggesting not much of a relationship at all.    

The PISA report presents within-country effect sizes for the intrinsic motivation index, calculating the achievement gains associated with a one unit change in the index.  One of several interesting findings is that intrinsic motivation is more strongly associated with gains at the top of the achievement distribution, among students at the 90^th percentile in math scores, than at the bottom of the distribution, among students at the 10^th percentile. 

The report summarizes the within-country effect sizes with this statement: “On average across OECD countries, a change of one unit in the index of intrinsic motivation to learn mathematics translates into a 19 score-point difference in mathematics performance.”^[vi]  This sentence can be easily misinterpreted.  It means that within each of the participating countries students who differ by one unit on PISA’s 2012 intrinsic motivation index score about 19 points apart on the 2012 math test.  It does not mean that a country that gains one unit on the intrinsic motivation index can expect a 19 point score increase.^[vii]    

Let’s now see what that association looks like at the national level.

PISA first reported national scores on the index of intrinsic motivation to learn mathematics in 2003.  Are gains that countries made on the index associated with gains on PISA’s math test?  Table 3-4 presents a score card on the question, reporting the changes that occurred in thirty-nine nations—in both the index and math scores—from 2003 to 2012.  Seventeen nations made statistically significant gains on the index; fourteen nations had gains that were, in a statistical sense, indistinguishable from zero—labeled “no change” in the table; and eight nations experienced statistically significant declines in index scores. 

The U.S. scored 0.00 in 2003 and 0.08 in 2012, notching a gain of 0.08 on the index (statistically significant).  Its PISA math score declined from 483 to 481, a decline of 2 scale score points (not statistically significant).

Table 3-4 makes it clear that national changes on PISA’s intrinsic motivation index are not associated with changes in math achievement.  The countries registering gains on the index averaged a decline of 3.7 points on PISA’s math assessment.  The countries that remained about the same on the index had math scores that also remain essentially unchanged (-0.09) And the most striking finding: countries that declined on the index (average of -0.15) actually gained an average of 10.3 points on the PISA math scale.  Intrinsic motivation went down; math scores went up.  The correlation coefficient for the relationship over all, not shown in the table, is -0.30.

The analysis above investigated student engagement.  International data from the 2012 PISA were examined on several dimensions of student engagement, focusing on a measure that PISA has employed since 2003, the index of intrinsic motivation to learn mathematics.  The U.S. scored near the middle of the distribution on the 2012 index.  PISA analysts calculated that, on average, a one unit change in the index was associated with a 19 point gain on the PISA math test.  That is the average of within-country calculations, using student-level data that measure the association of intrinsic motivation with PISA score.  It represents an effect size of about 0.20—a positive effect, but one that is generally considered small in magnitude.^[viii]

The unit of analysis matters.  Between-country associations often differ from within-country associations.  The current study used a difference in difference approach that calculated the correlation coefficient for two variables at the national level: the change in intrinsic motivation index from 2003-2012 and change in PISA score for the same time period.  That analysis produced a correlation coefficient of -0.30, a negative relationship that is also generally considered small in magnitude.

Neither approach can justify causal claims nor address the possibility of reverse causality occurring—the possibility that high math achievement boosts intrinsic motivation to learn math, rather than, or even in addition to, high levels of motivation leading to greater learning.  Poor math achievement may cause intrinsic motivation to fall.  Taken together, the analyses lead to the conclusion that PISA provides, at best, weak evidence that raising student motivation is associated with achievement gains.  Boosting motivation may even produce declines in achievement.

Here’s the bottom line for what PISA data recommends to policymakers: Programs designed to boost student engagement—perhaps a worthy pursuit even if unrelated to achievement—should be evaluated for their effects in small scale experiments before being adopted broadly.  The international evidence does not justify wide-scale concern over current levels of student engagement in the U.S. or support the hypothesis that boosting student engagement would raise student performance nationally.

Let’s conclude by considering the advantages that national-level, difference in difference analyses provide that student-level analyses may overlook.

1. They depict policy interventions more accurately.  Policies are actions of a political unit affecting all of its members.  They do not simply affect the relationship of two characteristics within an individual’s psychology. Policymakers who ask the question, “What happens when a country boosts student engagement?” are asking about a country-level phenomenon.

2.  Direction of causality can run differently at the individual and group levels.  For example, we know that enjoying a school subject and achievement on tests of that subject are positively correlated at the individual level.  But they are not always correlated—and can in fact be negatively correlated—at the group level. 

3.  By using multiple years of panel data and calculating change over time, a difference in difference analysis controls for unobserved variable bias by “baking into the cake” those unobserved variables at the baseline.  The unobserved variables are assumed to remain stable over the time period of the analysis.  For the cultural factors that many analysts suspect influence between-nation test score differences, stability may be a safe assumption.  Difference in difference, then, would be superior to cross-sectional analyses in controlling for cultural influences that are omitted from other models.

4.  Testing artifacts from a cultural source can also be dampened.  Characteristics such as enjoyment are culturally defined, and the language employed to describe them is also culturally bounded.  Consider two of the questionnaire items examined above: whether kids “enjoy” math and how much they “look forward” to math lessons.  Cultural differences in responding to these prompts will be reflected in between-country averages at the baseline, and any subsequent changes will reflect fluctuations net of those initial differences.

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This week marks the release of the 2015 Brown Center Report on American Education, the fourteenth issue of the series.  One of the three studies in the report, “Girls, Boys, and Reading,” examines the gender gap in reading.  Girls consistently outscore boys on reading assessments.  They have for a long time.  A 1942 study in Iowa discovered that girls were superior to boys on tests of reading comprehension, vocabulary, and basic language skills.^[i]  Girls have outscored boys on the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) reading assessments since the first NAEP was administered in 1971. 

I hope you’ll read the full study—and the other studies in the report—but allow me to summarize the main findings of the gender gap study here.

Eight assessments generate valid estimates of U.S. national reading performance: the Main NAEP, given at three grades (fourth, eighth, and 12^th grades); the NAEP Long Term Trend (NAEP-LTT), given at three ages (ages nine, 13, and 17); the Progress in International Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS), an international assessment given at fourth grade; and the Program for International Student Assessment (PISA), an international assessment given to 15-year-olds.  Females outscore males on the most recent administration of all eight tests.  And the gaps are statistically significant.  Expressed in standard deviation units, they range from 0.13 on the NAEP-LTT at age nine to 0.34 on the PISA at age 15.

The gaps are shrinking.  At age nine, the gap on the NAEP-LTT declined from 13 scale score points in 1971 to five points in 2012.  During the same time period, the gap at age 13 shrank from 11 points to eight points, and at age 17, from 12 points to eight points.  Only the decline at age nine is statistically significant, but at ages 13 and 17, declines since the gaps peaked in the 1990s are also statistically significant.  At all three ages, gaps are shrinking because of males making larger gains on NAEP than females.  In 2012, seventeen-year-old females scored the same on the NAEP reading test as they did in 1971.  Otherwise, males and females of all ages registered gains on the NAEP reading test from 1971-2012, with males’ gains outpacing those of females.

The gap is worldwide.  On the 2012 PISA, 15-year-old females outperformed males in all sixty-five participating countries.  Surprisingly, Finland, a nation known for both equity and excellence because of its performance on PISA, evidenced the widest gap.  Girls scored 556 and boys scored 494, producing an astonishing gap of 62 points (about 0.66 standard deviations—or more than one and a half years of schooling).   Finland also had one of the world’s largest gender gaps on the 2000 PISA, and since then it has widened.  Both girls’ and boys’ reading scores declined, but boys’ declined more (26 points vs. 16 points).  To put the 2012 scores in perspective, consider that the OECD average on the reading test is 496.  Finland’s strong showing on PISA is completely dependent on the superior performance of its young women.

The gap seems to disappear by adulthood.  Tests of adult reading ability show no U.S. gender gap in reading by 25 years of age.  Scores even tilt toward men in later years. 

The words “seems to disappear” are used on purpose.  One must be careful with cross-sectional data not to assume that differences across age groups indicate an age-based trend.  A recent Gallup poll, for example, asked several different age groups how optimistic they were about finding jobs as adults.  Optimism fell from 68% in grade five to 48% in grade 12.  The authors concluded that “optimism about future job pursuits declines over time.”  The data do not support that conclusion.  The data were collected at a single point in time and cannot speak to what optimism may have been before or after that point.  Perhaps today’s 12^th graders were even more pessimistic several years ago when they were in fifth grade.  Perhaps the 12^th-graders are old enough to remember when unemployment spiked during the Great Recession and the fifth-graders are not.   Perhaps 12^th-graders are simply savvier about job prospects and the pitfalls of seeking employment, topics on which fifth-graders are basically clueless.

At least with the data cited above we can track measures of the same cohorts’ gender gap in reading over time.  By analyzing multiple cross-sections—data collected at several different points in time—we can look at real change.  Those cohorts of nine-year-olds in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, are—respectively—today in their 50s, 40s, and 30s.  Girls were better readers than boys when these cohorts were children, but as grown ups, women are not appreciably better readers than men.

Care must be taken nevertheless in drawing firm conclusions.  There exists what are known as cohort effects that can bias measurements.  I mentioned the Great Recession.   Experiencing great historical cataclysms, especially war or economic chaos, may bias a particular cohort’s responses to survey questions or even its performance on tests.  American generations who experienced the Great Depression, World War II, and the Vietnam War—and more recently, the digital revolution, the Great Recession, and the Iraq War—lived through events that uniquely shape their outlook on many aspects of life. 

The gender gap is large, worldwide, and persistent through the K-12 years. What should be done about it?  Maybe nothing.  As just noted, the gap seems to dissipate by adulthood.  Moreover, crafting an effective remedy for the gender gap is made more difficult because we don’t definitely know its cause. Enjoyment of reading is a good example.  Many commentators argue that schools should make a concerted effort to get boys to enjoy reading more.  Enjoyment of reading is statistically correlated with reading performance, and the hope is that making reading more enjoyable would get boys to read more, thereby raising reading skills.

It makes sense, but I’m skeptical.  The fact that better readers enjoy reading more than poor readers—and that the relationship stands up even after boatloads of covariates are poured into a regression equation—is unpersuasive evidence of causality.  As I stated earlier, PISA produces data collected at a single point in time.  It isn’t designed to test causal theories.  Reverse causality is a profound problem.  Getting kids to enjoy reading more may in fact boost reading ability.  But the causal relationship might be flowing in the opposite direction, with enhanced skill leading to enjoyment.   The correlation could simply be indicating that people enjoy activities that they’re good at—a relationship that probably exists in sports, music, and many human endeavors, including reading.

A key question for policymakers is whether boosting boys’ enjoyment of reading would help make boys better readers.  I investigate by analyzing national changes in PISA reading scores from 2000, when the test was first given, to 2102.  PISA creates an Index of Reading Enjoyment based on several responses to a student questionnaire.  Enjoyment of reading has increased among males in some countries and decreased in others.  Is there any relationship between changes in boys’ enjoyment and changes in PISA reading scores? 

There is not.  The correlation coefficient for the two phenomena is -0.01.  Nations such as Germany raised boys’ enjoyment of reading and increased their reading scores by about 10 points on the PISA scale.  France, on the other hand, also raised boys’ enjoyment of reading, but French males’ reading scores declined by 15 points.  Ireland increased how much boys enjoy reading by a little bit but the boys’ scores fell a whopping 37 points. Poland’s males actually enjoyed reading less in 2012 than in 2000, but their scores went up more than 14 points.  No relationship.

How should policymakers proceed?  Large, cross-sectional assessments are good for measuring academic performance at one point in time.  They are useful for generating hypotheses based on observed relationships, but they are not designed to confirm or reject causality.  To do that, randomized control trials should be conducted of programs purporting to boost reading enjoyment.  Also, consider that it ultimately may not matter whether enjoying reading leads to more proficient readers.  Enjoyment of reading may be an end worthy of attainment irrespective of its relationship to achievement.  In that case, RCTs should carefully evaluate the impact of interventions on both enjoyment of reading and reading achievement, whether the two are related or not.  

The 2016 Brown Center Report (BCR), which was published last week, presented a study of Common Core State Standards (CCSS).   In this post, I’d like to elaborate on a topic touched upon but deserving further attention: what to expect in Common Core’s immediate political future. I discuss four key challenges that CCSS will face between now and the end of the year.

Let’s set the stage for the discussion.  The BCR study produced two major findings.  First, several changes that CCSS promotes in curriculum and instruction appear to be taking place at the school level.  Second, states that adopted CCSS and have been implementing the standards have registered about the same gains and losses on NAEP as states that either adopted and rescinded CCSS or never adopted CCSS in the first place.  These are merely associations and cannot be interpreted as saying anything about CCSS’s causal impact.  Politically, that doesn’t really matter. The big story is that NAEP scores have been flat for six years, an unprecedented stagnation in national achievement that states have experienced regardless of their stance on CCSS.  Yes, it’s unfair, but CCSS is paying a political price for those disappointing NAEP scores.  No clear NAEP differences have emerged between CCSS adopters and non-adopters to reverse that political dynamic.

"Yes, it’s unfair, but CCSS is paying a political price for those disappointing NAEP scores. No clear NAEP differences have emerged between CCSS adopters and non-adopters to reverse that political dynamic."

TIMSS and PISA scores in November-December

NAEP has two separate test programs.  The scores released in 2015 were for the main NAEP, which began in 1990.  The long term trend (LTT) NAEP, a different test that was first given in 1969, has not been administered since 2012.  It was scheduled to be given in 2016, but was cancelled due to budgetary constraints.  It was next scheduled for 2020, but last fall officials cancelled that round of testing as well, meaning that the LTT NAEP won’t be given again until 2024.  

With the LTT NAEP on hold, only two international assessments will soon offer estimates of U.S. achievement that, like the two NAEP tests, are based on scientific sampling:  PISA and TIMSS.  Both tests were administered in 2015, and the new scores will be released around the Thanksgiving-Christmas period of 2016.  If PISA and TIMSS confirm the stagnant trend in U.S. achievement, expect CCSS to take another political hit.  America’s performance on international tests engenders a lot of hand wringing anyway, so the reaction to disappointing PISA or TIMSS scores may be even more pronounced than what the disappointing NAEP scores generated.

Is teacher support still declining?

Watch Education Next’s survey on Common Core (usually released in August/September) and pay close attention to teacher support for CCSS.  The trend line has been heading steadily south. In 2013, 76 percent of teachers said they supported CCSS and only 12 percent were opposed.  In 2014, teacher support fell to 43 percent and opposition grew to 37 percent.  In 2015, opponents outnumbered supporters for the first time, 50 percent to 37 percent.  Further erosion of teacher support will indicate that Common Core’s implementation is in trouble at the ground level.  Don’t forget: teachers are the final implementers of standards.

An effort by Common Core supporters to change NAEP

The 2015 NAEP math scores were disappointing.  Watch for an attempt by Common Core supporters to change the NAEP math tests. Michael Cohen, President of Achieve, a prominent pro-CCSS organization, released a statement about the 2015 NAEP scores that included the following: "The National Assessment Governing Board, which oversees NAEP, should carefully review its frameworks and assessments in order to ensure that NAEP is in step with the leadership of the states. It appears that there is a mismatch between NAEP and all states' math standards, no matter if they are common standards or not.” 

Reviewing and potentially revising the NAEP math framework is long overdue.  The last adoption was in 2004.  The argument for changing NAEP to place greater emphasis on number and operations, revisions that would bring NAEP into closer alignment with Common Core, also has merit.  I have a longstanding position on the NAEP math framework. In 2001, I urged the National Assessment Governing Board (NAGB) to reject the draft 2004 framework because it was weak on numbers and operations—and especially weak on assessing student proficiency with whole numbers, fractions, decimals, and percentages.  

Common Core’s math standards are right in line with my 2001 complaint.  Despite my sympathy for Common Core advocates’ position, a change in NAEP should not be made because of Common Core.  In that 2001 testimony, I urged NAGB to end the marriage of NAEP with the 1989 standards of the National Council of Teachers of Mathematics, the math reform document that had guided the main NAEP since its inception.  Reform movements come and go, I argued.  NAGB’s job is to keep NAEP rigorously neutral.  The assessment’s integrity depends upon it.  NAEP was originally intended to function as a measuring stick, not as a PR device for one reform or another.  If NAEP is changed it must be done very carefully and should be rooted in the mathematics children must learn.  The political consequences of it appearing that powerful groups in Washington, DC are changing “The Nation’s Report Card” in order for Common Core to look better will hurt both Common Core and NAEP.

Will Opt Out grow?

Watch the Opt Out movement.  In 2015, several organized groups of parents refused to allow their children to take Common Core tests.  In New York state alone, about 60,000 opted out in 2014, skyrocketing to 200,000 in 2015.  Common Core testing for 2016 begins now and goes through May.  It will be important to see whether Opt Out can expand to other states, grow in numbers, and branch out beyond middle- and upper-income neighborhoods.

Conclusion

Common Core is now several years into implementation.  Supporters have had a difficult time persuading skeptics that any positive results have occurred. The best evidence has been mixed on that question.  CCSS advocates say it is too early to tell, and we’ll just have to wait to see the benefits.  That defense won’t work much longer.  Time is running out.  The political challenges that Common Core faces the remainder of this year may determine whether it survives.

Health reform (aka Obamacare) is entering a new stage. The recent announcement by United Health Care that it will stop selling insurance to individuals and families through most health insurance exchanges marks the transition. In the next stage, federal and state policy makers must decide how to use broad regulatory powers they have under the Affordable Care Act (ACA) to stabilize, expand, and diversify risk pools, improve local market competition, encourage insurers to compete on product quality rather than premium alone, and promote effective risk management. In addition, insurance companies must master rate setting, plan design, and network management and effectively manage the health risk of their enrollees in order to stay profitable, and consumers must learn how to choose and use the best plan for their circumstances.

Six months ago, United Health Care (UHC) announced that it was thinking about pulling out of the ACA exchanges. Now, they are pulling out of all but a “handful” of marketplaces. UHC is the largest private vendor of health insurance in the nation. Nonetheless, the impact on people who buy insurance through the ACA exchanges will be modest, according to careful analyses from the Kaiser Family Foundation and the Urban Institute. The effect is modest for three reasons. One is that in some states UHC focuses on group insurance, not on insurance sold to individuals, where they are not always a major presence. Secondly, premiums of UHC products in individual markets are relatively high. Third, in most states and counties ACA purchasers will still have a choice of two or more other options. In addition, UHC’s departure may coincide with or actually cause the entry of other insurers, as seems to be happening in Iowa.

The announcement by UHC is noteworthy, however. It signals the beginning for ACA exchanges of a new stage in their development, with challenges and opportunities different from and in many ways more important than those they faced during the first three years of operation, when the challenge was just to get up and running. From the time when HealthCare.Gov and the various state exchanges opened their doors until now, administrators grappled non-stop with administrative challenges—how to enroll people, helping them make an informed choice among insurance offerings, computing the right amount of assistance each individual or family should receive, modifying plans when income or family circumstances change, and performing various ‘back office’ tasks such as transferring data to and from insurance companies. The chaotic first weeks after the exchanges opened on October 1, 2013 have been well documented, not least by critics of the ACA. Less well known are the countless behind-the-scenes crises, patches, and work-arounds that harried exchange administrators used for years afterwards to keep the exchanges open and functioning.

The ACA forced not just exchange administrators but also insurers to cope with a new system and with new enrollees. Many new exchange customers were uninsured prior to signing up for marketplace coverage. Insurers had little or no information on what their use of health care would be. That meant that insurers could not be sure where to set premiums or how aggressively to try to control costs, for example by limiting networks of physicians and hospitals enrollees could use. Some did the job well or got lucky. Some didn’t. United seems to have fallen in the second category. United could have stayed in the 30 or so state markets they are leaving and tried to figure out ways to compete more effectively, but since their marketplace premiums were often not competitive and most of their business was with large groups, management decided to focus on that highly profitable segment of the insurance market. Some insurers, are seeking sizeable premium increases for insurance year 2017, in part because of unexpectedly high usage of health care by new exchange enrollees.

United is not alone in having a rough time in the exchanges. So did most of the cooperative plans that were set up under the ACA. Of the 23 cooperative plans that were established, more than half have gone out of business and more may follow. These developments do not signal the end of the ACA or even indicate a crisis. They do mark the end of an initial period when exchanges were learning how best to cope with clerical challenges posed by a quite complicated law and when insurance companies were breaking into new markets. In the next phase of ACA implementation, federal and state policy makers will face different challenges: how to stabilize, expand, and diversify marketplace risk pools, promote local market competition, and encourage insurers to compete on product quality rather than premium alone. Insurance company executives will have to figure out how to master rate setting, plan design, and network management and manage risk for customers with different characteristics than those to which they have become accustomed.

Achieving these goals will require state and federal authorities to go beyond the core implementation decisions that have absorbed most of their attention to date and exercise powers the ACA gives them. For example, section 1332 of the ACA authorizes states to apply for waivers starting in 2017 under which they can seek to achieve the goals of the 2010 law in ways different from those specified in the original legislation. Along quite different lines, efforts are already underway in many state-based marketplaces, such as the District of Columbia, to expand and diversify the individual market risk pool by expanding marketing efforts to enroll new consumers, especially young adults. Minnesota’s Health Care Task Force recently recommended options to stabilize marketplace premiums, including reinsurance, maximum limits on the excess capital reserves or surpluses of health plans, and the merger of individual and small group markets, as Massachusetts and Vermont have done.

In normal markets, prices must cover costs, and while some companies prosper, some do not. In that respect, ACA markets are quite normal. Some regional and national insurers, along with a number of new entrants, have experienced losses in their marketplace business in 2016. One reason seems to be that insurers priced their plans aggressively in 2014 and 2015 to gain customers and then held steady in 2016. Now, many are proposing significant premium hikes for 2017.

Others, like United, are withdrawing from some states. ACA exchange administrators and state insurance officials must now take steps to encourage continued or new insurer participation, including by new entrants such as Medicaid managed care organizations (MCOs). For example, in New Mexico, where in 2016 Blue Cross Blue Shield withdrew from the state exchange, state officials now need to work with that insurer to ensure a smooth transition as it re-enters the New Mexico marketplace and to encourage other insurers to join it. In addition, state insurance regulators can use their rate review authority to benefit enrollees by promoting fair and competitive pricing among marketplace insurers. During the rate review process, which sometimes evolves into a bargaining process, insurance regulators often have the ability to put downward pressure on rates, although they must be careful to avoid the risk of underpricing of marketplace plans which could compromise the financial viability of insurers and cause them to withdraw from the market. Exchanges have an important role in the affordability of marketplace plans too. For example ACA marketplace officials in the District of Columbia and Connecticut work closely with state regulators during the rate review process in an effort to keep rates affordable and adequate to assure insurers a fair rate of return.

Several studies now indicate that in selecting among health insurance plans people tend to give disproportionate weight to premium price, and insufficient attention to other cost provisions—deductibles and cost sharing—and to quality of service and care. A core objective of the ACA is to encourage insurance customers to evaluate plans comprehensively. This objective will be hard to achieve, as health insurance is perhaps the most complicated product most people buy. But it will be next to impossible unless customers have tools that help them take account of the cost implications of all plan features and report accurately and understandably on plan quality and service. HealthCare.gov and state-based marketplaces, to varying degrees, are already offering consumers access to a number of decision support tools, such as total cost calculators, integrated provider directories, and formulary look-ups, along with tools that indicate provider network size. These should be refined over time. In addition, efforts are now underway at the federal and state level to provide more data to consumers so that they can make quality-driven plan choices. In 2018, the marketplaces will be required to display federally developed quality ratings and enrollee satisfaction information. The District of Columbia is examining the possibility of adding additional measures. California has proposed that starting in 2018 plans may only contract with providers and hospitals that have met state-specified metrics of quality care and promote safety of enrollees at a reasonable price. Such efforts will proliferate, even if not all succeed.

Beyond regulatory efforts noted above, insurance companies themselves have a critical role to play in contributing to the continued success of the ACA. As insurers come to understand the risk profiles of marketplace enrollees, they will be better able to set rates, design plans, and manage networks and thereby stay profitable. In addition, insurers are best positioned to maintain the stability of their individual market risk pools by developing and financing marketing plans to increase the volume and diversity of their exchange enrollments. It is important, in addition, that insurers, such as UHC, stop creaming off good risks from the ACA marketplaces by marketing limited coverage insurance products, such as dread disease policies and short term plans. If they do not do so voluntarily, state insurance regulators and the exchanges should join in stopping them from doing so.

Most of the attention paid to the ACA to date has focused on efforts to extend health coverage to the previously uninsured and to the administrative stumbles associated with that effort. While insurance coverage will broaden further, the period of rapid growth in coverage is at an end. And while administrative challenges remain, the basics are now in place. Now, the exchanges face the hard work of promoting vigorous and sustainable competition among insurers and of providing their customers with information so that insurers compete on what matters: cost, service, and quality of health care.

Editor's note: This piece originally appeared in Real Clear Markets. Kevin Lucia and Justin Giovannelli contributed to this article with generous support from The Commonwealth Fund.

SUMMARY:
With the U.S. poverty rate stuck at around 15 percent for years, it’s clear that something needs to change, and candidates need to focus on three pillars of economic advancement-- education, work, family -- to increase economic mobility, according to Brookings Senior Fellow Isabel Sawhill and Senior Research Assistant Edward Rodrigue.

“Economic success requires people’s initiative, but it also requires us, as a society, to untangle the web of disadvantages that make following the sequence difficult for some Americans. There are no silver bullets. Government cannot do this alone. But government has a role to play in motivating individuals and facilitating their climb up the economic ladder,” they write.

The pillar of work is the most urgent, they assert, with every candidate needing to have concrete jobs proposals. Closing the jobs gap (the difference in work rates between lower and higher income households) has a huge effect on the number of people in poverty, even if the new workers hold low-wage jobs. Work connects people to mainstream institutions, helps them learn new skills, provides structure to their lives, and provides a sense of self-sufficiency and self-respect, while at the aggregate level, it is one of the most important engines of economic growth. Specifically, the authors advocate for making work pay (EITC), a second-earner deduction, childcare assistance and paid leave, and transitional job programs. On the education front, they suggest investment in children at all stages of life: home visiting, early childhood education, new efforts in the primary grades, new kinds of high schools, and fresh policies aimed at helping students from poor families attend and graduate from post-secondary institutions. And for the third prong, stable families, Sawhill and Rodrique suggest changing social norms around the importance of responsible, two-person parenthood, as well as making the most effective forms of birth control (IUDs and implants) more widely available at no cost to women.

“Many of our proposals would not only improve the life prospects of less advantaged children; they would pay for themselves in higher taxes and less social spending. The candidates may have their own blend of responses, but we need to hear less rhetoric and more substantive proposals from all of them,” they conclude.

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In their recent blog for Social Mobility Memos, Brad Wilcox, Robert Lerman, and Joseph Price make a convincing case that a stable family structure is an important factor in increased social mobility, higher economic growth, and less poverty over time.

The interesting question is: what lies behind this relationship? Why is a rise (or a smaller decline) in the proportion of married families associated, for example, with higher growth in average family incomes or a decline in poverty? The authors suggest a number of reasons, including the positive effects of marriage for children, less crime, men’s engagement in work, and income pooling. Of these, however, income pooling is by far the most important. Individual earnings have increased very little, if at all, over the past three or four decades, so the only way for families to get ahead was to add a second earner to the household. This is only possible within marriage or some other type of income pooling arrangement like cohabitation. Marriage here is the means: income pooling is the end.

How do we encourage more people to share incomes and expenses? There are no easy answers. Wilcox and his co-authors favor reducing marriage penalties in tax and benefit programs, expanding training and apprenticeship programs, limiting divorces in cases where reconciliation is still possible, and civic efforts to convince young people to follow what I and others have called the “success sequence.” All of these ideas are fine in principle. The question is how much difference they can make in practice. Previous efforts have had at best modest results, as a number of articles in the recent issue of the Brookings-Princeton journal The Future of Children point out.      

Our success sequence, which Wilcox wants to use as the basis for a pro-marriage civic campaign, requires teens and young adults to complete their education, get established in a job, and to delay childbearing until after they are married. The message is the right one.

The problem is that many young adults are having children before marriage. Why? Early marriage is not compatible, in their view, with the need for extended education and training. They also want to spend longer finding the best life partner. These are good reasons to delay marriage. But pregnancies and births still occur, with or without marriage. For better or worse, our culture now tolerates, and often glamorizes, multiple relationships, including premarital sex and unwed parenting. This makes bringing back the success sequence difficult.

Our best bet is to help teens and young adults avoid having a child until they have completed their education, found a steady job, and most importantly, a stable partner with whom they want to raise children, and with whom they can pool their income. In many cases this means marriage; but not in all. The bottom line: teens and young adults need more access and better education and counselling on birth control, especially little-used but highly effective forms as the IUD and the implant. Contraception, not marriage, is where we should be focusing our attention.

If you’re reading this article, chances are you know people who are still getting married. But it’s getting rarer, especially among the youngest generation and those who are less educated. We used to assume people would marry before having children. But marriage is no longer the norm. Half of all children born to women under 30 are born out of wedlock. The proportion is even higher among those without a college degree.

What’s going on here? Most of today’s young adults don’t feel ready to marry in their early 20s. Many have not completed their educations; others are trying to get established in a career; and many grew up with parents who divorced and are reluctant to make a commitment or take the risks associated with a legally binding tie.

But these young people are still involved in romantic relationships. And yes, they are having sex. Any stigma associated with premarital sex disappeared a long time ago, and with sex freely available, there’s even less reason to bother with tying the knot. The result: a lot of drifting into unplanned pregnancies and births to unmarried women and their partners with the biggest problems now concentrated among those in their 20s rather than in their teens. (The teen birth rate has actually declined since the early 1990s.)

Does all of this matter? In a word, yes.

These trends are not good for the young people involved and they are especially problematic for the many children being born outside marriage. The parents may be living together at the time of the child’s birth but these cohabiting relationships are highly unstable. Most will have split before the child is age 5.

Social scientists who have studied the resulting growth of single-parent families have shown that the children in these families don’t fare as well as children raised in two-parent families. They are four or five times as likely to be poor; they do less well in school; and they are more likely to engage in risky behaviors as adolescents. Taxpayers end up footing the bill for the social assistance that many of these families need.

Is there any way to restore marriage to its formerly privileged position as the best way to raise children? No one knows. The fact that well-educated young adults are still marrying is a positive sign and a reason for hope. On the other hand, the decline in marriage and rise in single parenthood has been dramatic and the economic and cultural transformations behind these trends may be difficult to reverse.

Women are no longer economically dependent on men, jobs have dried up for working-class men, and unwed parenthood is no longer especially stigmatized. The proportion of children raised in single-parent homes has, as a consequence, risen from 5 percent in 1960 to about 30 percent now.

Conservatives have called for the restoration of marriage as the best way to reduce poverty and other social ills. However, they have not figured out how to do this.

The George W. Bush administration funded a series of marriage education programs that failed to move the needle in any significant way. The Clinton administration reformed welfare to require work and thus reduced any incentive welfare might have had in encouraging unwed childbearing. The retreat from marriage has continued despite these efforts. We are stuck with a problem that has no clear governmental solution, although religious and civic organizations can still play a positive role.

But perhaps the issue isn’t just marriage. What may matter even more than marriage is creating stable and committed relationships between two mature adults who want and are ready to be parents before having children. That means reducing the very large fraction of births to young unmarried adults that occur before these young people say they are ready for parenthood.

Among single women under the age of 30, 73 percent of all pregnancies are, according to the woman herself, either unwanted or badly mistimed. Some of these women will go on to have an abortion but 60 percent of all of the babies born to this group are unplanned.

As I argue in my book, “Generation Unbound,” we need to combine new cultural messages about the importance of committed relationships and purposeful childbearing with new ways of helping young adults avoid accidental pregnancies. The good news here is that new forms of long-acting but fully reversible contraception, such as the IUD and the implant, when made available to young women at no cost and with good counseling on their effectiveness and safety, have led to dramatic declines in unplanned pregnancies. Initiatives in the states of Colorado and Iowa, and in St. Louis have shown what can be accomplished on this front.

Would greater access to the most effective forms of birth control move the needle on marriage? Quite possibly. Unencumbered with children from prior relationships and with greater education and earning ability, young women and men would be in a better position to marry. And even if they fail to marry, they will be better parents.

My conclusion: marriage is in trouble and, however desirable, will be difficult to restore. But we can at least ensure that casual relationships outside of marriage don’t produce children before their biological parents are ready to take on one of the most difficult social tasks any of us ever undertakes: raising a child. Accidents happen; a child shouldn’t be one of them.

Tomorrow, President Obama unveils his last budget, and we’re sure to see plenty of proposals for spending on education and skills. In the past, the Administration has focused on investments in early childhood education, community colleges, and infrastructure and research. From a budgetary standpoint, the problem with these investments is how to capture their benefits as well as their costs.

First step: find out what works. The Obama Administration has been emphatic about the need for solid evidence in deciding what to fund. The good news is that we now have quite a lot of it, showing that investing in human capital from early education through college can make a difference. Not all programs are successful, of course, and we are still learning what works and what doesn’t. But we know enough to conclude that investing in a variety of health, education, and mobility programs can positively affect education, employment, and earnings in adulthood.

For example:

1. Young, low-income children whose families move to better neighborhoods using housing vouchers see a 31 percent increase in earnings;

2. Quality early childhood and school reform programs can raise lifetime income per child by an average of about $200,000, for at an upfront cost of about $20,000;

3. Boosting college completion rates, for instance via the Accelerated Study in Associate Programs (ASAP) in the City University of New York, leads to higher earnings.

If such estimates are correct (and we recognize there are uncertainties), policymakers are probably underinvesting in such programs because they are looking at the short-term costs but not at longer-term benefits and budget savings.

First, the CBO’s standard practice is to use a 10-year budget window, which means long-range effects are often ignored. Second, although the CBO does try to take into account behavioral responses, such as increased take-up rates of a program, or improved productivity and earnings, it often lacks the research needed to make such estimates. Third, the usual assumption is that the rate of return on public investments in human capital is less than that for private investment. This is now questionable, especially given low interest rates.

A hot topic in budget politics right now is so-called “dynamic scoring.” This means incorporating macroeconomic effects, such as an increase in the labor force or productivity gains, into cost estimates. In 2015, the House adopted a rule requiring such scoring, when practicable, for major legislation. But appropriations bills are excluded, and quantitative analyses are restricted to the existing 10-year budget window.

The interest in dynamic scoring is currently strongest among politicians pushing major tax bills, on the grounds that tax cuts could boost growth. But the principles behind dynamic scoring apply equally to improvements in productivity that could result from proposals to subsidize college education, for example—as proposed by both Senator Sanders and Secretary Clinton. Of course, it is tough to estimate the value of these potential benefits. But it is worth asking whether current budget rules lead to myopia in our assessments of what such investments might accomplish, and thus to an over-statement of their “true” cost.

We have known for some time that children who grow up in single parent-families do not fare as well as those with two parents – especially two biological parents.  In recent years, some scholars have argued that the consequences are especially serious for boys.  Not only do boys need fathers, presumably to learn how to become men and how to control their often unruly temperaments, but less obviously, and almost counterintuitively, it turns out that boys are more sensitive or less resilient than girls. Parenting seems to affect the development of boys more than it affects the development of girls.  Specifically, their home environment is more likely to affect behavior and performance in school.

Up until now, these speculations have been based on limited evidence.  But new research from Harvard professor Raj Chetty and a team of colleagues shows that the effects of single parenthood are indeed real for all boys, regardless of family income, but especially for boys living in high-poverty, largely minority neighborhoods.

When they become adults, boys from low-income, single-parent families are less likely to work, to earn a decent income, and to go to college: not just in absolute terms, but compared to their sisters or other girls who grew up in similar circumstances.  These effects are largest when the families live in metropolitan areas (commuting zones) with a high fraction of black residents, high levels of racial and income segregation, and lots of single-parent families.  In short, it is not just the boy’s own family situation that matters but also the kind of neighborhood he grows up in.  Exposure to high rates of crime, and other potentially toxic peer influences without the constraining influence of adult males within these families, seems to set these boys on a very different course than other boys and, perhaps more surprisingly, on a different course from their sisters.

The focus of a great deal of attention recently has been on police practices in low-income minority neighborhoods.  Without in any way excusing police brutality where it has occurred, what this research suggests is that the challenge for police is heightened by the absence of male authority figures in low-income black neighborhoods.  In his gripping account of his own coming of age in West Baltimore, journalist Ta-Nehisi Coates recounts being severely punished by his father for some adolescent infraction.  When his mother protested, Ta-Nehisi’s father replied that it was better that this discipline come from within the family than be left to the police.  But Coates’ family was one of the few in his neighborhood where a father still existed.

Repairing families is difficult at best.  Most single-parent families are initially formed as the result of an unplanned birth to an unmarried young woman in these same communities.  Perhaps girls and young women simply suffer in a different way.  Instead of becoming involved in crime and ending up in prison or the informal economy, they are more likely to drift into early motherhood.  With family responsibilities at an early age, and less welfare assistance than in the past, they are also more likely to have to work.  But in the longer run, providing more education and a different future for these young women may actually be just as important as helping their brothers if we don’t want to perpetuate the father absence that caused these problems in the first place.  They are going to need both the motivation (access to education and decent jobs) and the means (access to better forms of contraception) if we are to achieve this goal.

Editor's note: This piece originally appeared in Real Clear Markets. 

Today marks Equal Pay Day. How are we doing? We have come a long way since I wrote my doctoral dissertation on the pay gap back in the late 1960s. From earning 59 percent of what men made in 1974 to earning 79 percent in 2015 (among year-round, full-time workers), women have broken a lot of barriers. 

There is no reason why the remaining gap can’t be closed. The gap could easily move in favor of women. After all, they are now better educated than men. They earn 60 percent of all bachelor’s degrees and the majority of graduate degrees. Adjusting for educational attainment, the current earnings gap widens, with the biggest relative gaps at the highest levels of education:

If we want to encourage people to get more education, we can't discriminate against the best educated just because they are women.

One source of the current gap is the fact that women still take more time off from work to care for their families. These family responsibilities may also affect the kinds of work they choose. Harvard professor Claudia Goldin notes that they are more likely to work in occupations where it is easier to combine work and family life. These divided work-family loyalties are holding women back more than pay discrimination per se. This should change when men are more willing to share equally on the home front, as Richard Reeves and I have argued elsewhere.  

But there is much to be done while waiting for this more egalitarian world to arrive. Paid family leave and more support for early child care and education would go a long way toward relieving families, and women in particular, of the dual burden they now face. In the process, the pay gap should shrink or even move in favor of women. 

The Economic Policy Institute (EPI) has just released a very informative report on these issues. They call for an aggressive expansion of both early childhood education and child care subsidies for low and moderate income families. Specifically, they propose to cap child care expenses at 10 percent of income, which would provide an average subsidy of $3,272 to working families with children and much more than this to lower-income families. 

The EPI authors argue that child care subsidies would provide needed in-kind benefits to lower income families (check!), boost women’s labor force participation in a way that would benefit the overall economy (check!), and reduce the gender pay gap (check!). In short, childcare subsidies are a win-win-win.

For present purposes I want to focus on the likely effects on the pay gap. In the mid-1990s, the U.S. had the highest rate of female labor force participation compared to Germany, Canada, and Japan. Now we have the lowest. One reason is because other advanced countries have expanded paid leave and child care support for employed mothers while the U.S. has not:

If we want to eliminate the pay gap and perhaps even reverse it, the primary focus must be on women’s continuing difficulties in balancing work and family life. We should certainly attend to any remaining instances of pay discrimination in the workplace, as called for in the Paycheck Fairness Act. But the biggest source of the problem is not employer discrimination; it is women’s continued double burden.

Event Information

Technology unimaginable at the time of the nation’s founding now poses stark challenges to America’s core constitutional principles. Policymakers and legal scholars are closely examining how constitutional law is tested by technological change and how to preserve constitutional principles without hindering progress. In Constitution 3.0: Freedom and Technological Change (Brookings Institution Press, 2011), Governance Studies Senior Fellow Benjamin Wittes and Nonresident Senior Fellow Jeffrey Rosen asked a diverse group of leading scholars to imagine how technological developments plausible by the year 2025 could stress current constitutional law. The resulting essays explore scenarios involving information technology, genetic engineering, security, privacy and beyond.

On December 13, the Governance Studies program at Brookings hosted a Judicial Issues Forum examining the scenarios posed in Constitution 3.0 and the challenge of adapting our constitutional values to the technology of the near future. Wittes and Rosen offered key highlights and insights from the book and was joined by two key contributors, O. Carter Snead and Timothy Wu, who discussed their essays.

After the program, panelists took audience questions.

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• Constitution 3.0: Freedom, Technological Change and the Law

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At the previous Summit of the Americas in Cartagena, Colombia in April 2012, President Barack Obama was badly roughed up by his Latin American counterparts (and embarrassed by his Secret Service for entertaining sex workers). Happily, the president and his entourage did much better at last week’s Summit in Panama, but the United States still has a way to go before the Summits once again become the productive vehicle for U.S. foreign policy that they once were, at their founding in Miami in 1994.

In Cartagena, leader after leader criticized the United States for allegedly heavy-handed counter-narcotics policies; oppressive treatment of immigrants; a weak response to crime and poverty in Central America; and monetary policies that supposedly harmed their economies. Most pointedly, speakers denounced the decades-old economic sanctions against Cuba. But given the upcoming Congressional elections, Obama and his Secretary of State Hillary Clinton did not want to do anything to endanger their Democratic Party’s chances. Obama was reduced to affirming, uncharacteristically, “I am here to listen, but our policies will not change.”

Once the November 2012 mid-term elections were over, policies did, in fact, change as the United States took a more relaxed approach to counternarcotics; the administration announced immigration policy reforms, including negotiating agreements with Central American nations to reduce the outflow of children and promote economic growth and jobs at home; and Vice President Joseph Biden met repeatedly with Central American leaders, and offered $1 billion in economic and security assistance.

In Cartagena, the Latin Americans threatened to boycott the Panama Summit if Cuba was not invited. But last December 17, President Obama and Cuban President Raúl Castro announced their agreement to negotiate the normalization of diplomatic relations, and in one blow, the United States transformed a thorn in relations with Latin America into a triumph of inter-American diplomacy that significantly enhanced U.S. prestige in the region.

So in Panama, most of the Latin American and Caribbean leaders, rather than berate the U.S. president, praised him for his courage and generally treated him with courtesy and respect. The three leaders of Central America’s Northern Tier (Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador—whose president is a former guerrilla commander) were effusive in their praise. The president of Brazil, Dilma Rousseff, who in Cartagena had sharply criticized U.S. monetary policies and had cancelled a visit to the White House to protest NSA spying, was pleased to announce that her visit had been rescheduled for this June. 

Obama’s own performance was more spirited than it had been in Cartagena. In response to a harsh polemic by Ecuadorean President Rafael Correa, Obama shot back: “The U.S. may be a handy excuse for diverting attention from domestic political problems, but it won’t solve those problems.” After listening politely through Raúl Castro’s extended remarks—during which Castro praised him as a man of honesty and authenticity—Obama departed to avoid having to sit through the predictable harangues of Argentine President Cristina Kirchner and Bolivian leader Evo Morales. Few could blame him.

At the parallel CEO Summit of business executives, Obama delivered thoughtful responses to questions posed by several entrepreneurs including Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg, distinguishing himself from the facile rhetorical answers of the other presidents on the panel. At a Civil Society Forum where delegates affiliated with Cuban government organizations engaged in disruptive tactics, Obama lectured firmly on the virtues of civility and tolerance. Together with two other presidents (Tabaré Vasquez of Uruguay and Guillermo Solis of Costa Rica), Obama met privately with a dozen leaders of nongovernmental organizations, took notes, and incorporated at least one of their suggestions into his later public remarks.

But Obama’s Panama experience was marred by an inexplicable misstep by his White House aides a month earlier—the very public sanctioning of seven Venezuelan officials for alleged human rights violation and corruption, and the declaration that Venezuela was a “threat to U.S. national security.” To Latin American ears, that language recalled Cold War-era justifications for CIA plots and military coups. The State Department claims it warned the White House against Latin American blowback, but perhaps not forcefully enough. Once Latin American anger become apparent, the White House tried to walk the “national security” language back, saying it was just a formality required by U.S. legislation, but the damage was done. Speaker after speaker condemned the “unilateral sanctions” and called for their repeal.

The ill-timed sanctions announcement provided Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and his populist allies with a ready stick to beat the United States. For whileObama’s diplomacy had managed to peel off most of the Central Americans and win over or at least diminish the antagonism of other leaders, it had not found a way to tranquilize the rejectionist states (Ecuador, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Argentina) tied to Venezuela in an “anti-imperialist” alliance. Although a relatively small minority, these spoilers seriously disrupt plenary meetings with long and vituperative monologues, and small minorities of “veto” players can block the signing of otherwise consensus documents such that in Panama, as in Cartagena, no consensus declaration was issued; rather the host leader signed brief “mandates for action” that lacked full legitimacy.

The problem of the rejectionist minority will be partially alleviated when Kirchner is shortly replaced, likely by a more moderate government in Argentina, and political turnover will eventually come in Venezuela, but the hemisphere needs new rules that protect majority rights to get things done. Some simple procedural innovations, such as a more forceful chair, or even the simple system of red-yellow-green lights that alert speakers to their time limits, would help.

Notwithstanding the misstep on Venezuela sanctions and the disruptive tactics of the rejectionist minority, the overall mood in Panama was upbeat, even celebratory. Leaders made reference to the xenophobic violence and religious intolerance plaguing other continents, and remarked with some pride that, in comparison, Latin America was a zone of peace that was also making progress, however inadequate, on human rights, poverty alleviation, and clean energy. With some procedural fixes, favorable political winds, and continued progress on concrete issues of mutual interest, inter-American relations could well continue their upward trajectory.

Read more about the Summit with Richard Feinberg's post on Cuba's multi-level strategy at the Seventh Summit of the Americas.

Change is a complicated thing in Cuba. On the one hand, many Cubans remain frustrated with limits on economic and political opportunity, and millennials are emigrating in ever rising numbers. On the other, there is more space for entrepreneurship, and Havana is full of energy and promise today.

The island’s emerging private sector is growing—and along with it, start-up investment costs. Three years ago, Yamina Vicente opened her events planning firm, Decorazón, with a mere $500 in cash. Today she estimates she would need $5,000 to compete. New upscale restaurants are opening: Mery Cabrera returned from Ecuador to invest her savings in Café Presidente, a sleek bistro located on the busy Avenue of the Presidents. And lively bars at establishments like 304 O’Reilly feature bright mixologists doing brisk business.

Photo credit: Richard Feinberg.

Havana’s hotels are fully booked through the current high season. The overflow of tourists is welcome news for the thousands of bed-and-breakfasts flowering throughout the city (many of which are now networked through AirBnB). While most bed-and-breakfasts used to be one or two rooms rented out of people’s homes, Cubans today are renovating entire buildings to rent out. These are the green shoots of what will become boutique hotels, and Cubans are quitting their low-paying jobs in the public sector to become managers of their family’s rental offerings.

Another new sign: real estate agencies! Most Cubans own their own homes—really own them, mortgage-free. But only recently did President Raúl Castro authorize the sales of homes, suddenly giving Cubans a valuable financial asset. Many sell them to get cash to open a new business. Others, to immigrate to Miami.

WiFi hot spots are also growing in number. Rejecting an offer from Google to provide Internet access to the entire island, the Cuban government instead set up some 700 public access locations. This includes 65 WiFi hot spots in parks, hotels, or major thoroughfares, where mostly young Cubans gather to message friends or chat with relatives overseas.

Economic swings

2015 was a good year for the Cuban economy, relatively speaking. Growth rose from the disappointing 2 percent in recent years to (by official measures) 4 percent. The Brazilian joint venture cigarette company, Brascuba, reported a 17 percent jump in sales, and announced a new $120 million investment in the Mariel Economic Development Zone. Shoppers crowded state-run malls over the holiday season, too. 

Photo credit: Richard Feinberg.

Consumers still report chronic shortages in many commodities, ranging from beer to soap, and complain of inflation in food prices. Alarmed by the chronic crisis of low productivity in agriculture, the government announced tax breaks for farmers in 2016. The government is already forecasting a slower growth rate for 2016, attributed to lower commodity prices and a faltering Venezuelan economy. It’s likely to fall back to the average 2 percent rate that has characterized the past decade.

Pick up the pace

Cuban officials are looking forward to the 7th Conference of the Cuban Communist Party (CCP) in mid-April. There is little public discussion of the agenda, however. Potential initiatives include a new electoral law permitting direct election of members of the national assembly (who are currently chosen indirectly by regional assemblies or by CCP-related mass organizations); a timetable for unification of the currency (Cubans today must deal with two forms of money); some measures to empower provincial governments; and the development of a more coherent, forward-looking economic development strategy.

[T]here are now two brain drains: an internal brain drain, as government officials abandon the public sector for higher incomes in the growing private sector; and emigration overseas.

But for many younger Cubans, the pace of change is way too slow. The talk of the town remains the exit option. Converse with any well-educated millennial and they’ll tell you that half or more of their classmates are now living abroad. Indeed, there are now two brain drains: an internal brain drain, as government officials abandon the public sector for higher incomes in the growing private sector; and emigration overseas to the United States, but also to Spain, Canada, Mexico.

The challenge for the governing CCP is to give young people hope in the future. The White House has signaled that President Obama may visit Cuba this year. Such a visit by Obama—who is immensely popular on the island—could help. But the main task is essentially a Cuban one.

Richard Feinberg’s forthcoming book, “Open for Business: Building the New Cuban Economy,” will be published by Brookings Press later this year.

In advance of President Obama’s historic trip to Cuba and Argentina, three Brookings scholars participated in a media roundtable to offer context and outline their expectations for the outcomes of the trip. Richard Feinberg and Ted Piccone discussed Cuba–including developments in the U.S.-Cuba relationship, the Cuban economy, and human rights on the island–and Harold Trinkunas offered insight on Argentina, inter-American relations, and the timing of the visit.

Read the transcript (PDF) »

Richard Feinberg:

The idea is to promote a gradual incremental transition to a more open, pluralistic and prosperous Cuba integrated into global markets of goods, capital, and ideas. It is a long-term strategy. It cannot be measured by quarterly reports.

Ted Piccone:

...the key [is] to unlock a whole set of future changes that I think will be net positive for the United States, but it is going to take time, and it is not going to happen overnight.

Harold Trinkunas:

Cuba is really about moving, among other things, a stumbling block to better relations with Latin America, and Argentina is about restoring a positive relationship with a key swing state in the region that was once one of our most important allies in the region.

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Crisis seems to be the byword for Brazil today: political crisis, economic crisis, corruption crisis. Even the 2016 Rio Olympics seem to teeter on the edge of failure, according to the governor of the state of Rio de Janeiro. Yet despite the steady drum beat of grim news, Brazil is more than likely to resume its upward trajectory within a few years. Its present economic and political troubles mask a number of positives: the strength of its democracy and a new found willingness to fight corruption at all costs. With the correct policies in place, its economy will recover in due course. The impeachment process against Dilma Rousseff will soon be over, one way or the other. The present troubles are merely a temporary detour on Brazil’s long quest to achieve major power status and a consequential role in the international system. In a world in turmoil, where geopolitical tensions are on the rise and the fabric of international politics is stressed by events such as Brexit, we should not lose sight of Brazil’s history of and potential for contributing to sustaining the liberal international order.

Brazil’s aspirations for greatness

Brazil has long aspired to grandeza (greatness) both at home and abroad. As its first ambassador to Washington, Joaquim Nabuco (1905-1910) once said, “Brazil has always been conscious of its size, and it has been governed by a prophetic sense with regard to its future.” As we document in our new book, Brazil has reached for major power status at least four times in the past 100 years: participating as a co-belligerent with the Allies in World War One and seeking a permanent seat on the Council of the League of Nations thereafter; joining the Allies in World War II and aspiring to a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in 1945; mastering nuclear technology beginning in the 1970s, including launching a covert military program (now terminated) to build a nuclear explosive device; and most recently, beginning with the presidency of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2011), seeking to become a leader in multilateral institutions, including actively campaigning for a permanent seat on the UNSC.

A decade ago, many Brazilians believed that this time their country was poised to secure its position as a major power. As the seventh largest economy in the world with the 10th largest defense budget and significant soft power, Brazilian leaders such as Lula saw their country as being “in the mix” of major powers who, while not able to make the international order alone, could very well shape its evolution through uncertain times together with other major powers. Certainly, they no longer saw Brazil as one of the middle or small powers, the “order takers” in the international system.

Brazil saw a new opportunity to emerge as a major power in the advent of a relatively stable and peaceful post-Cold War geopolitical order, the decade-long commodity boom that supercharged its economy after 2002, and the rise of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). Between 2002 and 2013, Brazil’s virtuous trifecta—democratic consolidation, rapid economic growth, and reduced inequality—was a boon to its soft power. This combination was highly attractive to many in the developing world, contributing to Brazil’s claim to leadership on the international stage as a bridge between the global South and the great powers. International peace and stability particularly favored Brazil’s predilection for deploying soft power rather than hard power. And in the BRICS, Brazil saw an opportunity to work together with other emerging powers critical of the present international order to advance its agenda for reformed global institutions.

Rethinking Brazil’s approach to global influence

Brazil’s bridge-building strategy was effective in advancing its national interests in multilateral forums, most recently on global internet governance and global climate change. But the BRICS dimension of Brazil’s strategy detracted from its ability to influence the world’s great democracies. The BRICS identity associated Brazil with authoritarian powers—China and Russia—that were viewed by the United States and its allies, at best, as unhelpful critics and, at worst, as deliberate saboteurs of the present order. This undermined Brazil’s credibility with Washington and other leading democracies, and hindered its ability to advance its preferred policies on everything from nonproliferation to the reform of global economic institutions to the debate on humanitarian intervention. In retrospect, working more closely with other emerging democracies that seek reform of the international order, such as through the India-Brazil-South Africa association known as IBSA, would have more clearly signaled Brazil’s constructive intentions while still preserving its critical posture.

Today, the opportunities that powered Brazil’s most recent rise—post-Cold War geopolitical stability and a massive commodity boom—are receding, replaced by a more fractious and dangerous international system. Despite troubles at home, it is not too early for Brazil’s leaders to think anew about how to strengthen national capabilities and deploy them strategically to address this new environment. This includes fortifying domestic institutions, both to address the present crisis but also to restore the luster of Brazil’s soft power. It means bolstering Brazil’s hard power capabilities once the economy improves and deploying them in ways that contribute to its soft power, for example by taking on additional responsibility for leading critical international peacekeeping operations as it has in Haiti. It means thinking carefully about how to signal to the democratic great powers Brazil’s commitment to a strengthened liberal international order, even as it holds onto its own principles and works towards reform of multilateral institutions. And eventually, as Brazil completes its recovery, it means contributing more substantially to the costs of maintaining its preferred global order. A Brazil that achieves all this will be well positioned to have a positive global impact, continuing to be a strong (if sometimes critical) partner for the United States in shaping the international order.

Recent developments in Turkey and Israel—on energy security and domestic politics, in particular—may help pave the way for a long-awaited rapprochement between the two countries.

It’s been five and a half years since the May 2010 Israel raid on the Mavi Marmara (part of the Gaza flotilla), which soured relations between Ankara and Jerusalem. At present, they’re characterized by distrust and suspicion at the top level, personal animosity between the leaders, a limited dialogue between the two governments, and ambassadors yet to be appointed. However, trade is booming and Israeli tourists are flocking back to Turkish vacation destinations.

Wanted: Energy supply and cooperation on Syria

Turkey’s downing of a Russian SU-24 fighter jet along the Syrian border on November 24 has provoked crisis in its relationship with Russia, with Russian President Vladimir Putin characterizing Turkey’s action as “a stab in the back.” Extending beyond bilateral relations, that crisis affects Turkey’s foreign policy more broadly. For Turkey, the most critical element in this feud is its energy security. 

Turkey imports most of its natural gas from Russia, and the two sides have long been engaged in talks to expand this relationship through the proposed Turkish Stream natural gas pipeline, which would channel gas to Turkey and Europe underneath the Black Sea (circumventing Ukraine). But on November 26, Russian Minister of Development Alexi Ulyukayev announced the cancellation of the project, sending shock waves throughout Turkey. The move has prompted concerns among the Turkish leadership about the reliability of Russian gas and a corresponding search for alternative supplies in the region. In addition to discussions with Qatar and Azerbaijan, there have been more statements in recent weeks from Turkish politicians, energy companies, and others calling for talks with Israel about future natural gas imports.

The Syrian crisis is another issue on which Turkey may seek quiet Israeli support—particularly the support of Israeli intelligence, which may prove crucial to Turkish war efforts.

Politically, the timing could be convenient: the Justice and Development Party (AKP)-led government could approach Israel and begin talks where they left off nearly two years ago. The dust has settled over the November 2015 elections and the AKP is not facing any serious domestic political challenges in the near future. The ball is now in President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s court. He commented to reporters in Paris on November 30 that he believes he’s “able to fix ties” with Israel, hinting at his willingness to move forward. He then stated on December 13 that the “region definitely needs” Turkish-Israeli normalization, citing previous Turkish demands for compensation to the families of the victims of the Mavi Marmara incident as well as the lifting of the Gaza blockade as his conditions for normalization.

Wanted: Energy demand and cooperation on Syria

From Jerusalem’s perspective, Israeli energy security may provide a “fig leaf” for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government to reach out to Turkey. Netanyahu and his cabinet have been stuck for nearly a year in attempts to approve and launch a compromise between the government and the gas companies (Delek and Noble) to begin the crucial phase of development of Israel’s largest Eastern Mediterranean gas field, Leviathan. About to clear the last hurdle before launching the deal, Netanyahu is under pressure to demonstrate the national security benefits of developing the gas. In this context, he and the Minister of Energy Yuval Steinitz have said that Turkey is being seriously considered as a future export destination. In a Knesset hearing, Netanyahu went even further by revealing that Israel has recently been engaged in discussions with Turkey to further explore the export option. 

The Syrian crisis provides Israel another reason to engage with Turkey. Israel is quite weary of the situation in Syria and may benefit from Turkish analysis and intelligence on this issue. 

Politically, Netanyahu will not face problems within his narrow coalition if he decides to warm up relations with Turkey. Former Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman, a staunch critic of Turkey and its leadership, is no longer in office. The recently appointed Chief of Mossad (currently National Security Advisor) Yossi Cohen, in contrast, is known to be a proponent of closer ties between Israel and Turkey. 

Re-friending?

Official visits between the two sides have been increasing: in June, Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Director General Dore Gold and his Turkish counterpart Feridun Sinirlioğlu met in Rome; in September, Professor Guven Sak (the head of the government-supported research institute of the Turkish industrialists and businessmen, TEPAV) led the first official visit to Israel by a Turkish political delegation; on December 3, Israeli news outlet NRG reported on a visit by Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Deputy Director General for Europe, Aviv Shiron's visit to Ankara and Istanbul in an attempt to warm relations between the two countries. 

There is no love lost between Israel and Turkey, and many issues still need to be resolved. Erdoğan has stated his conditions for normalization, and Netanyahu is reportedly insisting that Turkey expel Hamas operative Saleh al-Arouri (who has been directing Hamas terrorist activities in the West Bank) from its territory, as a condition. However, the current convergence of interests may pave the way to a resolution of the crisis between these two former strategic allies. In March 2013, President Obama helped orchestrate a formal Israeli apology to Turkey over the Mavi Marmara incident. Moving forward, more American senior-level diplomacy is needed. The United States—which has been active behind the scenes—will likely need to further push the two sides toward one another.

Are Turkey and Israel on the verge of signing a normalization agreement, after a six-year hiatus? Comments in recent days by senior officials in both countries suggest so. A senior Israeli official, quoted in the Times of Israel, stated that “95% of the agreement is completed,” while Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu said the parties are “one or two meetings away” from an agreement.

Media outlets in both countries have revealed that a meeting between senior Turkish and Israeli officials is expected to be held in Turkey on June 26—and that shortly after, an agreement is likely to be signed and go into effect. 

For two of America’s closest allies in the Middle East to bury the hatchet, reinstate ambassadors, and resume senior-level dialogue would surely be a boost for U.S strategic interests in the region. It would contribute to greater cohesion in dealing with the Syrian crisis, for example, and in the fight against the Islamic State. 

A quick recap

Let’s first recall how the crisis between the two former strategic allies developed, when in the aftermath of the Mavi Marmara incident (May 31, 2010)—resulting in the deaths of 9 Turks—Turkey recalled its ambassador in Tel Aviv and suspended nearly all defense and strategic ties with Israel. Israel also called back its ambassador in Ankara. At the time, Turkey set three conditions for resuming dialogue with Israel: a formal apology, compensation for the families of the victims, and a removal of Israel’s Gaza naval blockade. Relations came to a practical standstill, except in the economic sphere: trade between the two countries exceeded $5 billion in 2014, an unprecedented level. 

Israel formally apologized to Turkey in 2013 and in 2014 committed to paying compensation to the families of the victims. But the Gaza naval blockade has not been lifted. Turkey further demands greater access and presence in Gaza. For its part, Israel demands that Turkey not allow Hamas operative Salah al-Arouri, who resides in Istanbul, to coordinate terrorist operations against Israeli targets in the West Bank. Israel also wants Ankara to pressure Hamas to return the remains of two Israeli soldiers killed in the 2014 war in Gaza. 

Since the flotilla incident, Turkey was not always convinced that repairing relations with Israel actually served its interests. As the Arab Spring unfolded, Turkey hoped to assume a leadership role in the Arab and Muslim worlds—having good relations with Israel did not serve that purpose. And as Turkey went through periods of some unrest in the political arena (whether during the Gezi Park protests in 2013 or the hotly contested local and national elections), many in the ruling AKP party saw restoring relations with Israel as a potential liability in domestic politics. Israel, for its part, was mostly in a reactive mode: sometimes it tried to initiate contacts with Turkey, and sometimes it denounced Turkish anti-Israeli or anti-Semitic rhetoric.

The times they are a-changing

Now, however, new developments have prompted Turkey to seek a rapprochement with Israel. One key factor is the crisis in the Turkish-Russian relationship—in the aftermath of the suspension of the Turkish Stream natural gas pipeline project, Israeli natural gas is viewed as a possible substitute in the medium term for some of Turkey’s natural gas imports from Russia. And as the impact of the war in Syria on Turkey (including the refugee crisis and terrorist attacks) has made clear to Turkey that it must enhance its intelligence capabilities, and Israel can help. Israel, meanwhile, is searching for an export destination for its natural gas (Israeli Energy Minister Steinitz stated recently that “Turkey is a huge market for gas…they need our gas and we need this market”). Israeli leaders also know that resuming a political and military dialogue with Turkey may contribute to a more comprehensive view of the challenges Israel faces in the region. 

Five years after Israel’s formal request to open a representation office at NATO’s Brussels headquarters, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced last month that NATO has approved the Israeli request. Turkey had opposed it, blocking progress, since NATO decisions are adopted by consensus. In a move seen signaling a thawing of relations, Turkey recently removed its objection to Israel’s request, paving the way to NATO’s decision. Israel continues to be a partner in NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue along with Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, Jordan, Mauritania and Morocco. 

At a time when Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is attempting to strengthen his country’s regional strategic position and enhance its economic opportunities, a rapprochement with Israel makes sense. Bilateral negotiations are in the final stretch, as they have reached a compromise on the complex issue of Gaza and Hamas (Turkey will reportedly not demand the full lifting of Israel’s naval blockade on Gaza, settling for greater access and presence in Gaza. Israel will acquiesce to continued Hamas political activities in Turkey and will not demand the removal of Hamas operative al-Arouri from Turkey, but will get Turkish assurances that al-Arouri’s involvement in terror will cease.)

Fixing the troubled Turkish-Israeli relationship has been a mighty task for senior negotiators on both sides over the last few years, and although an agreement seems around the corner, the experience of recent years suggests that there can be last minute surprises. Israel’s Prime Minister had to jump over several hurdles, holding off pressure from Russia and Egypt not to seek rapprochement with Turkey, and ensuring support of the deal with Turkey from his newly appointed Defense Minister Avigdor Liberman, a known opponent of a deal. On the Turkish side, it seems that President Erdoğan wants a rapprochement with Israel, and feels that he needs it. This is tied directly to the Turkish domestic arena: Erdoğan has recently completed his consolidation of power, ousting Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu and paving the way to the election of his trusted confidant, Binali Yıldırım, as prime minister. In addition, his new allies—the military-judicial establishment—are in favor of mending ties with Israel. One caveat is that Erdoğan’s top priority is establishing a presidential system, and so if he feels at any point that reaching an agreement with Israel will somehow undermine those efforts, he may opt for maintaining the status quo.