"It is fortunate that a major feature of American social policy is a series of programs, often referred to as the safety net, that are designed to provide people with cash and other benefits when they fall on hard times—which they are more likely to do during a recession," write the authors of a new report on the response of the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program—the major federal welfare program that replaced Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) in 1996—to the Great Recession that lasted from December 2007 to June 2009.

In their report, "The Responsiveness of the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Program during the Great Recession," Ron Haskins, Vicky Albert, and Kimberly Howard write that "All in all, we conclude that the American system of balancing work requirements and welfare benefits worked fairly well, even during the most severe recession since the Depression of the 1930s."

Their report is based on three studies: (1) an examination of the changes in the TANF rolls compared to changes in AFDC rolls during previous recessions, plus changes in TANF rolls in relation to rising unemployment state-by-state; (2) a review of data on single mothers' likelihood to receive TANF benefits during the 2001 and 2007 recessions, their receipt of other program benefits, and what actions single mothers took to deal with the recession; and (3) interviews with 44 directors of state TANF programs to determine their state's response.

"An important question" noted by the authors at the outset "is whether the response of the nation's safety net program in general and the TANF program in particular was commensurate with the challenge posed by the huge level of unemployment during and following the Great Recession."

Some Results of the TANF Study

Haskins, Albert, and Howard arrived at a number of conclusions from the TANF/AFDC study, including:

• TANF rolls increased more in the 2001 recession and the 2007 Great Recession than did AFDC during previous, pre-welfare reform (1996) recessions.
• The increase in TANF rolls was greater during the period of rising unemployment in each state, which did not coincide exactly with the dates of the Great Recession, than during the official recession period nationally.
• The "nation's safety net as a whole performed well during the Great Recession and prevented millions of people from falling into poverty."

"The nation experienced 51 different recessions and 51 different responses by the TANF program to the recession,” they write. "But the key point is that measuring the rise of the TANF caseload in response to the unique increase in unemployment in each state reveals TANF to have been more responsive to the recession."

Some Results of the Single Mothers Study

• Compared with the 1990 recession before welfare reform, "single mothers were less likely to receive benefits from the TANF program during the 2001 and 2007 recessions."
• Single mothers were more likely to receive other "safety net" help such as Unemployment Compensation, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (formerly food stamps), Supplemental Security Income, the Earned Income Tax Credit, and child care, school lunch and breakfast, and other benefits for their children.
• In all the 1990, 2001, and 2007 recessions, "single mothers took action on their own" by finding jobs, living with family, and other ways to "weather the recession."
• Based on income, "poverty among single mothers and their children was lower during the Great Recession than during the recession of 1990."

Given the array of available benefits, the authors conclude that:

a mother with two children earning even as little as $11,000 per year could and still can escape poverty, as measured by income that includes non-cash benefits and tax credits, because of the generosity of these benefits. In our view, the combination of strong work requirements and generous work support benefits is a reasonable policy, despite the fact that fewer mothers receive TANF now than in the past.

Some Results of the TANF Directors Study

"Arguably the people who know the most about the goals and operation of state TANF programs and how the programs responded to the recession are the state TANF directors," write Haskins, Albert, and Howard. "They were, after all, the point persons for state TANF programs before and during the Great Recession. Interviews with TANF directors can provide an insider's view of the TANF issues that we have so far analyzed from the outside." Some of their conclusions from these interviews include:

• Most states did not struggle to pay for growing TANF rolls during the Great Recession.
• Most state directors considered their state's response to the recession "as adequate or better."
• The directors had suggestions for improving the TANF program, including having more flexibility in work participation rates, gaining access to the Contingency Fund, and placing greater emphasis on job training.

Some Policy Recommendations

Although the authors believe that the TANF program worked well, especially in conjunction with other safety net programs, they suggest some potential reforms:

• TANF allows vocational training to count toward states fulfilling their work requirement, but only a maximum of 30 percent of the work requirement can be fulfilled by TANF recipients in education or training. In times of high unemployment, Congress could raise the percentage limit from 30 to 40 or even 50 percent when unemployment reaches some specified level in the state, given that most experts believe the unemployed should expand their skills through job training during recessions.
• Congress should consider changing the 12-week limit on job search during periods of high unemployment to as much as six months, given that the average period of search before finding a job increases sharply during periods of high unemployment.

Download and read the full report for complete methodology, analysis, and data.

House Republicans recently approved the “Death Tax Repeal Act of 2015.”  If we care about our debt obligations, social mobility, or equality of opportunity, we should consider doing just the opposite: raising the tax and applying it to more of the super-wealthy.

Currently, the estate tax doesn't touch the first $5.43 million of an individual’s assets and the first $10.86 million of couples’ assets. The tax kicks in after that amount, eventually rising to a top rate of 40 percent.  

Proponents of repeal make a number of claims to make their case. Let’s examine the most common.

1. The estate tax affects a significant portion of Americans. Only about 5,400 estates will pay any estate tax this year. That’s about 0.2% of all estates – that’s right, just two tenths of one percent.  That’s a fortieth of the 1970’s share. Americans worried about the Estate Tax have nothing to fear but fear itself. 
2. The estate tax hurts small farms and businesses. In fact, the estate tax touches virtually no small farms or businesses. The Urban-Brookings Tax Policy estimated how many farm and business estates worth under $5 million paid any tax in 2013. Twenty did. Twenty small farms and businesses paid any estate tax in 2013. And those 20 estates faced an average tax rate of 4.9%. Only 660 farm estates—of any size—paid the tax in 2013, and 100 of those farms had assets worth over $20 million. The USDA estimates that 0.6% of all farm estates owed federal estate tax in 2013. This is because families who farm for a living have access to generous deductions: up to $1 million for continuing to farm the land for the next 10 years and up to $500,000 for adopting conservation easements. They can also delay payment and lighten their tax liability by gifting their land to heirs. Small businesses have similarly generous carve-out.
3. Repealing the estate tax doesn't affect the budget, because it’s a small share of federal revenue. In 2014, the estate tax represented 0.6% of federal collections, or roughly $20 billion annually, according to the Joint Committee on Taxation. But part of the reason that’s so low is because Congress has increased the exemption and lowered the rate in recent years; in 2001, the top rate was 55% and the exemption was only $675,000. Still, even today, repealing the tax is costly. The JCT estimates that repeal would cost the government $269 billion over the next decade.
4. The estate tax represents double taxation. Well, maybe. It is true that people  pay taxes on their income when earned and then may have to pay again when they pass it on to their heirs.  However, because the super-wealthy keep much of their assets as unrealized capital gains (55% for those estates worth over $100 million), the estate tax is the only way, right now, to tax these capital gains. In that sense it can be viewed as a partial corrective within our funhouse of a tax system. Some capital gains, to be sure, are the fruits of hard work and entrepreneurial creativity but a lot are simply the result of gains among those wealthy enough to participate in speculative ventures. 

One thing is true: repeal would mean a large tax break for the wealthiest 0.2% of the population. The 1,336 families with estates worth more than $20 million would get almost three-fourths of the benefit from the repeal and enjoy an average windfall of $10 million each, according to the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. The 318 families with estates worth more than $50 million would see an average windfall of $20 million each.

These facts are often obscured by our penchant for individual stories. One Washington Post story for example, acknowledges many of the statistics above, but then goes on to give two examples of farmers who had to sell land to meet their tax burden, one of which is several decades old, when the exemption was much lower. Elected officials love these kinds of stories and tell them often. Are they unaware of the generous special provisions for this group?  Do they truly believe that very wealthy families are the ones we should be helping? Or are they thinking about who is going to finance their next campaign?

The estate tax is one of the most progressive aspects of our tax system. In a time of increasing inequality, it provides a way to counteract the formation of a “permanent ownership class.” If anything, we should consider raising the rate and lowering the exemption to pay down debt and invest in opportunities for the unlucky children at the bottom of the wealth ladder. We could start by closing the stepped-up basis loophole and raising the estate tax to Clinton-era levels. We could do so in a way that protects real farmers and small business owners. Wealthy heirs, meanwhile, will still do very well, much better than the rest of America. A serious estate tax would allow us to come closer to our national ideal, in which no child is born a prince, and every child can become as rich as a king.

Note: An earlier version of this post said that the estate tax only applies to assets in excess of the exemption, which is incorrect. The estate tax is levied on the entire estate but is offset by a credit equal to the tax on the first $5.43 million. This version is corrected.

Improving data in the field of workforce development is a necessary step to evaluating programs and replicating success. What does current data tell us about the populations served? What outcomes should we measure to ensure programs are meeting America’s workforce development needs?

Earlier this month, we convened an expert group of policy makers, practitioners and scholars to address this problem, along with other challenges in workforce development. Previously, we interviewed Kate Blosveren Kreamer on the need to strengthen bridges from school to work. Next up in our Q&A series is Beth Weigensberg, a researcher at Mathematica Policy Research.

A: Although there is increasingly more rigorous research to assess effectiveness of programs, I feel a missing piece is understanding how to replicate and scale-up effective strategies. Often times workforce development programs that are deemed effective in one place do not always succeed when implemented in another. Research that evaluates effectiveness of programs should assess the role of contextual factors (including organizational, leadership, community, and political factors) to identify what is needed to successfully implement, replicate, and scale successful programs.

A: The workforce development field has an unfortunate history of “creaming”—programs selectively work with individuals most likely to succeed at finding employment, leaving those “harder-to-serve” individuals struggling to find assistance. Individuals that are often considered “hard-to-serve” include those who are homeless, disabled, formerly incarcerated, older workers, non-English speakers, low-income, and youth who are disconnected from school and employment. Increasing efforts to focus on these “harder-to-serve” populations include specialized targeted programs and strategies to help address the complex needs of these individuals, which often extend beyond skill development and finding a job. These specialized programs often provide additional support services to help address their complex needs, which can serve as additional barriers to obtaining and retaining employment.

A: Intermediate measures of engagement and skill development would provide interim measures of progress, while the ultimate objectives are obviously employment and educational attainment. Ongoing evaluation on interim measures allows for earlier acknowledgment of achievement and identification of those struggling to progress. Assessing outcomes in ways that control for different populations or barriers to employment, such as using risk-adjusted methodologies, can help us evaluate workforce development programs in an equitable manner.

One of the biggest challenges in the field is ensuring we have valid and reliable data to accurately estimate outcomes. The data available to assess outcomes are usually limited by what is collected in management information systems, which are often developed to be responsive to reporting requirements of publically-funded programs. But these siloed data do not allow for comprehensive assessment of workforce development outcomes within a state, locality, or even within a community-based employment and training organization that relies on numerous funding sources. Efforts are needed to integrate data and assess standardized outcome measures across program and funding silos to allow for more comprehensive assessment of outcomes within the field.