Event Information

Register for the Event

The government and opposition in Georgia remain locked in political stalemate. The opposition continues to hold rallies and to call for President Saakashvili to step down, and the opposition and government thus far have found no common basis for moving forward. All this plays out against a backdrop of lingering tensions in relations between Georgia and Russia in the aftermath of the August 2008 conflict.

On June 17, the Center on the United States and Europe (CUSE) at Brookings hosted Irakli Alasania, former Georgian permanent representative to the United Nations and currently the head of the Alliance for Georgia opposition group, for a discussion on the political crisis in Georgia and the prospects for resolution. After a decade of important positions in the Georgian government, Ambassador Alasania resigned from his position at the United Nations in December 2008 and has since been actively involved in the Georgian opposition. Brookings senior fellow Carlos Pascual introduced Ambassador Alasania and moderated the discussion.

Audio

• The Political Crisis in Georgia: Prospects for Resolution

Transcript

• Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

• 20090617_georgia

      

Introduction

Guaranteeing the right to vote and to participate in public and political affairs for all citizens is an important responsibility. Given the precarious position that IDPs can find themselves in and considering the extent to which they may need to rely on national authorities for assistance, IDPs have a legitimate and a heightened interest in influencing the decisions that affect their lives by participating in elections.   

Internally displaced persons often exist on the margins of society and are subject to a number of vulnerabilities because of their displacement. For instance, IDPs face an immediate need for protection and assistance in finding adequate shelter, food, and health care. Over time, they can suffer discrimination in accessing public services and finding employment on account of being an IDP from another region or town. IDPs also face an especially high risk of losing ownership of their housing, property, and land, something which can lead to loss of livelihoods and economic security as well as physical security. Women and children, who often make up the majority of IDP populations, face an acute risk of sexual exploitation and abuse.  

In addition to influencing public policy, elections can also be about reconciliation and addressing divisions and inequities that exist within society. For these reasons and others, IDPs should be afforded an opportunity to fully participate in elections as voters and as candidates.   

As noted in a press release of the Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons following an official mission to Georgia in December 2005, 

“[IDP] participation in public life, including elections, needs promotion and support. Supporting internally displaced persons in their pursuit of a normal life does not exclude, but actually reinforces, the option of eventual return. … Well integrated people are more likely to be productive and contribute to society, which in turn gives them the strength to return once the time is right."[1]

---

[1] United Nations Press Release - U.N. Expert Voices Concern for Internally Displaced Persons in Georgia, 27 December 2005, available at http://www.brookings.edu/projects/idp/RSG-Press-Releases/20051227_georgiapr.aspx.

Downloads

• Download

      

Event Information

Since the Rose Revolution in November 2003, Georgia has grappled with the many challenges of building a modern, Western-oriented state, including implementing political and economic reforms, fighting corruption, and throwing off the vestiges of the Soviet legacy. On the path toward a functioning and reliable democracy, Georgia has pursued these domestic changes in an often difficult international environment, as evidenced by the Russia-Georgia conflict in 2008.

On March 17, the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings (CUSE) hosted President Mikheil Saakashvili to discuss Georgia’s approach to these challenges. A leader of Georgia’s 2003 Rose Revolution, Saakashvili was elected president of Georgia in January 2004 and reelected for a second term in January 2008.

Vice President Martin Indyk, director of Foreign Policy at Brookings, provided introductory remarks and Senior Fellow and CUSE Director Fiona Hill moderated the discussion. After the program, President Saakashvili took audience questions.

Video

• Georgia Is a Transformed Country
• Georgia Is a Valuable Asset to Europe
• The Key to Effective Change Is Youth

Audio

• From Popular Revolutions to Effective Reforms: The Georgian Experience

Transcript

• Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

• 20110317_saakashvili_transcript

      

Editor's Note: Launched at a December 5, 2011 event at Brookings, this study is based on a publication developed in 2005 by the Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement: Addressing Internal Displacement: A Framework for National Responsibility.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

It is a central tenet of international law that states bear the primary duty and responsibility to protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of persons within their borders, including the internally displaced. While internally displaced persons (IDPs) remain entitled to the full protection of rights and freedoms available to the population in general, they face vulnerabilities that nondisplaced persons do not face. Therefore, in order to ensure that IDPs are not deprived of their human rights and are treated equally with respect to nondisplaced citizens, states are obligated to provide special measures of protection and assistance to IDPs that correspond to their particular vulnerabilities. Reflecting these key notions of international law, the rights of IDPs and obligations of states are set forth in the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (hereafter, “the Guiding Principles”).

Using the Guiding Principles as a departure for analysis, this study examines government response to internal displacement in fifteen of the twenty countries most affected by internal displacement due to conflict, generalized violence and human rights violations: Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Georgia, Iraq, Kenya, Myanmar, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Turkey, Uganda and Yemen. The analysis seeks to shed light on how and to what extent, if any, governments are fulfilling their responsibility toward IDPs, with a view to providing guidance to governments in such efforts. In so doing, this study also seeks to contribute to research and understanding regarding realization of the emerging norm of the “Responsibility to Protect.” To frame the analysis, the introduction to this volume examines the connections among the concepts of national responsibility, “sovereignty as responsibility” and the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P).

The comparative analysis across the fifteen countries, presented in chapter 1, is based on a systematic application of the document Addressing Internal Displacement: A Framework for National Responsibility (hereafter, “Framework for National Responsibility,” “the Framework”). Seeking to distill the Guiding Principles, the Framework outlines twelve practical steps (“benchmarks”) that states can take to directly contribute to the prevention, mitigation and resolution of internal displacement:

1. Prevent displacement and minimize its adverse effects.
2. Raise national awareness of the problem.
3. Collect data on the number and conditions of IDPs.
4. Support training on the rights of IDPs.
5. Create a legal framework for upholding the rights of IDPs.
6. Develop a national policy on internal displacement.
7. Designate an institutional focal point on IDPs.
8. Support national human rights institutions to integrate internal displacement into their work.
9. Ensure the participation of IDPs in decision making.
10. Support durable solutions.
11. Allocate adequate resources to the problem.
12. Cooperate with the international community when national capacity is insufficient.

      

Editor's Note: This is the first part of a two piece series on internal displacement that originally appeared online in TerraNullius. The second part is available here.

The Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement recently released a study entitled "From Responsibility to Response: Assessing National Response to Internal Displacement." The study examined 15 out of the 20 countries with the highest number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) due to conflict, generalized violence and human rights violations—Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Georgia, Iraq, Kenya, Myanmar, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Turkey, Uganda and Yemen.

According to estimates, these 15 countries represent over 70 percent of the world’s 27.5 million conflict-induced IDPs. Wherever possible, we also tried to include government efforts to address internal displacement by natural disasters. But in this and the subsequent blog post, we will focus on our main general conclusions as well as particular issues around housing, land and property (HLP) rights that emerged from our analysis (see Part II of this posting).

The study looks at how governments have fared in terms of implementing 12 practical steps (“benchmarks”) to prevent and address internal displacement, as outlined in the 2005 Brookings publication entitled "Addressing Internal Displacement: A Framework for National Responsibility." The 12 benchmarks are as follows:

1. Prevent displacement and minimize its adverse effects.
2. Raise national awareness of the problem.
3. Collect data on the number and conditions of IDPs.
4. Support training on the rights of IDPs.
5. Create a legal framework for upholding the rights of IDPs.
6. Develop a national policy on internal displacement.
7. Designate an institutional focal point on IDPs.
8. Support national human rights institutions to integrate internal displacement into their work.
9. Ensure the participation of IDPs in decisionmaking.
10. Support durable solutions.
11. Allocate adequate resources to the problem.
12. Cooperate with the international community when national capacity is insufficient.

Stepping back from HLP issues (to be addressed in a subsequent set of comments in Part II of this guest posting), we drew several key observations on our overall findings.

The study found that political will was the main determining factor of response to internal displacement. Governments cannot always control the factors that cause displacement, or may themselves be responsible for displacement, but they can take measures to improve the lives and uphold the rights and freedoms of IDPs. Internal displacement due to con­flict derives from political issues, and all aspects of a government’s response to it therefore are affected by political considerations, including, for example, acknowledgment of displacement, registration and collection of data on IDPs, ensuring the participation of IDPs in decision-making, assistance and protection offered to different (temporal) caseloads of IDPs, support for durable solutions, which durable solutions are supported, and the facilitation of efforts by international organizations to provide protec­tion and assistance to IDPs.

While none of the governments surveyed was fully protecting and assisting IDPs, four stand out in particular—Colombia, Georgia, Kenya and Uganda—for implementing their responsibility toward IDPs while three others—Central African Republic, Myanmar and Yemen—had particular difficulties in fulfilling their responsibilities toward IDPs. In Myanmar, the obstacles were primarily political while in Yemen and the Central African Republic, as in many of the countries surveyed, the limitations appear to arise primarily from inadequate government capacity.

The other eight countries were somewhere in between. For example, some, such as Nepal, have demonstrated a significant commitment at one particular point in time but have failed to follow through. Others, such as Sri Lanka, have at times demonstrated blatant disregard for their responsibility and have moved swiftly to try to bring an end to displacement. Sudan, Pakistan, and to a certain extent, Turkey, have very problematic records with respect to preventing displacement in one part of the country yet have supported efforts to bring an end to displacement in others. In some cases, such as Afghanistan and Yemen, the continuing conflict and the role of nonstate actors (and in Afghanistan, the presence of foreign militaries as well) have made it difficult for the government to respond effectively to internal displacement.

Prevention of internal displacement is paramount, but is probably the most difficult measure to take and the least likely to be taken in the countries as­sessed, which all had large IDP populations. Given the scale of displacement in the fifteen countries surveyed, it was to be expected that these governments would not have been suc­cessful in preventing displacement. Nearly half of the fifteen countries assessed had adopted some preventive measures on paper, but all fifteen have fallen short of actually prevent­ing displacement in practice.

Moreover, many national authorities themselves have been or are perpetrators of violence or human rights abuses that have led to displacement, and many states foster a culture of impunity for alleged perpetrators of serious human rights violations. Further, the presence of foreign military forces and/or non-state armed actors limits the abil­ity of many states to exercise full sovereignty over their territory and therefore to prevent the conditions that drive people into displacement. Some countries have taken steps to prevent dis­placement due to natural disasters or develop­ment but not due to conflict, indicating that the former is perhaps less politically taboo and/or practically less difficult to implement than the latter.

Sustained political attention by the highest authorities is a necessary, though not suffi­cient, condition for taking responsibility for IDPs. Nearly all of the governments surveyed, at least at some point, have exercised their responsibility to IDPs by acknowledging the existence of internal displacement and their responsibility to address it as a national prior­ity, for example, by drawing attention to IDPs’ plight. However, government efforts to raise awareness of internal displacement through public statements was not always a useful indicator of a government’s commitment to upholding the fundamental human rights and freedoms of IDPs.

Among the five countries with laws on or related to internal displacement, there were notable limitations to the scope of the laws and gaps in implementing them. Legislation was quite comprehensive in scope in at least two cases and was narrow in others, address­ing specific rights of IDPs or a phase of dis­placement. Other countries lacked a national legislative framework on IDPs but had generic legislation relevant to IDPs. Still others had laws that violated or could violate the rights of IDPs. Laws on internal displacement must be viewed in the context of other legislation and administrative acts applicable to the general population (e.g., those related to documenta­tion, residency, housing, land and property, and personal status), which this study reviews to the extent possible, particularly in the case studies on Georgia, Kenya, Afghanistan and Sri Lanka. In Africa, the region with the most IDPs, states have recognized in legally binding instruments the importance of addressing internal displace­ment by incorporating the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement into domestic legisla­tion and policy.

Many of the governments surveyed have adopted policies or action plans to respond to the needs of IDPs, but adequate implementa­tion and dissemination were largely lacking. Nine of the countries surveyed had developed a specific policy, strategy or plan on internal displacement, implemented to varying degrees; those in six of these countries were still active at the time of writing. In addition, at least two countries had national policies in draft form, and one country that does not recognize conflict-induced displacement had a plan for mitigating displacement by cyclones and a plan on disaster risk reduction, although it did not discuss displacement. While in some cases positive steps had been taken, by and large im­plementation of policies on internal displace­ment remains a challenge and has, in some cases, stalled. Available information indicates that efforts to raise awareness of IDP issues and policies have largely been inadequate.

It is difficult to assess governments’ com­mitment of financial resources to address internal displacement, but some trends were identified. Addressing internal displacement, especially over time, is a costly venture. While it was difficult to obtain a full picture of a coun­try’s expenditure on IDPs, several countries allocated funds to assist IDPs, including a few that had no national laws or policies on IDPs. In at least two countries, funds for assisting IDPs seemed to diminish in recent years. In many countries, difficulties arise at the district or municipal levels, where local authorities bear significant responsibility for addressing internal displacement but face many obstacles, including insufficient funds, to doing so. Allegations of corruption and misallocation of funds intended to benefit IDPs at certain points has been observed in some of the countries as­sessed. Some countries seem to rely on inter­national assistance to IDPs rather than national funds.

National human rights institutions (NHRIs) contribute invaluably to improving national responses to internal displacement in a number of countries. In recent years, an increasing number of NHRIs around the world have begun to integrate attention to internal displacement into their work. NHRIs have played an impor­tant role in raising awareness of internal dis­placement, monitoring displacement situations and returns, investigating individual complaints, advocating for and advising the government on the drafting of national policies to address inter­nal displacement, and monitoring and reporting on the implementation of national policies and legislation. In particular, the NHRIs of six of the countries surveyed stand out for their efforts to promote the rights of IDPs in their countries. Interestingly, almost all of their work with IDPs is funded by international sources, raising the question of whether national governments themselves should not be doing more to increase their funding of NHRIs in order to support their engagement with IDP issues.

International actors are valuable resources for efforts aiming to improve government response to IDPs. In many cases, the past Representatives of the UN Secretary-General (RSGs) mandated to study the issue of internal displacement (Francis Deng and his successor Walter Kälin) and the current UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons (Chaloka Beyani) had exercised significant influence on governments in encouraging and supporting action on behalf of IDPs. Along with these actors, UNHCR and the Brookings Project on Internal Displacement have provided technical assis­tance to support governments’ efforts to de­velop national legal frameworks to ensure IDPs’ access to their rights.

Durable solutions: Return was the durable solution most often supported by the govern­ments assessed. The Framework for National Responsibility identifies three durable solu­tions—return, local integration and settlement elsewhere in the country. However, the fifteen countries surveyed herein reflect a global ten­dency to emphasize return, often excluding the other durable solutions. Yet for solutions to be voluntary, IDPs must be able to choose among them, and local integration or settlement else­where in the country may in fact be some IDPs’ preferred solution. Especially in situations of protracted displacement, those may be the only feasible solutions, at least in the near future.

The most difficult benchmarks to analyze were those whose underlying concepts are very broad and those for which data was seemingly not publicly available. Chief among these were the benchmarks on preventing internal displacement (Benchmark 1), raising national awareness (Benchmark 2), promoting the participation of IDPs in decisionmaking (Benchmark 9), and allocating adequate resources (Benchmark 11). Analysis on all other benchmarks also faced data constraints as in many cases data were outdated or incomplete or simply were not available. Nonetheless, we found that the twelve benchmarks all directed attention to important issues in governments’ responses to internal displacement.

We also found that while protection is central to the Framework, the issue is of such importance that there should be a benchmark explicitly focused on it—and specifically on protection as physical security, provided to IDPs during all phases of displacement. This benchmark would also underscore the responsibility of governments to protect the security of humanitarian workers engaged with IDPs.

Overall, the study found that the Framework for National Responsibility is a valuable tool for analyzing government efforts to prevent dis­placement, to respond to IDPs’ needs for protection and assistance and to support durable solutions. But this study also reveals certain limitations to using the Framework as an assessment tool, particularly in terms of accounting for the responsibility of nonstate actors; accounting for national responsibility for protection, particularly during displacement; and accounting for causes of displacement other than conflict, violence and human rights violations.

       

Editor's Note: This is the second part of a two piece series on internal displacement that originally appeared online in TerraNullius. The first part is available here.
 
This post continues our discussion of the study entitled "From Responsibility to Response: Assessing National Response to Internal Displacement" recently released by the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement.

Addressing housing, land, and property (HLP) issues is a key component of national responsibility. Principle 29 of the non-binding but widely accepted Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement emphasizes that competent authorities have a duty to assist IDPs to recover their property and possessions or, when recovery is not possible, to obtain appropriate compensation or another form of just reparation.

The 2005 Framework for National Responsibility – which set the benchmarks we applied in our current study – reaffirms this responsibility (in Benchmark 10, “support durable solutions”) and flags a number of the challenges that often arise, such as IDPs’ lack of formal title or other documentary evidence of land and property ownership; the destruction of any such records due to conflict or natural disaster; and discrimination against women in laws and customs regulating property ownership and inheritance. The Framework for National Responsibility stresses that, “Government authorities should anticipate these problems and address them in line with international human rights standards and in an equitable and non-discriminatory manner.”

The extent to which a government has safeguarded HLP rights, including by assisting IDPs to recover their housing, land, and property thus was among the indicators by which we evaluated the efforts of each of the 15 governments examined in our study. Our findings emphasized the importance of both an adequate legal and policy framework for addressing displacement related HLP issues and the role that bodies charged with adjudication and monitoring can play in ensuring implementation.

HLP Law and Policy Frameworks

One of the most encouraging signs of governments taking seriously their responsibility to address internal displacement has been the development, adoption and implementation in all regions of the world of specific laws and policies that respect the rights of IDPs. Some of the countries surveyed have developed laws, decrees, orders, and policies that protect IDPs’ HLP rights, but these measures are also not without their limits and challenges. A few examples are presented below.

In Colombia, while Law 387 on Internal Displacement (1997) stipulates the right of IDPs to compensation and restitution (Article 10), the government has been hard-pressed to establish measures enabling them to realize that right (see further, below). In Colombia, the constitutional complaint process – the acción de tutela petition procedure – has made the government accountable to IDPs and has influenced government policy toward IDPs, including the policy of allocation of government assistance such as housing subsidies.

In Georgia, the legal framework for IDP protection includes a property restitution law for IDPs from South Ossetia, adopted in 2007, which provided for the establishment of a Commission on Restitution and Compensation; however, this body never became operational and the status of the law is unclear following the August 2008 conflict. The State Strategy on IDPs, also adopted in 2007, protects IDPs against “arbitrary/illegitimate eviction” and sets out a large-scale program for improving the living conditions of IDPs in their place of displacement, all the while reaffirming their right to property restitution.[1]

Displaced families whose homes were destroyed or damaged during the August 2008 received $15,000 from the government to rebuild their homes, although many IDPs have held off reconstruction efforts due to concerns about insecurity. The RSG on IDPs recommended in 2009 the established of a comprehensive mechanism for resolving HLP claims for both the South Ossetia and Abkhazia conflicts. In addition, in 2010, Georgia adopted procedures for vacating and reallocating IDP housing, which, among other things, addresses those cases in which removal of IDPs from a collective center is ordered by the government and may require an eviction, and spells out safeguards for guaranteeing the right of IDPs.[2]

Iraq’s 2005 Constitution protects Iraqis against forced displacement (Article 44(2)). Through its Property Claims Commission, formerly the Commission on the Resolution of Real Property Disputes established by Order No. 2 (2006), Iraq has sought to recover property seized between 1968 and 2003, although significant gaps and challenges remain. For those internally displaced between 2006 and 2008, Prime Ministerial Order 101 (2008) sets out a framework for providing property restitution for registered IDPs with a view to encouraging and facilitating their return to Baghdad governorate, the origin of the majority of post-2006 IDPs and the location of the majority of post-2006 returnees. However, there have been few claims; many IDPs lack the necessary documentation, do not trust government institutions, fear retribution or cannot afford the requisite costs.[3]

In Afghanistan, where national authorities have not yet defined “internally displaced persons,” property and land rights of IDPs are either specifically addressed or generally implicated in substantive and procedural provisions found in a series of executive acts that have been issued since 2001, including the most IDP-specific of them, Presidential Decree No. 104 on Land Distribution for Settlement to Eligible Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons (2005). This decree sets forth a basic framework for distributing government land to both IDPs and returnees as a means of addressing their housing needs. However, IDPs seeking access to land are required to provide their national identity cards (tazkera) and documentation proving their internal displacement status—documentation which they may have lost. Moreover, the decree does not recognize other fundamental rights or needs of the internally displaced; it is valid only in areas of origin; and its implementation has been marred by inefficiency and corruption within the very weak ministry that is tasked with its implementation.

Although the 2006 peace agreement in Nepal  included a commitment to return occupied land and property and to allow for the return of displaced persons, four years after the peace agreement (and three years after the adoption of a national policy), between 50,000 and 70,000 people remained displaced.  Nearly half of the returnees interviewed by the Nepal IDP Working Group reported serious land, housing and property problems.  Of the more than 10,000 claims for compensation for property filed in 2007 only 2,000 families had received support to reconstruct or repair their houses by 2009.  It is widely reported that IDPs with non-Maoist political affiliations have been the least likely to recover land and property.

In Turkey, the government has yet to take full responsibility for displacement caused by its security forces against a largely Kurdish population. In its Law 5233 on Compensation of Damages That Occurred Due to Terror and the Fight against Terror (27 July 2004) and its Return to Village and Rehabilitation Program, displacement is defined in terms of “terrorism” or the “fight” against it. This law does not specifically focus on internal displacement, but it does benefit IDPs among other affected populations. Law 5233 and its related amendments and regulations compensate for “material damages suffered by persons due to terrorist acts or activities undertaken during the fight against terror” between 1987 and 2004. Compensation is provided for three types of damage: loss of property; physical injuries, disabilities, medical treatment, death and funerals; and inability to access property due to measures taken during “the fight against terrorism.”

According to the law, compensation is to be determined by damage assessment commissions (DACs) at the provincial level, with funding provided by the Ministry of the Interior. From 2004 to August 2009, the commissions received just over 360,000 applications. Of those, over 190,000 claims were decided: 120,000 were approved and the claimants awarded compensation; the remaining 70,000 were denied. Around $1.4 billion in compensation was awarded, of which close to $1.1 billion has been paid.[4] The existing legal and policy framework do not adequately address the obstacles to return, including the village guard system, insecurity and the presence of landmines and unexploded ordnance.

In Kenya, the government’s promotion of return included a National Humanitarian Emergency Fund for Mitigation and Resettlement of Victims of 2007 Post-Election Violence which was to meet the full costs of resettlement of IDPs, including reconstruction of basic housing, replacement of household effects and rehabilitation of infrastructure. But in practice, the government has been criticized for promoting return before conditions were safe. The government has also tended to focus on IDPs who own land and to attach durable solutions to land; there is no clear strategy for dealing with landless IDPs, such as squatters and non-farmers.

Awareness among IDPs as to their housing, land, and property rights under existing law – where there is law addressing those rights – is inadequate in many instances. For example, in Turkey, about half of IDPs surveyed in 2006 were not aware of their entitlements under the Return to Village and Rehabilitation Program or the Law on Compensation. [5]

National Human Rights Institutions and Constitutional Courts

In some cases, national human rights institutions (NHRIs) and constitutional courts have a critically important role to play in supporting as well as in holding governments accountable to guarantee the rights of IDPs. In a number of the countries our study examined, the work of NHRIs on internal displacement has included a focus on HLP issues.

In Georgia, for example, the Public Defender has been actively monitoring and reporting on the country-wide housing program begun in 2009 and has raised concerns about evictions of IDPs and the quality of housing in relocation sites. The Public Defender’s office also has undertaken a study on the conditions of the hidden majority of IDPs living in private accommodation rather than in collective centers.

The Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission has reported on and raised concerns about the large number of IDPs living in urban slums and informal settlements and about the fact that many IDPs were unable to return to their homes due to disputes over land and property.

Constitutional courts have in some instances played a role in strengthening the national legal framework for protecting the property rights of IDPs. Notably, Colombia’s activist Constitutional Court, in its Decision T-821 in October 2007, ordered the government to ensure respect for IDPs’ right to reparation and property restitution. In January 2009, the Constitutional Court ordered the government to comprehensively address land rights issues and to establish mechanisms to prevent future violations.

Subsequently, the government has sought to ensure these rights by adopting in 2011 the historic and ambitious Law 1448, known as the Victims and Land Restitution Law. In this law, government acknowledges for the first time ever the existence of an internal armed conflict in Colombia, and recognizes as “victims” those individuals or communities whose rights were violated under international humanitarian law or international human rights law. The law regulates reparations for all victims of the armed conflict since 1985 – numbering over 5 million – including through land restitution or compensation for IDPs which is to occur over the next decade.

However, restitution of land does not guarantee returnees’ security and may even endanger people given that land disputes and seizures remain a driving force of displacement. Aiming to prevent further victimization of returnees as a result of insecurity and violence, the government established a new security body, the Integrated Center of Intelligence for Land Restitution (Centro Integrado de Inteligencia para la Restitución de Tierras, also known as CI2-RT) within the Ministry of Defense. Additional participants include the Office of the Vice President, the Ministry of Justice and Interior, the Department of Administrative Security (DAS), Social Action (Acción Social), Incoder, and organizations representing victims of violence. Time will tell how successful the implementation of this ambitious law will be.

In Georgia, the Constitutional Court has also played an important role by recognizing the rights of IDPs to purchase property without losing their IDP status or in any way jeopardizing their right to return.

Conclusion

Securing HLP rights for IDPs is, of course, a key component of finding durable solutions to displacement. The study found that land and property disputes are almost always sources or manifestations of lingering conflict and often an obstacle to IDPs’ free exercise of their right to return.  While some governments have made efforts to provide mechanisms for property restitution or compensation, those mechanisms have rarely been adequate to deal—at least in a timely manner—with the scale and complexity of the problem. National human rights institutions and constitutional courts can play a key role in holding governments accountable for HLP and other rights and freedoms of IDPs.

---

[1] Government of Georgia, State Strategy for Internally Displaced Persons–Persecuted Persons, Chapter V.

[2] The Standard Operating Procedures for Vacation and Reallocation of IDPs for Durable Housing Solutions (2010) (www.mra.gov.ge)

[3] IDMC, Iraq: Little New Displacement but around 2.8 Million Iraqis Remain Internally Displaced: A Profile of the Internal Displacement Situation, 4 March, 2010, p. 240 (www.internal-displacement.org)

[4] IDMC, Turkey: Need for Continued Improvement in Response to Protracted Displacement: A Profile of the Internal Displacement Situation, 26 October 2009, p. 12, citing correspondence with the government of Turkey, 17 September 2009 (www.internal-displacement.org)

[5] Hacettepe University, Institute of Population Studies, "Findings of the Turkey Migration and Internally Displaced Population Survey," press release, 6 December 2006, cited in IDMC, Turkey: Need for Continued Improvement in Response to Protracted Displacement: A Profile of the Internal Displacement Situation, 26 October 2009, p. 11 (www.internal-displacement.org)

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

Americans often think of our country as being one of great opportunity – where anyone can rise from very modest circumstances, if they work hard and make good choices. We believe that often remains true.

But, for children and youth growing up in poverty, such upward mobility in America is too rare. Indeed, just 30 percent of those growing up in poverty make it to middle class or higher as adults. Though we’ve made progress in reducing poverty over the past several decades, our poverty rates are still too high and our rate of economic advancement for poor children has been stuck for decades. That is an embarrassment for a nation that prides itself on everyone having a shot at the American Dream.

What can we do to reduce poverty and increase economic mobility? In our polarized and poisoned political atmosphere, it is hard to reach consensus on policy efforts. Both progressives and conservatives want lower poverty; but progressives want more public spending programs to improve opportunity and security for the poor, while conservatives generally argue for more responsibility from them before providing more help.

Even so, progressives and conservatives might not be as far apart as these stereotypes suggest. The two of us—one a conservative Republican and the other a progressive Democrat—were recently part of an ideologically balanced group of 15 scholars brought together by the American Enterprise Institute and the Brookings Institution. Our charge was to generate a report with policy proposals to reduce poverty and increase upward mobility. An additional goal was simply to see whether we could arrive at consensus among ourselves, and bridge the ideological divide that has so paralyzed our political leaders.

Together we decided that the most important issues facing poor Americans and their children are family, education and work. We had to listen to each other’s perspectives on these issues, and be open to others’ truths. We also agreed to be mindful of the research evidence on these topics. In the end, we managed to generate a set of policy proposals we all find compelling.

To begin with, the progressives among us had to acknowledge that marriage is a positive family outcome that reduces poverty and raises upward mobility in America. The evidence is clear: stable two-parent families have positive impacts on children’s success, and in America marriage is the strongest predictor of such stability. Therefore marriage should be promoted as the norm in America, along with responsible and delayed child-bearing.

At the same time, the conservatives among us had to acknowledge that investing more resources in the skills and employability of poor adults and children is crucial if we want them to have higher incomes over time. Indeed, stable families are hard to maintain when the parents – including both the custodial mothers and the (often) non-custodial fathers – struggle to maintain employment and earn enough to support their families. Investing in proven, cost-effective, education and training programs such as high-quality preschool and training for jobs in high-growth economic sectors can improve the skills and employability of kids from poor families and lift them out of poverty through work.

Another important compromise was that progressives acknowledged that expecting and even requiring adults on public assistance to work can reduce poverty, as we learned in the 1990s from welfare reform; programs today like Disability Insurance, among others, need reforms to encourage more work. And reforms that encourage innovation and accountability would make our public education programs for the poor more effective at all levels. We need more choice in public K-12 education (through charter schools) and a stronger emphasis on developing and retaining effective teachers, while basing our state subsidies to higher education institutions more heavily on graduation rates, employment, and earnings of their graduates.

Conservatives also had to acknowledge that requiring the poor to work only makes sense when work is available to them. In periods or places with weak labor markets, we might need to create jobs for some by subsidizing their employment in either the private or public sector (as we did during the Great Recession). We agreed that no one should be dropped from the benefit rolls unless they have been offered a suitable work activity and rejected it. And we also need to “make work pay” for those who remain unskilled or can find only low-wage jobs – by expanding the Earned Income Tax Credit (especially for adults without custody of children) and modestly raising the minimum wage.

We also all agreed on other topics. For instance, work-based learning—in the form of paid apprenticeships and other models of high-quality career and technical education—can play an important role in raising both skills and work experience among poor youth and adults.  And, if we raise public spending for the poor, we need to pay for it—and not increase federal deficits. We all agree that reducing certain tax deductions for high-income families and making our retirement programs more progressive are good ways to finance our proposals.

As our report demonstrates, it is possible for progressives and conservatives to bridge their differences and reach compromises to generate a set of policies that will reduce poverty and improve upward mobility. Can Congress and the President do the same?

Editor's Note: this piece first appeared in Inside Sources.

Downloads

• Explore the full report

      

As the income inequality discussion continues to simmer across the country, municipal minimum wage ordinances have become hot topics of conversation in many cities. In January 2016, Seattle will implement its second step-up in the local minimum wage in 9 months, reaching $13 for many employers in the city and edging closer to a $15 an hour minimum that will apply to most firms by 2019. San Francisco will reach a $15 an hour minimum by July 2018. Yet cities as diverse as Birmingham, Chicago, Los Angeles, and Louisville have enacted or proposed similar minimum wage laws. It is too early to discern true impact of these local wage ordinances, but speculation abounds regarding whether or how the higher wage will affect firms and the earnings of low-wage workers.

Less prominent in debate and discussion about the minimum wage is the potential impact that higher minimum wage rates may have for nonprofit organizations. Nonprofits perform many critical functions in our communities—often serving the most at-risk and disadvantaged. Yet, fiscal constraints often place a low ceiling on what many nonprofits can pay frontline staff. As a result, many different types of nonprofit organizations—child care centers, home health care organizations, senior care providers—pay staff at rates near or below the targets set by the recent crop of local minimum wage laws. Our popular image of a minimum wage worker is the teen-age cashier at a drive-through window or the sales clerk at a retail store in the local strip mall, but many workers in these “helping professions” are being paid low wages.

Increases in the minimum wage are occurring at the same time that many nonprofit service organizations are confronted with fixed or declining revenue streams. Facing fiscal pressure, nonprofit service organizations may pursue one or more coping strategies. In addition to reductions in staffing or hours, commonly expected responses, nonprofits may cut back services offered, scale back service areas, or favor clients that can afford higher fees.

Such responses could reduce the amount and quality of the services provided to vulnerable populations. For example, elderly populations on fixed incomes may have fewer options for home care. Working poor parents may find higher child care costs prohibitively expensive. Employment service organizations may find it harder to place hard-to-serve jobseekers in jobs due to more competitive applicant pools.

At the same time, higher minimum wages could have positive consequences for nonprofit staffing and capacity. Higher wages could reduce employee turnover and increase staff morale and productivity. Organizations may not have to grapple with the contradiction of serving low-income persons, but paying modest wages.

The most recent set of wage ordinances take cities to unknown territory. Anticipating potential negative effects, Chicago has exempted individuals in subsidized employment programs from its recent minimum wage ordinance. The city of Seattle has set aside funds to help nonprofits meet the higher local minimum wage, but many nonprofit funding streams are beyond the city’s control and are not seeing similar adjustments.

In the coming years, more research on how local nonprofits are affected by local minimum wage laws needs to occur. We should expect there to be a mix of positive and negative effects within a particular nonprofit organization and across different types of organizations. Nonprofit organizations should be engaged as stakeholders in debates around higher local minimum wages. And, nonprofits should actively engage in research efforts to document the impact of higher wages. In particular, nonprofits should work to compile data that can compare staffing, service delivery, and program outcomes before and after wage laws phase-in. Such data could provide important insight into the impact of local wage ordinances.

We also should be careful not to confuse other challenges confronting the nonprofit sector with the impact of higher minimum wages. For example, private philanthropy to human service nonprofits has failed to keep up with rising need and declining public sector revenue streams in most communities—realities that may pose more serious challenges than minimum wage laws, but ones without an obvious scapegoat.

In the end, ongoing debate around local minimum wage ordinances should provide us with the opportunity to re-examine how we support community-based nonprofits as a society and assess whether that support fits with all that we expect the nonprofit sector to accomplish for children and families in our communities. 

      

The mayoral election in Baltimore has brought local economic development strategies to the forefront. In a city in which inequality—by income, by race, and between neighborhoods—has increased in the past five years, the candidates have made it clear that more action must be taken to close disparities and improve economic outcomes for all residents. In a podcast segment, I commend the much-needed focus on equity but argue that the mayoral candidates should not lose sight of another critical piece of the equity equation: economic growth. Citing lessons from my recent paper, I outline strategies that Baltimore’s presumptive leaders should pursue—as well as several they should abandon—to place the city’s residents on the path to a more prosperous, equitable future.

Listen to the full podcast segment here: 

       

       

Editor's Note: This blog post is part of The Primaries Project series, where veteran political journalists Jill Lawrence and Walter Shapiro, along with scholars in Governance Studies and the Campaign Finance Institute, examine the congressional primaries and ask what they reveal about the future of each political party and the future of American politics.

A great deal of attention has been paid to the existence of independent expenditure groups and to the billionaires who fund them. The Koch brothers and Sheldon Adelson, right wing billionaires in politics, and Tom Steyer, the newest left wing billionaire in politics, seem to have had nearly as much ink spilled on them as have the candidates and causes they endorse.  And no wonder. Americans are fascinated and worried about the question Darrell West poses in the second chapter of his new book Billionaires, “Can rich dudes buy an election?”

Tracking the sources and amounts of money in post Citizens United elections is a full time and complex job. Our hats go off to the Campaign Finance Institute who has recently completed the most extensive study ever of the role of independent expenditures in primary elections. Michael Malbin, Founding Director of the Center and author of the upcoming report on this year’s primaries, shows us just how big these groups, often funded by billionaires, have gotten.  In research focusing on independent spending in the 2014 congressional primaries, Malbin points out that in the 15 House races with the most independent expenditure money ($500,000 +) these expenditures counted for 76% as much as the candidates own campaign money. In Senate races, the independent expenditures accounted for 44% as much as the candidates own money.  Even the candidates themselves are worried about this trend since it often seems that outside groups can swamp a candidate’s own message.

Malbin also shows us why it is so hard to figure out what’s going on in an individual election. Only 49 of the 281 organizations that were around in the 2012 cycle spending money on behalf of congressional primary candidates were also around in 2014. That means that there were 232 new and different groups playing in 2014, posing challenges for the journalists and academics trying to track them.

The Campaign Finance Institute, however, has data on all these organizations from 2012 and 2014.  They have categorized them by ideology and, as the following chart shows, there are some interesting developments. For instance, while conservative independent expenditure groups remain the biggest spenders in the 2014 congressional primaries, their overall proportion of independent expenditures is down from 2012.  That year, conservative groups spent $40.5 million, nearly three quarters of total independent expenditures, compared to $9.3 million or 17 percent of total expenditures for Democrats.  In 2014, conservative groups upped their spending to $56.8 million, but their overall share of independent expenditures fell to 68% as liberal groups doubled their spending and increased their percentage of the total to 23%.

Even more surprising is the change in spending patterns within the Republican Party. As the following table shows, this really was the year when the establishment fought back. In 2012 anti-establishment spending by independent expenditure groups in congressional primaries constituted 59% of all such expenditures while spending by independent expenditure groups on behalf of establishment Republicans was only 36% of the total.  In two years, those numbers flipped.  In 2014, with control of the Senate at stake, the establishment mobilized independent expenditure groups which spent 55% of all the money spent by such groups while the anti-establishment groups spent only 37%.

 

There’s something for everyone in these findings. For the Democrats who have been on the defensive for much of this year but who have gotten through a primary season with few internal divisions, the increase in spending on their behalf and the sense that they will be able to run a good ground game in the key states where it really counts is a plus.

For the Republicans, the heavy spending by establishment groups has paid off in that they haven’t let weak candidates slip into the general election contest. They are probably as strong as they can be going into the fall campaign.

Nonetheless, tracking the money in this new election environment is a complex and full time job. And Darrell West’s question still hangs over us—“Can rich dudes buy an election?”

      

It is no secret that American elections are getting wildly expensive. If you are unlucky enough to live in a swing state or a state with a competitive race for US House, US Senate or Governor, you know that every even numbered year means frequent phone calls, a barrage of campaign mail, and endless television ads. Candidates want your vote, and sometimes it seems their strategy is to annoy the average voter into turning out to the polls.

However, beyond direct candidate appeals, outside groups are now spending heavily on competitive races of all types. Many statewide campaigns now cost tens of millions of dollars, and interest groups, PACs, and other organizations are ponying up with substantial sums to try to reach voters and do one of two things. They either try to convince you one candidate deserves your vote or dissuade you from voting for the other candidate.

How much money is flowing into races beyond what candidates themselves spend? The answer is staggering. Below we profile the 20 most expensive Senate races since 2010 in terms of independent expenditures. The chart shows not only how expensive races are, but the extent to which outside groups seek to influence electoral outcomes.  

This chart shows that races are getting more expensive. Among these races, only two (Colorado and Pennsylvania) are from 2010. Half (10) of the races are being waged this cycle, and even though data are updated through Sunday, the totals are certain to rise. Those ten races alone have totaled over $435 million in spending in those states.

The totals provide a small picture into the magnitude of money in American politics. The totals exclude direct candidate spending and spending by other, outside groups not subject to as rigorous FEC disclosure requirements.

As campaigns continue to become more expensive and outside groups see participation in elections as a path toward influencing outcomes of both races and policy, there is one political certainty: over the next two to four years, many of the campaigns on this list will be displaced by future, more expensive campaigns for the Senate.

      

Editor’s Note: This post was originally published by the Institute of Governmental Studies. Thomas Mann is also Resident Scholar at IGS.

Donald Trump and the Amen chorus of Republican presidential aspirants may have appeared to monopolize the capacity to make fantastical claims about what’s wrong with America and how to fix it. But a rival has appeared on the scene, outlining a very different fantasy plan to run for president on the Democratic side of the aisle.

Harvard law professor Lawrence Lessig looks meek—a dead ringer for Mr. Peepers—yet is anything but. Lessig built an impressive career in legal scholarship on the regulation of cyberspace, and the mild-mannered, soft-spoken academic became a cult hero among libertarians fearful of increasing legal restrictions on copyright, trademark and the electromagnetic spectrum. But Lessig’s transformation into a political activist was spurred by his personal revelation that money in politics is the root of all our governing problems. Eliminate the dependence of elected officials on private donors and the formidable obstacles to constructive policymaking will crumble. Simple but searing truth, or a caricature of a complex governing system shaped by institutions, ideas/ideologies, and interests?

Lessig became a whirlwind of energy and organization to promote his new values and beliefs, leading efforts to “Change Congress,” convene a second constitutional convention, raise awareness of corruption in politics through the “New Hampshire Rebellion,” and start the “Mayday PAC,” a super PAC designed to end all super PACs. He wrote the bestselling book Republic, Lost: How Money Corrupts Congress—and A Plan to Stop It, delivered a series of popular TED talks, and tirelessly traveled the country with his PowerPoint.

With none of these enterprises yet bearing fruit, Lessig has decided to raise the stakes. He has announced that if he receives $1 million from small donors by September, he will seek the Democratic presidential nomination, running as a “referendum candidate.” His single-issue platform, built around the concept of “Citizen Equality,” consists of “true” campaign finance reform supplemented by electoral reform (to weaken the influence of gerrymandering) and voting rights. His goal is to use the election to build a mandate for political reform that will cure our democratic ills. Lessig will apparently have nothing to say about anything other than political reform, insisting that his issue should be and can be the number one priority of voters in the 2016 elections. If nominated and elected, President Lessig will serve in office only long enough to enact the Citizen Equality Act and then resign, turning over the powers and responsibilities of the office to the vice president. Recently he generously informed the Vice President that he would happily enable a third Joe Biden term by selecting him as his running mate.

The hubris of the Harvard Professor is breathtaking. In virtually every respect, his strategy is absurd. Lessig’s political reform agenda is stymied by Republicans, not Democrats. Why not direct his energies where the opposition resides? All of the current Democratic presidential candidates support the thrust of these reforms. But saying that this is their highest priority is likely to harm, not boost, their candidacies. Why would even the most ardent supporter of the three pillars of Lessig’s reform agenda cast a ballot solely on this basis? Big and important issues divide the two parties today and the stakes of public action or inaction are huge. We don’t have the luxury of using the election to try to build a mandate for a set of political reforms that would have no chance of passing in the face of GOP opposition and would be of only incremental utility if they did.

Campaign finance does play a corrosive role in our democracy and I have invested much of my career grappling with it. There is no doubt that money in elections facilitates the transfer of economic inequality into political inequality, and the spectacle of several hundred plutocrats dominating the finance of our elections should be a target of serious reform efforts in the courts and the Congress. At the same time it is foolish to imagine that campaign finance is the only route for private wealth to influence public policy or that its reform will dramatically transform the policy process. Money did not prevent the major legislative enactments of 2009-2010—including the stimulus, student loans, the Affordable Care Act, and financial services reform. Nor is it likely to be the critical factor on climate change, immigration, infrastructure or jobs and wages; which party wins the White House and whether control with Congress is unified or divided is key. If anything, the Lessig campaign is likely to weaken the forces for political reform by demonstrating just how small the relative priority for this action is.

Trump offers the country his outsider status, success in building his personal wealth, an outsized personality, a brashness in asserting how easily he can solve the country’s problems, and a hearty appetite for and skill in stoking the anger and fears of a segment of the country. He feeds the notion that a strong, fearless, wily leader, inexperienced and mostly uninformed in politics and governing, can be the man on a white horse saving a great country losing its exceptional status. His claim that all politicians are bought by private interests—a claim Lessig eagerly embraces—fits well with his grandiose claims that he alone can fix what ails the country. A significant segment of Republican voters, presumably not well versed in the American constitutional system are attracted to him, at least enough for him to be a factor in this election campaign.

Lessig is a far less commanding presence but his ambition burns no less than that of Trump. The notoriety, celebrity, and adoring audiences are heady stuff, even if on a much smaller scale. Lessig told Bloomberg that Trump’s candidacy is evidence that his reform message is taking hold. Lessig said, Trump “strikes people as credible when he says all these people (politicians) are bought—I used to buy them …Trump is saying the truth.” Lessig will be a minor figure in this election and the causes for which he fights are unlikely to advance from it. Both Lessig and Trump, despite their differences in visibility and importance in the election, will have contributed to the dumbing down of American politics, a reality that will bring tears to the eyes of civics teachers and political science professors across the country.

       

Hillary Clinton’s release of her campaign finance proposals on Tuesday confirms there will be no significant substantive differences on political reform among the aspirants for the Democratic presidential nomination but a huge gulf between the two parties, whoever the nominees.

Harvard law professor and activist Larry Lessig announced his candidacy for the Democratic nomination this past weekend based on the single issue of political reform, but his quixotic and gimmicky campaign is akin to carrying coals to Newcastle. His only difference with the other Democratic candidates is his insistence that political reform (primarily on campaign finance) should be of the highest priority and other concerns (immigration, wages, climate change, economic inequality, infrastructure, national security) should play second fiddle. Lessig apparently believes that Republican and independent voters will rally to his call and create a broad base of public support for bipartisan cooperation on changing the rules of the electoral game.

If only it were that simple. The gaping differences between the parties on campaign reform are both ideological and strategic. Republicans are more philosophically disposed to elevate free speech over political equality. They also realize that as presently constituted, their party is advantaged by fewer or no restrictions on money in politics, lower turnout among minorities and youth, and single-member districts. Democrats instinctively reject the argument that money is speech and are comfortable with using public authority to set and enforce the rules of democracy. But they also know that they would benefit from restrictions on big money in elections, guaranteed voting rights for all citizens, and a more proportional translation of votes into seats.

The Clinton campaign finance proposals generally follow the thrust of liberal reformers: building a counterforce to big money through multiple matching funds for small donors, increasing transparency by requiring timely disclosure of mega-contributions and transfers that now evade public scrutiny, and overturning Citizens United, which set the stage for a Wild West of outsized contributions and spending. Her support for a constitutional amendment to accomplish the latter is a pipedream and probably wouldn’t work if it were adopted. As she acknowledges, appointing Supreme Court justices to change the current 5-4 majority is the more promising route to the desired change.

Lessig’s dream notwithstanding, this particular agenda will be achieved only if and when Democrats manage to control both ends of Pennsylvania long enough to put the policies and a sympathetic Supreme Court in place. It’s an important choice for voters to consider in the 2016 elections but by no means the only or most pressing one.

       

The rise of SuperPACs, the decision in Citizens United, and intensified polarization in Congress has ignited a flame under the already robust academic debate over the role of money in elections. Last week, Lee Drutman wrote an article for Vox outlining the recent contribution of Raymond J. La Raja and Brian Schaffner made to the debate with their book, Campaign Finance and Political Polarization: When Purists Prevail.

The crux of the book argues that allowing political parties to control more money, not less, is the key to reducing polarization. This runs counter to many pro-reform writings, focused chiefly on empowering small donors in order to counter big-money politics. La Raja and Schaffner counter this narrative, suggesting parties channel money to create moderation, rather than small donors, which are polarizing.

Drutman pushes back on both accounts by taking issue with some of the underlying assumptions in When Purists Prevail, including the weight they place on median voter theory and the extent parties will spend money on moderate candidates in primary elections. He marshals a host of recent research to support the critique, including: a recent Brookings paper on the strength of political parties, data on the power of outside money in congressional elections, and research showing moderate districts do not necessarily produce moderate candidates.

Click here to read the full article on Vox.

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

Ryan’s EITC is pro-mobility… but funding it may not be

Paul Ryan seems to be thinking seriously about the issues of poverty and social mobility. He is a reformer as well as an authentic conservative.

While his willingness to embrace EITC expansion is welcome, his proposed funding methods raise serious questions. Paying for anti-poverty programs by cutting anti-poverty programs runs the risk of being self-defeating. No doubt some of them are not working as intended. But reform is the answer, rather than abolition. Many of these programs help those in the deepest poverty - who in many cases are those least likely to benefit from welfare-to-work policies such as the EITC, according to recent research from the Center for Budget and Policy Priorities and from the National Poverty Center. 

Ryan's package is worthy of serious attention, not least from the perspective of social mobility. It is important, however, not to consider the impact of the EITC expansion alone, but also how - and by whom- it will be paid for. 

      

      

Each year millions of low- to moderate-income Americans supplement their income by claiming the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) during tax season. Last year, 1 in 5 taxpayers claimed the credit and earned an average of nearly $2,400.

This tax season, some of those eligible for the EITC may also be able to claim, for the first time, a new credit created by the Affordable Care Act (ACA) to offset the cost of purchasing health insurance for lower-income Americans. It’s called the ACA premium tax credit.

To qualify for the ACA premium tax credit, filers need first to have an annual income that falls between 100 and 400 percent of the federal poverty line (between $11,670 and $46,680 for a single-person household in 2014). Beyond the income requirements, however, filers must also be ineligible for other public or private insurance options like Medicaid or an employer-provided plan.

Why the tax credit overlap matters

Identifying the Americans eligible for both credits is important because it sheds light on how many still need help paying for health insurance even after the ACA extended coverage options.

In a recent study of the EITC-eligible population, Elizabeth Kneebone, Jane R. Williams, and Natalie Holmes estimated what share of EITC-eligible filers might also qualify for the ACA premium tax credit this year.

Below, see a list of the top 10 states with the largest overlap between filers eligible for the EITC and those estimated to qualify for the ACA premium tax credit.* Notably, none of these states has expanded Medicaid coverage to low-income families after the passage of the ACA.

Nationally, an estimated 7.5 million people (4.2 million “tax units”) are likely eligible for both the ACA premium tax credit and the EITC. Nearly 1.3 million of those tax units are from the following ten states.

1. Florida

Overlap: 22.5 percent / 405,924 tax units
State-based exchange? No Expanded Medicaid coverage? No

2. Texas

Overlap: 21.4 percent / 513,061 tax units
State-based exchange? No Expanded Medicaid coverage? No

3. South Dakota

Overlap: 20.5 percent / 15,124 tax units
State-based exchange? No Expanded Medicaid coverage? No

4. Georgia

Overlap: 19.8 percent / 186,020 tax units
State-based exchange? No Expanded Medicaid coverage? No

5. Louisiana

Overlap: 19.6 percent / 86,512 tax units
State-based exchange? No Expanded Medicaid coverage? No

6. Idaho

Overlap: 19.3 percent / 28,855 tax units
State-based exchange? Yes Expanded Medicaid coverage? No

7. Montana

Overlap: 18.9 percent / 18,138 tax units
State-based exchange? No Expanded Medicaid coverage? No

8. Wyoming

Overlap: 18.4 percent / 7,276 tax units
State-based exchange? No Expanded Medicaid coverage? No

9. Utah

Overlap: 18.1 percent / 42,284
State-based exchange? No (Utah runs a small businesses marketplace, but it relies on the federal government for an individual marketplace) Expanded Medicaid coverage? No

10. Oklahoma

Overlap: 18.0% / 63,045 tax units
State-based exchange? No Expanded Medicaid coverage? No

* For the purposes of this list, we measured the overlap in “tax units,” not people. One tax unit equals a single tax return. If a family of four together qualifies for the ACA premium tax credit, they would be counted as one tax unit, not four, since they filed jointly with one tax return.

       

       

       

       

Policy Brief #175

As the nation strives to recover from the “Great Recession,” job creation remains one of the biggest challenges to renewed prosperity. Small businesses have been among the most powerful generators of new jobs historically, suggesting the value of a stronger focus on supporting small businesses—especially high-growth firms—and encouraging entrepreneurship. Choosing the right policies will require public and private decision-makers to establish clear goals, such as increasing employment, raising the overall return on investment, and generating innovations with broader benefits for society. Good mechanisms will also be needed for gauging their progress and ultimate success. This brief examines policy recommendations to strengthen the small business sector and provide a platform for effective programs. These recommendations draw heavily from ideas discussed at a conference held at the Brookings Institution with academic experts, successful private-sector entrepreneurs, and government policymakers, including leaders from the Small Business Administration. The gathering was intended to spur the development of creative solutions in the private and public sectors to foster lasting economic growth.

	RECOMMENDATIONS
	What incentives and assistance could be made available to “gazelles” and to small business more generally? What policies are likely to work most effectively? In the near term, government policies aimed at bolstering the recovery and further strengthening the financial system will help small businesses that have been hard hit by the economic downturn. Spurred by the interchange of ideas at a Brookings forum on small businesses, we have identified the following more targeted ideas for fostering the health and growth of small businesses (and, in many cases, larger businesses) over the longer run: Improve access to public and private capital. Reexamine corporate tax policy with an eye toward whether provisions of our tax code are discouraging small business development. Promote education to help businesses struggling with shortages of workers with particular skills, and promote research to spur innovation. Rethink immigration policy, as current policy may be contributing to shortages of key workers and deterring entrepreneurs who wish to start promising businesses in our country. Explore ways to foster “innovation-friendly” environments, such as regional cluster initiatives. Strengthen government counseling programs.

The term “small business” applies to many different types of firms. To begin, the small business community encompasses an enormous range of “Main Street” stores and services we use every day, such as restaurants, dry cleaners, card shops and lawn care providers. When such a business fails, it is often replaced by a similar firm. The small business community also includes somewhat bigger firms—in industries such as manufacturing, consulting, advertising and auto sales—that may have more staying power than Main Street businesses, but still tend to stay relatively small, with under 250 employees. While these two kinds of small businesses contribute relatively little to overall employment growth, they are a steady source of mainstream employment. If economic conditions do not support the formation of new businesses to replace the ones that fail, there would be a significant net destruction of jobs and harm to local communities.

Yet another type of small business has an explicit ambition for rapid growth. These high-growth companies are sometimes known as “gazelles.” According to the Small Business Administration, small businesses account for two-thirds of new jobs, and the gazelles account for much of this job creation. The most striking examples—such as Google and eBay—have tended to be in high-tech industries and were gazelles for a significant time before they graduated to be very large businesses. However, gazelles exist in all industry types and in all regions of the country, and the large majority are not grazing in the nation’s technology-dominated Silicon Valleys. According to one expert, the three largest industry categories for high-growth companies are restaurant chains, administrative services and health care companies. One non-high-tech example is Potbelly Sandwiches, a restaurant chain that began in Chicago. Another is the San Francisco-based Gymboree Corporation, a provider of child development programs and children’s clothing.

 

Fostering the Development of High-Growth Companies

High-growth small businesses represent only about 5 percent of total startups, making it important to determine how to spot and foster them. A key common characteristic is that growth is critically dependent on the entrepreneurs who start these companies; they are people on a mission, charismatic leaders who can inspire creativity and commitment from their staffs.

The age of these firms is highly correlated with when their growth is highest. Generally, the most dramatic growth occurs after at least four years of existence—and coincidentally lasts about four years—before it slows again to a more typical pace for small businesses. Of course, some firms such as Google defy this pattern and continue to experience high growth for many years.

Although dynamic small businesses can be found nearly everywhere and in many industries, some regions spawn more of them than others. These regions may have especially supportive features, such as a critical mass of potential workers with relevant skills, a social climate and network that encourage idea generation, locally available venture capital, or some combination of these factors.

Unfortunately, attempts to anticipate which companies or even industries are likely to produce gazelles are prone to error. Thus, excessive emphasis on national industrial policies that favor specific industries are likely misplaced. Without knowing how to target assistance precisely, broad strategies, such as assistance with funding, knowledge, contacts and other essential resources, may be the best approach to fostering high-growth businesses. Such support has the added value of also aiding Main Street businesses.

Many of the most promising policies focus on removing obstacles that hinder entrepreneurs with solid business plans from launching and expanding their businesses.

Funding

As a result of the burst of the dot.com bubble in early 2000 and the recent financial crisis, small businesses have found the availability of venture capital funds drastically diminished. The crisis has also made it more difficult to obtain funding from banks and other conventional means. These trends particularly affect the “missing middle” of small businesses—roughly, those with between 10 and 100 employees.

The venture capital market. Historically, venture capital has financed only a relatively small portion of small businesses, but those financed have tended to be the ones with the greatest growth potential. In recent years, firms that eventually grew to where they could issue initial public stock offerings generally relied more heavily on venture capital financing than the average small business.

The dollar value of venture capital deals funded today is only about one-fifth the size it reached at its peak. While the peak amount may have been too large, today’s value is probably too small. With their capital heavily invested in a small range of industries and locales, it seems likely that venture capital firms have missed a high proportion of potential investment opportunities. Further, “once burned, twice shy” funders have increasingly focused on larger, later-stage ventures. Consequently, mezzanine financing, which new companies need to survive and thrive in the critical early stages, is scarce.

The funding problems partly stem from venture capital firms today having less money to invest. Some investors who formerly contributed to such firms have become more risk-averse, and worse performance figures have discouraged new investors. Lack of venture capital affects some industries more than others, and even some green energy companies—viewed by some as one of the nation’s more promising industry sectors—have moved to China, where financial support is more readily available.

Bank lending. In contrast to large businesses, which can turn to capital markets for funding, many small businesses are dependent on banks for financing. Although the worst of the 2008–09 credit crunch is behind us, many small businesses still find it difficult to obtain bank loans. Community banks, a key source of small business financing, have been hard hit by losses in commercial real estate, which have limited their lending capacity. Further, many small business owners who historically would have used real estate assets as collateral for expansion loans can no longer do so because of declines in real estate prices. In addition, small businesses that have, in the past, used credit cards to purchase equipment and supplies have been hindered by reductions in credit limits.

Overall economic conditions

The high degree of uncertainty currently surrounding the economic and financing climate may have prompted many entrepreneurs and would-be entrepreneurs to hold off on growth plans. Despite their reputation as high-flying risk-takers, good entrepreneurs take only calculated risks, where the benefits outweigh the dangers. Uncertainties about the future trajectory of the economy merely increase risk without raising potential rewards.

Government policies

Government policies affect the climate for small businesses in many ways. For example, small businesses face substantial hurdles when entering the complicated world of federal grants and contracts. At the state level, severe budget shortfalls mean that even well-designed initiatives to boost small businesses may founder.

The Small Business Administration (SBA) assists the full continuum of small businesses through a variety of means. These include: an $80 billion loan guarantee portfolio; specialized counseling and training centers; specialized business development programs targeting the socially and economically disadvantaged; oversight to ensure that at least 23 percent of federal government contracts go to small businesses (with certain preferences for minority and women-owned businesses); and the Small Business Innovation Research and Small Business Investment Companies programs.

The Obama administration is attempting to broaden support for small businesses by bringing the SBA into multi-agency initiatives that tackle common problems. For example, the Departments of Energy, Commerce, Housing and Urban Development, Education, and Labor, along with the National Science Foundation and the SBA, are supporting a five-year, nearly $130 million Energy Regional Innovation Cluster.

Strength of “social capital”

Through the 1990s, the United States was a worldwide leader in fostering innovation and entrepreneurship and reaped the reward of employment growth. Current international comparisons suggest that we are now closer to tenth place among some 70 nations in our ability to support innovation. Much of what has kept our nation from remaining in the top spot appears to relate to insufficient cultural support for entrepreneurship.

Strong social networks in specific geographic regions appear to substantially bolster the growth of innovative businesses. These networks are built around entrepreneurial dealmakers who serve as the nodes of the network, forming connections among researchers, entrepreneurs and investors. Unfortunately, many regions and industries lack strong networks.

Access to decision-making information. Entrepreneurs need an array of information and advice about how to tackle the problems that arise at different stages in business development. The SBA reports that companies that have taken advantage of their long-term counseling programs, for example, have higher growth than companies that have not.

Opportunity for all. Social networks are self-selecting, and some people have to work extra hard to gain entry to a region’s network of entrepreneurs. While various organizations exist to help women and people of color access entrepreneurial skills and information, these efforts may not suffice. Under-representation of any group presumably would filter out a number of potential high-growth companies.

Workforce issues

A long-time strength of the American workforce, worker mobility has declined. This trend has been attributed in part to an aging population and in part to the current difficulty people have in selling their homes. Businesses report difficulty finding employees with the right training, especially at the technician level, where straightforward vocational training could help.

Global competition

Increasing global competition for good projects, entrepreneurs and capital is a positive trend from an international perspective, but runs counter to the national goal of promoting rapid growth in U.S. industry and employment. Today, many entrepreneurs can choose among starting a business here, in their home country, or even in a third, more hospitable nation. At the same time, current U.S. immigration policy hinders entrepreneurs from coming here to launch their companies. A recent report from The Brookings- Duke Immigration Policy Roundtable concluded that “educated workers with the knowledge and skills to innovate are critical” to the United States and recommended increasing the annual number of skilled visas.

 

Policy Goals for Small Business

Measuring Results

More work is needed to identify key policy goals and priorities related to small business success. Critically, what would constitute “improvement” in public policy regarding small business employment, and how would we measure it? Clearly, increasing the total number of jobs created each year (by both small and large businesses, net of job destruction) would be a positive outcome, all else being equal. Another potential goal would be improving the “quality” of the jobs created, as measured by average compensation or by job creation in new industries or geographic areas where unemployment is high. Creating “good jobs” that bring generous compensation would seem to be always desirable, but this outcome could conflict with other social goals, for example, if the jobs created required skills out of the reach of groups that are traditionally difficult to employ.

Slowing job destruction could be as important as increasing the creation of new jobs, but discouraging layoffs without increasing performance would do more harm than good. The trick is to raise the quality of marginal firms so that their improved performance allows them to retain employees they would otherwise have to let go.

A final key factor in setting policy goals that would support small businesses is measuring the cost to taxpayers of the initiatives that flow from the goals. This includes the subsidy cost contained in the federal budget, as well as costs and tradeoffs in society at large.

Changing Key Policies

Small businesses face both short-run and long-run challenges. With regard to the former, many small businesses have been hard hit by the recession and appear to be lagging behind larger businesses in their recovery. The cyclical struggles of this sector in part reflect the dependence of many small firms on the still-strained banking system for their financing; they also reflect the high toll that our extremely soft labor markets have taken on demand for Main Street goods and services. Thus, government policies aimed at broadly bolstering the recovery and further strengthening the financial system will yield important benefits to small businesses.

The government, in conjunction with the private sector, can also take steps that will foster an economic environment that is supportive of entrepreneurship and economic growth over the long run. Specific policy steps that might help small businesses (and, in many cases, large businesses) include:

Improve access to public and private capital. Implementing serious financial reform will reduce the likelihood that we will see a repeat of the recent credit cycle that has been so problematic for the small business sector. When credit market disruptions do occur, policymakers should be attentive to whether temporary expansions of the SBA loan guarantee program are needed to sustain lending to creditworthy borrowers. The SBA should also consider expanding the points of access to its loan programs through an expansion of its lending partners. Finally, the SBA (or a similar entity) might encourage venture capital funds to broaden their investments beyond familiar areas by systematically bringing these investors together with entrepreneurs from neglected geographic regions and business sectors.

Reexamine corporate tax policy. More thinking is needed about whether provisions in our tax code discourage small business development in a way that is harmful to the broader economy and that places the United States at a relative disadvantage internationally. For example, Congress might consider whether it would be beneficial, on net, to lower employment taxes as a way of spurring hiring at businesses with high-growth potential. In addition, some analysts believe there would be gains from increasing tax credits for research and development and further lowering taxes on capital equipment. A design priority in all cases should be simplicity, as complicated rules can limit take-up among smaller firms that do not have extensive accounting or legal expertise.

Promote education and research. Entrepreneurs report difficulty in finding workers with the skills they need for manufacturing, technology and other jobs that do not require four-year college degrees. Access to such educational opportunities, including tailored vocational training, should be affordable and ubiquitous.

At the university level, improvements are needed in the way academic research is brought to the commercial market. Continued public and private support for basic research might be wise, particularly if we are in a trough between waves of innovation, as some analysts believe. The large investments by the National Science Foundation, National Institutes of Health, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, and other ambitious public and private programs laid the groundwork for many of the high-growth businesses of today. It may be worth exploring whether support for research in “softer” areas than the sciences might do an equal or better job of inspiring innovations.

Rethink immigration policy. A reconsideration of limits on H1-B visas might help entrepreneurs struggling with shortages of workers with particular skills. In addition, current immigration policy discourages immigrants who want to establish entrepreneurial businesses in America. Any efforts to expand immigration are frequently perceived as “taking jobs away from Americans,” but studies have shown that new businesses create jobs for Americans.

Explore ways to foster “innovation-friendly” environments. Some regions of the United States clearly do a better job of encouraging innovation. Silicon Valley is the classic example, but there may be as many as 40 such clusters scattered around the country. While clusters often arise organically, typically near major universities, some states have made an explicit commitment to innovation and entrepreneurship. Examples include the Massachusetts Technology Collaborative and California’s Biological Technologies Initiative, involving community colleges statewide. Federal, state and local policymakers should keep a keen eye on ways of adapting best practices from these initiatives as information becomes available about which elements are most effective.

Strengthen government counseling programs. The SBA might do more to expand and tailor its already successful growth counseling programs to better meet the needs of both Main Street and potential high-growth businesses, as well as firms at different developmental stages. Any effort to expand small businesses’ opportunities for federal grants and contracts should be accompanied by significant streamlining of the application process.

Downloads

• Download Policy Brief

      

Policy Brief #180

	EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
	The year 2010 in Afghanistan had some encouraging signs but on balance it was less positive than had been hoped. In 2011, therefore, it is important to do two things: first, look for further improvements in our strategy; and second, develop a backup plan, should the current approach not yield the kind of progress that is necessary and expected. This policy brief addresses the first challenge, improving the U.S./NATO counterinsurgency campaign. The basic logic of current strategy is accepted, but several new initiatives or ideas are explored to make it more promising and more effective. Three main ideas are developed: Promoting Afghan political organizations built around ideas and platforms, not individuals and ethnicities, in a change from longstanding American policy that could improve the quality of governance in the country. Taking pressure off the bilateral U.S.-Afghan relationship on the issue of anticorruption, largely by creation of an international advisory board consisting of prominent individuals from key developing countries like Indonesia and Tanzania that have had considerable success improving their own nations' governance in recent times. Offering a civilian nuclear energy deal to Pakistan, conditional on clear action by Islamabad to shut down insurgent sanctuaries that are currently using its territory to attack the Afghan government as well as NATO forces.

The past year was not without good news in Afghanistan. It saw a successful deployment of nearly another 40,000 NATO troops to Afghanistan; twice as much growth in Afghan security forces together with a much more robust approach to their training; increases in American civilian capacity in Kabul and in the field; and highly effective targeting of Afghan (and Pakistani) insurgents within Afghanistan and just over the border with Pakistan. I would also count the September parliamentary elections as more good than bad, since it was Afghans who held other Afghans accountable for infractions, and since the Karzai government appears on balance to be tolerating an outcome that will reduce the strength of its cronies in the elected assembly (though this issue remains a work in progress). Finally, NATO's decision at the November Lisbon Summit to emphasize the year 2014 as the time when Afghanistan would assume full control of security operations-rather than President Obama's earlier preference to emphasize July 2011 as the point when the U.S. departure would begin-clarified the American and international commitments to get the job done right before going home. Among other benefits, this change should help convince more Afghan and Pakistani fence-sitters that they can count on us, rather than encouraging hedging behavior out of fear of a premature, hurried NATO exit.

However, 2010 also witnessed a roughly 50 percent increase in the overall level of violence that can only partially be explained by our increased presence and tempo of operations. That increase reflects a very resilient insurgency. Problematic relations between the Obama administration and the Karzai government have also continued, the corruption problem has remained intractable (largely fueled by the western presence with all of its trappings), and the Pakistani government still tolerates sanctuaries for the Haqqani network and the "Quetta Shura Taliban" (that is, the Afghan Taliban) on its territory.

For the most part, the strategy of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) under General David Petraeus, and the efforts of the international community more broadly, seem sound. The paramount goal in Afghanistan is to put the country's government in a position to control its own territory. That is the way to ensure that no large terrorist sanctuaries re-emerge there that could threaten the United States, nuclear-armed Pakistan, or other core western interests. But to achieve that goal, a comprehensive counterinsurgency approach that helps build up the Afghan state is needed, because establishing control of territory requires that the government possess a certain legitimacy among its people-which in turn requires some measure of economic and political progress. Hence, to achieve a fairly simple goal, we have properly undertaken a fairly ambitious strategy, after having tried the opposite, minimalist approach for the first half dozen years of the war only to see the Taliban make a comeback. Yet the strategy still needs improvement to address its two main vulnerabilities: the weakness and corruption of the Afghan government, and the schizophrenic approach to the war on the part the Pakistani government. This policy brief proposes ideas to address each of these problems. The proposals would also improve the prospects of any sound backup plan that might have to be considered this year, such as the concept that Brookings Senior Fellow Bruce Riedel and I have recently developed that we call a "Plan A-" for the country.

Afghan Governance and Anti-Corruption Efforts

Working with the Karzai government is an inherently complex matter. On the one hand, we have no choice but to partner with Afghanistan's elected leader, who in fact remains reasonably popular among his own people with a 62 percent favorability rating according to the latest polls. On the other hand, the government is widely seen as ineffective by many of its own citizens, helping generate motivation and recruits for the insurgency. So do we work with Karzai, or work around him? In fact, we must do both. We need a better way to help the Afghan government improve its performance without inciting periodic public spats along the way that set back our efforts to cooperate. And we also need a way to help build for Afghanistan's post-Karzai future, the sooner the better.

Improving Afghan Governance and Fighting Corruption

General Stanley McChrystal's 2009 assessment of the situation in Afghanistan famously and dramatically concluded that corruption in the Afghan government was comparable to the insurgency itself in posing a serious threat to the country. As such, General Petraeus has been right to focus intently on corruption since assuming command, including assigning the formidable Brigadier General HR McMaster to the task, and some positive things are happening as a result. More intelligence assets are being devoted to the problem. Field commanders and development specialists are more aware of the need to understand the power of money, and to be cognizant of whom they are empowering or embittering through their contracting processes and economic development efforts.

Yet problems remain. Corruption remains very serious. And disputes about corruption with President Karzai still go public too often. The United States and the international community more generally should reframe the issue of fighting corruption, as Marine Colonel Greg Douquet and I have previously argued. The challenge should be seen and described primarily as one of improving governance in Afghanistan rather than tackling a culture of criminality.

Blantant, extreme corruption must be prosecuted. But by criminalizing routine corruption, we not only encourage unrealistic expectations in the U.S. Congress and elsewhere about the progress that is achievable over the next few years, we may miss opportunities to work with Afghan "reconciliables"-individuals who may have had some corrupt tendencies yet also try to provide a certain level of effective governance. We also fail to recognize our own past role in the dynamic. Pumping billions of dollars a year into a poor economy, and inadvertently favoring certain power brokers and tribes over others in the process, feeds the very corruption that we so abhor.

Research on fighting corruption and improving governance points to a better way of thinking about this problem. One key insight from renowned development expert Paul Collier and others is that young democracies with weak checks on presidential powers and an easy source of cash tend to have major problems with corruption-so Afghanistan's challenges, rather than being viewed primarily as criminal, should be expected in some ways. Taking this tone with the Karzai government can improve atmospherics and bolster our odds of eliciting cooperative behavior from Kabul.

Another key finding from MIT's Benjamin Olken and other researchers is that trained, independent auditors deployed from the central government to various parts of the country can improve the quality of government performance. Government auditors could also counter the "inverse pyramid" patronage network that is common in the Karzai administration, a network in which corrupt officials "invest" in purchasing government positions and their "dividends" are paid to them in the form of bribes and extortion. Reforming Afghanistan's government will require reversing this trend, or at least mitigating it, through such auditors and other governmental improvements.

And perhaps most important of all, the development literature shows that a number of countries around the world have made headway in combating corruption and improving governance over the years. Brookings and World Bank scholars Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Pablo Zoido-Lobaton document progress in places including Indonesia, Hong Kong, Georgia, Albania, Tanzania and Rwanda. We should try to involve more experts from such countries in the effort. President Karzai and others might react more positively to hearing suggestions about how to reduce bribes, check nepotism, and improve governance from Indonesians or Tanzanians rather than Americans.

With U.S. assistance, Afghanistan's government has improved. We are now seeing points of light in the anticorruption effort, such as President Karzai's new specialized anticorruption agency-the High Office of Oversight. Several key ministers in the Karzai cabinet are also exemplary on this front, including for example Minister of Interior Mohammadi. We should emphasize their sound efforts more often. But there is clearly a long way to go, and an international contact group may help.

Strengthening Afghan Political Parties and Institutions

Afghanistan's corruption problem is largely rooted in the fact that the young political system is still too driven by personalities-and to a lesser extent ethnicity-and not enough by ideas.

Part of the challenge is to make sure that Mr. Karzai relinquishes power in 2014, when he reaches the constitutional limit of two full presidential terms. Prudence requires that we assume Mr. Karzai will seek to change the constitution or otherwise manipulate the electoral and legal process to stay in office-not out of any megalomania, but as much as anything out of fear for himself and his friends and relatives given the uncertainty of who might follow him in office. As such, it is possible that Karzai could declare martial law and suspend future elections. He could seek a peace deal with insurgents that makes him the compromise candidate under a future modified constitution. He could even consider a military coup.

It is important to deflate this possibility before it gains momentum. U.S. policymakers should, for example, mention publicly that Mr. Karzai will no longer be president after 2014. This is unobjectionable as a point of legal fact-at least right now-so there is no reason to shy away from saying so. Talking about it enough will help clarify the international community's intentions and expectations. And given Afghanistan's long-term need for international security and economic assistance, Afghan leaders would have to take notice.

The second imperative is to strengthen Afghan political organizations. That means helping Afghanistan's reformers and patriots, of whom there are many, to form strong political movements. Mr. Karzai has chosen some good cabinet officials and governors, but these are just a few individuals. Afghanistan's organized political parties are very weak. There are some fledgling new movements-like the one spearheaded by former foreign minister and presidential candidate Abdullah Abdullah. But they are loosely organized and have relatively vague policy platforms.

Afghanistan needs political movements tied to ideas and governing principles rather than ethnicity or individuals. Mr. Karzai has so far discouraged their formation. He has argued that Afghans dislike political parties because of the legacy of Communist Party abuses in the late 1970s and 1980s. But the 1980s are increasingly ancient history. Those who oppose parties today seem motivated mostly by their own desire to divide and conquer a weak, inchoate opposition.

It is time for the U.S. government and the many other governmental and nongovernmental organizations present in Afghanistan to strongly support the activities of new political movements. They should encourage and fund Afghans as they hold policy conferences, create research institutes, do grass-roots political organizing, and talk policy and politics in print, on television and on the radio. This approach need not be anti-Karzai; the president himself could form a party.

Such dynamics could affect even the shorter-term calculations of Afghan politicians. If Afghan voters in 2014 and thereafter are empowered to make real policy choices, candidates will take notice and start developing ideas they can run on. That may be as good an antidote to weak governance and rampant corruption as we can find-not only for the future but for today as well.

Getting Pakistan Off the Fence

Pakistan arguably remains the most complex ally the United States has ever had in wartime. Nine years into the campaign, we still cannot clearly answer the question of whether Pakistan is with us or against us. America needs bold new policy measures to help Islamabad-in all its many dimensions and factions-make up its mind.

Despite allowing massive NATO logistics operations through its territory and helping the United States pursue al Qaeda operatives, Pakistan tolerates sanctuaries on its soil for the major insurgencies fighting in Afghanistan. These include the Afghan Taliban (known as the Quetta Shura Taliban because its principle base remains in Quetta in the Pakistani province of Baluchistan) as well as the Haqqani and Hezb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (HiG) networks. The Haqqanis straddle the border between the Afghan provinces of Khost, Paktia, and Paktika as well as North Waziristan and other tribal areas within Pakistan; HiG is further north, operating in and around the Khyber Pass connecting Kabul and Jalalabad in Afghanistan with Peshawar and points east in Pakistan. Thus, all three major Afghan insurgent groups have home bases in Pakistan, and despite the occasional drone strike are generally beyond NATO's reach as a result.

Pakistan has taken some worthy actions against extremists in its remote northern and western areas in recent years. Specifically, it has recognized the so-called Pakistani Taliban (the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, or TTP) as a mortal threat to the Pakistani state and responded accordingly in some tribal areas. Pakistanis argue, however, that limited numbers of ground troops combined with the past year's devastating floods prevent them from doing more. Quetta, North Waziristan, and other key places remain dens of iniquity, havens for extremists who continue to attack NATO and Afghan troops across the border and then return home for rest, regrouping, and fresh recruiting. Major command-and-control hubs are permanently located within Pakistan as well, and key insurgent leaders like Mullah Omar (to say nothing of Osama bin Laden) probably remain safely ensconced on Pakistani territory where U.S. forces cannot get at them. But it is perhaps not just a matter of available troops. Pakistan would rather have the Taliban and the Haqqanis back in power, especially in the country's south and east, than any group like the former Northern Alliance, which it views as too close to India. Since Islamabad cannot be sure that the current Afghan political system will survive, therefore, it keeps a backup plan based largely on the Taliban and its associates.

Under these circumstances, part of the right policy is to keep doing more of what the Obama administration has been doing with Pakistan-building trust, as with last fall's strategic dialogue in Washington; increasing aid incrementally, as with the new five-year, $2 billion aid package announced during that dialogue; encouraging Pakistan-India dialogue (which would help persuade Islamabad it could safely move more military forces from its eastern border to its western regions) and coordinating militarily across the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region. But President Barack Obama needs to think bigger. The clarification that the U.S.-led ISAF mission will continue until 2014, and indeed beyond, at the November Lisbon summit was a step in the right direction but more is needed.

Obama should offer Islamabad a much more expansive U.S.-Pakistani relationship if it helps win this war. Two major incentives would have particular appeal to Pakistan. One is a civilian nuclear energy deal like that being provided to India, with full safeguards on associated reactors. Pakistan's progress on export controls in the wake of the A.Q. Khan debacle has been good enough so far to allow a provisional approval of such a deal if other things fall into place as well, including Islamabad’s compliance with any future fissile production cutoff treaty. Second is a free trade accord. Struggling economically, Pakistan needs such a shot in the arm, and a trade deal could arguably do even more than aid at this point.

But the key point is this: Pakistan should be told that these deals will only be possible if the United States and its allies prevail in Afghanistan. Small gestures of greater helpfulness are not adequate; bottom-line results are what count and what are needed. If Afghanistan turns around in a year or two, the deals can be set in motion and implemented over a longer period that will allow the United States to continually monitor subsequent Pakistani cooperation in the war. These terms are really just common sense, and they are based on political realism about America's domestic politics as well as its strategic interests, since there is no way the Congress would support such a nuclear deal if Pakistani policy ultimately contributed to our losing the war in Afghanistan.

Conclusion

Current strategy in Afghanistan is built on reasonably sound counterinsurgency principles and is fairly promising in its prospects for the year ahead. But every such operation is different. That is a basic corollary of counterinsurgency theory, with its emphasis on local politics, conditions, and personalities-meaning that there is no reason to believe that current strategy is good enough just because its fundamentals are time-tested.

A number of other policy reforms, beyond those discussed here, may be worth considering in the coming months as well. The numerical goal for the Afghan security forces is probably still too low, and should approach 400,000 uniformed personnel rather than the current 305,000 target (this debate is well underway as of this writing). The legal system remains weak, with glaring problems such as a major dearth of judges and severely inadequate pay for prosecutors, as well as no clear strategy for linking the formal justice system to the local, traditional justice systems that remain important in Afghanistan today. Finally, in the aftermath of the September 2010 parliamentary elections, some patchwork solution to the disenfranchisement of Pashtuns in provinces like Ghazni where many of them could not vote (or had their votes thrown out) is probably needed. Perhaps some additional modest number of Pashtuns could be given non-voting adjunct status in the parliament, allowing their voices to be heard even if they were ultimately not able to win seats.

But the three changes to our current approach discussed in this policy brief are central, and have not received their due attention. On the anticorruption front, adoption of a less bilateral approach that includes a high-level international advisory body on good governance for the Karzai government could improve the tone and substance of the effort. On the Afghan politics front, the international community should be unapologetic about supporting Afghan political parties built on ideas and agendas more than personalities and ethnicities. And finally, in regard to Pakistan, an informal but public U.S. offer to pursue a bilateral civilian nuclear energy deal should Pakistan help us win the war by clamping down on insurgent sanctuaries, might motivate greater efforts by our on-again off-again allies across the border. Adoption of these recommendations would improve our prospects for at least moderate success in Afghanistan and help make 2011 the belated turnaround year that we so badly need.

Downloads

• Download Policy Brief

       

Policy Brief #181

The new normal for local, state and federal governments is fiscal austerity. Although President Obama supported education during his State of the Union address and in his budget proposal to Congress, cash-strapped localities and states—which foot most of the bill for educating America’s children—may have to balance their budgets with cuts to schools and teachers. The recession exposed a long-developing structural imbalance between public expenditure versus raising the revenue for public services. Especially on education, reality has set in, with a vengeance.

Cutting public expenditure is not necessarily a bad thing. There are, however, some activities that have become so fundamentally governmental and so critically important to the nation’s future that they require special care during a period of severe budget trimming. Education is one such example.

The Brown Center on Education Policy at Brookings has recently developed proposals to ensure that federal investments in education have impact. These proposals present the dual advantage of low costs of implementation at the federal level coupled with the promise of considerable leverage at the state and local level. Two of those proposals are presented in this brief: increasing digital and virtual education and expanding consumer information on higher education.

	RECOMMENDATIONS
	One important path to individual opportunity is higher levels of educational attainment. The U.S. economy is marked by an increasing economic divide between those who are educated and those who are not. In a time of fiscal austerity, every federal dollar invested in education must have a return. Congress should: Increase digital and virtual education. In reauthorizing the No Child Left Behind Act, provide that parents of economically disadvantaged students who are eligible for federal Title I funding should be able to direct that the funding associated with their child be spent to cover the costs of enrolling their child in virtual courses or in a virtual school.   Expand consumer information in higher education. Amend the Higher Education Act (HEA) to require that states that receive federal funds for statewide longitudinal data systems provide information on completion rates, employment levels, and annual earned income for each degree or certificate program and for each degree-granting institution that operates in the state. This information could be disseminated on the Internet.

Downloads

• Download full policy brief

       

Policy Brief #182

Protection of people from oppressive governments, civil conflict and disasters has moved to the top of the international agenda. The United Nations Security Council authorized all measures necessary to protect civilians in Libya as the airstrikes began. Humanitarian agencies-working in more places and under more difficult conditions than ever before-are grappling with the aftermath of Japan's massive earthquake even as they are also working with displaced people in Haiti and Ivory Coast and responding to hundreds of thousands of people fleeing Libya. And increasingly these agencies are not only trying to assist people through provision of relief items, but also trying to protect them. But with so many global organizations mobilizing to protect civilians when disasters strike and conflicts break out, the concept of protection has begun to lose its distinctive meaning.

Can anyone "do" protection? In The Politics of Protection: The Limits of Humanitarian Action (Brookings Institution Press, 2011), I describe how protection has been stretched to include all manner of important activities-from provision of food to curriculum development, from advocacy to monitoring, from building latrines to voter registration. Beyond affirming the responsibility of governments to protect their people, international law offers no clear guidance on how to translate the principles of protection into action.

Given the likelihood that conflicts will continue and natural disasters will increase in the future, much more attention is needed on the question of protection, which has emerged over the years from international humanitarian law, refugee law and human rights law. The most visible part of the international humanitarian system is the vast array of U.N. agencies and nongovernmental organizations. Yet military forces, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and thousands of civil society organizations are also major actors in humanitarian response. This brief describes observations and recommendations on protection in humanitarian work culled from my forthcoming book.

	RECOMMENDATIONS
	With changes in the nature of conflict and with the likelihood of increasing severity and frequency of sudden-onset disasters because of climate change, more attention needs to be paid to understanding how humanitarian actors can-and cannot-protect people. The United Nations and other humanitarian actors should consider the following recommendations: Humanitarian agencies need to re-evaluate what protection means in the context of today's conflicts and to recognize their own limitations in keeping people safe. If they are serious about protecting people, they need to work with national military and police forces which have the resources to provide such physical protection. This is hard for humanitarian agencies that see their work as grounded in principles of impartiality, independence and neutrality. NGOs should review their current policies and practices on protection to ensure that they are not promising more than they can deliver or being used as a cover for the lack of effective political action.   " As the term "protection of civilians" has come to mean different things for different actors, the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs should develop a very short summary statement of what it means to protect civilians that can be broadly used by a range of different communities and individuals in different contexts. The office should then collect the best practices to illustrate how protection of civilians is effectively carried out on the ground.   As both conflicts and disasters take on a distinctive form when they occur in urban areas, much more work is needed to retool humanitarian assistance for urban environments. This means that humanitarian agencies need to work with municipal authorities in preparing for and responding to urban residents affected by violence and disasters.   In light of the fact that climate change is likely to result in more large-scale and varied types of displacement, U.N. agencies and researchers should analyze the gaps in international legal protection for those forced to leave their countries because of climate change-induced environmental factors. Guidelines should be developed to assist governments considering evacuation or relocation of populations from areas likely to be affected by natural disasters or climate change.   Given the pace of technological change taking place with robotic armaments, the International Committee of the Red Cross should convene a group of experts from the military research and international law communities to begin to identify the gaps in international humanitarian law resulting from the widespread use of those technologies.

Downloads

• Download Policy Brief

       

Policy Brief #184

The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA) approved in September 2011 constitutes the most significant overhaul of the American patent system in decades. This policy brief examines some key patent law changes and studies mandated by the legislation, and provides recommendations for companies on successfully navigating the new landscape. [Editor's Note: the legislation was signed into law by President Obama on September 16, 2011.]

Perhaps most notably, the new law will move the United States away from a “first to invent” system and closer to the “first to file” approach used in much of the rest of the world. Other important changes include a new proceeding in the U .S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) for third-party challenges to the validity of a recently issued patent, an expanded mechanism for a third party to provide information to the PTO that could be used to narrow or eliminate claims in a pending patent application being prosecuted by a commercial rival, and the introduction of a new, broadly applicable patent infringement defense based on prior commercial use.

	RECOMMENDATIONS
	Under the “first to file” provision of the AIA, companies should be more careful when producing pre-filing disclosures for venues such as conferences and trade shows, with the understanding that under the AIA those disclosures may play a much larger role than in the past with respect to patentability of the associated IP.   Under the AIA, rights to an invention prior to a filing date will depend more on the history of relevant disclosures and less on nonpublic, internal company documents such as laboratory notebooks. All companies—large and small—should consider how to modify their procedures for protecting, evaluating, and filing patents on their inventions accordingly.   The AIA provides a grace period during which inventors can disclose their invention without losing the right to patent it, but leaves uncertainty regarding the definition of “disclosure”. Companies should carefully monitor case law and PTO actions that will undoubtedly help clarify this issue in the coming years.   Companies should reevaluate the extent and manner to which they use provisional patent applications to preserve IP rights.   In light of the increased number of mechanisms available to challenge the validity of pending and issued patents, companies engaged in patent prosecution should reconsider the tradeoffs of performing their own thorough prior art searches during patent prosecution. By finding and disclosing relevant prior art to the PTO, companies may reduce the likelihood that the disclosed prior art will be used successfully against them in future validity challenges.

In addition, there are several other aspects of the AIA that do not change patent law, but may have far reaching consequences. For example, an AIA mandated study by the Government Accountability Office promises to furnish vitally important information on the economic impact of patent litigation by non-practicing entities, and will almost certainly influence future patent legislation. Under the AIA, the hurdles small businesses face in protecting their patents internationally will also receive attention through a PTO study.

It will take many years to develop a mature body of case law and legal scholarship on the full impact of the AIA. What is clear today is that it will profoundly impact the ways that patents are filed, prosecuted, and litigated in the coming years. Companies and other entities that retool their patent strategies to address these changes will be in a much stronger position to maximize the value of their intellectual property (IP) portfolios.

First Inventor to File

One of the most significant components of the AIA concerns the move from a first to invent system to a first to file system. Under this provision, which takes effect 18 months after the AIA is enacted into law, an inventor may win the race to create the invention but lose the race to file the corresponding patent application, and thus lose the right to patent the invention.

However, the AIA includes an important exception in the form of a grace period allowing an inventor or others who obtained information from the inventor to make disclosures regarding the invention in advance of filing a patent application, as long as the application is filed within one year after the first disclosure. Some form of grace period has been a feature of the U.S. patent landscape since the 19th century, and allows an inventor time to examine the commercial practicability of the invention, engage in discussions with potential partners and customers and secure the resources necessary to draft a patent application.

The inclusion of both first to file language and a grace period in the new patent law creates what could amount to a hybrid between first to invent and first to file. For example, in the case of two inventors who independently disclose the same invention immediately following its conception, both the pre-AIA “first to invent” law and the post- AIA “first to file” law can favor the earlier discloser, who is by definition the earlier inventor if the disclosure is truly immediate. However, in the absence of disclosure in advance of a patent filing, pre-AIA law favors the earlier inventor, while the AIA “first to file” provision will favor the earlier filer.

As a result, under the AIA inventors and the companies that employ them must think much more carefully about how to manage pre-filing disclosures. Put simply, silence can be costly. To the extent that a company remains quiet about an invention while contemplating whether or not to pursue patent protection, it stands exposed to the possibility of losing the right to do so if a competitor files first. A company wishing to avoid this risk faces the additional challenge that the AIA does not specifically define what constitutes “disclosure” sufficient to preserve patentability. The use of provisional patent applications, which offer advantages including a more formalized way to document the dates and content of disclosures than activities such as presentations at trade shows, should also be reevaluated in light of the AIA.

Some companies may find themselves targeted by competitors’ disclosures engineered specifically to foreclose patent opportunities. To reduce vulnerability to such attacks, companies can engage in preemptive “defensive” disclosures, but must be mindful of the impacts of these disclosures on their own patent filing deadlines.

In addition, employees engaged in intellectual property creation can be made aware that there is an increased need to pursue timely steps to secure patent protection on new inventions. Internal company systems for documenting, reporting, and rewarding innovations can be modified to better match the provisions of the AIA. Companies should also consider the budgetary impact of the AIA in terms of the amount and timing of expenditures.

It is important to recognize that the AIA leaves substantial differences between the patent laws in the United States and those in other countries. For example, unlike in the United States both pre- and post-AIA, in Europe an inventor’s own public disclosures in the year prior to a patent filing can be invalidating prior art. To the extent that for financial or other reasons a company needs to defer filing a U.S. patent application to a future date, in one sense the systems have actually moved farther apart. This is due to what amounts to a newly incentivized option to buy some measure of protection in the U.S. by disclosing in advance of a filing at the cost of losing patentability in Europe. This requires careful consideration of disclosure plans.

Best Mode and Invalidity

The AIA does not alter the requirement that a patent application must “set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out” the invention. However, somewhat paradoxically, for proceedings commenced on or after the date of its enactment, the AIA eliminates the alleged failure to follow this requirement as grounds for asserting invalidity.

This change has the potential to alter a fundamental compact between an inventor and the government that is at the core of the patent system, which grants a patent holder the right to exclude others from practicing an invention in exchange for disclosing the best mode contemplated by the inventor. The AIA eliminates the failure to make this disclosure as grounds for asserting invalidity. Some inventors may view this as creating an incentive to intentionally withhold information on how to best carry out an invention.

Supplemental Examination

The AIA creates a new supplemental examination procedure, effective one year after enactment, allowing a patent owner to request that the PTO perform a supplemental examination to “consider, reconsider, or correct information believed to be relevant” to a patent. Subject to certain exceptions, this process can prevent a patent from being “held unenforceable on the basis of conduct” relating to this information.

The supplemental examination provision is particularly relevant to inequitable conduct allegations that are frequently raised by defendants in patent litigation. Defendants often try to identify information relating to the prosecution of patents that have been asserted against them that, in their view, indicates inequitable conduct rendering the patents unenforceable. Supplemental examination provides a way for a patent owner to preemptively attempt to inoculate a patent against such allegations.

Pre-Issuance Submissions

Beginning one year after the AIA is enacted, third parties will have the option of providing pre-issuance submissions of prior art accompanied by “a concise description of the asserted relevance of each submitted document” to the PTO in connection with a pending application. Such submissions can be used, for example, to attempt to prevent or hinder the issuance of a patent that the submitting party views as detrimental to its interests. However, to the extent that a patent examiner finds the arguments provided through a pre-issuance submission unconvincing, the resulting patent might actually be strengthened, not weakened.

Prior Commercial Use Defense to Infringement

Since 1999, alleged infringers of business method patents have had access to a “prior use” provision that can constitute a defense against infringement, provided certain conditions are met. For patents issued on or after the date of enactment of the AIA, the prior use defense can be applied, subject to certain exceptions, to patent infringement claims covering a much broader range of subject matter “consisting of a process, or consisting of a machine, manufacture, or composition of matter used in a manufacturing or other commercial process.”

Post-Grant Review Proceedings

Post-grant review proceedings are conducted through the PTO in order to reconsider alreadyissued patents, and can lead to the confirmation, cancellation, withdrawal, or modification of patent claims. T he phrase “post-grant review” is sometimes used to broadly refer to multiple types of post-grant proceedings including the ex parte and inter partes reexaminations available under pre- AIA patent law, and sometimes to more narrowly refer to a specific new review option created by the AIA (in fact, in the AIA itself the phrase is used in both the broad and narrow meanings).

Under pre-AIA patent law, a requester wishing to initiate an ex parte or inter partes reexamination provides the PTO with one or more published prior art references and an explanation why those references, in the view of the requester, raise a “substantial new question of patentability.” The PTO can either grant or deny the request; if the request is granted, an ex parte reexamination proceeds without any further input from the requester (unless the requester is the patent owner), while in an inter partes reexamination the requester participates during the reexamination process.

Both types of reexaminations have proven to be highly effective ways for third parties to challenge the validity of issued patent claims, often in tandem with or as a lower cost alternative to challenges adjudicated through the Federal court system and the International Trade Commission. According to data released by the PTO in June 2011, 92% of the requests for ex parte reexamination filed since the proceeding was introduced in the 1980s have been granted, and fewer than one quarter of patents subject to ex parte reexamination have emerged without any claim changes or cancellations. Inter partes reexamination was introduced in 1999; since then 95% of inter partes reexamination requests have been granted, and only 13% of patents subject to inter partes reexamination have survived with all claims confirmed.

The AIA leaves ex parte reexamination in place, but a year after enactment will replace inter partes reexaminations with “inter partes review” proceedings adjudicated by a newly renamed Patent Trial and Appeal Board within the PTO. The pre-AIA threshold to grant an inter partes reexamination of a “substantial new question of patentability” will be replaced with a higher threshold requiring that the PTO find a “reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the petition.” This higher standard will also be applied to inter partes reexaminations filed during the transition period immediately following enactment of the AIA and preceding the shift to inter partes review. Inter partes review requests must be filed no earlier than nine months (and in some cases longer) after the grant or reissue of the patent being challenged.

Additionally, the AIA creates a new “post-grant review” process through which a petitioner who is not the patent owner can request the cancellation as invalid of one or more claims of a patent granted or reissued within the previous nine months. The PTO can authorize a post-grant review if the information presented by the petitioner, “if not rebutted, would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least one of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” Under the AIA this threshold can be satisfied not only using traditional invalidity arguments based on settled law, but also by a petition that raises “a novel or unsettled legal question that is important to other patents or patent applications.” This language amounts to an invitation to address “novel or unsettled” legal questions through the PTO, raising a number of issues relating to respective roles the courts and the PTO will play in resolving them.

For companies engaged in or threatened with patent litigation or those that simply want to launch a pre-emptive strike at patents held by a competitor, post-grant review introduces a new way to challenge patents. The AIA contains estoppel and other provisions intended to prevent a requester from having two bites at the apple by challenging a claim in both a PTO post-grant (or inter partes) review and a civil action or International Trade Commission proceeding. However, in some circumstances these provisions may turn out to be largely toothless, since patent cases often involve multiple defendants who form joint defense groups and engage in coordinated attacks on patent validity. There is nothing in the AIA preventing one defendant from challenging claim validity through a post-grant or inter partes review and another from simultaneously or later asserting invalidity of the same claims in the federal court system or at the International Trade Commission.

The AIA also expressly provides that, starting one year after enactment, statements by a patent owner filed in a federal court or with the PTO regarding claim scope can be cited to the PTO for consideration in ex parte, inter partes, and post-grant review proceedings to determine claim meaning.

Other Provisions

In addition to codifying many changes to patent law, including those described above, the AIA contains other provisions that will likely have a significant impact on the operation of the PTO and on future patent legislation. Several of these provisions are discussed below.

Fee Diversion

One of the most controversial aspects of the patent reform debate has pertained to the practice of fee diversion, which arises because the PTO takes in an amount in fees that exceeds its appropriation. The Senate version (S. 23) of the AIA passed in March 2011 provided for the creation of a fund that would have allowed the PTO roll over excess funds into future fiscal years. However, in the House version (H.R. 1249) passed in June 2011 that became the template for the final legislation, this provision was removed and replaced with a newly established “Patent and Trademark Fee Reserve Fund” to be held in the treasury and into which excess fees will be deposited. This approach does not cleanly put the fee diversion issue to rest, and the details of how the reserve fund will be managed in future years remain unclear.

Studies Mandated by the AIA

The AIA mandates several studies, including one to be performed by the Government Accountability Office to examine the “consequences of litigation by non-practicing entities, or by patent assertion entities,” to gather data, among other things, on the volume of litigation, the number of cases found to be without merit, the costs to patent holders, licensees, licensors, and inventors, the economic impact of this litigation, and the “benefit to commerce, if any, supplied by non-practicing entities or patent assertion entities that prosecute such litigation.”

“Non-practicing entities” and “patent assertion entities” are terms that are sometimes used to describe companies that have little or no business other than the assertion of patents. Patent litigation involving these entities has grown significantly in recent years, in large part due to the potential for large judgments and settlements. The GAO study provides an opportunity for an unbiased examination of a significant aspect of the litigation environment, and is likely to produce information that will be valuable in drafting future patent legislation.

The AIA also mandates that the PTO perform a study on international patent protections for small businesses. T he financial burden of obtaining international patent protection is particularly heavy for small companies due to the combined costs of performing many different country-specific filings. As a result, many small companies either avoid foreign filings altogether, or perform foreign filings only for a small subset set of countries and only for the patents that they believe to be the most valuable. A goal of the AIA-mandated study is to determine whether to recommend establishing a loan or grant program to help small businesses defray the costs associated with international patent protection.

It is likely the study will conclude that such a program would be beneficial to small businesses, but it is just as likely that implementing it will prove to be extremely difficult in the current budgetary environment. However, the study may influence future patent legislation in the United States and abroad, and may be useful in multilateral discussions regarding international patent protection.

Conclusion

The AIA will reshape how United States patents are obtained, challenged, and valued in acquisition, licensing, and litigation settlement discussions. Companies that overhaul their intellectual property strategies in light of the provisions of the AIA will be in a better position to maximize the value of their patent portfolios and to strengthen their options in patent litigation matters.

Downloads

• Download Policy Brief

       

Policy Brief #185

The unprecedented surge in incarceration since 1980 has stimulated a national debate between those who claim that locking up over 2 million people is necessitated by public safety concerns, and those who say the human and financial burden of imprisoning so many of our citizens is intolerable.

But framing the incarceration debate as a tradeoff between public safety and public finance is far too narrow. The best evidence suggests the prison population would be substantially reduced with negligible effects on crime rates. Crime could actually be reduced if the savings were put to use in strengthening other criminal justice programs and implementing other reforms. Making this case requires that we confront widespread skepticism about the possibility of reducing criminal behavior on the outside.

The research community has made real progress in identifying the causal effect of various crime-related policies in recent years, providing us with proven alternatives to prison for controlling crime. The key has been to make greater use of experimental methods of the sort that are common in medicine, as well as "natural experiments" that arise from naturally occurring policy or demographic shifts.

	RECOMMENDATIONS
	The resources currently dedicated to supporting long prison sentences should be reallocated to produce swifter, surer, but more moderate punishment. This approach includes hiring more police officers -we know now that chiefs using modern management techniques can make effective use of them.   Increased alcohol excise taxes reduce not only alcohol abuse but also the associated crime at very little cost to anyone except the heaviest drinkers. Federal and state levies should be raised.   Crime patterns and crime control are as much the result of private actions as public. The productivity of private-security efforts and private cooperation with law enforcement should be encouraged through government regulation and other incentives.   While convicts typically lack work experience and skills, it has proven very difficult to increase the quality and quantity of their licit employment through job creation and traditional training, either before or after they become involved with criminal activity. More effective rehabilitation (and prevention) programs seek to develop non-academic ("social-cognitive") skills like self-control, planning, and empathy.   Adding an element of coercion to social policy can also help reduce crime, including threatening probationers with swift, certain and mild punishments for illegal drug use, and compulsory schooling laws that force people to stay in school longer.

The unprecedented surge in incarceration since 1980 has stimulated a national debate between those who claim that locking up over 2 million people is necessitated by public safety concerns, and those who say the human and financial burden of imprisoning so many of our citizens is intolerable. This debate played itself out vividly in the U.S. Supreme Court's May 2011 decision (Brown v. Plata) requiring California to dramatically scale back the size of its prison population. The majority's decision written by Justice Anthony Kennedy focused on inhumane conditions in California's prisons. In dissent, Justice Antonin Scalia emphasized the "terrible things [that were] sure to happen as a consequence of this outrageous order," while Justice Samuel Alito argued the majority was "gambling with the safety of the people of California." These dissenting opinions will sound familiar to states considering cutbacks in incarceration to balance dwindling state budgets.

However, framing the incarceration debate as a tradeoff between public safety and public finance is far too narrow. Prison is not the only option we have for controlling crime. But making the case for alternative approaches has historically been an uphill battle. What noted crime expert and UCLA professor Mark Kleiman calls the "brute force" strategy of locking up lots of people in prison has an obvious logic to it. The perception that "prison works" is reinforced by today's crime rates, now at a 50-year low.

In contrast, there is an abiding skepticism about the effectiveness of other efforts to change criminal behavior on the outside. One reason for this skepticism is the difficulty of distinguishing cause from effect in crime data. For decades, criminologists have maintained that one obvious alternative to prison - putting more police on the streets to help deter crime - doesn't work, because the numbers suggest a positive association between the crime rate and the number of police. (This is analogous to the association between the large numbers of physicians in areas with high concentrations of sick people, such as hospitals.)

Confidence in rehabilitation through social programs also is low, because recidivism rates are so high, even among inmates who participate in re-entry programs. In a recent interview, for example, the Los Angeles District Attorney told Time that, with respect to rehabilitation for gang-involved inmates, "we predict with some degree of confidence . . . it will fail in many, many, many cases."

Fortunately, in recent years researchers have made real progress in identifying the impact of various crime-related policies. The key has been to make greater use of experimental methods of the sort common in medicine, as well as "natural experiments" that arise from naturally occurring policy or demographic shifts.

The over-riding conclusion of the best new research is that there is "money on the table"; we can reduce the financial and human costs of crime without stimulating resurgence in crime rates.

Prisons and crime

Much of the reluctance to reduce the prison population reflects a belief that the extraordinary reduction in crime that occurred in the 1990s was caused by a surge in imprisonment. But even a casual look at the actual statistics challenges the view that prison trends get all or most of the credit for the crime drop.

Looking at three periods from recent history, we see that the crime drop of the 1990s did coincide with a large increase in the prison population. But the large crime increase during the prior period was also associated with a jump in imprisonment - and so was the relatively static crime pattern since 2000. If the prison surge of the 1990s gets credit for the crime drop, then fairness requires that the prison surge of the 1980s gets the blame for the crime increase of that period, while the prison increase of the 2000s was largely irrelevant. This type of armchair analysis supports almost any conclusion.

PERCENTAGE CHANGE
	Prisoners/cap	Robbery rate
1984-1991	+66	+33
1991-2000	+42	-47   (the crime drop)
2000-2008	+10	0

Studies suggest that increased use of imprisonment indeed should receive part of the credit for the crime drop of the 1990s, in the sense that crime was lower than it would have been had we taken all the funds devoted to prison increases and spent it for purposes other than crime control. But is that the right counterfactual? If the vast increase in prison expenditures came at the expense of alternative crime-control efforts that might be even more effective, then the net effect of the imprisonment boom is not so clear, even qualitatively.

Alternatives to prison

Prison alternatives can be organized into two large and somewhat overlapping bins of crime-control activities, which we label "changing individual propensities towards crime" and "changing the offending environment." Under each heading, we identify particularly promising programs, based on recent assessments of costs and benefits. We conclude with rough calculations that highlight the potential magnitude of the inefficiency within our current policy approach - that is, how much extra crime-prevention could be achieved by simply reallocating resources from less-efficient to more-efficient uses.

Changing individual propensities towards crime

1. The difficulties of changing poverty and adverse mental health: While a large body of criminological and psychological theory has emphasized the role of economic disadvantage and mental health problems in contributing to criminal behavior, empirical evidence suggests that job training and mental health courts are not the most cost-effective ways to control crime - not because these disadvantages don't matter, but because they are so difficult to modify in practice.
    
2. Coercive social policy: The average high school graduation rate in the America's 50 biggest urban school systems is about 53 percent. One of the few levers available to policymakers to ensure youth stay in school is to raise the compulsory schooling age - although it is natural to wonder what good schooling will do for youth who are being forced to go against their will. It is thus striking that we have strong quasi-experimental evidence from both the United States and Great Britain that cohorts exposed to an increased compulsory schooling age have reduced crime involvement. That benefit augments the usual list of benefits associated with more schooling, and it complements the benefits of early childhood interventions like Perry Preschool (a two-year preschool program for disadvantaged 3- and 4-year-olds) and Head Start (the large-scale federal preschool program).
    
3. Social-cognitive skill interventions: Most of the economics-of-crime literature has focused on ways of reducing crime by changing the incentives that confront potential offenders, with very little attention devoted to helping people respond to the incentives they already face. A growing body of evidence shows that social-cognitive skills - for example, impulse control, inter-personal skills and future orientation - influence people's response to incentives and predict criminal involvement, schooling and employment participation.

Moreover, intervention research also suggests that targeted efforts to improve the social-cognitive skills of young people at risk and to modify the social systems that may contribute to or reinforce delinquency can reduce crime. The benefits of such efforts can far exceed their costs.

Changing the offending environment

1. Swiftness and certainty, not severity, of punishment: Much of the increase in America's prison population since the 1970s comes from an increase in average sentence lengths. Yet new data from the randomized Hawaii Opportunity Probation with Enforcement (HOPE) experiment found that frequent drug testing, followed immediately by a very short jail stay for dirty urine, substantially reduced drug use and criminality among probationers. Studies of the federal government's Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) police hiring grants provides further empirical support for the growing suspicion that swiftness and certainty of punishment may actually be most important for controlling crime. The notion that crime is reduced by simply putting more police on the streets without changing what they do, and that deterrence (rather than simply incapacitation) may be an important mechanism behind this result, also overturns the conventional wisdom that prevails in many criminology circles.
    
2. Demand curves for criminogenic goods are negatively sloped: The federal and state excise taxes on beer and liquor have declined markedly (in real terms) since World War II. These rates are considerably below the marginal external social cost, even if effects on crime are not considered. Many people outside the economics profession are skeptical that modest changes in the price of alcohol can do much to change use, given the social context in which drinking so frequently occurs; the possibility that many of highest-risk alcohol users have some level of dependency; and how little attention so many people pay to a 5, 10 or even 20 percent change in prices. Yet the empirical evidence that raising taxes and prices would reduce some types of crime is very strong.
    
3. Private co-production: Most of the research on crime control strategies focuses on the role played by government and non-profit interventions. But private citizens and businesses account for a surprisingly large share of resources devoted to preventing crime. State and local governments can help reduce crime indirectly by encouraging private actions that make law enforcement more productive. Two examples for which benefits exceed costs by an order of magnitude are building the police-tracking infrastructure for Lojack, and creating the legal framework for Business Improvement Districts (where local businesses are subject to tax payments that go in part toward making the neighborhood clean and safe).

It bears repeating that the goal is not to identify the "best" alternative to prison, but rather the best portfolio of options.

What the status quo costs us

Our review of the best available social science suggests that America's current approach to crime control is woefully inefficient. Much greater crime control could be achieved at lower human and financial cost. To illustrate the potential gains from improving the efficiency of the current system, consider the following hypothetical policy experiment.

Imagine that we changed sentencing policies and practices in the United States so that the average length of a prison sentence reverted to what it was in 1984 - i.e., midway through the Reagan administration. This policy change would reduce our current prison population by around 400,000 and total prison spending (currently $70 billion annually) by about $12 billion per year.

What would we give up by reducing average sentence lengths back to 1984 levels? In terms of crime control: not all that much. Assume that society "breaks even" on the $12 billion we spend per year to have average sentence lengths at 2009 rather than 1984 (so that the benefits to society are just worth $12 billion), although more pessimistic assumptions are also warranted.

What could we do instead with our newly acquired $12 billion? One possibility would be to put more police on the streets. Currently, the United States spends around $100 billion per year on police protection, so this hypothetical policy switch would increase the nation's police budget by 12 percent, enabling deployment of as many as 100,000 more police officers. The estimated elasticity of crime with respect to police is far larger (in absolute value) than even the most optimistic assessment of what the elasticity of crime would be with respect to increased sentence lengths. This resource reallocation would lead to a decline of hundreds of thousands of violent and property crime victimizations each year.

A different way to think about the potential size of this efficiency gain is to note that the benefit-cost ratio for increased spending on police may be on the order of 4:1. If the benefit-cost ratio for marginal spending on long prison sentences is no more than 1:1, then reducing average sentence lengths to 1984 levels in order to increase spending on police could generate net benefits to society on the order of $36 billion to $90 billion per year.

Suppose instead that we devote the resources from a $12 billion cut in prison spending to supporting high-quality preschool programs. This would enable a large increase in federal spending on preschool services - for example, $12 billion would represent a 150 percent increase in the annual budget for Head Start (currently around $8 billion per year). Currently Head Start can enroll only around half of eligible 3 and 4-year-olds, and provides early childhood education services that are far less intensive than successful, widely-cited model programs like the Perry Preschool and Abecedarian. Head Start children participate in the program for shorter periods (usually one year, versus two to five years for the others), and the educational attainment of Head Start teachers is lower.

A 150 percent increase in Head Start's budget could dramatically expand the program on both the extensive and intensive margins. Given available data, the benefit-cost ratio of this expenditure would fall in the range of 2:1 to 6:1 - that is, from two to six dollars in long-term benefit for every dollar spent. Reallocating resources from long prison sentences to early childhood education might generate from $12 billion to $60 billion in net benefits to society.

If crime reduction is a key goal, we might do better still by focusing on human capital investments in the highest-risk subset of the population - through efforts to address social-cognitive skill deficits of young people already involved in the criminal justice system. Marvin Wolfgang's seminal cohort studies found that only a small fraction of each cohort commits the bulk of all crime. While early intervention programs target children during the time of life in which they are most developmentally "plastic," interventions with adolescents and young adults can be more tightly targeted on those whose arrest histories suggest they are likely to end up as serious offenders. Another benefit of targeting criminally active teens and adults is an immediate crime reduction payoff.

What sort of social-cognitive skill development could we provide to high-risk young people with $12 billion per year?

With around $1 billion, we could provide functional family therapy (FFT) to each of the roughly 300,000 youths on juvenile probation. E.K. Drake and colleagues estimate that FFT costs something less than $2,500 per youth, with a benefit-cost ratio that may be as high as 25:1 from crime reduction alone.

With the remaining $11 billion we could provide multi-systemic therapy (MST) to almost every arrestee age 19 and under. The cost of MST is around $4,500 per year, with a benefit-cost ratio of around 5:1.

Estimates such as these indicate that diverting $12 billion from long prison sentences to addressing social-cognitive skill deficits among high-risk youth could generate net social benefits on the order of $70 billion per year. Even if FFT and MST, when implemented at large scale, are only half as effective as previous experiments suggest, this resource switch would still generate substantial societal benefits.

The preceding calculations are intended to be illustrative rather than comprehensive benefit-cost analyses, and, clearly, they are subject to a great deal of uncertainty. Nevertheless, they strongly suggest the enormous efficiency gains that could result from reallocating resources from prisons to other uses that will, among other beneficial outcomes, reduce crime.

A key challenge we currently face is that our government systems are not well suited to converting the fifth year of a convicted drug dealer's prison term into an extra year or two of Head Start for a poor child. Government agency heads have strong incentives to maximize the budgets of their agencies, and pour any resources that are freed-up from eliminating ineffective program activities back into their own agencies. This is the intrinsic difficulty of rationalizing policies across domains, agencies, and levels of government. If we could solve this problem - and orient the policy system to up-weight evidence from design-driven research - then in our quest for effective crime control, it appears possible that we could have more for less.

Downloads

• Download Policy Brief

       

Why is Springfield's economy proving so resilient?

Several reasons come to mind: You're a manageably sized regional hub. You've got a university and important hospital assets. And you stand at the brink of an enormously attractive natural area -- the Ozarks.

More and more in today's footloose economy, jobs and people flock to livable places with affordable housing, vibrant downtowns, cultural amenities and lots of close-by outdoor recreation.

And Springfield's got all that. Well, OK: Downtown hardly buzzes with "24-7" meeting and living as yet. But the university keeps students around, and meanwhile, nearby Branson remains one of the nation's foremost "drive-to" cultural attractions. Likewise, the beautiful "lake country" draws visitors and second-home buyers from all over the Midwest. In this case natural beauty really is natural capital: The famous Ozarks ambience continues to support a $1-billion-a-year tourist sector to cushion the blows of any national economic downturn.

No wonder the region paced the state's growth in the 1990s and now holds on better in bad times. Greater Springfield has service jobs, rolling hills, lakes, Andy Williams, retirees and their pensions, and reasonably priced new subdivisions. What's not to like?

But here's the harder question: Can Springfield stay attractive? Can it stay resilient? The worry is that signs of strain have now appeared after a decade of fast growth.

Many of these strains my colleagues and I detailed in a recent Brookings Institution report I co-authored, titled "Growth in the Heartland: Challenges and Opportunities for Missouri."

Springfield, we demonstrated, sprawled in the 1990s. Yes, the city proper grew by 8 percent. But mostly population moved ever outward during the decade, and that, we said, has brought problems.

Thousands of people flocked to smaller outlying towns like Willard, Strafford, Republic, Clever, Nixa and Ozark, which hit "hypergrowth" in the 1990s and struggled to keep up. Christian and Webster counties grew unsustainably by 66 and 31 percent, respectively. And even more disturbing some 28,000 people settled in unincorporated fringe areas ill-equipped to accommodate them with modern sewers and good services.

The result: Septic and fertilizer seepage from scattered new homes exacerbates the water-quality problems that have fouled Lake Taneycomo and Table Rock Lake. Taxes are increasing as local governments strain to provide the necessary roads, services or sewer lines in places that never needed them. And with more sprawl coming, more traffic and more mini-malls could cost the region its reputation as the heartland of rural America -- quaint, scenic and friendly. The bottom line: Highly dispersed, low-density development may well be undermining the durability of its growth.

In that sense, the real test of Springfield's resilience lies ahead and turns on its ability to manage its growth to make it sustainable. What is more, the best way for Springfield to continue to grow in high-quality ways would seem to be to continue to set the standard for land-use and environmental reform in Missouri -- a state that has lagged on promoting sensible land use and planning.

As a state, after all, Missouri needs to update its badly outmoded planning statutes to provide its regions more tools to manage change.

It needs to promote regional solutions among its many localities. And it needs to better align its transportation and infrastructure investment policies with the principles of sound land use and sensible planning.

In this regard, what the state does -- or doesn't do -- to manage growth matters for Springfield because, ultimately, it is the state that sets the rules for what type of growth occurs all over. By remaining virtually laissez-faire on growth and development topics, the state of Missouri may well be undercutting its future competitiveness.

Given that, Springfield should take seriously the fact that with its strong growth, fresh voice and signature environmental assets, it is well positioned to lead the state in promoting reform.

So Springfield should step forward on these issues -- as the state's new economic driver, and as its most progressive region.

Already southwest Missouri business leaders have come together to protect the lakes. Now the region should show the way in other ways, by hammering out a regional system for managing fast growth; rationalizing local government competition; and insisting on state action to allow all regions to make headway.

For that is the way for the Springfield region to prosper: To help itself, it must help nudge the entire state along. Only in that fashion will a distinctive region maintain its distinctive vitality.

      

Executive Summary

Census 2000 confirms that despite scant population growth in the 1990s, Kansas City remains at the core of a robust regional economy.

Population in Kansas City has changed little over the last two decades, and the city has dropped from 27th largest in the U.S. to 36th largest. Most neighborhoods in the city and its close-in suburbs failed to grow or actually lost population in the 1990s. Meanwhile, population boomed in the rest of the metro area, growing by a third since 1980. Today, only a quarter of the region's residents resides in Kansas City. Only a doubling of the city's immigrant population in the last decade forestalled greater population decline.

And yet, despite the stagnation of their city's population, residents' economic condition remained healthy. A high proportion of adults in Kansas City work, and employment is diversified among several industries. The city has a strong middle class, with gains in both moderate-income and high-income households in the 1990s. Real median income grew during the decade. Compared to other Living Cities, Kansas City's poverty rates remain low, its homeownership rates remain high, and its rental housing remains affordable. Still, significant income and educational attainment gaps by race and ethnicity point to opportunities to build a stronger minority middle class in Kansas City in the coming decade.

Along these lines and others, then, Kansas City in Focus: A Profile from Census 2000 concludes that:

• Kansas City lies at the heart of a rapidly decentralizing region. Kansas City's population grew nominally (1.5 percent) in the 1990s, after declining in the 1980s. The city itself was divided, however, with most neighborhoods in the southern half stagnating or losing population, and most in the northern reaches of the city gaining. Elsewhere in the metro area, population boomed by 16 percent in the 1990s. Outer parts of Johnson County (KS) and Jackson County (MO) grew rapidly, as did population in all suburban counties. Only one in four metropolitan residents lives in Kansas City today.

• The city's population is growing more diverse. Like most Midwestern cities, Kansas City's population remains predominantly white and black. The city lost white population in the 1990s, but gained residents of other races and ethnicities. International immigrants have contributed to the changing profile of the city and region. The number of foreign-born living in Kansas City more than doubled in the 1990s, and more than twice as many settled in the suburbs over the same period. What is more, the city's immigrant population itself is quite diverse; Mexico is the most common country of birth, but half come from countries in Asia, Europe, and Africa.

• Some parts of the urban core are attracting new residents, but others contain aging populations. With a little over 37,000 members, the 25- to 29-year-old population represents Kansas City's largest age group. These younger residents help account for the city's relatively small household size, and the significant degree of household turnover in neighborhoods around the downtown and northern parts of the city. Many neighborhoods in the city and inner suburbs, meanwhile, house significant shares of elderly residents. The growing representation of seniors is also reflected in the city's two largest household categories, childless couples and people living alone. Reversing a decline in the number of younger married-couple families in the city could be critical to maintaining neighborhood vitality and fiscal stability.

• Increasing educational attainment and high levels of work contribute to the economic success of most Kansas City residents. Unlike the trend in many other U.S. cities, Kansas City's income distribution actually "evened out" in the 1990s. Median household income in Kansas City grew at about the national average, and the poverty rate declined. The healthy economic profile of city residents owes to several factors. While unemployment has risen since Census 2000 was conducted, Kansas City's rate remains below the average for large cities. Likewise, high school and college degree attainment among city workers rank above national averages. Workers are also employed in a diverse set of industries throughout the region. Yet racial differences cut against these trends. As elsewhere, blacks and Hispanics in Kansas City significantly lag whites on educational attainment, and those gaps contribute to large disparities in household incomes by race and ethnicity.

• Kansas City is a "homeowner city," but some groups are not sharing in the benefits. Among the 23 Living Cities, Kansas City ranks fifth on its homeownership rate, which rose to 58 percent in 2000. The homeownership gap between whites and minority groups widened in the 1990s, however. The black homeownership rate in Kansas City did not increase at all over the decade, and the rate for Hispanics fell. Rents remain relatively affordable, however, and Kansas City ranks last among the 23 Living Cities in the share of renters who face housing cost burdens. While affordability may dissuade some renters from moving into homeownership, it may also present a chance for the city's families to save for ownership opportunities.

By presenting the indicators on the following pages, Kansas City in Focus: A Profile from Census 2000 is intended to give readers a better sense of where Kansas City and its residents stand in relation to their peers, and how the 1990s shaped the city, its neighborhoods, and the entire Kansas City region. Living Cities and the Brookings Institution Center on Urban and Metropolitan Policy hope that this information will prompt a fruitful dialogue among city and community leaders about the direction Kansas City should take in the coming decade.

Kansas City Data Book Series 1
Kansas City Data Book Series 2

      

Lynn Neary: I'm Lynn Neary in Washington, sitting in for Neal Conan.

John Kerry may not have clinched the Democratic nomination for president in yesterday's primaries and caucuses, but his victories in five of the seven races certainly completed his rehabilitation from an also-ran to a front-runner. John Edwards and Wesley Clark also won last night, Edwards in South Carolina, Clark in a tight race in Oklahoma, where Edwards came in second. Joe Lieberman dropped out of the race altogether. Howard Dean vowed to fight on despite a dismal showing. So did Al Sharpton, who placed third in South Carolina. Dennis Kucinich barely registered with voters. All the candidates now have their eyes on the future with contests in delegate-heavy states now up for grabs.

...

...

Lynn Neary:...With us to talk about money in politics is Anthony Corrado. He's a professor of government at Colby College in Waterville, Maine, and is spending this year as a visiting fellow at The Brookings Institution here in Washington.

Thanks for being with us.

Anthony Corrado: Well, thanks for inviting me, Lynn.

Lynn Neary: Do we know exactly how much money's been spent so far by the candidates?

Anthony Corrado: Well, so far the Democrats have raised about $170 million in private donations and public funding all together, and all of that money's now been spent. This very competitive contest has proved to be very expensive so that as we enter this crucial part of the nominating process, no candidate really has a large reservoir of cash that's available to be spent.

Lynn Neary: Yeah. Both Dean and Kerry used the same strategy, focusing on Iowa and New Hampshire, but came up with very different results, didn't they?

Anthony Corrado: Yes, they did, and it was particularly problematic for Howard Dean because what Dean decided to do was use the large store of cash that he had raised in 2003 to spend lots of money in the states that would be voting in February, as well as in Iowa and New Hampshire, and as a result spent over $3 1/3 million on television in states that were voting after New Hampshire. Whereas John Kerry basically took all of the money he had and put it into Iowa and New Hampshire and was able to get the victories he needed to spur additional fund-raising so that he right now is in the best position even though he ended up raising much less than Howard Dean prior to New Hampshire. He's now in the best position to raise and spend money in this next stage of the race.

Lynn Neary: Yeah. And what about Dean? Has he been able to--he was so well-known for his fund-raising. How has his fund-raising been since he has started losing?

Anthony Corrado: Well, his fund-raising has actually held up very well. He's raising about a million dollars a week. He's raised about $3 million since that now-infamous night in Iowa. But one of the problems that he has is that he built such a large organization that it's very expensive to maintain. And as a result he has not had money for television advertising this week. He's not doing any television advertising in the states this weekend. And he probably won't do any television advertising in Tennessee and Virginia. So he's basically gone off of the airwaves in terms of paid television, with the exception of looking towards Wisconsin, which isn't until February 17th.

...

Listen to this entire program, or purchase a transcript

      

Event Information

Antibacterial drug resistance is a global public health threat poised to worsen due to the combination of the inappropriate use of existing drugs and a marked decline in innovative antibacterial drug development. In order to tackle this problem, stakeholders must consider comprehensive strategies that address both drug development and stewardship.

On February 7, the Engelberg Center for Health Care Reform convened an expert workshop, “Modernizing Antibacterial Drug Development and Promoting Stewardship” to explore a two-pronged approach to combating antibacterial drug resistance that includes: 1) the development of pathogen-focused antibacterial drugs that target the most serious public health threats; and 2) stewardship efforts for all antibacterial products in order to preserve their utility. Participating stakeholders included experts from the drug development and health care industries, the clinical community, government, and academia. These stakeholders shared their insights on potential frameworks and evidentiary considerations for pathogen-focused drug development, and efforts underway to promote the appropriate use of commonly used antibacterial drugs in the ambulatory care setting.

Event Materials

• Antibiotic Development Slides
• 07 antibacterial expert workshop discussion guide
• 07 antibacterial expert workshop public agenda
• 07 antibacterial expert workshop meeting summary

       

Nigeria is facing a confluence of troubles: dramatically reduced oil prices have pummeled a country that depends on oil exports for two-thirds of its national revenues; the Boko Haram insurgency continues to wreak havoc particularly in the north of the country, where suicide bombings (many of which are now carried out by kidnapped girls) have killed hundreds; and corruption remains a drain on the country, which ranked 136th out of 168 countries on Transparency International’s 2015 Corruptions Perceptions Index.

But amidst this, Nigeria completed its first peaceful transition of power nine months ago—to Muhammadu Buhari, who has since made some progress in reforming the military, sacking corrupt leaders, and injecting energy into the counter-Boko Haram campaign. 

On February 29, the Africa Security Initiative at Brookings hosted a discussion on the current state of Nigeria, featuring EJ Hogendoorn of the International Crisis Group, Madeline Rose of Mercy Corps, Mausi Segun of Human Rights Watch, and Amadou Sy from Brookings. Brookings’s Mike O’Hanlon moderated the conversation.

As O’Hanlon argued at the start, Nigeria is one of the most important countries in the world, but appears little in policy debates. Nigeria is sub-Saharan Africa’s largest economy, and security risks emanating in the country can have spillover effects. All of the participants stressed that Nigeria should factor more centrally in conversations about international security, economic development, and humanitarian issues.

Nigeria’s ups and downs

O’Hanlon started by framing three overlapping challenges in Nigeria:

• The struggle against Boko Haram, which is more complicated than a pure terror group, but has also pledged loyalty to ISIS.
• The question of reform, to include the army, the police, and the entire government.
• The state of the economy, since Nigerian livelihoods need to be improved if there is any hope to handle the first two situations. 

Hogendoorn praised the peaceful transition of power to President Buhari, calling it a “stunning achievement” for the country and those who helped from the outside. However, the problems facing Nigeria—namely the insurgency in the Niger Delta, declining oil prices, and corruption and government mismanagement (at state and federal levels)—are large, he said. He argued that declining oil prices and income are impacting the government’s ability to fulfill promises, and that state governments are powerful and difficult to reform. He praised some anti-corruption institutions in Nigeria, as well as a number of effective governors who have changed corruption situation dramatically over a short period of time. But in the end, he said, it comes down to good leadership. The Nigerian people must demand accountability. 

Rose detailed how things have changed in Nigeria since Mercy Corps became heavily involved in the area in 2012. Mercy Corps’ main missions there include violence reduction, education, and creating opportunity for young girls, as well as humanitarian response. While there has been progress on chronic violence in Nigeria, particularly in the northeast of the country, Rose stressed that there is much to be done. She concluded that there is not enough attention to the human element of the crisis. For example, Rose noted that displacement is common across the Northeast. The displaced are mainly women and children. In the displaced groups, the eldest becomes de facto head of household—sometimes forcing leading adolescent girls to turn to selling sex for food or money for food. Rose called on the government to address this. 

Segun agreed that the focus needs to change regarding crisis response in Nigeria. In the past, the focus has been almost entirely on a military response. This has not been a workable plan, she said, partly because the “military operates above the law.” The reforms in Nigeria must have a social component, Segun argued. Lack of access to opportunity, economic problems, and desertification of major water bodies have all combined to drive farmers and fisherman from the Northeast and into the heart of the conflict. 

Sy returned to the importance of economic interests in resolving the crises in Nigeria. He reminded the audience that the country is the largest economy of sub-Saharan Africa, and that is important for the entire continent. Since two-thirds of the government revenue comes from oil, the oil shock has dealt a huge blow. But there is hope for Nigeria, Sy noted. One reason is stimulus via investment outside the oil sector. There has been an increase in infrastructure spending, as well as on human development (namely in education and health). In both cases, he said the biggest issue will be implementation. Sy gave four recommendations to the Nigerian government: 1) increase infrastructure expenditure, 2) make government more lean and cost-effective, 3) increase taxation in non-oil revenue items, and 4) reduce corruption. 

Overall, the participants expressed cautious hope for Nigeria despite the problems it faces. The government there still has a long list of to-do’s, but there is reason to believe that it is on the right general track.

      

We are kicking off the new Millions Learning video series with a spotlight on Teach For All, one of the 14 case studies examined in the Millions Learning report. Teach For All is an international network of local, independent partner country organizations dedicated to improving educational opportunities for children and youth around the globe. From China to Bulgaria to Peru to Ghana, each partner organization recruits and trains recent top-performing graduates and professionals to teach in their country’s underserved communities for two years, with the ultimate goal of developing a cadre of education leaders, both inside and outside of the classroom.

In this video, Wendy Kopp, CEO and co-founder of Teach For All, discusses Teach For All’s unique approach to building a pipeline of future “learning leaders and champions” and the role that a supportive policy environment plays in enabling this process. Kopp then explains how Teach For All grew from the original Teach For America and Teach First in the United Kingdom to an international network of 40 partner countries, sharing her own lessons learned along the way.

To learn more about Millions Learning, please visit our interactive report, Millions Learning: Scaling up quality education in developing countries, and/or visit our webpage.

Video

• Getting millions to learn: Interview with Wendy Kopp of Teach For All

       

Event Information

Register for the Event

U.S. policy towards South Asia has changed considerably over the last seven decades. The nature of U.S. engagement with different countries in the region has varied over time, as has the level of U.S. interest. While India and Pakistan have received the most attention from Washington, the United States has also been engaging with Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, albeit to different degrees. 

On May 19, The India Project at Brookings hosted a panel discussion exploring the past and present U.S approaches towards South Asia, based on Senior Fellow Stephen Cohen’s new book, “The South Asia Papers: A Critical Anthology of Writings” (Brookings Institution Press, 2016). Panelists also assessed the Obama administration’s policies toward the region, and the challenges and opportunities that lie ahead for the next U.S. administration. Fellow Tanvi Madan, director of The India Project, moderated the discussion.

After the discussion, the panelists took questions.

Video

• U.S. policy toward South Asia: Past, present, and future

Audio

• U.S. policy toward South Asia: Past, present, and future

Transcript

• Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

• 20160519_south_asia_transcript