• Political, economic, sociological and technological factors are poised to challenge EU and US ideological positions on internet governance, which will make it difficult to find consensus and common ground in the years to come.
• The EU and US share core values and perspectives relating to internet governance, such as openness, freedom and interoperability, as well as a human rights framework for cybersecurity. There have been many examples of successful multi-stakeholder cooperation between the EU and US, including the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) transition and the European Dialogue on Internet Governance (EuroDIG).
• There are also subtle differences between the EU and US, and each has different reasons to support multi-stakeholderism. Cases that highlight growing tensions in EU–US coordination on internet governance include the controversies surrounding the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), the WHOIS system that governs domain name registration data, and the board of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), which undermined an independent cybersecurity review.
• Internet governance is becoming more complex, with a multiplicity of actors and no obvious authority for important emerging issues. Additionally, the rise of China and its authoritarian vision for the future of the internet is a threat to the current internet governance institutions that have been shaped by and reflect Western values.
• To bridge ideological gaps the EU and US should build capacity between likeminded stakeholders, create a taskforce on effective multi-stakeholder internet governance, and work through non-governmental stakeholders to improve participation.

In 2018, Iceland joined the Wellbeing Economy Alliance, a network of countries developing frameworks to measure social, economic and environmental factors in an attempt to move beyond GDP being the sole measurement of economic success. Other governments and organizations supporting this approach include New Zealand, Scotland and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).
 
Against this backdrop, the prime minister of Iceland and 2019 Chatham House Prize nominee, Katrín Jakobsdóttir, shares insights into her government’s approach and her personal and political motivations for embarking on the wellbeing economy project.

The new European Commission has finally started its work this week. In a world increasingly defined by great power competition and deprived of the certainties of a strong transatlantic partnership, this might well be the first commission where foreign and security policy issues will be equally important to internal EU ones.

Amid an escalating Sino-American rivalry, there is a growing realization in Brussels that something has to change in the way the EU thinks and acts internationally.

Charting a more successful path forward will not be easy. Josep Borrell, the EU’s new high representative for foreign affairs and security policy, during his confirmation hearing, offered a hint as to what might be needed to get there: ‘The EU has to learn to use the language of power.”’

What might this mean in practice?

Four issues illustrate some of the key dilemmas ahead for the EU and its new executive.

Hard power

The most revealing of these concerns hard power.

For a union so addicted to the US security guarantee, and so used to the softer approaches of exercising its influence, this was always going to be a difficult discussion. The recent disagreement between Germany and France over the future of NATO gave a taste of how fraught and complex this discussion can be.

Underpinning it are three fundamental questions. If the EU has to enhance its capacity to defend its interests with military power, how (and how quickly) is it to move ahead, how much additional responsibility will that mean and to what degree will this responsibility need to be shouldered autonomously, potentially distancing itself from NATO or Washington? Moving forward with this agenda while balancing the competing interests of member states and preserving the fragile progress already achieved with initiatives such as PESCO will not be easy.

Discussion and debate among member states should not be discouraged, but the new commission has a role to play in ensuring that such discussion is constructive. Distracting talks about an EU army or a nuclear ‘Eurodeterrent’ should be shelved, with the focus as much as possible on acquiring tangible capabilities, getting the defence architecture right, ensuring operational readiness and spending defence budgets smartly.

How to use power

Great powers have traditionally been able to cooperate in certain areas while competing in others. Given their wide reach, powers like the US have generally not allowed disagreement on one issue to interfere with the ability to work together on others.

If the EU aspires to be a more assertive global player, it will need to grow comfortable with this compartmentalization. For example, if Brussels wants to stand up to Beijing regarding human rights, the South China Sea or issues of acquisition of European infrastructure, this should not mean that cooperation on areas such as peacekeeping, arms control or climate change needs to be blocked.

Footing the bill

Ursula von der Leyen, the new commission president, has announced that she wants an increase of 30% for external action in the 2021–27 Multi-annual Financial Framework (the EU budget). But with the Brexit budget gap looming, and little appetite to increase contributions or reduce the funds allocated to costly schemes, like the Common Agricultural Policy, compromises will have to be made for this to happen.

This will be one of the first key tests for the new commission. Power costs money, not just gestures, and therefore specific commitments already made under the Juncker mandate regarding the European Defence Fund or the new Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument need to be guaranteed, if not expanded.

Internal politics

None of these steps are possible if the internal workings of the EU become too dysfunctional. A stronger stance internationally would make the sometime incoherence of internal EU management more of a liability to the bloc’s credibility. For example, how can the EU advocate for the rule of law beyond its borders while some of its own member states violate the same principles? 

And there remains the perpetual question of how much more power member states are willing to cede – if any – to deliver faster and more efficient decision-making. If the bloc’s reflexes – often slow, consensual and risk averse – are out of place with the role of a modern great power, how does the commission envision introducing decision-making mechanisms, like qualified majority voting, in foreign and security policy matters?

Borrell’s résumé shows his extensive experience in handling critical policy dossiers. He is also expected to travel less than his predecessor, being mindful of the even heavier institutional work ahead, not least in working with a more politically fragmented European Council and a more politicized European Parliament.

Ultimately, learning the language of power might mean that the EU finally deals with the basics of international affairs as a coherent and cohesive actor, rather than as an occasional ensemble. This endeavour clearly lacks a fixed path or destination. But the new commission seems to be mindful that the EU will have to find new ways to use power as the world changes around it. In doing so, it should keep in mind that the language of power is best articulated not with words, but with actions.

This will be done through examining transatlantic approaches and responses to China through the lens for four key themes (digital technology; trade and investment; governance of global commons; and climate change and the environment) that have been identified as crucial to developing effective policy responses and fostering collaboration.

The project will strengthen national, regional and international responses to the risks and opportunities posed by China’s changing role within the global economy and international rules-based order.

The convincing general election win for the Conservative Party and Boris Johnson opens a new chapter in British history. On 31 January 2020, Britain will withdraw from the EU and return to its historical position as a separate European power.

Recognising the strategic significance of this change, the Queen’s speech opening the new parliament stated that 'the government will undertake the deepest review of Britain's security, defence, and foreign policy since the end of the Cold War'. But in what context?

Prime Minister Boris Johnson and other Brexit supporters have yearned for Britain to return to its exceptional trajectory. In their view, Britain can once again become a trading nation - more global in outlook and ambition than its European neighbours, freed from the shackles of an ageing and fractured European continent and its deadening regulatory hand.

This imagery makes good copy. But the 21st century does not offer Britain the same opportunities as did the 18th, 19th or early 20th centuries. This is a different world, and Britain’s position in it needs to be crafted with a sharp eye to what is possible.

Geopolitics undergoing wrenching change

This is not declinism. The UK remains an economically strong and politically influential country by relative global standards – it is currently the fifth or sixth largest economy in the world, and the second largest donor of official development assistance. It has ubiquitous cultural brands from fashion and music to the royal family, and an eminent diplomatic and security position at the heart of all of the world’s major international institutions and alliances, from NATO and the UN security council to the IMF, G7, G20 and Commonwealth. 

But Britain leaves the EU just as the geopolitical landscape is undergoing wrenching change. The United States has turned inwards, closer to its own historic norm, and is undermining the international institutions which it created alongside Britain in the 1940s. China’s international influence is on the rise alongside its vast and still growing economy, challenging traditional norms of individual freedom and public transparency.

Russia is navigating the cracks and crevices of the fracturing rules-based international order with ruthless efficiency. Sensing the change in the wind, many governments are now back-tracking on their post-Cold War transitions to more open and democratic societies.

The implications of this new context have yet to be fully internalised by those who look forward to Britain’s future outside the EU. Britain will be negotiating new trade deals in an increasingly transactional, fragmented and protectionist international economic environment. It will be trying to sell its world-class services into markets where national control over finance, law, technology and media is increasingly prized.

Making new diplomatic inroads will be no easier. The government will face strong internal and external criticism if it lends security assistance to states that are simultaneously clamping down on their citizens’ rights. With the number of military personnel in decline and investment in new equipment stretched across multiple expensive platforms, the UK could struggle to project meaningful defence cooperation to new security partners in Asia at the same time as upholding its NATO commitments and its deployments in conflict zones around the world.

Britain also opens its new global chapter at a time when it is changing domestically. There is no over-riding reason for a missionary British foreign policy – neither the economic returns or image of national glory that drove Empire, nor the existential defence of its land, interests and freedom that drove it during the Cold War.

Stretching liberal interventionism to Iraq, as Tony Blair did when he was prime minister, and to Libya as David Cameron did in 2011, has injected a deep dose of popular scepticism to the idea that Britain - with or without allies - can or should help make the world in its own image.

This more defensive mindset – epitomised by parliament’s refusal to use military force to punish President Bashar al Assad’s regime for using chemical weapons against its citizens in 2013 – will not abate soon. Especially when the new government’s political bandwidth will be stretched by fiendishly complex trade-offs between its financial promises to support domestic renewal, the imperatives of striking and implementing a new free trade agreement with the EU, and the economic consequences of leaving the single market.

All this points to the fact that the most important step for Britain at the beginning of this new national chapter will be to establish an effective partnership with the EU and its member states. They face the same international risks as Britain and have as much to gain from the preservation of rules-based international behaviour. Recognising the continued interdependence between Britain and the EU will offer both sides greater leverage in a more competitive and hostile world.

A new transatlantic relationship

Once it has agreed its new relationship with the EU, Britain can turn to crafting its new relationship with the mighty United States. US-UK economic interdependence and close security ties should help discipline the bilateral economic relationship. The more difficult challenge will be for the UK to avoid falling into fissures between the US and the EU over how to manage bilateral relations with China and Russia, particularly if President Trump wins a second term.

Britain will have to get used to this difficult balancing act between its transatlantic heart and European head after Brexit. This makes it all the more important for the UK to develop new diplomatic and commercial initiatives with countries that are also struggling to cope with the current uncertain, transactional international environment.

Canada, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand can grow as bilateral economic partners and as allies in international institutions, such as the G7, OECD and WTO. They may even open a door to British engagement in regional trade arrangements such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CP-TPP), which do not require the same political commitments as EU membership.

Turning from an EU-rooted foreign and economic policy to one that is once again more international in outlook will be difficult, take time and be more costly than the government currently envisages. The irony is that for this to be successful requires sustained political investment by the Johnson government to build a strong relationship with the EU that it is focused on leaving.

There are two well-established ideas in trade. Individually, they are correct. Combined, they can lead to a conclusion that is unfortunately wrong.

The first idea is that, across a range of economic sectors, the EU and the US have been engaged in a battle to have their model of regulation accepted as the global one, and that the EU is generally winning.

The second is that governments can use their regulatory power to extend strategic and foreign policy influence.

The conclusion would seem to be that the EU, which has for decades tried to develop a foreign policy, should be able to use its superpower status in regulation and trade to project its interests and its values abroad.

That’s the theory. It’s a proposition much welcomed by EU policymakers, who know they are highly unlikely any time soon to acquire any of the tools usually required to run an effective foreign policy.

The EU doesn’t have an army it can send into a shooting war, enough military or political aid to prop up or dispense of governments abroad, or a centralized intelligence service. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has declared her outfit to be a ‘geopolitical commission’, and is casting about for any means of making that real.

Through the ‘Brussels effect’ whereby European rules and standards are exported via both companies and governments, the EU has indeed won many regulatory battles with the US.

Its cars, chemicals and product safety regulations are more widely adopted round the world than their American counterparts. In the absence of any coherent US offering, bar some varied state-level systems, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is the closest thing the world has to a single model for data privacy, and variants of it are being adopted by dozens of countries.

The problem is this. Those parts of global economic governance where the US is dominant – particularly the dollar payments system – are highly conducive to projecting US power abroad. The extraterritorial reach of secondary sanctions, plus the widespread reliance of banks and companies worldwide on dollar funding – and hence the American financial system – means that the US can precisely target its influence.

The EU can enforce trade sanctions, but not in such a powerful and discriminatory way, and it will always be outgunned by the US. Donald Trump could in effect force European companies to join in his sanctions on Iran when he pulled out of the nuclear deal, despite EU legislation designed to prevent their businesses being bullied. He can go after the chief financial officer of Huawei for allegedly breaching those sanctions.

By contrast, the widespread adoption of GDPR or data protection regimes inspired by it may give the EU a warm glow of satisfaction, but it cannot be turned into a geopolitical tool in the same way.

Nor, necessarily, does it particularly benefit the EU economy. Europe’s undersized tech sector seems unlikely to unduly benefit from the fact that data protection rules were written in the EU. Indeed, one common criticism of the regulations is that they entrench the power of incumbent tech giants like Google.

There is a similar pattern at work in the adoption of new technologies such as artificial intelligence and the Internet of Things. In that field, the EU and its member states are also facing determined competition from China, which has been pushing its technologies and standards through forums such as the International Telecommunication Union.

The EU has been attempting to write international rules for the use of AI which it hopes to be widely adopted. But again, these are a constraint on the use of new technologies largely developed by others, not the control of innovation.

By contrast, China has created a vast domestic market in technologies like facial recognition and unleashed its own companies on it. The resulting surveillance kit can then be marketed to emerging market governments as part of China’s enduring foreign policy campaign to build up supporters in the developing world.

If it genuinely wants to turn its economic power into geopolitical influence – and it’s not entirely clear what it would do with it if it did – the EU needs to recognize that not all forms of regulatory and trading dominance are the same.

Providing public goods to the world economy is all very well. But unless they are so particular in nature that they project uniquely European values and interests, that makes the EU a supplier of useful plumbing but not a global architect of power.

On the other hand, it could content itself with its position for the moment. It could recognize that not until enough hard power – guns, intelligence, money – is transferred from the member states to the centre, or until the member states start acting collectively, will the EU genuinely become a geopolitical force. Speaking loudly and carrying a stick of foam rubber is rarely a way to gain credibility in international relations.

This article is part of a series of publications and roundtable discussions in the Chatham House Global Trade Policy Forum.

Labour leadership candidate, Lisa Nandy, reflects on the party's foreign policy priorities and makes the case for a foreign policy underpinned by internationalism.

In recent years, the Labour party has struggled to reach cross-party consensus on its foreign policy agenda. While the current leadership election offers the party an opportunity to debate and redefine its position on issues such as immigration, security and Brexit, the extent to which Labour can reconcile its factionalism remains unclear. As Labour undergoes a process of reflection, what kind of foreign policy agenda should the party rally behind that will also appeal to voters outside of its traditional base?

Can the Labour party be unified on its approach to international issues? Is an internationalist foreign policy an attractive choice for voters? And as Brexit tensions persist, what might the party's framework be to ensure new trade deals and partnerships align with fundamental Labour priorities such as workers' rights?

Please note this an online-only event.

According to a previously agreed timetable for phase two of Brexit talks, negotiations on the future EU-UK trade relations were scheduled to begin in March. Then a global pandemic hit. Despite the ongoing COVID-19 outbreak, the UK government insists that the Brexit negotiations are on track and there are currently no plans to extend the transition period beyond 2020.

However, the original timetable for trade talks was already widely seen as extremely constrained. Can negotiations still be done in time? With the decision on any possible extension to be made by July at the latest, can the two sides make sufficient progress by that point? Or would the ongoing public health crisis make requesting an extension to the transition period more politically viable for the UK government? Finally, if there is no extension, could Britain still leave the EU with no deal?

In this webinar, the speaker will discuss how the need to manage other challenges, such as the current COVID-19 outbreak, might affect the government’s approach to the negotiations with the EU. He will also share his insights on what to expect from the second phase of negotiations and on the most important lessons from phase one. 

Since the World Health Organisation (WHO) declared COVID-19 a pandemic, few countries have chosen to ignore social distancing recommendations. But, even among those states which have, the Belarusian official response to its epidemic remains unique.

President Aliaksandr Lukashenka’s statements that vodka, sauna and tractors are protecting Belarusians from coronavirus attracted amused attention in international media. Lukashenka also described other societies’ response to COVID-19 as ‘a massive psychosis’.

Although Lukashenka is notorious for his awkward style of public communication, the fact that Belarus is refusing to impose comprehensive confinement measures is of concern. Belarusians continue to work, play football and socialise.

Lukashenka, himself playing ice hockey in front of state cameras, claims it is the best way to stay healthy. Belarusian authorities clearly appear to be in denial – and this could have dire humanitarian consequences.

From denial to half measures

Belarus actually has one of the largest numbers of hospital beds in the world per 1,000 of the population. But in the absence of quarantine measures its health system, already crippled by corruption and embezzlement, is likely to be overwhelmed.

Patients being treated for pneumonia in hospitals have suggested medical staff are uninformed and inadequately equipped. It is claimed doctors are not reporting COVID-19 as the suspected cause of death, either through a lack of testing or for fear of reprisals.

Observers believe the real mortality rate is already well above official figures (40 deaths as of 16 April). Based on an Imperial College London model, between 15,000 and 32,000 people could die under the current mild confinement regime – and such a high death toll would hugely impact the country’s political stability. Citing personal data protection, the Ministry of Health has imposed a total news blackout; the only cluster officially acknowledged so far is the city of Vitsebsk.

Although specific Belarusian cities and some individuals started changing their approach – by extending school vacations or cancelling weddings – such measures remain half-hearted.

Clearly a major reason for such an apparently irresponsible reaction is that Belarus cannot afford a massive lockdown that would freeze its already underdeveloped economy and drive it deeper into recession. Unlike many other nations, Belarus lacks budgetary resources for a sizable stimulus package. But a delayed response might backfire on the economy.

Economic recession has been forecast to amount to at least 10% of GDP. For Lukashenka, who openly challenged conventional wisdom regarding the need for quarantine and isolation, such an economic downturn would harm his confidence rating in the eyes of Belarusian voters, mindful of the state’s mismanagement of the crisis. And it could create doubt within the ruling elite itself, with Lukashenka seeking re-election for a sixth mandate in late August.

Against this backdrop, a radicalization of the opposition-minded part of society is also to be expected, with greater reliance on social networks in the face of official secrecy and disinformation. The expected response of the regime is then likely to be pre-emptive repression. Evidence is emerging that law enforcement agencies have already stepped up judicial and paralegal harassment of dissenters, notably independent journalists and bloggers.

Russia’s initial reluctance to address the coronavirus crisis may also have influenced Belarus. Lukashenka and his administration often react to public health challenges by the Soviet rulebook, reminiscent of the Soviet authorities’ mismanagement of the Chernobyl disaster in 1986.

Russia has unilaterally closed its borders with Belarus and, as bilateral relations continue to deteriorate, this casts further doubt on the viability of the Union State of Belarus and Russia. Pro-Russian media forecast Moscow will be unwilling to alleviate the expected socio-economic crisis, as it continues to reject Minsk’s demands regarding subsidised oil deliveries. Yet the Kremlin might use the crisis as an opportunity to resume its integrationist pressure on Belarus.

China, with which Belarus engaged in a seemingly privileged strategic partnership in the 2010s, was actually the first country to dispatch humanitarian aid to beef up Belarusian capacity to fight the virus.

But Minsk should not expect Beijing to rescue its economy and, unless it commits to more internal reforms, Belarus is not likely to receive much from the EU either. The regime has already applied to the IMF for emergency financial support, but conditions are attached and, even if successful, the funds would amount to no more than $900m.

The government’s decision to take only half measures so far is rooted in the hope COVID-19 is not as bad as foreign experts fear. But, unless the leadership acknowledges the public health crisis and mitigates its economic impact, COVID-19 will accelerate Belarus’s slide back into international self-isolation. If combined with a humanitarian crisis, this will put the Belarusian regime under considerable stress.

This crisis does risk a new ‘Chernobyl moment’ for the authorities, but the population could react more vocally this time. As volunteers self-organise to fight the epidemic, it might become more difficult for the authorities to say that it is efficient in running the country. But the bottom line is Belarus desperately needs money. Whoever steps up to support Belarus financially will also be able to heavily influence its politics.

In the last 100 years, global economic crises from the Great Depression of the 1930s to the 2008 financial crash have contributed to significant political changes in Europe, often leading to a rise in popularity for extremist parties and politics. As Europe contends with a perceived crisis of democracy - now compounded by the varied responses to the coronavirus outbreak - how should we understand the relationship between externally-driven economic crises, political upheaval and democracy?

The panellists will consider the parallels between the political responses to some of the greatest economic crises Europe has experienced in the last century. Given that economic crises often transcend borders, why does political disruption vary between democracies? What can history tell us about the potential political impact of the unfolding COVID-19-related economic crisis? And will the unprecedented financial interventions by governments across Europe fundamentally change the expectations citizens have of the role government should play in their lives?

This event is based on a recent article in The World Today by Hans Kundnani and Pepijn Bergsen who are both researchers in Chatham House's Europe Programme. 'Crawling from the Wreckage' is the first in a series of articles that look at key themes in European political discourse from the last century. You can read the article here. 

This event is open to Chatham House Members. Not a member? Find out more.

• Meeting future global food security requirements is not just about quantity; it is also about meeting growing needs in a way that safeguards human as well as planetary health. But national priorities and policies often remain out of sync with aspirations for more sustainable and healthy food systems.
• International trade and trade policies play an ambiguous role in the current food system. With 80 per cent of the world’s population depending on imports to meet at least part of their food and nutritional requirements, trade has a unique function in offsetting imbalances between supply and demand. However, in the absence of effective regulatory frameworks or pricing frameworks that internalize environmental, social or health costs, trade can exacerbate and globalize challenges associated with food production and land use trends such as deforestation, land degradation, greenhouse gas emissions, biodiversity loss and the shift to unhealthy diets.
• Over the last two decades, trade in agricultural products (excluding intra-EU flows) has more than tripled in value, to reach $1.33 trillion. The geography of global food trade flows has also shifted, primarily towards South–South trade, which now accounts for roughly a quarter of total agricultural trade flows. The nature of global trade has changed drastically, with traditional exports such as wheat and coffee growing slowly at around 2 per cent per year, while products such as palm oil, fruit juice, soft drinks and other processed products have grown at 8 per cent or more annually.
• This overall increase in trade in agricultural products raises questions about the growing utilization of resources, such as water or soil nutrients, that are embedded in those products through production and processing. Trade itself also causes negative environmental impacts, starting with greenhouse gas emissions associated with transport and storage. If the environmental cost associated with production and trade is not reflected in the final price of goods, trade may accelerate the depletion of resources or their unsustainable use.
• It is critical to ensure that trade policy options pursued by producing and consuming countries alike will support a transition to more sustainable and healthier food and land use systems. The first step in addressing trade-related food systems challenges must involve rebuilding trust among policy actors. There is a need for new spaces for informal dialogue among actors, and ‘soft’ governance mechanisms that can help rebuild consensus on the best ways forward. Meeting these challenges also requires an appreciation of the complex interactions between sectoral policies (e.g. on water, land, food, etc.) and their multiple interfaces with trade policies. 
• Conditioning the use of subsidies on their sustainability and/or health impacts encourages the delivery of essential public goods in ways that are consistent with sustainability and health goals. A first step therefore is the removal of perverse incentives (e.g. subsidies encouraging the overuse of fertilizers or pesticides or the overproduction of certain commodities, as well as certain biofuels subsidies) and replacing them with market-correcting subsidies.
• Trade facilitation measures for fruits and vegetables that are aimed at easing transit at the border, by cutting unnecessary bureaucracy and reducing waiting times, can improve their availability, reduce costs and improve food quality and safety for consumers. Similarly, measures aimed at improving sustainable cold storage and upgrading value chains can support better diets and consumption by increasing the availability of fresh produce on markets, especially in developing countries.
• A global food stamps programme developed through the G20 and facilitated by the UN’s food agencies could address purchasing power imbalances and tackle malnutrition in developing countries. If carefully designed, such ‘safety net’ schemes can not only contribute to improving calorific intakes but also help deliver more balanced and healthier diets. Careful attention must be given to how such a scheme would work in practice, building on experience to date with similar initiatives.
• Integrating the notion of sustainable food and inputs trade in the post-2020 global biodiversity framework can help to deliver more sustainable and healthier food and land use systems. This could be achieved by likeminded countries introducing a set of goals or targets aimed at mitigating the role of trade in placing indirect pressure on biodiversity, and to encourage trade in biodiversity-based products including natural ingredients produced ethically and following sustainability principles and criteria.
• An SDG-oriented agenda for agricultural trade is needed. It could be formed by countries seeking to remove perverse incentives, guaranteeing a safe harbour for market-correcting measures, clarifying existing rules and establishing plurilateral negotiations among subsets of the WTO membership, or sectoral approaches, to address specific challenges.
• Greenhouse gas emissions resulting from trade need to be addressed. Governments could seek to achieve this through ensuring the carbon neutrality of existing and new trade deals, either by connecting carbon markets among contracting parties or by developing joint initiatives to tax international maritime and air transport emissions.

In recent years, clean energy access for refugees and internally displaced people has emerged as a potential method of improving humanitarian outcomes and enabling self-reliance. While recent research emphasizes the need for more quantitative data to inform energy access interventions, better qualitative understanding would also improve innovation in this area.

This ethnographic study is the first of its kind to analyse energy access and resilience strategies deployed in two refugee camps, Kakuma in Kenya and Goudoubo in Burkina Faso. The stories of residents in these camps demonstrate the importance of considering everyday experiences of displaced people in developing sustainable humanitarian energy interventions.

This paper highlights the need for new methodological approaches to expand the evidence base for humanitarian energy interventions and policies. Future research could usefully inform humanitarian energy projects by examining the technical knowledge and existing practices of refugees in the design of energy technologies, systems and business models. Uptake and sustained use of new systems may be more likely where interventions build on or work in harmony with these factors.

To identify and promote collaborative opportunities for an inclusive and sustainable circular economy transition at the international level, a clearer understanding and discussions of the potential winners and losers of such a transition is needed. In short, a ‘win-win-win’ vision for the environment, people and the economy, needs to be built and credible pathways to achieving this vision.

This research workshop, organized by Chatham House and UNIDO, will build on previous and ongoing research by Chatham House, and others, to drive forward an inclusive circular economy agenda and promote a just transition from linear to circular economic models. Chatham House, in collaboration with partners, aims to provide a strong evidence base of the opportunities and trade-offs in this transition from linear to circular models by robustly analysing the political economies in key regions in the developing world and engaging with leading stakeholders from governments, international organizations, civil society and the business community.

Latin America is an important geographical region for the circular economy especially in view of the circular bioeconomy and the agenda around inclusiveness. Several countries are beginning to embrace the circular economy concept and related policies. This workshop will bring together circular economy leaders from policy, business and civil society across Latin American countries to identify and discuss challenges, large-scale positive sum opportunities, investment needs, existing alliances and the potential to scale up circular economy practices. The second day of the workshop includes site visits to various circular economy projects in Uruguay.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only. 

The circular economy, that minimizes waste and keeps materials and products in circulation for as long as possible, is increasingly regarded as a promising model for driving sustainable and resilient economic growth in both developed and emerging economies. To successfully scale circular practices and ensure the transition from a linear to a circular model leaves no one behind, an inclusive and collaborative approach is required.

• Inclusive policy approaches for solving the global waste crisis.
• Financing the circular economy and closing the investment gap.

• Trade in the circular economy: closed local economies or global collaborating systems?

During the second day of the conference, more specific circular economy themes are discussed in virtual panels including the following topics:

• Beyond plastic recycling: innovations for sustainable packaging.
• Advancing multilateral action on marine plastic pollution.
• Industry 4.0 and circular economy: identifying opportunities for developing countries.

The Chatham House Circular Economy conference forms part of the programme of events to celebrate the Chatham House Centenary highlighting the main goals for the institute’s second century.

The circular economy minimises waste and keeps materials and products in circulation for as long as possible. It is increasingly regarded as a promising model for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the global climate goals of the Paris Agreement, as well as driving sustainable and resilient economic growth in both developed and emerging economies.

The financial industry has a key role to play in scaling up circular practices and ensure the transition from a linear to a circular model. Interest and action from policymakers, the financial industry, and other stakeholders towards financing the circular economy is already emerging in the form of thematic circular economy funds and innovative financial vehicles, as well as new investment criteria, guidance and standards.

However, as more activities around circular economy financing are emerging, questions that arise concern issues of common definitions and standards, consistency with green climate finance and development finance as well as distributive justice and good governance.

Specific questions to be discussed during this event include:

• What is the current circular economy finance landscape in terms of initiatives, definitions, criteria and guidance?
• What are the roles of public and private funding and blended finance in financing the circular economy?
• What lessons can be learned from green climate finance initiatives and ESG related factors and risks?  What types of financial products for small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) in developing countries are required?
• How can the finance industry support inclusive and just transitions to the circular economy?

This roundtable will bring together experts representing public and private finance and investment to discuss these questions and share best practise to forge pathways for joined up approach on circular economy finance.

The roundtable will build on previous and ongoing research by Chatham House and others, to drive forward a global and inclusive circular economy agenda.  

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.