The second wave of Arab uprisings that started in Sudan in December last year and extended to Algeria, Lebanon and Iraq this year have built on past experiences of political transitions during the Arab Spring, both its mistakes and achievements. Protesters from this new wave have already learned five lessons from previous transitions.

The first lesson is that toppling the head of a regime does not mean that the political regime has fallen.  In Tahrir Square on 11 February 2011, Egyptian protesters celebrated the decision of Hosni Mubarak to step down and left the square, thinking his resignation was enough to allow a democratic transition to take place. In contrast, in Sudan and Algeria, protesters continued to demonstrate after the resignation of Abdelaziz Bouteflika and the military-led ousting of Omar al-Bashir.

Protesters understood the lesson that the regime is found not only in the head of the state, but rather in the rules that govern the political sphere. By extension, political change requires changing the rules, not just the names of those in charge of implementing them.

The second lesson is that resorting to violence is the fastest way to end any hope for democratic change. Protesters who decided to take up arms offered their regimes the chance to reframe the political uprisings as civil war, as was the case in Syria. Even when armed groups manage to bring down the regime, their presence endangers the transitional phase afterwards, as is the case in Libya.

Although protesters in Sudan and Iraq have been faced with government violence and repression, they have insisted on their non-violent approach. In Sudan, the protesters responded to the massacre outside of the General Command of the Armed Forces on 3 June by organizing a mass demonstration on 30 June, which put pressure on the military to resume talks with the revolutionary forces.

The third lesson is that once the old regime has fallen, the transition period must be a collective decision-making process in which the opposition has, at least, veto power. The example of Tunisia after 2011 is a case in point. The Higher Authority for Realization of the Goals of the Revolution, Political Reform and Democratic Transition, which formulated the planned course of the transition, included representatives from across the political spectrum and civil society.

Although the military forces in Algeria and Sudan will not cease to play a political role any time soon, this does not have to mean exerting complete control over the transitional period. Sudan could offer a positive example in this regard, if it succeeds in implementing a power-sharing deal according to which a joint civilian-military sovereign council will govern Sudan during the transitional period.

The fourth lesson is that political transitions should achieve agreement on the rules of the game before proceeding to elections. In Egypt after 2011, rushed elections served to divide the political opposition and dramatically increase polarization in society. In this second wave, protesters have perceived elections as a trap which enable old regimes to reproduce themselves with new names.

In both Algeria and Sudan, protesters have resisted attempts by the military to hold elections as soon as possible. In Sudan, the agreement between the revolutionary forces and the military council postponed the elections until after the end of a three-year transitional period of technocratic rule. In Algeria, protesters are taking to the streets every Friday to demonstrate against the authorities’ decision to hold presidential elections in December.

The fifth and final lesson is that the call for change in the region goes beyond electoral democracy and extends to deep socioeconomic reforms. Iraq and Lebanon show this clearly: relatively free and fair elections have already been held but have served only to reinforce corrupt sectarian regimes.

According to the fifth wave of the Arab Barometer, the economic situation and corruption are perceived as the main challenge for Algerians (62.2%), Sudanese (67.8%), Lebanese (57.9%), and Iraqis (50.2%), while democracy is perceived as the main challenge for only 2.3%, 3.9%, 5% and 1.4% respectively.  The experience of the Arab Spring has shown people that democratic measures are only a means to an end.

Unlike in 2011, when the Arab Spring revolts enjoyed broad international support, this second wave is taking place in a hostile environment, with stronger Russian and Iranian presences in the region and an indifferent international climate. But where protesters have the advantage is in experience, and across the region they are clearly adapting their tactics to lessons learned from the early part of the decade.

There has been a stark contrast between messaging coming from the international community and trends on the ground as Libya’s latest bout of civil war enters its eighth month.

Led by Germany, some states have been trying to build consensus for a ceasefire ahead of a summit that is expected to be held in Berlin in the next few months. Today marks the date of one of the final planning meetings for the summit.

The increasing use of drone technology, airstrikes and further influxes of fighters trend points in the opposite direction. Warring groups in Libya continue to receive support from external states, undermining international efforts to de-escalate the conflict. A UN arms embargo goes largely unenforced. As the Berlin process unfolds, there is little evidence to suggest that these external states will shift their positions.

The launch of Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) offensive on Tripoli in April sunk a UN-planned ‘national conference’, intended to be held less than two weeks later, to negotiate a framework for transition out of Libya’s governance crisis. Yet, Haftar has so far failed in his objective of capturing Tripoli. While his offensive continues, had he the capacity to capture the city, he would have done so already.

This has created a conundrum for peace talks: there appears to be little chance of negotiating a deal with Haftar, while it is also hard to see how a deal could be reached without him.

The field marshal has little interest in accepting a withdrawal, even a partial one, of his forces. His opponents – who have found unity in their shared efforts to defeat Haftar’s forces – will not accept a ceasefire that leaves the LAAF on the hinterlands of the capital. Similarly, a deal apparently agreed in Abu Dhabi between Haftar and Prime Minister Fayez al-Serraj in February is also dead in the water.

Amid this logjam, there has been an increasing interest in the economic content of the Berlin summit. Countries supportive of Haftar argue that his alliance has legitimate concerns over the management of Libya’s economy and, particularly, the dominant role of the Tripoli-based central bank and its governor in supporting armed groups.

For some within these countries, changing the leadership of the central bank and a finding means of limiting the dominance of the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) over the state’s resources – thus reducing flows of funding to armed groups fighting Haftar – could present a point of agreement in Berlin.

But their focus on financial management in Tripoli is not mirrored by interest in holding the rival central bank in the eastern city of Bayda – an institution unrecognized by the international community – to account for its pursuit of its own monetary policy. This is built on approximately $23 billion of unsecured debt from commercial banks and $11 billion of currency supplied by Russia.

Indeed, very few of the conversations surrounding parameters for Berlin contain details of what would be asked of eastern-based actors beyond pursuit of an audit of the Tripoli and Bayda central banks (only the Tripoli bank is recognized by the international community).

Clearly, the GNA and its allies would have no incentive to accept provisions that limit their means to mobilize resources for the war while its opponents do not receive the same scrutiny. 

However, it is possible to capitalize on the broad interest in economic content to reach some points of agreement over the management of the economy and state institutions. Rather than seeking to replace individuals aligned with one faction for those aligned with another, or expecting asymmetrical concessions from the GNA and its allies, this effort must instead focus on structures and processes that exacerbate the conflict and represent major grievances for the warring parties.

Importantly, this would include the establishment of a system of transparency and accountability for the management of Libya’s finances.  The opacity of current processes enables the support of patronage-based networks with no effective oversight.

Linked to this, the development of effective processes for budgeting and allocating funds could help to reduce graft.

And, finally, rationalizing the role of state institutions to agree their roles and responsibilities, creating the room for reforms to Libya’s system of state employment and subsidies through provision of direct payments to Libyan citizens, is essential.  

An economic commission that comprises members from across political and institutional divides – receiving political support from international powers and technical support from international financial institutions – could be an effective approach. Such a commission could match an inclusive, Libyan-led process with international support to progressively harmonize economic and financial policy between rival authorities and develop consensus for a process of institutional reunification in Libya.

This would constitute a major element of an eventual political settlement and reduce the risk of a limited set of actors capturing the system at the expense of the others – an outcome which would likely result in future bouts of violence.

Such a commission would offer a means of addressing a key driver of the conflict by decentralizing aspects of Libya’s governance, moving away from the dominance of Tripoli and the current winner-take-all system. 

These issues cannot be put to one side, to follow progress on the security front. The remarkable resilience that Libya’s economy has shown over the last seven months should not be taken for granted. It has become increasingly difficult for Libya’s institutions to insulate themselves from the conflict as both sides seek to mobilize resources to sustain their war effort.

The LAAF is increasingly looking to sideline civilian authorities in eastern Libya. On the other side, the GNA has found means of routing funds to armed groups fighting Haftar.

In September, a dispute over the supply of jet fuel between the LAAF and the National Oil Corporation resulted in the establishment of a parallel Brega Petroleum Marketing Company, the state-owned company that possesses a monopoly over fuel distribution.

Meanwhile, other major problems lurk under the surface.  The banking sector is in an increasingly perilous state and debts continue to mount all around, with those in the east not accounted for by Tripoli’s official authorities.  

Through the establishment of an economic commission, the Berlin process provides an opportunity and – most importantly – a mechanism to address these problems while also helping to maintain the basic functionality of the state.  Even if a ceasefire deal does not materialize, initiating negotiations about the future shape of the state and its economy would be a significant step forward.

Over recent weeks, widespread popular protests have engulfed Iraq and Lebanon. What began as calls for reform in the context of high unemployment and endemic corruption have evolved into direct challenges to the existing political order in both countries. How have the ruling elites responded to the popular uprisings? What do these developments mean for the future of the two countries and the region more broadly?

Dr Lina Khatib and Dr Renad Mansour will discuss what is at stake for protesters and what are the obstacles to meaningful and sustainable reform in Iraq and Lebanon.

Please note this webinar is for Middle East and North Africa Programme supporters only and will be taking place online.

Following the US strike on Qassem Solaimani and Abu Mehdi al-Muhandis, populist cleric Muqtada al-Sadr has violently cracked down on youth-led protests in Iraq.

His paramilitaries and ‘blue hats’ –  supposedly created to protect protestors from state and allied parastatal security forces – sought to end the months-long demonstrations by attacking the places where protesters have camped since October. In Baghdad’s Tahrir Square, they successfully captured the famous Turkish restaurant which had become a symbol of Iraq’s ‘October revolution’. 

Once the champion of Iraq’s protest movement, Sadr has seemingly changed course and now leads the counter-protests. This reversal has mystified many, from Iraqis who saw Sadr as an ally in their struggle for reform against an impenetrable elite to foreign diplomats who hoped Sadr could help pushback against Iranian influence in Iraq. 

Yet this is not the first time that Sadr has drastically redefined his position. Since 2003, he has gone from Shia sectarian militia leader to pro-democracy reformist and Iraqi nationalist.

And in the past few months, he has given mixed signals, both supporting and criticising the protesters. The most recent incidents of Sadrist violence targeting demonstrators provoked a societal backlash, prompting Sadr to change tack once more and announce that he would disband the blue hats and investigate their crimes against protesters.

Sadr and the paramilitaries

Sadr’s latest change of course may seem to flow directly from the US assassination of Qassem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis and the ensuing vacuum in the Shia paramilitary sphere. Prior to this move, the Sadrists were on the defensive, outflanked and outgunned by the growing coercive and political power of a constellation of Shia armed groups coalescing under Muhandis’s de facto leadership. Many of these groups competed for Sadr’s base, including Qais al-Khazali’s Asa’ib ahl al-Haq and Akram al-Kaabi’s Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba.  

With Muhandis out of the picture, Sadr could reclaim the space by pushing his own right hand, Kadhem al-Issawi (Abu Do’a), to be the new centre of the paramilitary field and forcing competitors, including Khaza’li and Kaabi, to rally around his leadership.

Iran, in the short term, appears to be going along with this solution to bring more coherence to its allied forces in Iraq as it seeks to counter what it regards as US aggression. Iran also hopes that bringing Sadr back in will help neutralize the protest movement which threatens its stake in Iraqi politics. 

The most visible sign of this Iran-brokered rapprochement was the 13 January meeting in Qom attended by Sadr, Issawi and several senior militia commanders including Laith al-Khazali (Qais al-Khazali’s brother). 

Following the Qom meeting, a pattern of tit-for-tat violence and assassinations between the Sadrists’ Saraya al-Salam and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq – ongoing since the start of the October protests in Iraq – ceased.

A fragmented movement?

However, while the US strikes certainly changed Sadr’s political calculations, there are more persistent fundamentals at work that help explain his change of course. The first of these relates to long-standing fragmentation within the movement. This exists not only within Sadrist paramilitaries, but within the movement’s clerical networks, and also applies to the ties that bind the Sadrist leadership to its popular base. This fragmentation makes it difficult for Sadr to impose a coherent politics on his followers from the top down.

There are signs that Sadr’s recent shift in position has exacerbated this fragmentation. His attempt to reposition the movement’s base within the ‘resistance axis’ that supports the Shia militias in Iraq has only been partially successful. On 24 January, responding to the US assassinations, Sadr called for a million-man march focused on expelling US forces from Iraq. However, turnout was poor, especially given the huge logistical support for the march, and it lasted only a few hours.

Equally revealing, when Sadr called on his supporters to vacate the squares, many refused. One Sadrist protester in Baghdad’s Tahrir Square told the authors: ‘We’ve been camping with our brothers and sisters for four months. Why should we leave them to die?’

Meanwhile, fissures have also opened up within the Sadrists’ clerical elite. One senior Sadrist cleric, for example, is openly defying Sadr’s authority and siding with the revolutionaries in Nasiriyah. 

Sadr’s attempt to dominate the paramilitary sphere is also unlikely to prove any more successful than his many previous failed attempts since 2003. He is neither trusted nor respected by the leaders of other groups. The Iran-brokered rapprochement is already showing signs of weakness. Two recent assassinations of Saraya al-Salam leaders in Basra and Maysan indicate a potential renewal of power struggles between the Sadrist militia and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq.  

Sadr is not a revolutionary

Sadr has never been a revolutionary, but someone who seeks to leverage a role as both ‘spoiler’ and ‘stabilizer’ to maximise his political leverage. This strategy is ultimately oriented towards sustaining Iraq’s extant political system, not its overthrow. Forced to choose between the roles of revolutionary or maintainer of the status quo, he has opted for the latter. 

The protests that erupted in 2019 were not the same movement that Sadr led from 2015. The 2015 protests were an elite-driven phenomenon, integrated into the political field and carefully calibrated to exert pressure on the elite towards gradual reform. 

By contrast, the 2019 demonstrations spring from a youth-led, bottom-up mobilization that rejects politicization and seeks a more radical form of change. Chatham House surveys in a forthcoming paper reveal that the protesters are younger that those who protested in 2015-16. Fewer have permanent employment. Instead of demanding better services or jobs, they are focusing wholesale transformation of the post-2003 political system.

A Sadrist official told the authors that their movement initially joined the protests in October 2019 expecting a similar reform-orientation to the protests which Sadr had previously led. However, according to him, the protesters failed to come forward with reasonable demands or alternative names for prime minister. He believed the protests would fade, and many would regret the ‘wasted time and blood’. 

Sadr’s relations with Iran

A final long-term factor at play is Sadr’s receding autonomy from Iran. Ever since his movement’s electoral victory in May 2018, Sadr came under enormous pressure to reconcile with the political wing of the Iranian-allied parastatal armed groups in the formation of a new government acceptable to Iran.

Over the last year, Sadr has moved even closer to Iran, spending more time in Qom. Iran has offered Sadr security from his paramilitary rivals (such as Asa’ib ahl al-Haq), convincing Sadr that he is safer in Iran than Iraq. Moreover, Sadr is undertaking religious training in Qom, and may see this as a chance to enhance his standing in the Shia religious field as many look towards a future beyond the elderly Najaf-based marja Ali al-Sistani.

By keeping Sadr in Qom, Iran appears to be trying to isolate him from what they regard as negative influences. As tensions between the Sadrists and other protest groups intensified, efforts were made by some protest leaders and allied political groups to reach Sadr in Qom and try to persuade him to change course or restrain the worst abuses of his forces. However, this delegation was unable to make contact with Sadr. Those involved told the authors they have resorted to communicating with local Sadrist leaders in Najaf, Babil, Basra and Baghdad. 

Crossing a line

This is a transformative moment for the Sadrists. Sadr is now defying the popular sentiments driving protests across central and southern Iraq. The sense of betrayal among former allies and friends of the Sadrists is palpable. One senior activist involved in cooperation with the Sadrists wrote that, no matter what moves Sadr makes next, the cleric has ‘terminated all partnership with the protesters,’ and ‘shattered the framework for cooperation’. A line has thus been crossed that Sadr cannot reverse; he will not be able to recover what he has now lost. 

Iran, also, does not see Sadr as a dependable ally, and will look to isolate and side-line the cleric when the opportunity arises. Thus, in seeking to exploit a crisis for short-term gain, Sadr may well have sealed his fate – in the long term – as a declining force in Iraqi politics.

Water is a critical issue for Iraq’s future stability and prosperity. Only a few decades ago, the country was one of the most fertile in the region, with two major rivers flowing through it. Today, national and transboundary pollution, mismanagement, and debilitating cycles of conflict have contributed to a situation where only half of current water needs are being met, and where an 80% reduction in the flow of water down the Tigris and Euphrates rivers has led to the loss of millions of acres of formerly productive land and the displacement of rural communities.

Water scarcity can be a driver of violence and conflict. Tribal conflicts over water sources have erupted sporadically in the south and the contamination of municipal water which led to the hospitalization of some 118,000 citizens was a trigger for the large-scale protests in Basra in late 2018. Without concerted action by national and local governments, companies and international agencies, the situation will only worsen as higher temperatures and reduced rainfall drive rural-to-urban migration and increase the risk of drought, food insecurity and water-related diseases.

At this roundtable, part of the Chatham House Iraq Initiative, experts will discuss the domestic, regional and international factors that continue to exacerbate the water crisis in Iraq, and propose solutions, including technical innovation, public sector capacity-building and greater international cooperation, that might contribute to effective state-building, build resilience to the effects of climate change and reduce the risk of further conflict.

To understand Lebanon’s financial collapse, look to its politics.

The country has been deeply damaged by an increasingly dysfunctional political system. A series of compromises have alienated it from its main markets in the Gulf and strangled its economy; anyone that has glanced at fluctuations in Lebanese bank deposits over the last 10 years can see the correlation.

Imagine if Boris Johnson or Donald Trump were obliged to form joint governments with Jeremy Corbyn or Bernie Sanders. The result would be paralysis and lack of accountability as each party pulls the country in opposite directions and blames the other for the state of limbo. This has been the state of affairs in Lebanon since the Doha agreement of 2008. 

That agreement followed an 18-month siege that paralyzed Beirut and an attack on the city by Hezbollah’s ‘black shirts’. The Doha formula imposed governments of national unity between Prime Minister Saad Hariri’s pro-Saudi camp and Hezbollah’s pro-Iran camp and their respective internal allies.

The pattern was set: each period of subsequent paralysis was followed by further compromise as the tug of war pulled the country away from its principal economic partners, the Arab Gulf states, with the regional balance of power tilting towards Hezbollah. 

It was not supposed to be like this. The Baabda Declaration in June 2012, reached after a process of national dialogue, was meant to secure Lebanon’s neutrality in regional conflicts, with both sides promising to hold back on external alliances and coexist despite difference over major regional issues like the war in Syria, the standoff between the US and Iran or relations with Israel or the Gulf states.

This has worn away. The Baabda declaration itself became a sham when Hezbollah inserted itself into the war in Syria in support of the Assad regime and overtly got involved in Iraq and Yemen as an Iranian proxy. This was followed by Saudi opposition to concessions by Hariri that led to the election of General Michel Aoun, an ally of Hezbollah, as president in October 2016; again, after a political paralysis that lasted 29 months with no active government and no head of state.  

The Saudis were also furious when President Aoun’s son-in-law, Foreign Minister Gebran Bassil, abstained from condemning the burning of the Saudi embassy in Tehran at an Arab League meeting in Cairo in January 2016, citing the need to preserve national unity.

Fearing that he was simply providing Hezbollah with protection in the guise of compromise, the Saudis pressured Hariri to resign in November 2017 during a trip to Riyadh, but he later challenged that by retracting on his resignation when back in Beirut. Lebanon was caught between two sides, and as the regional conflict intensified from tension to open confrontation, neutrality was no longer an option.

Gulf connections

An estimated 350,000 Lebanese expats live and work in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar and Kuwait. These countries are also the main clients for Lebanese contractors, consultants and advertising companies, some of which have offices there. The domestic tourism industry relies heavily on Arab Gulf visitors and they are a principal source of foreign investments especially in the real estate sector.

Lebanon also enjoyed a certain degree of political and economic protection from the US and the Gulf, and Hezbollah benefited indirectly from that protection, as it also shielded it to a certain degree from sanctions.

The deterioration of relations meant that the country was cut off by its Gulf partners. This was manifested in travel bans for Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nationals to Lebanon and a decrease in investments and bank deposits, as well as a decrease in remittances from Lebanese expats, partly because of economic crisis in the Gulf countries themselves.

Saudi Arabia withdrew $4 billion of aid to the Lebanese army and internal security forces, and no aid or deposits were forthcoming as the economic and financial situation deteriorated. 

The costs to the Lebanese economy include the opportunity cost created by the annual threat of war with Israel, after which trips are cancelled and projects postponed. Hezbollah also controls a section of Beirut port where it pays no duty or taxes. Add to that the economic fallout from the war in Syria, such as the impact on exports, the inflow of refugees and the cost of Hezbollah’s involvement.

The burden of these political factors is difficult to estimate but it constitutes the ransom that the Lebanese economy bears as a cost of the compromise. This is not to absolve Lebanese politicians from corruption or bankers of mismanagement but to add that political factors cannot be ignored.

The cumulative cost and economic impact of being cut off from its main economic partner eventually bankrupted the country. The fiscal and financial aspects, with Lebanon’s inability to service its debt, are but a reflection of these political factors. In the long run, the key to avoiding complete collapse is to restore relations with the GCC and free Lebanon from that very costly grip.

Summary

• China’s presence in the Maghreb has increased in recent years, raising concerns among Western powers. China has focused on bilateral relations with these countries while also working within the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and the China–Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF). However, this engagement has limited strategic value compared to relations China has with Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates.
• Since the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013, China has shown greater interest in the Maghreb as an entry point to European and African markets. China has pursued commercial relations over political influence in the region. Morocco and Tunisia are still dependent on France, their former colonial power, and the European Union, which exert great political, economic, security and cultural influence over the two countries.
• The Maghreb countries’ economic relations with China have grown exponentially, with Algeria forming the closest relationship. However, Morocco and Tunisia are keen to attract China’s investment and involvement in major construction and infrastructure projects to boost industrial and economic development. While China’s investments in Morocco and Tunisia remain at a low level, trade relations with both countries have grown steadily. Politically, China’s policy of noninterference in domestic affairs appeals to Maghreb states, which resent Western interference.
• China’s influence in the Maghreb remains minimal. Its soft power push has struggled to promote advantages of strong relations with China beyond economics. Furthermore, Morocco and Tunisia’s populations have generally scant knowledge about China’s politics and culture. China has tried to address this lack of familiarity through the establishment of Confucius Institutes and other cultural activities. However, language and cultural barriers still impede the development of close relations, compared to those China has with other countries in Africa.

Summary

• GCC states seek to be leaders in digital innovation, but this leaves them vulnerable to an increasing range of cyberthreats. Governments have invested significantly in cybersecurity but these measures have been unevenly implemented, makingit difficult for these states to be resilient against a large-scale cyber incident.
• Strategies, structures and processes (‘approaches’) for achieving cyber resilience can be conceptualized along a scale from centralized to distributed: centralized approaches maintain decision-making power in a single body, while distributed ones disperse power over many sites.
• Centralized approaches provide more resilience against unwanted influence, while distributed approaches provide more resilience against intrusions into infrastructure. The GCC states have so far prioritized centralized over distributed cyber resilience, seeking internet and social media control over sustainable network recovery.
• GCC governments should make a sustainable commitment to cyber resilience that provides clear guidance to organizations and makes best use of emerging cybersecurity structures. This may involve further engagement with international initiatives and partners to increase cyber resilience.
• Given limited resources, GCC governments should rebalance their efforts from centralized towards distributed approaches to resilience.
• GCC governments should examine the impact of relevant new technologies, discussing openly the risks of these technologies and appropriate solutions.

At this webinar, part of the Chatham House MENA Programme Online Event Series, experts will explore how the coronavirus pandemic is impacting the economy, state-society relations and healthcare throughout the Middle East and North Africa. How are governments handling this crisis and what measures have they put in place to stop the spread of the virus? Why are some governments withholding information about the number of cases? What has the response from the public been so far? How is this affecting the region and how does it compare to the global picture?

The event will be held on the record.

As Lebanon strains to contain COVID-19, it is not clear which governmental public health policies apply to refugees. The government announced free testing for coronavirus in the public Rafiq Hariri University Hospital in Beirut but has not mentioned if refugees are eligible.

Lebanon’s coronavirus containment strategy is based on self-reporting and, given incidents of forced deportation and harassment of Syrian refugees from both the authorities and local communities, it is certainly less likely refugees would present themselves to the health authorities for fear of deportation.

Despite agreeing a Lebanon Crisis Response Plan with the UN for refugees, different ministries were left to implement it without coordination, just as Lebanese politicians from all sides started trying to rally popular support for ridding Lebanon from refugees - in particular from Syria, who Lebanese leaders say are causing a strain on the country’s already weak infrastructure.

This finger pointing is coupled with the leaders’ own complete disregard for the rampant corruption and lack of accountability within Lebanon’s political class, which contribute to the weakening of the country’s infrastructure.

For refugees who do find themselves back in Syria, there are different challenges according to which area they are in. In the north-east, the WHO and international NGOs (INGOs) negotiate with both Kurdish authorities as well as the government - each presenting its own hurdles.

Kurdish authorities in northeast Syria have closed the Semalka border with Iraqi Kurdistan, posing a serious dilemma for INGOs offering services in north-east Syria but concerned about their staff safety whose movement is now curtailed.

The government of Syria has stipulated all emergency response must go through its ministries. But this limits what the WHO can do in the country and gives Syrian authorities the ability to block ‘cross-line aid’ which goes from government-controlled to non-government areas.

Despite reports that doctors raised the alarm about suspected cases well before patient zero was confirmed, the government appears to be either covering up the actual extent of the spread of COVID-19 or failing to respond. Some limited testing kits have arrived but testing has barely started.

The WHO’s Syria plan is divided into three regions (north-west, north-east, and areas under government control). But concerns remain as to how workable such a decentralized plan is because of the government’s practices. In January, the UN Security Council did not renew the cross-border response resolution for the Yaroubiye border crossing between Syria and Iraq that the WHO was using to send medical supplies into north-east Syria.

Syrian authorities do not permit recently authorized ‘cross-line’ responders to engage with non-government authorities in areas outside regime control. This essentially voids the authorization to work cross-line as it is practically impossible to implement programs. The WHO has sought approval from the Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to move medical supplies by land to north-east Syria.

While promising facilitation, the Ministry’s reply comes with conditions of seeking detailed approval for every shipment. When Eastern Ghouta was under siege, similar conditions led to certain supplies being removed from UN/ICRC convoys to Eastern Ghouta, and there is no guarantee this will not happen again.

Due to lack of capacity in north-east Syria, coronavirus tests conducted by the WHO there must be processed through the Central Public Health Laboratory in Damascus. Samples are transported twice a week from Qamishli to Damascus but no results were ever received from Damascus for those tests.

While the WHO is able to coordinate access to north-west Syria with the Turkish authorities, the prospective coronavirus testing capacity in the Idlib region is low – despite claims that thousands of kits are arriving, a lack of resource on the ground means potentially only 20 tests per day could be done in an area inhabited by an estimated three million people.

Following the recently announced ceasefire in the area, many internally displaced people are returning from the Turkish border to their homes in the north-west, but such mass movement increases the risk of coronavirus spreading. People also continue to move between Syria, Iraq, Turkey and Lebanon, posing a challenge to the WHO’s COVID-19 response in the Levant, as the WHO has distinct response plans for each country in the region and it is difficult to coordinate across these plans.

Challenges face refugees even if they head towards Europe due to the potential for conflation between migration control and coronavirus outbreak control. Aurelie Ponthieu, Coordinator for Forced Migration at Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) says there is a risk some countries could use COVID-19 to impose draconian measures towards asylum seekers.

The crisis has also put a halt to search and rescue operations in the Mediterranean because European countries are not allowing boats carrying migrants to disembark under the pretext of limiting the spread of coronavirus. And for migrants who already made it - such as in Greece - they are now being put in collective quarantines in asylum centers, often with poor medical facilities.

Ponthieu also reports that migrants being quarantined on overcrowded navy ships docked in Greek ports, making social distancing impossible. And she is concerned the Greek authorities are imposing a curfew on asylum seekers but not on the local population.

UNHCR is stressing that people’s right of asylum must not be overruled by concerns about the spread of coronavirus, while local and international NGOs across the Levant are trying to coordinate their advocacy on lifting restrictions on freedom of movement for humanitarian workers and on other policies and practices by authorities in the region which are adversely affecting refugee and other vulnerable communities.

The international community must not lose sight of the impact of the crisis on refugees and migrants. It is not enough simply to supply humanitarian and medical assistance without paying attention to the policies and practices of the different authorities who have direct control over the fate of vulnerable communities.

The author would like to thank Aurelie Ponthieu and the two INGO field workers who all agreed to be interviewed to inform this analysis piece.

The event will be livestreamed on the MENA Programme Facebook page.

Climate and environmental issues have largely been marginalized in discussions about the Middle East and North Africa region and yet are critical to peace and security. In this webinar, experts will explore mounting pressures including those related to water (reduced, less reliable and more polluted sources), extreme temperatures, air pollution, land degradation and sea-level rise. Panelists will discuss the potential impact of worsening environmental conditions and what the region's governments can do to protect the health and livelihoods of their peoples.

This webinar is part of the Chatham House MENA Programme's Online Event Series and will be held on the record.

In Morocco, the COVID-19 pandemic has increased public trust in government, but people still have doubts about the effectiveness of the healthcare system. According to a recent study conducted by the Moroccan Institute for Policy Analysis (MIPA), the majority of Moroccans surveyed are generally satisfied with the measures taken by the government to battle the coronavirus. However, the same survey also shows that Moroccans do not have confidence in the healthcare sector’s ability to respond to this pandemic.

The positive perceptions of the government’s response can be explained by the swift and strict measures enacted. King Mohammed VI held a high-level meeting with the prime minister, the minister of health, and top security officials on 17 March and a few days later, on 20 March, the Moroccan government declared a state of health emergency and began to implement aggressive measures to contain the virus.

This has included closing airports, schools, mosques, cafés and shops – with the exception of food markets – preventing large gatherings, as well as strict guidelines to ensure social distancing. As of 2 April, nearly 5000 people have been arrested for violating the state of health emergency.

In order to address urgent medical needs and to mitigate the economic impact of the pandemic, the King ordered the creation of an emergency fund, raising more than 32.7 billion Moroccan Dirhams ($3.2 billion). The Ministry of Finance will begin to make cash transfers to vulnerable citizens, and especially those who have lost their jobs. However, the stipulations surrounding these cash transfers will be decided in the coming weeks.

Updates about the virus are communicated daily by the Ministry of Health, despite growing criticism of its communication strategy. As of 4 April, Moroccan authorities have confirmed 883 cases and 58 deaths.

Call for national unity

In times like these, there is a call for unity in the face of a national and global crisis, and opposition groups such as Adl wal Ihssan and Rif activists have expressed their support for government measures and have encouraged people to follow the new guidelines and restrictions. However, despite calls to release political prisoners, Moroccan authorities have not indicated that they will do so. This is a missed opportunity vis-à-vis the opposition because it could have served as a way to further strengthen national unity during the crisis.

These are all promising signs and point to what is likely to be a short-term burst in unity and institutional trust. However, the institutional weaknesses in governance and the healthcare system have not disappeared, which is why this increase in institutional trust should be taken with a grain of salt.

Public trust issues

This pandemic poses tremendous challenges for governments across the globe, and this holds especially true for states in the Middle East and North Africa region, where citizens do not approve of government performance and do not trust key state institutions. The 2019 Arab Barometer survey found that Moroccans do not trust most of the country’s political institutions (notably the parliament and the Council of Ministers) and the level of satisfaction with the government’s performance remains extremely low.

On the public health front, as shown in two of MIPA’s recent surveys, trust in the healthcare system is also very low. Around three-quarters of those surveyed do not trust Moroccan hospitals, highlighting the acute structural problems in the healthcare system. In fact, there is a stark divide between private and public healthcare, as well as a huge gap in access to healthcare facilities between urban and rural areas. Most of the country’s hospitals and doctors are located in major urban areas and the only three laboratories with capabilities for COVID-19 testing are located in Rabat and Casablanca, but even there, testing capacity is very limited.

Similar to other countries, there could be a major shortage of doctors and medical equipment throughout Morocco. So far, the Ministry of Finance has said that 2 billion dirhams of the emergency fund will go towards purchasing medical equipment such as beds, ventilators, tests, prevention kits and radiology equipment, but the timeline remains unclear.

A vulnerable economy

There is significant concern about the medium- and long-term economic impact of the virus. Two of the country’s key economic sectors have already been hit hard: agriculture and tourism. The agricultural sector was already struggling due to the impact of drought, while the coronavirus pandemic is likely to impact Morocco’s tourism industry not just this year, but well into 2021. In terms of government response, the emergency fund is a strong start, but questions surrounding the management of these funds have already been raised.

The most vulnerable parts of the population have been affected by the economic crisis because of the country’s bulging informal sector – in which most people work - and a very weak private sector. In fact, two-thirds of the workforce are not covered by a pension plan, almost half of the working population does not currently benefit from medical coverage and there is no social care system for vulnerable parts of the population. As of 1 April, more than 700,000 workers have lost their jobs.

Moving forward?

Even if public perceptions of the government’s response are positive at the moment, this is most likely a short-term surge that should not be taken for granted. Despite the efforts made by the government, Morocco’s health system is not equipped to handle this crisis. Even with the new measures that have been implemented, if the spread of the virus gets out of control, more funds, more doctors, and more equipment will be needed. Given the structural weaknesses of the healthcare system, this will be an uphill battle.

Moreover, even if the government manages to mitigate the public health impact, the economic consequences will be dire—especially in the tourism industry—and will severely hurt those workers in the informal sector who are living without a safety net. In Morocco, this category represents most of the working population.

This crisis highlights that the Moroccan government must urgently tackle its large portfolio of unfinished reforms, notably in healthcare, the economy, and labour rights. So far, the government is capitalizing on the spirit of unity, social solidarity and public support. The future trajectory of the pandemic and the effectiveness of governance will determine if this spirit of solidarity will last. If the government fails to effectively mitigate the public health and economic impacts of this pandemic, this solidarity and cooperation will not last long.

Yemen suffered from the excessive control of the central government prior to the current conflict. Federalism has been put forward by many Yemeni political parties since the National Dialogue Conference (NDC) as the supposed magic cure for this significant problem. Today, Yemen is more fragmented than ever, its state central institutions have been scattered and lack leadership and the state has lost most of its sovereignty. The prevailing narrative that decentralization through federalism is Yemen’s inevitable path post-conflict often fails to acknowledge that there are prerequisites for effective local governance, beyond political will.  

In a recent article, Osamah Al Rawhani addressed how the weakness of central state institutions is the key challenge to proceeding with federalism in Yemen and highlighted prerequisites and contextual factors that need to be addressed before reforming the structure of the state. He argued that the viability of decentralization relies on the presence of a functioning, representative central government that is capable of devolving power but also able to keep the state from further fragmentation. 

In this webinar, part of the Chatham House project on The Future of the State in the Middle East and North Africa, the article’s author will discuss recent developments in Yemen, where shifting frontlines and regional divisions are fragmenting the country in new ways. The speaker will explore alternative approaches to pursue the path of federalism that recognize the current realities and the critical need for strong central institutions. He will also survey the internal and external factors that must be considered to rebuild a stable state in Yemen.

You can express your interest in attending by following this link. You will receive a Zoom confirmation email should your registration be successful. Alternatively, you can watch the event live on the MENA Programme Facebook page.

Historically, Iraq lay claim to one of the most abundant water supplies in the Middle East. But the flow of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers has reduced by up to 40% since the 1970s, due in part to the actions of neighbouring countries, in particular Turkey, upstream.

Rising temperatures and reduced rainfall due to climate change are also negatively impacting Iraq’s water reserves. Evaporation from dams and reservoirs is estimated to lose the country up to 8 billion cubic metres of water every year.

A threat to peace and stability

Shortages have dried up previously fertile land, increasing poverty in agricultural areas. Shortages have also served to fuel conflict: communities faced with successive droughts and government inertia proved to be easy targets for ISIS recruiters, who lured farmers into joining them by offering money and food to feed their families. Economic hardship for those whose livelihoods relied upon river water has also driven rural to urban migration, putting significant strain on already over-populated towns and cities, exacerbating housing, job and electricity shortages, and widening the gap between haves and have-nots.

But scarcity isn’t the most crucial element of Iraq’s water crisis – contamination is. Decades of local government mismanagement, corrupt practices and a lack of regulation of dumping (it is estimated up to 70% of Iraq’s industrial waste is dumped directly into water) has left approximately three in every five citizens without a reliable source of potable water.

In 2018, 118,000 residents of Basra province were hospitalised with symptoms brought on by drinking contaminated water, which not only put a spotlight on the inadequacies of a crumbling healthcare system but sparked mass protests and a subsequent violent crackdown.

The water crisis is also undermining the stability of the country’s federal governance model, by occasionally sparking disputes between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government, as well as between governorates in the south.

The crisis is both a symptom and a cause of poor governance. Iraq is stuck in a cycle whereby government inaction causes shortages and contamination, which result in economic losses, reduced food supply, increased prices and widespread poor health. This in turn leads to increasing levels of poverty, higher demand on services and civil unrest, increasing the pressure on a weak, dysfunctional system of government.

What can be done?

The first priority should be modernising existing water-management infrastructure - a relic of a time when the problem was an excess rather than a shortage of water (the last time Iraq’s flood defences were required was 1968). Bureaucratic hurdles, widespread corruption and an endless cycle of other crises taking precedent prevent good initiatives from being implemented or scaled up.

Diversifying energy sources to improve provision is crucial. Baghdad has a sewage treatment plant that originally ran on its own electricity source, but this capacity was destroyed in 1991 and was never replaced. The city continues to suffer from dangerous levels of water pollution because the electricity supply from the grid is insufficient to power the plant. Solar energy has great potential in sun-drenched Iraq to bridge the gaping hole in energy provision, but successive governments have chosen to focus on fossil fuels rather than promoting investment to grow the renewables sector.

Heightened tension with upstream Turkey could turn water into another cause of regional conflict. But, if approached differently, collaboration between Iraq and its neighbour could foster regional harmony.

Turkey’s elevated geography and cooler climate mean its water reserves suffer 75% less evaporation than Iraq’s. Given that Turkey’s top energy priority is the diversification of its supply of imported hydrocarbons, a win-win deal could see Turkey exchange access to its water-management infrastructure for delivery of reduced cost energy supplies from Iraq.

German-French cooperation on coal and steel in the 1950s and the evolution of economic integration that followed might provide a model for how bilateral cooperation over one issue could result in cooperation with other regional players (in this case Iran and Syria) on a range of other issues. This kind of model would need to consider the future of energy, whereby oil and gas would be replaced by solar-power exports.

These solutions have been open to policymakers for years and yet they have taken little tangible action. While there are leaders and bureaucrats with the will to act, effective action is invariably blocked by a complex and opaque political system replete with vested interests in maintaining power and wealth via a weak state and limited services from central government.

Breaking the cycle

To break this cycle, Iraq needs a group of professional and able actors outside of government to work with willing elements of the state bureaucracy as a taskforce to pressure for action and accountability. Publishing the recommendations from a hitherto withheld report produced in the aftermath of Basra’s 2018 heath crisis would be a great start.

In time, this taskforce could champion the prioritisation of water on the national agenda, the implementation of infrastructure upgrades, and hold more productive conversations with neighbour states.

With such a high degree of state fragmentation and dysfunction in Iraq, looking to the central government to provide leadership will not yield results. Engagement with a coalition of non-state actors can begin to address the water crisis and also open a dialogue around new models of governance for other critical issues. This might even be a starting point for rewriting the tattered social contract in Iraq.

This piece is based on insights and discussion at a roundtable event, Conflict and the Water Crisis in Iraq, held at Chatham House on March 9 as part of the Iraq Initiative.

On April 9, Iraqi President Barham Salih gathered the Shia, Kurdish and Sunni political blocs at the presidential palace to task head of intelligence Mustafa al-Kadhimi with forming a government.

Kadhimi is the third prime minister-designate assigned since Prime Minister Adil abd al-Mehdi resigned in November, in the wake of mass protests against government corruption and the country’s ethno-sectarian based political system.

Kadhimi’s two predecessors, Muhammad Tawfiq Allawi and Adnan al-Zurfi, both failed to form a government. This third attempt came as Iraq struggles with repeated crises since October 2019, when the government began responding with deadly force to large-scale mass protests, killing more than 600 and injuring tens of thousands.

In January, the assassination of Qasem Soleimani escalated tensions between the United States and Iran, with Iraq stuck in the middle and becoming the home for regular tit-for-tat attacks. The Islamic State — never completely defeated — took advantage of these crises and increased its attacks in disputed territories.

The outbreak of COVID-19 challenges the country’s fragile public health sector, while the decline in the price of oil will make it harder for leaders to pay the public salaries that keep the system (and patronage) moving.

What does the delay in forming a government amid multiple crises mean for the post-2003 Iraqi political system?

Iraq’s post-2003 political system is designed to withstand crisis. Over the years, political parties reflecting the country’s ethnic and sectarian divides have had a tacit understanding that crises represent a risk to their collective interests. These elite stakeholders have together weathered civil war, insurgency and multiple protests — despite deep conflicts with one another.

For instance, in September 2018 protesters attacked most major political party headquarters and the Iranian consulate in Basra, and authorities killed some 20 protesters.

Since the May election of that year, the fragmented Shia elite had been unable to even declare which side has the largest parliamentary bloc, let alone decide on a government.

But after the September crisis, the previously gridlocked parties swiftly came together to form an “understanding” that pushed through the impasse leading to the Mehdi government. In 2020, however, Iraq’s political parties were slower to come back together despite the multiple crises — far greater than 2018. The system is less able to swiftly fix itself, based primarily on the fragmentation of the elite — and their determination to prevent any challenge to their rule.

Why did the two prior attempts fail?

The two previous prime minister-designates each fell short for different reasons. When I met Allawi in February at the prime minister’s guesthouse in Baghdad, he was very clearly convinced that his mandate was to sideline the parties.

He hoped that simply choosing technocratic ministers outside the elite pact, with the support of Moqtada al-Sadr behind him, would garner support from protesters and the disillusioned public. He failed, however, because his cabinet had to go through parliament and the parties rejected what they saw a threat to the elite pact and the system.

Zurfi similarly failed after being directly appointed in March by Salih after the Shia parties failed to come up with a candidate. From the beginning, then, Zurfi faced challenges because parties were not in agreement. He attempted to directly confront his opposition, and spoke out against Iranian influence in Iraq. As a result, Zurfi was unable to even get to parliament with his proposed cabinet, as the Shia parties got back together to bring him down.

The failure of both strategies — Allawi attempting to work outside the elite party system and Zurfi trying to target certain parties — reveals tensions in Iraq’s political system. This fragmentation strains the parties’ ability to swiftly unite, and the system’s ability to withstand crises.

The endemic problems are a consequence of fragmentation, including the failure following the 2018 elections to declare governing parliamentary bloc. Moreover, after that election, newcomers into the political system (two-thirds of the MPs are serving their first term) are increasingly making their own demands and less willing to blindly toe party lines.

Can Kadhimi overcome the impasse?

Kadhimi’s appointment as prime minister-designate nonetheless is on shaky foundations. His appointment had previously faced a veto from Iran and its allied groups which make up the Fateh bloc. Kataeb Hezbollah, an armed group close to Iran and linked to the Popular Mobilization Units, issued a statement accusing Kadhimi with blood on his hands for the deaths of Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis.

Many Fateh bloc members had for months vetoed Kadhimi’s name due to this allegation. Immediately before Kadhimi addressed the nation for the first time, Iraqi state television broadcast a prerecorded statement by PMU (and Fateh) leader Qais al-Khazali, who had also previously accused Kadhimi of spying for the Americans and being complicit in the two killings.

Khazali, who commands the second-largest party within Fateh, accepted the party line to back Kadhimi but came out with his own conditions on television. However, the concerns about the COVID-19 crisis and the collapse of the price of oil finally brought all sides to compromise — a design of the political system.

Kadhimi has signalled he will play by the old rules with these stakeholders. Because of the magnitude of these simultaneous crises, Iraqi politics is moving back to the post-2003 norm. The ethno-sectarian based political system is geared to weather such existential crises more than it is to handling day-to-day governance. Despite the notion of “post-sectarianism” in Iraq, this system is based on ethno-sectarian political party compromise.

In his television address, Khazali, who had previously attempted to move away from sectarian language, explained that the process of selecting a prime minister is reserved to the Shia, who have the right as the majority, and not to Salih, a Kurd.

Over the years Kadhimi has expressed an admiration of the bravery of the protesters and of the importance of civil society. Many Iraqi civil society activists owe their lives to the work of the former intelligence chief. However, he has also been part of the same system that has violently suppressed protesters.

As the compromise prime minister-designate, he will find it difficult to transform his country as long as he plays by the rules of post-2003 Iraq — an irony not lost on the protesters who immediately rejected the candidacy of a man whom until recently many protesters had supported.

This article was originally published in The Washington Post

Summary

• Following the territorial defeat of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in northeastern Syria, the Kurdish-led autonomous administration in the region is now grappling with the task of quickly dealing with thousands of the group’s detained members while bringing justice to their victims. To that end, local authorities are focusing on the use of counterterrorism laws and courts to charge captured ISIS members and determine their guilt accordingly.
• The piecemeal approach to justice is deeply flawed, and raises particular concerns about due process. No precise instruments exist to determine the personal responsibility of ISIS individuals for specific crimes, or for their role in war crimes committed by the group. In any event, the scale of the crimes and the number of victims – as well as severe shortages of resources and workers – make dispensation of justice extremely difficult through the traditional legal system.
• Not all detained ISIS members receive prison sentences. Individuals who did not hold senior roles in the group’s apparatus and are not accused of ‘major’ crimes (in practice, largely defined as fighting for ISIS and murder) are being released under limited reconciliation deals with tribal leaders. But the involvement of local community leaders in those efforts is not enough to ensure positive results. Many victims are upset at seeing ISIS members walk free without even admitting their guilt publicly or apologizing for the pain they caused.
• To overcome the limitations of the current, counterterrorism-focused framework, a ‘transitional justice’ approach could provide judicial and non-judicial instruments to establish accountability for ISIS crimes and reduce community resistance to the reintegration of group members. A combination of non-judicial mechanisms such as truth commissions, missing persons’ committees, and reparations and victim-healing programmes could play a vital role in providing ISIS victims with a sense of justice while contributing to peacebuilding and stability.
• Ignoring the urgency of developing a long-term plan to serve justice and contribute to community healing will almost certainly allow ISIS to continue to prevent the recovery and development of northeastern Syria. This, in turn, risks undermining the stability of the country and the region at large.

In August 2012, when the UN released its report Gaza in 2020: A liveable place?, they could not have imagined what the world would look like in 2020: cities under lockdown, restrictions on movement, border closures, widespread unemployment, economic collapse, fear and anxiety and, above all, uncertainty about what the future holds.

For Gaza’s population of 2 million people this reality is nothing new. The conditions that the rest of the world are currently experiencing as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic is similar to the tight blockade Gaza has been living under ever since Hamas took over in 2007. Israel has imposed severe restrictions on the movement of people and goods, youth unemployment has reached 60 per cent, and over 80 per cent of Gaza’s population are now dependent on international aid.

The people of Gaza are having to face the COVID-19 crisis already at a disadvantage, with poor infrastructure, limited resources and a shortage of the most basic services, such as water and power supply. It also has a fragile health system, with hospitals lacking essential medical supplies and equipment, as well as the capacity to deal with the outbreak as there are only 84 ICU beds and ventilators available.

Meanwhile, intra-Palestinian divisions have persisted and were evident in the initial reaction to the pandemic. When President Mahmoud Abbas announced a state of emergency, it took two days for the Hamas-led government in Gaza to follow suit and shut down schools and universities. They later made a separate emergency appeal to address the crisis and prepare for a COVID-19 response in Gaza. This lack of coordination is typical of the way the Palestinian Authority and Hamas approach crisis situations.

After the initial uncoordinated response, Hamas, as the de-facto ruler of Gaza, has asserted its ability to control Gaza’s borders by putting in place quarantine measures for everyone who enters the strip, whether through the Erez checkpoint with Israel or the Rafah border with Egypt. They have also assigned 21 hospitals, hotels, and schools as compulsory quarantine centres for all arrivals from abroad, who have to stay in quarantine for 21 days. In comparison, there are 20 quarantine centres in the West Bank.  These strict measures have prevented the spread of the virus in the community and confined it to the quarantine centres, with only 20 confirmed cases of COVID-19 as of 6 May. Gaza’s de-facto authorities have also been able to monitor markets and prices to ensure the availability of essential goods.

Faced with a major crisis, Al-Qassam Brigades – the armed wing of Hamas – have tried to play the role of a national army by participating in efforts to fight the pandemic. They have relatively good logistical capacity and have contributed to the construction of two quarantine facilities with a total capacity of 1,000 units to prepare for more arrivals into Gaza. At the local level, municipalities have been disinfecting public spaces and facilities in addition to disseminating information about the virus and related preventative and protective measures. Other precautionary measures put in place include closing the weekly open markets, and restricting social gatherings like weddings and funerals.

Despite COVID-19, it’s business as usual when it comes to international dealings with Gaza. The key parties in the conflict – Israel, Hamas and the Palestinian Authority – along with the main external actors – Egypt, the United Nations and Qatar – have continued to stick to their policies aimed at keeping the security situation under control and preventing further escalation. Although Israel has allowed entry of pharmaceutical supplies and medical equipment into Gaza during the pandemic, it has kept its restrictions on the movement of goods and people in place, while keeping a close eye on the development of the COVID-19 outbreak in Gaza – a major outbreak here would be a nightmare scenario for Israel.

Meanwhile, Qatar has continued to address the humanitarian and economic needs of Gaza in an attempt to ease the pressure and prevent further escalation. It has pledged $150 million over the next six months to help families in Gaza from poorer backgrounds. Gaza has also been discussed by the Middle East Quartet, as Nickolay Mladenov, the UN special coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, expressed his concern about the risk of a disease outbreak in Gaza during a call with the members of the Quartet.

Amid the pandemic, threats are still being exchanged between Israel and Hamas. The Israeli defence minister, Naftali Bennett, requested that in return for providing humanitarian aid to Gaza, Hamas agrees to return the remains of two Israeli soldiers killed in the 2014 war. While openly rejecting Bennett's statement, the leader of Hamas in Gaza, Yahya Sinwar, has offered to move forward with a prisoner swap deal if Israel agrees to release elderly prisoners and detainees in addition to detained women and children. Though dealing with its own COVID-19 outbreak, Egypt has started to mediate between the two parties in an attempt to stabilize the situation and reach a prisoner swap deal.

In the wake of this pandemic, lessons should be learned and policies should be examined, by all parties. Firstly, Israel should re-evaluate its security measures towards Gaza by easing restrictions on movement and trade which would have a positive impact on living conditions for Gaza’s population. The current measures have proven to be unsustainable and have contributed to the endless cycle of violence. Secondly, the intra-Palestinian division should end, to save Palestinians from contradictory policies and insufficient capacity on both sides. In fact, all previous attempts have failed to end this self-destructive division and this is due to the absence of political will on both sides. Elections seem to be the only viable path towards unity. Finally, efforts by the international community should go beyond stabilizing the security situation and ongoing crisis inside Gaza, where disruption of normal life is the norm.

While the world has reacted to this pandemic with a whole host of new policies and emergency measures, it has remained business as usual when dealing with Gaza. Should COVID-19 spread in Gaza, its people – who have already paid the price of a continuous blockade and intra-Palestinian division for 13 years – will pay a heavy price yet again. However, this time it is not a crisis that they alone will have to face.

Significant political change is coming to the Gulf monarchies, often seen in the West as bastions of stability, argues a new Chatham House report entitled Future Trends in the Gulf.

The Gulf states are already undergoing dramatic demographic and economic changes – changes which are being accelerated by lower oil prices.

The current political systems in the Gulf have been defined by the oil era, enabling governments to provide extensive economic benefits and no taxation, while maintaining a monopoly over political power. As the economic role of the state changes, its political role will change too.

Even at a time of plenty, pressures for political change have been rising. Significant changes in the availability of information, the surge in social media and women’s education are driving new demands for transparency.

Political protests have been most visible in Bahrain, but calls for change and reform have been growing in all of the Gulf countries. Raif Badawi, the blogger recently flogged in Saudi Arabia, is hardly an isolated case: campaigners for constitutional monarchies and elected parliaments have been facing severe punishments for years. 

The report author, Jane Kinninmont, says:

'The US and UK underestimate the significant leverage that they still have in the Gulf compared with most other countries, even if it is less than in the 20th century. As much as Asian countries are strengthening their trade links with the Gulf, they are reluctant to step forward as the security allies that the Gulf countries need.' 

Combating instability, extremism and sectarianism in the wider region requires looking hard at the pressures for change and insecurities inside the Gulf states. These help explain, for instance, why Qatar and the UAE have backed different sides in the intensifying civil conflict in Egypt.

The report, based on three years of research, argues that:      

• It is time for the GCC countries to seize the opportunity to carry out gradual and consensual political and social reforms towards more constitutional forms of monarchy. 

• Western countries, especially the US and UK, need to diversify the base of relations with the Gulf beyond the existing elite – and reach out to a broader base among the increasingly well-educated and aspirational new generation.

• Defence cooperation with the Gulf needs to be placed in a wider political context, where respect for human rights is not seen as being at odds with security imperatives, but as part of ensuring sustainable security. The UK and US policy of expanding their military bases in Bahrain has sent a strong signal that political reform is not their priority. 

• A fresh discourse on Gulf security needs to take account of the need for people to feel secure vis-à-vis their own governments, for instance by ensuring the police are held accountable by independent judiciaries, and ending lengthy detention without trial.

• In partnering with Gulf countries against extremism, Western allies need to broach sensitive issues such as religious education in Saudi Arabia, or the impact on Western publics and Muslim communities outside the region of flogging a blogger for insulting Islam.

The Russian annexation of Crimea was one of the great strategic shocks of the past twenty-five years. For many in the West, Moscow’s actions in early 2014 marked the end of illusions about cooperation, and the return to geopolitical and ideological confrontation. Russia, for so long a peripheral presence, had become the central actor in a new global drama. In this groundbreaking book, renowned scholar Bobo Lo analyses the broader context of the crisis by examining the interplay between Russian foreign policy and an increasingly anarchic international environment. He argues that Moscow’s approach to regional and global affairs reflects the tension between two very different worlds—the perceptual and the actual.

The Kremlin highlights the decline of the West, a resurgent Russia, and the emergence of a new multipolar order. But this idealized view is contradicted by a world disorder that challenges core assumptions about the dominance of great powers and the utility of military might. Its lesson is that only those states that embrace change will prosper in the twenty-first century.

A Russia able to redefine itself as a modern power would exert a critical influence in many areas of international politics. But a Russia that rests on an outdated sense of entitlement may end up instead as one of the principal casualties of global transformation.

Praise for Russia and the New World Disorder

'Once again, Bobo Lo has written an illuminating book on Russia's foreign policy. He has achieved a real 'tour de force' in both conceptual and descriptive terms. With elegance and precision, Lo has explained why Russia, as a declining power, is still so important for international stability, crisis management, and global issues. A must-read for now, and certainly a classic book for the next decade.'
—Dr Thomas Gomart, Director of the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI), Paris

'Bobo Lo offers a trenchant analysis of the challenges and choices that confront Russia in today's rapidly changing global environment. In his compelling discussion of the Kremlin's Hobbesian view of the international system, he asks whether Russia is capable of jettisoning its imperial mindset and becoming a modern nation-state capable of interacting more effectively both with its neighbors and the wider world. His answer is sobering--and sometimes surprising.'
—Angela Stent, Director, Center for Eurasian, Russian and East European Studies (CERES), Georgetown University, and author of The Limits of Partnership: US-Russian Relations in the Twenty-First Century.

'Bobo Lo's new book is elegantly written and has a masterful grasp of the pressures and temptations that have acted on Putin in foreign and security policy. He puts us all in his debt.'
—Robert Service, Fellow of the British Academy, and Emeritus Fellow, St Antony's College, University of Oxford

Seeing geo-strategic rivalry between the US and China as the sole variable in Asia-Pacific security risks becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy, according to a forthcoming Chatham House paper.            

As Xi Jinping’s visit to the US approaches, The Asia-Pacific Power Balance: Beyond the US–China Narrative, warns against deploying Cold War-type narratives that pit the two countries against each other. Such narratives not only misunderstand the complexity of the region and the growing influence of India, Japan and Indonesia, but also risk increasing the likelihood of conflict and of missing vital opportunities for future cooperation.                

The paper, by John Nilsson-Wright, Tim Summers and Xenia Wickett argues that by focusing too heavily on the US and China, policymakers risk narrowing the aperture through which they evaluate policy choices regarding major regional challenges. Some of the key findings include the following:

Military

• Despite rapidly rising defence spending across Asia, the relative importance of traditional military means is declining relative to instruments such as development assistance and cyber offence.
• The militaries of Japan and India are becoming – in very different ways – more versatile and potentially expanding their remits. In the future, there will be a larger number of more capable military powers in the region, including South Korea and Vietnam.
• Current perceptions that the main dynamic is China’s rising military capabilities outstripping others in the region, therefore, need to be tempered. India’s defence spending, for example, as a percentage of GDP has surpassed China’s for the past several decades.

Economics

• Although China has the world’s second-largest economy and – despite recent problems – is growing faster than most major economies, its growth rate is in secular decline. China has gone from near-constant double-digit growth over the past four decades to 7.4 per cent in 2014 and could dip below 7 per cent this year.
• Whilst India’s economy remains notably smaller than those of China, the US and Japan, it will surpass China’s growth rate this year and has a lot of potential.
• If the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is successfully negotiated, the potential for integration and growth between the United States, Japan and the other 10 TPP members may reduce their current trade dependence on China.

Demography

• The demography of Asia is another reason to look beyond the US-China nexus, as China faces the challenge of an aging society, while countries such as India have the advantage of a younger population and decades of demographic dividend ahead of them.
• Likewise populations across much of Southeast Asia, such as the Philippines and Indonesia are growing rapidly and expanding their middle classes. 

The risk of a serious cyber attack on civil nuclear infrastructure is growing, as facilities become ever more reliant on digital systems and make increasing use of commercial ‘off-the-shelf’ software, according to a major new report from Chatham House.

Cyber Security at Civil Nuclear Facilities: Understanding the Risks is the result of an 18-month study that draws on in-depth interviews with 30 leading industry practitioners based in more than eight countries. It found that the trend to digitization, when combined with a lack of executive-level awareness of the risks involved, means that nuclear plant personnel may not realize the full extent of their cyber vulnerability and are thus inadequately prepared to deal with potential attacks. 

Specific findings include:                

• The conventional belief that all nuclear facilities are ‘air gapped’ (isolated from the public internet) is a myth. The commercial benefits of internet connectivity mean that a number of nuclear facilities now have VPN connections installed, which facility operators are sometimes unaware of.
• Search engines can readily identify critical infrastructure components with such connections.
• Even where facilities are air gapped, this safeguard can be breached with nothing more than a flash drive.
• Supply chain vulnerabilities mean that equipment used at a nuclear facility risks compromise at any stage.
• A lack of training, combined with communication breakdowns between engineers and security personnel, means that nuclear plant personnel often lack an understanding of key cyber security procedures.
• Reactive rather than proactive approaches to cyber security contribute to the possibility that a nuclear facility might not know of a cyber attack until it is already substantially under way.

In the light of these risks, the report outlines a blend of policy and technical measures that will be required to counter the threats and meet the challenges. 

Recommendations include:

• Developing guidelines to measure cyber security risk in the nuclear industry, including an integrated risk assessment that takes both security and safety measures into account.
• Engaging in robust dialogue with engineers and contractors to raise awareness of the cyber security risk, including the dangers of setting up unauthorized internet connections.
• Implementing rules, where not already in place, to promote good IT hygiene in nuclear facilities (for example to forbid the use of personal devices) and enforcing rules where they do exist.
• Improving disclosure by encouraging anonymous information sharing and the establishment of industrial CERTs (Computer Emergency Response Team).
• Encouraging universal adoption of regulatory standards.

Revenues for pharmaceutical companies need to be 'delinked' from sales of antibiotics to avoid their over-use and avert a public health crisis, says a new report from the think-tank Chatham House.

Over-use of antibiotics is contributing to the growing resistance of potentially deadly bacteria to existing drugs, threatening a public health crisis in the near future. The report notes that, by 2050, failing to tackle antibiotic resistance could result in 10 million premature deaths per year.                                       

Novel antibiotics to combat resistant pathogens are thus desperately needed, but market incentives are exacerbating the problem. Towards a New Global Business Model for Antibiotics: Delinking Revenues from Sales states that,                                       

'The current business model requires high levels of antibiotic use in order to recover the costs of R&D. But mitigating the spread of resistance demands just the opposite: restrictions on the use of antibiotics.'

To tackle this catch-22 problem, the Centre on Global Health Security at Chatham House recommends the establishment of a global body to implement a radical new business model for the industry, which would encourage investment and promote global access to - and conservation of - antibiotics.      

The current business model has several perverse effects. As R&D is an inherently risky and costly endeavour, the industry is chronically under-investing in new treatments. Today, few large pharmaceutical companies retain active antibacterial drug discovery programmes. Re-stoking the industry's interest in antibiotics would be one of the primary roles of the new body.   

Secondly, the need to recover sunk cost under the current business model encourages both high prices and over-marketing of successful drugs, making potentially life-saving treatments unaffordable to many in developing countries, while simultaneously encouraging over-use in developed markets and increasing resistance.   

The new global body would address these challenges by ‘delinking’ pharmaceutical revenues from sales of antibiotics. It would do this by directly financing the research and development of new drugs, which it would then acquire at a price based on production costs rather than the recovery of R&D expenses. Acquisition could take the form of procurement contracts with companies, the purchase of full IP rights or other licensing mechanisms.                                       

This would enable it to promote global access to antibiotics while simultaneously restricting over-use. Conservation would be promoted through education, regulation and good clinical practice, with the report recommending that 'proven conservation methods such as antibiotic stewardship programmes… be incentivized and implemented immediately.'

Priorities for R&D financing would be based on a comprehensive assessment of  threats arising from resistance. Antibiotics would qualify for the highest level of financial incentives if they combat resistant pathogens posing a serious threat to human health.                                       

Finance for the new body would come from individual nation states, with the report noting that this could 'begin with a core group of countries with significant research activity and large antibiotic markets, (though) it is envisaged that all high income countries should make an appropriate financial contribution.'                                 

It is not yet clear exactly how much funding would be necessary to combat resistance, but with inaction expected to cost $100 trillion in cumulative economic damage, the report argues that 'an additional global investment of up to $3.5 billion a year (about 10 per cent of the current value of global sales of antibiotics) would be a bargain.'

Given the international context, it is in Britain’s best interests to treat Europe as the ‘inner circle’ of its foreign, security and international economic policy, argues Dr Robin Niblett, director of Chatham House, in a new paper.

The British government’s approach since 2010 of seeking to enhance the UK's relations with the world’s emerging powers while balancing these with relationships with the United States and Europe has had only limited success. With constrained resources, and in the face of intense global economic competition, mounting security challenges and decaying international institutions, trying to commit the UK equally on all three fronts will not succeed in the future.

Britain, Europe and the World: Rethinking the UK’s Circles of Influence calls for a different mindset and strategy towards the UK’s place in the world – one in which Britain is surrounded by three concentric circles of influence:

• The first or ‘inner circle’ is the EU, the region with which the UK’s relationships need to be strongest and most active.
• The ‘second circle’ consists of the protective and enabling set of economic and security relationships with the US.
• Finally, an ‘outer circle’ comprises the UK’s other key bilateral and institutional relationships.

Should the UK vote to remain in the EU, policy-makers should commit to placing the EU at the centre of Britain's foreign policy, using the country’s economic weight, diplomatic skills and networks to play a leading role in leveraging more effective EU-wide policies.
 
Should the country vote to leave, the UK and the EU would enter an extended period of dislocation before arriving at a new, mutually diminished settlement. British policy-makers would be forced to deal and negotiate with the EU on critical policy issues from the outside. It is hard to see, argues Dr Niblett, how that could lead to EU policies or an international context more in line with British interests.                          

Despite its structural flaws and competing national interests, the EU offers the best prospects for managing the rapidly changing global context, for three main reasons:

First, it allows the UK to leverage the EU’s global economic weight to enhance the UK’s economic interests internationally, including securing beneficial trade agreements and contributing to EU and global standard-setting and rule-writing. Conversely, leaving would require the UK to renegotiate over 100 trade agreements, and would disadvantage UK interests in EU markets, including making EU governments less likely to liberalize services.                          

Second, it gives the UK a say in designing new EU initiatives to strengthen both British and European security in the face of diverse threats, whether managing the flow of refugees and other emigrants; combatting terrorism; or managing a more assertive Russia and the fallout from a disintegrating Middle East.                          

Third, cooperating with other EU members offers a way of maximizing opportunities to find joint solutions to shared problems, whether in terms of responding to climate change; managing growing cyber insecurity; reversing the decay of governance in failing states; or combating the rise of dangerous non-state actors.

Dr Robin Niblett said:

‘Britain is likely to be richer, safer and more influential in the coming decades if it treats Europe as the ‘inner circle’ of its foreign policy. For a mid-sized country like the UK, being a major player in a strong regional institution can offer a critical lever for international influence. In the UK’s case, this means choosing to be a leading player in the world’s principal civilian power, the European Union.’

About 90 per cent of refugees living in camps have no access to electricity and many lack any form of lighting at night, says a Chatham House report for the Moving Energy Initiative. Energy poverty in refugee settlements is not on the radar of international initiatives and humanitarian agencies are ill-equipped to deal with the scale of need. 

Heat Light and Power for Refugees: Saving Lives, Reducing Costs zooms in on the energy needs of refugees and displaced people worldwide, and presents the first ever estimates of the volume and costs of what they use.

'The problem goes beyond electricity. 80 per cent of those in camps rely on firewood for cooking and, as a result, we estimate that some 20,000 people die prematurely each year due to the pollution from indoor fires. Exposure to extremes of cold and heat are also killers for people living in flimsy, temporary shelter,' says Glada Lahn, senior research fellow at Chatham House. 'The current lack of provision for energy undermines the fundamental aims of humanitarian assistance,' she adds.

There are nearly 60 million forcibly displaced people in the world, and they pay staggering costs for energy. The 83,277 households living in Dadaab in Kenya, the world’s largest refugee settlement, spent an estimated $6.2 million on firewood last year, which accounts for approximately 24 per cent of their overall household income. (The average UK household spent 4 per cent of its income on energy in 2011.) In Uganda, almost half of refugee households surveyed by the UNHCR skip meals because they do not have enough fuel to cook with.

'The imperative is to find humane, creative and cost-effective ways to respond to the needs of so many individuals, most of whom are women and children.  Improving access to clean, safe and sustainable energy offers a promising way forward,' says Kofi Annan in the report’s foreword.

The report calls for an overhaul in the way that heat, light and power are delivered in humanitarian crises. It makes the case for new partnerships between humanitarian agencies and private providers to increase clean energy access in refugee settlements. Investment in energy infrastructure will also benefit host communities in some of the world’s poorest countries.

'As refugee households spend approximately $2.1 billion on energy each year, developing local markets for energy services could be part of a mix of solutions,' adds Lahn. 'Using green, culturally appropriate technologies could save lives, reduce CO2 emissions by 11 million tonnes per year and radically improve living standards. Introducing even the most basic solutions, such as improved cookstoves and basic solar lanterns, could save $323 million a year in fuel costs.' 

Other findings include:

• Rape and violence against women is common in many unlit camps. Only 4 per cent of women and girls in households in the Goudoubo camp in Burkina Faso would go out after dark due to the lack of streetlights.
• Wood equalling around 49,000 football pitches worth of forest (64,700 acres) is burned by displaced families living in camps each year, mainly in countries suffering severe deforestation, because they have no alternative sources of energy.
• Firewood consumption emits nearly twice as much CO2 as liquid petroleum gas and produces little energy in comparison to its carbon intensity.

International Development Minister Grant Shapps said:

‘Across sub-Saharan Africa, hundreds of millions of people still do not have access to electricity. Women and girls are at risk of violence after dark, families are forced to inhale toxic kerosene fumes, and energy remains unaffordable for many.

‘With the technology in place and investors coming on board, the time to act is now. The UK's Energy Africa campaign is already kick-starting a solar revolution across the continent.

‘Supporting the Moving Energy Initiative is another way Britain can help boost access to clean, reliable and affordable energy. This will transform people’s lives and help achieve the UN’s goal of universal energy access by 2030.’

International Affairs, the institute’s peer-reviewed journal, has published high-quality, policy relevant articles for over 90 years and its global readership includes many of the world’s pre-eminent academic thinkers, policy-makers and practitioners. From January, when its current contract to publish with Wiley-Blackwell ends, OUP will assume responsibility to publish, distribute and market the journal to new and existing readers and audiences.

Vanessa Lacey, senior publisher for Oxford Journals, commented on the acquisition: 'We are thrilled to have been chosen by Chatham House to publish their prestigious journal International Affairs from 2017. International Affairs is a critically important, ‘must read’ journal of relevance to international relations academics and policy-makers alike. We look forward to partnering with Chatham House and International Affairs’ exceptional editorial team to reinforce its position as a global leader in its field.'

Robin Niblett, director of Chatham House, said: 'Chatham House is delighted to have teamed up with OUP, the world’s leading university press, to publish International Affairs. In terms of shared values, reputation and vision, OUP is an ideal partner for International Affairs and Chatham House. This is an exciting opportunity to develop further the journal’s digital outreach and its engagement with new audiences around the world.'

Andrew Dorman, commissioning editor of International Affairs also commented: 'The IA team is really pleased to be working in partnership with OUP to produce the journal. We share a common vision to publish cutting edge articles from across the discipline, which influence both the academic and practitioner communities in all parts of the world.'

OUP adds International Affairs, the foremost UK international relations journal and one of the top ten internationally, to a growing portfolio of respected international relations-related journals. 

European leaders need to implement common European solutions to the refugee crisis. Only joint solutions can credibly and effectively reduce the growing human suffering and social and political turmoil.

The refugee crisis poses a serious challenge, both to the welfare of refugees and to European societies. In 2015, more than 1.5 million migrants crossed into the European Union. From Italy to Poland, and from Greece to Germany, countries face immense challenges in responding to requests for humanitarian aid, asylum, and integration. The associated integration challenges in housing, language, work and welfare are already formidable. Failing to manage them properly poses serious threats to social cohesion and political stability.

European countries have had sufficient time to analyse and assess the long-standing challenges which created the current crisis. Now it is time to act – not individually and at the expense of others, but jointly and in a spirit of European solidarity. This is why Vision Europe – a partnership between seven leading think tanks and foundations in Europe – will in 2016 focus its efforts on providing practical solutions to the current refugee crisis, and its root causes. We, the seven signatories, writing in an individual capacity, see an urgent need for a common European approach, to compliment local and national efforts.

At present, there is no consensus among member states on how to respond to the crisis, neither on the objectives to be achieved or the methods to be used.  But disagreements on substance must be overcome now. Building on current discussions, we propose a comprehensive agenda at the EU level, with five major dimensions.

First, it is important to control the EU’s external borders so that only refugees fleeing war and persecution, who have a legitimate right to seek asylum, can enter and potentially remain in the EU. The porous nature of the EU’s external borders has meant an unacceptable loss of control in the eyes of many EU citizens and has raised false hopes for irregular migrants trying to enter the Union. The control of the borders of the Schengen Area should be a collective effort of the EU and all Member States, coordinated by European Institutions with professional staff and with financial support provided to Member States at the EU’s periphery. Regaining control of the EU’s external borders is essential to preserve open internal borders.

Second, beyond implementing the already agreed upon relocation of 160,000 refugees from Greece and Italy, the EU should develop a system which distributes a much larger number of refugees across the Union, directly from the hotspots in the EU and the neighbouring counties such as Turkey, Jordan or Lebanon. Member States not willing to host refugees themselves could choose to make a primarily financial contribution to the system. A Migration Solidarity Fund should be created to manage this compensatory system. Turkey’s efforts to reduce the crossings in the Aegean Sea should be matched by a willingness among EU Member States to take in refugees in an orderly manner. The Conclusions from the European Council seem to move in the right direction in this regard.

The third measure should be to improve, standardize and speed up the processes to determine asylum applications. The sooner refugees know whether they can stay, the more energy can be invested in their integration into host countries’ societies and in family reunions. The sooner a decision is taken, the fairer and more feasible it is to send back those whose requests are refused in full respect of international law and human rights. And EU members cannot afford to have vastly different standards in granting asylum status.  Under international law, there can be no limit set on the number of those eligible to request asylum.

As a fourth measure, we recommend expanding efforts at the EU level to improve the living conditions of refugees staying in countries close to their countries of origin. Many refugees want to return to their homes as soon as the situation becomes safe again. They should not be driven to start the hazardous journey to the European Union only because of unbearable conditions in the countries where they are currently sheltering.

Last but not least, the EU and its Member States should work vigorously towards ending the violent conflicts that are the principal causes of the crisis. Europe must invest heavily in the Syria peace process, in particular. The EU must also raise the ambition and resources of its Neighbourhood Policy, with a focus on helping to stabilise the region and on improving the living conditions and economic opportunities in the Southern neighbourhood.

But action is also required at the national level, especially in the EU countries where significant numbers of refugees have received or are expected to receive asylum. The distribution of refugees across municipalities and regions should be fair and should come with adequate support and resources from the national level, emphasising education and language training. The recognition of professional competences and support to enter the labour market should be available at a very early stage. Within our societies, we need a dialogue between refugees and the host society. It should be made clear that respect for human rights, democratic values and cultural norms is indispensable for a prolonged stay in the respective European host country.

Coming from seven European countries, with different national policies and approaches to the refugee crisis, the foundations and think tanks of Vision Europe are working together to advance new ideas, to frame an informed debate and to emphasize the benefits of common European solutions to Europe-wide problems. Europe is strong enough to manage the migration challenges, but only if political leaders act now, act responsibly and use the resources at their disposal, including support for civil society working in this area. We must not leave the public space to populists and nationalists offering false promises. Only a European solution will be workable and sustainable.

Aart de Geus
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Bertelsmann Stiftung, Germany

Artur Santos Silva
President, Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, Portugal

Guntram Wolff
Director, Bruegel, Belgium

Mikko Kosonen
President, Finnish Innovation Fund Sitra, Finland

Piero Gastaldo
Secretary General, Compagnia di San Paolo, Italy

Robin Niblett
Director, Chatham House, United Kingdom

Yves Bertoncini
Director, Jacques Delors Institute, France

The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) currently being negotiated between the European Union (EU) and the United States has been sold by politicians on both sides as a strategic opportunity to shape globalization to the benefit of both parties. But a new research paper from Chatham House finds that the risks of such an ambitious project are significant – whether or not the current deadlock in negotiations can be overcome – and the UK vote for Brexit increases those risks.

The primary strategic benefit of TTIP would be to enable the United States and the EU to set the ‘rules of the road’ for international trade in the 21st century. TTIP’s backers hope that if the EU and the United States can agree on a new set of standards, the power of their combined markets will lead other countries to adopt the same rules. According to Realizing TTIP’s Strategic Potential one of the risks of agreeing such far-reaching rules is that they set the bar too high for other countries to accept. By imposing restrictive rules unilaterally on, for example, state-owned enterprises, TTIP could provoke retaliation and encourage other countries to establish alternative rules.

TTIP also has the potential to attract other countries to align themselves economically and politically with the EU and the United States due to their ‘soft-power’. But this benefit will only materialise if strategically important countries, such as Turkey, are able to join. The research finds that the demands placed on Turkey may be too high for this to be a realistic prospect in the near future. Ukraine is another strategic country that could be targeted for expansion of TTIP, but extending membership to Ukraine would be regarded by Russia as a 'serious escalation' by the West in their confrontation.

The paper argues there would be benefits to the UK, the EU and the United States if the UK were to join TTIP after the UK leaves the EU. For the UK it could provide the only real prospect of being able to influence international standards and a relatively quick means to conclude a comprehensive trade deal with the United States. For the EU and the United States, it would ensure the scale and attractiveness of TTIP is not reduced by the loss of one of the major European economies. It would also provide an immediate opportunity to establish TTIP as a plurilateral deal that is open to new members. The process would be made easier if the UK were to maintain an active role in the development of the EU position on TTIP, while the UK is still a member of the EU. This would mean that the UK would be in a position to accept the terms required to join TTIP relatively quickly upon exiting the EU. There will inevitably be sensitivities in the UK, other EU member states and the EU institutions about this, but it is in the strategic interests of all parties.

The most immediate risk for TTIP, however, is of failure. Despite 14 rounds of negotiations so far there is still disagreement over what should be included in the scope of the negotiations, including issues such as financial services regulation, which the United States is determined to exclude, and how to handle politically sensitive questions such as investor-state dispute settlement, which has become a hot-button issue in the EU. Even if an agreement is reached it must then be ratified by a sceptical US Congress, where there are challenges on both sides of the aisle, and by EU institutions and member states. The hostility to TTIP in many parts of Europe, especially in Germany, is not encouraging.

If the negotiations break down, or a deal is reached that falls short of the ambition set for it, this would send a damaging signal to the rest of the world about the ability of the EU and the United States to work together. It could also hasten the demise of their influence. For the EU, the stakes are greater now that the UK has decided to leave the EU.

The paper notes that the EU-US trade relationship is still the largest bilateral relationship in the world 'for now', but that in most sectors the lead over China is decreasing. If they miss this opportunity, the United States and the EU may not get another chance to set the standards that will govern the global trading order in the 21st century.

Report author, Gregor Irwin, said:

'TTIP negotiations are hanging in the balance. If they succeed TTIP has the potential to shape the next generation of trade rules and ensure a transatlantic vision for the international trading system prevails.  

'For now, both sides are facing off against each other in the negotiations and failing to focus enough on the strategic risks and opportunities from TTIP. If the full strategic potential from TTIP is to be realized they must pay more attention to how other countries are likely to respond.

'The UK’s decision to leave to leave the EU should sharpen the incentives that both sides have to conclude a deal. It is in everyone’s interest to ensure that the UK is able to join TTIP once the UK leaves the EU.

'Further opening up TTIP to include Turkey could create an alternative anchor for its economic and political relationship with the EU, short of EU membership. It could transform Turkey’s relationship with the EU, just as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has transformed Mexico’s relationship with the US.'

Professor Tim Benton has joined Chatham House’s Energy, Environment and Resources department to help develop the institute’s work on the critical challenges of climate change, resilience and sustainable development. He brings renowned expertise on food security and environmental change, and will focus on establishing new initiatives at the intersection of research and policymaking.

Previously Tim has been UK champion for global food security, acting as an ambassador and spokesperson as well as coordinating work between research councils and government departments in this increasingly important area or research. Tim is also the dean for strategic research initiatives at the University of Leeds and a global agenda steward for the World Economic Forum.

Rob Bailey, director of the Energy, Environment and Resources department, said: 'I am delighted to welcome Tim to Chatham House. He has distinguished himself as a leading thinker on climate change and food security and we are all excited at the prospect of working with him.'

Tim Benton said: 'It is an honour to join Chatham House, with its great international reputation for independent thinking. I am looking forward to making a contribution to meeting the challenges implicit in managing the world’s resources sustainably whilst the global population and economy grows.'

The project aims to analyze and highlight important issues emanating from Turkey’s geostrategic position and bring a Turkish perspective to important regional developments. Areas of research include Turkey’s evolving relationship with Europe and its contribution to the new ‘silk road’ known as the Belt and Road initiative, aimed at strengthening trade and infrastructure links between Asia and Europe.

Mr Ali Y Koc, vice chairman of Koc Holding, has also joined the Chatham House Panel of Senior Advisers, to which he will bring his experience and perspectives on Turkey and on wider global political, economic and social issues.

Koc Holding is the leading business group in Turkey with extensive activities in the manufacturing, energy, defence and finance sectors. Mr Ali Y Koc is a board member and executive committee member of Koc Holding and chairman of the 1907 Fenerbahce Association and the National Competitiveness Research Association. He is a board member of the Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEIK), Endeavor Turkey and vice president of the Turkish Industrialists' and Business Association (TUSIAD). He is also a member of the Bank of America Global Advisory Council.

Robin Niblett, director of Chatham House, said: 'We are grateful to Mr Ali Y Koc and Koc Holding for supporting this initiative, which builds on our established track record of work on Turkey. Turkey plays an increasingly important strategic role, and through this project, Chatham House will be able to expand its analysis and activities in this area. I am also delighted that Chatham House will benefit from the input and expertise of Mr Koc as a member of the institute’s Panel of Senior Advisers.'

Mr Ali Y Koc said: 'Koc Holding is pleased to establish a long-term partnership with Chatham House and support a distinctive research project on Turkey at a world-leading think-tank. We look forward to sharing our insights on Turkey and other significant issues in international affairs among such a distinguished globally-renowned group of individuals in foreign policy, business and civil society on the Panel of Senior Advisers.'

In recognition of Chatham House’s continued dedication to workplace diversity, the institute has been listed in the Inclusive Top 50 UK Employers List – a definitive ranking of UK-based organizations that promote inclusion across all protected characteristics, throughout each level of employment within an organization.

Powered by the Excellence in Diversity Awards, the Inclusive Top 50 UK Employers recognizes the organizations that demonstrate the promotion of all strands of diversity including age, disability, gender, LGBT, race, faith and religion.

Complied by a dedicated panel of judges, the list has been collated based on each organization’s performance in a range of areas within the diversity arena. Organizations featured have provided sufficient evidence on an amalgam of topics including recruitment procedures, training and a host of diversity related initiatives.

The Inclusive Top 50 UK Employers List, in partnership with recruitment specialists Rullion, recognizes the outstanding efforts of organizations that have begun their journey to attracting and retaining a truly diverse workforce, achieving equality, diversity and inclusion in its purest form.

Lisa O’Daly, Director of Human Resources, Chatham House, said: ‘I am delighted that Chatham House has been included in the Inclusive Top 50 UK Employers List. This is just really the beginning of our journey to diversity and inclusion and is a recognition of the collective efforts of our staff which is changing Chatham House for the better.’

‘The UK companies on the list are showing by their actions that they are integrating what they believe into how they operate creating an inclusive culture, which begins at the very top of the organization,’ said Donna Herdsman, EMEA Partnership Manager, Rullion. 

The Chatham House Prize is presented annually to the person, persons or organization deemed by members of the Royal Institute of International Affairs to have made the most significant contribution to the improvement of international relations in the previous year.

The CPJ has been recognized for its efforts in defending the right of journalists to report the news without fear of reprisal, at a time when the free press is under serious pressure in many parts of the world.

Highlights of the work of the CPJ during 2017 include the launch of the US Press Freedom Tracker documenting attacks on press freedom in the US and the launch of its Free the Press campaign to raise awareness of journalists imprisoned on anti-state charges around the world. In addition, last year its advocacy helped secure the early release from prison of at least 75 journalists worldwide and helped to win convictions in the murders of six reporters, including Marcos Hernández Bautista in Mexico and Syrian editor Naji Jerf, who was killed in Turkey.

In a climate where the term ‘fake news’ is used to discredit much reporting, the CPJ has robustly supported the fourth estate’s role in contributing to a sustainably secure, prosperous and just world.

Events

The Chatham House Prize 2018 was awarded in a ceremony on Wednesday 28 November at Chatham House in London. The executive director of the committee, Joel Simon, accepted the award and spoke about the importance of safeguarding journalism and free speech, followed by a discussion about the challenges of reporting today with a panel of journalists who have faced these pressures in their work.

Nominees

The nominees for the Chatham House Prize 2018 were:

• The Committee to Protect Journalists
• Mario Draghi, President, European Central Bank
• Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
• Halima Ismail Ibrahim, Chair, National Independent Electoral Commission, Federal Republic of Somalia

About the Chatham House Prize

The Chatham House Prize is presented to the person, persons or organization deemed by members of Chatham House to have made the most significant contribution to the improvement of international relations in the previous year.

The selection process is independent, democratic and draws on the deep knowledge of Chatham House's research teams, making the Prize a distinctive and unique award in the field of international affairs.

A short-list of nominees is selected by the institute's three presidents from a longer list submitted by the research programmes and departments in their areas of expertise. The recipient is then determined by Chatham House's broad membership base on a one-member, one-vote basis. The award is presented on behalf of the institute's patron, Her Majesty the Queen, representing the non-partisan and authoritative character of the Prize.

The Chatham House Prize was launched in 2005. Previous recipients of the Prize include former Colombian president Juan Manuel Santos, former president of Ghana John Kufuor, Médecins Sans Frontières and Melinda Gates, co-founder of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.

For more information, please contact:

Chatham House press office
Email: pressoffice@chathamhouse.org
Phone: +44 (0)207 957 5739

CPJ Communications Associate 
Beatrice Santa-Wood
Email: press@cpj.org
Phone: +1 212 300 9032

The gift will create the Stavros Niarchos Foundation (SNF) Wing, enabling a permanent expansion of the institute’s research and providing a home to its Queen Elizabeth II Academy for Leadership in International Affairs. The wing will also house the ‘Chatham House SNF CoLab’, an initiative to open Chatham House’s policy research to wider public audiences.

The funds from the Stavros Niarchos Foundation (SNF) will be used to integrate a three-storey wing with the institute’s renowned building at 10 St James’s Square. The SNF Wing will support research collaboration and provide a stimulating environment to explore ways to engage people in the institute’s research, using interactive multimedia and other digital tools. Inauguration of the Chatham House SNF CoLab and the SNF Wing is anticipated in fall of 2019.

The gift from SNF is one of the largest in the institute’s history and is a major milestone in the foundation’s long-standing support of Chatham House, which dates back to 2007 and includes grants for research, infrastructure and student outreach totalling over £4.5m in the past 5 years.

Chairman of Chatham House, Lord Jim O’Neill said, 'This exceptional gift from SNF is a vote of confidence in the independence, quality and impact of the institute’s work. It will guarantee that the institute can innovate for the future, especially by engaging younger generations into its research and ideas, which is essential.'

Director of Chatham House Dr Robin Niblett said the gift will encourage informed public debate at a time of unprecedented global uncertainty and deepening political polarisation.

'The SNF Wing and Chatham House SNF CoLab will ensure Chatham House can continue to serve as a trusted hub for dialogue and a source of credible information, analysis and ideas on international affairs. It is an enormous boost to our staff and their work as we begin our second century, and of special value in such turbulent times.'

SNF Co-President Andreas Dracopoulos said, 'Chatham House is one of our key partners, and this grant marks an important new stage in our collaboration. At a time of uncertainty in international affairs, supporting the world-class independent analysis that can help citizens around the world engage in informed decisions about their future is essential. We are proud to help Chatham House maintain its independent voice while deepening its engagement with the public.'

The Stavros Niarchos Foundation’s past support has enabled Chatham House to establish an ‘SNF Floor’ with a broadcast media studio, a purpose-built simulation centre and training facilities, which will now be incorporated into the larger SNF Wing. The floor was officially opened by His Royal Highness the Duke of Sussex in 2017, when he took part in a scenario exercise exploring how to respond to a humanitarian emergency that required landmine clearance, drawing on the Duke’s ongoing work in this field.

For more information please contact:

pressoffice@chathamhouse.org
Phone: +44 (0)207 957 5739

For the past few months, users have been sharing their thoughts on our website on the future of democracy and the role of technology in it. Many have shared concerns about the effects of technological change:  

• Social media may be undermining the historic role of politicians to speak on behalf of their constituencies.
• Twitter favours brief writing and hence brief thinking, which may be leading to a deterioriation in democratic debates.
• The risk that the so-called 'echo chamber effect' undermines balanced and reasoned public debate.

But there have also been lots of ideas about how technology can help European democracies become more responsive and dynamic such as:

• The use of technology to better inform citizens and include civil society in decision-making.
• Sybil-proof identity verification for social network accounts operated by local municipalities.
• The development of non-profit personal data cooperatives as a response to the domination of Big Tech.

Now we want users help in shaping the final report. What do you think should be included?

We are opening up the report writing process and inviting you to take part and feed in your views. Work with us on a collaborative draft in Google Docs – comment, edit and get an insight into the black box of think tank research.

We’ll also be incorporating the most interesting submissions from the previous phase. If you'd like to make a submission, you can still do so here.

How To Join

To access the documents, you will need a Gmail account and to be registered as a user on demtech.chathamhouse.org. Each research question has its own working document, accessed via the Research Questions page.

The process is open to everyone. We look forward to working with you!

Join the project now

The Chatham House Prize is awarded to the person, persons or organization who is deemed to have made the most significant contribution to the improvement of international relations in the previous year. The presentation ceremony and panel discussion with the winners will be livestreamed on Wednesday.

The Blue Planet II series highlighted the damage caused by discarded plastics to the world’s oceans and marine wildlife. It is estimated that there are more than 150 million tonnes of plastic in the world’s oceans; resulting in the deaths of 1 million birds and 100,000 sea mammals each year. 

Dr Robin Niblett, director of Chatham House said: ‘Plastic pollution is one of the gravest challenges facing the world’s oceans, and undoubtedly an international issue. Sir David and the BBC Studios Natural History Unit played an instrumental role in helping to put this issue at the forefront of the public agenda. Blue Planet II spurred a passionate global response and generated clear behavioural and policy change.’

This year the G20 agreed on an international framework to address marine plastic litter, acknowledging the increasing urgency of the issue and the need for an international solution. This follows action from the UK government, including a plan to ban common plastic items and investment in global research.

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Read more about Chatham House's research work in this area

Other nominees

Dr Niblett thanked Chatham House members for voting and acknowledged the outstanding achievements of the 2019 nominees:

Abiy Ahmed, prime minister of Ethiopia, nominated for his efforts to transform civic leadership and promote plural politics, free speech and peace in Ethiopia 

Katrín Jakobsdóttir, prime minister of Iceland, nominated for her commitment to gender equality and women’s financial inclusion in Iceland 

Event

The Prize was presented to Sir David and Julian Hector by Her Majesty The Queen at Chatham House on Wednesday 20 November.

Watch video from the event

For more information please contact

Chatham House Press Office
pressoffice@chathamhouse.org
+44 (0)207 957 5739

BBC Studios Natural History Unit Communications Manager
Lynn.li@bbc.co.uk
+44 (0) 7513 137893

About the Chatham House Prize

The Chatham House Prize is voted for by Chatham House members, following nominations from the institute’s staff. The award is presented on behalf of the institute's patron, Her Majesty the Queen, representing the non-partisan and authoritative character of the Prize.

The Chatham House Prize was launched in 2005. Previous recipients of the Prize include the Committee to Protect Journalists, Colombian president Juan Manuel Santos, president of Ghana John Kufuor, Médecins Sans Frontières and Melinda Gates, co-founder of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.

Chatham House is a world-leading policy institute based in London. Our mission is to help governments and societies build a sustainably secure, prosperous and just world. We engage governments, the private sector, civil society and our members in open debate and private discussions about the most significant developments in international affairs.  Our research and policy ideas involve rigorous analysis of critical global, regional and country-specific challenges and opportunities.

About BBC Studios Natural History Unit 

BBC Studios Natural History Unit produces the world’s most iconic natural history programmes, such as Blue Planet II and Planet Earth II, which have been watched by more than a billion people globally. Ranging from technically challenging live shows and super-landmarks to long-running series and children’s content, The Natural History Unit programmes include Dynasties, Blue Planet Live, Springwatch, Animal Babies: First Year On Earth, Andy’s Dinosaur Adventures as well as the currently on air Seven Worlds, One Planet presented by Sir David Attenborough and third-party commissions for Discovery, Apple, Quibi, National Geographic and BBC America. 

The Natural History Unit is part of BBC Studios, a subsidiary of the BBC, which develops, produces and distributes bold, British content, making over 2,500 hours of content each year, operating in 22 markets globally and generating revenue of around £1.4bn. In the year to March 2019, it returned £243m to the BBC Group, complementing the BBC’s licence fee and enhancing programmes for UK audiences.

The situation in Ukraine remains in flux and despite Europe and the US toughening sanctions on Russia, President Putin continues to increase the scope of Russia’s involvement in the conflict between the Ukrainian government and the separatists. It remains unclear how far Putin is willing to go, what his broader regional ambitions are, and what he will do if forced further into a corner by Western actions. In this time of uncertainty and instability it is therefore vital to assess how the transatlantic partners should respond to this increasingly precarious situation. 

At this all-day event, the group will discuss how US policy towards Russia is changing, what this means for Europe and, subsequently, how Europe should respond. 

Attencance at this event is by invitation only.

The event is part of the Transatlantic Strategy Group on the Future of US Global Leadership run jointly with the German Marshall Fund of the United States. Over the course of a year, this group will come together to discuss how US policy is changing on key issues and the implications for Europe. This project is supported by the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung.

In an open podcast recorded following the event, Robin Niblett discussed the state of the transatlantic relationship with International New York Times London Bureau Chief Steven Erlanger, former UK defence secretary Liam Fox and former Foreign Affairs Committee chair Mike Gapes.

The roundtable was held under the Chatham House Rule.

While revelations about the activities of the NSA and GCHQ confirmed the depth of cooperation between the US and the UK over intelligence, the debate over the UK’s membership of the EU and difficulties in coordinating a response to the Syria crisis have raised tensions between policy-makers in Washington and London. With the two countries now facing an array of shared international challenges – not least in Ukraine, Afghanistan and Iraq – this roundtable will examine the current state of the transatlantic relationship.

This event will focus on the challenges of regulatory issues in the negotiations with the United States, including how to promote convergence of regulations and standards and how to explore equivalency in a number of sectors such as automobiles, financial services, and pharmaceuticals. The event will also examine how closer regulatory cooperation between the US and EU can improve international cooperation on regulatory matters.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

The British vote to leave the EU is (and should be) seen as a wakeup call for political elites on both sides of the Atlantic. Under normal circumstances, the institutional support that crossed party lines for the Remain campaign should have ensured it a comfortable victory; instead, it lost by a not-insignificant 52−48 per cent margin. Similarly, Donald Trump has alienated the establishment of both American parties – while Democratic dislike is predictable, the extent of the Republican elite’s discomfort with Trump, clearly on display at the party’s convention in Cleveland this week, is extremely unusual at this point in an election campaign which is more typically a display of ‘rally around the candidate’. But as Brexit demonstrated, the conventional logic may not apply in 2016.

There are significant differences between the UK referendum and the US elections. Some of this is structural – a national referendum operates along very different lines than a US presidential election, after all, and the US electorate is much larger and more diverse than its British equivalent. Furthermore, American voters will be making a choice between individuals as well as ideas. This does not necessarily work to the advantage of either Donald Trump or Hillary Clinton (both of whom have the highest unfavourability ratings for presidential candidates seen in decades), but highly individualized questions of personality and temperament will impact voter behaviour in a way that they did not for British referendum voters. Finally, who wins the US election will depend in very large part on state politics and electoral college math – as the 2000 election showed, the candidate who wins the popular vote does not necessarily end up as president.

But there is a far more important message that politicians in the US, UK and, more broadly, Europe, should take away from the Brexit result. Regardless of what happens in the US elections, elites no longer necessarily hold the preponderance of power. The disenfranchised who have historically either not had the mass or the coherence to communicate it now do - at least on occasion.

This is not an ideological split – Brexit voters came together from all parts of the political spectrum. Equally, in the US, Sanders and Trump voters are bucking the system in both the Democratic and Republican parties.

There is a significant backlash under way in both countries towards aspects of globalization, going beyond the traditional right/left divide. Allowing for some differences in specifics, the American and British political establishments have, over the past few decades, broadly eased restrictions on the free movement of capital, goods and people across national borders. There have been notable benefits associated with this approach that have mostly been distributed inclusively, but the costs have typically hit those already less advantaged and without opportunities or skills to mitigate them. Those who have been left out or left behind from these changes are discovering their own political power.

Politicians are going to have to find ways not just to appeal to these voters who feel disenfranchised by existing structures, but also address their legitimate concerns. There will of course be partisan policy solutions put forward on both sides. But inevitably the political leadership is going to have to find ways to bridge party lines to realize solutions to those social and economic inequalities. Ignoring them, as many have in the past, is increasingly a quick path to losing power.

Unless the world wants to turn back to more isolationist and protectionist times, with the slower growth and inequalities that this includes, politicians are also going to have to do a better job of explaining the benefits of globalization. And, more importantly, they will have to ensure that these benefits reach their broader population more equitably and that the costs are better mitigated. 

So the Brexit vote does not necessarily presage a Trump victory on 8 November, but it shows in stark terms that the world has fundamentally changed – the time when elites alone could call the shots is gone. Politicians, including Hillary Clinton, will need to respond proactively to the causes of the dissatisfaction rather than waiting until the next time they need the public vote.

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