2016 ushered in the revamped UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which built on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), adopted in 2000. Poverty eradication is the number one developmental goal of both the MDGs and SDGs.

Over the past two decades, global efforts have been successful as the number of people living in poverty declined by more than half, from more than 1.9 billion in 1990 to 836 million in 2015. Despite such progress, the Arab world continues to lag in its efforts to combat poverty.

In fact, according to the UNDP, between 2010 and 2012, the percentage of the population in the region making less than $1.25 a day increased (PDF) from 4.1 percent to 7.4 percent. Previously, countries in the region had made progress in reducing poverty, but high levels of political unrest had reversed many of these improvements.

Poverty and conflict: A direct correlation

The persistence of conflict in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen remains one of the main drivers of poverty regionally. In Syria, after five years of civil war it is estimated that 80 percent of the population lives in poverty, and life expectancy has been cut by 20 years.

Almost a decade after the US-led invasion in 2003, poverty rates are on the rise in Iraq with statistics from the World Bank showing that 28 percent of Iraqi families live under the poverty line. The mass displacement from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) controlled areas, the decline in global oil prices and higher unemployment rates has meant that despite its oil wealth, the Iraqi government has failed miserably in addressing the poverty rate in the country.

Yemen's poverty rate has increased from 42 percent of the population in 2009, to an even more alarming 54.5 percent in 2012.

Despite an initial wave of optimism after the 2011 Arab uprisings, countries in North Africa continue to face economic challenges that have seen poverty rates increase in many areas.

In Egypt, the Arab world's most populous country, five years of political upheaval have taken a toll on the economy. Increased unemployment, lower tourist arrivals, dwindling foreign currency reserves, and a weaker Egyptian pound has meant that 26 percent of Egypt's 90 million people live under the poverty line.

Despite a relatively successful and ongoing political transition in Tunisia, one in every six Tunisians lives below the poverty line as well. Tunisia is one of the highest contributors of ISIL fighters per capita, and Tunisian leaders continue to make a direct correlation between poverty and terrorism.

In the Palestinian territories, a lack of employment opportunities due to restrictions imposed by the Israeli occupation continues to drive rising levels of poverty (PDF). Nearly two years after the war in Gaza, reconstruction efforts have slowed to a crawl. Such efforts promised employment for thousands of Palestinians; however, the slow trickle of foreign donations and a deficiency of construction materials indicate that the situation will not improve any time soon.

Although the outlook for the West Bank appears less grim than in Gaza, high levels of poverty persist as many Palestinians hold jobs that pay a meager wage. This shortage of suitable employment forces many Palestinians to seek employment from companies operating in settlements on occupied Palestinian territory.

Even with some Palestinians performing these jobs out of necessity, per capita income in the West Bank continues to decline. In Gaza, the situation is even worse with per capita income 31 percent lower than in 1994.

One step forward, two steps back

The SDGs provide an ambitious blue print for global development that includes a focus on education, the environment, women's rights, sustainable water, and many other critical areas. While all of these issues are of importance to the region, it will become increasingly problematic to progress these goals without a renewed emphasis on poverty eradication.

Countries currently in conflict pose the greatest challenge to poverty eradication efforts, as participants in these conflicts have pushed aside humanitarian concerns in the quest for victory. The international community should make preparations for post-war reconstruction in Syria and Yemen, while also remaining wary of incomplete political settlements that raise the prospect for the resumption of hostilities in the future.

Even though in Palestine it is unlikely that the Israeli occupation will end anytime soon, however Fatah and Hamas should work toward a reconciliation to improve the system of governance in the territories. This will provide Palestinians with a united front to tackle the challenges posed by the occupation and ease the suffering felt in both Gaza and the West Bank.

Arab countries must recognise that absolute poverty is only one dimension of the problem and that redistributive policies can only go as far to address the issue. The uprisings have shown that Arab youth not only protested against economic inequality, but also against marginalisation and political disenfranchisement. Any renewed push for more economic opportunities must also provide Arab youth with a chance to shape their future.

Lower oil prices will likely affect the level of aid wealthier Gulf Cooperation Council countries give to poorer countries in the region. Nonetheless, such aid should not simply dry up. The Saudi-led coalition has destroyed a large portion of the Yemeni infrastructure, so the Kingdom and members of its coalition should bear a large part of the reconstruction effort.

Arab governments should understand that poverty also has a security and stability dimension. The 2011 uprisings have shown that Arab societies have the ability to challenge incompetent governance and corruption.

Food security remains a huge challenge for a region that imports much of its key food staples. Should poverty and food security issues not be addressed, any future protest wave may constitute a "revolution of the hungry", that is likely to be more violent than the protest wave of 2011.

This article originally appeared in Al Jazeera English.

Event Information

The Brookings Doha Center (BDC) hosted a panel discussion on April 19, 2016, about the ongoing reconstruction of the Gaza Strip. The panelists included Omar Shaban, director of Pal-Think, a research institution based in Gaza; and Naglaa Elhag, head of rehabilitation and international development at the Qatar Red Crescent Society (QRCS). Sultan Barakat, the BDC’s director of research, moderated the event, which was attended by members of Qatar’s diplomatic, academic, and media community.

Barakat opened by noting the slow progress of reconstruction in Gaza. Almost two years since the cessation of hostilities between Hamas and Israel, the rebuilding process has stalled for a number of reasons. First, the distribution of aid money pledged by donor countries during the October 2014 Cairo Conference has slowed. According to the World Bank, as of March 31, 2016, donor countries had dispersed only 40 percent of the pledged money. At the current rate, the fulfillment of all pledges will not occur until 2019, two years after the target date. Second, construction materials only enter Gaza from one border crossing. As a result of the sluggish rebuilding process, only 9 percent of totally damaged houses and 45 percent of partially damaged houses in Gaza have been repaired, leaving over 14,800 families internally displaced. Additionally, job opportunities promised by various construction projects have failed to materialize, leading to increased feelings of desperation and frustration among Gaza’s population.

Shaban expanded on these developments, expressing the notion that the people in Gaza feel neglected. Due to the high levels of frustration, he feels that a new round of hostilities between militants and Israel could happen at any moment. He explained further by highlighting the volatility of the area and mentioning how previous conflicts were easily ignited by an array of incidents: a kidnapping, a cross-border raid, an assassination, continuous rocket fire. Since frustration among Gazans continues to mount, arguably to its highest level, renewed conflict seems almost certain. Consequently, Shaban argued, fear of another round of conflict between Hamas and Israel has instilled a sentiment of donor fatigue. Donors do not want to see their support go to waste in another round of destruction, turning the delivery of assistance into an exercise of futility.

Shaban attributed this attitude among some donors to the lack of a political solution to the crisis in Gaza. Hamas, the de-facto governing authority in Gaza, does not work for the people, nor does the Palestinian Authority (PA), based in Ramallah. Neither body provides economic opportunities for Gazans, as those employed by either the PA or Hamas often do not receive their salaries. Reconciliation talks between both groups failed to establish a unity government. Egypt, Israel, and the United States would feel more comfortable negotiating with a unity government, presumably dominated by the PA, not Hamas, which each of the aforementioned countries designate as a terrorist organization. If the PA does reach an agreement with Hamas, Egypt has implied that it would open its border with Gaza at Rafah, as long as the PA stations a security presence at the crossing. This could enhance the slow trickle of construction materials into Gaza, allow for the increased export of commercial goods, and also enable Gazans to leave and return at a higher rate than currently permitted. According to Shaban, opening another access point for Gaza to the outside world would temporarily ease the burden faced by Gaza’s citizens, but the current crisis requires a solution to ameliorate the economic and political situation in the long term.

Elhag opened her remarks by reviewing the difficulties of implementing aid projects in Gaza. While working in Gaza for the QRCS, she noticed little progress from international agencies, as they do not address the main problems, typically taking short cuts, which she highlighted by stating, “We don’t treat the wounds, we cover it with a bandage.” To elaborate on this point she mentioned that lack of access in and out of Gaza and the Israeli naval blockade as two factors hindering reconstruction. Due to these restrictions, aid workers have difficulty entering Gaza. Elhag surmised that the lack of accountability on the part of international agencies and the Israelis and the fear of aid projects being destroyed again because of the political situation both contribute to the stalled reconstruction, producing grim realities in Gaza.

Furthermore, Elhag explained that a resolution to the Gaza crisis does not rest on the distribution of money. She believes that only solutions from both sides of the conflict will end the suffering in Gaza. To exemplify the frustrations felt by donors, Elhag noted that since 2008, QRCS invested $100 million in housing units and other aid projects in Gaza, but some of these projects were destroyed during the 2014 war. QRCS observed this and shifted their focus to securing food sources and enhancing the education and health sectors in Gaza.

At the conclusion of Elhag’s observations, Barakat asked the panel where the money donated for reconstruction goes and how the Gaza reconstruction mechanism (GRM) works. Shaban described how the money actually gets funneled through the PA’s ministry of finance in Ramallah, before it reaches Gaza. Hamas officials or members of Gaza’s civil society do not oversee any aspect of aid distribution. So from the start, the distribution of funds lacks transparency, as the PA gives the money to the U.N. office in Gaza, which administers the GRM. From there, the United Nations composes a list of people in Gaza that require construction materials. The Israeli administrative body in the ministry of defense, the Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (Cogat), must approve the names on the list. Construction materials can then be distributed through the GRM. Shaban concluded his explanation of the GRM by noting the many levels of bureaucracy involved have created a slow distribution process for a populace in desperate need.

From the regional perspective, some Arab states’ past political differences with Hamas has stymied political progress in Gaza, but the panel agreed that some of these relationships, especially with Saudi Arabia, are on the mend. The work of regional actors like Egypt, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey could help push a reconciliation deal between Fatah and Hamas. Shaban proposed allowing some Hamas members to take part in any future coalition government, as some of their relationships in Sinai could help Egypt secure the troubled region. Cooperation on security matters between Egypt and Hamas could inspire enough confidence in the Egyptians for them to open the Rafah crossing.

Ending the discussion, Barakat clarified the proposals of the panel by reiterating the need for donors to fulfill aid pledges. The GRM needs reform, especially through the inclusion of Gaza’s civil society in the reconstruction process. Finally, reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas, as well as Egypt and Hamas, would help foster security cooperation at the borders.

Video

• Reviving the stalled reconstruction of Gaza

Transcript

• Event Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

• gaza transcript

Two years after Hamas and Israel agreed to a cessation of hostilities, reconstruction in Gaza has been painfully slow. This was the focus of a panel discussion at the Brookings Doha Center on April 19. As Senior Fellow and Director of Research Sultan Barakat explained, rebuilding has stalled in part because the distribution of aid money pledged by donor countries during the October 2014 Cairo Conference has slowed; according to the World Bank, donor countries had dispersed only 40 percent of the pledged money as of the end of March. At this rate, the pledged funds will not be dispersed until 2019, two years after the target date.

Moreover, construction materials only enter Gaza through one border crossing and must be cleared by layers of bureaucracy. As Omar Shaban—director of Pal-Think, a research institution in Gaza—explained, money for Gaza reconstruction is funneled through the PA’s ministry of finance in Ramallah, which transfers it to the U.N. office in Gaza. The United Nations composes a list of people in Gaza that require construction materials, and the Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (Cogat)—an Israeli administrative body in the ministry of defense—must approve the names on the list. The U.N. then distributes construction materials. Shaban emphasized that the bureaucratic nature of this process has slowed reconstruction considerably, adding that the process isn’t transparent enough, since neither Hamas officials nor members of Gaza’s civil society oversee any aspect of aid distribution.

As a result of the sluggish rebuilding process, Barakat said, only 9 percent of totally damaged houses and 45 percent of partially damaged houses in Gaza have been repaired, leaving over 14,800 families internally displaced. Meanwhile, promised job opportunities in construction projects have failed to materialize, exacerbating feelings of desperation and frustration among Gaza’s population.

[T]he process isn’t transparent enough [said Shaban], since neither Hamas officials nor members of Gaza’s civil society oversee any aspect of aid distribution.

Shaban agreed that people in Gaza feel neglected. With high levels of frustration, he expressed fear that a new round of hostilities between militants and Israel could begin at any time. Previous conflicts were easily ignited—by a kidnapping, a cross-border raid, an assassination, or continuous rocket fire. Shaban argued that the volatility of the situation may be heightening fatigue among donors, who do not want to see their support go to waste in another round of destruction.

Naglaa Elhag, head of rehabilitation and international development at the Qatar Red Crescent Society (QRCS), discussed the difficulties of implementing aid projects in Gaza. She argued that international agencies do not always address the main problems and typically take shortcuts, saying of her own organization and others: “We don’t treat the wounds, we cover it with a bandage.” She highlighted various factors slowing reconstruction, including the lack of accountability on the part of international agencies, fears of renewed conflict, and the Palestinian political stalemate. Since 2008, according to Elhag, QRCS invested $100 million in housing units and other aid projects in Gaza, but some were destroyed during the 2014 war. As a result, QRCS shifted its focus away from physical reconstruction and towards food security, education, and health. 

A related problem is the Palestinian political stalemate. According to Shaban, neither Hamas (the de-facto governing authority in Gaza) nor the Palestinian Authority (PA, based in Ramallah) provides economic opportunities for Gazans, and those nominally on Palestinian government payrolls often do not receive their salaries. Reconciliation talks have failed to establish a unity government, making Egypt, Israel, and the United States reticent to negotiate. Egypt has indicated that if the PA does reach an agreement with Hamas, it would open its border with Gaza at Rafah (presuming the PA has a security presence there). This could increase the flow of construction materials into Gaza, allow for the increased export of commercial goods, and enable Gazans to come and go more frequently. But while opening another crossing for Gaza would temporarily ease the burden faced by the people there, Shaban stressed that a long-term political and economic solution is needed. Elhag, too, emphasized that a resolution to the Gaza crisis isn’t about the distribution of money—rather, she believes a joint Israeli-Palestinian solution is needed to end the suffering in Gaza. 

In the past, tensions between some Arab states and Hamas have also hampered progress in Gaza, but the panelists agreed that some of these relationships—especially with Saudi Arabia—are on the mend. Regional actors like Egypt, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey could help push a reconciliation deal between Fatah and Hamas, which would help improve the situation in Gaza. And as Barakat stressed in conclusion, there is an urgent need for donors to fulfill aid pledges and for the Gaza reconstruction mechanism to become more inclusive, so that Gazans themselves can more fully participate in rebuilding their neighborhoods. 

Are Turkey and Israel on the verge of signing a normalization agreement, after a six-year hiatus? Comments in recent days by senior officials in both countries suggest so. A senior Israeli official, quoted in the Times of Israel, stated that “95% of the agreement is completed,” while Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu said the parties are “one or two meetings away” from an agreement.

Media outlets in both countries have revealed that a meeting between senior Turkish and Israeli officials is expected to be held in Turkey on June 26—and that shortly after, an agreement is likely to be signed and go into effect. 

For two of America’s closest allies in the Middle East to bury the hatchet, reinstate ambassadors, and resume senior-level dialogue would surely be a boost for U.S strategic interests in the region. It would contribute to greater cohesion in dealing with the Syrian crisis, for example, and in the fight against the Islamic State. 

A quick recap

Let’s first recall how the crisis between the two former strategic allies developed, when in the aftermath of the Mavi Marmara incident (May 31, 2010)—resulting in the deaths of 9 Turks—Turkey recalled its ambassador in Tel Aviv and suspended nearly all defense and strategic ties with Israel. Israel also called back its ambassador in Ankara. At the time, Turkey set three conditions for resuming dialogue with Israel: a formal apology, compensation for the families of the victims, and a removal of Israel’s Gaza naval blockade. Relations came to a practical standstill, except in the economic sphere: trade between the two countries exceeded $5 billion in 2014, an unprecedented level. 

Israel formally apologized to Turkey in 2013 and in 2014 committed to paying compensation to the families of the victims. But the Gaza naval blockade has not been lifted. Turkey further demands greater access and presence in Gaza. For its part, Israel demands that Turkey not allow Hamas operative Salah al-Arouri, who resides in Istanbul, to coordinate terrorist operations against Israeli targets in the West Bank. Israel also wants Ankara to pressure Hamas to return the remains of two Israeli soldiers killed in the 2014 war in Gaza. 

Since the flotilla incident, Turkey was not always convinced that repairing relations with Israel actually served its interests. As the Arab Spring unfolded, Turkey hoped to assume a leadership role in the Arab and Muslim worlds—having good relations with Israel did not serve that purpose. And as Turkey went through periods of some unrest in the political arena (whether during the Gezi Park protests in 2013 or the hotly contested local and national elections), many in the ruling AKP party saw restoring relations with Israel as a potential liability in domestic politics. Israel, for its part, was mostly in a reactive mode: sometimes it tried to initiate contacts with Turkey, and sometimes it denounced Turkish anti-Israeli or anti-Semitic rhetoric.

The times they are a-changing

Now, however, new developments have prompted Turkey to seek a rapprochement with Israel. One key factor is the crisis in the Turkish-Russian relationship—in the aftermath of the suspension of the Turkish Stream natural gas pipeline project, Israeli natural gas is viewed as a possible substitute in the medium term for some of Turkey’s natural gas imports from Russia. And as the impact of the war in Syria on Turkey (including the refugee crisis and terrorist attacks) has made clear to Turkey that it must enhance its intelligence capabilities, and Israel can help. Israel, meanwhile, is searching for an export destination for its natural gas (Israeli Energy Minister Steinitz stated recently that “Turkey is a huge market for gas…they need our gas and we need this market”). Israeli leaders also know that resuming a political and military dialogue with Turkey may contribute to a more comprehensive view of the challenges Israel faces in the region. 

Five years after Israel’s formal request to open a representation office at NATO’s Brussels headquarters, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced last month that NATO has approved the Israeli request. Turkey had opposed it, blocking progress, since NATO decisions are adopted by consensus. In a move seen signaling a thawing of relations, Turkey recently removed its objection to Israel’s request, paving the way to NATO’s decision. Israel continues to be a partner in NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue along with Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, Jordan, Mauritania and Morocco. 

At a time when Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is attempting to strengthen his country’s regional strategic position and enhance its economic opportunities, a rapprochement with Israel makes sense. Bilateral negotiations are in the final stretch, as they have reached a compromise on the complex issue of Gaza and Hamas (Turkey will reportedly not demand the full lifting of Israel’s naval blockade on Gaza, settling for greater access and presence in Gaza. Israel will acquiesce to continued Hamas political activities in Turkey and will not demand the removal of Hamas operative al-Arouri from Turkey, but will get Turkish assurances that al-Arouri’s involvement in terror will cease.)

Fixing the troubled Turkish-Israeli relationship has been a mighty task for senior negotiators on both sides over the last few years, and although an agreement seems around the corner, the experience of recent years suggests that there can be last minute surprises. Israel’s Prime Minister had to jump over several hurdles, holding off pressure from Russia and Egypt not to seek rapprochement with Turkey, and ensuring support of the deal with Turkey from his newly appointed Defense Minister Avigdor Liberman, a known opponent of a deal. On the Turkish side, it seems that President Erdoğan wants a rapprochement with Israel, and feels that he needs it. This is tied directly to the Turkish domestic arena: Erdoğan has recently completed his consolidation of power, ousting Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu and paving the way to the election of his trusted confidant, Binali Yıldırım, as prime minister. In addition, his new allies—the military-judicial establishment—are in favor of mending ties with Israel. One caveat is that Erdoğan’s top priority is establishing a presidential system, and so if he feels at any point that reaching an agreement with Israel will somehow undermine those efforts, he may opt for maintaining the status quo. 

While antibiotics are necessary and crucial for treating bacterial infections, their misuse over time has contributed to a rather alarming rate of antibiotic resistance, including the development of multidrug-resistance bacteria or “super bugs.” Misuse manifests throughout all corners of public and private life; from the doctor’s office when prescribed to treat viruses; to industrial agriculture, where they are used in abundance to prevent disease in livestock. New data from the World Health Organization (WHO) and U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) confirm that rising overuse of antibiotics has already become a major public health threat worldwide.

As drug resistance increases, we will see a number of dangerous and far-reaching consequences. First, common infections like STDs, pneumonia, and “staph” infections will become increasingly difficult to treat, and in extreme cases these infections may require hospitalization or treatment with expensive and toxic second-line therapies. In fact, recent estimates suggest that every year more than 23,000 people die due to drug-resistant infections in the U.S., and many more suffer from complications caused by resistant pathogens. Further, infections will be harder to control. Health care providers are increasingly encountering highly resistant infections not only in hospitals – where such infections can easily spread between vulnerable patients – but also in outpatient care settings.

Incentivize appropriate use of antibiotics. Many patients and providers underestimate the risks of using antibiotics when they are not warranted, in part because these drugs often have rapid beneficial effects for those who truly need them.  In many parts of the world the perception that antibiotics carry few risks has been bolstered by their low costs and availability without a prescription or contact with a trained health care provider. Education efforts, stewardship programs, and the development of new clinical guidelines have shown some success in limiting antibiotic use, but these fixes are limited in scope and generally not perceived as cost-effective or sustainable. Broader efforts to incentivize appropriate use, coupled with economic incentives, may be more effective in changing the culture of antibiotic use. These options might include physician or hospital report cards that help impact patient provider selection, or bonuses based on standardized performance measures that can be used to report on success of promoting appropriate use.  While these might create additional costs, they would likely help control rates of drug resistant infections and outweigh the costs of treating them.

Reinvigorate the drug development pipeline with novel antibiotics. There has not been a new class of antibiotics discovered in almost three decades, and companies have largely left the infectious disease space for more stable and lucrative product lines, such as cancer and chronic disease. Antibiotics have historically been inexpensive and are typically used only for short periods of time, creating limited opportunities for return on investment. In addition, unlike cancer or heart disease treatments, antibiotics lose effectiveness over time, making them unattractive for investment. Once they are on the market, the push to limit use of certain antibiotics to the most severe infections can further constrict an already weak market.

Late last year, H.R. 3742, the Antibiotic Development to Advance Patient Treatment (ADAPT) Act of 2013, was introduced and referred to the House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Health. If enacted, the ADAPT Act would create a streamlined development pathway to expedite the approval of antibiotics that treat limited patient populations with serious unmet medical needs. This could potentially reduce costs and development time for companies, thereby encouraging investment in this space. Regulators have indicated that they would also welcome the opportunity to evaluate benefits and risk for a more selective patient subpopulation if they could be confident the product would be used appropriately. The bill has received a great deal of support and would help address a critical public health need (I cover this topic in more detail with my colleagues Kevin Outterson, John Powers, and Mark McClellan in a recent Health Affairs paper).

Advance new economic incentives to remedy market failure. Innovative changes to pharmaceutical regulation, research and development (R&D), and reimbursement are necessary to alleviate the market failure for antibacterial drugs. A major challenge, particularly within a fee-for-service or volume-based reimbursement system, is providing economic incentives that promote investment in drug development without encouraging overuse.  A number of public and private stakeholders, including the Engelberg Center for Health Care Reform and Chatham House’s Centre on Global Health Security Working Group on Antimicrobial Resistance, are exploring alternative reimbursement mechanisms that  “de-link” revenue from the volume of antibiotics sold. Such a mechanism, combined with further measures to stimulate innovation, could create a stable incentive structure to support R&D.

Improve tracking and monitoring of resistance in the outpatient setting. There is increasing concern about much less rigorous surveillance capabilities in the outpatient setting, where drug-resistant infections are also on the rise. Policymakers should consider new incentives for providers and insurers to encourage a coordinated approach for tracking inpatient and outpatient resistance data. The ADAPT Act, mentioned above, also seeks to enhance monitoring of antibiotic utilization and resistance patterns. Health insurance companies can leverage resistance-related data linked to health care claims, while providers can capture lab results in electronic health records. Ultimately, this data could be linked to health and economic outcomes at the state, federal, and international levels, and provide a more comprehensive population-based understanding of the impact and spread of resistance. Current examples include the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) Sentinel Initiative and the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute’s PCORnet initiative. 

Antibiotic resistance is an urgent and persistent threat. As such, patients and providers will continue to require new antibiotics as older drugs are forced into retirement by resistant pathogens. Stewardship efforts will remain critical in the absence of game-changing therapies that parry resistance mechanisms. Lastly, a coordinated surveillance approach that involves diverse stakeholder groups is needed to understand the health and economic consequences of drug resistance, and to inform antibiotic development and stewardship efforts.

Editor's note: This blog was originally posted in May 2014 on Brookings UpFront.

Event Information

As policy agendas for 2015 come into sharper focus, much of the national conversation is aimed at tackling challenges in biomedical innovation. The first two months of the year alone have seen landmark proposals from Congress and the Obama Administration, including the House’s 21^st Century Cures initiative, a bipartisan Senate working group focused on medical progress, President Obama’s Precision Medicine Initiative and a number of additional priorities being advanced by federal agencies and other stakeholders.

On March 13, the Engelberg Center for Health Care Reform hosted the State of Biomedical Innovation Conference to provide an overview of emerging policy efforts and priorities related to improving the biomedical innovation process. Senior leaders from government, academia, industry, and patient advocacy shared their thoughts on the challenges facing medical product development and promising approaches to overcome them. The discussion also examined the data and analyses that provide the basis for new policies and track their ultimate success.

 Join the conversation by following @BrookingsMed or #biomed

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• State of biomedical innovation conference: Panel 1
• State of biomedical innovation conference: Panel 2

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• State of biomedical innovation conference

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• Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

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• 20150313_biomed_transcript
• 313 MASTER DECK2

The breakthrough therapy designation (BTD) program was initiated by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in 2012 to expedite the development of treatments for serious or life-threatening illness that demonstrate “substantial improvement” over existing therapies. The program has since become a widely supported mechanism for accelerating patient access to new drugs. As of March 2015, FDA has received a total of 293 requests for BTD. However, it has granted just  82 (28%), which indicates an ongoing lack of clarity over what exactly meets the criteria for the designation.

On April 24, the Center for Health Policy at Brookings convened a public meeting to explore the designation’s qualifying criteria and how FDA applies those criteria across therapeutic areas. Panelists used real-world and hypothetical case studies to frame the discussion, and highlighted major considerations for the application process, the FDA’s evaluation of the evidence, and the key factors for acceptance or rejection. The discussion also identified strategies to ensure that qualifying criteria are well understood. Here are the five big takeaways:

1.  The BTD program is viewed positively by drug companies, researchers, advocates, and others 

Across the board, participants expressed enthusiasm for the BTD program. Industry representatives noted that their experience had been extremely positive, and that the increased cooperation with and guidance from FDA were very helpful in streamlining their development programs. Receiving the designation can also raise a drug company’s profile, which can facilitate additional investment as well as clinical trial patient recruitment; this is particularly important for smaller companies with limited resources.

Patient and disease advocates were likewise supportive, and expressed hope that the early lessons learned from successful breakthrough therapy approvals (which have been mostly concentrated in the oncology and antiviral fields) could be translated to other disease areas with less success. However, while BTD is an important tool in expediting the development of new drugs, it is just one piece of broader scientific and regulatory policy landscape. Accelerating the pace of discovery and development of truly innovative new drugs will depend on a range of other factors, such as developing and validating new biomarkers that can be used to measure treatment effects at an earlier stage, as well as establishing networks that can streamline the clinical trial process. It will also be important to develop effective new approaches to collecting, analyzing, and communicating information about these treatments once they are on the market, as this information can potentially be used by FDA, providers, and patients to  further improve prescription drug policy and medical decision-making.

2.  BTD requests far outnumber those that actually meet the qualifying criteria

Since the program began, less than 30 percent of requests have received BTD designation. A substantial majority were denied at least in part due to either a lack of data or problems with the quality of the data, or some combination of the two. For example, some sponsors requested the designation before they had any clinical data, or submitted the request using clinical data that was incomplete or based on flawed study designs. Many requests also failed to meet the Agency’s bar for “substantial improvement” over existing therapies.

One reason for the high denial rate may be a lack of a clear regulatory or statutory bar that could be used as a definitive guide for sponsors to know what is needed to qualify for the designation. BTD denials are also confidential, which means that sponsors effectively have nothing to lose by submitting a request. Going forward, manufacturers may need to exercise more discretion in deciding to request the designation, as the process can be resource- and time-intensive for both sides.

3.  There is no single threshold for determining what defines a breakthrough therapy

About 53 percent of the 109 total BTD denials were due at least in part to the fact that the drug did not represent a substantial improvement over existing therapies. During the day’s discussion, FDA and sponsors both noted that this is likely because the criteria for BTD are inherently subjective. In practice, this means there is no clear threshold for determining when a new therapy represents a “substantial improvement” over existing therapies. Designation decisions are complex and highly dependent on the context, including the disease or condition being targeted, the availability of other treatments, the patient population, the outcomes being studied, and the overall reliability of the data submitted. Given the multiple factors at play, it can be difficult in some cases to determine when a new product is potentially “transformational” as opposed to “better,” especially for conditions that are poorly understood or have few or no existing treatments. In making its determinations, FDA considers the totality of the evidence submitted, rather than focusing on specific evidentiary requirements.

4.  Early communication with FDA is strongly recommended for BTD applicants

Roughly 72 percent of the BTD denials related at least in part to trial design or analysis problems, which led several people to suggest that sponsors engage with FDA prior to submitting their request. Though there are several formal mechanisms for interacting with the agency, informal consultations with the relevant review division could help sponsors to get a better  and much earlier sense of what kind of data FDA might need. This early communication could both strengthen viable BTD requests and reduce the number of frivolous requests.

5.  FDA may need more resources for implementing the BTD program

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In the face of unprecedented global challenges, effective global cooperation increasingly requires a partnership between state and non-state actors. Many international institutions now involve non-state actors in arenas that were once the exclusive province of states. The paper analyzes the evolution of civil society participation in the governance of international institutions and highlights the shift from a model based on consultation toward a model of multistakeholder governance. The paper argues that consultation is a less effective approach to involving civil society in achieving the mission of these institutions and suggests that more robust forms of multi-stakeholder participation by civil society can foster greater accountability and better deliberation. It analyzes competing claims about the desirability of including civil society in the governance of international institutions and suggests that an emerging constituency model can promote more effective multi-stakeholder governance. Constituency structures are already central features of several global health institutions and are now being contemplated by institutions in other sectors, including by the Education for All—Fast Track Initiative.

Multi-stakeholder approaches to governance are likely to become more widespread in the years to come in order to harness the contributions of a plethora of private actors engaged in responding to a wide range of global challenges. Even with enhanced cooperation between states, it is increasingly clear that non-state actors are essential to responding to key challenges across a wide range of sectors. Although it is possible to imagine expanded cooperation between state and non-state actors without opening up the governance structures of international institutions, it is less likely that these institutions will be successful in the longrun without a shift toward greater multi-stakeholder involvement in the institutions themselves.

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INTRODUCTION

In recent years, there has been a resurgence of interest in the issue of inequality. Part of this resurgence can be traced to new evidence of persistent and widening wealth gaps. Average incomes may be converging globally as a result of high growth in emerging markets, stronger growth in many poor countries, and slow growth in rich countries. However, the evidence also shows that within countries a parallel process of income divergence, marginalization and rising inequality is also taking place. Put differently, the rising tide of global prosperity is not lifting all boats.

Much of the international debate on inequality focuses on the distribution of income across and within countries. Other dimensions of inequality have received less attention. This is unfortunate. Amartya Sen has described development as “a process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy” by building human capabilities or their capacity to lead the kind of life they value. Income is a means to that end but it is a limited indicator of well-being. Moreover, a person’s income reflects not just personal choice but also their opportunities for improving health, literacy, political participation and other areas. Education is one of the most basic building blocks for the “real freedoms” that Sen describes. People denied the chance to develop their potential through education face diminished prospects and more limited opportunities in areas ranging from health and nutrition, to employment, and participation in political processes. In other words, disparities in education are powerfully connected to wider disparities, including international and intra-country income inequalities. This is why education has been identified as one of the most critical factors in breaking down the disadvantages and social inequalities that are limiting progress toward the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)—development targets adopted by the international community for 2015.

Understanding patterns of educational inequality is critical at many levels. Ethical considerations are of paramount importance. Most people would accept that children’s educational achievements should not be dictated by the wealth of their parents, their gender, their race or their ethnicity. Disparities in educational opportunities are not just inequalities in a technical sense, they are also fundamental in equities—they are unjust and unfair. In an influential paper, John Roemer differentiated between inequalities that reflect factors such as luck, effort and reasonable reward, and those attributable to circumstances that limit opportunity (Roemer 1988).1 While the dividing line may often be blurred, that distinction has an intuitive appeal. Most people have a high level of aversion to the restrictions on what people—especially children—are able to achieve as a result of disparities and inherited disadvantages that limit access to education, nutrition or health care (Wagstaff, 2002). There is a wide body of opinion across political science, philosophy and economics that equal opportunity—as distinct from equality of outcomes—is a benchmark of egalitarian social justice. The theories of distributive justice associated with thinkers such as Amartya Sen, John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin and John Roemer argue, admittedly from very different perspectives, that public policy should aim at equalizing opportunity to counteract disadvantages associated with exogenous circumstances over which individuals or social groups have no control. Given the role of education as a potential leveler of opportunity, it is a national focal point for redistributive social justice.

Considerations of economic efficiency reinforce the ethical case for equalizing educational opportunities. Education is a powerful driver of productivity, economic growth, and innovation. Econometric modeling for both rich and poor countries suggests that an increase in learning achievement (as measured by test score data) of one standard deviation is associated on average with an increase in the long-run growth rate of around 2 percent per capita annually (Hanushek and Wößmann, 2010; Hanushek, 2009; Hanushek and Wößmann, 2008). Such evidence points to the critical role of education and learning in developing a skilled workforce. Countries in which large sections of the population are denied a quality education because of factors linked to potential wealth, gender, ethnicity, language and other markers for disadvantage are not just limiting a fundamental human right. They are also wasting a productive resource and undermining or weakening the human capital of the economy.

International development commitments provide another rationale for equalizing educational opportunities. This is for two reasons. First, the commitments envisage education for all and achievement of universal primary education by 2015. Second, there is mounting evidence that inequality is acting as a brake on progress toward the 2015 goals. Since around 2005, the rate of decline in the out-of-school population has slowed dramatically. Based on current trends, there may be more children out of school in 2015 than there were in 2009. Caution has to be exercised in interpreting short-run trends, especially given the weakness of data. However, the past three editions of the UNESCO Education for All Global Monitoring Report (GMR) have highlighted the role of inequality in contributing to the slowdown with governments struggling to reach populations that face deeply entrenched disadvantages (UNESCO, 2008, 2010, 2011). Therefore, picking up the pace toward the 2015 goals requires a strengthened focus on equity and strategies that target the most marginalized groups and regions of the world (Sumner and Tiwari, 2010; UN-DESA, 2009; UNESCO, 2010). It should be added that disparities in education relate not just to access, but also to learning achievement levels.

Accelerated progress in education would generate wider benefits for the MDGs. Most of the world’s poorest countries are off-track for the 2015 MDG target of halving income poverty and a long way from reaching the targets on child survival, maternal health and nutrition. Changing this picture will require policy interventions at many levels. However, there is overwhelming evidence showing that education—especially of young girls and women—can act as a potent catalyst for change. On one estimate, if all of sub-Saharan Africa’s mothers attained at least some secondary education, there would be 1.8 million fewer child deaths in the region each year. Thus while education may lack the “quick fix” appeal of vaccinations, it can powerfully reinforce health policy interventions.

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INTRODUCTION

In August, 2010 the government of Kenya adopted a new constitution. This followed a referendum in which an overwhelming majority of Kenyans voted for change. The decisive impetus for reform came from the widespread violence and political crisis that followed the 2007 election. While claims of electoral fraud provided the immediate catalyst for violence, the deeper causes were to be found in the interaction of a highly centralized ‘winner-take-all’ political system with deep social disparities based in part on group identity (Hanson 2008).

Provisions for equity figure prominently in the new constitution. Backed by a bill of rights that opens the door to legal enforcement, citizenship rights have been strengthened in many areas,including access to basic services. ‘Equitable sharing’ has been introduced as a guiding principle for public spending. National and devolved governments are now constitutionally required to redress social disparities, target disadvantaged areas and provide affirmative action for marginalized groups.

Translating these provisions into tangible outcomes will not be straightforward. Equity is a principle that would be readily endorsed by most policymakers in Kenya and Kenya’s citizens have provided their own endorsement through the referendum. However, there is an ongoing debate over what the commitment to equity means in practice, as well as over the pace and direction of reform. Much of that debate has centered on the constitutional injunction requiring ‘equitable sharing’ in public spending.

On most measures of human development, Kenya registers average outcomes considerably above those for sub-Saharan Africa as a region. Yet the national average masks extreme disparities—and the benefits of increased prosperity have been unequally shared.

There are compelling grounds for a strengthened focus on equity in Kenya. In recent years, the country has maintained a respectable, if less than spectacular, record on economic growth. Social indicators are also on an upward trend. On most measures of human development, Kenya registers average outcomes considerably above those for sub-Saharan Africa as a region. Yet the national average masks extreme disparities—and the benefits of increased prosperity have been unequally shared. Some regions and social groups face levels of deprivation that rank alongside the worst in Africa. Moreover, the deep fault lines running through society are widely perceived as a source of injustice and potential political instability.

High levels of inequality in Kenya raise wider concerns. There has been a tendency in domestic debates to see ‘equitable sharing’ as a guiding principle for social justice, rather than as a condition for accelerated growth and enhanced economic efficiency. Yet international evidence strongly suggests that extreme inequality—especially in opportunities for education— is profoundly damaging for economic growth. It follows that redistributive public spending has the potential to support growth.

The current paper focuses on a group of 12 counties located in Kenya’s Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASALs). They are among the most disadvantaged in the country. Most are characterized by high levels of income poverty, chronic food insecurity and acute deprivation across a wide range of social indicators.

Nowhere is the deprivation starker than in education. The ASAL counties account for a disproportionately large share of Kenya’s out-of-school children, pointing to problems in access and school retention. Gender disparities in education are among the widest in the country. Learning outcomes for the small number of children who get through primary school are for the most part abysmal, even by the generally low national average standards.

Unequal public spending patterns have played no small part in creating the disparities that separate the ASAL counties from the rest of Kenya—and ‘equitable sharing’ could play a role in closing the gap. But what would a more equitable approach to public spending look like in practice?

This paper addresses that question. It looks in some detail at education for two reasons. First, good quality education is itself a powerful motor of enhanced equity. It has the potential to equip children and youth with the skills and competencies that they need to break out of cycles of poverty and to participate more fully in national prosperity. If Kenya is to embark on a more equitable pattern of development, there are strong grounds for prioritizing the creation of more equal opportunities in education. Second, the education sector illustrates many of the wider challenges and debates that Kenya’s policymakers will have to address as they seek to translate constitutional provisions into public spending strategies. In particular, it highlights the importance of weighting for indicators that reflect need in designing formulae for budget allocations.

Our broad conclusion is that, while Kenya clearly needs to avoid public spending reforms that jeopardize service delivery in wealthier counties, redistributive measures are justified on the grounds of efficiency and equity.

The paper is organized as follows. Part 1 provides an overview of the approach to equity enshrined in the constitution. While the spirit of the constitution is unequivocal, the letter is open to a vast array of interpretations. We briefly explore the implications of a range of approaches. Our broad conclusion is that, while Kenya clearly needs to avoid public spending reforms that jeopardize service delivery in wealthier counties, redistributive measures are justified on the grounds of efficiency and equity. Although this paper focuses principally on basic services, we caution against approaches that treat equity as a matter of social sector financing to the exclusion of growth-oriented productive investment.

Part 2 provides an analysis of some key indicators on poverty, health and nutrition. Drawing on household expenditure data, the report locates the 12 ASAL counties in the national league table for the incidence and depth of poverty. Data on health outcomes and access to basic services provide another indicator of the state of human development. While there are some marked variations across counties and indicators, most of the 12 counties register levels of deprivation in poverty and basic health far in excess of those found in other areas.

Part 3 shifts the focus to education. Over the past decade, Kenya has made considerable progress in improving access to basic education. Enrollment rates in primary education have increased sharply since the elimination of school fees in 2003. Transition rates to secondary school are also rising. The record on learning achievement is less impressive. While Kenya lacks a comprehensive national learning assessment, survey evidence points to systemic problems in education quality. In both access and learning, children in the ASAL counties—especially female children—are at a considerable disadvantage. After setting out the national picture, the paper explores the distinctive problems facing these counties.

In Part 4 we look beyond Kenya to wider international experience. Many countries have grappled with the challenge of reducing disparities between less-favored and more-favored regions. There are no blueprints on offer. However, there are some useful lessons and guidelines that may be of some relevance to the policy debate in Kenya. The experience of South Africa may be particularly instructive given the weight attached to equity in the post-apartheid constitution.

Part 5 of the paper explores a range of approaches to financial allocations. Converting constitutional principle into operational practice will require the development of formulae-based approaches. From an equitable financing perspective there is no perfect model. Any formula that is adopted will involve trade-offs between different goals. Policymakers have to determine what weight to attach to different dimensions of equity (for example, gender, income, education and health), the time frame for achieving stated policy goals, and whether to frame targets in terms of outcomes or inputs. These questions go beyond devolved financing. The Kenyan constitution is unequivocal in stipulating that the ‘equitable sharing’ provision applies to all public spending. We therefore undertake a series of formula-based exercises illustrating the allocation patterns that would emerge under different formulae, with specific reference to the 12 ASAL focus counties and to education.

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May’s jobs gains, released this morning, show that only 38,000 new jobs were added this May, down from an average of 178,000 over the first four months of the year, and the least new jobs added since September 2010.

This year’s monthly job gains and losses can indicate how the economy is doing once they are corrected to account for the pattern we already expect in a process called seasonal adjustment. The approach for this seasonal adjustment that is presently used by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) puts very heavy weight on the current and last two years of data in assessing what are the typical patterns for each month.

In my paper “Unseasonal Seasonals?” I argue that a longer window should be used to estimate seasonal effects. I found that using a different seasonal filter, known as the 3x9 filter, produces better results and more accurate forecasts by emphasizing more years of data. The 3x9 filter spreads weight over the most recent six years in estimating seasonal patterns, which makes them more stable over time than in the current BLS seasonal adjustment method.

I calculate the month-over-month change in total nonfarm payrolls, seasonally adjusted by the 3x9 filter, for the most recent month. The corresponding data as published by the BLS are shown for comparison purposes. According to the alternative seasonal adjustment, the economy actually lost about 4,000 jobs in May (column Wright SA), compared to the official BLS total of 38,000 gained (column BLS Official).

In addition to seasonal effects, abnormal weather can also affect month-to-month fluctuations in job growth. In my paper “Weather-Adjusting Economic Data” I and my coauthor Michael Boldin implement a statistical methodology for adjusting employment data for the effects of deviations in weather from seasonal norms. This is distinct from seasonal adjustment, which only controls for the normal variation in weather across the year. We use several indicators of weather, including temperature and snowfall.

We calculate that weather in May had a negligible effect on employment, bringing up the total by only 4,000 jobs (column Weather Effect). Our weather-adjusted total, therefore, is 34,000 jobs added for May (column Boldin-Wright SWA). This is not surprising, given that weather in May was in line with seasonal norms.

Unfortunately, neither the alternative seasonal adjustment, nor the weather adjustment, makes todays jobs report any more hopeful. They make little difference and, if anything, make the picture more gloomy.

a. Applies a longer window estimate of seasonal effects (see Wright 2013).
b. Includes seasonal and weather adjustments, where seasonal adjustments are estimated using the BLS window specifications (see Boldin & Wright 2015). The incremental weather effect in the last column is the BLS official number less the SWA number.

Issuing work permits to refugees in return for donor support for jobs is seen as a “win-win-win” for refugees, host countries, and the international community. It would stem the flow of refugees to Europe, decrease the dangers of radicalization, and prevent the exploitation of refugees as a source of cheap labor. At last February’s “Supporting Syria and the Region” conference co-hosted by the U.K., Germany, Kuwait, Norway, and the United Nations, former British Foreign Secretary David Miliband called for a million work permits to be made available to Syrians, 200,000 each in Jordan and Lebanon and 600,000 in Turkey.

Turkey issued a decree in January 2016 allowing work permits for Syrians. Jordan also agreed to provide work permits for up to 200,000 Syrians over a number of years in exchange for aid and the opening of European markets to goods produced or special economic zones—all this to lead to jobs for one million Jordanians as well when other aid and spending is added in. Lebanon, whose fragile confessional politics makes the one million plus Sunni refugees a more palpable threat, has chosen not to issue work permits. Yet, according to the International Labor Organization (ILO), “around half of (working age) Syrian refugees are economically active and just one-third have access to overwhelmingly informal and low-skilled employment.” That’s around 165, 000 employed informally. The number is around 160,000 in Jordan  with 1.3 million Syrians and over 400,000 in Turkey with 2.7 million Syrian refugees.  

In Turkey and Jordan, as elsewhere, work permits are tied to employers who apply on behalf of employees once residency, registration, and health requirements are met. In both countries, employers must pay the legal minimum wage and social security payments. The permits are renewed annually. But, for the majority of Syrians working in labor markets with an abundance of local and foreign low-skill, low-wage workers, the pay is nowhere near the minimum wage. As to the promised jobs in the special zones, those will take time to materialize, and we already know that, at least in the garment sector, up to 80 percent of the workers are young women from South Asia, largely residing in dorms but at least receiving the minimum wage. Whether Syrians can adapt to this model remains to be seen. In both Jordan and Turkey, there are certain limits on the percentage of Syrians versus locals in many manufacturing and services jobs; in Jordan there is some evidence that “ghost” Jordanian workers are used to get around this requirement.

Jordan already has over 240,000 foreign workers, mainly Egyptians and Asians, who have work permits, with the total number including those working illegally may be as high as a million. There is a move to get Syrians to replace the foreign workers with permits but that seems a bit uncertain. It seems unlikely that employers will be eager to replace employees, often of long standing and for whom they have gone to the expense of getting work permits.  In Turkey, with fewer foreign workers, many locals work informally, though they tend to get paid significantly more than Syrians. The chances of employers hiking up wages to legalize Syrian employees, whether in Jordan or Turkey, are slim and the record to date appears to confirm this.   

In Jordan, the government provided a three-month grace period for workers to receive permits free of charge. Less than 2,000 permits had been granted by April. An ILO survey in Jordan, which looked at workers in the construction and agriculture sectors, noted that while 90 percent of workers had heard about the grace period, none in the agriculture sector and only 85 percent in construction had work permits, though almost all knew that getting caught might mean detention at the Azraq refugee camp. And an inability to pay social security constituted a major barrier. Often a concern is to go through employers to get the permit.  

In Turkey, the numbers are not encouraging either: By May, only 10,000 had actually registered for work permits. Refugees International reports that Turkey’s work permit program may end up benefitting 40,000 Syrians or roughly 10 percent of those actually working. The government, though, thinks that the program will eventually help all those currently working informally.

The ILO, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and Refugees’ International have praised the Jordanian and Turkish governments for granting work permits. The decision was not easy and was politically charged in both countries. But the political and psychological significance of providing an opening for Syrians to slowly integrate themselves and move towards a stable future is certainly worth pursuing, even if it doesn’t bring immediate rewards. Already, Turkey allows Syrian doctors and medical personnel to work in health centers serving refugees. Over 4000 Syrian teachers have received stipends from a Ministry of Education program funded by UNICEF and western donors. And agricultural workers no longer need work permits so long as provincial governors give their approval.

Eventually delinking work permits from employers will help, and the ILO urges Jordan to do so for agricultural and construction workers. In both Jordan and Turkey, lowering social security payments would also smooth the transition. More support to vocational training, health care, education for children are other ideas being pursued. While making work permits available is not the same as a blanket “right-to-work” law for refugees, a right protected under the U.N. 1951 Refugee Convention but accepted in full neither by Jordan nor Turkey (however, the key international treaty that protects the right to work in binding form is the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to which Jordan and Turkey are signatories), this is an opening and one that the international community should monitor and support. Aside from the February conference, other agreements—such as the one between the EU and Turkey and the upcoming EU deal with Lebanon and Jordan—provide suitable platforms towards improving on this initial phase.   

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Sub-Saharan Africa’s growth performance over the last decade has been astounding, though they mask underlying job creation challenges facing policymakers. The unemployment rate for sub-Saharan Africa remained fairly stable over the period. In 2015, it stood at a slightly high 7.4 percent, compared with over 9 percent in the European Union and 5.3 percent in the United States. However, the figures on vulnerable employment and the working poor[1] in Africa tell a different story—averaging 69.9 percent and 64.0 percent in 2015, respectively. Indeed, of those who are employed, four in five workers are not in the wage economy, but in the informal sector, with no access to workers’ benefits, social protection, and job reliability. In addition, many workers—both formal and informal—are underemployed or overqualified.

The conventional knowledge of structural transformation—labor migration from agriculture to high-productivity, labor-intensive industry—has been turned on its head in Africa. Instead, Africans are moving to jobs in the services sector, which some experts argue is a less productive path. Then again, unique opportunities in African digital jobs are opening up doors the world has never seen before.

The need for decent job creation in Africa also provides both threats and opportunities to the United States. For example, a lack of viable jobs could make the turn to crime, violence, and even extremism—with the promise of steady income from these activities—more appealing to economically marginalized individuals, especially among the youth. Furthermore, job creation boosts the growth of the middle class, expanding the base of consumers for American products, at the same time creating new, stronger trade partners able to supply goods to American consumers. Already, the United States and other countries are creating a myriad of programs to boost entrepreneurship on the continent.

On Monday, June 27, the Brookings Institution’s Africa Growth Initiative and the Congressional African Staff Association hosted an event to discuss why Africa is struggling to create the quantity and quality of jobs it needs and what policies—both African and U.S.—can turn that trend around. Ernest Danjuma Enebi, founder and managing partner of The Denda Group, moderated the discussion. Panelists included Dr. Eyerusalem Siba, research fellow at the Africa Growth Initiative; Hassanatu Blake, co-founding director and president of the non-profit Focal Point Global; and Nicolas Cook, a specialist in African Affairs in the Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division of the Congressional Research Service.

The discussion touched on multiple key points, including what Africa’s unique structural transformation path means for the region’s employment landscape; how development partner efforts affect job growth on the continent; how Africa can avoid a potential “demographic timebomb” of youth unemployment and instead benefit from a “demographic dividend”; and how the United States is addressing the challenges these trends pose for both the continent and the U.S.

Enebi began the dialogue with a Q&A with Siba on an overview of African economic trends, youth unemployment, and formal sector jobs on the continent.

Blake argued that the high youth unemployment is due in part to the region’s struggling educational systems where Poor quality education leads to poor grades on periodic tests and thus students are being pushed out of school, she said. Once out of the formal schooling system, they enter the workforce underprepared without the skills they need to succeed in the job market.

Blake continued to argue this point through a description of Harambee, a private South African organization that works towards improving prospects of youth employment. The program has placed over 20,000 youth into jobs over the past 5 years by testing job applicants on literacy and mathematical ability and matching them with employers. Harambee addresses a broader skills mismatch that Blake argued is holding back job creation. More broadly, Blake argued, public-private partnerships must be created to help youth find jobs and employers find employees.

A major theme of the discussion was that a shift away from aid and towards the support of labor-intensive industries and enabling environments for business can spur job creation.

Of course, causes of unemployment are largely driven by the demand-side factors, acknowledged the panelists. A major theme of the discussion was that a shift away from aid and towards the support of labor-intensive industries and enabling environments for business can spur job creation. Indeed, Cook discussed the importance of the mantra “trade not aid” in addressing these issues, as there are many large American firms with an economic interest in expanding to Africa; however this interest is miniscule compared to Africa’s trade with the rest of the world. Increasing global investments in Africa is, thus, a key part of any job creation, he emphasized.

Cook also touched on global relationships with Africa. He noted that only 1 percent of U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) goes to Africa, and only one percent of American trade is with Africa. Now, several economic development programs, like the U.S. Electrify Africa Act of 2015 and the USAID Power Africa Initiative, exist but are in need of continued funding. To boost trade, the United States has launched the Trade Africa program and has established trade hubs in western, eastern, and southern Africa.

Investments in infrastructure, greater participation in the export market, interventions on improving managerial and marketing skills and the use of information and communications technologies (ICTs) to access global markets can help clear the way for greater job creation.

Siba agreed with the idea of a focus on trade and FDI as major factors in job creation. In fact, she shifted the discussion toward a focus on investments in supporting industry because, as she emphasized, the biggest predictor of business performance including job creation is export market participation. Investments in infrastructure, greater participation in the export market, interventions on improving managerial and marketing skills and the use of information and communications technologies (ICTs) to access global markets can help clear the way for greater job creation, she said.

There are clearly many opportunities for foreign investors to support African industry, but challenges to development remain due to poor infrastructure and a lackluster environment for business.

Blake agreed that ICTs and infrastructure hold great potential for spurring job growth, but pointed out that ICT and infrastructure investment “look different” in different parts of the continent. In some countries in central Africa that she worked with and Cameroon, she suggested, ICTs are not always the best vehicle to drive job growth due to the prohibitive cost of ICT devices and emphasized that keeping local conditions in mind when exploring potential job-creating programs and investments is essential for success.

Cook then pivoted to a discussion on the importance of small enterprises and technology in boosting job growth. He pointed out the importance of WhatsApp as a new means of communication that has helped spur job growth and productivity, and the mobile money transfer platform m-Pesa as a key component of the increase in micro-lending in Kenya. Offered by Safaricom, Kenya’s largest mobile network, M-Pesa allows mobile phone users to transfer money, pay bills, and deposit money. The World Bank highlighted the service in 2009, concluding that “The affordability of the service has been key in opening the door to formal financial services for Kenya’s poor.” The service has also allowed financing of micro-enterprise to take off, but Cook acknowledged that ascertaining the precise impact of these technologies on job growth is very difficult due to the scarcity of data.

The small credit card market and rarely used banking services exclude a wide percentage of the population from the financial system. The widespread presence of mobile phones has now opened up this system.

Fifty to 80 percent of new jobs in Africa are created by small businesses that are not likely to survive more than five years.

Siba elaborated on Cook’s description of the vital role of small businesses in creating jobs on the continent. She argued that any job creation programs in Africa should focus on solving the challenges of small businesses in job creation because they dominate the market structure. Unfortunately, at the moment, small businesses there are not robust. Fifty to 80 percent of new jobs in Africa are created by small businesses that are not likely to survive more than five years. Since small and medium enterprises comprise over 90 percent of all firms in sub-Saharan Africa, this volatility affects the whole economy. As a result, any potential solutions must take this market structure into account. In addition, as Siba suggested, increased focus must be paid to the integration of African businesses into regional markets and domestic and global value chains so that small and medium enterprises have more opportunities to grow.

The discussion concluded with a focus on opportunities for growth: Governments should focus on processing raw commodities for local uses, like timber, coffee, and cocoa; small- and medium-sized enterprises should be scaled up with stronger access to financing and skill development; governments should pursue partnerships with private companies to address the skills mismatch; and education funding should be deliberately targeted to address missing skills, correctly processed, and carefully monitored. Continued job creation in Africa depends on it.

On Monday, July 18, 2016, the world celebrated Nelson Mandela International Day, a day recognizing the former president of South Africa’s commitment to fostering peace and freedom. Every year the Nelson Mandela Foundation hosts a lecture, inviting prominent individuals to discuss significant social issues affecting the African continent. For this year’s lecture, Bill Gates was selected to speak on the theme of “Living Together” in front of a packed stadium in Pretoria. Gates focused on a topic Mandela returned to repeatedly throughout his life—the power of the youth. In the words of Gates, “…young people are better than old at driving innovation because they are not locked in by the limits of the past… we must clear away the obstacles standing in young people’s way so that they can seize all of their potential.”

Unfortunately, South Africa, the second-largest economy on the continent, has the highest youth unemployment rate at 54 percent, as seen in the figure below. Surprisingly, according to the figure the highest rates of youth unemployment lie in the upper-middle-income countries as classified by GNI per capita. Additionally, these unemployment rates might be depressed due to the fact that unemployment refers to people looking for jobs, and many of Africa’s youth are forced into the informal sector after giving up on their search for employment.

Although youth unemployment in Africa is often seen as a growing challenge, a number of experts interpret the large youth population as an opportunity, as long as the youth have access to the economic opportunities through which they can channel their energy into progress. As Africa’s youth is predicted to grow exponentially, achieving broad-based economic growth and development will rely on breaking down the barriers to economic opportunity, by investing in human capital (through education) and in improving business environments. 

Figure 2.3. Youth unemployment will continue to be a growing challenge in 2016

Interestingly, GDP and income classification have little correlation with youth unemployment rates. For example, South Africa, which has the second-largest economy on the continent and is considered an upper-middle-income country based on its GNI per capita, has the highest youth unemployment rate at nearly 54 percent. Meanwhile, the Liberian economy, which is nearly 200 times smaller than South Africa’s, has a youth unemployment rate 10 times smaller. Youth unemployment is measured as the share of the labor force (ages 15-24) without work but available for and seeking employment. Estimates may be low in some low-income countries like Liberia because many young people cannot afford not to work to seek employment and as a result, end up in low-paying jobs.

Source: Youth unemployment figures from World Development Indicators and GDP data from the World Bank databank.

See the Brookings Africa Growth Initiative’s Foresight Africa 2016 report, from which the figure below comes, for more highlights on the growing challenge of youth unemployment in Africa. In addition, earlier this month the Brookings Institution hosted an Africa Policy Dialogue on the Hill on jobs in Africa, alluding to the shortcomings of the educational systems and the importance of infrastructure and electricity to support business and attract investment. For a summary of the conversation, see here.

Tor Syvrud contributed to this post.

In this speech at the annual meeting of the Downtown Detroit Partnership, Chris Leinberger discussed the downtown Detroit strategic planning process Brookings has started in partnership with the University of Michigan.

The metro program hosts and participates in a variety of public forums. To view a complete list of these events, please visit the metro program's Speeches and Events page which provides copies of major speeches, PowerPoint presentations, event transcripts, and event summaries.

Selected Media Coverage
Expert Offers Tips to Give Downtown a Lift
UM Land-Use Strategist: Detroit Poised for Downtown Redevelopment

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Introduction

The post-World War II era has witnessed the nearly exclusive building of low density suburbia, here termed “drivable sub-urban” development, as the American metropolitan built environment. However, over the past 15 years, there has been a gradual shift in how Americans have created their built environment (defined as the real estate, which is generally privately owned, and the infrastructure that supports real estate, majority publicly owned), as demonstrated by the success of the many downtown revitalizations, new urbanism, and transit-oriented development. This has been the result of the re-introduction and expansion of higher density “walkable urban” places. This new trend is the focus of the recently published book, The Option of Urbanism: Investing in a New American Dream (Island Press, November 2007).

This field survey attempts to identify the number and location of “regional-serving” walkable urban places in the 30 largest metropolitan areas in the U.S., where 138 million, or 46 percent, of the U.S. population lives. This field survey determines where these walkable urban places are most prevalent on a per capita basis, where they are generally located within the metro area, and the extent to which rail transit service is associated with walkable urban development.

The first section defines the key concepts used in the survey, providing relevant background information for those who have not read The Option of Urbanism. The second section outlines the methodology. The third section, which is the heart of the report, outlines the findings and conclusions of the survey.

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I have been coming to Charlotte for 25 years, consulting for the likes of Crosland and Faison Enterprises, and have observed in Charlotte one of the most remarkable metropolitan transformations in the country. The economy has obviously changed, becoming one of the largest concentrations of U.S. financial institutions, thanks to the likes of Hugh McColl, Bank of America and Wachovia.

Your town has seen the metropolitan edge grow into South Carolina and up past Davidson. This sprawl is balanced by the splendor of uptown, or Center City, partially a benefit of McColl's focus on your downtown.

I returned to Charlotte two weeks ago, courtesy of the Charlotte Region Civic By Design Forum, sponsored by AIA Charlotte, to see what has happened since my last visit and to give a speech about the structural shift in how the country is building its built environment. As I mentioned in a column in the Observer before I came (March 8, "Charlotte, walk this way"), the metro areas are changing from just offering the Ozzie and Harriet version of the American Dream and adding a "walkable urban" Seinfeld version as well.

So what did I see in Charlotte?

First, I saw the beginning of the end of sprawl. Like much of the rest of the country, the over-production of automobile-driven suburban development at the fringe of your metropolitan area has reached its limits. The combination of outrageous commutes, high gas prices, and the increasing number of consumers preferring a walkable urban way of life have combined to end the geometric increase in land consumption.

The sub-prime crisis has just accelerated an underlying trend. That trend demonstrates that a lifestyle predicated on cheap gas, subsidized infrastructure and long commutes could not last.

Walkable, urban places

But what is emerging to take its place?Metro Charlotte seems to be following a national trend in creating and growing high-density, walkable urban places. The opening of the Lynx light rail line to the south is showing the way. It starts in a re-energized Center City with the one-of-a-kind performing arts center, museums, high-rise temples of commerce, sports venues, a convention center, high-end hotels, the central library, among other regionally significant treasures. There is now a "there there" in Center City.

However, housing is the true sign that a downtown is viable. For years, the few urbanites in Charlotte found refuge in the Fourth Ward, one of the special places in the South. However, resilient, safe and racially and socially integrated housing districts have emerged in the First, Second and Third Wards, as well as the beginning of luxury high-rise living in the heart of Center City. There even are small grocery stores and some of the best dining in the region. You are seeing the emergence of a Big City.

But it definitely is not confined to Center City.

Downtown-adjacent places such as Southend, arts-focused places like NoDa, and emerging Elizabeth Avenue and Midtown all are providing rich options. Each of these places has its own character. These places offer a somewhat lower density, but still walkable urban, alternative to Center City.

There is going to be a major hurdle to transforming SouthPark into what it wants to be, an upscale walkable urban place like Winter Park in Orlando or Bethesda near Washington, D.C. It was built for the easy movement and storage of the car, and a decision will have to be made as to whether it wants to be a drivable place -- or a walkable place. Right now, it is trying to be both, is neither fish nor fowl, and this will fail. The fact that there are no plans for rail transit nearby is just one of many signs that it is a very confused area.

Metro Charlotte's future

Regardless of whether SouthPark figures out what it wants to be when it grows up, there will be 8-10 regionally significant, walkable urban places to develop in Metro Charlotte over the next two decades. Each will have a unique character and different density. What they will have in common is that they are walkable (also bikable) for most residents' everyday needs and maybe even employment.

Only four or five have begun to germinate so far. SouthPark should be on that list but won't be until it solves its identity crisis. Where will the others emerge? Best bet is to follow the rails. Most will be anchored by a transit station.

I think I have seen the future of Charlotte. Continue to build out the light-rail system and encourage mixed-use, high-density zoning around the stations. You will find that your extraordinary growth of the past generation will continue but in a new and different manner since the market demands different options. You will also find that this new kind of growth will be economically, financially and environmentally more sustainable.

Editor’s Note: This piece originally was published on the Guardian’s Sustainable Business website.

I recently returned from Copenhagen, my first time to the Danish capital. Even a three day visit affirms why this city of more than 540,000 residents has received global recognition as a beacon of sustainable development. An incredible 36 percent of all commuting trips to work or school are made by bike along, in many cases, secure bike lanes that protect cyclists from cars and buses. Another 32 percent of city residents either walk or utilize the region's highly-efficient public transportation network of buses and trains.

This kind of sustainable development clearly yields significant environmental benefits. Copenhagen achieved the highest ranking in the 2009 European Green City Index, scoring in the top 10 in all eight categories, from energy efficiency to transport and environmental governance.

Growing green is obviously an environmental imperative. Yet the Copenhagen experience shows that it can be a market proposition as well, with a diverse set of economic and fiscal benefits accruing to cities that are at the vanguard of sustainable development. Cities like Copenhagen, in short, may be inventing a clean economy of place.

Monday Morning, the respected Scandinavian thinktank, recently released a report detailing the effect of building a city that is high in spatial efficiency and rich in transport choices. Some of the benefits are direct and local. Residents who cycle to work or school are healthier, so health care costs decline (by an estimated $380 million a year). Fewer cars on the road means less congestion and fewer accidents, so additional savings are realized.

Yet the big effect from sustainable development may be indirect and global, as specialized firms naturally rise and expand to meet the growing demand for clean services and clean products. Monday Morning's report finds that Copenhagen's clean sector has been a critical contributor to the region's economy in the past decade, with green exports outpacing all other sectors by growing at an astounding 77 percent between 2004 and 2009.

Cities in the U.S. are following suit. Portland, Oregon, is also internationally renowned for its commitment to sustainable development. The Portland metropolis has an expansive public transit system and an urban growth boundary to control development at the urban periphery. The city boasts a green investment fund to provide grants for residential and commercial building projects.

Now the city is striving, like Copenhagen, to reap the economic rewards of sustainable development through business formation, firm expansion, job growth and private investment. In February, Portland released its first regional export plan to double exports over five years by building on the region's distinctive economic and physical attributes. A critical pillar of this strategy involves increasing the export orientation of firms in the burgeoning clean technology sector to serve growing markets in Asia, Latin America and elsewhere.

Both Copenhagen and Portland recognize that urbanization is the dominant market-shaping trend of the century. By 2030 it is estimated that China will have one billion residents while India will have 590 million. These nations and others will demand products and services that enable development that is economically supportive, environmentally sensitive and spatially efficient. And those products and services may disproportionately emerge from firms located in cities, in mature economies and rising nations alike, which are first movers on sustainable development.

The economic benefits of sustainable development could be substantial. Last year, my program at Brookings measured the U.S. clean economy at 2.7 million jobs. That means the clean economy has more jobs than fossil-fuel related industries and is nearly twice the size of the biosciences field and 60 percent of the 4.8 million strong IT sector.

The U.S. clean economy is also incredibly diverse (sweeping across five broad categories and 39 separate clusters) and disproportionately located in the nation's top 100 cities and metropolitan areas.

Green architecture and construction services cluster illustrates the potential for growth and the reality of metropolitan concentration. This segment already employs over 56,000 people in the U.S. Some 90 percent of these jobs are located in the top 100 cities and towns (although those communities house only two-thirds of the population). The segment grew by a healthy annual average of 6.4 percent between 2003 and 2010 and includes firms such as Burns and McDonnell Engineering in Kansas City, McKinstry and Co. in Seattle, and Gensler in San Francisco. Conclusion: the clean economy of place constitutes a virtuous cycle between cities, companies, consumers and clusters.

Let me end where I began, in Copenhagen. The city is not resting on its cycling laurels but setting its sights higher, towards achieving a goal of carbon neutrality by 2025. Shakespeare was wrong: all is not rotten in the state of Denmark. Nurturing what is good — and green — embracing it and extending it could provide a platform for economic growth for decades to come.

An economic analysis of a sample of neighborhoods in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area using walkability measures finds that:

• More walkable places perform better economically. For neighborhoods within metropolitan Washington, as the number of environmental features that facilitate walkability and attract pedestrians increase, so do office, residential, and retail rents, retail revenues, and for-sale residential values.

• Walkable places benefit from being near other walkable places. On average, walkable neighborhoods in metropolitan Washington that cluster and form walkable districts exhibit higher rents and home values than stand-alone walkable places.

• Residents of more walkable places have lower transportation costs and higher transit access, but also higher housing costs. Residents of more walkable neighborhoods in metropolitan Washington generally spend around 12 percent of their income on transportation and 30 percent on housing. In comparison, residents of places with fewer environmental features that encourage walkability spend around 15 percent on transportation and 18 percent on housing.

• Residents of places with poor walkability are generally less affluent and have lower educational attainment than places with good walkability. Places with more walkability features have also become more gentrified over the past decade. However, there is no significant difference in terms of transit access to jobs between poor and good walkable places.

The findings of this study offer useful insights for a diverse set of interests. Lenders, for example, should find cause to integrate walkability into their underwriting standards. Developers and investors should consider walkability when assessing prospects for the region and acquiring property. Local and regional planning agencies should incorporate assessments of walkability into their strategic economic development plans and eliminate barriers to walkable development. Finally, private foundations and government agencies that provide funding to further sustainability practices should consider walkability (especially as it relates to social equity) when allocating funds and incorporate such measures into their accountability standards.

The Great Recession highlighted the need to change the prevailing real estate development paradigm, particularly in housing. High-risk financial products and practices, “teaser” underwriting terms, steadily low-interest rates, and speculation in housing were some of the most significant contributors to the housing bubble and burst that catalyzed the recession. But an oversupply of residential housing also fueled the economic crisis.

However, a closer look at the post-recession housing numbers paints a more nuanced picture. While U.S. home values dropped steadily between 2008 and 2011, distant suburbs experienced the starkest price decreases while more close-in neighborhoods either held steady or in some cases saw price increases. This distinction in housing proximity is particularly important since it appears that the United States may be at the beginning of a structural real estate market shift. Emerging evidence points to a preference for mixed-use, compact, amenity-rich, transit-accessible neighborhoods or walkable places.

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Recently, Bolivian President Evo Morales declared himself a “slave of the people” and said he is backing the proposed constitutional reform that would enable him to seek re-election in 2019 if that’s what the citizens want. Last Saturday, September 26, the Legislative Assembly partially amended the Constitution (by a two-thirds majority), authorizing Morales to run for the presidency once again in 2019. February 21, 2016 is set as the date of the popular referendum to validate or reject the amendment.

This amendment allows presidential re-election for two consecutive terms, rather than just one re-election, as dictated by the previous constitutional provision. The change takes into account the current presidential term (2015-2020) and clarifies that Evo and his vice president are authorized to run only one more time, that is, to seek re-election only for the 2020 to 2025 period. The opposition immediately denounced the amendment as “tailoring the law to the needs of one person”.

It should be noted that Morales and García ran and won in the 2005, 2009, and 2014 elections. The current term is the second consecutive term under the new Bolivian Constitution (adopted in 2009) and the third since they were first elected, in 2005. If he wins the elections scheduled for 2019, Evo would become one of the leaders to hold power the longest in Bolivia and throughout Latin America.

Re-election fever

This constitutional amendment, recently adopted in Bolivia, is not an isolated event. Rather, it fits within a regional trend toward re-election that has been gaining ground in Latin America over the past 20 years.

While the region ushered in democracy in the late 1970s and many clearly opposing re-election, this situation changed dramatically a few years later. The first wave of reforms favorable to immediate or consecutive re-election came in the first half of the 1990s with the impetus of Alberto Fujimori in Peru (1993), Carlos Menem in Argentina (1994), and Fernando Henrique Cardoso in Brazil (1997). From then on, several more presidents introduced reforms during their administrations to keep themselves in power. A second wave of reforms, led by Hugo Chávez, took place in the middle of the last decade, with a view to moving from immediate re-election to indefinite re-election. Chávez secured this objective via referendum in 2009.

Chávez’s example was reproduced by Daniel Ortega in 2014 in Nicaragua (the second country to allow indefinite re-election). Currently one more president, Rafael Correa (Ecuador), is promoting a reform along similar lines.

Recent reforms and trends

The years 2014 and 2015 have been full of news a about re-election. In the last 20 years the Dominican Republic has led in the number of re-election related reforms, with four from 1994 to 2015. The most recent, in July 2015, has re-established immediate re-election, enabling President Danilo Medina to run once again in May 2016 elections to aspire to a second consecutive term.

Two more countries have moved in what some might call extreme directions in 2014 and 2015. Nicaragua eliminated any impediment to re-election from the constitution in January of 2014, while Colombia moved in the opposite direction when they approved a reform prohibiting presidential re-election, in June 2015, a decade after re-election was first adopted.

On April 22, 2015, the Honduran Supreme Court declared the articles of the constitution that prohibited presidential re-election inapplicable. These articles also punished public officials and any other citizen who proposed or supported amending them, as these articles were considered not subject to reform. In 2009 the effort to call a National Constitutional Assembly after a non-binding consultation to amend the constitution and do away with this provision, led to the coup d’état that removed former President Zelaya from office.

In Brazil, the Chamber of Deputies cast an initial vote in 2015 in favor of eliminating re-elections, which is now being examined in the Senate. Most analysts consider it likely that the senate will adopt a similar position as the lower house, i.e. in favor of doing away with re-election.

Finally, one should note the cases of Ecuador and Bolivia, countries in which efforts are under way to amend the constitutions in relation to elections, in the terms analyzed above.

As a result of the reforms of the last few years, at this time 14 of the 18 countries in the region allow re-election, albeit with different specific rules. Venezuela (since 2009) and Nicaragua (since 2014) are the only countries so far that allow indefinite re-election. In five countries – Argentine, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, and the Dominican Republic – consecutive re-election is allowed, but not indefinitely (only one re-election is permitted). Nonetheless, presidents who re-founded the institutional order through constitutional assemblies have been able to benefit from a third term, leaving out the first term on the argument that it pre-dated the constitutional reforms (Bolivia and Ecuador). To these five countries we should added the above-mentioned case of Honduras.

In six other countries one can return to the presidency after an interval of one or two presidential terms. These are Chile, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Panama, Peru, and Uruguay. As we have observed, only four countries have an absolute prohibition on any type of re-election, namely Mexico, Guatemala, Paraguay, and, since last July, Colombia.

My opinion

This re-election fever is bad news for a region like ours given the institutional weaknesses, the crisis of the political parties, the growing personalization of politics, and, in several countries, hyper-presidentialism.

Something is very wrong when a president of a democracy considers himself or herself as indispensable as to change the constitution in order to stay in power. As Pope Francis noted recently; “a good leader is one who is capable of bringing up other leaders. If a leader wants to lead alone, he is a tyrant. True leadership is fruitful.”

“The leaders of today will not be here tomorrow. If they do not plant the seed of leadership in others, they are worthless. They are dictators,” he concluded.

I agree with Pope Francis. The health of a democracy depends essentially on its ability to limit the power of those in government so they cannot reshape the law to fit their personal ambitions. In other words, democracy in Latin America does not need leaders who are slaves of the people, but who are slaves to the law and the institutions.

This piece was originally published by International IDEA.

I was honored today to speak at the kick off meeting of the new ReFormers Caucus. This group of over 100 former members of the U.S. Senate, the House, and governors of both parties, has come together to fight for meaningful campaign finance reform. In the bipartisan spirit of the caucus, I shared speaking duties with Professor Richard Painter, who was the Bush administration ethics czar and my predecessor before I had a similar role in the Obama White House. 

As I told the distinguished audience of ReFormers (get the pun?) gathered over lunch on Capitol Hill, I wish they had existed when in my Obama administration role I was working for the passage of the Disclose Act. That bill would have brought true transparency to the post-Citizens United campaign finance system, yet it failed by just one vote in Congress.  But it is not too late for Americans, working together, to secure enhanced transparency and other campaign finance changes that are desperately needed.  Momentum is building, with increasing levels of public outrage, as reflected in state and local referenda passing in Maine, Seattle and San Francisco just this week, and much more to come at the federal, state and local level.

What if I told you I’d found a surefire way to decrease community involvement in our local schools while at the same time increasing the costs of providing education for taxpayers? Probably not a political winner, eh? And yet, for well over 100 years we’ve adopted such an approach to governing America’s public schools.

I’m talking of course, about the widespread and increasingly questionable practice of local school district governments holding their school board elections “off-cycle” so that they are contested apart from regular national elections.

Just how significant and widespread are “off-cycle” school board elections? And what are the consequences of using off-cycle elections for the tone and direction of education policy? UC Berkeley Political Scientist Sarah Anzia recently penned a terrific book examining the causes and consequences of off-cycle elections in American politics in which she finds that 90 percent of states hold at least some municipal races apart from major national elections and three quarters of states do so for school board elections. Data from the National School Boards Association seem to confirm Anzia’s descriptive account on the prevalence of these elections.

By exploiting the occasional episode in which a change in state law forced localities to move their elections “on cycle,” Anzia is able to provide some pretty rigorous causal evidence that off-cycle elections decrease voter turnout and equip organized interests (e.g. teachers unions) to obtain more favorable policy outcomes. Anzia’s findings mesh nicely with other work done by University of Pennsylvania Political Scientist, Marc Meredith, who found that when school boards are given the authority to choose election dates for raising revenue (e.g. bond elections) boards will “manipulate” the timing of elections in predictable ways to ensure an electorate that is most favorable to increased school spending.

"While most citizens are tuned into the presidential primary contests this year, the important reality is that thousands of school board members will be 'elected' by tiny and unrepresentative electorates prior to next November’s general election."

While most citizens are tuned into the presidential primary contests this year, the important reality is that thousands of school board members will be “elected” by tiny and unrepresentative electorates prior to next November’s general election. This isn’t an accident or an oversight. The helpless position of today’s “education voter” is a predictable consequence of Progressive era reforms that sought to “take politics out of education.” As Columbia Professor, Jeffrey Henig, explains in his insightful and wide-ranging book, The End of Exceptionalism in American Education, the widespread use of single-purpose governments that are insulated from the electorate has been a hallmark of American school governance that is only recently beginning to come undone.

Advocates of off-cycle elections sometimes contend that holding school elections apart from major federal elections helps foster a more informed electorate. But shouldn’t the onus be on those who defend off-cycle elections to demonstrate better outcomes in districts that cling to a policy that often results in higher costs to taxpayers and diminishes small-d democracy. Of course it’s fair and important to ask, “How much democracy is good for our schools?” However, there are at least three reasons to be skeptical that the benefits of using “off-cycle” elections outweigh the costs:

First, I’m unaware of any scholarly evidence that the voters who participate in off-cycle elections are significantly more informed than the electorates participating in on-cycle elections. More importantly, I am not aware of any scholarly research that demonstrates a linkage between off-cycle elections and better student achievement outcomes. To the contrary, my friend and collaborator Arnie Shober (Lawrence University) and I found a strong association between a district’s relative academic performance and the use of on-cycle elections in a 2014 analysis that we undertook for the Fordham Institute. Although that report could not establish any causal relationship between on-cycle elections and better student achievement (clearly we could not randomly assign on-cycle elections), the fact that we found a positive correlation between on-cycle school board elections and a district’s academic performance arguably puts the ball back in the court of those who would prefer diminished citizen participation and higher fiscal costs.

Second, on the subject of higher costs, consider the takeaway from a recent piece in Governing Magazine that quotes Rice University Political Scientist and local elections expert, Melissa Marschall.  It paraphrases Marschall, saying “There's no doubt about it. Holding concurrent elections is bound to increase turnout…Holding elections less frequently should save them [local governments] money.” In short, even if some benefits (a marginally more informed electorate?) could in theory be demonstrated, one would also need to account for known costs: lower citizen participation and more frequent elections that school districts cannot piggyback onto national or statewide elections.

Third and finally, as Eitan Hersh explains in a hard-hitting recent post on FiveThirtyEight, there’s more than a tinge of hypocrisy when it comes to those who defend off-cycle elections. Ironically, while the Democratic Party and organized labor often advocate for policies that enhance workplace democracy and reduce barriers to voter participation (i.e., opposing voter ID laws, supporting same day registration and vote by mail), these two groups have, according to Hersh, led the charge to retain off-cycle school board elections that all but assure lower and more unrepresentative turnout.  

Admittedly, there’s no perfect approach to governing American K-12 education. And, governance “reform” is hardly a panacea for improving our schools. Nonetheless, as Noel Epstein wisely observed in her 2004 volume, Who’s in Charge Here?, when education governance is fragmented ordinary citizens are challenged to hold policy-makers accountable because it is difficult for the public to mobilize and readily identify which political authority or authorities are responsible. The bottom line: we don’t do the electorate any additional favors by purposefully staggering school board races across multiple off-year election cycles. Consolidating the school election calendar is a small, but nonetheless sensible step in the right direction.  

The campaign for the 2016 Presidential nominations has shaken the political kaleidoscope, and the pieces are still moving. The populist surge of both Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders has torn the carefully crafted campaign strategies of other candidates into tatters. Populism is trumping realism. Political nostrums – like how Evangelical Christians or women will vote – are being challenged almost daily. The political establishment looks like the Wizard of Oz, with feeble powers inside giant machines.

There are, then, many losers in 2016. But perhaps the biggest loser of all is public policy. Policy used to matter quite a lot; the very term “policy platform” implied a solid structure, on which candidates would stand. Today, the strength of a candidate’s policy prescriptions and the strength of their political support seem unrelated. Or if there is a relationship, it is an inverse one. Trump provides the most vivid example of the sundering of policy from politics. But the policies of Sanders don’t come close to adding up either. Trump’s ideas are wacky – but Sanders’ are weak.

Trump’s proposals (when clear enough to be assessed) have been judged to be wholly impractical by every expert who is not certifiable. You cannot, in fact, force a sovereign nation to pay for a 2,000-mile, $20-billion wall you are building to keep their people out. You cannot enact a “total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the U.S.” You cannot impose a 45 percent tariff on Chinese goods. You cannot cut taxes, ignore entitlements and wipe out the national debt. You cannot deport 11 million people. To be clear, I mean “cannot” here in the narrow, policy sense, rather than in legal or moral terms.

But cries of foul from the policy analysts have fallen on deaf ears. Each time Trump makes a ludicrous suggestion, these experts fill the airwaves with their reasoned arguments against it, Trump ignores them, and his poll ratings go up. Every time an establishment expert attacks one of his proposals, his anti-establishment credentials are burnished.

Meanwhile, the uber-wonk of the Republican field, Jeb Bush, became a piece of political marginalia. He produced some thoughtful and sensible policy ideas, on student financing, economic growth, health care, energy, school reform, and so on. Look where that got him.

Trump has grasped an important truth about politics in the digital age. Policy statements do not need to be serious proposals. They are merely ways to signal to the electorate what your instincts are, and what kinds of things you care about. It doesn’t matter if they don’t pass muster in the DC think-tank community. They are essentially a long list of the candidate’s likes and dislikes – politics in primary colors.

At his rallies, Trump announces his plan to build a wall on the southern border of the U.S., and asks: “And who’s gonna pay for it?” Then he holds out the mike to the crowd. They dutifully shout back: “Mexico!” It’s not true, and it can’t be true, but it doesn’t seem to matter. If Trump wins and appoints Ben Carson, the U.S. will have a Secretary for Education who has wondered aloud if Joseph built the pyramids.

Over on the Democrat side, Hillary Clinton, a wonk to match Bush, continues to fight a nervously close battle against a man who seems to design his policies on a blank sheet of paper, never allowing the facts on the ground to dilute the purity of his vision.

To be clear: I’m not saying that Sanders and Trump are equivalent. Trump plays on fear and loathing; Sanders indulges utopian idealism. But like Trump, the main purpose of Sanders’ policies is to signal a broad set of values, rather than chart a realistic way forward. Even the most progressive analysts of health care policy, like my Brookings colleague Henry Aaron, consider the Sanders plan for a single-payer health care system to be a pipe dream. As Aaron writes: “We know that single-payer mechanisms work in some countries. But those systems evolved over decades, based on gradual and incremental change from what existed before. That is the way that public policy is made in democracies.” Indeed. But not the way public policy is being made on the campaign trail.

Likewise, Sanders’ fiscal policies simply do not stack up, even if he can make the economy grow like it’s the ‘60s (the 1860s, that is). But don’t take my word for it: ask ultra-liberal economist Paul Krugman. Or indeed the four Democrat former chairs of the president’s Council of Economic Advisers who jointly wrote to warn of the fuzzy math at the heart of Sanders’ tax and spending plans. Sanders is playing fantasy fiscal policy.

But just as the unhinged ideas from Trump are doing nothing to dampen his fans, so the unrealistic ones from Sanders are not putting off his core supporters. And just as the scorn of the establishment helps Trump, so the attacks from experts on the mainstream left on Sanders’ ideas bolster his image as a revolutionary idealist, refusing to accept the status quo.

We should be honest: it is only in exceptional circumstances that policy is likely to be the central ingredient of politics. The personality, vision and message of the candidate, and the efficiency of a political operation, are typically more important. We should also be honest that the aspirational nature of campaign pledges very often puts them well beyond reasonable reach. Remember Hoover’s “chicken in every pot and a car in every garage?” Presidents can’t make that kind of change happen.

But even if policies declared on the campaign trail have often been a stretch, they have at least been a stretch in the right direction. Even if they were aspirational, they were not bonkers. The capacity to propose sensible policy has historically been a necessary test of political candidates, with scholars and serious journalists acting as examiners. Good policy may not often win you an election, but really bad policy could lose one. Now, in a fragmented media market, this basic test of policy seriousness may no longer disqualify a candidate.

Most successful Presidential candidates have, once in office, attempted to follow through on most (75% according to one study) of their campaign promises. Obama tried for 80%, according to Politifact. But many of those being made this year cannot be taken seriously, even perhaps by the candidates themselves. They are positioning devices, rather than proposals.

For a scholar working in a public policy think-tank, these are of course disheartening trends. What use is there for policy analysis when it seems as if politicians barely need policies at all? But there are deeper dangers here. If policy and politics separate entirely, the people who end up in office are likely to have little regard for policies, or even the skills required to make them. This will reduce the chances that policies will be implemented successfully, or that they will be effective, and therefore make them even less relevant to an electorate already concerned that our governance system is broken. Worse, the careless disregard for facts, laws, costs, and even basic math is corrosive to the democratic process. It is too much, perhaps, to expect politicians to seek to make voters better informed about the key issues. But I think it is reasonable to hope they will not misinform them.

I hope that I am wrong. I hope that policy will make a political comeback. But I’m not holding my breath.

Editor's note: This piece originally appeared in Bloomberg Government.

Introduction:

Unexpectedly, Italian politics has undergone a significant breakthrough over the last months. New protagonists, new languages, and new projects have markedly enlivened the usually swampy political landscape. In fact, if one adopts concepts and tools that are common to the analysis of political economy in the euro area, one would discover that what happened was far from unexpected. The unprecedented depth of the economic crisis of the last years paved the way to policy responses that were different from those common in the past. How different they should be, is however another question. This analysis shows why change was unavoidable, but some pillars of the “old politics” need to be carefully preserved if the new course is to succeed.

The consequences of the financial crisis on the Italian economy have produced a loss of output of around 9% of Italy's GDP. There had never been a similar loss of income in post-war Italian economy. The protracted recession has caused permanent effects on the output capacity of Italian firms affecting the level of investments that fell by almost 30%. Households have considerably shifted downwards their consumption patterns. This breakthrough in economic behaviors has been mirrored by a sense of deep disappointment among the population vis-à-vis the political class. The dramatic loss of income represented a rupture of the former political-economic model of the Italian economy based on cyclical developments.

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If you want to understand what drove the intense opposition to the nuclear deal with Iran in certain quarters of the American political establishment, as well as across the broader Middle East, all you have to do is look at the photos from Iranian president Hassan Rouhani’s inaugural tour of Europe this week. The most notorious shot shows plywood barricades concealing ancient Roman statues, apparently out of concern that their nudity would shock or offend the leader of an Islamic theocracy.

The alacrity with which Italian leaders jettisoned their values and historical legacy in hopes of gaining some advantage in Iran’s post-sanctions gold rush is precisely what nuclear deal opponents predicted and hoped to forestall. After all, a Europe that would so readily censor the treasures of its own glorious antiquity, in an obsequious gesture that was apparently unbidden by Tehran, is unlikely to jeopardize any budding business to penalize any Iranian infractions of the agreement, or to put pressure on Iran over any of its other objectionable policies.

As I wrote 10 months ago:

After a deal, the Islamic Republic will be back in business, its standing as an investment destination restored and its place in the community of nations effectively normalized. This is, of course, precisely what Tehran is seeking and what Hassan Rouhani was elected to the presidency to accomplish — redemption. An imperfect, incomplete redemption, but a new beginning nonetheless.

But redemption is precisely what [Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin] Netanyahu and other opponents of an Iranian deal are determined to prevent. They appreciate that once the current network of multilateral sanctions is unraveled, it will never be reinstated, absent some extraordinary provocation by Tehran. The presumption, then, is that the threat posed by Iran’s regional ambitions will never be successfully blunted. For Netanyahu—and for many in the American policy community—that is an unacceptable outcome. They believe, as the prime minister declared on Tuesday, that “If Iran wants to be treated like a normal country, let it act like a normal country.”

Netanyahu and other opponents of the deal did not achieve that goal. Much of the U.S. unilateral sanctions regime remains intact, and these measures—along with some residual uncertainty about the longevity of the nuclear deal—will restrain the horizons of Iran’s economic and geopolitical reintegration into the international community. But for all practical purposes, the Islamic Republic’s redemption is complete.

The alacrity with which Italian leaders jettisoned their values and historical legacy in hopes of gaining some advantage in Iran’s post-sanctions gold rush is precisely what nuclear deal opponents predicted and hoped to forestall.

So in the wake of this broad normalization, how can the world continue to nudge Tehran toward “acting like a normal country”? For starters, by restraining the impulse to placate ideological excesses of Iranian politics—or, for that matter, those of its neighbors.

The Italian deference to Rouhani is not without precedent: similar measures were taken last year to protect the delicate sensibilities of Abu Dhabi’s crown prince. And it was not without foundation—in 1999, photos of a previous Iranian president, Mohammad Khatami, enjoying an Italian state dinner provoked a furor among opponents of his reformist agenda because they revealed wine glasses on the tables.

However, there were an infinite number of ways for circumventing these civilizational conflicts without repudiating Italian artistic glory. To avoid a repeat of his Roman fiasco, Khatami simply adapted his future European visits to incorporate a greater number of official breakfast meetings, where abstinence was more easily ensured.

Iran’s rehabilitation without full-fledged reformation compounds the already urgent challenges of an unstable Middle East. Its reintegration can be a stabilizing force, but only if Tehran reconciles itself to the world, rather than the reverse.

And thus, it happened, Brexit is a reality. For the first time in history, a European Union member state has decided to leave the EU. And what a member state it is. The U.K. is the EU’s second-largest economy, its main military power (along with France), a country with a global foreign policy outlook, and a pro-active approach to international crises and challenges.

The composite coalition that championed Brexit, including the openly xenophobic U.K. Independence Party (UKIP) as well as staunch free marketeers from the Conservative Party, understandably celebrates a result probably unachievable just a few years ago. So do the other parties in Europe that have made opposition to immigration, European integration, and globalization the centerpiece of their political agenda, such as the National Front in France, the PVV in the Netherlands, and the Northern League in Italy. Rightly emphasizing the similarities with his views on these issues, the Republican contender for the U.S. presidency, Donald Trump, has hailed Brexit as a “good thing.”

The rest of the world—and of the U.K.—is stunned, as The New York Times headline read on the day after the U.K. referendum. Politicians, experts, and ordinary citizens wonder about the effects of Brexit for the U.K., Europe, and the world. These are legitimate concerns. To put it bluntly, Brexit is a severe blow to the U.K., to the EU, and to the international liberal order. Worse still, it might trigger a chain reaction that could turn it into a full-blown catastrophe.

A more divided country

In just one night, the U.K. has plunged into a grave constitutional crisis. The dramatic fall of the pound vis-à-vis the dollar—it reached its lowest point in 30 years—has caused the British gross domestic product to slip below France’s in two hours. It may be that the grim predictions of the U.K. Treasury—which has warned about a U.K. going into a recession already this year – are exaggerated. Yet there is little doubt that the next prime minister—David Cameron has already announced he will resign in the next few months—will have to cope with volatile markets and a more fragile and vulnerable economy. And this is going to be just one of the excruciatingly difficult tasks he or she will be confronted with.

The Conservative Party still holds an absolute majority in Parliament, so it is from its ranks that the next prime minister will come out. Pundits are betting on a leading figure of the pro-Brexit fraction, but that is not a given. The party is divided and bitter between its pro- and anti-Brexit camps, a wound that a centrist might perhaps have a better chance to heal.

Mending intra-party fences will just be the start, however. The EU referendum has torn apart the country. It has highlighted painful splits between the older generation (overwhelmingly in favor of Brexit) and the younger one (massively against); between the province and urban centers (London, Manchester, and Liverpool all voted to stay in the EU); and between English and Welsh (who voted for Brexit) and Northern Irish and Scots (who voted against).

This latter split is likely to have political consequences. The Scottish National Party, which unsuccessfully ran a pro-independence campaign in 2014, has announced that the possibility of holding a second referendum is on the table. And Sinn Fein, the Irish nationalist party, has called for a vote on Northern Ireland’s reunification with Ireland. Post-Brexit, the U.K. faces the prospects not only of a diminished international role and economy, but territory too.

A weaker EU

The EU will also suffer from Brexit. The leaders of the other 27 member states have to now decide how they want to handle the divorce with London. As the British economy is deeply integrated with the EU’s, imposing hard terms on the U.K.—for instance, excluding it altogether from the European single market—is counterproductive. At the same time, EU leaders want to prevent that too generous terms might invite emulations from other countries. Indeed, the risk of contagion has never been so high.

Next fall, Italy may find itself in a political crisis if voters reject a constitutional reform on whose success the pro-EU Prime Minister Matteo Renzi has pinned his political career. Mistrust of Italy’s ability to run the economy will spread across markets, raising the specter of yet another eurozone crisis. This will only give Euroskeptic movements more credibility. In spring 2017, the Netherlands and France will hold national elections, while German voters will go to the polls in early fall. Marine Le Pen and Geert Wilders, leaders of the National Front and the PVV respectively, are polling ahead of pro-EU forces. Both have both promised an EU referendum if elected. German Chancellor Angela Merkel is weary and might be unable to secure a fourth mandate. If she goes, the next chancellor is very likely to be less pro-EU and tougher on immigration. Europe’s re-nationalization would then be a real prospect.

A less cohesive West

A fractured and divided EU would be a much less relevant international actor. The Europeans’ influence on global governance, international institutions, and multilateral negotiations would shrink. The United States would see Europe as a problem rather than a partner, and the cohesion of the West, as much as its leadership capacity, would dwindle. The notion that rules, institutions, and norms should govern international relations would lose in credibility, while the one that emphasizes power would gain. The functionality of the Western-promoted liberal order would be at risk.

Well-respected experts have good reasons to argue that we should not despair about Brexit. They are right, the catastrophic scenario sketched above is not a given. Yet it’s not implausible either. Policymakers in the U.K., Europe, and elsewhere should consider their next steps being fully aware that Brexit’s effects might be felt farther away than the British Isles.

Event Information

With international attention focused on the humanitarian emergencies in Syria and Iraq, the escalating crisis in Libya has gone overlooked. Scores of those displaced during the 2011 Libyan revolution have been unable to return to their homes, while over a million more have been uprooted in the subsequent violence. Hundreds of thousands of Libyans remain displaced within their country, while countless more have sought shelter in neighboring states such as Tunisia. At the same time, human traffickers are taking advantage of the collapse of order in Libya, sending more and more boats across the Mediterranean filled with asylum seekers and migrants desperate to reach Europe. With the vast majority of international actors having pulled out of Libya in the summer of 2014, humanitarian assistance for needy populations is in short supply, and solutions to the crisis seem far from sight.

On April 24, the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement convened a discussion on the humanitarian consequences of the violence in Libya, focusing on the implications for those in Libya and for the country’s neighbors. Brookings Nonresident Fellow Megan Bradley drew on recent research on Libya’s displacement crisis. Speakers also included Kais Darragi of the Embassy of the Republic of Tunisia and Shelly Pitterman of the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Elizabeth Ferris, senior fellow and co-director of the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement moderated the event and offered opening remarks.

Audio

• An overlooked crisis: Humanitarian consequences of the conflict in Libya

Transcript

• Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

• 20150424_libya_humanitarian_transcript

Editor's Note: This article originally appeared on Lawfare.

Faced with the breakdown of national armies in Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Yemen, Arab states have increasingly turned toward alliances with armed militias to ensure security. Popular, anti-government protests and insurgencies for the most part precipitated the breakdown of regime military institutions, yet pre-existing internal ethnic, clan, and ideological cleavages helped to hasten the breakdown. The beleaguered state security forces have now entered into a variety of alliances—tacit or active—with militias they deem sympathetic to their interests, often organized on the basis of entrenched ethno-sectarian or tribal identities. Such militia forces supplement and at times even stand in for the weak or absent army and police as providers of local security.

On the one hand, militia forces have in certain circumstances proven effective at counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. On the other hand, they have also committed atrocities against civilians that hamper long-term efforts to build trust and stability. Their greatest risk is that, by eroding the central government’s monopolization on force, they jeopardize the territorial cohesion of the state.

In Iraq, the rise of powerful communal militias has paralleled the growth of the threat from the Islamic State. This has presented the United States with a quandary: how to combat the Islamic State by mobilizing local Sunnis while at the same time safeguarding the broader integrity of the Iraqi state and its security institutions. The national guard concept, which successive Iraqi governments have tried in the past, was seen as one way to do this. A national guard force would retain the militias’ local knowledge and roots, both unique tools necessary for a successful counterinsurgency against the Islamic State. At the same time, the guard would (at least in theory) be subject to increased oversight and control by the central government.

Other fractured Arab states, most notably Libya, have tried to implement a national guard model as a way to harness militia power, but this too has failed. Variations of hybrid, provincially-organized military forces exist in Yemen and Syria. While each case is different, the failure of national guards bears certain similarities. Examining the Iraqi case in particular can highlight the potential utility of national guards but also the parallel political and institutional reforms that are necessary to make the concept work.

The idea of creating a national guard in Iraq has been a centerpiece of U.S. engagement since the dramatic advance of the Islamic State on Tikrit and Mosul in 2014. President Obama specifically mentioned U.S. support for a national guard as a means to help Iraqi Sunnis “secure their own freedom” from the Islamic State. Much of U.S. thinking about the Iraqi National Guard (ING) was guided by the example of the Sunni Awakening of 2006 and 2007, when the United States actively recruited and “flipped” Sunni tribes that had supported the al-Qaeda-inspired insurgency. In return for guarantees of autonomy and military, financial, and political backing, the Sunni tribes were able to turn the tables on the insurgent fighters and impose a measure of peace and stability. The 2014 initiative essentially sought to reproduce this arrangement. The idea was that given proper incentives, the Sunni tribes would again fight the radical Islamists who threatened their supremacy. Over the long term, such national guard forces could be integrated formally as auxiliary troops in a federal structure, comparable in many ways to the U.S. National Guard.

Yet the Awakening analogy failed on a number of levels. The Shi’i-dominated Iraqi central government had never been enthusiastic about empowering Sunni tribes in the first place. With the dismantling of the Iraqi army in 2003, security had effectively devolved to party, tribal, and sectarian militias. Many Iraqis wondered why the United States would seek to create new militias, especially ones recently tied to al-Qaeda and other terrorists. As Iraq scholar Adeed Dawisha described, the gains in security came“not because of the state, but in spite of it.”

As the U.S. began withdrawing from Iraq in 2009 and 2010, then-Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki quickly moved to dismantle the Awakening-associated militias. Only a handful of former militia fighters received their promised positions in the police, army, or civil services. Some former militia leaders were arrested on seemingly politically-motivated charges of terrorism or subversion. Efforts to enact a Sunni-dominated super-region comparable to the federal status of the Kurdish Regional Government in the north were rebuffed, despite the provisions of Iraq’s constitution that allowed for the creation of such an entity. Politically marginalized, some Sunnis returned to their alliance with the radical mujahideen.

The election of the new prime minister Haydar al-Abadi in 2014 raised the promise of renewed Sunni-Shi’i reconciliation. Abadi expressed support for the national guard initiative and forwarded a bill to parliament in 2014. Thousands of volunteers came forward from the Sunni tribes in the west and U.S. and Iraqi officials met with tribal leaders to help solidify support. The United States began to enlist support from Iraq’s Sunni neighbors to provide training and support for the ING.

Yet resistance within Abadi’s own political coalition stymied these efforts. The National Guard bill foundered in parliamentary committee, with open questions about the extent of control vested in provincial governors and the chain of command subordinating the ING to the ministries of interior, defense, or the prime minister himself. Officers of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) regarded the militias as unfit for duty and as rivals for budget and resources. Iraq’s constitution specifically prohibited the formation of militias outside the framework of the armed forces (with an exception of the peshmergaforces of the Kurdish Regional Government). Moreover, there was concern that once the Sunnis were authorized to organize a militia, other ethno-sectarian communities, such as Christians or Turkomen,might try to follow suit out of fear of falling under the mercy of their more powerful neighbors. The ING, then, could undercut any pretense of the Iraqi state possessing a monopoly over the use of force.

At base, though, many of Iraq’s Shi’i leaders simply believed that they didn’t need Sunni support. With the ING initiative stalled in parliament, the Shi’i factions have actively cultivated Shi’i militias as part of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF, or Hashd al-Shaabi). The origins of the PMF can be traced to a statement by Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, Iraq’s senior Shi’i cleric, which explicitly called on the faithful to take up arms to defend Iraq in the face of the Islamic State onslaught in 2014. Muqtada al-Sadr’s Jaysh al-Mahdi, the Badr Organization, and other political factions quickly took the opportunity to reconstitute or expand their private armies.

Backed by Iran’s expeditionary al-Qods Force, PMF militias played a prominent role in the spring 2015 offensive against the Islamic State in Tikrit. By spring 2015, PMF counted around 60,000 men under arms. Still, the performance of these militias has been less than stellar. In the spring 2015 offensive on Tikrit, PMF forces failed repeatedly to dislodge Islamic State resistance, despite enjoying superiority in numbers. U.S. air support proved critical to allowing the offensive to proceed. Some PMF units quit the fight instead of working under American air cover. Others were involved in a campaign of terror against Sunnis, looting, kidnapping, and killing those suspected of collaborating with the Islamic State.

The prospects for the mobilization of Iraq’s Sunnis are not dead—yet. A handful of Sunni tribes joined the PMF during the Tikrit offensive. In Anbar, likely the next front in the campaign against the Islamic State, U.S. and Iraqi officials have cultivated ties with local Sunni tribes and organized some 8,000 men into Sunni PMF units. Some tribes have made their service conditional on guarantees of greater autonomy and the removal of Shi’i militia forces. Yet the intake for training programs remains slow and drop-out rates high. On the one hand, tribes continue to resent the central government. On the other hand, they fear retribution should the Islamic State return.

Abadi’s visit to Washington in April 2015 focused on expanding and enhancing security cooperation with the United States. The United States has insisted that the PMF be brought more fully under the control of the Iraqi Security Forces and that PMF units reflect the demographics of the provinces and districts in which they operate. This would mean that in ethnically-mixed areas, such as in Nineveh or Babil, each ethnic group would have its own militia proportional to its size in the locality. The Iraq Train and Equip Program (ITEP) is slowly coming online, funneling American money and weapons to various local militia forces as well as ISF.

Cooperating with the United States has been a delicate balancing act for Abadi. While Kurdish and Sunni leaders see U.S. military support as a means to their own ends, Abadi’s own Shi’i political camp—as well as his allies in Tehran—are far more wary. When the U.S. Congress passed a bill in May 2015 effectively mandating the Defense Department to bypass Baghdad and provide support for Sunni and Kurdish fighters directly, Abadi protested that this constituted a grave violation of Iraqi sovereignty.

Still, reliance on the ragtag PMF alone is not sustainable in the long term. Operating far from home and with limited training, these overwhelmingly Shi’i forces cannot be expected to become an army of occupation in Sunni areas like Tikrit or Fallujah. Ultimately, local partners will be necessary to build and maintain peace and stability. The national guard, then, may well re-emerge as a more sustainable structure for administrative and security devolution.

While analysts and policymakers naturally focus on cases of success, there are important lessons to be learned from Iraq’s failures. For countries like Iraq where central armies have more or less broken down and a bevy of militias has emerged in its stead, as in Libya, Yemen, and Syria, the national guard could represent a path to reconstituting fragile state authority.

But for this to happen, several broad principles need to be heeded:

• National guards cannot simply be conceived as short-term, improvised solutions to immediate security crises. Rather, the creation of national guards is part of the impetus of security-sector reform (SSR) and post-conflict demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) of armed groups.
• National guards must overcome the legacies of past authoritarian experiences where pro-government militias were often seen as mere thugs for the regime, not a disciplined professional fighting force. In particular, the older officer class of regular forces may see them as competitors. To build trust among the population and other military institutions, national guards should be accompanied by revisions to chain of command establishing clear relationships of authority between the guards, the police, the army, and other security agencies, and subordinating all security services to civilian authorities.
• National guard initiatives must also be accompanied by moves toward political power-sharing arrangements. The success of national guards ultimately depends not just on their short-term tactical effectiveness but on the degree of local buy-in. Constitutions can provide a structure for bolstering confidence between a central government and subnational militia forces. Since militia membership and cohesion is often based on geographic linkages—to town, municipality or province—national guards may well be a part of federalist power devolution, especially in countries with overlapping ethno-sectarian and regional cleavages.
• Western governments can assist in setting up and training national guards, but they must ensure that proper political and institutional reforms are also undertaken. In many cases, Western states provide models for how decentralized, federally-organized military forces can complement national armies and local police. The United States, for instance, has a great deal of experience with its own federalized national guard structure and can draw on this example in its train-and-equip programs. There are other potentially useful models as well, including the British Territorial Army, a part-time, volunteer force that was integrated into the British Army in the early twentieth century; the Danish Home Guard, which incorporated anti-Nazi resistance militias into a national command structure after World War II; or the Italian Carabineri, which is often discussed as a potential model for dealing with Libya’s unique security challenges.

Outside assistance to national guards must avoid exacerbating existing communal and political fault lines. Helping peripheral and minority groups set up their own armed forces can, on one hand, embolden these groups to resist the central government and, on the other hand, spur resentment from the central government and fear of future disloyalty or rebellion. These concerns become even more acute when national guards are seen as proxies for outside powers. With this in mind, the U.S. and outside powers should calibrate their assistance to both regionally-based national guards and central government forces to ensure rough parity between the two. This could entail making funding, equipment and training for the central security services contingent on a proportional commitment to strengthen the guards.

National guards are political institutions, not just military instruments. They can have far-ranging consequences for political stability and cohesion. While no panacea for the challenge of building effective states, they can play an important role in addressing security concerns and moving toward more meaningful power sharing.