de

Highly Selective Enrichment of Phosphorylated Peptides from Peptide Mixtures Using Titanium Dioxide Microcolumns

Martin R. Larsen
Jul 1, 2005; 4:873-886
Technology




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Analysis of the Human Tissue-specific Expression by Genome-wide Integration of Transcriptomics and Antibody-based Proteomics

Linn Fagerberg
Feb 1, 2014; 13:397-406
Research




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Exponentially Modified Protein Abundance Index (emPAI) for Estimation of Absolute Protein Amount in Proteomics by the Number of Sequenced Peptides per Protein

Yasushi Ishihama
Sep 1, 2005; 4:1265-1272
Research




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Accurate Proteome-wide Label-free Quantification by Delayed Normalization and Maximal Peptide Ratio Extraction, Termed MaxLFQ

Jürgen Cox
Sep 1, 2014; 13:2513-2526
Technological Innovation and Resources




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The hibernating 100S complex is a target of ribosome-recycling factor and elongation factor G in Staphylococcus aureus [Protein Synthesis and Degradation]

The formation of translationally inactive 70S dimers (called 100S ribosomes) by hibernation-promoting factor is a widespread survival strategy among bacteria. Ribosome dimerization is thought to be reversible, with the dissociation of the 100S complexes enabling ribosome recycling for participation in new rounds of translation. The precise pathway of 100S ribosome recycling has been unclear. We previously found that the heat-shock GTPase HflX in the human pathogen Staphylococcus aureus is a minor disassembly factor. Cells lacking hflX do not accumulate 100S ribosomes unless they are subjected to heat exposure, suggesting the existence of an alternative pathway during nonstressed conditions. Here, we provide biochemical and genetic evidence that two essential translation factors, ribosome-recycling factor (RRF) and GTPase elongation factor G (EF-G), synergistically split 100S ribosomes in a GTP-dependent but tRNA translocation-independent manner. We found that although HflX and the RRF/EF-G pair are functionally interchangeable, HflX is expressed at low levels and is dispensable under normal growth conditions. The bacterial RRF/EF-G pair was previously known to target only the post-termination 70S complexes; our results reveal a new role in the reversal of ribosome hibernation that is intimately linked to bacterial pathogenesis, persister formation, stress responses, and ribosome integrity.




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The cytochrome P450 enzyme CYP24A1 increases proliferation of mutant KRAS-dependent lung adenocarcinoma independent of its catalytic activity [Cell Biology]

We previously reported that overexpression of cytochrome P450 family 24 subfamily A member 1 (CYP24A1) increases lung cancer cell proliferation by activating RAS signaling and that CYP24A1 knockdown inhibits tumor growth. However, the mechanism of CYP24A1-mediated cancer cell proliferation remains unclear. Here, we conducted cell synchronization and biochemical experiments in lung adenocarcinoma cells, revealing a link between CYP24A1 and anaphase-promoting complex (APC), a key cell cycle regulator. We demonstrate that CYP24A1 expression is cell cycle–dependent; it was higher in the G2-M phase and diminished upon G1 entry. CYP24A1 has a functional destruction box (D-box) motif that allows binding with two APC adaptors, CDC20-homologue 1 (CDH1) and cell division cycle 20 (CDC20). Unlike other APC substrates, however, CYP24A1 acted as a pseudo-substrate, inhibiting CDH1 activity and promoting mitotic progression. Conversely, overexpression of a CYP24A1 D-box mutant compromised CDH1 binding, allowing CDH1 hyperactivation, thereby hastening degradation of its substrates cyclin B1 and CDC20, and accumulation of the CDC20 substrate p21, prolonging mitotic exit. These activities also occurred with a CYP24A1 isoform 2 lacking the catalytic cysteine (Cys-462), suggesting that CYP24A1's oncogenic potential is independent of its catalytic activity. CYP24A1 degradation reduced clonogenic survival of mutant KRAS-driven lung cancer cells, and calcitriol treatment increased CYP24A1 levels and tumor burden in Lsl-KRASG12D mice. These results disclose a catalytic activity-independent growth-promoting role of CYP24A1 in mutant KRAS-driven lung cancer. This suggests that CYP24A1 could be therapeutically targeted in lung cancers in which its expression is high.




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SUMOylation of the transcription factor ZFHX3 at Lys-2806 requires SAE1, UBC9, and PIAS2 and enhances its stability and function in cell proliferation [Protein Synthesis and Degradation]

SUMOylation is a posttranslational modification (PTM) at a lysine residue and is crucial for the proper functions of many proteins, particularly of transcription factors, in various biological processes. Zinc finger homeobox 3 (ZFHX3), also known as AT motif-binding factor 1 (ATBF1), is a large transcription factor that is active in multiple pathological processes, including atrial fibrillation and carcinogenesis, and in circadian regulation and development. We have previously demonstrated that ZFHX3 is SUMOylated at three or more lysine residues. Here, we investigated which enzymes regulate ZFHX3 SUMOylation and whether SUMOylation modulates ZFHX3 stability and function. We found that SUMO1, SUMO2, and SUMO3 each are conjugated to ZFHX3. Multiple lysine residues in ZFHX3 were SUMOylated, but Lys-2806 was the major SUMOylation site, and we also found that it is highly conserved among ZFHX3 orthologs from different animal species. Using molecular analyses, we identified the enzymes that mediate ZFHX3 SUMOylation; these included SUMO1-activating enzyme subunit 1 (SAE1), an E1-activating enzyme; SUMO-conjugating enzyme UBC9 (UBC9), an E2-conjugating enzyme; and protein inhibitor of activated STAT2 (PIAS2), an E3 ligase. Multiple analyses established that both SUMO-specific peptidase 1 (SENP1) and SENP2 deSUMOylate ZFHX3. SUMOylation at Lys-2806 enhanced ZFHX3 stability by interfering with its ubiquitination and proteasomal degradation. Functionally, Lys-2806 SUMOylation enabled ZFHX3-mediated cell proliferation and xenograft tumor growth of the MDA-MB-231 breast cancer cell line. These findings reveal the enzymes involved in, and the functional consequences of, ZFHX3 SUMOylation, insights that may help shed light on ZFHX3's roles in various cellular and pathophysiological processes.




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Cross-regulation between LUBAC and caspase-1 modulates cell death and inflammation [Signal Transduction]

The linear ubiquitin assembly complex (LUBAC) is an essential component of the innate and adaptive immune system. Modification of cellular substrates with linear polyubiquitin chains is a key regulatory step in signal transduction that impacts cell death and inflammatory signaling downstream of various innate immunity receptors. Loss-of-function mutations in the LUBAC components HOIP and HOIL-1 yield a systemic autoinflammatory disease in humans, whereas their genetic ablation is embryonically lethal in mice. Deficiency of the LUBAC adaptor protein Sharpin results in a multi-organ inflammatory disease in mice characterized by chronic proliferative dermatitis (cpdm), which is propagated by TNFR1-induced and RIPK1-mediated keratinocyte cell death. We have previously shown that caspase-1 and -11 promoted the dermatitis pathology of cpdm mice and mediated cell death in the skin. Here, we describe a reciprocal regulation of caspase-1 and LUBAC activities in keratinocytes. We show that LUBAC interacted with caspase-1 via HOIP and modified its CARD domain with linear polyubiquitin and that depletion of HOIP or Sharpin resulted in heightened caspase-1 activation and cell death in response to inflammasome activation, unlike what is observed in macrophages. Reciprocally, caspase-1, as well as caspase-8, regulated LUBAC activity by proteolytically processing HOIP at Asp-348 and Asp-387 during the execution of cell death. HOIP processing impeded substrate ubiquitination in the NF-κB pathway and resulted in enhanced apoptosis. These results highlight a regulatory mechanism underlying efficient apoptosis in keratinocytes and provide further evidence of a cross-talk between inflammatory and cell death pathways.




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ABC transporters control ATP release through cholesterol-dependent volume-regulated anion channel activity [Signal Transduction]

Purinergic signaling by extracellular ATP regulates a variety of cellular events and is implicated in both normal physiology and pathophysiology. Several molecules have been associated with the release of ATP and other small molecules, but their precise contributions have been difficult to assess because of their complexity and heterogeneity. Here, we report on the results of a gain-of-function screen for modulators of hypotonicity-induced ATP release using HEK-293 cells and murine cerebellar granule neurons, along with bioluminescence, calcium FLIPR, and short hairpin RNA–based gene-silencing assays. This screen utilized the most extensive genome-wide ORF collection to date, covering 90% of human, nonredundant, protein-encoding genes. We identified two ABCG1 (ABC subfamily G member 1) variants, which regulate cellular cholesterol, as modulators of hypotonicity-induced ATP release. We found that cholesterol levels control volume-regulated anion channel–dependent ATP release. These findings reveal novel mechanisms for the regulation of ATP release and volume-regulated anion channel activity and provide critical links among cellular status, cholesterol, and purinergic signaling.




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Reduction of protein phosphatase 2A (PP2A) complexity reveals cellular functions and dephosphorylation motifs of the PP2A/B'{delta} holoenzyme [Enzymology]

Protein phosphatase 2A (PP2A) is a large enzyme family responsible for most cellular Ser/Thr dephosphorylation events. PP2A substrate specificity, localization, and regulation by second messengers rely on more than a dozen regulatory subunits (including B/R2, B'/R5, and B″/R3), which form the PP2A heterotrimeric holoenzyme by associating with a dimer comprising scaffolding (A) and catalytic (C) subunits. Because of partial redundancy and high endogenous expression of PP2A holoenzymes, traditional approaches of overexpressing, knocking down, or knocking out PP2A regulatory subunits have yielded only limited insights into their biological roles and substrates. To this end, here we sought to reduce the complexity of cellular PP2A holoenzymes. We used tetracycline-inducible expression of pairs of scaffolding and regulatory subunits with complementary charge-reversal substitutions in their interaction interfaces. For each of the three regulatory subunit families, we engineered A/B charge–swap variants that could bind to one another, but not to endogenous A and B subunits. Because endogenous Aα was targeted by a co-induced shRNA, endogenous B subunits were rapidly degraded, resulting in expression of predominantly a single PP2A heterotrimer composed of the A/B charge–swap pair and the endogenous catalytic subunit. Using B'δ/PPP2R5D, we show that PP2A complexity reduction, but not PP2A overexpression, reveals a role of this holoenzyme in suppression of extracellular signal–regulated kinase signaling and protein kinase A substrate dephosphorylation. When combined with global phosphoproteomics, the PP2A/B'δ reduction approach identified consensus dephosphorylation motifs in its substrates and suggested that residues surrounding the phosphorylation site play roles in PP2A substrate specificity.




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NF-{kappa}B mediates lipopolysaccharide-induced alternative pre-mRNA splicing of MyD88 in mouse macrophages [Signal Transduction]

Although a robust inflammatory response is needed to combat infection, this response must ultimately be terminated to prevent chronic inflammation. One mechanism that terminates inflammatory signaling is the production of alternative mRNA splice forms in the Toll-like receptor (TLR) signaling pathway. Whereas most genes in the TLR pathway encode positive mediators of inflammatory signaling, several, including that encoding the MyD88 signaling adaptor, also produce alternative spliced mRNA isoforms that encode dominant-negative inhibitors of the response. Production of these negatively acting alternatively spliced isoforms is induced by stimulation with the TLR4 agonist lipopolysaccharide (LPS); thus, this alternative pre-mRNA splicing represents a negative feedback loop that terminates TLR signaling and prevents chronic inflammation. In the current study, we investigated the mechanisms regulating the LPS-induced alternative pre-mRNA splicing of the MyD88 transcript in murine macrophages. We found that 1) the induction of the alternatively spliced MyD88 form is due to alternative pre-mRNA splicing and not caused by another RNA regulatory mechanism, 2) MyD88 splicing is regulated by both the MyD88- and TRIF-dependent arms of the TLR signaling pathway, 3) MyD88 splicing is regulated by the NF-κB transcription factor, and 4) NF-κB likely regulates MyD88 alternative pre-mRNA splicing per se rather than regulating splicing indirectly by altering MyD88 transcription. We conclude that alternative splicing of MyD88 may provide a sensitive mechanism that ensures robust termination of inflammation for tissue repair and restoration of normal tissue homeostasis once an infection is controlled.




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DHHC7-mediated palmitoylation of the accessory protein barttin critically regulates the functions of ClC-K chloride channels [Cell Biology]

Barttin is the accessory subunit of the human ClC-K chloride channels, which are expressed in both the kidney and inner ear. Barttin promotes trafficking of the complex it forms with ClC-K to the plasma membrane and is involved in activating this channel. Barttin undergoes post-translational palmitoylation that is essential for its functions, but the enzyme(s) catalyzing this post-translational modification is unknown. Here, we identified zinc finger DHHC-type containing 7 (DHHC7) protein as an important barttin palmitoyl acyltransferase, whose depletion affected barttin palmitoylation and ClC-K-barttin channel activation. We investigated the functional role of barttin palmitoylation in vivo in Zdhhc7−/− mice. Although palmitoylation of barttin in kidneys of Zdhhc7−/− animals was significantly decreased, it did not pathologically alter kidney structure and functions under physiological conditions. However, when Zdhhc7−/− mice were fed a low-salt diet, they developed hyponatremia and mild metabolic alkalosis, symptoms characteristic of human Bartter syndrome (BS) type IV. Of note, we also observed decreased palmitoylation of the disease-causing R8L barttin variant associated with human BS type IV. Our results indicate that dysregulated DHHC7-mediated barttin palmitoylation appears to play an important role in chloride channel dysfunction in certain BS variants, suggesting that targeting DHHC7 activity may offer a potential therapeutic strategy for reducing hypertension.




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The focal adhesion protein kindlin-2 controls mitotic spindle assembly by inhibiting histone deacetylase 6 and maintaining {alpha}-tubulin acetylation [Signal Transduction]

Kindlins are focal adhesion proteins that regulate integrin activation and outside-in signaling. The kindlin family consists of three members, kindlin-1, -2, and -3. Kindlin-2 is widely expressed in multiple cell types, except those from the hematopoietic lineage. A previous study has reported that the Drosophila Fit1 protein (an ortholog of kindlin-2) prevents abnormal spindle assembly; however, the mechanism remains unknown. Here, we show that kindlin-2 maintains spindle integrity in mitotic human cells. The human neuroblastoma SH-SY5Y cell line expresses only kindlin-2, and we found that when SH-SY5Y cells are depleted of kindlin-2, they exhibit pronounced spindle abnormalities and delayed mitosis. Of note, acetylation of α-tubulin, which maintains microtubule flexibility and stability, was diminished in the kindlin-2–depleted cells. Mechanistically, we found that kindlin-2 maintains α-tubulin acetylation by inhibiting the microtubule-associated deacetylase histone deacetylase 6 (HDAC6) via a signaling pathway involving AKT Ser/Thr kinase (AKT)/glycogen synthase kinase 3β (GSK3β) or paxillin. We also provide evidence that prolonged hypoxia down-regulates kindlin-2 expression, leading to spindle abnormalities not only in the SH-SY5Y cell line, but also cell lines derived from colon and breast tissues. The findings of our study highlight that kindlin-2 regulates mitotic spindle assembly and that this process is perturbed in cancer cells in a hypoxic environment.




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Polarization of protease-activated receptor 2 (PAR-2) signaling is altered during airway epithelial remodeling and deciliation [Immunology]

Protease-activated receptor 2 (PAR-2) is activated by secreted proteases from immune cells or fungi. PAR-2 is normally expressed basolaterally in differentiated nasal ciliated cells. We hypothesized that epithelial remodeling during diseases characterized by cilial loss and squamous metaplasia may alter PAR-2 polarization. Here, using a fluorescent arrestin assay, we confirmed that the common fungal airway pathogen Aspergillus fumigatus activates heterologously-expressed PAR-2. Endogenous PAR-2 activation in submerged airway RPMI 2650 or NCI–H520 squamous cells increased intracellular calcium levels and granulocyte macrophage–colony-stimulating factor, tumor necrosis factor α, and interleukin (IL)-6 secretion. RPMI 2650 cells cultured at an air–liquid interface (ALI) responded to apically or basolaterally applied PAR-2 agonists. However, well-differentiated primary nasal epithelial ALIs responded only to basolateral PAR-2 stimulation, indicated by calcium elevation, increased cilia beat frequency, and increased fluid and cytokine secretion. We exposed primary cells to disease-related modifiers that alter epithelial morphology, including IL-13, cigarette smoke condensate, and retinoic acid deficiency, at concentrations and times that altered epithelial morphology without causing breakdown of the epithelial barrier to model early disease states. These altered primary cultures responded to both apical and basolateral PAR-2 stimulation. Imaging nasal polyps and control middle turbinate explants, we found that nasal polyps, but not turbinates, exhibit apical calcium responses to PAR-2 stimulation. However, isolated ciliated cells from both polyps and turbinates maintained basolateral PAR-2 polarization, suggesting that the calcium responses originated from nonciliated cells. Altered PAR-2 polarization in disease-remodeled epithelia may enhance apical responses and increase sensitivity to inhaled proteases.




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Inflammatory and mitogenic signals drive interleukin 23 subunit alpha (IL23A) secretion independent of IL12B in intestinal epithelial cells [Signal Transduction]

The heterodimeric cytokine interleukin-23 (IL-23 or IL23A/IL12B) is produced by dendritic cells and macrophages and promotes the proinflammatory and regenerative activities of T helper 17 (Th17) and innate lymphoid cells. A recent study has reported that IL-23 is also secreted by lung adenoma cells and generates an inflammatory and immune-suppressed stroma. Here, we observed that proinflammatory tumor necrosis factor (TNF)/NF-κB and mitogen-activated protein kinase (MAPK) signaling strongly induce IL23A expression in intestinal epithelial cells. Moreover, we identified a strong crosstalk between the NF-κB and MAPK/ERK kinase (MEK) pathways, involving the formation of a transcriptional enhancer complex consisting of proto-oncogene c-Jun (c-Jun), RELA proto-oncogene NF-κB subunit (RelA), RUNX family transcription factor 1 (RUNX1), and RUNX3. Collectively, these proteins induced IL23A secretion, confirmed by immunoprecipitation of endogenous IL23A from activated human colorectal cancer (CRC) cell culture supernatants. Interestingly, IL23A was likely secreted in a noncanonical form, as it was not detected by an ELISA specific for heterodimeric IL-23 likely because IL12B expression is absent in CRC cells. Given recent evidence that IL23A promotes tumor formation, we evaluated the efficacy of MAPK/NF-κB inhibitors in attenuating IL23A expression and found that the MEK inhibitor trametinib and BAY 11–7082 (an IKKα/IκB inhibitor) effectively inhibited IL23A in a subset of human CRC lines with mutant KRAS or BRAFV600E mutations. Together, these results indicate that proinflammatory and mitogenic signals dynamically regulate IL23A in epithelial cells. They further reveal its secretion in a noncanonical form independent of IL12B and that small-molecule inhibitors can attenuate IL23A secretion.




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UK and Ireland After No Deal

Invitation Only Research Event

17 September 2019 - 8:30am to 9:30am

Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Event participants

Sir Martin Donnelly, President, Boeing Europe and Managing Director, Boeing UK and Ireland; Permanent Secretary, UK Department for International Trade (2016-17)

Prime Minister Boris Johnson has declared that Britain will be out of the EU on 1 November irrespective of the terms of the departure. With time and options limited, what are the implications of leaving without a deal for the UK and Ireland? Notably, the UK government has previously claimed it would keep the Irish border open in the event of a no-deal Brexit. Is the EU likely to reciprocate? How feasible would keeping an external border open be in practice? And what could this mean for UK-EU trade going forward?
 
With the country facing a potential election, how will the public respond to prospects of no deal? Will the prime minister’s tough stance pay off domestically? And what reactions can we expect from the devolved administrations? Over the course of this session, the speaker will share his thoughts on the domestic and international implications of a no-deal Brexit.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

Please note the speaker will be speaking in a personal capacity.

Event attributes

Chatham House Rule

Alina Lyadova

Europe Programme Coordinator




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UK General Election 2019: Britain's New Foreign Policy Divide

9 December 2019

Thomas Raines

Director, Europe Programme
A breakdown of foreign policy consensus means voters have a meaningful choice between two different visions of Britain’s place in the world.

2019-12-09-JohnsonCorbyn.jpg

Boris Johnson and Jeremy Corbyn at the state opening of Parliament in October. Photo: Getty Images.

Genuine ideological differences have returned to British politics. That is as true in foreign policy as in questions of domestic politics. The post-Cold War foreign policy consensus in UK politics around liberal multilateralism is fraying.

This tradition had some key characteristics. It saw Britain as one of the cornerstones of an international order built on a liberal (or neo-liberal if you prefer) approach to economic globalization. EU membership was considered central to Britain’s influence and prosperity (even if further political integration never had deep support). Security policy was grounded in a stable package of NATO membership, close ties to the US, nuclear deterrence and a willingness to conduct military intervention.

Both main parties accepted that foreign policy had a commercial dimension. Both were willing to sell arms abroad to regimes with dubious domestic records.

Despite differences of emphasis, and some moments of genuine disagreement, foreign policy did not undergo big shifts as different parties traded periods in office. That may be set to change. 

Party divides

On the one hand, Labour wants to reset and re-orientate Britain’s international role based on human rights and international law. It promises a new internationalism and to end what it glibly calls the ‘bomb first, talk later’ approach, alongside a human rights-driven trade policy. More concretely, it promises to legislate to ensure Parliament takes decisions on military action, boost resources for the underfunded Foreign Office and suspend arms sales to Saudi Arabia for use in Yemen.  

In Jeremy Corbyn, they have a leader with roots in a distinct left-wing ideological tradition of internationalism that blends a commitment to international solidarity alongside anti-imperial and anti-war sentiment. He has spent his career as a sharp critic of Israeli and US policy, while championing various international political causes, some more radical or fringe than others. His historic positions on issues like NATO and nuclear deterrence, while not represented in the party manifesto, demonstrate a personal radicalism that no recent Labour PM has embodied.

His willingness to challenge the failures of the hitherto centre ground of foreign policy – particularly on military interventions from Iraq to Libya – is an under-appreciated aspect of his appeal among many supporters, even while it is one of the sharpest lines of attack from his critics. Boris Johnson’s chauvinistic rhetoric could not stand in sharper contrast to Labour’s commitment to conduct an audit of the effect of Britain’s colonial legacy on violence and insecurity.  

The Conservative manifesto asserts their pride in Britain’s historical role in the world, followed by a broad set of largely rhetorical commitments to bolster alliances and expand influence. An ambitious free trade agenda points to a more economic and commercially driven foreign policy, the inevitable trade-offs and constraints of which are only beginning to be addressed and debated.

There is an underlying sense that Britain will be liberated from the constraints of EU membership, although beyond trade there is little that would not have been possible, or in most cases easier, from within the EU. As my colleague Richard Whitman has observed, the empty bromide ‘Global Britain’ has been dropped altogether, though beyond the idea of a new UK space command and a stronger sanctions regime, there is little that is new or specific.  

Not all the consensus centre-ground position has been abandoned. Both major parties remain committed to spending 2 per cent of GDP on defence and 0.7 per cent of gross national income on development in their 2019 manifestos.

But beyond their manifesto commitments, prime ministers can exercise extensive powers in foreign affairs through the royal prerogative. Their government can choose to recognize other states, as Labour intends to do with Palestine. They can sign international treaties. And at present, in the absence of the sort of war powers act proposed by Labour, they can conduct military action without recourse to Parliament, which has no legally established role in this area.

Even a weak minority government would have considerable scope to transform the tone of Britain’s diplomacy.

Foreign policy as a partisan political issue

If UK foreign policy becomes more partisan, this will have longer term implications. Voters will theoretically have greater scope to shape and influence foreign policy more directly. Foreign policy may become divisive if it becomes more partisan. It may also become less consistent, which will affect the capacity of the UK to show leadership over the longer term on issues on which there is no domestic consensus. Britain’s allies may need to manage a less reliable partner. The diplomatic and security apparatus of Whitehall will need to be more adaptable.  

British elections generally don’t turn on foreign policy questions; 2019 will not buck that trend. At the same time, this election will be very influential in shaping Britain’s position on the world stage and its approach to international issues. Boris Johnson and Jeremy Corbyn represent very different ideas about Britain’s role: its foreign policy, its alliances, and indeed its idea of itself. The Brexit context makes these political undercurrents on foreign policy matter all the more.

Foreign policy may not matter that much to most voters, but these elections matter for foreign policy. 




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The Future of Democracy in Europe: Technology and the Evolution of Representation

3 March 2020

To the extent that perceptions of a crisis in liberal democracy in Europe can be confirmed, this paper investigates the nature of the problem and its causes, and asks what part, if any, digital technology plays in it.

Hans Kundnani

Senior Research Fellow, Europe Programme

2020-02-27-Irish-Referendum.jpg

A woman writes a note on the Savita Halappanavar mural in Dublin on 26 May 2018, following a referendum on the 36th amendment to Ireland’s constitution. The referendum result was overwhelmingly in favour of removing the country’s previous near-universal ban on abortion. Photo: Getty Images.

Summary

  • There is a widespread sense that liberal democracy is in crisis, but little consensus exists on the specific nature and causes of the crisis. In particular, there are three prisms through which the crisis is usually seen: the rise of ‘populism’, ‘democratic deconsolidation’, and a ‘hollowing out’ of democracy. Each reflects normative assumptions about democracy.
  • The exact role of digital technology in the crisis is disputed. Despite the widely held perception that social media is undermining democracy, the evidence for this is limited. Over the longer term, the further development of digital technology could undermine the fundamental preconditions for democracy – though the pace and breadth of technological change make predictions about its future impact difficult.
  • Democracy functions in different ways in different European countries, with political systems on the continent ranging from ‘majoritarian democracies’ such as the UK to ‘consensual democracies’ such as Belgium and Switzerland. However, no type seems to be immune from the crisis. The political systems of EU member states also interact in diverse ways with the EU’s own structure, which is problematic for representative democracy as conventionally understood, but difficult to reform.
  • Political parties, central to the model of representative democracy that emerged in the late 18th century, have long seemed to be in decline. Recently there have been some signs of a reversal of this trend, with the emergence of parties that have used digital technology in innovative ways to reconnect with citizens. Traditional parties can learn from these new ‘digital parties’.
  • Recent years have also seen a proliferation of experiments in direct and deliberative democracy. There is a need for more experimentation in these alternative forms of democracy, and for further evaluation of how they can be integrated into the existing institutions and processes of representative democracy at the local, regional, national and EU levels.
  • We should not think of democracy in a static way – that is, as a system that can be perfected once and for all and then simply maintained and defended against threats. Democracy has continually evolved and now needs to evolve further. The solution to the crisis will not be to attempt to limit democracy in response to pressure from ‘populism’ but to deepen it further as part of a ‘democratization of democracy’.




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Another CDU Leadership Race Begins in Merkel’s Shadow

28 February 2020

Quentin Peel

Associate Fellow, Europe Programme
The election of a new leader of the chancellor’s party will be another contest over her legacy.

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German Chancellor Angela Merkel is depicted on a float in the Rosenmontag parade in Mainz on 24 February. Photo: Getty Images.

Perhaps it will be second time lucky. At the end of April, Germany’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU) will elect a new party leader to follow in the footsteps of Angela Merkel. An emergency party congress has been summoned to do that after the surprise resignation of Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, Merkel’s chosen successor.

The plan is to leave the decision on who will be the CDU candidate for chancellor at the next election until after Germany’s EU presidency concludes in December. So Merkel will keep her job until 2021, and the new leader will have to learn to live with her.

The three leading candidates are Armin Laschet, Friedrich Merz and Norbert Röttgen, all from the state of North Rhine-Westphalia. Two of the three – Merz and Röttgen – were sacked by Merkel from their former jobs. They have not forgotten. Only Armin Laschet, currently CDU leader in North Rhine-Westphalia and state premier, can be described as a Merkel loyalist, true to her centrist mantra.

He is the man to beat, having teamed up with Jens Spahn, the 39-year-old health minister, who is popular with party conservatives. Spahn will run as his deputy, so the team straddles the left-right divide in the party. But the contest still seems set to be a bitter battle between pro- and anti-Merkel factions that could leave the party badly split.

After nearly 15 years as chancellor, and 18 years as CDU leader, Merkel remains the most popular politician in Germany. In spite of criticism that she lacks vision, her caution and predictability appear to be just what most German voters like.

But her term in office has also seen the steady shrinking of the centre ground in German politics, with the rise of the environmentalist Green party and the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) at the expense of the centre-right CDU and the centre-left Social Democratic Party (SPD).

The battle for the soul of the CDU is between those who think Merkel has been too left-wing, and want a more conservative leader to win back AfD voters, and those who believe that the CDU must stay in the centre, and prepare for a future coalition with the Greens. Merz is seen as the former, Laschet and Röttgen the latter.

Unless Laschet emerges as the clear winner in April, the leadership contest is likely to leave Germany sorely distracted by domestic politics just as it takes over the EU presidency in the second half of the year. Instead of Merkel having a triumphant international swansong on the EU stage, she could be battling to protect her inheritance at home.

The one area on which all three leadership candidates seem to agree is foreign policy: they all want Germany to take more leadership and responsibility, and for the European Union to play a bigger role in security, defence and international affairs. They are all Atlanticists, but critical of Donald Trump’s ‘America First’ stance. All are on the record criticizing the chancellor – at least tacitly – for not having a more vigorous foreign policy.

There the similarity ends.

On the right, the 64-year-old Merz is both the most conservative and the most popular with the party grassroots. He fell out with the chancellor when she took over his job as CDU leader in parliament in 2002. He quit politics to become a corporate lawyer (and a millionaire), but never lost his political ambition. He is an economic liberal but socially conservative, a strong critic of Merkel’s migration policy and her lack of clear leadership. Critics say he is a man of the past, and not a team player.

On the EU, he believes Germany is ‘leaving too much to the French’. If France and Germany cannot agree on financial matters, he said at the London School of Economics in February, they should instead forge a stronger EU industrial policy focused on creating more ‘European champions’.

Laschet, the Merkel loyalist, is four years younger, and from the left of the party. Like Merz, he is a former member of the European parliament. In 2015, he defended Merkel’s open border policy to accept refugees stranded in the Balkans. On Russia, however, he is more critical, calling for a new effort to re-engage with Vladimir Putin. Most recently, at the Munich Security Conference, he called for stronger Franco-German relations, and more support for the eurozone reforms proposed by Emmanuel Macron.

As CDU leader in North Rhine-Westphalia, Laschet has the strongest power base. He earned his political spurs there by winning the last state election in 2017, in contrast to Röttgen, who lost to the SPD and Greens five years earlier.

Röttgen, chairman of the Bundestag foreign affairs committee, is the surprise candidate. Once a Merkel favourite, they fell out when she sacked him as environment minister after he lost the North Rhine-Westphalia election. By throwing his hat in the ring, he has forced it to become an open contest. He is independent-minded and outspoken, but not as bitterly hostile to the chancellor as Merz, so he could be a compromise candidate.

Laschet is clearly the man Merkel would find it easiest to live with. The decision will be taken by a party congress, not a grassroots ballot, which gives him a better chance. But Merz is the most eloquent orator and seen as the best campaigner. The challenge for party members is whether they believe it is better to swing right and squeeze the AfD, or stick to the centre to hold onto voters tempted by the Greens, who have replaced the SPD as the second-most popular party in Germany.

The race is wide open. So is the future of the CDU. The only prediction one can make with much certainty is that as long as Merkel remains chancellor, any successor will struggle to get out of her shadow.




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Virtual Breakfast: Is a Brexit Delay Possible?

Research Event

7 April 2020 - 8:30am to 9:30am

Event participants

Gavin Barwell, Downing Street Chief of Staff to Prime Minister Theresa May (2017-19)
Chair: Thomas Raines, Director, Europe Programme, Chatham House

Please note this an online-only event.

According to a previously agreed timetable for phase two of Brexit talks, negotiations on the future EU-UK trade relations were scheduled to begin in March. Then a global pandemic hit. Despite the ongoing COVID-19 outbreak, the UK government insists that the Brexit negotiations are on track and there are currently no plans to extend the transition period beyond 2020.

However, the original timetable for trade talks was already widely seen as extremely constrained. Can negotiations still be done in time? With the decision on any possible extension to be made by July at the latest, can the two sides make sufficient progress by that point? Or would the ongoing public health crisis make requesting an extension to the transition period more politically viable for the UK government? Finally, if there is no extension, could Britain still leave the EU with no deal?

In this webinar, the speaker will discuss how the need to manage other challenges, such as the current COVID-19 outbreak, might affect the government’s approach to the negotiations with the EU. He will also share his insights on what to expect from the second phase of negotiations and on the most important lessons from phase one. 

Alina Lyadova

Europe Programme Coordinator




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Coronavirus and the Future of Democracy in Europe

31 March 2020

Hans Kundnani

Senior Research Fellow, Europe Programme
The pandemic raises difficult questions about whether liberal democracies can adequately protect their citizens.

2020-03-31-Police-Poland

Police officers wearing protective face masks patrol during coronavirus lockdown enforcement in Wroclaw, Poland. Photo by Bartek Sadowski/Bloomberg via Getty Images.

It is less than a month since we published our research paper on the future of democracy in Europe. But it feels like we now live in a different world. The coronavirus has already killed thousands of people in Europe, led to an unprecedented economic crisis and transformed daily life – and in the process raised difficult new questions about democracy.

The essence of our argument in the paper was that democracy in Europe should be deepened. But now there is a much more basic question about whether democracies can protect their citizens from the pandemic.

There has already been much discussion about whether authoritarian states will emerge stronger from this crisis than democracies. In particular, although the virus originated in China and the government initially seemed to struggle to deal with it, it was able to largely contain the outbreak in Hubei and deploy vast resources from the rest of the country to deal with it.

Come through the worst

China may have come through the worst of the health crisis – though a second wave of infections as restrictions are lifted is possible – and there have already been three times as many deaths in Italy, and twice as many in Spain, as in China (although there is increasing doubt about the accuracy of China’s figures).

However, it is not only authoritarian states that seem so far to have coped relatively well with the virus. In fact, some East Asian democracies appear to have done even better than China. At the time of writing South Korea, with a population of 51.5 million, has had only 144 death rates so far. Taiwan, with a population of nearly 24 million, has had only two deaths.

So rather than thinking in terms of the relative performance of authoritarian states and democracies, perhaps instead we should be asking what we in Europe can learn from East Asian democracies.

It is not yet clear why East Asian democracies were able to respond so effectively, especially as they did not all follow exactly the same approach. Whereas some quickly imposed restrictions on travel (for example, Taiwan suspended flights from China and then prohibited the entry of people from China and other affected countries) and quarantines, others used extensive testing and contact tracing, often making use of personal data collected from citizens.

Whatever the exact strategy they used, though, they did all act quickly and decisively – and the collective memory of the SARS outbreak in 2003 and other recent epidemics seems to have played a role in this. For example, following the SARS outbreak, Taiwan created a central epidemic command center. Europe, meanwhile, was hardly affected by SARS – and we seem to have assumed the coronavirus would be the same (although that does not quite explain why we were still so slow to react in February even after it was clear that the virus had spread to Italy).

However, while the relative success of East Asian democracies may have something to do with this recent experience of epidemics, it may also have something to do with the kind of democracies they are. It may be a simple matter of competence – the bureaucracy in Taiwan and South Korea may function better, and in particular in a more coordinated way, than in many European countries.

But it may also be more than that. In particular, it could be that East Asian democracies have a kind of 'authoritarian residue' that has helped in the initial response to this crisis. South Korea and Taiwan are certainly vibrant democracies – but they are also relatively new democracies compared to many in Europe. As a result, citizens may have a different relationship with the state and be more willing to accept sudden restrictions of freedoms, in particular on movement, and the use of personal data – at least in a crisis.

In that sense, the pandemic may be a challenge not to democracy as such but to liberal democracy in particular – in other words, a system of popular sovereignty together with guaranteed basic rights, such as including freedom of association and expression and checks and balances on executive power. There may now be difficult trade-offs to be made between those basic rights and security – and, after the experience of coronavirus, many citizens may choose security.

This brings us back to the issues we discussed in our research paper. Even before the coronavirus hit, there was already much discussion of a crisis of liberal democracy. In particular, there has been a debate about whether liberalism and democracy, which had long been assumed to go together, were becoming decoupled.

In particular, ‘illiberal democracies’ seemed to be emerging in many places including Europe (although, as we discuss in the paper, some analysts argue that the term is incoherent). This model of ‘illiberal democracy’ – in other words, one in which elections continue to be held but some individual rights are curtailed – may emerge stronger from this new crisis.

It is striking that Singapore – also seen as responding successfully to coronavirus – was seen as a paradigmatic ‘illiberal democracy’ long before Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán embraced the idea. In particular, there is little real opposition to the People’s Action Party, which has been in power since 1959.

Since this new crisis began, Orbán has gone further in suspending rights in Hungary. On March 11, he declared a state of emergency – as many other European countries have also done. But he has now gone further by passing legislation that allows him to govern by decree indefinitely and make it illegal to spread misinformation that undermines the government’s response to the pandemic. Clearly, this is a further decisive step in the deconsolidation of liberal democracy in Hungary.

So far, though, much of the discussion, particularly in the foreign policy world, has focused mainly on how to change popular perceptions that liberal democracies are failing in this crisis. For example, High Representative Josep Borrell, the European Union’s foreign minister, wrote last week of a 'battle of narratives'.

But this misses the point. It is not a matter of spinning the European model, but of taking seriously the substantial questions raised by the coronavirus about the ability of liberal democracies to adequately protect their citizens.




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Virtual Breakfast: Engaging with the EU From the Outside: A Perspective From Norway

Invitation Only Research Event

24 April 2020 - 8:30am to 9:30am

Event participants

Niels Engelschiøn, Director-General, Department for European Affairs, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Chair: Dr Robin Niblett, Director; Chief Executive, Chatham House

Please note this an online-only event.

Norway is one of the few European countries that remains outside of the European Union. After the country’s population rejected the prospect of joining the EU twice, Norway’s relationship with the Union has been based on its membership of the European Economic Area (EEA), alongside Iceland and Liechtenstein.

The ‘Norway Model’ was often mentioned in the run up to the Brexit vote as a possible basis for Britain’s future relationship with the bloc, not least because it offers the least disruption to the current arrangement. Equally, Norway is not subject to the EU fisheries policy - an anticipated major issue in the next phase of Brexit talks. Nor is it part of the EU Customs Union.

Even though Prime Minister Johnson has now ruled out the type of deep economic and regulatory integration with the EU that Norway enjoys through its EEA membership, the country’s experience can still offer valuable lessons for the UK as it prepares to exit the transition period at the end of 2020.

In this session, the speaker will share Norway’s experience as a long-standing EEA member and discuss the challenges of engaging with the EU from the outside. What lessons can Norway offer the UK ahead of the negotiations on the future of UK-EU relations? What are the limits of its current arrangement with the EU? And is there any appetite among the Norwegian population to revisit it?

Alina Lyadova

Europe Programme Coordinator




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Virtual Breakfast: Europe in the Age of COVID-19: Priorities and Debates

Invitation Only Research Event

6 May 2020 - 9:00am to 10:00am

Event participants

Duncan Robinson, Charlemagne Columnist; Brussels Bureau Chief, the Economist
Chair: Pepijn Bergsen, Research Fellow, Europe Programme, Chatham House

The new European Commission had a bold new agenda when it began its work in December 2019, with climate change, digital transformation and strengthening European democracy among its priorities. Less than six months later, the European continent is in the midst of the worst crisis since the second World War and business as usual has been taken over by crisis management.

Has COVID-19 monopolized the agenda in Brussels? What priorities are still on the table and what debates have fallen victim to the coronavirus? Is the current crisis reigniting and exacerbating existing faultlines in the EU or creating new ones?

Reflecting on his first four months as the Economist’s Charlemagne columnist, the speaker will share what decision-making in Brussels looks like during a pandemic and what debates are dominating conversations in the EU capital today.

Event attributes

Chatham House Rule

Alina Lyadova

Europe Programme Coordinator




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Evolution, expression, and substrate specificities of aldehyde oxidase enzymes in eukaryotes [Enzymology]

Aldehyde oxidases (AOXs) are a small group of enzymes belonging to the larger family of molybdo-flavoenzymes, along with the well-characterized xanthine oxidoreductase. The two major types of reactions that are catalyzed by AOXs are the hydroxylation of heterocycles and the oxidation of aldehydes to their corresponding carboxylic acids. Different animal species have different complements of AOX genes. The two extremes are represented in humans and rodents; whereas the human genome contains a single active gene (AOX1), those of rodents, such as mice, are endowed with four genes (Aox1-4), clustering on the same chromosome, each encoding a functionally distinct AOX enzyme. It still remains enigmatic why some species have numerous AOX enzymes, whereas others harbor only one functional enzyme. At present, little is known about the physiological relevance of AOX enzymes in humans and their additional forms in other mammals. These enzymes are expressed in the liver and play an important role in the metabolisms of drugs and other xenobiotics. In this review, we discuss the expression, tissue-specific roles, and substrate specificities of the different mammalian AOX enzymes and highlight insights into their physiological roles.




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The heme-regulatory motifs of heme oxygenase-2 contribute to the transfer of heme to the catalytic site for degradation [Protein Structure and Folding]

Heme-regulatory motifs (HRMs) are present in many proteins that are involved in diverse biological functions. The C-terminal tail region of human heme oxygenase-2 (HO2) contains two HRMs whose cysteine residues form a disulfide bond; when reduced, these cysteines are available to bind Fe3+-heme. Heme binding to the HRMs occurs independently of the HO2 catalytic active site in the core of the protein, where heme binds with high affinity and is degraded to biliverdin. Here, we describe the reversible, protein-mediated transfer of heme between the HRMs and the HO2 core. Using hydrogen-deuterium exchange (HDX)-MS to monitor the dynamics of HO2 with and without Fe3+-heme bound to the HRMs and to the core, we detected conformational changes in the catalytic core only in one state of the catalytic cycle—when Fe3+-heme is bound to the HRMs and the core is in the apo state. These conformational changes were consistent with transfer of heme between binding sites. Indeed, we observed that HRM-bound Fe3+-heme is transferred to the apo-core either upon independent expression of the core and of a construct spanning the HRM-containing tail or after a single turnover of heme at the core. Moreover, we observed transfer of heme from the core to the HRMs and equilibration of heme between the core and HRMs. We therefore propose an Fe3+-heme transfer model in which HRM-bound heme is readily transferred to the catalytic site for degradation to facilitate turnover but can also equilibrate between the sites to maintain heme homeostasis.




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An enzyme-based protocol for cell-free synthesis of nature-identical capsular oligosaccharides from Actinobacillus pleuropneumoniae serotype 1 [Enzymology]

Actinobacillus pleuropneumoniae (App) is the etiological agent of acute porcine pneumonia and responsible for severe economic losses worldwide. The capsule polymer of App serotype 1 (App1) consists of [4)-GlcNAc-β(1,6)-Gal-α-1-(PO4-] repeating units that are O-acetylated at O-6 of the GlcNAc. It is a major virulence factor and was used in previous studies in the successful generation of an experimental glycoconjugate vaccine. However, the application of glycoconjugate vaccines in the animal health sector is limited, presumably because of the high costs associated with harvesting the polymer from pathogen culture. Consequently, here we exploited the capsule polymerase Cps1B of App1 as an in vitro synthesis tool and an alternative for capsule polymer provision. Cps1B consists of two catalytic domains, as well as a domain rich in tetratricopeptide repeats (TPRs). We compared the elongation mechanism of Cps1B with that of a ΔTPR truncation (Cps1B-ΔTPR). Interestingly, the product profiles displayed by Cps1B suggested processive elongation of the nascent polymer, whereas Cps1B-ΔTPR appeared to work in a more distributive manner. The dispersity of the synthesized products could be reduced by generating single-action transferases and immobilizing them on individual columns, separating the two catalytic activities. Furthermore, we identified the O-acetyltransferase Cps1D of App1 and used it to modify the polymers produced by Cps1B. Two-dimensional NMR analyses of the products revealed O-acetylation levels identical to those of polymer harvested from App1 culture supernatants. In conclusion, we have established a protocol for the pathogen-free in vitro synthesis of tailored, nature-identical App1 capsule polymers.




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Structural and mutational analyses of the bifunctional arginine dihydrolase and ornithine cyclodeaminase AgrE from the cyanobacterium Anabaena [Enzymology]

In cyanobacteria, metabolic pathways that use the nitrogen-rich amino acid arginine play a pivotal role in nitrogen storage and mobilization. The N-terminal domains of two recently identified bacterial enzymes: ArgZ from Synechocystis and AgrE from Anabaena, have been found to contain an arginine dihydrolase. This enzyme provides catabolic activity that converts arginine to ornithine, resulting in concomitant release of CO2 and ammonia. In Synechocystis, the ArgZ-mediated ornithine–ammonia cycle plays a central role in nitrogen storage and remobilization. The C-terminal domain of AgrE contains an ornithine cyclodeaminase responsible for the formation of proline from ornithine and ammonia production, indicating that AgrE is a bifunctional enzyme catalyzing two sequential reactions in arginine catabolism. Here, the crystal structures of AgrE in three different ligation states revealed that it has a tetrameric conformation, possesses a binding site for the arginine dihydrolase substrate l-arginine and product l-ornithine, and contains a binding site for the coenzyme NAD(H) required for ornithine cyclodeaminase activity. Structure–function analyses indicated that the structure and catalytic mechanism of arginine dihydrolase in AgrE are highly homologous with those of a known bacterial arginine hydrolase. We found that in addition to other active-site residues, Asn-71 is essential for AgrE's dihydrolase activity. Further analysis suggested the presence of a passage for substrate channeling between the two distinct AgrE active sites, which are situated ∼45 Å apart. These results provide structural and functional insights into the bifunctional arginine dihydrolase–ornithine cyclodeaminase enzyme AgrE required for arginine catabolism in Anabaena.




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Detailed analyses of the crucial functions of Zn transporter proteins in alkaline phosphatase activation [Enzymology]

Numerous zinc ectoenzymes are metalated by zinc and activated in the compartments of the early secretory pathway before reaching their destination. Zn transporter (ZNT) proteins located in these compartments are essential for ectoenzyme activation. We have previously reported that ZNT proteins, specifically ZNT5–ZNT6 heterodimers and ZNT7 homodimers, play critical roles in the activation of zinc ectoenzymes, such as alkaline phosphatases (ALPs), by mobilizing cytosolic zinc into these compartments. However, this process remains incompletely understood. Here, using genetically-engineered chicken DT40 cells, we first determined that Zrt/Irt-like protein (ZIP) transporters that are localized to the compartments of the early secretory pathway play only a minor role in the ALP activation process. These transporters included ZIP7, ZIP9, and ZIP13, performing pivotal functions in maintaining cellular homeostasis by effluxing zinc out of the compartments. Next, using purified ALP proteins, we showed that zinc metalation on ALP produced in DT40 cells lacking ZNT5–ZNT6 heterodimers and ZNT7 homodimers is impaired. Finally, by genetically disrupting both ZNT5 and ZNT7 in human HAP1 cells, we directly demonstrated that the tissue-nonspecific ALP-activating functions of both ZNT complexes are conserved in human cells. Furthermore, using mutant HAP1 cells, we uncovered a previously-unrecognized and unique spatial regulation of ZNT5–ZNT6 heterodimer formation, wherein ZNT5 recruits ZNT6 to the Golgi apparatus to form the heterodimeric complex. These findings fill in major gaps in our understanding of the molecular mechanisms underlying zinc ectoenzyme activation in the compartments of the early secretory pathway.




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Reduction of protein phosphatase 2A (PP2A) complexity reveals cellular functions and dephosphorylation motifs of the PP2A/B'{delta} holoenzyme [Enzymology]

Protein phosphatase 2A (PP2A) is a large enzyme family responsible for most cellular Ser/Thr dephosphorylation events. PP2A substrate specificity, localization, and regulation by second messengers rely on more than a dozen regulatory subunits (including B/R2, B'/R5, and B″/R3), which form the PP2A heterotrimeric holoenzyme by associating with a dimer comprising scaffolding (A) and catalytic (C) subunits. Because of partial redundancy and high endogenous expression of PP2A holoenzymes, traditional approaches of overexpressing, knocking down, or knocking out PP2A regulatory subunits have yielded only limited insights into their biological roles and substrates. To this end, here we sought to reduce the complexity of cellular PP2A holoenzymes. We used tetracycline-inducible expression of pairs of scaffolding and regulatory subunits with complementary charge-reversal substitutions in their interaction interfaces. For each of the three regulatory subunit families, we engineered A/B charge–swap variants that could bind to one another, but not to endogenous A and B subunits. Because endogenous Aα was targeted by a co-induced shRNA, endogenous B subunits were rapidly degraded, resulting in expression of predominantly a single PP2A heterotrimer composed of the A/B charge–swap pair and the endogenous catalytic subunit. Using B'δ/PPP2R5D, we show that PP2A complexity reduction, but not PP2A overexpression, reveals a role of this holoenzyme in suppression of extracellular signal–regulated kinase signaling and protein kinase A substrate dephosphorylation. When combined with global phosphoproteomics, the PP2A/B'δ reduction approach identified consensus dephosphorylation motifs in its substrates and suggested that residues surrounding the phosphorylation site play roles in PP2A substrate specificity.




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Processivity of dextransucrases synthesizing very-high-molar-mass dextran is mediated by sugar-binding pockets in domain V [Glycobiology and Extracellular Matrices]

The dextransucrase DSR-OK from the Gram-positive bacterium Oenococcus kitaharae DSM17330 produces a dextran of the highest molar mass reported to date (∼109 g/mol). In this study, we selected a recombinant form, DSR-OKΔ1, to identify molecular determinants involved in the sugar polymerization mechanism and that confer its ability to produce a very-high-molar-mass polymer. In domain V of DSR-OK, we identified seven putative sugar-binding pockets characteristic of glycoside hydrolase 70 (GH70) glucansucrases that are known to be involved in glucan binding. We investigated their role in polymer synthesis through several approaches, including monitoring of dextran synthesis, affinity assays, sugar binding pocket deletions, site-directed mutagenesis, and construction of chimeric enzymes. Substitution of only two stacking aromatic residues in two consecutive sugar-binding pockets (variant DSR-OKΔ1-Y1162A-F1228A) induced quasi-complete loss of very-high-molar-mass dextran synthesis, resulting in production of only 10–13 kg/mol polymers. Moreover, the double mutation completely switched the semiprocessive mode of DSR-OKΔ1 toward a distributive one, highlighting the strong influence of these pockets on enzyme processivity. Finally, the position of each pocket relative to the active site also appeared to be important for polymer elongation. We propose that sugar-binding pockets spatially closer to the catalytic domain play a major role in the control of processivity. A deep structural characterization, if possible with large-molar-mass sugar ligands, would allow confirming this hypothesis.




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The Escherichia coli cellulose synthase subunit G (BcsG) is a Zn2+-dependent phosphoethanolamine transferase [Glycobiology and Extracellular Matrices]

Bacterial biofilms are cellular communities that produce an adherent matrix. Exopolysaccharides are key structural components of this matrix and are required for the assembly and architecture of biofilms produced by a wide variety of microorganisms. The human bacterial pathogens Escherichia coli and Salmonella enterica produce a biofilm matrix composed primarily of the exopolysaccharide phosphoethanolamine (pEtN) cellulose. Once thought to be composed of only underivatized cellulose, the pEtN modification present in these matrices has been implicated in the overall architecture and integrity of the biofilm. However, an understanding of the mechanism underlying pEtN derivatization of the cellulose exopolysaccharide remains elusive. The bacterial cellulose synthase subunit G (BcsG) is a predicted inner membrane–localized metalloenzyme that has been proposed to catalyze the transfer of the pEtN group from membrane phospholipids to cellulose. Here we present evidence that the C-terminal domain of BcsG from E. coli (EcBcsGΔN) functions as a phosphoethanolamine transferase in vitro with substrate preference for cellulosic materials. Structural characterization of EcBcsGΔN revealed that it belongs to the alkaline phosphatase superfamily, contains a Zn2+ ion at its active center, and is structurally similar to characterized enzymes that confer colistin resistance in Gram-negative bacteria. Informed by our structural studies, we present a functional complementation experiment in E. coli AR3110, indicating that the activity of the BcsG C-terminal domain is essential for integrity of the pellicular biofilm. Furthermore, our results established a similar but distinct active-site architecture and catalytic mechanism shared between BcsG and the colistin resistance enzymes.




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Impact of 1,N6-ethenoadenosine, a damaged ribonucleotide in DNA, on translesion synthesis and repair [Enzymology]

Incorporation of ribonucleotides into DNA can severely diminish genome integrity. However, how ribonucleotides instigate DNA damage is poorly understood. In DNA, they can promote replication stress and genomic instability and have been implicated in several diseases. We report here the impact of the ribonucleotide rATP and of its naturally occurring damaged analog 1,N6-ethenoadenosine (1,N6-ϵrA) on translesion synthesis (TLS), mediated by human DNA polymerase η (hpol η), and on RNase H2–mediated incision. Mass spectral analysis revealed that 1,N6-ϵrA in DNA generates extensive frameshifts during TLS, which can lead to genomic instability. Moreover, steady-state kinetic analysis of the TLS process indicated that deoxypurines (i.e. dATP and dGTP) are inserted predominantly opposite 1,N6-ϵrA. We also show that hpol η acts as a reverse transcriptase in the presence of damaged ribonucleotide 1,N6-ϵrA but has poor RNA primer extension activities. Steady-state kinetic analysis of reverse transcription and RNA primer extension showed that hpol η favors the addition of dATP and dGTP opposite 1,N6-ϵrA. We also found that RNase H2 recognizes 1,N6-ϵrA but has limited incision activity across from this lesion, which can lead to the persistence of this detrimental DNA adduct. We conclude that the damaged and unrepaired ribonucleotide 1,N6-ϵrA in DNA exhibits mutagenic potential and can also alter the reading frame in an mRNA transcript because 1,N6-ϵrA is incompletely incised by RNase H2.




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Spectral and photochemical diversity of tandem cysteine cyanobacterial phytochromes [Plant Biology]

The atypical trichromatic cyanobacterial phytochrome NpTP1 from Nostoc punctiforme ATCC 29133 is a linear tetrapyrrole (bilin)-binding photoreceptor protein that possesses tandem-cysteine residues responsible for shifting its light-sensing maximum to the violet spectral region. Using bioinformatics and phylogenetic analyses, here we established that tandem-cysteine cyanobacterial phytochromes (TCCPs) compose a well-supported monophyletic phytochrome lineage distinct from prototypical red/far-red cyanobacterial phytochromes. To investigate the light-sensing diversity of this family, we compared the spectroscopic properties of NpTP1 (here renamed NpTCCP) with those of three phylogenetically diverged TCCPs identified in the draft genomes of Tolypothrix sp. PCC7910, Scytonema sp. PCC10023, and Gloeocapsa sp. PCC7513. Recombinant photosensory core modules of ToTCCP, ScTCCP, and GlTCCP exhibited violet-blue–absorbing dark-states consistent with dual thioether-linked phycocyanobilin (PCB) chromophores. Photoexcitation generated singly-linked photoproduct mixtures with variable ratios of yellow-orange and red-absorbing species. The photoproduct ratio was strongly influenced by pH and by mutagenesis of TCCP- and phytochrome-specific signature residues. Our experiments support the conclusion that both photoproduct species possess protonated 15E bilin chromophores, but differ in the ionization state of the noncanonical “second” cysteine sulfhydryl group. We found that the ionization state of this and other residues influences subsequent conformational change and downstream signal transmission. We also show that tandem-cysteine phytochromes present in eukaryotes possess similar amino acid substitutions within their chromophore-binding pocket, which tune their spectral properties in an analogous fashion. Taken together, our findings provide a roadmap for tailoring the wavelength specificity of plant phytochromes to optimize plant performance in diverse natural and artificial light environments.




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Crystallographic and kinetic analyses of the FdsBG subcomplex of the cytosolic formate dehydrogenase FdsABG from Cupriavidus necator [Molecular Biophysics]

Formate oxidation to carbon dioxide is a key reaction in one-carbon compound metabolism, and its reverse reaction represents the first step in carbon assimilation in the acetogenic and methanogenic branches of many anaerobic organisms. The molybdenum-containing dehydrogenase FdsABG is a soluble NAD+-dependent formate dehydrogenase and a member of the NADH dehydrogenase superfamily. Here, we present the first structure of the FdsBG subcomplex of the cytosolic FdsABG formate dehydrogenase from the hydrogen-oxidizing bacterium Cupriavidus necator H16 both with and without bound NADH. The structures revealed that the two iron-sulfur clusters, Fe4S4 in FdsB and Fe2S2 in FdsG, are closer to the FMN than they are in other NADH dehydrogenases. Rapid kinetic studies and EPR measurements of rapid freeze-quenched samples of the NADH reduction of FdsBG identified a neutral flavin semiquinone, FMNH•, not previously observed to participate in NADH-mediated reduction of the FdsABG holoenzyme. We found that this semiquinone forms through the transfer of one electron from the fully reduced FMNH−, initially formed via NADH-mediated reduction, to the Fe2S2 cluster. This Fe2S2 cluster is not part of the on-path chain of iron-sulfur clusters connecting the FMN of FdsB with the active-site molybdenum center of FdsA. According to the NADH-bound structure, the nicotinamide ring stacks onto the re-face of the FMN. However, NADH binding significantly reduced the electron density for the isoalloxazine ring of FMN and induced a conformational change in residues of the FMN-binding pocket that display peptide-bond flipping upon NAD+ binding in proper NADH dehydrogenases.




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Japan's ‘Indo-Pacific’ question: countering China or shaping a new regional order?

8 January 2020 , Volume 96, Number 1

Kei Koga

Japan's primary objective of the ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP) strategy is to shape and consolidate regional order in the Indo-Pacific region based on the existing rules-based international order. The concept initially aimed to achieve two different objectives—shaping a regional order in the Indo-Pacific and ensuring the defence of Japan; however, Japan has gradually shifted its strategic focus onto the former, separating national defence from the FOIP concept, which reflects a change in the degree of its commitment to the two objectives. On the one hand, as its overall security strategy, Japan has determined to steadily enhance its national defence by increasing its own defence capabilities and strengthening the US–Japan alliance, while transforming its partnerships with like-minded states, such as Australia and India, into a diplomatic, and potentially military, alignment. This has been brought about by shifts in the regional balance of power, particularly the rise of China and the relative decline of the United States. On the other hand, as part of its FOIP strategy, Japan's attempts to build a new regional order in the Indo-Pacific region aim to defend the existing rules-based order established by the United States from challengers, particularly China. Yet, given the strategic uncertainty over Japan's international coalition-building efforts to create a new regional order, Japan has made its approach flexible; Tokyo is using its ambiguous FOIP concept to gauge other states' responses, understand their perspectives, and change its strategic emphases accordingly—so-called ‘tactical hedging’. Japan has pursued similar means to achieve the two key objectives. Nevertheless, the country's core interest, the defence of Japan, is more imperative than building a regional order in the Indo-Pacific region, and Japan faces different types of challenges in the future.




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Developmental peace in east Asia and its implications for the Indo-Pacific

8 January 2020 , Volume 96, Number 1

Ling Wei

This article adopts a constructive approach to examining the problem of the Indo-Pacific construct. Through reflection on the east Asian experience, it proposes an analytical framework of developmental peace as a constellation of international practices, which means that the more economic development is prioritized by states in regional processes, the more likely it is that a sustainable peace will be achieved. States participating in regional integration comprise a community of practice. On the basis of a shared understanding that development is of overriding importance and underpins security and state legitimacy, the community takes economic development as the anchoring practice; this practice embodies and enacts constitutive rules and fundamental norms for a broader set of practices in regional processes, such as peaceful coexistence and non-interference. The more economic development is prioritized on domestic and regional agendas, the more likely it is that conflicts in the security realm will be relaxed or even resolved to protect security interests. The author draws some useful implications from the developmental peace in east Asia for the Indo-Pacific construct, among which the most important include building shared understandings on the prioritization of economic development, taking advantage of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and using the code of conduct process as a vehicle and best practice to facilitate rule-making for the maritime order. Finally, the author briefly discusses the contributions of the study and limitations of the model.




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Understanding the dynamics of the Indo-Pacific: US–China strategic competition, regional actors, and beyond

6 November 2019 , Volume 96, Number 1

The first issue of International Affairs in 2020 explores the geopolitics of the 'Indo-Pacific' region.

Kai He and Mingjiang Li

As a geographical concept, ‘Indo-Pacific’ has existed for decades. As a political and strategic concept, it has since 2010 gradually become established in the foreign policy lexicon of some countries, especially Australia, India, Japan and the United States. However, China seems to be reluctant to identify itself as part of the Indo-Pacific; Chinese leaders believe that the US-led Indo-Pacific strategy aims to contain China's rise. While the battle between the two geographical concepts ‘Indo-Pacific’ and ‘Asia–Pacific’ may be fairly easily settled in the future, US–China strategic competition has just begun. Will the Indo-Pacific become a battlefield for US–China rivalry? How will China cope with the US ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP) strategy? How will other regional actors respond to the US–China strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific? What are the strategic implications of the ‘Indo-Pacific’ concept for regional order transformation? How will the Indo-Pacific be institutionalized, economically, politically and strategically? This article introduces the January 2020 special issue of International Affairs, which aims to address those questions, using both country-specific and regional perspectives. Seven articles focus on the policy responses of major players (Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan and ASEAN) to the US FOIP strategy and related US–China rivalry in the region. A further three articles examine the profound implications of Indo-Pacific dynamics for regional institution-building and for geopolitical and geo-economic architecture.




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The Commonwealth Cyber Declaration: Achievements and Way Forward

Invitation Only Research Event

4 February 2020 - 9:15am to 5:30pm

Chatham House, London

In April 2018, the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM), held in London, saw the creation and the adoption of the Commonwealth Cyber Declaration. The declaration outlines the framework for a concerted effort to advance cybersecurity practices to promote a safe and prosperous cyberspace for Commonwealth citizens, businesses and societies. 

The conference will aim to provide an overview on the progress made on cybersecurity in the Commonwealth since the declaration was announced in 2018. In addition, it will examine future challenges and potential solutions going forward.

This conference is part of the International Security Programme's project on Implementing the Commonwealth Cybersecurity Agenda and will convene a range of senior Commonwealth representatives as well as a selection of civil society and industry stakeholders. This project aims to develop a pan-Commonwealth platform to take the Commonwealth Cyber Declaration forward by means of a holistic, inclusive and representative approach.

Please see below meeting summaries from previous events on Cybersecurity in the Commonwealth:  

Attendance at this event is by invitation only. 

Esther Naylor

Research Assistant, International Security Programme
+44 (0)20 7314 3628




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Religious violence, gender and post-secular counterterrorism

4 March 2020 , Volume 96, Number 2

Katherine E. Brown

This article argues that despite the framing of religion in the discipline and practice of International Relations (IR) as a force for good, or a cause of evil in the world, IR fails to treat religion on its own terms (as sui generis). With a few exceptions, the discipline has pigeonholed religion as a variable of IR, one that can be discussed as one might GDP, HIV, or numbers of nuclear missiles: measurable, with causality and essential properties. IR has also tended to treat religion as equivalent to features of global politics that it already recognizes—as an institution or community or ideology, for example—but in doing so, it misses intrinsic (and arguably unique) elements of religion. Drawing on feminist insights about how gender works in IR, namely that gender is a construct, performative and structural, this article argues a similar case for religion. A reframing of religion is applied to the case of Daesh (so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, ISIS) to show how our understanding of the organization changes when we view religion differently. The implications for counterterrorism policies if religion is viewed as more than a variable are explored in light of recent territorial and military losses for Daesh. The article therefore proposes a post-secular counterterrorism approach.




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The politics of hope: privilege, despair and political theology

4 March 2020 , Volume 96, Number 2

Caron E. Gentry

Situated within feminist Christian Realism, this article looks at what political theology is and its relevance to International Relations. Hope is a central theme to political theology, underpinning the necessity to be witness to and to work against oppressive structures. Simply put, hope is the desire to make life better. For Christians, this hope stems from a belief in resurrection of Christ and the faith that such redemption is offered to all of humanity. Hope, however, is not limited to Christianity and, therefore, Christian theology. Thus, taking an intersectional approach, the article looks for similarities in how hope is articulated in three personal narratives: theologian Jürgen Moltmann, UK Muslim advocate Asim Qureshi, and Black Lives Matter co-founder Patrisse Khan-Cullors. Across all three personal narratives, the need for hope begins in a place of despair, signalling a need to recognize that hope and privilege are in tension with one another. Feminist Christian Realism acknowledges and embraces this tension, recognizing that hope cannot function if the pain, oppression and harm caused by privilege are erased or minimized.




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Predictions and Policymaking: Complex Modelling Beyond COVID-19

1 April 2020

Yasmin Afina

Research Assistant, International Security Programme

Calum Inverarity

Research Analyst and Coordinator, International Security Programme
The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the potential of complex systems modelling for policymaking but it is crucial to also understand its limitations.

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A member of the media wearing a protective face mask works in Downing Street where Britain's Prime Minister Boris Johnson is self-isolating in central London, 27 March 2020. Photo by TOLGA AKMEN/AFP via Getty Images.

Complex systems models have played a significant role in informing and shaping the public health measures adopted by governments in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. For instance, modelling carried out by a team at Imperial College London is widely reported to have driven the approach in the UK from a strategy of mitigation to one of suppression.

Complex systems modelling will increasingly feed into policymaking by predicting a range of potential correlations, results and outcomes based on a set of parameters, assumptions, data and pre-defined interactions. It is already instrumental in developing risk mitigation and resilience measures to address and prepare for existential crises such as pandemics, prospects of a nuclear war, as well as climate change.

The human factor

In the end, model-driven approaches must stand up to the test of real-life data. Modelling for policymaking must take into account a number of caveats and limitations. Models are developed to help answer specific questions, and their predictions will depend on the hypotheses and definitions set by the modellers, which are subject to their individual and collective biases and assumptions. For instance, the models developed by Imperial College came with the caveated assumption that a policy of social distancing for people over 70 will have a 75 per cent compliance rate. This assumption is based on the modellers’ own perceptions of demographics and society, and may not reflect all societal factors that could impact this compliance rate in real life, such as gender, age, ethnicity, genetic diversity, economic stability, as well as access to food, supplies and healthcare. This is why modelling benefits from a cognitively diverse team who bring a wide range of knowledge and understanding to the early creation of a model.

The potential of artificial intelligence

Machine learning, or artificial intelligence (AI), has the potential to advance the capacity and accuracy of modelling techniques by identifying new patterns and interactions, and overcoming some of the limitations resulting from human assumptions and bias. Yet, increasing reliance on these techniques raises the issue of explainability. Policymakers need to be fully aware and understand the model, assumptions and input data behind any predictions and must be able to communicate this aspect of modelling in order to uphold democratic accountability and transparency in public decision-making.

In addition, models using machine learning techniques require extensive amounts of data, which must also be of high quality and as free from bias as possible to ensure accuracy and address the issues at stake. Although technology may be used in the process (i.e. automated extraction and processing of information with big data), data is ultimately created, collected, aggregated and analysed by and for human users. Datasets will reflect the individual and collective biases and assumptions of those creating, collecting, processing and analysing this data. Algorithmic bias is inevitable, and it is essential that policy- and decision-makers are fully aware of how reliable the systems are, as well as their potential social implications.

The age of distrust

Increasing use of emerging technologies for data- and evidence-based policymaking is taking place, paradoxically, in an era of growing mistrust towards expertise and experts, as infamously surmised by Michael Gove. Policymakers and subject-matter experts have faced increased public scrutiny of their findings and the resultant policies that they have been used to justify.

This distrust and scepticism within public discourse has only been fuelled by an ever-increasing availability of diffuse sources of information, not all of which are verifiable and robust. This has caused tension between experts, policymakers and public, which has led to conflicts and uncertainty over what data and predictions can be trusted, and to what degree. This dynamic is exacerbated when considering that certain individuals may purposefully misappropriate, or simply misinterpret, data to support their argument or policies. Politicians are presently considered the least trusted professionals by the UK public, highlighting the importance of better and more effective communication between the scientific community, policymakers and the populations affected by policy decisions.

Acknowledging limitations

While measures can and should be built in to improve the transparency and robustness of scientific models in order to counteract these common criticisms, it is important to acknowledge that there are limitations to the steps that can be taken. This is particularly the case when dealing with predictions of future events, which inherently involve degrees of uncertainty that cannot be fully accounted for by human or machine. As a result, if not carefully considered and communicated, the increased use of complex modelling in policymaking holds the potential to undermine and obfuscate the policymaking process, which may contribute towards significant mistakes being made, increased uncertainty, lack of trust in the models and in the political process and further disaffection of citizens.

The potential contribution of complexity modelling to the work of policymakers is undeniable. However, it is imperative to appreciate the inner workings and limitations of these models, such as the biases that underpin their functioning and the uncertainties that they will not be fully capable of accounting for, in spite of their immense power. They must be tested against the data, again and again, as new information becomes available or there is a risk of scientific models becoming embroiled in partisan politicization and potentially weaponized for political purposes. It is therefore important not to consider these models as oracles, but instead as one of many contributions to the process of policymaking.




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Perspectives on Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century

20 April 2020

Nuclear deterrence theory, with its roots in the Cold War era, may not account for all eventualities in the 21st century. Researchers at Chatham House have worked with eight experts to produce this collection of essays examining four contested themes in contemporary policymaking on deterrence.

Dr Beyza Unal

Senior Research Fellow, International Security Programme

Yasmin Afina

Research Assistant, International Security Programme

Dr Patricia Lewis

Research Director, Conflict, Science & Transformation; Director, International Security Programme

Dr John Borrie

Associate Fellow, International Security Programme

Dr Jamie Shea

Associate Fellow, International Security Programme

Peter Watkins

Associate Fellow, International Security Programme

Dr Maria Rost Rublee

Associate Professor of International Relations, Monash University

Cristina Varriale

Research Fellow in Proliferation and Nuclear Policy, RUSI

Dr Tanya Ogilvie-White

Adjunct Senior Fellow, Griffith Asia Institute, Griffith University

Dr Andrew Futter

Associate Professor of International Politics, University of Leicester

Christine Parthemore

Chief Executive Officer, Council on Strategic Risks (CSR)

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Royal Navy Vanguard Class submarine HMS Vigilant returning to HMNB Clyde after extended deployment. The four Vanguard-class submarines form the UK's strategic nuclear deterrent force. Photo: Ministry of Defence.

Summary

  • This collection of essays explores, from the perspectives of eight experts, four areas of deterrence theory and policymaking: the underlying assumptions that shape deterrence practice; the enduring value of extended deterrence; the impact of emerging technologies; and the ‘blurring’ of the lines between conventional and nuclear weapons.
  • Nuclear deterrence theory, with its roots in the Cold War era, may not account for all eventualities in security and defence in the 21st century, given the larger number of nuclear actors in a less binary geopolitical context. It is clear that a number of present factors challenge the overall credibility of ‘classical’ nuclear deterrence, meaning that in-depth analysis is now needed.
  • Uncertainty as to the appetite to maintain the current nuclear weapons policy architecture looms large in discussions and concerns on global and regional security. The demise of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, doubts over the potential extension of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, heightened regional tensions in Northeast and South Asia, together with the current and likely future risks and challenges arising from global technological competition, making it all the more urgent to examine long-held assumptions in the real-world context.
  • Extended deterrence practices differ from region to region, depending on the domestic and regional landscape. Increased focus on diplomatic capabilities to reduce risks and improve the long-term outlook at regional level, including by spearheading new regional arms-control initiatives, may be a viable way forward. Addressing the bigger picture – notably including, on the Korean peninsula, Pyongyang’s own threat perception – and the links between conventional and nuclear missile issues will need to remain prominent if long-term and concrete changes are to take hold.
  • Most states have long held nuclear weapons to be ‘exceptional’: their use would represent a dramatic escalation of a conflict that must never be attained. Latterly, however, some officials and scholars have made the case that the impact of the use of a low-yield nuclear weapon would not be entirely distinct from that of a large-scale conventional attack. This blurring of lines between conventional and nuclear deterrence strips nuclear weapons of their exceptional nature, in a context in which states are faced with diverse, complex and concurrent threats from multiple potential adversaries that are able to synchronize non-military and military options, up to and including nuclear forces. The use of nuclear weapons risks becoming a ‘new normal’, potentially reducing the threshold for use – to cyberattacks, for example. This has direct implications for discussions around strategic stability. 
  • While emerging technologies may offer tremendous opportunities in the modernization of nuclear weapons, they also present major risks and destabilizing challenges. Artificial intelligence, automation, and other developments in the cyber sphere affect dynamics on both the demand and supply sides of the nuclear deterrence equation. States and alliance such as NATO must adapt their deterrence thinking in light of these technological developments, and define their primary purpose and priorities in this shifting security context. Resilience planning, adaptation to the evolving security environment, threat anticipation, and consistent crisis management and incident response – as well as thinking about the mitigation measures necessary to prevent conflict escalation should deterrence fail – will all be critical in upholding nuclear deterrence as both policy and practice.




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Nuclear Tensions Must Not Be Sidelined During Coronavirus

1 May 2020

Ana Alecsandru

Research Assistant, International Security Programme
Although the pandemic means the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference (RevCon) is postponed, the delay could be an opportunity to better the health of the NPT regime.

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Painted stairs in Tehran, Iran symbolizing hope. Photo by Fatemeh Bahrami/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images.

Despite face-to-face diplomatic meetings being increasingly rare during the current disruption, COVID-19 will ultimately force a redefinition of national security and defence spending priorities, and this could provide the possibility of an improved political climate at RevCon when it happens in 2021.

With US presidential elections due in November and a gradual engagement growing between the EU and Iran, there could be a new context for more cooperation between states by 2021. Two key areas of focus over the coming months will be the arms control talks between the United States and Russia, and Iran’s compliance with the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the Iran Nuclear Deal.

It is too early to discern the medium- and longer-term consequences of COVID-19 for defence ministries, but a greater focus on societal resilience and reinvigorating economic productivity will likely undercut the rationale for expensive nuclear modernization.

Therefore, extending the current New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) would be the best, most practical option to give both Russia and the United States time to explore more ambitious multilateral arms control measures, while allowing their current focus to remain on the pandemic and economic relief.

Continuing distrust

But with the current treaty — which limits nuclear warheads, missiles, bombers, and launchers — due to expire in February 2021, the continuing distrust between the United States and Russia makes this extension hard to achieve, and a follow-on treaty even less likely.

Prospects for future bilateral negotiations are hindered by President Donald Trump’s vision for a trilateral arms control initiative involving both China and Russia. But China opposes this on the grounds that its nuclear arsenal is far smaller than that of the two others.

While there appears to be agreement that the nuclear arsenals of China, France, and the UK (the NPT nuclear-weapons states) and those of the states outside the treaty (India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel) will all have to be taken into account going forward, a practical mechanism for doing so proves elusive.

If Joe Biden wins the US presidency he seems likely to pursue an extension of the New START treaty and could also prevent a withdrawal from the Open Skies treaty, the latest arms control agreement targeted by the Trump administration.

Under a Biden administration, the United States would also probably re-join the JCPOA, provided Tehran returned to strict compliance with the deal. Biden could even use the team that negotiated the Iran deal to advance the goal of denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

For an NPT regime already confronted by a series of longstanding divergences, it is essential that Iran remains a signatory especially as tensions between Iran and the United States have escalated recently — due to the Qassim Suleimani assassination and the recent claim by Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps to have successfully placed the country’s first military satellite into orbit.

This announcement raised red flags among experts about whether Iran is developing intercontinental ballistic missiles due to the dual-use nature of space technology. The satellite launch — deeply troubling for Iran’s neighbours and the EU countries — may strengthen the US argument that it is a cover for the development of ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons.

However, as with many other countries, Iran is struggling with a severe coronavirus crisis and will be pouring its scientific expertise and funds into that rather than other efforts — including the nuclear programme.

Those European countries supporting the trading mechanism INSTEX (Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges) for sending humanitarian goods into Iran could use this crisis to encourage Iran to remain in compliance with the JCPOA and its NPT obligations.

France, Germany and the UK (the E3) have already successfully concluded the first transaction, which was to facilitate the export of medical goods from Europe to Iran. But the recent Iranian escalatory steps will most certainly place a strain on the preservation of this arrangement.

COVID-19 might have delayed Iran’s next breach of the 2015 nuclear agreement but Tehran will inevitably seek to strengthen its hand before any potential negotiations with the United States after the presidential elections.

As frosty US-Iranian relations — exacerbated by the coronavirus pandemic — prevent diplomatic negotiations, this constructive engagement between the E3 and Iran might prove instrumental in reviving the JCPOA and ensuring Iran stays committed to both nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

While countries focus their efforts on tackling the coronavirus pandemic, it is understandable resources may be limited for other global challenges, such as the increasing risk of nuclear weapons use across several regions.

But the potential ramifications of the COVID-19 crisis for the NPT regime are profound. Ongoing tensions between the nuclear-armed states must not be ignored while the world’s focus is elsewhere, and the nuclear community should continue to work together to progress nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, building bridges of cooperation and trust that can long outlast the pandemic.




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It's a man's world: carnal spectatorship and dissonant masculinities in Islamic State videos

7 May 2020 , Volume 96, Number 3

Manni Crone

Islamic State videos have often been associated with savage violence and beheadings. An in-depth scrutiny however reveals another striking feature: that female bodies are absent, blurred or mute. Examining a few Islamic State videos in depth, the article suggests that the invisibility of women in tandem with the ostentatious visibility of male bodies enable gendered and embodied spectators to indulge in homoerotic as well as heterosexual imaginaries. In contrast to studies on visual security and online radicalization which assert that images affect an audience, this article focuses on the interaction between video and audience and argues that spectators are not only rational and emotional but embodied and gendered as well. Islamic State videos do not only attract western foreign fighters through religious–ideological rhetoric or emotional impact but also through gendered forms of pleasure and desire that enable carnal imagination and identification. The article probes the analytical purchase of carnal aesthetics and spectatorship.




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Accountability, denial and the future-proofing of British torture

7 May 2020 , Volume 96, Number 3

Ruth Blakeley and Sam Raphael

When powerful liberal democratic states are found to be complicit in extreme violations of human rights, how do they respond and why do they respond as they do? Drawing on the example of the United Kingdom's complicity in torture since 9/11, this article demonstrates how reluctant the UK has been to permit a full reckoning with its torturous past. We demonstrate that successive UK governments engaged in various forms of denial, obfuscation and attempts to obstruct investigation and avoid accountability. The net effect of their responses has been to deny the victims redress, through adequate judicial processes, and to deny the public adequate state accountability. These responses are not simply aimed at shielding from prosecution the perpetrators and those who have oversight of them, nor preventing political embarrassment. The various forms of denial and obstruction are also designed to ensure that collusion can continue uninterrupted. A core concern of intelligence officials and ministers has been to prevent any process that would lead to a comprehensive prohibition on involvement in operations where torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment are a real possibility. The door remains wide open, and deliberately so, for British involvement in torture.




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Let's talk about the interregnum: Gramsci and the crisis of the liberal world order

7 May 2020 , Volume 96, Number 3

Milan Babic

The liberal international order (LIO) is in crisis. Numerous publications, debates and events have time and again made it clear that we are in the midst of a grand transformation of world order. While most contributions focus on either what is slowly dying (the LIO) or what might come next (China, multipolarity, chaos?), there is less analytical engagement with what lies in between those two phases of world order. Under the assumption that this period could last years or even decades, a set of analytical tools to understand this interregnum is urgently needed. This article proposes an analytical framework that builds on Gramscian concepts of crisis that will help us understand the current crisis of the LIO in a more systematic way. It addresses a gap in the literature on changing world order by elaborating three Gramsci-inspired crisis characteristics—processuality, organicity and morbidity—that sketch the current crisis landscape in a systematic way. Building on this framework, the article suggests different empirical entry points to the study of the crisis of the LIO and calls for a research agenda that takes this crisis seriously as a distinct period of changing world orders.




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China and Russia in R2P debates at the UN Security Council

7 May 2020 , Volume 96, Number 3

Zheng Chen and Hang Yin

While China and Russia's general policies towards the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) are similar, the two reveal nuanced differences in addressing specific emergencies. Both express support for the first two pillars of R2P while resisting coercive intervention under its aegis, as they share anxieties of domestic political security and concerns about their international image. Nonetheless, addressing cases like the Syrian crisis, Russian statements are more assertive and even aggressive while Chinese ones are usually vague and reactive. This article highlights the two states’ different tones through computer-assisted text analyses. It argues that diplomatic styles reflect Russian and Chinese perceptions of their own place in the evolving international order. Experiences in past decades create divergent reference points and status prospects for them, which leads to their different strategies in signalling Great Power status. As Beijing is optimistic about its status-rising prospects, it exercises more self-restraint in order to avoid external containments and is reluctant to act as an independent ‘spoiler’. Meanwhile, Moscow interprets its Great Power status more from a frame of ‘loss’ and therefore is inclined to adopt a sterner approach to signal its status. Although their policies complement each other on many occasions, there is nothing akin to a Sino–Russian ‘bloc’.




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Webinar: Implications of the COVID-19 Pandemic for African Economies and Development

Research Event

21 April 2020 - 4:30pm to 5:30pm

Event participants

Dr Hafez Ghanem, Vice President for Africa, World Bank
Chair: Elizabeth Donnelly, Deputy Director, Africa Programme, Chatham House

Dr Hafez Ghanem discusses the implications of the COVID-19 pandemic for African economies and their development and poverty reduction efforts, and assesses the priorities and obstacles for establishing a comprehensive response to the crisis.
 
While the acute strain placed on health systems by the COVID-19 pandemic is already in evidence, the long-term economic fallout from the crisis is yet to fully manifest.
 
For Africa it is the economic impact that may leave the most enduring legacy: from the direct expense of measures to treat, detect and reduce the spread of the virus; to the indirect costs of domestic lockdown measures, global supply chain disruptions and plummeting commodity prices.
 
As decision-makers globally start to plan for the scale of this economic shock, strategizing in and on Africa to meet the challenge will require unprecedented planning and commitment - and will need to be matched by support from international partners to enable long-term recovery.
 

Hanna Desta

Programme Assistant, Africa Programme




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Webinar: Implications of the COVID-19 Pandemic for Food Security and Resilience in Africa

Research Event

23 April 2020 - 1:00pm to 2:00pm

Event participants

Dr Arif Husain, Chief Economist and Director of Research, Assessment and Monitoring, United Nations World Food Programme
Respondent: Dr Leena Koni Hoffmann, Associate Fellow, Africa Programme, Chatham House
Chair: Professor Tim Benton, Research Director, Emerging Risks; Director, Energy, Environment and Resources Programme, Chatham House
Dr Arif Husain gives his assessment of the potential impact that the COVID-19 pandemic will have on food security in Africa and what can be done to prevent a food security emergency.
 
Linked to the immediate public health consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic are those of economic and food security, particularly significant for low- and middle-income countries. Currently more than 821 million people globally go hungry, with 100 million of those suffering acute hunger, and this will worsen if the evolving economic emergency becomes a food security emergency.
 
Sub-Saharan African countries rely on trade for food security and for revenue; they imported more than 40 million tons of cereal from around the world in 2018, according to the World Food Programme (WFP). The region faces stark new challenges due to the pandemic.

This event launches the WFP paper COVID-19: Potential impact on the world’s poorest people.

Department/project

Hanna Desta

Programme Assistant, Africa Programme




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Webinar: Idlib at Risk – Doctors and First Responders in Northwest Syria

Members Event Webinar

23 April 2020 - 5:00pm to 6:00pm

Online

Event participants

Dr Munzer al-Khalil, Head, Idlib Health Directorate
Raed Al Saleh, Director, Syria Civil Defence (The White Helmets)
Alaa Rajaa Mughrabieh, Child Protection Officer, Hurras Network
Chair: Dr Lina Khatib, Director, Middle East and North Africa Programme, Chatham House

 

In Syria, uncertainty about the safety of the ceasefire agreed between Russia and Turkey last month is inhibiting 1 million people who have been displaced since December 2019 from returning home.

The looming COVID-19 global health crisis threatens to further devastate those most vulnerable as the conditions in northwest Syria’s refugee camps make it hard to practice common social distancing guidelines. Added to this, the medical infrastructure in the region has been decimated after years of bombings which has disabled over 70 health facilities since April 2019.

This webinar highlights the potentially catastrophic risks of a coronavirus outbreak in Idlib and displacement camps in northwest Syria by speaking with medical and civil society actors working in the region. How are doctors and local humanitarian organizations scaling up their medical and prevention response to the COVID-19 outbreak?

What key supplies such as ventilators, testing kits and critical sanitary equipment are still lacking? And how can the international community step in to help mitigate the potentially devastating consequences of an outbreak in these refugee camps?

This event is run in collaboration with The Syria Campaign, a human rights organization working with Syrian civil society to raise the voices of those struggling for democracy, and support frontline activists and humanitarians.