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Episode 32: Pacific Rim


  • Pacific Rim Review
  • World War Z mini-review
  • What We Watched: The Lone Ranger, Breaking Bad, Mad Men, Celeste and Jesse Forever, Despicable Me 2, Ruby Sparks, Melancholia, Do The Right Thing, ESPN 30 for 30: Broke, etc.


Next Episode: The Conjuring




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Episode 33: Upstream Color/The Kings of Summer/Blackfish


  • Upstream Color review
  • The Kings of Summer review
  • Blackfish review
  • What We Watched: Fruitvale Station, At World's End, The Spectacular Now, Elysium, Only God Forgives, and The ABCs of Death
  • Grand Theft Auto 5 talk





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Episode 34: Gravity


  • Gravity Review
  • What We Watched: Room 237, The American Scream, Bless Me Ultima, Ernest Scared Stupid, The Conjuring, V/H/S 2, H. H. Holmes: America's First Serial Killer & Attack on Titan.
  • Gravity Spoiler Discussion (after the outro music). 





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Episode 35: 12 Years A Slave


  • 12 Years A Slave Review
  • What We Watched: Seduced and Abandoned, Bad Granpda, Grave Encounters, Carrie, Oliver Stone's Untold History of the United States, Adventure Time, Chopping Mall, Frenzy, The Halloween Tree, Sisters, Altered States, Sleepaway Camp, American Mary, Friday the 13th IV: The Final Chapter, Cannibal Holocaust, Prince of Darkness & The Fog. 






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Episode 38: Oldboy/Frozen

  • Oldboy Review
  • Frozen Review
  • What We Watched: Fargo, Homefront, Gravity
  • The Walking Dead Mid-Season Spoiler Discussion
  • Oldboy Spoiler Discussion
  • Thor: The Dark World Acid-Indused Hypothesizing 






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Episode 39: American Hustle/The Hobbit 2/Anchorman 2/Out of the Furnace

  • American Hustle
  • The Hobbit: The Desolation of Smaug
  • Anchorman 2: The Legend Continues
  • Out of the Furnace
  • 2014 Bucket List Films
  • What We Watched: Bully, Prisoners, Powwow Highway, Miss Representation, The Spectacular Now, Knuckle, Shut Up And Play The Hits, Mike Birbiglia: My Girlfriend's Boyfriend and The Act of Killing. 


Next Episode: Martin Scorcese's The Wolf of Wall Street and Spike Jonze's Her. 




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Towards an Outcome-Oriented Food and Agricultural Aid and Development System

Invitation Only Research Event

21 May 2019 - 9:00am to 24 May 2019 - 5:00pm

The Rockefeller Foundation, Bellagio Center, Italy

Chatham House, in partnership with the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM), convened leading experts and key stakeholders to consider how the system of global institutions that provide aid and finance, global public goods and technical assistance to low-income countries can be better aligned to support the realization of SDG 2 in the context of those countries’ own efforts with a focus on SDGs 2.3 and 2.4.

This meeting aimed to contribute to an outcome-oriented food and agricultural aid development system; create greater understanding of the comparative advantages of key institutions, areas of duplication or inefficiency and gaps; identify topics for further research and analysis; and identify key near-term political moments to focus the community and catalyze steps towards change.

Event attributes

Chatham House Rule

Department/project

Alexandra Squires McCarthy

Programme Coordinator, Global Health Programme
+44 (0)207 314 2789




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The NHS Is Not for Sale – But a US–UK Trade Deal Could Still Have an Impact

29 November 2019

Dr Charles Clift

Senior Consulting Fellow, Global Health Programme
Charles Clift examines what recently leaked documents mean – and do not mean – for healthcare in transatlantic trade negotiations.

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Kings College Hospital in London. Photo: Getty Images.

The leaked record of the five meetings of the UK–US Trade & Investment Working Group held in 2017–18 has led to a controversy in the UK election campaign around the claim that ‘the NHS is up for sale’.

But a careful reading of the leaked documents reveals how remarkably little concerns the NHS – in five meetings over 16 months, the NHS is mentioned just four times. The patent regime and how it affects medicines is discussed in more depth but largely in terms of the participants trying to understand each other’s systems and perspectives. For the most part, the discussions were overwhelmingly about everything else a trade deal would cover other than healthcare – matters such as subsidies, rules of origin and customs facilitation.

But this does not mean there will be no impact on Britain’s health service. There are three main concerns about the possible implications of a US–UK trade deal after Brexit – a negotiation that will of course only take place if the UK remains outside the EU customs union and single market and also does not reach a trade agreement with the EU that proves incompatible with US negotiating objectives.

One concern is that the US aim of securing ‘full market access for US products’, expressed in the US negotiating objectives, will affect the ability of NICE (The National Institute for Health and Care Excellence) to prevent the NHS from procuring products that are deemed too expensive in relation to their benefits. It could also affect the ability of the NHS to negotiate with companies to secure price reductions as, for instance, happened recently with Orkambi, a cystic fibrosis drug.

A peculiarity of the main US government healthcare programme (Medicare) is that it has historically not negotiated drug prices, although there are several bills now before Congress aiming to change that. US refusal to negotiate or control prices is one reason that US drug prices are the highest in the world.  

A second concern is that the US objective of securing ‘intellectual property rights that reflect a standard of protection similar to that found in US law’ will result in longer patent terms and other forms of exclusivity that will increase the prices the NHS will have to pay for drugs.

However, it is not immediately apparent that UK standards are significantly different from those in the US – the institutional arrangements differ but the levels of protection offered are broadly comparable. Recent publicity about a potential extra NHS medicine bill of £27 billion resulting from a trade deal is based on the NHS having to pay US prices on all drugs – which seems an unlikely outcome unless the UK contingent are extraordinarily bad negotiators.

Nevertheless, in an analysis section (marked for internal distribution only), the UK lead negotiator noted: ‘The impact of some patent issues raised on NHS access to generic drugs (i.e. cheaper drugs) will be a key consideration going forward.’

A third concern is that the US objective of providing ‘fair and open conditions for services trade’ and other US negotiating objectives will oblige the UK to open up the NHS to American healthcare companies.

This is where it gets complicated. At one point in a discussion on state-owned enterprises (SOEs) the US asked if the UK had concerns about their ‘health insurance system’ (presumably a reference to the NHS). The UK response was that it ‘wouldn’t want to discuss particular health care entities at this time, you’ll be aware of certain statements saying we need to protect our needs; this would be something to discuss further down the line…’

On this exchange the UK lead negotiator commented:  ‘We do not currently believe the US has a major offensive interest in this space – not through the SOE chapter at least. Our response dealt with this for now, but we will need to be able to go into more detail about the functioning of the NHS and our views on whether or not it is engaged in commercial activities…’

On the face of it, these documents provide no basis for saying the NHS would be for sale – whatever that means exactly. The talks were simply an exploratory investigation between officials on both sides in advance of possible negotiations.

But it is a fact that US positions in free trade agreements are heavily influenced by corporate interests. Their participation in framing agreements is institutionalized in the US system and the pharmaceutical and healthcare industries in the US spend, by a large margin, more on lobbying the government than any other sector does. Moreover, President Donald Trump has long complained about ‘the global freeloading that forces American consumers to subsidize lower prices in foreign countries through higher prices in our country’.

It is when (and if) the actual negotiations on a trade deal get under way that the real test will come as the political profile and temperature is raised on both sides of the Atlantic.




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Professor Robyn Alders, AO

Senior Consulting Fellow, Global Health Programme

Biography

Robyn Alders is a senior consulting fellow with the Chatham House Global Health programme focusing on policy opportunities to support sustainable livestock strategy implementation and sustainable food and nutrition security through a One Health lens.

Robyn is also an honorary professor with the Development Policy Centre within the Australian National University, an adjunct professor in the Department of Infectious Disease and Global Health, School of Veterinary Medicine, Tufts University, and chair of the Kyeema Foundation and Upper Lachlan Branch of the NSW Farmers’ Association. 

For more than 30 years, she has worked closely with family farmers in sub-Saharan Africa, South East Asia and Australia and as a veterinarian, researcher and colleague, with an emphasis on the development of sustainable infectious disease control in animals in rural areas in support of food and nutrition security and systems.

Areas of expertise

  • Domestic and global food and nutrition security/systems
  • Health security
  • One/Planetary Health
  • Gender equity
  • Science communication 

Past experience

2019 - presentHonorary professor, Development Policy Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, Australia
2012-18Professor of food and nutrition security, Faculty of Veterinary Science, University of Sydney, Australia

 




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Nina van der Mark

Research Analyst, Global Health Programme

Biography

Nina works on universal health coverage (UHC) and health system reforms. Her research is primarily focused on the political economy of UHC and accelerating health system reforms in low-and-middle income countries.

Previously, Nina worked as an international development professional, focused on health financing and advocacy in the fields of sexual and reproductive health and rights, youth participation and maternal and child health. Nina has experience working in Ethiopia and Nigeria. She has also worked for the private sector as a healthcare technology research consultant for Southeast Asia.

She has a broad-based interest in global health, including the influence of demographic changes on population health outcomes, innovative health financing mechanisms and improving research uptake into health policy.

She has a multidisciplinary background and holds a Msc in Population and Development at The London School of Economics (LSE) and a BA in Liberal Arts and Sciences, focused on international relations, international law and China studies at University College Utrecht. 




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The Hurdles to Developing a COVID-19 Vaccine: Why International Cooperation is Needed

23 April 2020

Professor David Salisbury CB

Associate Fellow, Global Health Programme

Dr Champa Patel

Director, Asia-Pacific Programme
While the world pins its hopes on vaccines to prevent COVID-19, there are scientific, regulatory and market hurdles to overcome. Furthermore, with geopolitical tensions and nationalistic approaches, there is a high risk that the most vulnerable will not get the life-saving interventions they need.

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A biologist works on the virus inactivation process in Belo Horizonte, Brazil on 24 March 2020. The Brazilian Ministry of Health convened The Technological Vaccine Center to conduct research on COVID-19 in order to diagnose, test and develop a vaccine. Photo: Getty Images.

On 10 January 2020, Chinese scientists released the sequence of the COVID-19 genome on the internet. This provided the starting gun for scientists around the world to start developing vaccines or therapies. With at least 80 different vaccines in development, many governments are pinning their hopes on a quick solution. However, there are many hurdles to overcome. 

Vaccine development

Firstly, vaccine development is normally a very long process to ensure vaccines are safe and effective before they are used. 

Safety is not a given: a recent dengue vaccine caused heightened disease in vaccinated children when they later were exposed to dengue, while Respiratory Syncytial Virus vaccine caused the same problem. Nor is effectiveness a given. Candidate vaccines that use novel techniques where minute fragments of the viruses’ genetic code are either injected directly into humans or incorporated into a vaccine (as is being pursued, or could be pursued for COVID-19) have higher risks of failure simply because they haven’t worked before. For some vaccines, we know what levels of immunity post-vaccination are likely to be protective. This is not the case for coronavirus. 

Clinical trials will have to be done for efficacy. This is not optional – regulators will need to know extensive testing has taken place before licencing any vaccine. Even if animal tests are done in parallel with early human tests, the remainder of the process is still lengthy. 

There is also great interest in the use of passive immunization, whereby antibodies to SARS-CoV-2 (collected from people who have recovered from infection or laboratory-created) are given to people who are currently ill. Antivirals may prove to be a quicker route than vaccine development, as the testing requirements would be shorter, manufacturing may be easier and only ill people would need to be treated, as opposed to all at-risk individuals being vaccinated.

Vaccine manufacturing

Developers, especially small biotechs, will have to make partnerships with large vaccine manufacturers in order to bring products to market. One notorious bottleneck in vaccine development is getting from proof-of-principle to commercial development: about 95 per cent of vaccines fail at this step. Another bottleneck is at the end of production. The final stages of vaccine production involve detailed testing to ensure that the vaccine meets the necessary criteria and there are always constraints on access to the technologies necessary to finalize the product. Only large vaccine manufacturers have these capacities. There is a graveyard of failed vaccine candidates that have not managed to pass through this development and manufacturing process.

Another consideration is adverse or unintended consequences. Highly specialized scientists may have to defer their work on other new vaccines to work on COVID-19 products and production of existing products may have to be set aside, raising the possibility of shortages of other essential vaccines. 

Cost is another challenge. Vaccines for industrialized markets can be very lucrative for pharmaceutical companies, but many countries have price caps on vaccines. Important lessons have been learned from the 2009 H1N1 flu pandemic when industrialized countries took all the vaccines first. Supplies were made available to lower-income countries at a lower price but this was much later in the evolution of the pandemic. For the recent Ebola outbreaks, vaccines were made available at low or no cost. 

Geopolitics may also play a role. Should countries that manufacture a vaccine share it widely with other countries or prioritize their own populations first? It has been reported that President Trump attempted to purchase CureVac, a German company with a candidate vaccine.  There are certainly precedents for countries prioritizing their own populations. With H1N1 flu in 2009, the Australian Government required a vaccine company to meet the needs of the Australian population first. 

Vaccine distribution

Global leadership and a coordinated and coherent response will be needed to ensure that any vaccine is distributed equitably. There have been recent calls for a G20 on health, but existing global bodies such as the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI) and GAVI are working on vaccines and worldwide access to them. Any new bodies should seek to boost funding for these entities so they can ensure products reach the most disadvantaged. 

While countries that cannot afford vaccines may be priced out of markets, access for poor, vulnerable or marginalized peoples, whether in developed or developing countries, is of concern. Developing countries are at particular risk from the impacts of COVID-19. People living in conflict-affected and fragile states – whether they are refugees or asylum seekers, internally displaced or stateless, or in detention facilities – are at especially high risk of devastating impacts. 

Mature economies will also face challenges. Equitable access to COVID-19 vaccine will be challenging where inequalities and unequal access to essential services have been compromised within some political systems. 

The need for global leadership 

There is an urgent need for international coordination on COVID-19 vaccines. While the WHO provides technical support and UNICEF acts as a procurement agency, responding to coronavirus needs clarity of global leadership that arches over national interests and is capable of mobilizing resources at a time when economies are facing painful recessions. We see vaccines as a salvation but remain ill-equipped to accelerate their development.

While everyone hopes for rapid availability of safe, effective and affordable vaccines that will be produced in sufficient quantities to meet everyone’s needs, realistically, we face huge hurdles. 




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Coronavirus: Public Health Emergency or Pandemic – Does Timing Matter?

1 May 2020

Dr Charles Clift

Senior Consulting Fellow, Global Health Programme
The World Health Organization (WHO) has been criticized for delaying its announcements of a public health emergency and a pandemic for COVID-19. But could earlier action have influenced the course of events?

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WHO director-general Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus at the COVID-19 press briefing on March 11, 2020, the day the coronavirus outbreak was classed as a pandemic. Photo by FABRICE COFFRINI/AFP via Getty Images.

The World Health Organization (WHO) declared the spread of COVID-19 to be a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) on January 30 this year and then characterized it as a pandemic on March 11.

Declaring a PHEIC is the highest level of alert that WHO is obliged to declare, and is meant to send a powerful signal to countries of the need for urgent action to combat the spread of the disease, mobilize resources to help low- and middle-income countries in this effort and fund research and development on needed treatments, vaccines and diagnostics. It also obligates countries to share information with WHO.

Once the PHEIC was declared, the virus continued to spread globally, and WHO began to be asked why it had not yet declared the disease a pandemic. But there is no widely accepted definition of a pandemic, generally it is just considered an epidemic which affects many countries globally.

Potentially more deadly

The term has hitherto been applied almost exclusively to new forms of flu, such as H1N1 in 2009 or Spanish flu in 1918, where the lack of population immunity and absence of a vaccine or effective treatments makes the outbreak potentially much more deadly than seasonal flu (which, although global, is not considered a pandemic).

For COVID-19, WHO seemed reluctant to declare a pandemic despite the evidence of global spread. Partly this was because of its influenza origins — WHO’s emergency programme executive director said on March 9 that ‘if this was influenza, we would have called a pandemic ages ago’.

He also expressed concern that the word traditionally meant moving — once there was widespread transmission — from trying to contain the disease by testing, isolating the sick and tracing and quarantining their contacts, to a mitigation approach, implying ‘the disease will spread uncontrolled’.

WHO’s worry was that the world’s reaction to the word pandemic might be there was now nothing to be done to stop its spread, and so countries would effectively give up trying. WHO wanted to send the message that, unlike flu, it could still be pushed back and the spread slowed down.

In announcing the pandemic two days later, WHO’s director-general Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus reemphasised this point: ‘We cannot say this loudly enough, or clearly enough, or often enough: all countries can still change the course of this pandemic’ and that WHO was deeply concerned ‘by the alarming levels of inaction’.

The evidence suggests that the correct message did in fact get through. On March 13, US president Donald Trump declared a national emergency, referring in passing to WHO’s announcement. On March 12, the UK launched its own strategy to combat the disease. And in the week following WHO’s announcements, at least 16 other countries announced lockdowns of varying rigour including Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Serbia, Spain and Switzerland. Italy and Greece had both already instituted lockdowns prior to the WHO pandemic announcement.

It is not possible to say for sure that WHO’s announcement precipitated these measures because, by then, the evidence of the rapid spread was all around for governments to see. It may be that Italy’s dramatic nationwide lockdown on March 9 reverberated around European capitals and elsewhere.

But it is difficult to believe the announcement did not have an effect in stimulating government actions, as was intended by Dr Tedros. Considering the speed with which the virus was spreading from late February, might an earlier pandemic announcement by WHO have stimulated earlier aggressive actions by governments?

Declaring a global health emergency — when appropriate — is a key part of WHO’s role in administering the International Health Regulations (IHR). Significantly, negotiations on revisions to the IHR, which had been ongoing in a desultory fashion in WHO since 1995, were accelerated by the experience of the first serious coronavirus outbreak — SARS — in 2002-2003, leading to their final agreement in 2005.

Under the IHR, WHO’s director-general decides whether to declare an emergency based on a set of criteria and on the advice of an emergency committee. IHR defines an emergency as an ‘extraordinary event that constitutes a public health risk through the international spread of disease and potentially requires a coordinated international response’.

In the case of COVID-19, the committee first met on January 22-23 but were unable to reach consensus on a declaration. Following the director-general’s trip to meet President Xi Jinping in Beijing, the committee reconvened on January 30 and this time advised declaring a PHEIC.

But admittedly, public recognition of what a PHEIC means is extremely low. Only six have ever been declared, with the first being the H1N1 flu outbreak which fizzled out quickly, despite possibly causing 280,000 deaths globally. During the H1N1 outbreak, WHO declared a PHEIC in April 2009 and then a pandemic in June, only to rescind both in August as the outbreak was judged to have transitioned to behave like a seasonal flu.

WHO was criticized afterwards for prematurely declaring a PHEIC and overreacting. This then may have impacted the delay in declaring the Ebola outbreak in West Africa as a PHEIC in 2014, long after it became a major crisis. WHO’s former legal counsel has suggested the PHEIC — and other aspects of the IHR framework — may not be effective in stimulating appropriate actions by governments and needs to be reconsidered.

When the time is right to evaluate lessons about the response, it might be appropriate to consider the relative effectiveness of the PHEIC and pandemic announcements and their optimal timing in stimulating appropriate action by governments. The effectiveness of lockdowns in reducing the overall death toll also needs investigation.




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Schnyder corneal dystrophy-associated UBIAD1 is defective in MK-4 synthesis and resists autophagy-mediated degradation [Research Articles]

The autosomal dominant disorder Schnyder corneal dystrophy (SCD) is caused by mutations in UbiA prenyltransferase domain-containing protein-1 (UBIAD1), which uses geranylgeranyl pyrophosphate (GGpp) to synthesize the vitamin K2 subtype menaquinone-4 (MK-4). SCD is characterized by opacification of the cornea, owing to aberrant build-up of cholesterol in the tissue. We previously discovered that sterols stimulate association of UBIAD1 with ER-localized HMG-CoA reductase, which catalyzes a rate-limiting step in the synthesis of cholesterol and nonsterol isoprenoids, including GGpp. Binding to UBIAD1 inhibits sterol-accelerated ER-associated degradation (ERAD) of reductase and permits continued synthesis of GGpp in cholesterol-replete cells. GGpp disrupts UBIAD1-reductase binding and thereby allows for maximal ERAD of reductase as well as ER-to-Golgi translocation of UBIAD1. SCD-associated UBIAD1 is refractory to GGpp-mediated dissociation from reductase and remains sequestered in the ER to inhibit ERAD. Here, we report development of a biochemical assay for UBIAD1-mediated synthesis of MK-4 in isolated membranes and intact cells. Using this assay, we compared enzymatic activity of WT UBIAD1 with that of SCD-associated variants. Our studies revealed that SCD-associated UBIAD1 exhibited reduced MK-4 synthetic activity, which may result from its reduced affinity for GGpp. Sequestration in the ER protects SCD-associated UBIAD1 from autophagy and allows intracellular accumulation of the mutant protein, which amplifies the inhibitory effect on reductase ERAD. These findings have important implications not only for the understanding of SCD etiology but also for the efficacy of cholesterol-lowering statin therapy, which becomes limited, in part, because of UBIAD1-mediated inhibition of reductase ERAD.




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Myeloid-specific deficiency of pregnane X receptor decreases atherosclerosis in LDL receptor-deficient mice [Research Articles]

The pregnane X receptor (PXR) is a nuclear receptor that can be activated by numerous drugs and xenobiotic chemicals. PXR thereby functions as a xenobiotic sensor to coordinately regulate host responses to xenobiotics by transcriptionally regulating many genes involved in xenobiotic metabolism. We have previously reported that PXR has pro-atherogenic effects in animal models, but how PXR contributes to atherosclerosis development in different tissues or cell types remains elusive. In this study, we generated an LDL receptor-deficient mouse model with myeloid-specific PXR deficiency (PXRMyeLDLR–/–) to elucidate the role of macrophage PXR signaling in atherogenesis. The myeloid PXR deficiency did not affect metabolic phenotypes and plasma lipid profiles, but PXRMyeLDLR–/– mice had significantly decreased atherosclerosis at both aortic root and brachiocephalic arteries compared with control littermates. Interestingly, the PXR deletion did not affect macrophage adhesion and migration properties, but reduced lipid accumulation and foam cell formation in the macrophages. PXR deficiency also led to decreased expression of the scavenger receptor CD36 and impaired lipid uptake in macrophages of the PXRMyeLDLR–/– mice. Further, RNA-Seq analysis indicated that treatment with a prototypical PXR ligand affects the expression of many atherosclerosis-related genes in macrophages in vitro. These findings reveal a pivotal role of myeloid PXR signaling in atherosclerosis development and suggest that PXR may be a potential therapeutic target in atherosclerosis management.




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Lipid rafts and neurodegeneration: structural and functional roles in physiologic aging and neurodegenerative diseases [Thematic Reviews]

Lipid rafts are small, dynamic membrane areas characterized by the clustering of selected membrane lipids as the result of the spontaneous separation of glycolipids, sphingolipids, and cholesterol in a liquid-ordered phase. The exact dynamics underlying phase separation of membrane lipids in the complex biological membranes are still not fully understood. Nevertheless, alterations in the membrane lipid composition affect the lateral organization of molecules belonging to lipid rafts. Neural lipid rafts are found in brain cells, including neurons, astrocytes, and microglia, and are characterized by a high enrichment of specific lipids depending on the cell type. These lipid rafts seem to organize and determine the function of multiprotein complexes involved in several aspects of signal transduction, thus regulating the homeostasis of the brain. The progressive decline of brain performance along with physiological aging is at least in part associated with alterations in the composition and structure of neural lipid rafts. In addition, neurodegenerative conditions, such as lysosomal storage disorders, multiple sclerosis, and Parkinson’s, Huntington’s, and Alzheimer’s diseases, are frequently characterized by dysregulated lipid metabolism, which in turn affects the structure of lipid rafts. Several events underlying the pathogenesis of these diseases appear to depend on the altered composition of lipid rafts. Thus, the structure and function of lipid rafts play a central role in the pathogenesis of many common neurodegenerative diseases.




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Lipid rafts as signaling hubs in cancer cell survival/death and invasion: implications in tumor progression and therapy [Thematic Reviews]

Cholesterol/sphingolipid-rich membrane domains, known as lipid rafts or membrane rafts, play a critical role in the compartmentalization of signaling pathways. Physical segregation of proteins in lipid rafts may modulate the accessibility of proteins to regulatory or effector molecules. Thus, lipid rafts serve as sorting platforms and hubs for signal transduction proteins. Cancer cells contain higher levels of intracellular cholesterol and lipid rafts than their normal non-tumorigenic counterparts. Many signal transduction processes involved in cancer development (insulin-like growth factor system and phosphatidylinositol 3-kinase-AKT) and metastasis [cluster of differentiation (CD)44] are dependent on or modulated by lipid rafts. Additional proteins playing an important role in several malignant cancers (e.g., transmembrane glycoprotein mucin 1) are also being detected in association with lipid rafts, suggesting a major role of lipid rafts in tumor progression. Conversely, lipid rafts also serve as scaffolds for the recruitment and clustering of Fas/CD95 death receptors and downstream signaling molecules leading to cell death-promoting raft platforms. The partition of death receptors and downstream signaling molecules in aggregated lipid rafts has led to the formation of the so-called cluster of apoptotic signaling molecule-enriched rafts, or CASMER, which leads to apoptosis amplification and can be pharmacologically modulated. These death-promoting rafts can be viewed as a linchpin from which apoptotic signals are launched. In this review, we discuss the involvement of lipid rafts in major signaling processes in cancer cells, including cell survival, cell death, and metastasis, and we consider the potential of lipid raft modulation as a promising target in cancer therapy.




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Lipid rafts and pathogens: the art of deception and exploitation [Thematic Reviews]

Lipid rafts, solid regions of the plasma membrane enriched in cholesterol and glycosphingolipids, are essential parts of a cell. Functionally, lipid rafts present a platform that facilitates interaction of cells with the outside world. However, the unique properties of lipid rafts required to fulfill this function at the same time make them susceptible to exploitation by pathogens. Many steps of pathogen interaction with host cells, and sometimes all steps within the entire lifecycle of various pathogens, rely on host lipid rafts. Such steps as binding of pathogens to the host cells, invasion of intracellular parasites into the cell, the intracellular dwelling of parasites, microbial assembly and exit from the host cell, and microbe transfer from one cell to another all involve lipid rafts. Interaction also includes modification of lipid rafts in host cells, inflicted by pathogens from both inside and outside the cell, through contact or remotely, to advance pathogen replication, to utilize cellular resources, and/or to mitigate immune response. Here, we provide a systematic overview of how and why pathogens interact with and exploit host lipid rafts, as well as the consequences of this interaction for the host, locally and systemically, and for the microbe. We also raise the possibility of modulation of lipid rafts as a therapeutic approach against a variety of infectious agents.















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X-ray structures of catalytic intermediates of cytochrome c oxidase provide insights into its O2 activation and unidirectional proton-pump mechanisms [Molecular Biophysics]

Cytochrome c oxidase (CcO) reduces O2 to water, coupled with a proton-pumping process. The structure of the O2-reduction site of CcO contains two reducing equivalents, Fea32+ and CuB1+, and suggests that a peroxide-bound state (Fea33+–O−–O−–CuB2+) rather than an O2-bound state (Fea32+–O2) is the initial catalytic intermediate. Unexpectedly, however, resonance Raman spectroscopy results have shown that the initial intermediate is Fea32+–O2, whereas Fea33+–O−–O−–CuB2+ is undetectable. Based on X-ray structures of static noncatalytic CcO forms and mutation analyses for bovine CcO, a proton-pumping mechanism has been proposed. It involves a proton-conducting pathway (the H-pathway) comprising a tandem hydrogen-bond network and a water channel located between the N- and P-side surfaces. However, a system for unidirectional proton-transport has not been experimentally identified. Here, an essentially identical X-ray structure for the two catalytic intermediates (P and F) of bovine CcO was determined at 1.8 Å resolution. A 1.70 Å Fe–O distance of the ferryl center could best be described as Fea34+ = O2−, not as Fea34+–OH−. The distance suggests an ∼800-cm−1 Raman stretching band. We found an interstitial water molecule that could trigger a rapid proton-coupled electron transfer from tyrosine-OH to the slowly forming Fea33+–O−–O−–CuB2+ state, preventing its detection, consistent with the unexpected Raman results. The H-pathway structures of both intermediates indicated that during proton-pumping from the hydrogen-bond network to the P-side, a transmembrane helix closes the water channel connecting the N-side with the hydrogen-bond network, facilitating unidirectional proton-pumping during the P-to-F transition.




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The short variant of optic atrophy 1 (OPA1) improves cell survival under oxidative stress [Bioenergetics]

Optic atrophy 1 (OPA1) is a dynamin protein that mediates mitochondrial fusion at the inner membrane. OPA1 is also necessary for maintaining the cristae and thus essential for supporting cellular energetics. OPA1 exists as membrane-anchored long form (L-OPA1) and short form (S-OPA1) that lacks the transmembrane region and is generated by cleavage of L-OPA1. Mitochondrial dysfunction and cellular stresses activate the inner membrane–associated zinc metallopeptidase OMA1 that cleaves L-OPA1, causing S-OPA1 accumulation. The prevailing notion has been that L-OPA1 is the functional form, whereas S-OPA1 is an inactive cleavage product in mammals, and that stress-induced OPA1 cleavage causes mitochondrial fragmentation and sensitizes cells to death. However, S-OPA1 contains all functional domains of dynamin proteins, suggesting that it has a physiological role. Indeed, we recently demonstrated that S-OPA1 can maintain cristae and energetics through its GTPase activity, despite lacking fusion activity. Here, applying oxidant insult that induces OPA1 cleavage, we show that cells unable to generate S-OPA1 are more sensitive to this stress under obligatory respiratory conditions, leading to necrotic death. These findings indicate that L-OPA1 and S-OPA1 differ in maintaining mitochondrial function. Mechanistically, we found that cells that exclusively express L-OPA1 generate more superoxide and are more sensitive to Ca2+-induced mitochondrial permeability transition, suggesting that S-OPA1, and not L-OPA1, protects against cellular stress. Importantly, silencing of OMA1 expression increased oxidant-induced cell death, indicating that stress-induced OPA1 cleavage supports cell survival. Our findings suggest that S-OPA1 generation by OPA1 cleavage is a survival mechanism in stressed cells.




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The finiteness of the spectrum of boundary value problems defined on a geometric graph

V. A. Sadovnichii, Ya. T. Sultanaev and A. M. Akhtyamov
Trans. Moscow Math. Soc. 80 (2020), 123-131.
Abstract, references and article information




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On the solvability of a class of nonlinear integral equations in the problem of a spread of an epidemic

A. G. Sergeev and Kh. A. Khachatryan
Trans. Moscow Math. Soc. 80 (2020), 95-111.
Abstract, references and article information





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Terapia inédita reverte leucemia incurável em bebê de 1 ano

Tratamento genético foi testado em Layla Richards que estava desenganada pelos médicos. Especialistas ressaltam que os resultados são iniciais e podem não ocorrer em outros pacientes.

The post Terapia inédita reverte leucemia incurável em bebê de 1 ano appeared first on Saúde Próspera.



  • Dicas de Saúde

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Teste de sangue para detectar Alzheimer está próximo da realidade

Exame poderá detectar a doença na fase inicial. Pesquisadores da Faculdade de Medicina Osteopática da Universidade de Rowan, nos Estados Unidos, afirmam que estão perto de desenvolver um exame de sangue para detectar Alzheimer com precisão, o que dar...

The post Teste de sangue para detectar Alzheimer está próximo da realidade appeared first on Saúde Próspera.



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Unha encravada: Como evitar e desencravar

Unha encravada: quem teve jamais quer repetir a experiência. Os que nunca passaram pela situação, tremem com a ideia de sentir aquela dor de que só ouvem sobre nos relatos.

The post Unha encravada: Como evitar e desencravar appeared first on Saúde Próspera.



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Com que roupa eu vou? Dicas de qual roupa usar

Com que roupa eu vou? Todos os dias nós, mulheres, enfrentamos o dilema de decidir o que vestir. Veja algumas dicas para lhe ajudar a escolher qual roupa usar… A…

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  • Dicas de Saúde

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Cirurgia Plástica não tem idade

A cirurgia plástica é a área da medicina responsável pela reparação dos defeitos estéticos. Os problemas estéticos podem ser congênitos, ou seja, que já estão presentes no nascimento ou adquiridos…

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What happens to a fund that is listed pursuant to a product specific rule filing once the fund is eligible to operate under Rule 6c-11 and elects to list on Nasdaq under Rule 5704?

Publication Date: Apr 10 2020 The SEC will withdraw the existing approval order and the fund will become subject to the requirements of Rule 6c-11 and Nasdaq Rule 5704....




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Do all the funds operating under an existing exemptive order have to transition to operating under Rule 6c-11 and Nasdaq Rule 5704 at the same time?

Publication Date: Apr 10 2020 Yes. According to the SEC, once an ETF becomes eligible to operate under Rule 6c-11 and elects to list on Nasdaq under Nasdaq Rule 5704, the existing order related to that fund (and all other funds under that exemptive order) will be rescinded. Once a fund is listed under Nasdaq Rule 5704, it will not be able to relist under Nasdaq Rule 5705(b) (Index Fund Shares) or Nasdaq Rule 5735 (Managed Fund Shares) unless a new exemptive relief order is obtained from the SEC....




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What will an ETF listed under Nasdaq Rule 5704 need to submit to Nasdaq to evidence compliance with the continued listing standards?

Publication Date: Apr 10 2020 Funds listed under Nasdaq Rule 5704 are required to submit an annual certification regarding the funds compliance with Rule 6c-11 during the most recent fiscal year. The certification is required within 30 calendar days of a fund’s fiscal year end. The certification can be found here....




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What types of ETFs are eligible to be listed under Nasdaq Rule 5704?

Publication Date: Apr 10 2020 ETFs that meet the definition of “Exchange Traded Fund” in Nasdaq Rule 5704(a)(1)(A) are eligible to be considered for listing pursuant to Nasdaq Rule 5704. ETFs that are excluded from operating pursuant to Rule 6c-11 under the Investment Company Act of 1940 are not eligible to list under Nasdaq Rule 5704....




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What documentation is required in connection with listing an ETF under Nasdaq Rule 5704?

Publication Date: Apr 10 2020 New Fund Launches In addition to completing the Listing Application, new funds are required to complete a certification prior to receiving approval of an initial listing application. The certification can be found here. Listing Transfers In addition to completing the Listing Application, funds switching from another market to Nasdaq are required to complete a certification regarding compliance with SEC Rule 6c-11. The certification must be completed prior to...




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How can a company rely on the COVID-19 exception to shareholder approval requirements?

Publication Date: May 4 2020 On May 1, 2020, Nasdaq adopted Rule 5636T, operative through, and including, June 30, 2020, to provide listed companies with a temporary exception from certain shareholder approval requirements. A Company must submit an application to Nasdaq’s Listing Qualifications Department demonstrating that the transaction satisfies the requirements in Rule 5636T and must provide the Notification Form: Listing of Additional Shares (“LAS Form”) required by...




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Understanding China’s Evolving Role in Global Economic Governance

Invitation Only Research Event

21 November 2019 - 4:00pm to 22 November 2019 - 5:00pm

The Hague, The Netherlands

Almost four years since it was established, the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) has approved 49 projects and proposed 28. The AIIB claims to be more efficient and less bureaucratic than traditional multilateral development banks (MDB’s) which has threatened the existing model of multilateral development finance. At the same time, China’s increased role in previously Western-led economic institutions, such as the WTO and IMF, has raised questions over the future of the international trade order. How will a rising China shape the international institutional order? Where are there opportunities for potential collaboration and what areas pose challenges? And how should other states and international organizations respond?

Attendance at this event is by invitation only. 

Lucy Ridout

Programme Administrator, Asia-Pacific Programme
+44 (0) 207 314 2761