16 September 2020

17 September 2020

Viral infection is one environmental factor that may contribute to the initiation of pancreatic β-cell destruction during the development of autoimmune diabetes. Picornaviruses, such as encephalomyocarditis virus (EMCV), induce a pro-inflammatory response in islets leading to local production of cytokines, such as IL-1, by resident islet leukocytes. Furthermore, IL-1 is known to stimulate β-cell expression of iNOS and production of the free radical nitric oxide. The purpose of this study was to determine whether nitric oxide contributes to the β-cell response to viral infection. We show that nitric oxide protects β-cells against virally mediated lysis by limiting EMCV replication. This protection requires low micromolar, or iNOS-derived, levels of nitric oxide. At these concentrations nitric oxide inhibits the Krebs enzyme aconitase and complex IV of the electron transport chain. Like nitric oxide, pharmacological inhibition of mitochondrial oxidative metabolism attenuates EMCV-mediated β-cell lysis by inhibiting viral replication. These findings provide novel evidence that cytokine signaling in β-cells functions to limit viral replication and subsequent β-cell lysis by attenuating mitochondrial oxidative metabolism in a nitric oxide–dependent manner.

In addition to their well-known role in the control of cellular proliferation and cancer, cell cycle regulators are increasingly identified as important metabolic modulators. Several GWAS have identified SNPs near CDKN2A, the locus encoding for p16INK4a (p16), associated with elevated risk for cardiovascular diseases and type-2 diabetes development, two pathologies associated with impaired hepatic lipid metabolism. Although p16 was recently shown to control hepatic glucose homeostasis, it is unknown whether p16 also controls hepatic lipid metabolism. Using a combination of in vivo and in vitro approaches, we found that p16 modulates fasting-induced hepatic fatty acid oxidation (FAO) and lipid droplet accumulation. In primary hepatocytes, p16-deficiency was associated with elevated expression of genes involved in fatty acid catabolism. These transcriptional changes led to increased FAO and were associated with enhanced activation of PPARα through a mechanism requiring the catalytic AMPKα2 subunit and SIRT1, two known activators of PPARα. By contrast, p16 overexpression was associated with triglyceride accumulation and increased lipid droplet numbers in vitro, and decreased ketogenesis and hepatic mitochondrial activity in vivo. Finally, gene expression analysis of liver samples from obese patients revealed a negative correlation between CDKN2A expression and PPARA and its target genes. Our findings demonstrate that p16 represses hepatic lipid catabolism during fasting and may thus participate in the preservation of metabolic flexibility.

Cellular energy demands are met by uptake and metabolism of nutrients like glucose. The principal transcriptional regulator for adapting glycolytic flux and downstream pathways like de novo lipogenesis to glucose availability in many cell types is carbohydrate response element–binding protein (ChREBP). ChREBP is activated by glucose metabolites and post-translational modifications, inducing nuclear accumulation and regulation of target genes. Here we report that ChREBP is modified by proline hydroxylation at several residues. Proline hydroxylation targets both ectopically expressed ChREBP in cells and endogenous ChREBP in mouse liver. Functionally, we found that specific hydroxylated prolines were dispensable for protein stability but required for the adequate activation of ChREBP upon exposure to high glucose. Accordingly, ChREBP target gene expression was rescued by re-expressing WT but not ChREBP that lacks hydroxylated prolines in ChREBP-deleted hepatocytes. Thus, proline hydroxylation of ChREBP is a novel post-translational modification that may allow for therapeutic interference in metabolic diseases.

The development of a chronic, low-grade inflammation originating from adipose tissue in obese subjects is widely recognized to induce insulin resistance, leading to the development of type 2 diabetes. The adipose tissue microenvironment drives specific metabolic reprogramming of adipose tissue macrophages, contributing to the induction of tissue inflammation. Uncoupling protein 2 (UCP2), a mitochondrial anion carrier, is thought to separately modulate inflammatory and metabolic processes in macrophages and is up-regulated in macrophages in the context of obesity and diabetes. Here, we investigate the role of UCP2 in macrophage activation in the context of obesity-induced adipose tissue inflammation and insulin resistance. Using a myeloid-specific knockout of UCP2 (Ucp2ΔLysM), we found that UCP2 deficiency significantly increases glycolysis and oxidative respiration, both unstimulated and after inflammatory conditions. Strikingly, fatty acid loading abolished the metabolic differences between Ucp2ΔLysM macrophages and their floxed controls. Furthermore, Ucp2ΔLysM macrophages show attenuated pro-inflammatory responses toward Toll-like receptor-2 and -4 stimulation. To test the relevance of macrophage-specific Ucp2 deletion in vivo, Ucp2ΔLysM and Ucp2fl/fl mice were rendered obese and insulin resistant through high-fat feeding. Although no differences in adipose tissue inflammation or insulin resistance was found between the two genotypes, adipose tissue macrophages isolated from diet-induced obese Ucp2ΔLysM mice showed decreased TNFα secretion after ex vivo lipopolysaccharide stimulation compared with their Ucp2fl/fl littermates. Together, these results demonstrate that although UCP2 regulates both metabolism and the inflammatory response of macrophages, its activity is not crucial in shaping macrophage activation in the adipose tissue during obesity-induced insulin resistance.

Cancer cachexia is characterized by reductions in peripheral lean muscle mass. Prior studies have primarily focused on increased protein breakdown as the driver of cancer-associated muscle wasting. Therapeutic interventions targeting catabolic pathways have, however, largely failed to preserve muscle mass in cachexia, suggesting that other mechanisms might be involved. In pursuit of novel pathways, we used untargeted metabolomics to search for metabolite signatures that may be linked with muscle atrophy. We injected 7-week–old C57/BL6 mice with LLC1 tumor cells or vehicle. After 21 days, tumor-bearing mice exhibited reduced body and muscle mass and impaired grip strength compared with controls, which was accompanied by lower synthesis rates of mixed muscle protein and the myofibrillar and sarcoplasmic muscle fractions. Reductions in protein synthesis were accompanied by mitochondrial enlargement and reduced coupling efficiency in tumor-bearing mice. To generate mechanistic insights into impaired protein synthesis, we performed untargeted metabolomic analyses of plasma and muscle and found increased concentrations of two methylarginines, asymmetric dimethylarginine (ADMA) and NG-monomethyl-l-arginine, in tumor-bearing mice compared with control mice. Compared with healthy controls, human cancer patients were also found to have higher levels of ADMA in the skeletal muscle. Treatment of C2C12 myotubes with ADMA impaired protein synthesis and reduced mitochondrial protein quality. These results suggest that increased levels of ADMA and mitochondrial changes may contribute to impaired muscle protein synthesis in cancer cachexia and could point to novel therapeutic targets by which to mitigate cancer cachexia.

Pectins are a major dietary nutrient source for the human gut microbiota. The prominent gut microbe Bacteroides thetaiotaomicron was recently shown to encode the founding member (BT1017) of a new family of pectin methylesterases essential for the metabolism of the complex pectin rhamnogalacturonan-II (RG-II). However, biochemical and structural knowledge of this family is lacking. Here, we showed that BT1017 is critical for the metabolism of an RG-II–derived oligosaccharide ΔBT1017oligoB generated by a BT1017 deletion mutant (ΔBT1017) during growth on carbohydrate extract from apple juice. Structural analyses of ΔBT1017oligoB using a combination of enzymatic, mass spectrometric, and NMR approaches revealed that it is a bimethylated nonaoligosaccharide (GlcA-β1,4-(2-O-Me-Xyl-α1,3)-Fuc-α1,4-(GalA-β1,3)-Rha-α1,3-Api-β1,2-(Araf-α1,3)-(GalA-α1,4)-GalA) containing components of the RG-II backbone and its side chains. We showed that the catalytic module of BT1017 adopts an α/β-hydrolase fold, consisting of a central twisted 10-stranded β-sheet sandwiched by several α-helices. This constitutes a new fold for pectin methylesterases, which are predominantly right-handed β-helical proteins. Bioinformatic analyses revealed that the family is dominated by sequences from prominent genera of the human gut microbiota, including Bacteroides and Prevotella. Our re-sults not only highlight the critical role played by this family of enzymes in pectin metabolism but also provide new insights into the molecular basis of the adaptation of B. thetaiotaomicron to the human gut.

Methionine, through S-adenosylmethionine, activates a multifaceted growth program in which ribosome biogenesis, carbon metabolism, and amino acid and nucleotide biosynthesis are induced. This growth program requires the activity of the Gcn4 transcription factor (called ATF4 in mammals), which facilitates the supply of metabolic precursors that are essential for anabolism. However, how Gcn4 itself is regulated in the presence of methionine is unknown. Here, we discover that Gcn4 protein levels are increased by methionine, despite conditions of high cell growth and translation (in which the roles of Gcn4 are not well-studied). We demonstrate that this mechanism of Gcn4 induction is independent of transcription, as well as the conventional Gcn2/eIF2α-mediated increased translation of Gcn4. Instead, when methionine is abundant, Gcn4 phosphorylation is decreased, which reduces its ubiquitination and therefore degradation. Gcn4 is dephosphorylated by the protein phosphatase 2A (PP2A); our data show that when methionine is abundant, the conserved methyltransferase Ppm1 methylates and alters the activity of the catalytic subunit of PP2A, shifting the balance of Gcn4 toward a dephosphorylated, stable state. The absence of Ppm1 or the loss of the PP2A methylation destabilizes Gcn4 even when methionine is abundant, leading to collapse of the Gcn4-dependent anabolic program. These findings reveal a novel, methionine-dependent signaling and regulatory axis. Here methionine directs the conserved methyltransferase Ppm1 via its target phosphatase PP2A to selectively stabilize Gcn4. Through this, cells conditionally modify a major phosphatase to stabilize a metabolic master regulator and drive anabolism.

Pyrroline-5-carboxylate reductase 1 (PYCR1) catalyzes the biosynthetic half-reaction of the proline cycle by reducing Δ1-pyrroline-5-carboxylate (P5C) to proline through the oxidation of NAD(P)H. Many cancers alter their proline metabolism by up-regulating the proline cycle and proline biosynthesis, and knockdowns of PYCR1 lead to decreased cell proliferation. Thus, evidence is growing for PYCR1 as a potential cancer therapy target. Inhibitors of cancer targets are useful as chemical probes for studying cancer mechanisms and starting compounds for drug discovery; however, there is a notable lack of validated inhibitors for PYCR1. To fill this gap, we performed a small-scale focused screen of proline analogs using X-ray crystallography. Five inhibitors of human PYCR1 were discovered: l-tetrahydro-2-furoic acid, cyclopentanecarboxylate, l-thiazolidine-4-carboxylate, l-thiazolidine-2-carboxylate, and N-formyl l-proline (NFLP). The most potent inhibitor was NFLP, which had a competitive (with P5C) inhibition constant of 100 μm. The structure of PYCR1 complexed with NFLP shows that inhibitor binding is accompanied by conformational changes in the active site, including the translation of an α-helix by 1 Å. These changes are unique to NFLP and enable additional hydrogen bonds with the enzyme. NFLP was also shown to phenocopy the PYCR1 knockdown in MCF10A H-RASV12 breast cancer cells by inhibiting de novo proline biosynthesis and impairing spheroidal growth. In summary, we generated the first validated chemical probe of PYCR1 and demonstrated proof-of-concept for screening proline analogs to discover inhibitors of the proline cycle.

Oxygen regulates hypoxia-inducible factor (HIF) transcription factors to control cell metabolism, erythrogenesis, and angiogenesis. Whereas much has been elucidated about how oxygen regulates HIF, whether lipids affect HIF activity is un-known. Here, using cultured cells and two animal models, we demonstrate that lipoprotein-derived fatty acids are an independent regulator of HIF. Decreasing extracellular lipid supply inhibited HIF prolyl hydroxylation, leading to accumulation of the HIFα subunit of these heterodimeric transcription factors comparable with hypoxia with activation of downstream target genes. The addition of fatty acids to culture medium suppressed this signal, which required an intact mitochondrial respiratory chain. Mechanistically, fatty acids and oxygen are distinct signals integrated to control HIF activity. Finally, we observed lipid signaling to HIF and changes in target gene expression in developing zebrafish and adult mice, and this pathway operates in cancer cells from a range of tissues. This study identifies fatty acids as a physiological modulator of HIF, defining a mechanism for lipoprotein regulation that functions in parallel to oxygen.

Peptidoglycan (PG) is an essential constituent of the bacterial cell wall. During cell division, the machinery responsible for PG synthesis localizes mid-cell, at the septum, under the control of a multiprotein complex called the divisome. In Escherichia coli, septal PG synthesis and cell constriction rely on the accumulation of FtsN at the division site. Interestingly, a short sequence of FtsN (Leu75–Gln93, known as EFtsN) was shown to be essential and sufficient for its functioning in vivo, but what exactly this sequence is doing remained unknown. Here, we show that EFtsN binds specifically to the major PG synthase PBP1b and is sufficient to stimulate its biosynthetic glycosyltransferase (GTase) activity. We also report the crystal structure of PBP1b in complex with EFtsN, which demonstrates that EFtsN binds at the junction between the GTase and UB2H domains of PBP1b. Interestingly, mutations to two residues (R141A/R397A) within the EFtsN-binding pocket reduced the activation of PBP1b by FtsN but not by the lipoprotein LpoB. This mutant was unable to rescue the ΔponB-ponAts strain, which lacks PBP1b and has a thermosensitive PBP1a, at nonpermissive temperature and induced a mild cell-chaining phenotype and cell lysis. Altogether, the results show that EFtsN interacts with PBP1b and that this interaction plays a role in the activation of its GTase activity by FtsN, which may contribute to the overall septal PG synthesis and regulation during cell division.

Environmental factors, such as viral infection, are proposed to play a role in the initiation of autoimmune diabetes. In response to encephalomyocarditis virus (EMCV) infection, resident islet macrophages release the pro-inflammatory cytokine IL-1β, to levels that are sufficient to stimulate inducible nitric oxide synthase (iNOS) expression and production of micromolar levels of the free radical nitric oxide in neighboring β-cells. We have recently shown that nitric oxide inhibits EMCV replication and EMCV-mediated β-cell lysis and that this protection is associated with an inhibition of mitochondrial oxidative metabolism. Here we show that the protective actions of nitric oxide against EMCV infection are selective for β-cells and associated with the metabolic coupling of glycolysis and mitochondrial oxidation that is necessary for insulin secretion. Inhibitors of mitochondrial respiration attenuate EMCV replication in β-cells, and this inhibition is associated with a decrease in ATP levels. In mouse embryonic fibroblasts (MEFs), inhibition of mitochondrial metabolism does not modify EMCV replication or decrease ATP levels. Like most cell types, MEFs have the capacity to uncouple the glycolytic utilization of glucose from mitochondrial respiration, allowing for the maintenance of ATP levels under conditions of impaired mitochondrial respiration. It is only when MEFs are forced to use mitochondrial oxidative metabolism for ATP generation that mitochondrial inhibitors attenuate viral replication. In a β-cell selective manner, these findings indicate that nitric oxide targets the same metabolic pathways necessary for glucose stimulated insulin secretion for protection from viral lysis.

Poly(ADP-ribose) polymerase (PARP) superfamily members covalently link either a single ADP-ribose (ADPR) or a chain of ADPR units to proteins using NAD as the source of ADPR. Although the well-known poly(ADP-ribosylating) (PARylating) PARPs primarily function in the DNA damage response, many noncanonical mono(ADP-ribosylating) (MARylating) PARPs are associated with cellular antiviral responses. We recently demonstrated robust up-regulation of several PARPs following infection with murine hepatitis virus (MHV), a model coronavirus. Here we show that SARS-CoV-2 infection strikingly up-regulates MARylating PARPs and induces the expression of genes encoding enzymes for salvage NAD synthesis from nicotinamide (NAM) and nicotinamide riboside (NR), while down-regulating other NAD biosynthetic pathways. We show that overexpression of PARP10 is sufficient to depress cellular NAD and that the activities of the transcriptionally induced enzymes PARP7, PARP10, PARP12 and PARP14 are limited by cellular NAD and can be enhanced by pharmacological activation of NAD synthesis. We further demonstrate that infection with MHV induces a severe attack on host cell NAD+ and NADP+. Finally, we show that NAMPT activation, NAM, and NR dramatically decrease the replication of an MHV that is sensitive to PARP activity. These data suggest that the antiviral activities of noncanonical PARP isozyme activities are limited by the availability of NAD and that nutritional and pharmacological interventions to enhance NAD levels may boost innate immunity to coronaviruses.

Priorities for implementing Ethiopia's national dialogue 11 May 2022 — 1:00PM TO 3:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 3 May 2022 Online

Experts discuss challenges and priorities in shaping an inclusive and effective national dialogue in Ethiopia.

Ethiopia is grappling with numerous contentious national issues – not least persistent conflict in several parts of the country – which underscore the need for large-scale dialogue and reconciliation efforts to address the country’s deep-rooted societal and political divisions. Ethiopia’s newly established National Dialogue Commission – whose 11 commissioners were appointed in February 2022 – has begun a four-phased process of preparations for a dialogue, with its initial stage focused on stakeholder engagement and local knowledge mobilization.

There are major challenges, however, in ensuring inclusivity amidst ongoing conflict and questions on how a country-wide process will sit alongside local dialogue initiatives and wider mediation and peacebuilding efforts. Linking the process to constitutional bodies will also be an important priority to ensure dialogue outcomes are effectively implemented.

At this public event, panellists will exchange perspectives on how to shape an effective national dialogue in Ethiopia, including priorities for building a credible National Dialogue Commission and the roles and responsibilities of other national, regional and local-level actors. They will also discuss key implementation mechanisms and long-term priorities for trust-building and cultivating a conducive environment for inclusive dialogue.

This webinar is part of a series of events and outputs on Ethiopia’s political transition.

This event will also be broadcast live on the Chatham House Africa Programme’s Facebook page.

Climate migration: Ways ahead from the next generation The World Today rsoppelsa.drupal 25 May 2022

Ella Dennis and Mike Higgins talk to young activists seeking solutions as global warming wreaks havoc in sub-Saharan Africa

Africa has the lowest carbon emissions per capita yet the highest rate of temperature increase in the world. Rising levels of desertification, drought and flooding are already forcing millions of Africans to relocate to find more stable livelihoods. 

The continent’s youth will bear the brunt of this climate migration problem. It is estimated that by 2050, Africa will be home to 86 million internal climate migrants.

How is climate migration already affecting sub-Saharan Africa and what frameworks could tackle it? To begin to answer those questions, five young activists from across the region, who are members of Chatham House’s Common Futures Conversations, took part in a panel discussion at the world’s first youth-led Conference on Climate Migration, convened in April by the Alliance for Citizen Engagement, a nonpartisan think tank based in the US. 

The conversation and follow-up discussions focused on a common problem – climate migration brings people into conflict and puts pressure on infrastructure. 

In Kenya, droughts have left 3.5 million people hungry and the chronic flooding of several lakes in the Rift Valley has displaced hundreds of thousands, said Gerald Muchiri, 29, a social scientist from Kenya. One result has been outbreaks of violence between pastoralists such as the Orma people and the farmers of the Pokomo community, said Laura Mukhwana, 33, a PhD student in Kenya. She believes this violence is likely to worsen. ‘Inter-group conflicts will pose even larger security concerns for surrounding communities as climate migration intensifies,’ she said.

Suleman Nuhu, 24, a farmer and veterinary student from Nigeria, said farmer-herder conflicts were his country’s most significant climate-migration issue. The movement of nomadic tribes from the north had affected him personally: ‘Nomads have trespassed on [my family’s] farms many times while moving with their livestock, destroying our crops.’ 

Changes in climate also force people to move from rural to urban areas. Nigeria, for instance, struggles with the so-called ‘Lagos problem’, said Temiloluwa Lawal, 25, a lawyer and researcher from Nigeria. An estimated 22 million people, a number that is rising fast, are crammed into a city smaller than Greater London. While not on the same scale, Zimbabwe experiences comparable challenges, said Tinotenda Dube, 29, a Zimbabwean finance director. Thanks to drought, unemployed rural migrants arriving in cities ‘put excessive pressure on service delivery against a low tax base,’ he said. ‘People, including close family members of mine, are crowded in dilapidated homes because they cannot afford to pay rent for decent housing.’ 

But there is hope, say the activists. Dube believes that affordable housing is an ‘integral component of [tackling] the climate migration crisis’. 

In Zimbabwe, he has developed a low-cost home finance model that, he said, has helped more than 250 low-income households find good-quality accommodation. Alongside this initiative, Dube has co-founded a property and construction company, Solinfra Zimbabwe Private Ltd, to provide low-cost housing. 

Muchiri is taking action in Kenya, founding an NGO called Social Assistance Welfare to tackle public health issues, he said: ‘As climate migration becomes more intense, I expect preventable health issues to increase throughout the region, and thus see Social Assistance Welfare as an important mitigation.’

In Nigeria, Nuhu noted that to help reduce conflict between farmers and herders social-media campaigns are encouraging pastoralists to move from nomadic livestock farming to more efficient intensive systems, using ranching and grazing reserves. ‘As for food security problems, the best mitigation is to reduce reliance on rain-fed agriculture through irrigation schemes,’ he said. 

All five agreed that, in their experience, the youth of sub-Saharan Africa could be better informed about climate migration. But they took encouragement from the fact the young are passionate about tackling issues arising from the broader climate crisis. 

In Kenya, Mukhwana pointed to successful youth projects around agro-forestry and tree-planting. She added that there is ‘a growing movement of urban youth who are advocating for climate justice, such as the Kenyan Youth Environmental Network and Fridays for the Future Kenya’. It was pleasing too, she said, that when the Kenyan government revised its contributions to the Paris Climate Accords it staged a week-long youth conference to include their opinions.

‘Overall, I am quite hopeful about how the youth are mobilizing themselves in Kenya,’ she added.

Find out more about Chatham House’s Common Futures Conversations
 

Enhancing the role of women in peacebuilding and politics in Ethiopia 29 June 2022 — 1:00PM TO 2:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 16 June 2022 Online

Panellists discuss the priorities for promoting the agency of women in politics and peacebuilding in Ethiopia and approaches for combatting gender-based discrimination and violence.

The war in northern Ethiopia and conflicts elsewhere have disproportionately affected women and girls – including through the infliction of physical and sexual violence, the heightened impacts of displacement and disruptions to education, and the co-option of women’s experiences in narratives by aggressors of conflict.

Hard-won political gains in women’s rights have been undermined and deep-rooted gender inequalities exacerbated. Despite this, women remain central actors in politics, as well as in conflict resolution and mediation efforts. However, more needs to be done to promote the security and inclusion of women in finding sustainable solutions for Ethiopia’s long-term recovery and to institutionalize reforms for gender equity and development.

At this public event, panellists will discuss the priorities for improving women’s participation and equality in public decision-making in Ethiopia and how to strengthen the implementation of legislation on women’s rights. They will also discuss what societal shifts and approaches are needed to combat gender-based discrimination and violence and to promote the agency of women in peacebuilding.

This webinar is part of a series of events and outputs on Ethiopia’s political transition.

This event will also be broadcast live on the Chatham House Africa Programme’s Facebook page.

What will authorizing the return of US troops mean for Somalia? Explainer Video aboudiaf.drupal 17 June 2022

Ahmed Soliman examines what the reintroduction of US military means for Somalia.

He says the strategy remains to try and reduce al-Shabaab’s threat, suppress its ability to carry out operations, and target its senior leadership.

There is more of a recognition now that the focus needs to be on restoring an effective security sector within Somalia and ensuring their forces are ready, but this also requires better coordination between the federal government and federal member states which it is hoped will happen in this new administration.

What challenges does the new president of Somalia face? Explainer Video aboudiaf.drupal 28 June 2022

Ahmed Soliman examines the challenges the new president Hassan Sheikh Mohamud faces in his first 100 days as president.

Key issues for the new administration are a deteriorating situation with regards to drought as close to half the population are facing food insecurity due to a fourth failed rainy season.

Combined with an inflation rate above ten per cent, many Somalis are at risk of famine and starvation. Many areas of the country are affected from the pastoralist regions to those which house IDP camps around the capital city and other towns, all being exacerbated by the war in Ukraine as Somalia was importing much of its wheat imports from Ukraine and Russia.

COP27: Navigating a difficult road to Sharm El-Sheikh Expert comment NCapeling 6 July 2022

Against a backdrop of rising urgency, COP27 in Egypt will bring all aspects of climate action into the spotlight – but especially the role of the host country.

As COP26 drew to a close in Glasgow, Egyptian officials announced their priorities for COP27, emphasizing climate finance and climate adaptation – a new approach given previous COPs mainly focused on mitigation, reducing emissions to limit climate damage.

This was followed by the COP27 presidency outlining its vision at MENA Climate Week 2022 to achieve ‘substantive and equal progress’ on all aspects of the negotiations, and Egypt emphasizing its intention to focus on implementing existing carbon reduction targets rather than pushing for further carbon cuts.

Egypt argues it is hosting COP27 on behalf of African nations and that, while it is promoting the interests of the developing world, it will be an impartial arbiter. However it is also useful to consider its priorities from the Egyptian government’s perspective.

Agenda drivers

Egypt has long prioritized climate finance and adaptation because it remains in need of technical and financial support to adapt, especially in agriculture and tourism.

It plans to expand its access to climate funding and investment, an area in which Egypt has been relatively successful as it currently receives 27 per cent of all multilateral climate finance in the MENA region and has issued the region’s first sovereign green bonds.

With public debt currently 94 per cent of GDP, Egyptian officials have also called for debt relief for Egypt and other developing countries.

Egypt’s Climate Change Strategy reflects this approach, aiming to enhance Egypt’s rank on the Climate Change Performance Index in order to ‘attract more investments and acquire more climate funding’.

Limiting the mitigation scope and the focus on finance also echoes Egypt’s own reluctance to make carbon reduction commitments. The Egyptian nationally determined contribution (NDC) – its 2030 pledge under the Paris Agreement – does not include any quantifiable emission reduction targets.

Egypt is one of only a few countries which failed to submit an updated NDC in 2021 and its upcoming update will not include an economy-wide carbon reduction target.

Egypt has also never published a long-term strategy and has no decarbonization plans despite independent estimates it should cut rising emissions by one-quarter by 2030, and by two-thirds by 2050 to be aligned with the Paris Agreement. This partly explains why observers rate Egypt’s climate action as highly insufficient.

Furthermore, Egypt’s championing of ‘moving from pledges to implementation’ without having quantifiable carbon reduction pledges of its own effectively exempts it from both pledging and implementation.

As a developing country, Egypt’s negotiating position is supported by UNFCCC provisions which recognize differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities of nations.

Its proposal to focus COP27 on the implementation of climate action and finance pledges is important in consolidating progress. But not pushing for more emission reductions at this critical moment risks derailing global decarbonization momentum and undermining global climate action.

According to optimistic estimates, if current climate pledges were implemented the world would still remain on track for 2°C of warming by the end of the century, with far worse impacts than if warming was curbed at 1.5°C.

Under a 2°C scenario, 37 per cent of the global population could regularly be exposed to extreme heat waves compared to 14 per cent in a 1.5°C warmer world, with developing countries expected to be worst-affected.

A 2°C trajectory also runs the risk of tipping points such as the melting of ice sheets in Antarctica and Greenland, triggering runaway climate change. Time to change the warming trajectory is running out as the latest IPCC assessment warns the window of opportunity is now ‘brief and rapidly closing’, and the UN Secretary General recently called for faster carbon cuts by the end of 2022 to avoid a ‘climate catastrophe’.

A different energy transition

Egypt opted not to join any of the voluntary sectoral coalitions at COP26 on reducing methane, clean energy transition, transition to zero-emissions vehicles, or moving beyond oil and gas.

This position is explained by its growing role as an exporter and advocate for fossil gas in the energy transition. Egypt is the second-largest producer of natural gas in Africa and is emerging as a fossil gas hub for the eastern Mediterranean, which is shaping its domestic energy policy.

Its 59GW electricity generation capacity is almost double the peak demand and is dominated by gas-powered electricity generation, which currently represents 42 per cent of all Africa’s gas generation.

Egypt’s climate policy is also shaped by fossil gas, and its national Climate Change Strategy encourages the expansion of gas use by promoting a transition to compressed natural gas for vehicles, the expansion of its domestic natural gas network – despite having universal access to electricity – and shifting to a gas-fuelled shipping sector.

Egypt also voiced support for other African countries to extract and deploy fossil gas and oil resources, making it one of the protagonists of the ‘great fossil gas pushback’. These advocates defend the right of developing countries to deploy fossil gas as a ‘transition fuel’ and champion its necessity to solve energy poverty.

But their position is not shared by all African and developing countries, and is rejected by some civil society groups, who argue it risks locking in greenhouse gases and local emissions for decades as well as delaying future development of low carbon energy systems.

Egypt’s huge spare generation capacity has contributed to a slowdown in renewable energy projects over the past two years. With renewables representing just 6GW, Egypt is expected to miss its renewable energy target for 2022, set at 20 per cent of generating capacity.

Engaging Egypt better

But these positions are more malleable than they seem, and Egypt is open to dialogue – not just on refining the COP27 agenda but also on reviewing its own climate priorities and leveraging its energy sector for a more ambitious transition.

Why Ethiopia must close its political gender gap The World Today mhiggins.drupal 29 July 2022

Women urgently need to gain access to high office if the country hopes to survive, say Hilina Berhanu Degefa and Emebet Getachew.

At the end of 2021, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s government announced the formation of a three-year national dialogue to address Ethiopia’s political crisis, looking at the ongoing civil war and conflict, inflation, unemployment, drought and other urgent domestic issues. 

But, while efforts have been made to ensure the participation of women in this dialogue, it must be more than symbolic otherwise gaps in meaningful gender inclusion could have significant implications on the very survival of the country.
 
One of the challenges for meaningful inclusion is that Ethiopia is a highly patriarchal society. Patriarchal norms and practices permeate all aspects of the country’s social, economic and political life. Women constitute over half of the Ethiopian population and represent 41 per cent of the national parliament.

Nevertheless, most political parties, including those with liberal credentials, are exclusively governed by men, with women taking almost no part in key decision-making processes. As a result, women are relegated to the margins of political and economic activities. 

Though there has been little systematic study of the structural challenges faced by Ethiopian women in politics, women members of political parties encounter many barriers, including political violence, male-coded norms and sexist discourses across Ethiopian society.
 
The nature and scale of political violence perpetrated against women is particularly disempowering and affects their ability to participate in political spaces.

While attitudes to gender equality, sexual violence and gender discrimination are often trivialized, they remain ever-present threats in women’s lives. As late as 2016, a significant minority of men still believed wife-beating to be justified in certain situations. Even when women overcome social pressure to pursue their political ambitions, patriarchal views and practices within political party structures about the role of women significantly undermine their active participation and engagement. 

The political space is even more inaccessible to women with disabilities and in conflict and climate-related crises such as among internally displaced people and in pastoral communities. Male-coded norms ingrained at both party and community levels remain a significant concern. Specifically, sex in exchange for candidacy, inconsiderate working schedules affecting women with children and denial of access to equal information and financial resources are frequently reported as major internal hurdles among political parties.

Closing the gender gap could offer Ethiopia a new beginning

Many political initiatives designed to tackle these gender imbalances often have been driven by short-term political considerations without proper gender-gap assessment and policy analysis. In most cases, the authorities have viewed gender-targeted reforms as acts of benevolence, dispensed by the government, without adopting the legal and financial measures necessary to ensure sustainability and impact.
 
Take, for example, Abiy’s appointment of a 50:50 gender-balanced cabinet in 2018. At the time, much was made about its transformative potential, with the prime minister attracting widespread global approval. Yet, a cabinet reshuffle in 2021 reduced female representation to 36.3 per cent, with far less scrutiny or accountability.

This indicates that gender equality in Ethiopia is not considered a priority but rather an endeavour for more opportune, ‘stable’ times. Without thorough measures that create the conditions for real change, the aspiration of having a gender-balanced cabinet will always be challenging to translate into lasting equal representation.
 
The proposed national dialogue presents an ideal opportunity for Ethiopian women to begin reshaping attitudes and closing the gender gap through their inclusion and participation in the political process. To do so, three issues must be addressed.
 
First, the varying rights of women need to be consolidated, including on identity, constitutional reform and economic issues .

Second, gender equality considerations must be absorbed into mainstream political discourse at all levels.

Third, the experiences of women in the recent war, other ongoing conflicts and past and lingering legacies of political violence targeting women from specific communities, must be acknowledged and remedied. 

If Ethiopia is indeed serious about addressing its asymmetric gender power dynamics, this national dialogue provides an excellent opportunity to begin the process. Genuine participation of women as independent actors, with their own agency, could offer Ethiopia a new beginning.

Will Africans’ calls for better democracy be met? The World Today mhiggins.drupal 29 July 2022

Voters want the continent’s ageing leaders to step aside to usher in a new age of political engagement and robust democracy, say the experts of Afrobarometer.

Across Africa, recent years have been marked by both encouraging democratic highs and troubling anti-democratic lows. Notable advances from last year include the Gambia’s successful presidential election, a ruling-party transition in Zambia and the first democratic transfer of power in Niger. In the lead up to this, add Malawi’s retake of its flawed presidential election in 2020 and an earlier succession of oustings of long-serving autocrats in Sudan, Zimbabwe and the Gambia. 

Contrast these gains, though, with setbacks elsewhere, including increasing restrictions on opposition parties in Benin, Senegal and Tanzania; the use of violence and intimidation during elections in Côte d’Ivoire and Uganda; and military coups, with the latest in Burkina Faso this year and last year in Chad, Mali, Sudan and Guinea.

These contradictory developments join dire warnings from experts that democracy is losing ground on the continent. But what can we learn about the state of democracy on the continent from Africans themselves?

Afrobarometer, a pan-African, non-partisan research network, has been surveying people about their views on democracy, governance and quality of life for more than 20 years. After interviewing nearly 50,000 citizens across 34 countries during Afrobarometer Round 8, which spans 2019-2021, we find that despite the efforts of some leaders to undermine democratic norms, Africans remain committed to democracy and democratic institutions.

They believe that the military should stay out of politics, that political parties should freely compete for power, that elections are an imperfect but essential tool for choosing their leaders, and that it is time for the old men who cling to power to step aside.

But their political reality falls short of these expectations. The perception of widespread and worsening corruption is particularly corrosive, leaving people increasingly dissatisfied with political systems that are yet to deliver on their aspirations to live in societies that are democratically and accountably governed. And although citizens find myriad ways to voice their concerns, they feel that their governments are not listening.

Simply put, Africans want more democratic and accountable governance than they think they are getting.

Africans’ democratic aspirations

Over the past decade, democracy watchers have been alarmed by declining trends in Africa. Concerns have been exacerbated in the past two years as some governments have taken advantage of the Covid pandemic to limit freedoms, restrict fair campaigning or postpone elections. Activists fear that supposedly temporary rollbacks in hard-won governance reforms could become permanent.

But for the most part, African citizens remain committed to democracy and democratic institutions. Across 30 countries that Afrobarometer has surveyed consistently since Round 5 (2011–2013), most indicators are strong and quite steady.

For example, seven in 10 Africans say that ‘democracy is preferable to any other kind of government’. While this is down modestly from 73 per cent a decade ago, more specific indicators seem to affirm popular commitment to democracy. Large and steady majorities consistently reject authoritarian alternatives, including one-person or ‘strongman’ rule (82 per cent), one-party rule (77 per cent) and military rule (75 per cent), which is clearly rejected even in many of the countries rocked by recent military coups.

Africans also express strong support for a limit to presidential terms, a feature of democratic governance that researchers and activists argue nurtures political participation, demonstrates that change via the ballot box is possible, and reduces the risk of personality cults, authoritarianism, corruption and coups. Across 34 countries, an average of 76 per cent favour limiting their presidents to two terms, including a majority (54 per cent) who ‘strongly’ support this rule. Term limits enjoy majority support in every surveyed country. 

The public’s democratic commitment is undergirded by strong and in some cases growing support for core democratic institutions. Support for multiparty competition and parliamentary oversight of leaders remains steady, while expectations that governments should be accountable to the courts have increased significantly over the past decade.

In addition, growing numbers of people say it is more important to have a government that is accountable to the people rather than one that just ‘gets things done’, an especially strong indicator of deepening commitment to democratic norms among citizens. 

Trouble at the polling booth

Elections remain a central, though controversial, institution of democracy for Africans. They have served as the foundation for real change, as in Zambia last year. But in other cases, such as Uganda’s January 2021 poll, they have been marred by violence and human rights abuses, as well as the weaponization of Covid to justify restrictions on campaigning.

The public is also sceptical about the capacity of elections to bring about real change: fully 50 per cent say they do not think elections are effective in enabling voters ‘to remove from office leaders who do not do what the people want’.

At the same time, large majorities report positively on their country’s election environment. Asked about their most recent election, at least eight in 10 say they did not observe intimidation (87 per cent) or interference (81 per cent) by security forces and did not fear violence (80 per cent).

We must keep in mind that these encouraging averages can obscure deep problems in some countries. For example, while only 3 per cent of Namibians say votes are ‘often’ not counted fairly, between a quarter and one-third cite inaccurate counts as a frequent problem in Zimbabwe, Sudan and Gabon. 

In addition, confidence in the fairness of the media environment is drastically lower, on average just 36 per cent.

But perhaps most importantly, almost nine in 10 Africans (87 per cent) say they are free to vote as they choose, including sizeable majorities in every surveyed country. And a solid majority of 63 per cent rate their most recent election as completely or mostly free and fair. 

All of this may help to explain still-strong support for competitive elections as the best system for selecting leaders. A robust three-quarters confirm their commitment to elections, though this has fallen slightly over the past decade, probably reflecting disillusionment with electoral processes that are too often torn by violence and produce contested results. 

A growing number of people may also be recognizing that elections, especially poor-quality ones, are not enough to guarantee democracy and better governance, and that a healthy democracy must include such other features as government accountability, respect for the rule of law, responsiveness and citizen participation.

The ‘democratic disappointment’ gap

To what extent does political reality align with Africans’ democratic aspirations? Our findings suggest that it is falling well short of expectations.

While a slim majority has steadily reported that their country is a ‘full democracy’ or one ‘with minor problems’ over the past decade, satisfaction, however, has dropped to 43 per cent in that time. 

What explains this growing dissatisfaction? Other indicators of democratic supply offer some clues. While ratings of election quality have held steady, favourable public assessments of presidential accountability to parliament and to the courts have both declined.

The rising scourge of corruption

But one of the most significant driving factors may be burgeoning corruption, a trend that appears to parallel declining democratic satisfaction. On average across 34 countries, around six in 10 say both that corruption in their country increased over the past year, and that their government is doing a poor job of controlling it.

These perceptions matter. Over time, when perceptions of corruption rise or fall, levels of dissatisfaction with democracy tend to follow suit. 

In South Africa, dissatisfaction with democracy grew steadily alongside scandals involving President Jacob Zuma, and has continued to rise under his successor, Cyril Ramaphosa, whose office has been tainted by ‘Farmgate’ and a major Covid-relief scandal. The ‘Fishrot’ scandal in Namibia has had similar consequences.

Are governments listening?

African citizens are raising their voices, calling on their governments to fulfil their democratic aspirations. Since April 2017, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace has recorded more than 70 episodes in 35 African countries of protests focused on issues ranging from demands for democracy in eSwatini to resisting police brutality, presidential third-term attempts and Covid restrictions. 

Citizen participation and government responsiveness are cornerstones of democracy. But are governments listening?

Voting is the most obvious and popular way for citizens to express themselves, and Africans take advantage of this opportunity. Two-thirds said they voted in their most recent national election. But elections occur only occasionally, and they force individuals to compress a wide array of views into very few choices. How do Africans find their voice during the long intervals between elections?

Many invest in personal efforts to act as agents of change. In fact, nearly half say they joined with others to raise an issue at least once in the past year, and a third contacted a political leader. A quarter report they acted with others to request government action. Less common but still important modes of engagement include asking for help from or lodging a complaint with government, contacting the media, and joining a demonstration.

These robust levels of citizen engagement suggest that people feel they can make a difference. Unfortunately, decision-makers aren’t always receptive or responsive to citizen voices. Less than a quarter of people think local government officials listen to them – and even fewer think their members of parliament do. 

What is more troubling is that fully two-thirds say they are at risk of retaliation or some form of negative consequences if they take action by reporting incidents of corruption. 

Lack of government responsiveness and respect for popular voices may have direct implications for both citizen engagement and citizen satisfaction. For example, we find that people are more likely to contact leaders or take other actions to solve problems if they believe that government officials respect and listen to them; that they will get a response if they raise an issue; and if they do not need to fear retaliation. 

Similarly, when we compare country averages for government responsiveness to the percentage of citizens who are satisfied with democracy, we again find positive associations. 

When governments are responsive, citizens are more likely to engage in addressing community needs and to be satisfied with their political system and optimistic about the future. Respectful and responsive governance has the potential to spur citizen action to solve critical development challenges – and may be the cure for what ails democracy.

Now is the moment to launch an African vaccine industry The World Today mhiggins.drupal 31 July 2022

The continent plans to make 60 per cent of its vaccines by 2040. After the failure of the world to help in the pandemic, it’s high time, says Ngozi Erondu.

The lack of an African vaccine industry has been a glaring concern for decades. Before the pandemic, 99 per cent of Africa’s vaccines were manufactured outside the continent. As well as endangering the lives of millions, this situation has inhibited social and economic progress on the continent.

In response, the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC) has undertaken an ambitious plan, outlined in the Partnerships for African Vaccine Manufacturing (PAVM) Framework for Action, to develop the nascent African vaccine manufacturing sector into an end-to-end industry by 2040. The framework aims to raise the share of African-manufactured vaccines used across the continent to 60 per cent by 2040, or the equivalent to up to 1.7 billion doses annually.

Seven of every 10 vaccines used in Africa are currently donated through Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance. Most are administered within childhood immunization programmes and are largely manufactured either in India, or by  multinational vaccine manufacturers in North America or Japan.

Vaccine donations have inhibited the development in Africa of vaccines and other countermeasures against diseases.

Though the Ebola virus was discovered in Central Africa in 1976, vaccine development was not adequately funded until it emerged in Europe in 2014. Human monkeypox resurfaced in Nigeria in 2017, yet the global Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations only targeted it for vaccine development in July this year.

The pandemic highlighted Africa’s fatal dependency on imported vaccines. Only 20 per cent of Africans are fully vaccinated against Covid-19, due to the failure of countries in the Global North to ensure the equitable distribution of vaccines via the COVAX facility to 40 per cent of the world’s most vulnerable people. 

The pandemic also confirmed that Africa could not rely on fellow states of the Global South. At the height of the Delta variant outbreak in early 2021, India halted vaccine exports to Africa, where only 1.5 per cent of the population had at that time received any vaccine doses.

After decades of discussions, there are signs that Africa could soon succeed in creating its own vaccine industry. First, the 55-member African Union is in the process of establishing the African Medicines Agency, a regional regulatory body. 
 

‘The new public health order’

Additionally, the African Export-Import Bank and African Development Bank (AfDB) have established a foundation to provide financial and strategic support for the development of the pharmaceutical industry and the consolidation of regional vaccination programmes in Africa (the foundation would potentially negotiate intellectual property rights and licensing issues but that remains to be seen).

Second, studies show there is an emerging middle class in Africa. In a 2011 report by the AfDB, this was estimated at some 56 million households. Potentially, this means many people will be able to buy vaccines and medicines made in Africa.

About a third of African countries currently pay for their vaccine needs. According to PAVM forecasts, the value of the total African market could reach between $3 billion and $17 billion by 2040.

The recent entry into effect of the African Continental Free Trade Area should also prove conducive to African vaccine development. Through economic integration, free movement and harmonized regional standards, countries that invest in their biopharmaceutical and medical technology sectors may attract employees, regional and international businesses, and investment. Further, the pandemic has encouraged people to relocate to countries with, or planning for, universal healthcare.

Building an African pharmaceutical industry from the ground up could take much longer than two decades and cost tens of billions of dollars. Nevertheless, the moment seems ripe, and timely support has been forthcoming from influential regional actors, including Rwandan President Paul Kagame, South Africa’s Cyril Ramaphosa, and private sector business executives, including the Zimbabwean-born billionaire Strive Masiyiwa.

With a pandemic treaty embedding equity in prevention, preparedness and response some way off, and given the limitations surrounding the recent World Trade Organization compromise on the TRIPS waiver – which temporarily waives Covid-19 vaccine patent protections for poorer countries – it is doubly important for Africa to build up its own pharmaceutical industry and emergency systems. 

In 2021, John Nkengasong, then director of Africa CDC, wrote of the necessity of a post-pandemic ‘new public health order’ for Africa. Such a change may threaten the global health organizations, industries and institutes who derive payment from ‘saving Africa’ during emergencies. Additionally, through strengthening Africa CDC, other actors such as the World Health Organization may find that they have a diminished strategic role on the continent.
 
While Africa should not dismiss these valuable and long-standing partnerships, it must take the opportunity to advance its interests and to assume leadership in this important area.

A booming tech sector can unleash pan-African trade The World Today mhiggins.drupal 31 July 2022

The new African Continental Free Trade Area must embrace hyperscale data centres, cross-border digital payments and other innovations to realise its potential.

The Africa Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) not only lays the groundwork for a single market across the continent, it can act as a driving force to unleash the full potential of the technology revolution that is under way across the African continent. 

To help achieve this, the AfCFTA must go beyond simply lowering barriers to the movement of goods and services, to what the World Bank calls an ‘FDI [foreign direct investment] deep scenario’. This requires harmonizing policies on investment, competition, intellectual property rights and e-commerce to encourage FDI at a greater scale. 

The World Bank estimates that the AfCFTA could increase income across the continent by 7 per cent by 2035 (an additional $445 billion), mainly by boosting intra-regional trade in manufactured goods and lifting approximately 40 million people from extreme poverty. Under an FDI deep scenario, the projected income growth jumps to 9 per cent by 2035, supporting 50 million people out of extreme poverty. 

The initial focus of the AfCFTA is on movement of goods and services and the associated financial flows through the establishment of the Pan-African Payment and Settlement System (PAPSS), a technology that enables instant local currency payment across Africa without first converting to a hard currency. In addition, harmonizing policies and easing the movement of data could enable technology to accelerate the anticipated AfCFTA income growth.

Global venture capital is pouring in

There is no doubt the African tech industry is growing. In 2021, 681 African technology companies raised $5.2 billion in equity venture funding, up from $2 billion in 2019, according to Partech Partners’ annual Africa Tech Venture Capital report. 

It is understandable why the industry has attracted global venture capital. While tech businesses are often initially focused on meeting needs in their home markets, most have a strong desire to tap into the pan-African market, with its 1.3 billion consumers across 54 countries and a combined GDP of $3.4 trillion. This in turn should attract global venture capital to invest in Africa. 

The AfCFTA has created a framework for technology-led companies to scale across the continent in a way that will impact digital infrastructure, logistics, energy and much else. For example, Africa’s hyperscale data centre capacity would benefit from the ability to locate centres in the lowest cost jurisdiction with the best energy availability and to use that to power cloud storage across the continent.

Yet various regulatory constraints, including the desire for each state to own its population’s data on local servers, prevent that. As a result, African data centres are less competitive than those in America and China. 

Similarly, logistics and other sectors would be transformed if the information on goods in transit, such as digital customs documentation, could move easily across borders while being tracked across all 54 countries. Financial services would also benefit from the ability to pay across borders in a low-cost, frictionless way.

Fintech companies should be encouraged to build technology solutions linking to PAPSS and other initiatives to accelerate the adoption-of-use cases that PAPSS supports – such as intra-Africa instant payment, embedded finance and remittances services.

AfCFTA may also unlock mergers and acquisitions (M&A) activity among African and international firms. Technology companies are using M&A to enter new markets, as the international payments platform Stripe did when it acquired the Nigerian business Paystack, and the payments business MFS Africa did when it took over the fintech start-up Baxi. 

Governments and regulators must support innovation

Given the difficulty of a country-by-country organic growth strategy across Africa, M&A is likely to increase in various technology sectors over the next few years. With the anticipated ease of doing business that the AfCFTA could facilitate, we are likely to witness further welcome consolidation, creating larger corporates that create more jobs and increase tax revenues. 

To unlock the benefits that technology will bring, governments and regulators need to play a supportive role in encouraging innovation. They will need to ensure the appropriate consumer protections are in place without stifling creativity through regulation, inefficiencies or rent-seeking. 

At the same time, governments and regulators should not permit themselves to be held to ransom by dominant incumbents, such as banks and mobile operators in the fintech space, at the expense of stifling technology companies looking to disrupt their respective industries. 

Only then will the AfCFTA allow Africa to benefit from its tech potential. 

Risana Zitha writes this article in a personal capacity

Climbing out of the Chinese debt trap The World Today mhiggins.drupal 1 August 2022

Beijing must play a pivotal role in soothing African economic distress, says Alex Vines.

Poorer countries across the world – including many in Africa – are facing $35 billion in debt-service payments in 2022. According to the World Bank, around 40 per cent of this total is owed to China.

Across the African continent, the economic impacts of the coronavirus pandemic have increased rates of extreme poverty and inequality. Since early 2022 the situation has worsened even further, due to the knock-on effects of spiking inflation and interest rates following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Shortages of fuel and foodstuffs have caused prices to leap upwards. Urban unrest is on the rise, and African governments are having to make tough economic choices as their budgets are squeezed ever more tightly.

Across the continent, progress on the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals is being jeopardized, and non-energy-producing lower and lower-middle income African governments are struggling to repay their loans.

During the Covid pandemic, the G20 assisted 31 out of 36 eligible African countries with its Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI). Established in May 2020, the DSSI helped countries concentrate their resources on fighting the pandemic and safeguarding the lives and livelihoods of millions of the most vulnerable people before it expired at the end of 2021. From 2022, it has been replaced by the G20’s Common Framework for Debt Treatments.

As the second-largest economy in the world after the United States, and the dominant lender for many African states, China has an important role to play in such initiatives. Beijing still tries to keep a low profile and renegotiate its terms on a bilateral basis – although it did support Angola’s early call for G20 action on an initiative that would fulfil what the DSSI delivered. The challenge is to encourage more consistency and trust in such initiatives, as Chinese officials consider them to be too western-oriented. 
 

China’s lending to Africa peaked in 2016

Contemporary views of Chinese lending in Africa remain coloured by the rapid expansion of Chinese finance from the early 2000s to resource-rich African states, and oil producers in particular. The reality is that much of China’s lending has evolved, and is neither intrinsically predatory nor problematic for African partners – and China increasingly prefers to do business with states it considers to be better run.

In fact, as commodity prices and growth rates declined from 2015, Chinese lending to Africa fell significantly, from a peak of $29.5 billion in 2016 to $7.6 billion in 2019. The socio-economic impact of the pandemic has made this situation worse.

That China has attracted criticism is often due to a lack of transparency in its investments, especially those in Kenya and Zambia. This reputation has not been helped by opaque lending arrangements imposed by Chinese state-owned banks, requiring borrowers to prioritize them for repayment. This could lead to cutbacks in key areas of social spending, with direct impacts on African communities.

Over the past two decades, Chinese finance has contributed to an infrastructure boom in many African countries. Angola, for example, was able to undertake a rapid post-conflict reconstruction of its infrastructure, with new roads and bridges being built across the country. New models of financing are being developed: in Kenya, the new Nairobi expressway was constructed under a $600 million Build-Operate-Transfer model that provides for ownership to revert to the national government after a 30-year concession period.

Chinese companies have helped African countries build and upgrade over 10,000km of railway, around 100,000km of highway, 1,000 bridges and 100 ports, as well as power plants, hospitals and schools.

China’s involvement in African debt has varied considerably between countries and over time. Although in recent years this involvement has been framed in the context of the Belt and Road Initiative, it has for the most part been uncoordinated and unplanned, with credit being offered by competing lenders with links to different elements of the Chinese state.

In recent years, as reports have emerged around the poor quality of some of China’s past lending, the authorities in Beijing have sought greater control over new development lending and have imposed new sustainability requirements. At the same time, African countries have sought to diversify sources of supply for infrastructure contracts beyond China. Loans are generally now on a smaller, more manageable scale.

With the introduction of its Global Development Initiative in September 2021, there are indications that China is moving to a ‘new development paradigm’, with the emphasis on providing flows of foreign direct investment rather than loans and a focus on supporting small and medium-sized enterprises, human capital investments and green development.
 

African debt distress

A paper drawing on expertise from Chatham House’s Africa, Asia and Global Economy and Finance experts will be published before the G20 summit in Bali in November 2022. It examines seven African countries that the World Bank deemed in 2020 to be in most debt distress or at risk of debt distress because of their Chinese stock – Angola, Cameroon, Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Zambia. Two countries – Côte d’Ivoire and South Africa – have received new loans from China and are not in any distress.

The paper observes that a lack of transparency over the nature of the terms agreed by these African governments has led to intense domestic criticism and international accusations that China is seeking control over strategic assets.

In fact, in Angola and Zambia, China may have accidently fallen into its own debt trap through profligate and uncoordinated lending.

Zambia became the first pandemic-era default in 2020 and is seeking relief on $17 billion of external debt. After holding general elections in August 2022, Angola and Kenya will also seek additional debt relief, but both may also seek more funds from the private commercial market because of the slow progress of the G20’s Common Framework – something flagged as a concern by China.

All seven of the countries that are most indebted to China are actively seeking to reduce this financial reliance on Beijing in the future.

China has a pivotal role to play in finding effective solutions to these and other African countries’ debt distress. Improved coordination and cooperation between creditors in China and in other parts the world could enhance the positive impact of multilateral initiatives, such as the Common Framework, which has aimed to bring China and India to the negotiating table along with the IMF, the Paris Club group of creditor nations and private creditors.

So far, Chad, Ethiopia and Zambia are the only African countries to have signed up to the framework since its launch in 2020. Although China is suspicious of the IMF, if African states collectively encouraged Beijing to engage with the Common Framework, it could be improved so as to provide debt relief to those African countries finding it difficult to repay their loans.

Review: the rise of Africa’s superwomen The World Today mhiggins.drupal 1 August 2022

From foster care in England to colonialism’s legacy in Zimbabwe, this set of essays on race, feminism and identity is searingly honest, says Masiyaleti Mbewe.

Black and Female
Tsitsi Dangarembga, Faber, £9.99

The 1988 novel Nervous Conditions by the Zimbabwean author Tsitsi Dangarembga is considered one of Africa’s finest literary exports. It won the Commonwealth Writers’ Prize and alongside The Book of Not (2006) and This Mournable Body (2018), shortlisted for the 2020 Booker Prize, forms a trilogy of semi-autobiographical novels that grapple with the gendered colonial oppression of young black girls and women from Southern Rhodesia through to Zimbabwe. 

In Black and Female, Dangarembga continues the interrogation of these intersections in an unflinchingly honest and personal, if occasionally dense, collection of essays. Along the way, she examines the sheer magnitude of colonialism’s effects on African people, and how they ripple through her early childhood in England and her formative years as a writer, filmmaker and feminist activist in post-independence Zimbabwe.

‘Writing While Black and Female’

In 1961 Dangarembga’s parents relocated from Southern Rhodesia to the UK. While they worked and studied in London, they put their two-year-old daughter, her older brother and, later, her younger sister into private foster care in Dover, Kent (as many Africans did – a fact that was new to me). The first essay, ‘Writing While Black and Female’, takes a painful look at the four years she spent with her foster parents, Mummy-Gran and Daddy Henry. 

Blackness, she learned in those years, was a consequence of her non-whiteness. So Dangarembga writes of the momentary elation she felt when a stranger addressed her as a ‘lovely little piccaninny’, giving her ‘a category I could wield against the void of no longer being’. To cope with this sort of racialization and her abandonment, the young Dangarembga turned to disassociation and self-harm. 

As she writes: ‘Blackness is a condition imposed on me, rather than being an experienced identity.’ Instead of ‘black’ people, therefore, Dangarembga prefers the term ‘highly melanated people’. It is a resonant phrase, highlighting the inherently ridiculous nature of racism.

Dangarembga’s ‘Africanness’ shifts into focus upon her return to Rhodesia in 1965. At first, other children refused to play with her and her siblings, calling them ‘varungu’ (white people). As she describes it: ‘The dance of my identities … became frenetic’. 

In ‘Black, Female and the Superwoman Black Feminist’, the second essay, Dangarembga is adamant about the urgent necessity of a black feminist practice that is centred on action to provide real, material change. Along the way, she makes a distinction – a slightly uneasy one to my mind – between the patriarchy that western colonization imposed, based on private ownership, and the patriarchy of pre-colonial African society with its foundations in kinship that devolved power to an extent.

‘Hence women could and did become rulers and warriors, and royal spirit mediums called mhondoro,’ Dangarembga writes approvingly. She is making a nuanced point; but the idea of a more accommodating sort of patriarchy jars a little nonetheless.

While independence may have arrived for Zimbabwe more than 40 years ago, Dangarembga argues strongly that the subjugation of women and feminists at the hands of the ruling Zanu-PF government continues as an extension of colonial rule. Indeed, beyond Zimbabwe, black feminists remain ‘a small, often embattled group’ across Africa, believes Dangarembga. 

As a young black feminist who is part of this ‘small, embattled group’, I should say we have been able to foster large communities digitally and otherwise to work around the hostility we are often faced with. Despite internet shutdowns and restrictions, we resist – an act Dangarembga encourages.  

Resistance, she says, starts with establishing community despite these difficulties. At the nucleus of Dangarembga’s argument is the ‘superwoman’ of the essay’s title, the African woman who doesn’t require external factors to be inspired to action but who continuously draws on what Dangarembga calls ‘internal agency’ that derives from ‘an unrelenting fight for survival and dignity’.

Pointedly, she criticizes global feminism’s greater focus on optics than activism in the practical sense. One only has to observe the performative allyship and ‘Instagram activism’ rampant on the internet today to see her point.
 

The complexities of decolonization

In the final essay, ‘Decolonization as Revolutionary Imagining’, Dangarembga turns her gaze upon the ‘highly stratified’ European societies that outsourced their violent inequality to their empires and ‘the work of decolonization’. However, decolonial discourse is complex, and it is here that the writing occasionally gets bogged down. Fewer recommendations with more elaboration perhaps would have helped.

She herself acknowledges the difficulties of decolonization. Centuries of the Enlightenment and its logic of ‘racism, slavery, genocide and colonization’ are hard to uproot ‘whatever one’s melanin concentration’, she writes.

Nevertheless, Dangarembga concludes with the radical determination to dismantle that is evident throughout this searing yet hopeful collection: ‘The trajectory of current and future generations depends on that uprooting.’

Culture notes: Europe's broken promises to Africa The World Today mhiggins.drupal 1 August 2022

Europe’s ‘gas grab’ in Africa is just the latest abuse of its relationship with the continent, says Catherine Fieschi.

When Emmanuel Macron made one of his first visits to Africa as France’s recently elected young president in 2017, his speech at Ouagadougou University in Burkina Faso was designed to set the tone for a new relationship between his country and African countries. 

‘There no longer is a French policy for Africa,’ he said.

This was a signal away from ‘la Françafrique’, with its post-colonial accents and the propping up of regimes friendly to France, to something that was more strategic, equitable and transparent – more partnership and less tutelage. 

And Europe seemed to be following suit. In March 2020 the European Union and Africa decided that they would redefine their relationship. The European Commission unveiled its vision for a ‘comprehensive strategy with Africa’. The roadmap would give Africa significantly more say over the nature and extent of the relationship, more choice and more political agency.

But what, today, is left of these aspirations? Despite repeated statements, Europe seems to be saying one thing and doing another. 

Earlier this year, after the long-awaited 6th annual EU-African Union summit in Brussels, South African president Cyril Ramaphosa was frank when he summed up the gap between stated ambitions and the current relationship. The pandemic-weary Global South had reason to be wary. Ramaphosa laid out missed opportunities, disappointment and the low expectations that act as self-fulfilling prophecies. 

Europe’s changing focus in Africa 

From the apparent high point of the Ouagadougou speech, Macron has now turned to the Organization Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF) in Africa for geopolitical purposes. His primary aim is to combat the rise of Islamist militants and terrorism in the Sahel as well as to tackle the growing influence of China and Russia in the region. 

Russian inroads – via the security firm Wagner in Mali, for instance – have given France further cause to use the OIF to counter destabilization activities. Both the United Kingdom and France train African military in the Sahel, but now, with the end of France’s anti-insurgent Operation Barkhane in Mali, the subsequent withdrawal of French troops and the increasingly established presence of the Wagner group, the security situation in the region is expected to deteriorate dramatically and become increasingly impermeable to European interests and forces.

As for development aid, Britain’s Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy makes no bones about the fact that Asia is now a priority over Africa.

The relationship between Africa and Britain is being transformed as a result, most obviously through the cuts in development aid, with African aid cut by 66 per cent in 2021. But the nature of the relationship, which has become both more conditional and more transactional, has also changed. 

The UK is emphasizing human rights and ‘free societies’, but also pushing for free market principles rather than the kind of state involvement that some African countries often prefer as a road to accelerated and more autonomous development. 

The future of energy exports and COP27

The issue of energy exports points to what will most likely trigger the greatest disappointment in the next few years – climate and climate finance. 

Green energy deals, like the $8.5 billion COP26 package from the EU, United States and UK to South Africa, look far more problematic now in the light of Europe’s African gas-grab. Indeed, Europe is importing as much African gas as it can after the invasion of Ukraine by Russia reduced supplies. Yet African countries are still being told to curb their own use of ‘dirty’ energy. 

As an illustration, Nigeria holds 3 per cent of the world’s gas reserves, but has barely tapped them, while 40 per cent of its output is exported to Europe. In April, Italy closed deals to buy gas from Angola and the Republic of Congo, while Germany did the same with Senegal.
 

At COP15 in Copenhagen in 2009, developed countries pledged an annual $100 billion in climate finance to developing countries for both adaptation and mitigation. But pledges have never really materialized. The aid agency Oxfam estimates that only about a third of the money has been delivered. Climate finance was again the main focus of COP26 – and dismissed by Greta Thunberg as more ‘blah, blah, blah’.

This series of repeated resets, pledges and disappointments tells a story – indeed, several stories. First and foremost, it is one of arrogance and betrayal. That much is obvious. But it is also a story about stories – about how the narratives elaborated by various European countries and leaders never amount to more than a sum of transactions. 

Climate change places Europe, and other rich nations, at a crossroads in its relationship with Africa: the former holds the wealth, but also some of the keys and threats to the transition. COP27, to be held in Egypt in November, will be the next chapter in the story. 

The online media changing African news The World Today mhiggins.drupal 2 August 2022

Africa’s news sites are gripping audiences with digital innovation and bold directions. Helen Fitzwilliam talks to editors at three platforms.

Lydia Namubiru
News editor of ‘The Continent’ (South Africa)

At the start of the pandemic, we realized a lot of fake news was being shared on WhatsApp. So, The Continent chose to launch on that platform to insert some real journalism in a way that could easily be shared. We now have about 100,000 readers across Africa and the rest of the world, but we had to dramatically change the way we write and edit stories: to compete with the likes of Twitter and Instagram, we try to keep stories tight at 300 words. 

There’s a real variety. We can run an investigation into corruption in the Democratic Republic of the Congo a week after a front page on the fashion designer who dresses Africa’s ‘big men’ [powerful leaders]. We cover feminist issues, the backlash against LGBT people in Ghana; we’ve had the Namibian first lady talking to us about misogyny. These are not the sort of topics a typical African newspaper is going to lead with.

With a story such as Ukraine, the war’s impact on the cost of living has been the most obvious angle for us. It has driven countries such as Malawi into crisis, forcing a devaluation of the currency.
 
As for the future, we see two issues looming. Workers’ economic rights and their treatment by multinationals will be a big story. There are refugees in camps in Kenya working in data operations and being paid a pittance to help create huge, potentially multimillion-dollar systems for US companies. 

Second, Africa has the world’s youngest population and the oldest leaders, so this will likely lead to activism and protests. The young are exposed to the global village, so they want different things and have different values. They speak a completely different language their leaders do not understand. It will be an interesting conflict, but could lead to real violence. 

John Githongo
Editor of ‘The Elephant’ (Kenya)

We set up this platform four years ago. Due to political and commercial pressures, mainstream media wasn’t doing much critical reporting. We have between 30,000 and 80,000 readers a week, the majority of them in Africa. 

The digital space reaches a completely different demographic. When The Elephant started, it was 80 per cent male and over 40, but we have gained more younger people and more women. Now it is 60 per cent men, 40 per cent women and that is something we have been working at. 

Our editorial approach is that as long as a piece has a strong argument and fits into our pan-African brief, we will publish it – even if we don’t agree with it.

The conflicts in Ethiopia and parts of the Sahel make the war in Ukraine pale in comparison. So many people have died in Ethiopia or been displaced and now we have the onset of a famine after four years of failed rain. During the 1960s and 1970s, when the Cold War found its way on to African soil, millions of people died – so there is caution about getting involved in a European fight.

There is always a lot of fake news around during elections. But people are beginning to be more sceptical. We go after those who attempt to change the level of debate with reputation-laundering and try to expose their actions. 
 
The future of democracy is going to be a big issue. When Africans were watching the attack on the US Capitol last year, they were hoping it was not a Black Lives Matter protest, which could have resulted in a ‘blackbath’. As soon as they saw the white guys wearing horns, people laughed with relief. 

There is an ongoing recalibration of Africa’s geopolitical relations with the rest of the world. A poll released in June showed China has overtaken the United States as the foreign power having the biggest positive influence in Africa in the eyes of young people across the continent. The younger generation is writing its own narrative. 

Wale Lawal
Editor of ‘The Republic’ (Nigeria)

Nigerian audiences are increasingly online and tend to read both local and international publications. They also know that the issues they care about are either under-reported or reported at lower quality levels. 

At The Republic, we provide political journalism that tends to require high levels of expertise. Yet online audiences also prioritize engagement: it is not enough for an issue to be important, it also needs to be interesting.

Some topics we have covered that Western media tend not to include how people experience blackness in different parts of the world; the waves of mostly female-led and youth-led movements rising up against autocratic governments across Africa; and relationships between countries within Africa itself. In the early days of the pandemic, we launched a Covid-19 and Africa series, having noticed a glaring lack of African expert voices in global media.
 
We also cover Africa’s evolving relations with Russia. Whenever we encounter a story like Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the first thing we always ask ourselves is what missing voice can we add to the current discussion? All we were reading about after the invasion was how neighbouring countries were opening their borders and their homes to Ukrainians. Most people saw only that. 

But we knew that around 15,000 Africans were studying in Ukraine, that Africans routinely face harsh treatment at international borders, and that clearly their voices were missing from the discussion.

With fake news and information gaps on social media, our usual approach is to develop expert-led columns and circulate these as widely as possible.

Our next mission is to think about the role that independent media can play in supporting democracies, such as by increasing voter turnout. During the last election in Nigeria, less than 35 per cent of those who registered to vote eventually did so.

Not the same old African story The World Today mhiggins.drupal 2 August 2022

Nollywood studio boss Mo Abudu and author Dipo Faloyin discuss how Africans are redefining how the world sees them.

Mo Abudu
EbonyLife’s latest TV drama series, Blood Sisters, was in Netflix’s global top 10. It’s a thriller and it may be slightly melodramatic because we Nigerians are melodramatic. But it deals with universal themes. Nigerians are no different to anyone else. I want EbonyLife productions increasingly to appeal to anyone in the world, even if it’s in our language. Oloture, one of our films, was about human trafficking. It was all done in pidgin English and subtitled. I watch a lot of Korean dramas and Spanish dramas that are subtitled. A good story is a good story.

Dipo Faloyin
The influence that African countries have had on the West, from music, food and film to literature, science and technology, is something people find difficult to take seriously. So, it’s good to see Netflix and other production companies take it more seriously. How has your discussion with them changed since the early days?

Mo Abudu
I have been going to an entertainment market in Cannes called Mipcom for about 12 years, and at first no one had any interest in African content. So, we focused on doing local content for local markets. Now, different communities around the world want representation in content that speaks to them. Specific countries are also saying to streamers: ‘What’s your local content strategy?’ 

Netflix was the first of the streamers to come into Africa, and it now has an Africa office. Amazon has also made inroads recently. Disney is arriving. In the United States and Britain, they just need to maintain subscriber numbers, but real growth for them is going to be in Asia and Africa. 

I’m not telling broadcasters or distributors to commission original African content as a charity project – they can make money from this. Within five days of launch, Blood Sisters registered 11 million hours of viewing on Netflix around the world. It was made on a budget five times smaller than productions outside Africa. But we need to be among the gatekeepers, too. 

Moving beyond Hollywood

Dipo Faloyin
The challenge that many creatives across Africa have is that people [elsewhere] don’t necessarily feel like they relate to this continent. They see ‘Africa’ and its cultures as very distant. Instead of intricate, specific stories, simple stories of simple people have been pushed about the continent. 

I still get asked questions like, ‘But, what should we do about Africa’s problems?’ My response is, ‘Stop seeing Africa as just a problem.’ 

Mo Abudu
I was speaking at the Qatar Economic Forum recently and the panel started off talking about the ‘problems of Africa’ – and I had to jump in and say, ‘I get you guys talking about the problems, I’m not an economist, I’m just an entrepreneur, but from an entrepreneurial perspective, we have resources – like cobalt from the Democratic Republic of Congo that’s in all of our mobile phones.’ 

The problem is, we ship out all our resources and by the time they come back to us, they are 10-times more expensive than we can afford. I keep saying that they need to know they need us as much as we need them.
 
Dipo Faloyin
There are certainly issues within the continent like there are everywhere else; but more accurate stories will help people have a better sense of the context in which so many communities and their lives have been built up. 

Mo Abudu
The West doesn’t seem to have any interest in making films about Africa unless it’s about the worst of Africa: the slave trade, the Rwandan genocide, blood diamonds. That seems to be what has defined us. 

Dipo Faloyin
If you ask most people around the world to close their eyes and picture Africa, two images will come up: safari, and poverty and strife. Until the age of 12, I grew up in Lagos, a metropolis with no wild animals running around. There are slums, of course, but also traffic, shopping centres and overpriced restaurants. 

Writers who pitch ideas to Vice.com where I work often still don’t differentiate African countries. They’ll say, ‘There’s been a coup in Mali. Why can’t Africa get its head around democracy?’, and I remind them a small minority of countries on the continent is under any form of authoritarian rule. 

It’s frustrating that this perception hasn’t changed. For us to break through we need big cultural institutions – Hollywood, museums, literature – to allow people from across the regions to tell these stories. We are rarely portrayed as protagonists and forward thinkers. But I’m excited for the future.

The Climate Briefing: The nexus of water security and climate policy Audio NCapeling 22 August 2022

Examining the crossover between water security and climate change with the next two COPs taking place in regions with a history of being water stressed.

What should policymakers and negotiators from the Middle East and Africa working on water security focus on at COP27?

What does it mean to achieve water security? What are the main barriers or challenges? How is water security relevant to climate change?

This podcast was produced in collaboration with the UK Aid-funded Knowledge, Evidence and Learning for Development (K4D) programme which facilitates the use of evidence and learning in international development policy and programming.

Towards democracy in Sudan: Reflections on the transitional period 20 September 2022 — 2:00PM TO 4:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 31 August 2022 Online

In this webinar, panellists discuss the key outcomes of the evaluation workshop and reflect on how the experience of the transition to date should inform the realization of Sudan’s democratic aspirations going forward.

The military coup on 25 October 2021 halted Sudan’s transition to democracy and prospects for sustainable peace. Since then, members of the former regime have regained political influence, with many reinstated to senior positions.

The coup has provoked a strong reaction from the country’s pro-democracy movement and youth-led resistance committees who have led continuous peaceful protests demanding civilian democratic transition, despite a brutal crackdown by state security forces.

Those supportive of the coup have blamed the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC), a wide coalition of pro-democracy political and civilian groups, for the mistakes of the transitional government.

However, the country’s political, security and economic situation has sharply deteriorated since the military’s action, and the progress achieved by the transitional government has been reversed, leading to an accelerating economic crisis, increased food insecurity and political instability.

The FFC, which played a key role in appointing the transitional government, has acknowledged its errors. In July 2022, it held a workshop in Khartoum, which was broadcast on social media, to evaluate its performance and identify lessons learned, in discussion with civil society actors and activists.

In this webinar, leading pro-democracy movement figures and independent experts discuss the key outcomes of the evaluation workshop and reflect on how the experience of the transition to date should inform the realization of Sudan’s democratic aspirations going forward.

This event is part of a Chatham House Africa programme project on supporting Sudan’s civilian-led democratic transition.

A natural climate change priority for Africa Expert comment LJefferson 28 September 2022

Nature-based solutions can protect African nations’ shared natural endowment and meet the needs of their people.

Africa’s principal climate change negotiators have long understood the important contribution of ‘nature-based solutions’ (NBS) in delivering land (and sea) based options as part of the goals of the Paris Agreement. Limiting temperature rises to only 1.5°C by 2050 will demand finding innovative ways to protect Africa’s vast natural endowment that also meets the equally acute needs of its people. Nature-based solutions may do both.

The urgency for Africa cannot be overstated. At a Chatham House conference in Libreville, the Gabonese minister for the environment highlighted that if global warming surges by 2.5° or 3°C the impact would be at least 6°C for Africa. Decision-makers on the continent and across the world need to understand that ‘business as usual’ cannot be an option given the potential for loss of life, conflict and chaos.

Adaption, mitigation, or both?

Although adaptation to climate change has hitherto tended to be the continent’s main concern, there has also been growing recognition of the ways that Africa’s natural environments, from forests and grasslands, to peatlands and coastal and marine ecosystems, all also mitigate its impacts by sequestering carbon. The Congo Basin alone is said to store upwards of 4 per cent of global emissions annually.

These environments are under increasing pressure. Deforestation is a sad reality, caused mostly by unsustainable and extensive agricultural practices focused on cash crops for export more than food production to feed local populations. And arguing that African states and peoples should slow the development of their economies and infrastructure in response to a crisis born of the already-industrialized world does not find a responsive audience in a continent hungry for jobs and opportunity.

Nature-based solutions offer an answer to this conundrum. There is growing evidence that natural habitats both help avoid losses from climate change-related disasters and can drive economic growth. There is thus potential for NBS to tackle both adaptation and mitigation challenges at relatively low cost.

NBS – the rocky road from commitment to policy

It was logical therefore for Africa and like-minded countries to work to integrate NBS more strongly into the climate change agenda at COP26. The final Glasgow Climate Pact duly emphasized the importance of protecting ecosystems. The Global Forest Finance Pledge signed in the margins was also significant. African focus, with COP 27 in Egypt soon to take place, is now on domestic implementation and delivery of these pledges. The new African Union Climate Change and Resilient Development strategy (2022-2032) sets out many of the challenges and opportunities.

Choosing the right development pathway is tough, requiring political will and inclusive governance. Besides the challenge of securing alternative national revenue if a country moves away from fossil-intensive fuels – particularly acute for Africa’s resource-producing states – there is a dizzying array of policy decisions to be taken. African governments need to choose the most appropriate renewable energy sources, secure alternative livelihoods and continue to meet basic needs of the most vulnerable in the context of radical restructuring.  

Towards African solutions

There can be no one-size-fits-all answer to these questions – it is sadly still necessary to underline the enormous geographic, cultural and political diversity of the continent – but African experts have begun to draw together some emerging common themes from work already underway.  

Maintaining the ‘status quo’ in agricultural practices is no longer an option. Emphasis on sustainable agriculture is urgently needed andthat includes the elaboration of a ‘new deal’ between nature and people.  

Conservation also needs to be reframed as an economic opportunity, particularly in the elaboration and development of ecosystem services that deliver the true value of Africa’s forests, and that involve, value and reward local communities, respecting their rights and livelihoods.

Regional cooperation is likewise key, including on the management of forest, wildlife and water resources – Africa’s ecosystems do not respect arbitrary political boundaries, and accomplishing the dual feat of protecting cross-border systems at the same time as realizing their economic potential will demand effective collaboration, as well as training, education and communication at all levels.

The imperative of finance

A further imperative will be securing sufficient developed country financing – whether that be to secure value for net sequestration and effective forest management or for models of context-appropriate ‘smarter’ sustainable rural conservation and ecosystem resilience.

A new vision for African agency in sustainable development Expert comment LJefferson 18 October 2022

Change is necessary not only in global economic structures and attitudes – but in African governance too.

The conventional notion that Africa is mostly a consumer of norms and practices designed by the Global North has been repeatedly challenged and is increasingly being debunked. Increased African agency in international affairs is today a well-established and documented reality. But Africa’s influence still does not match the scale of the challenges that it faces on its pathway to sustainable development. 

Pushing for African agency in sustainable development also warrants a critical assessment of how ‘sustainable development’ should be defined, and how it can be achieved in terms of actual poverty reduction and real improvement in the lives of local poor Africans. Sustainable development has been a political catchphrase for over 30 years – but a genuine transition towards sustainability has yet to begin.

African agency today

Historically, there have been structural limitations on the agency of African stakeholders to shape development pathways. Chief among them, donor-recipient power dynamics have persistently promoted dependency and sustained institutional corruption. Many African countries are also challenged by economic incentives and infrastructure that have favoured the market demands and supply chains of former colonial powers, which largely remain reliant on natural resource extraction, and are marked by limited investment in value-addition activities and technology development.

Today, however, African agency is being exerted in a more assertive fashion. The African Union (AU), individual African states, civil society, the private sector and eminent and ordinary persons are all displaying Africa’s agency in steering global sustainable development priorities, namely by proposing their own development agenda, The African Union Agenda 2063, adopted in 2013. This was followed by the UN Sustainable Development Goals (Agenda 2030), which in many ways mirror Agenda 2063 – a clear demonstration of the influence of Africa in the global arena. 

Agenda 2063 is a strategic roadmap for Africa ‘to build an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven and managed by its own citizens and development goals representing a dynamic force in the international arena’. Prepared following a broad-based participatory consultation, it advocates for inclusion and empowerment and provides an excellent vision for African countries and African people. The SDGs address several of the key shortcomings of their predecessor – the MDGs – and incorporate a broader and more transformative agenda that more adequately reflects the complex challenges of the 21st century and the need for structural reforms in the global economy and governance norms.

In international forums on sustainable development, African countries are increasingly using their collective voice to change the discourse on how development can and should be done. For instance, by championing innovative solutions for carbon markets, African policy leaders are enabling access to climate finance for development while preserving Africa’s natural wealth.

In the post-COVID era, championing investments in and leadership of Africa’s global health architecture demonstrates a desire that in the next pandemic, Africa CDC, AMA and continental manufacturers will play leading roles in determining Africa’s public health strategy and implementation.

In trade, building on the groundwork led by the regional economic commissions, the AfCFTA will catalyse and scale regional integration, trade and cooperation, leading to promising new modes of supply chain and self-sufficiency.

Encouraging signs, but persistent shortcomings

Encouraging signs that African agency is gaining momentum cannot disguise the fact that Africa has yet to move from rhetoric to implementation in the realm of sustainable development. Continental visions often fail to go beyond declarations of intent, and have only limited influence on governance systems or national structural transformation, and African states remain vulnerable to economic shocks emanating from the global system.

Change will require governance systems that are coordinated, transparent, efficient, and inclusive, as well as tools, processes, and means (material, technical, and human) for successful implementation. There is an urgent need for a new governance paradigm in Africa and internationally, dealing with long-term social change.

Notably, African agency should not be only seen as emanating from government, but also as being exerted by independent civil society organizations and committed ordinary individuals. Effective agency needs to be multi-faceted and multi-actor, and depends on the inclusiveness of African governments and their willingness to work with civil society in their strategic engagements with external partners.

Both Agenda 2063 and the SDGs hold the potential for transformation, but implementation will depend on continued advocacy to hold authorities to account and change the dominant discourse, logic and rules of engagement at global, regional, national, and local levels. There is a need for a dynamic new model of African ‘development’.

Time for a new vision

Africa’s economic landscape is changing rapidly, with new regional and local value chains, and integrated regional economic corridors to link countries, minimize the burden of high-cost production and logistics, and boost real incomes and international competitiveness. But Africa continues to face structural challenges, including the need for large investment projects – at a time when Africa remains a net exporter of capital.

Donors and development partners must reflect upon their prior modes of engagement and commit to genuine and equitable relationships with African states. Such partnerships must reflect mutual respect of ideas and accountability, and commit to making space in international forums and multi-lateral arrangements for African people and countries to realize their own visions for progress.

But African leaders and actors must also recognize that with the advent of resources and agency comes responsibility for results and outcomes, notably the need to improve governance. Gaps in accountability, widespread corruption, and lack of successful implementation and sustainability of projects must be addressed.

Reflections at 100: Empire and decolonization Audio MVieira 1 November 2022

How did leading academics and policymakers think about and impact imperialism and decolonization from the 1920s to 1970s?

This episode of Reflections at 100, marking the centenary of International Affairs, looks at how empire and decolonization have been discussed in the journal.

Isabel and Krisztina speak to Meera Sabaratnam about how thinkers and policymakers from the 1920s to 1970s understood both empire and then decolonization. Meera highlights four tensions present within the discussions, and how these may impact the international order today.

Inderjeet Parmar delves deeper into the influence of Chatham House at the time and situates these discussions in the broader think-tank and global context.

Reflections at 100 is a mini-series accompanying the journal’s centenary Archive Collections. The collections bring together articles from our archive which speak to the past, present, and future of current affairs issues. In each podcast episode we speak to editors and contributors to the collection and explore what the research tells us about policymaking today. 

Explore the Archive Collection, free to access until mid-November 2022, including Meera’s introduction: 100 years of empire and decolonization.

International Affairs was started at Chatham House in 1922 to communicate research to members who could not attend in person. Over the past 100 years it has transformed into a journal that publishes academically rigorous and policy relevant research. It is published for Chatham House by Oxford University Press. Read the latest issue here. 

Africa’s maritime agency cannot be overlooked Expert comment LJefferson 3 November 2022

Increasing maritime awareness has already delivered impact, but consistency and continental leadership are needed to realize the sector’s full potential.

Africa’s 48,000 kilometres of coastline, shared among 38 coastal states, are resource rich and hold some of the world’s most strategic sea lanes, including the approaches to the Suez Canal, which carries 12 per cent of worldwide trade, and the Gulf of Guinea, a critical route for global energy. But despite the vast potential this represents, piracy and maritime insecurity have dominated the narrative of Africa’s coasts, and further propagated the image of African states as beholden to external intervention.

Yet African agency is established and evolving in the sector, with African littoral states enhancing their capacity to face collective security threats and exercising increasing autonomy in responding to the recent rush of external actors looking for port facilities and military bases. Enhanced continental coordination, consistency and leadership can help Africa’s maritime endowment become a resource that can bring sustainable benefit across the continent.  

Agency beyond piracy: the Gulf of Aden and Western Indian Ocean

Piracy became the dominant frame of reference for the East African maritime space as a result of the crisis off the coast of Somalia, which peaked between 2008 and 2012. In 2008, the UN Security Council (UNSC) took the unprecedented step of authorizing international naval operations in Somali territorial waters, contributing to a gradual reduction in attacks. There have been no successful hijackings reported since 2017.

But progress has not just been down to international assistance. Somalia is prioritizing increased domestic enforcement capacity – as demonstrated in the establishment of  a new specialized maritime unit and the wider region enhanced collaboration and information sharing through the Djibouti Code of Conduct of 2009, amended in 2017.

South Africa’s recent admission as a new signatory demonstrates its continued relevance. In March 2022, the UNSC authorization lapsed, following pressure from the Somali government. Although it is not yet clear whether Somali efforts will be sufficient to repress piracy in the long term, this reverse was a clear statement of Somalia’s agency at a level unthinkable during the outset of the crisis.

As the immediate threat of piracy has quietened, broader geopolitical dynamics have come to the fore, notably in a surge by external actors to establish strategic ports and military bases. Here too, African states have demonstrated enhanced agency, for better or worse. Consider Djibouti’s unilateral seizure of a container terminal from an Emirati firm, Sudan’s review of Russian and Turkish deals for maritime facilities, Tanzania’s rejection of a Chinese-led port investment, or the Seychelles withdrawing agreement for an Indian naval base.

Such examples point to a growing awareness of the value of maritime resources within African states, alongside a willingness and ability to push back against external imposition – and indeed to innovate in finding solutions beyond infrastructure and ‘hard’ security. In 2018, the Seychelles launched the world’s first sovereign blue bond to fund sustainable marine projects. That other countries are seeking to replicate this model points to the potentially global impact of African leadership on maritime issues.

Regional cooperation or competition in the Gulf of Guinea?

The Gulf of Guinea is likewise resource rich and geographically strategic, and has faced diverse maritime security threats including piracy, smuggling, illegal fishing, oil theft and pollution. Gulf of Guinea states put in place several initiatives to promote security, including the Yaoundé Code of Conduct (YCoC), signed by 25 states in 2013, that led to information-sharing and cooperation on interdiction, investigation and prosecution. But crime in the Gulf of Guinea nonetheless reached an all-time high in 2020, suffering 130 of the 135 maritime kidnappings recorded worldwide, due to the non-binding nature of the YCoC and gaps in capacity and finance.

Though external actors have become increasingly engaged, including the EU, US, France, Denmark, and the G7++ Group of Friends of the Gulf of Guinea (FOGG), states within the region, especially those most affected by piracy and armed robbery, have nonetheless demonstrated leadership. Nigeria, Ghana, and Cote D’Ivoire have all developed maritime security strategies; Nigeria launched its Deep Blue Project to secure Nigerian waters; Ghana has strengthened its navy; and Togo has changed its laws and judicial system to allow the arrest and prosecution of ships and persons. Maritime security incidents have consequently reduced in 2022.

Africa-Japan relations and evolving multilateralism 23 November 2022 — 9:00AM TO 10:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 17 November 2022 Online

This panel discussion reflects on the outcomes of TICAD 8 in 2022 and looks forward to TICAD 9 in 2025.

The eighth edition of the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD), held in Tunisia from 27–28 August 2022, marked the second time that Japan’s now-triennial summit was hosted in an African country, after TICAD 6 was held in Kenya in 2016.

The summit was attended by 48 representatives of African countries and at least 20 heads of state and government and included a pledge by the Japanese government to commit $30 billion in public and private finance to Africa over the next three years.

In reaffirming the three pillars of TICAD 8 – revolving around the economy, societal resilience, and peace and stability – the newly adopted Tunis Declaration (28 August 2022) also outlined some of the key projects underpinning Japan’s pledge, including a $4 billion fund for a Green Growth Initiative with Africa (GGA).

2023 will mark 30 years since the inception of TICAD in 1993 and ten years since the African Union (AU)’s adoption of its flagship Agenda 2063, on which the Tunis Declaration placed distinct emphasis.

This panel discussion reflects on the outcomes of TICAD 8 in 2022 and looks forward to TICAD 9 in 2025, exploring wider developments in summitry, Africa-Asia relations, and modes of multilateralism.

Questions explored include:

• How has international summitry evolved over the past three decades since the inception of TICAD in 1993, which represented the first periodic high-level summit engagement with Africa by a ‘non-traditional’ partner?
• Looking ahead to TICAD 9 in 2025, what are the priorities for enforcing the stated tenets of TICAD – ‘African ownership, international partnership, inclusivity and openness’ – in cooperation efforts?
• What lessons can be drawn from TICAD’s co-partnership approach (with the African Union Commission and others) – particularly given increasing calls for AU membership of the G20 and Prime Minister Kishida’s pledge at TICAD 8 to support a permanent African UNSC seat during its non-permanent membership in 2023–24? Beyond membership, what are the priorities for furthering agency?
• How are Africa-Asia relations evolving and diverging? How are Japan and other Asian countries perceived by different African countries?

This event is the third in the Chatham House – Japan House London webinar series (2022-2023). The series is held in partnership with Japan House London. You can watch previous webinars from the series here.

Sudan’s gold boom: Connections to conflict and transnational impacts 7 December 2022 — 2:00PM TO 3:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 24 November 2022 Online

At this event, experts will discuss Sudan’s gold sector, its connections to conflict, and transnational impacts. 

At this webinar panellists will discuss Sudan’s gold sector, its connections to conflict, and transnational impacts.

Sudan is one of the largest gold producers on the continent, with the industry constituting Sudan’s foremost source of hard currency since the secession of South Sudan in 2011 and resulting loss of oilfields.

The gold rush that has ensued has had important implications for domestic and transnational conflict dynamics. Military actors and armed groups have sought control of gold-producing areas in the peripheries and to capitalize on the flow of labour migrants, against a wider backdrop of conflict partly stemming from contestation for control between central and local actors.

International interests are prominent, including increased Russian involvement in the sector, while gold smuggling has also interlaced with mercenary activity in neighbouring CAR, Chad and Libya.
 
At this event, panellists will discuss Sudan’s gold trade, its connections to conflict, and transnational impacts, including the international politics of Sudan’s gold extraction and role of armed groups. It will also explore the environmental and socio-economic dimensions of gold in Sudan’s border areas. 
 
This roundtable is an output of the Cross-Border Conflict: Evidence, Policy and Trends (XCEPT) research programme, funded by UK Aid from the UK government.
 

Africa in 2023: Continuing political and economic volatility Expert comment NCapeling 6 January 2023

Despite few African trade and financial links with Russia and Ukraine, the war in Ukraine will cause civil strife in Africa due to food and energy inflation.

Africa’s economy was recovering from the COVID-19 pandemic in 2022 when a range of internal and external shocks struck such as adverse weather conditions, a devastating locust invasion, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine – all of which worsened already rapidly-rising rates of inflation and borrowing costs.

Although the direct trade and financial linkages of Africa with Russia and Ukraine are small, the war has damaged the continent’s economies through higher commodity prices, higher food, fuel, and headline inflation.

The main impact is on the increasing likelihood of civil strife because of food and energy-fuelled inflation amid an environment of heightened political instability.

Key African economies such as South Africa and Nigeria were already stuck with low growth and many African governments have seen their debt burdens increase – some such as Ethiopia and Ghana now have dollar debt trading at distressed levels – and more countries will follow in 2023.

On average the public sector debt-to-GDP ratio of African countries stood at above 60 per cent in 2022. The era of Chinese state-backed big loans and mega-projects which started 20 years ago in Angola after the end of its civil war may be coming to an end but Chinese private sector investments on the continent will continue through its Belt and Road Initiative and dual circulation model of development.

Great and middle powers building influence

Geopolitical competition in Africa has intensified in 2022, particularly among great powers such as China, Russia, the US, and the EU but also by middle powers such as Turkey, Japan, and the Gulf states.

The sixth AU-EU summit held in Brussels in February 2022 agreed on the principles for a new partnership, although the Russian invasion of Ukraine which followed disrupted these ambitions. Japan’s pledge of $30 billion in aid for Africa at TICAD 8 in August 2022 was clearly made due to the $40 billion pledged at the China–Africa summit in November 2021.

The US also launched a new strategy to strengthen its partnership and held a second US-Africa Leaders’ summit in Washington in December, the first since 2014. Russia’s ambition has been curtailed by its invasion of Ukraine, postponing its second summit with African states to 2023.

The imposition of international sanctions complicated its trade and investments, and military support such as that provided by Russian paramilitary group Wagner focused on Mali, Libya and the Central African Republic (CAR) has been curtailed.

The strategic importance of Africa has resulted in all the UN P5 members calling on the G20 to make the African Union (AU) its 21st member in 2023 under India’s presidency.

International competition to secure Africa’s critical and strategic minerals and energy products intensified in 2022 and, in the energy sector, European countries are seeking to diversify away from Russian oil and gas with alternative supplies, such as those from Africa.

Western mining companies and commodity traders are also increasingly seeking alternative supplies from Africa. Decarbonization is becoming a driver of resource nationalism and geopolitical competition in certain African mining markets, home to large deposits of critical ‘transition minerals’ such as copper, cobalt, graphite, lithium, or nickel.

COP27 was hosted in Egypt in November and gave African leaders an opportunity to shape climate discussions by pushing priority areas such as loss and damage, stranded assets, access to climate finance, adaptation, and desertification. Climate adaptation in Africa is a key condition to preserving economic growth and maintaining social cohesion.

The Horn of Africa, particularly Somalia, is suffering from one of the worst droughts in memory. The geopolitical and geoeconomic ramifications of the war in Ukraine has directly impacted the African continent by contributing to food and cooking oil inflation and humanitarian aid delivery.

Thoughout 2022 the AU was undergoing intensive reform and it struggled to respond to the growing number of security crises across the continent. Hotspots in 2023 will be in the western Sahel and Lake Chad Basin, eastern DRC, and northern Mozambique, all of them crossing state borders.

In Mozambique, a 2019 peace deal assisted by the United Nations (UN) will see the last ex-guerrillas from Renamo demobilized in 2023 to reintegrate into civilian life – some having been recruited in 1978.

In eastern Congo, M23 – one of around 120 armed groups – resumed its conflict against the central government. After lying dormant for several years, it took up arms again in 2021 and has been leading an offensive in eastern DRC against the Congolese army.

According to the UN, Rwanda has been supporting M23, and Kenya’s parliament approved in November the deployment of about 900 soldiers to the DRC as part of a joint military force from the East African Community (EAC) bloc – DRC joined the EAC in March.

In the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia saw an uneasy ceasefire agreed between the federal government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF).

Islamist militant groups in Africa further expanded their territorial reach in 2022, particularly in the western Sahel where al-Qaeda and Islamic State affiliates are competing for influence and continued to make inroads.

The drawdown and exit of western forces from Mali, both the French Operation Barkane and international contributions for the UN’s MINUSMA mission there, adds new dimensions to regional security challenges.

Mali’s decision in May to withdraw from the G5 Sahel has also eroded the regional security architecture. Jihadist activity may spread further into coastal states which has resulted in international partners such as France and the UK redesigning their security assistance strategies for the region.

Coups on the increase again

Since 2020, there have been successful military coups in Burkina Faso (twice), Chad, Guinea, Mali (twice), and Sudan, and failed ones in the CAR, Djibouti, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Niger, and possibly Gambia and São Tomé and Príncipe.

Three national elections illustrate the state of African democracy in 2022. In Angola’s August elections, the ruling MPLA lost its absolute majority with the opposition UNITA winning the majority in Luanda for the first time.

Building carbon markets that work for Africa 31 January 2023 — 2:00PM TO 3:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 19 January 2023 Online

At this webinar, held in partnership with UNDP, speakers share experiences on carbon market advancement in Africa, highlighting challenges and obstacles.

Carbon finance offers a major opening towards meeting the goals of the Paris Agreement but progress across regions has been uneven, with the African continent accounting for just 15 per cent of voluntary carbon credits issued globally in 2021.

Harnessing the potential of carbon markets may offer one route towards closing the significant shortfall in climate financing for Africa, as well as accelerating transition in cooking and energy solutions and limiting deforestation.

Article 6 of the Paris Agreement requires significant adjustment of regulatory and policy frameworks at national level in order to align with emerging global imperatives within carbon markets. Various stakeholders, including the private sector, need to take these realities into considerations as they seek to meet commitments towards a more sustainable future.

Governments and the private sector alike need to address the obstacles that have held back Africa’s participation in carbon markets, and should explore all options including both the compliance and voluntary markets, and market-based alternatives such as emissions trading schemes and carbon taxes.

At this webinar, held in partnership with UNDP, speakers share experiences on carbon market advancement in Africa, highlighting challenges and obstacles. Speakers also explore in-country experiences and make proposals on how Africa might benefit from a functional global carbon market.

Silencing the Guns in Africa by 2030: Lessons from Mozambique 17 February 2023 — 7:00AM TO 9:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 7 February 2023 Addis Ababa and online

A hybrid event in Addis Ababa reflecting on Mozambique’s 2019 peace agreement and the lessons it offers for the African Union’s ‘Silencing the Guns’ agenda by 2030.

This event will explore opportunities for furthering the AU’s Silencing the Guns agenda by 2030 to assist Africa’s transformative development, highlighting lessons learnt from Mozambique’s experience.

The ‘Silencing the Guns in Africa’ agenda, a flagship initiative of the African Union’s (AU) Agenda 2063, aspires to end all wars and conflict, prevent genocide, and stop gender-based violence.

The 2019 peace agreement in Mozambique and the subsequent disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process supported by the United Nations (UN) but implemented by Mozambique’s government and institutions, provides experience and learning for other continental conflicts that have recently ended or resumed.

Mozambique is seeking to break from the cyclical ‘conflict trap’ where once a country experiences one civil war, it is significantly more likely to experience additional episodes of violence.

Since the end of Mozambique’s civil war in 1992, targeted armed conflict by RENAMO resumed in 2013 and ended through the new agreement in August 2019. The final reintegration into civilian life of former Mozambican combatants of opposition RENAMO will be completed in 2023.

Mozambique and Switzerland – a key supporter of successive Mozambican peace processes – have become non-permanent members of the UN Security Council for the first time in their respective histories.

At a moment when old vulnerabilities and new threats are apparent on the African continent, this seminar, held by Chatham House in partnership with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), explores opportunities to furthering the AU’s Silencing the Guns agenda by 2030 to assist Africa’s transformative development, as outlined by the UNDP in a report published in February 2022.

This hybrid event is held in partnership with the African Union Commission and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

This event will also be broadcast live via the Africa Programme Facebook page.

A critical juncture for Sudan’s democratic transition Expert comment LJefferson 28 March 2023

International pressure is essential to reach an agreement that establishes a credible civilian government.

The signing of the Framework Agreement (FA) on 5 December 2022 between Sudan’s military leaders and its leading pro-democracy parties is a major step to reversing the damage done by the disastrous military coup in October 2021.

The FA removes any formal role for the military in Sudan’s politics. A civilian head of state and prime minister will select the cabinet and chair the Defence and Security Council. The armed forces will be prohibited from non-military business activities and security sector reform will lead to a unified, professional and non-partisan national army. Elections are due to take place at the end of a two-year transitional period. 

Signatories included General Abdel Fatah Al Burhan, chair of the Sovereign Council and head of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (known as Hemedti), his deputy and Commander of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and more than 40 civilian entities, including the Forces of Freedom and Change- Central Council (FFC-CC), a few other political parties, former armed movements, civil society organizations and professional associations. However, the agreement has faced criticism from the street for not being sufficiently radical, has been overshadowed at times by heightened tension between the two military leaders, and has seen sabotage attempts by supporters of the Bashir regime.

Building consensus on the Framework Agreement

The agreement meets most of the demands of the anti-coup camp, at least on paper. Yet doubts persist as to whether the military are genuine about handing over power, particularly among the neighbourhood-based resistance committees – the heart of the youth-led mobilization that forced the military to recognize the failure of their power grab. Peaceful protests against the coup have seen 125 killed and over 8,000 injured by government security forces. Many want to see Burhan and Hemedti held accountable.

Recognizing the need to expand popular support, FFC-CC leaders have been reaching out to other pro-democracy forces to build a united civilian front. They report increased buy-in from some resistance committees in the last few months, recognizing that street protests alone were not sufficient to overthrow the coup, and that engagement with the military is necessary to find a way out of the impasse.

The FA offers the only currently available path to embedding civilian politics in Sudan and has received active diplomatic support from UNITAMS, AU and IGAD (who form the Tripartite Mechanism), the Troika of the US, UK and Norway, alongside the EU, as well as Saudi Arabia and the UAE (who are members of ‘the Quad’ with the US and UK).

Broader public participation has also been developed through a series of conferences, facilitated by the Tripartite Mechanism, on five contentious issues – dismantling the old regime, the Juba Peace Agreement, Eastern Sudan, Transitional Justice and Security Sector Reform. Recommendations will be incorporated in a final political agreement. 

The political process has been overshadowed by increasingly visible tension between Burhan and Hemedti, seen in parallel foreign visits, conflicting public statements, and a heavy military presence in Khartoum. But concerns that SAF and the RSF were heading towards confrontation appear to have been assuaged thanks to international pressure and preliminary agreements reached between military and civilian signatories of the FA on security sector reform and integration. In a significant breakthrough, both sides have now agreed to draft the final agreement and transitional constitution, with the aim of forming a civilian government by 11 April.  

Potential spoilers and interests from Sudan’s regions

Progress has been made, but significant challenges remain, notably from supporters of the former Bashir regime in ‘the deep state’ and from Sudan’s historically marginalized peripheries. Old regime elements have been intensifying social media campaigns to derail the agreement and drive a wedge between the SAF and RSF, and have been accused of deliberately inciting instability in the peripheries to undermine the democratic transition. 

The Popular Defence Forces, established by the National Islamic Front in the 1990s, have been reactivated under different names in several parts of the country and there are reports of mobilization and recruitment of armed militias in Darfur. The recent public appearance of Ali Karti, the Secretary-General of the Islamic Movement, who has close relations with Islamists in SAF, has also caused renewed concern.

Two Darfuri armed movement leaders who signed the October 2020 Juba Peace Agreement (JPA) and are members of the current military-led government, have not signed the FA, allegedly due to concerns about their representation in the next government.

Despite intensive efforts to bring them on board, there is continuing disagreement over the inclusion of other members of ‘the Democratic Bloc’, a political alliance backed by Sudan’s influential neighbour Egypt, which is reportedly angry at being excluded from the Quad. The FFC-CC say that the door is open for the two Darfuri leaders and some other political parties, but they will not allow the agreement to be ‘diluted’ with political forces who intend to torpedo the transition, including by imposing a weak prime minister.

Both Burhan and Hemedti have courted support from the regions. Burhan used the 2020 SAF takeover of Al Fashaga in the contested eastern border region with Ethiopia to boost his national standing and secure backing from local tribal leaders; while Hemedti has sought to position himself as a champion of the peripheries, particularly in his Darfur heartlands, while simultaneously advancing his business interests.

Competition between them in building domestic powerbases, as well as alliances with neighbouring states, risks reigniting tensions, particularly given deep grievances and contrasting ambitions between and among Sudan’s diverse regional leaders and communities.

Fighting over ‘white gold’: Sesame in Ethiopia and Sudan Expert comment LJefferson 3 April 2023

The supply chain of a seemingly innocuous cash crop – sesame – has intersected with transnational conflict dynamics, exacerbating tensions between Ethiopia and Sudan.

Late 2020 saw the beginning of the devastating war in Tigray and the occupation of a disputed region on the Ethiopia–Sudan border – Al Fashaga – by the Sudanese army. These shocks disrupted settled patterns of land ownership and control in both Ethiopia’s volatile north and Sudan’s borderlands, historically the heart of the sesame and oilseed production that is economically vital to both countries.

These seemingly harmless cash crops are now embedded in local, subnational and national political contestations in both countries. Sesame value chains are being reshaped, with power and profits being used to entrench the grip of political and armed actors who are reinforcing new patterns of land control and driving informal and illicit trade – impacting the coping mechanisms of local communities and threatening to fuel further conflict.

Regional rivalries drive contestation over the Ethiopia supply chain

Internal borders between most of Ethiopia’s regions are marked by boundary disputes, which often degenerate into violent conflict. The most important is between the Tigray and Amhara regions. Since the war began in 2020, the Amhara region has annexed vast areas of western and southern Tigray, which the Amhara region claims were taken from them by Tigray 30 years ago, after the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) dominated ethnic coalition came to power.

Ethiopia’s exports of spices, oilseeds and pulses brought in over half a billion dollars in 2021, roughly a quarter of the country’s total export revenues and second only to coffee. The sector has been rocked by the war in the north, which accounted for much of Ethiopia’s sesame production, with an estimated 500,000 hectares of sesame fields taken out of cultivation during the 2021 growing season. Conflict has exacerbated a steady decline in formal revenues from sesame exports, dropping over $115 million from 2016 to 2021.

Alongside falling production, the previously integrated value chain has been disrupted and decentralized by political fragmentation and land competition between Amharas and Tigrayans. Before the war, the agricultural sector in Western Tigray/Welkait was dominated by Tigrayan business interests, through the TPLF’s regional endowment fund EFFORT, a business conglomerate including subsidiaries such as Guna Trading House, and Hiwot Agricultural Mechanization.