Introduction

Reaching education goals in the coming years will require sharp increases in funding and better delivery. Despite a global focus on improving access to education, nearly 60 million children in developing countries remain out of primary school and increased investments have not translated to better education quality or improved learning outcomes (UNESCO 2015a). Even with an increase in domestic public expenditure, UNESCO estimates that the financing gap for delivering good quality universal education from pre-school through junior secondary levels by 2030 in low-income countries will be $10.6 billion, on average, between 2015 and 2030—over four times the level currently provided by official donors ($2.3 billion) (UNESCO 2015b).

Closing acute financing and delivery gaps that prevent access to quality education will be a major challenge, requiring all hands on deck. Domestic governments and foreign donors will need to step up their game substantially, but fiscal and capacity constraints are likely to prevent them remedying resource deficits on their own in the short term. Non-state actors—mainly religious and charitable organizations, private (“foundation”) schools, and a small number of for-profit schools—are already partially filling the gaps, although the precise extent of their services and their impact is unknown.

Determining the appropriate role of non-state actors in education is a contentious topic among specialists. Disagreements have revolved around serious normative issues, including such basic questions as whether non-state provision is consistent with the principle of education as a human right, and serious empirical questions relating to quality and equity implications. This discussion has been blurred by definitional issues (i.e., what is non-state and private education?); lack of clarity over distinctions between ownership, delivery, and financing; a lack of accurate data on current and potential provision rates; and an insufficient base of evidence from which to draw clear conclusions on the effectiveness of non-state engagement in education. These problems have made it difficult to generate comparisons across empirical studies, leading to significant variation in the interpretation of evidence. For some observers, evidence has fueled concern that non-state education is violating human rights principles (e.g., the report by the United Nations Rapporteur on Education),1 while for others it has provided encouragement that non-state engagement can help address financing and delivery challenges (e.g., Tooley 2009).

Our goal is to provide a neutral background to this debate and identify areas of common ground. Beginning with some big picture facts, this paper develops a detailed language around non-state actors in education. We then outline current issues and poles of debate around engagement of non-state actors in education and provide an assessment of the depth of available data and evidence. To close, we establish a typology and propose a framework for discussions around the role of non-state actors in basic education and how these actors can best contribute to the achievement of Education for All and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Our paper refers largely to basic education, including pre-primary, primary, and lower-secondary, as this is the main focus of much recent discussion around the role of non-state actors in education and an area of strong growth in developing countries.

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Editor's note: POLITICO Magazine released a list of the top 50 influential people in Washington, D.C., including Brookings Senior Fellow Robert Kagan and Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Victoria Nuland, described as "the ultimate American power couple."

Victoria Nuland and Robert Kagan fell in love “talking about democracy and the role of America in the world” on one of their first dates. It’s a shared passion that hasn’t faded over time.

It was just two years ago that President Obama was gushing to aides about an essay that Kagan, a historian and author, wrote about the myth of American decline—a theme Obama echoed in his State of the Union that January. This year, Kagan’s sprawling New Republic essay, “Superpowers Don’t Get to Retire,” insisted on America’s enduring responsibility to shape the world order—and issued a direct challenge to a president who has summarized his own foreign-policy doctrine with a minimalist “don’t-do-stupid-s—t” directive. Obama promptly invited Kagan in for a West Wing consult, but it was also clear that Kagan had helped rouse the president’s Republican critics, who have been increasingly adopting Kagan’s argument that just because it’s been a decade of wearying war in Iraq and Afghanistan doesn’t mean America can roll up its superpower carpet and stay home when new crises, from Iraq to Russia to Syria, beckon.

Nuland, overseeing European and Eurasian Affairs at the State Department, has been a strong advocate of the engaged approach her husband favors as a crisis with Russia has unfolded on her diplomatic turf this year. The point was made, rather sensationally, in February, when a leaked audio recording of her F-bomb-laden diatribe about the fecklessness of the European Union, which she accused of not exactly playing a constructive role trying to end the growing conflict in Ukraine, appeared on the Internet. Nuland, a career Foreign Service officer, has been an impassioned advocate for democracy-building in Eastern Europe, and while she got pushback from European counterparts over her “f—k the EU” comment, the United States has been leading the effort to impose sanctions on Russia since President Vladimir Putin seized Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula and waged a proxy war in the country’s east—dragging a reluctant Europe along pretty much every step of the way.

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The financial sector has undergone major changes in response to the Great Recession and post-crisis regulatory reform, as a result of the Dodd-Frank Act and Basel III. These changes have created serious questions about the sector’s role in supporting economic growth and how it affects financial and overall economic stability.

On June 8, the Initiative on Business and Public Policy at Brookings explored the intersection of the financial system and economic growth with the goal of informing the public policy debate. The event featured a keynote address by Richard Berner, director of the Office of Financial Research and other participants with a wide range of views from a variety of backgrounds. Among other issues, the experts considered the changing landscape of the financial sector; growth-promoting allocation and investment decisions; credit availability for low- and moderate-income households; the ideal balance between growth and stability; and the impact of the 2014 midterm elections on regulatory reform.

 Follow the conversation at @BrookingsEcon or #Finance.

Video

• Keynote remarks by Richard Berner
• The financial sector: How has it changed?
• The view from the trenches
• The future of the U.S. financial sector

Audio

• Can the financial sector promote growth and stability?

Transcript

• Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

• Aaron Kleins presentation
• 20150608 BAER slides
• 20150608 MEHTA slides
• 20150608_financial_sector_stability_transcript

Executive Summary ¹

The regional banks play an important role in the economy providing funding to consumers and small- and medium-sized businesses. Their model is simpler than that of the large Wall Street banks, with their business concentrated in the U.S.; they are less involved in trading and investment banking, and they are more reliant on deposits for their funding. We examined the balance sheets of 15 regional banks that had assets between $50 billion and $250 billion in 2003 and that remained in operation through 2014.

The regionals have undergone important changes in their financial structure as a result of the financial crisis and the subsequent regulatory changes:

• Total assets held by the regionals grew strongly since 2010. Their share of total bank assets has risen since 2010.

• Loans and leases make up by far the largest component of their assets. Since the crisis, however, they have substantially increased their holdings of securities and interest bearing balances, including government securities and reserves.

• The liabilities of the regionals were heavily concentrated in domestic deposits, a pattern that has intensified since the crisis. Deposits were 70 percent of liabilities in 2003, a number that fell through 2007 as they diversified their funding sources, but by 2014 deposits made up 82 percent of the total.

• Regulators are requiring large banks to increase their holdings of long term subordinated debt as a cushion against stress or failure. The regionals, as of 2014, had not increased their share of such liabilities.

• Like the largest banks, the regionals increased their loans and leases in line with their deposits prior to the crisis. And like the largest banks, this relation broke down after 2007, with loans growing much more slowly than deposits. Unlike the largest banks, the regionals have increased loans strongly since 2010, but there remains a significant gap between deposits and loans.

• The regional banks’ share of their net income from traditional sources (mostly loans) has been slowly declining over the period.

• The return on assets of the regionals was between 1.5 and 2.0 percent prior to the crisis. This turned sharply negative in the crisis before recovering after 2009. Between 2012 and 2014 return on assets for these banks was around 1.0 percent, well below the pre-crisis level.

As we saw with the largest banks, the structure and returns of the regional banks has changed as a result of the crisis and new regulation. Perhaps the most troubling change is that the volume of loans lags well behind the volume of deposits, a potential problem for economic growth. The asset and liability structure of the banks has also changed, but these banks have a simpler business model where deposits and loans still predominate.

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A major oil spill will result in cleanup spending that boosts GDP, but no one thinks oil spills are good. Oil spills and other forms of pollution are examples of negative externalities — harm caused to others by the economic activity of a firm or industry. These externalities represent a failure of the market, and unless there is corrective action, their presence means that there is too much production of something that causes negative spillovers.

That criticism can be applied to the financial services industry. Many say that it grew too large, triggered a financial crisis and damaged the rest of the economy. Is that still the case, and is financialization spoiling the economy? Despite the alarmist rhetoric around today’s finance sector, the answer is generally “no” because of changes made to financial regulation.

First, a check on the facts: How large is the industry and how much has it grown? The broad definition of the financial sector includes finance, insurance and real estate, known by the acronym “FIRE.” It was 17.5 percent of gross domestic product in 1990 and rose to 20.0 percent in 2014, but that figure is misleading as it includes office and apartment rents and leases — stuff that has little to do with Wall Street.

Finance and insurance separately peaked well before the financial crisis at 7.7 percent of GDP, which was up from 5.8 percent in 1990. In 2014, it was 7.0 percent of GDP. Employment in finance and insurance has been on a downtrend since 2003 and is currently 4.25 percent of total nonfarm payrolls. Most of those jobs are in offices and bank branches around the country. (The output data given here are drawn from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, GDP by Industry data. The employment data are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Payroll Employment data. Author’s calculations.)

Still, salaries and bonuses at the top are extremely attractive, so perhaps the externality plays out by drawing the best and brightest away from other more productive activities. The Harvard Crimson reported that in 2007, 23 percent of graduating Harvard seniors said they planned to enter finance. That is an impressive number, but things turned around sharply, with the 23 percent figure falling to 11.5 percent in 2009 after the financial crisis. At this point, the financial industry really isn’t large enough to crowd out other parts of the economy.

Meanwhile, the insurance industry serves an important social purpose providing life, property, and casualty insurance. AIG got into trouble in the crisis because it strayed into providing very risky financial services, not because of its main insurance business. Likewise, the core value of banks is financial intermediation between savers and investors, giving savers relatively secure and liquid assets while also funding investment.

There are critics of how well our banking industry serves this core purpose, a quality that is hard to determine. My judgment is that it does the job pretty well compared to most other countries. As the IMF reported in September 2015, the non-performing loan problem among European banks remains severe, whereas most U.S. banks now have strong balance sheets. Good financial intermediation means that most of the savings dollars are transferred to investors and are not lost through inefficient bank operations. A 2002 study that I participated in found bank productivity higher in the United States than in France or Germany.

The parts of the financial sector that give rise to the most concern are market-making, deal-making and the creation and trading of derivatives on Wall Street. The volume of market trading has increased exponentially because of the increased speed of computers and communications. Up to a certain point, the increased volume is helpful because it adds to the liquidity of markets, but the advent of high-frequency trading has taken us over the top. As Michael Lewis describes in his book Flash Boys, the high speed traders are finding ways to shave milliseconds off the time needed to make trades. That is thoroughly wasteful. As for deal-making, it has been going on for a long time — indeed the go-go years for deals were in the 1980s — so it is hard to blame the recent slowing of economic growth on this activity.

Still, the explosion of derivatives and other overly-complex instruments was problematic, and it is crystal clear that the mortgage market became too opaque and removed accountability from the system. The layering of complex derivatives on top of lousy mortgages (and other shaky assets) distorted the economy, resulted in the overbuilding of houses, and caused the financial crisis. There are plenty of people at fault besides the bankers, but the smart people on Wall Street were driving the process, and they should have known better. The excessive financialization obscured the reality of loans that depended upon ever-rising home prices and thus were never going to be paid back. There was an externality because the private calculations of potential profit ignored the risks being imposed on society.

Is that still the situation today? No. Things have changed. Banks and other financial institutions that create risks for the whole economy are now required to hold sufficient capital to cover losses even in periods of economic and financial stress, plus a liquidity buffer (they must pass “stress tests” administered by the Federal Reserve). The screws have been turned pretty tight, and the owners of large financial institutions will bear the costs of future failures — not taxpayers. This brings private incentives in line with the public interest, getting rid of the externality that gave us too much financialization in the first place. But to keep the future safe, we’ll have to make sure no one forgets what happened in the last crisis, and ensure that new risks are not created in other, less-regulated parts of the industry.

Editor's note: This piece originally appeared in the Washington Post.

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Despite the attention on the mid-term races, few elections are competitive. Electoral competition, already low at the national level, is in decline in state and primary elections as well. Reformers, who point to gerrymandering and a host of other targets for change, argue that improving competition will produce voters who are more interested in elections, better-informed on issues, and more likely to turn out to the polls.

On October 27, the Brookings Institution—in conjunction with the Cato Institute and The Pew Research Center—presented a discussion and a groundbreaking survey exploring the attitudes and opinions of voters in competitive and noncompetitive congressional districts. The survey, part of Pew's regular polling on voter attitudes, was conducted through the weekend of October 21. A series of questions explored the public's perceptions, knowledge, and opinions about electoral competitiveness.

The discussion also explored a publication that addresses the startling lack of competition in our democratic system. The Marketplace of Democracy: Electoral Competition and American Politics (Brookings, 2006), considers the historical development, legal background, and political aspects of a system that is supposed to be responsive and accountable, yet for many is becoming stagnant, self-perpetuating, and tone-deaf. Michael McDonald, editor and Brookings visiting fellow, moderated a discussion among co-editor John Samples, director of the Center for Representative Government at the Cato Institute, and Andrew Kohut and Scott Keeter from The Pew Research Center, who also discussed the survey.

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• 20061027
• 20061027ppt