Reducing inequality and expanding opportunity are central challenges increasingly acknowledged by leaders across the political spectrum. Policymakers generally agree that one key solution is to prepare young people and adults with the skills to earn a good income. Unlike other advanced countries, however, reform proposals in the United States have typically included little or nothing about apprenticeship—a highly cost-effective mechanism for developing workplace skills and for reducing youth unemployment. However, interest in apprenticeship models is building in the United States, partly because of the recent successes of Britain and South Carolina in stimulating major expansions of apprenticeship training. A robust apprenticeship system is especially attractive because of its potential to reduce youth unemployment, improve the transition from school to career, upgrade skills, raise wages of young adults, strengthen a young worker’s identity, increase U.S. productivity, achieve positive returns for employers and workers, and use limited federal resources more effectively.

Apprenticeship prepares workers to master occupational skills and achieve career success. Under apprenticeship programs, individuals undertake productive work for their employer, earn a salary, receive training primarily through supervised work‐ based learning, and take academic instruction that is related to the apprenticeship occupation. The programs generally last from two to four years. Apprenticeship helps workers to master not only relevant occupational skills, but also other work‐related skills, including communication, problem solving, allocation of resources, and dealing with supervisors and a diverse set of coworkers. The course work is generally equivalent to at least one year of community college. Completing apprenticeship training yields a recognized and valued credential attesting to mastery of skill required in the relevant occupation. Unlike the normal part-time jobs held by high school and college students, apprenticeship integrates what young people learn on the job and in the classroom. Box 7-1 describes a successful youth apprenticeship program in Georgia. (See the PDF for Box 7-1).

In some ways, apprenticeship offers an alternative to the “academic-only” college focus of U.S. policymakers. Increasingly, placing all of our career-preparation eggs in one basket is leaving young adults, especially minority young men, well behind. Among young adults ages twenty-five to thirty-four in 2013, 49 percent of all women and 37 percent of African American women had earned at least an Associate degree; for men, the comparable figures were 40 percent and 28 percent, respectively. Furthermore, in 2011–12, nearly two African American women earned a bachelor’s degree for every African American male who earned one (National Center for Education Statistics 2013). Despite the well-documented high average returns to college, variations in interests, capacities, and learning styles suggest many young people would benefit far more from alternative pathways to rewarding careers than they do from academic-only pathways. 

Apprenticeship can narrow the postsecondary achievement gaps in both gender and race. Having learning take place mostly on the job, making the tasks and classroom work highly relevant to their careers, and providing participants with wages while they learn are especially beneficial to men, particularly minority men. Apprenticeship can give minorities increased confidence that their personal efforts and investment in skill development will pay off, giving graduates a genuine sense of occupational identity and occupational pride. 

Additionally, apprenticeship is a useful tool for enhancing youth development. Young people work with natural adult mentors who offer guidance but allow youth to make their own mistakes (Halpern 2009). Youth see themselves judged by the established standards of a discipline, including deadlines and the genuine constraints and unexpected difficulties that arise in the profession. Supervisors provide the close monitoring and frequent feedback that helps apprentices keep their focus on performing well at the work site and in the classroom. 

Furthermore, apprenticeship is distinctive in enhancing both the worker supply side and the employer demand side of the labor market. On the supply side, the financial gains to apprenticeship are strikingly high. U.S. studies indicate that apprentices do not have to sacrifice earnings during their education and training and that their long-term earnings benefits exceed the gains they would have accumulated after graduating from community college (Hollenbeck 2008). The latest reports from the state of Washington show that the gains in earnings from various education and training programs far surpass the gains from all other alternatives (Workforce Training and Education Coordinating Board 2014). A broad study of apprenticeship in ten states also documents large and statistically significant earnings gains from participating in apprenticeship programs (Reed et al. 2012). 

On the demand side, employers can feel comfortable upgrading their jobs knowing that their apprenticeship programs will ensure an adequate supply of well-trained workers. High levels of apprenticeship activity in Australia, Canada, and Britain demonstrate that even companies in labor markets with few restrictions on hiring, firing, and wages are willing to invest in apprenticeship training. While no rigorous evidence is available about apprenticeship’s costs and benefits to U.S. employers, research in other countries indicates that employers gain financially from their apprenticeship investments (Lerman 2014). 

In general, firms reap several advantages from their apprenticeship investments. They save significant sums in recruitment and training costs, in reduced errors in placing employees, in excessive costs when the demand for skilled workers cannot be quickly filled, and in all employees being well versed with company procedures. One benefit to firms that is rarely captured in studies is the positive impact of apprenticeship on innovation. Well-trained workers are more likely to understand the complexities of a firm’s production processes and therefore to identify and implement technological improvements, especially incremental innovations to improve existing products and processes. A study of German establishments documents this connection and finds a clear relationship between the extent of in-company training and subsequent innovation (Bauernschuster, Falck, and Heblich 2009). In the United States, evidence from surveys of more than 900 employers indicates that the overwhelming majority of them believe their programs are valuable and involve net gains (Lerman, Eyster, and Chambers 2009). Nearly all sponsors reported that apprenticeship programs help them meet their skill demands—87 percent reported that they would strongly recommend registered apprenticeship programs, and another 11 percent recommended apprenticeship programs with some reservations. Other benefits of apprenticeship include reliably documenting appropriate skills, raising worker productivity, increasing worker morale, and reducing safety problems.

While apprenticeship offers a productivity-enhancing approach to reducing inequality and expanding opportunity, activity in the United States has declined in recent years to levels about one-tenth of those in Australia, Canada, and Britain. Some believe the problems include inadequate information and familiarity with apprenticeship, an inadequate infrastructure, and expectations that sufficient skills will emerge from community college programs. Others see the main problem as an unwillingness of U.S. companies to invest, no matter how favorable government subsidies and marketing policies are. In considering these explanations, we should remember that even in countries with robust apprenticeship systems, only a minority of firms actually hires apprentices. Since the number of apprenticeship applicants already far exceeds the number of apprenticeship slots, the main problem today is to increase the number of apprenticeship openings that employers offer. Counseling young people about potential apprenticeship opportunities is a sensible complementary strategy to working with the companies, but encouraging interest in apprenticeship could be counterproductive without a major increase in apprenticeship slots. 

Developing a more robust support system for apprenticeship programs requires action at various levels of government. This proposal consists of a series of targeted initiatives that rely on both state and federal support. At the state level, governments could develop marketing campaigns to persuade employers to create apprenticeship programs, and to build on existing youth apprenticeship programs. At the federal level, the government could provide federal subsidies to encourage take-up of existing vouchers for apprenticeship programs; designate occupational standards for apprenticeship through a joint Office of Apprenticeship (OA)–Department of Commerce (Commerce) team; and develop an infrastructure of information, peer support, and research within the Departments of Commerce and Labor.

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• Expanding Apprenticeship Opportunities in the United States - Full Text

The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) provides a refundable tax credit to lower-income working families. In 2011, the EITC reached 27.9 million tax filers at a total cost of $62.9 billion. Almost 20 percent of tax filers receive the EITC, and the average credit amount is $2,254 (IRS 2013). After expansions to the EITC in the late 1980s through the late 1990s—under Democrat and Republican administrations—the EITC now occupies a central place in the U.S. safety net. Based on the Census Bureau’s 2012 Supplemental Poverty Measure (SPM), the EITC keeps 6.5 million people, including 3.3 million children, out of poverty (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities [CBPP] 2014a). No other tax or transfer program prevents more children from living a life of poverty, and only Social Security keeps more people above poverty.

Since the EITC is only eligible to tax filers who work, the credit’s impact on poverty takes place through encouraging employment by ensuring greater pay after taxes. The empirical research shows that the tax credit translates into sizable and robust increases in employment (Eissa and Liebman 1996; Meyer and Rosenbaum 2000, 2001). Thus, the credit reduces poverty through two channels: the actual credit, and increases in family earnings. This dual feature gives the EITC a unique place in the U.S. safety net; in contrast, many other programs redistribute income while, at least to some degree, discouraging work. Importantly, transferring income while encouraging work makes the EITC an efficient and cost-effective policy for increasing the after-tax income of low-earning Americans. Yet a program of this size and impact could be more equitable in its reach. Under the current design of the EITC, childless earners and families with only one child, for instance, receive disproportionately lower refunds. 

In 2014, families with two children (three or more children) are eligible for a maximum credit of $5,460 ($6,143) compared to $3,305 for families with one child. Married couples, despite their larger family sizes, receive only modestly more-generous EITC benefits compared to single filers. Childless earners benefit little from the EITC, and have a maximum credit of only $496—less than 10 percent of the two-child credit. 

Prominent proposals seek to mitigate these inequalities. President Obama’s fiscal year 2015 budget includes an expansion of the childless EITC, a concept outlined by John Karl Scholz in 2007 in a proposal for The Hamilton Project. Notably, MDRC is currently evaluating Paycheck Plus, a pilot program for an expanded EITC for workers without dependent children, for the New York City Center for Economic Opportunity (MDRC 2014). The recent Hamilton Project proposal for a secondary-earner tax credit addresses the so-called EITC penalty for married couples (Kearney and Turner 2013). And the more generous EITC credit for three or more children was recently enacted as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, and is currently scheduled to sunset in 2017. 

Considering this broad set of EITC reforms, and recognizing the demonstrated effectiveness of the program as an antipoverty program with numerous benefits, this policy memo proposes an expansion for the largest group of  EITC recipients: families with one child. In particular, I propose to expand the one-child schedule to be on par with the two-child schedule, in equivalence scale-adjusted terms. An equivalence scale captures the cost of living for a household of a given size (and demographic composition) relative to the cost of living for a reference household of a single adult, and is a standard component in defining poverty thresholds. The proposal expands the maximum credit for one-child families to $4,641, from $3,305 under current law, an increase of about 40 percent. The expansion will lead to a roughly $1,000 increase in after-tax income for taxpayers in the bottom 40 percent of the income distribution receiving the higher credit. As this paper outlines, the expansion is justified on equity and efficiency grounds. This expansion is anchored in the equity principle in that the generosity of the credit should be proportional to the needs of families of differing sizes; I use the equivalence scale implicit in the poverty thresholds of the Census SPM as a guide for household needs. This proposal is also supported by efficiency principles given the EITC’s demonstrated success at raising labor supply among single mothers. 

The target population for the proposal is low-income working families with children. Implementing this proposal requires legislative action by the federal government; it is important to note that altering the EITC schedule requires a simple amendment to the tax code, and not a massive overhaul of our nation’s tax system. The revenue cost of the proposal derives from additional federal costs of the EITC, less the additional payroll and ordinary federal income taxes. The private benefits include increases in after-tax income and reductions in poverty. The proposal would also generate social benefits through the spillover effects that the increase in income plays in improving health and children’s cognitive skills (Dahl and Lochner 2012; Evans and Garthwaite 2014; Hoynes, Miller, and Simon forthcoming).

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• Building on the Success of the Earned Income Tax Credit - Full Text

British debates about welfare reform have often been influenced by American ideas. The Clinton-era welfare reforms were echoed in some of Tony Blair’s alterations to British benefits. Gordon Brown, as Chancellor, introduced a new Working Tax Credit as a direct result of studying the Earned Income Tax Credit. Brown particularly liked the political advantages of a ‘tax cut for hard-working families’, as opposed to a ‘benefit handout to welfare families’.

But now the transatlantic traffic in ideas on welfare is going the other way. The U.K.’s introduction of a single, unified system of transfer payments – the Universal Credit – is getting quite a bit of attention in the wonkier regions of D.C. politics. Paul Ryan, at a Brookings summit on social mobility, mentioned the Universal Credit (UC) as a possible inspiration for a new round of welfare reform. (Ryan is giving a speech at AEI in a couple of weeks: we’re likely to hear more about his thinking then.) When the architect of the UC, Iain Duncan Smith, visited D.C. recently, he held a series of meetings with leading Republicans to discuss his reforms.

The main attractions of the Universal Credit are fourfold:

1. Simplicity. By unifying five cash benefits and an ‘in kind’ benefit (Housing Benefit) into a single, monthly payment, the complexity of the system from the point of view of the recipient will be greatly reduced.
   
   
2. Cost control. Housing Benefit is paid directly to the landlord, which reduces the tenant’s incentive to control costs.  Add that to the crazily overheated U.K. housing market, and should come as no surprise that Housing Benefit has become a major strain on the system, quintupling in cost in real terms over the last two decades to hit £24 billion a year (c. $41bn), to become the second-biggest element of the U.K.’s system, after pensions.  By including an allowance for housing in the single cash payment in UC, the recipient will be incentivized to control their own housing costs.
    
3. Stronger work incentives. The UC has a flatter ‘taper’ than existing benefits, meaning that cash payments are reduced more slowly as earnings rise. In particular, the UC will allow benefit recipients to work part-time (less than 16 hours a week), and still keep claiming. On the downside, incentives for second earners in two-adult families will be reduced. 
   
   
4. Tighter and more targeted work requirements. The UC will contain stronger requirements to seek work than existing benefits, and importantly, has a ‘sliding scale’ of requirements, depending on the position of the recipient. For example, parents with children under the age of 1 will be exempt from work requirements; those with children aged between  1 and 5 will be obliged to attend for interviews with a case worker to prepare for a return to work; those with children at school will be required to ‘actively seek work’.

Sounds pretty good, doesn't it? And in fact it is, on paper at least. In practice the introduction of UC has been marked with huge overspend and delay on the required new IT system. The whole exercise has also been made much harder by cuts in many of the relevant cash benefits, as well as the introduction of a ‘household cap’ on total welfare receipts. The Universal Credit as an idea has a lot of support. As so often, it has been putting the idea a reality that has been difficult.

What—if anything—can the U.S. take from the UC? Short answer: not much. 

Many of the problems the UC addresses do not really apply in the U.S. Work incentives are already pretty strong in the U.S., thanks to the relative generosity of the EITC, and the relative meanness of out-of-work welfare supports. Also, there are already much stronger work requirements in the U.S. system. Some want to go further, and add work requirements to the receipt of food stamps, for example. But this would not require a major overhaul.  As Melissa Boteach and her colleagues at the Center for American Progress write,“the primary problem that the Universal Credit is supposed to address in the United Kingdom—the lack of incentive for jobless workers to enter the labor force—is far less of an issue in the United States”.

The UC also further centralizes an already highly centralized system, by getting rid of Housing Benefit, which is currently administered by Local Authorities. The U.S. system is much less centralized, with states and cities having a high degree of control over the way TANF and SNAP are administered. It is hard to see how anything like a UC could work in the U.S. at anything higher than State level. A Wisconsin Universal Credit makes sense in a way that a U.S. Universal Credit does not.  But if shifting towards block grants to states is really what this is about (see Marco Rubio’s ‘flex fund’ idea),that’s a whole different debate.

A final point. Simplicity and ease of use for the recipient is a key goal of the UC, and a worthy one. The stress and difficulties faced by low-income families just in applying for assistance is unacceptable in the 21st century. But it is not clear that the whole system has to be upended to achieve this goal. Technology ought to allow a single access point to the system, with the complexity out of sight of the user. 

In the U.K. the Universal Credit has a strong rationale, despite the implementation challenges. In the U.S., it is a solution in search of a problem. 

At 77 years of age, the federal minimum wage deserves a respite from the day-to-day combat of political life. Today, protestors around the country are demanding a $15 minimum. But few observers think this level is economically desirable: even fewer think that it is likely.

Democrats want a higher minimum, and say so loudly. Republicans of a free-market persuasion mostly do not—but tend to stay silent because they know that swing voters look positively at raising the wages of low-earners.

The minimum wage is lagging…

Congressional political stalemate has meant the U.S. wage floor has lagged behind median earnings. In contrast wage growth in other OECD countries has performed much better, as this graph produced by the Hamilton Project shows:

Advanced nations have de-politicized minimum wage decisions

The federal minimum wage is an established piece of the U.S. policy furniture—and one that is quite dated. It now makes sense to consider taking some of the power and responsibility for setting the wage rate out of the hands of politicians—just as interest rates are set by the Federal Reserve.

This is not a novel proposal in international terms. In most advanced economies, minimum wage decisions are not purely political. Out of 66 countries studied by Tito Boeri in 2009, 24 delegate the determination the minimum wage level to a tripartite body; 26 countries set the minimum wage after taking advice following formal consultation between the Government and representatives of employers and workers; and just 16 countries (including the U.S.) set the minimum wage through a simple legislative vote.

Over in the U.K., the Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron just jacked up the national minimum wage by 3% up to £6.70, with barely a squeak of protest from employers or the right wing of his own party. Why? Because, like his two predecessors, he simply followed the advice of the Low Pay Commission, which is comprised of nine commissioners—three each from trade unions, employer organizations and academia.

Two options for taking the political heat out of the U.S. minimum wage

Can the U.S. follow suit? And if it can, what might the new system look like? Two options at least are worth considering.

1. A Federal Minimum Wage Advisory Board. This could be made up (like the U.K. version) of nine members: three representatives of employer organizations, three from labor organizations, and three independent labor economists. The Board would recommend a rate for the national minimum wage each year, which would then be enacted by Congress in the usual manner. The Board would have a strong incentive to set a rate likely to be adopted by Congress, in order to establish and maintain its reputation: there is, after all, little point in sitting on a Board that is ignored. The Board’s recommendation would not be binding and would not become the legal ‘default’ level. But because the advice is likely to be sensible, Congress would likely be inclined to follow it.

2. Wage Indexation. An alternative—favored by my Brookings colleague Gary Burtless—would be to simultaneously raise the minimum wage and introduce automatic indexing, lifting the minimum wage at the same rate as either consumer prices or the median wage—preferably the latter. In effect, this would do for the minimum wage what President Nixon did for Social Security. Congress would have the power to suspend a rise—perhaps if unemployment reached a certain threshold—but the default position would be to link changes in the minimum wage to changes in the median wage or in the broader consumer economy.

Policy commitment devices in action

These are both examples of what I have called policy commitment devices—in a new paper, Ulysses Goes to Washington—that help to overcome political myopia in order to support longer-term policy objectives. In the first case, taking advice from an independent commission, the commitment is somewhat less binding, although as James Madison knew, ‘the counsels and checks of friends’ can carry plenty of weight. Indexation would be a tighter form of binding, since inaction on the part of politicians would lead to an uprating of minimum wage, rather than the current stasis.

For both sides, there are political attractions to sub-contracting some decision-making power over the minimum wage. By accepting the advice of an independent body or allowing indexation to do its silent work, Republicans can keep their business donors and right-wing critics at bay; Democrats can do the same for unions and the political left. Sometimes the most powerful thing politicians can do is give some power away. The minimum wage is now perhaps a case in point.

House Republicans recently approved the “Death Tax Repeal Act of 2015.”  If we care about our debt obligations, social mobility, or equality of opportunity, we should consider doing just the opposite: raising the tax and applying it to more of the super-wealthy.

Currently, the estate tax doesn't touch the first $5.43 million of an individual’s assets and the first $10.86 million of couples’ assets. The tax kicks in after that amount, eventually rising to a top rate of 40 percent.  

Proponents of repeal make a number of claims to make their case. Let’s examine the most common.

1. The estate tax affects a significant portion of Americans. Only about 5,400 estates will pay any estate tax this year. That’s about 0.2% of all estates – that’s right, just two tenths of one percent.  That’s a fortieth of the 1970’s share. Americans worried about the Estate Tax have nothing to fear but fear itself. 
2. The estate tax hurts small farms and businesses. In fact, the estate tax touches virtually no small farms or businesses. The Urban-Brookings Tax Policy estimated how many farm and business estates worth under $5 million paid any tax in 2013. Twenty did. Twenty small farms and businesses paid any estate tax in 2013. And those 20 estates faced an average tax rate of 4.9%. Only 660 farm estates—of any size—paid the tax in 2013, and 100 of those farms had assets worth over $20 million. The USDA estimates that 0.6% of all farm estates owed federal estate tax in 2013. This is because families who farm for a living have access to generous deductions: up to $1 million for continuing to farm the land for the next 10 years and up to $500,000 for adopting conservation easements. They can also delay payment and lighten their tax liability by gifting their land to heirs. Small businesses have similarly generous carve-out.
3. Repealing the estate tax doesn't affect the budget, because it’s a small share of federal revenue. In 2014, the estate tax represented 0.6% of federal collections, or roughly $20 billion annually, according to the Joint Committee on Taxation. But part of the reason that’s so low is because Congress has increased the exemption and lowered the rate in recent years; in 2001, the top rate was 55% and the exemption was only $675,000. Still, even today, repealing the tax is costly. The JCT estimates that repeal would cost the government $269 billion over the next decade.
4. The estate tax represents double taxation. Well, maybe. It is true that people  pay taxes on their income when earned and then may have to pay again when they pass it on to their heirs.  However, because the super-wealthy keep much of their assets as unrealized capital gains (55% for those estates worth over $100 million), the estate tax is the only way, right now, to tax these capital gains. In that sense it can be viewed as a partial corrective within our funhouse of a tax system. Some capital gains, to be sure, are the fruits of hard work and entrepreneurial creativity but a lot are simply the result of gains among those wealthy enough to participate in speculative ventures. 

One thing is true: repeal would mean a large tax break for the wealthiest 0.2% of the population. The 1,336 families with estates worth more than $20 million would get almost three-fourths of the benefit from the repeal and enjoy an average windfall of $10 million each, according to the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. The 318 families with estates worth more than $50 million would see an average windfall of $20 million each.

These facts are often obscured by our penchant for individual stories. One Washington Post story for example, acknowledges many of the statistics above, but then goes on to give two examples of farmers who had to sell land to meet their tax burden, one of which is several decades old, when the exemption was much lower. Elected officials love these kinds of stories and tell them often. Are they unaware of the generous special provisions for this group?  Do they truly believe that very wealthy families are the ones we should be helping? Or are they thinking about who is going to finance their next campaign?

The estate tax is one of the most progressive aspects of our tax system. In a time of increasing inequality, it provides a way to counteract the formation of a “permanent ownership class.” If anything, we should consider raising the rate and lowering the exemption to pay down debt and invest in opportunities for the unlucky children at the bottom of the wealth ladder. We could start by closing the stepped-up basis loophole and raising the estate tax to Clinton-era levels. We could do so in a way that protects real farmers and small business owners. Wealthy heirs, meanwhile, will still do very well, much better than the rest of America. A serious estate tax would allow us to come closer to our national ideal, in which no child is born a prince, and every child can become as rich as a king.

Note: An earlier version of this post said that the estate tax only applies to assets in excess of the exemption, which is incorrect. The estate tax is levied on the entire estate but is offset by a credit equal to the tax on the first $5.43 million. This version is corrected.

Improving data in the field of workforce development is a necessary step to evaluating programs and replicating success. What does current data tell us about the populations served? What outcomes should we measure to ensure programs are meeting America’s workforce development needs?

Earlier this month, we convened an expert group of policy makers, practitioners and scholars to address this problem, along with other challenges in workforce development. Previously, we interviewed Kate Blosveren Kreamer on the need to strengthen bridges from school to work. Next up in our Q&A series is Beth Weigensberg, a researcher at Mathematica Policy Research.

A: Although there is increasingly more rigorous research to assess effectiveness of programs, I feel a missing piece is understanding how to replicate and scale-up effective strategies. Often times workforce development programs that are deemed effective in one place do not always succeed when implemented in another. Research that evaluates effectiveness of programs should assess the role of contextual factors (including organizational, leadership, community, and political factors) to identify what is needed to successfully implement, replicate, and scale successful programs.

A: The workforce development field has an unfortunate history of “creaming”—programs selectively work with individuals most likely to succeed at finding employment, leaving those “harder-to-serve” individuals struggling to find assistance. Individuals that are often considered “hard-to-serve” include those who are homeless, disabled, formerly incarcerated, older workers, non-English speakers, low-income, and youth who are disconnected from school and employment. Increasing efforts to focus on these “harder-to-serve” populations include specialized targeted programs and strategies to help address the complex needs of these individuals, which often extend beyond skill development and finding a job. These specialized programs often provide additional support services to help address their complex needs, which can serve as additional barriers to obtaining and retaining employment.

A: Intermediate measures of engagement and skill development would provide interim measures of progress, while the ultimate objectives are obviously employment and educational attainment. Ongoing evaluation on interim measures allows for earlier acknowledgment of achievement and identification of those struggling to progress. Assessing outcomes in ways that control for different populations or barriers to employment, such as using risk-adjusted methodologies, can help us evaluate workforce development programs in an equitable manner.

One of the biggest challenges in the field is ensuring we have valid and reliable data to accurately estimate outcomes. The data available to assess outcomes are usually limited by what is collected in management information systems, which are often developed to be responsive to reporting requirements of publically-funded programs. But these siloed data do not allow for comprehensive assessment of workforce development outcomes within a state, locality, or even within a community-based employment and training organization that relies on numerous funding sources. Efforts are needed to integrate data and assess standardized outcome measures across program and funding silos to allow for more comprehensive assessment of outcomes within the field.