The Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS) program has become an important tool of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in ensuring that the benefits of a given medical product outweigh the associated risks, and has enabled FDA to approve a number of products that might not otherwise have been made available for patient use. Since the implementation of the REMS program, however, concerns have been raised regarding its impact on patient access to products and the associated burden on providers and health care systems. In an effort to address these concerns—and as part of its commitments under the Prescription Drug User Fee Act reauthorization of 2012—FDA has undertaken efforts to standardize and improve the effectiveness of REMS, and to better integrate REMS programs into the health system. As part of this broader initiative, the Agency is currently assessing the feasibility of integrating accredited continuing education (CE) programs and activities into REMS programs that have been developed for a single drug.

Under a cooperative agreement with the FDA, the Center for Health Policy held an expert workshop on May 18 titled, “Incorporating Continuing Education into Single-Drug REMS: Exploring the Challenges and Opportunities”. This workshop provided an opportunity for pharmaceutical manufacturers, regulators, CE providers, accreditors, and other stakeholders to explore the ways that CE can be a valuable addition to the REMS toolkit, discuss potential barriers to the development and implementation of REMS-related CE for single products, and identify strategies for addressing those barriers.

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Event Information

Under the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act (FDAAA) of 2007, the FDA has the authority to require pharmaceutical manufacturers to develop Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS) for drugs or biologics that carry serious potential or known risks. Since that time, the REMS program has become an important tool in ensuring that riskier drugs are used safely, and it has allowed FDA to facilitate access to a host of drugs that may not otherwise have been approved. However, concerns have arisen regarding the effects of REMS programs on patient access to products, as well as the undue burden that the requirements place on the health care system. In response to these concerns, FDA has initiated reform efforts aimed at improving the standardization, assessment, and integration of REMS within the health care system. As part of this broader initiative, the agency is pursuing four priority projects, one of which focuses on improving provider-patient benefit-risk counseling for drugs that have a REMS attached.

Under a cooperative agreement with FDA, the Center for Health Policy at Brookings held an expert workshop on July 24 titled, “Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS): Building a Framework for Effective Patient Counseling on Medication Risks and Benefits”. This workshop was the first in a series of convening activities that will seek input from stakeholders across academia, industry, health systems, and patient advocacy groups, among others. Through these activities, Brookings and FDA will further develop and refine an evidence-based framework of best practices and principles that can be used to inform the development and effective use of REMS tools and processes.

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• REMS_PBRC_Meeting_Agenda
• REMS BR Speaker Bios
• REMS BenefitRisk Meeting Summary
• REMS BenefitRisk communication white paper

       

Event Information

The biomedical innovation ecosystem continues to evolve and enhance the processes by which treatments are developed and delivered to patients. Given this changing biomedical innovation landscape, it is imperative that all stakeholders work to ensure that development programs, regulatory practices, and the policies that enable them are aligned on and achieving a common set of goals. This will require a thorough reexamination of our understanding of biomedical innovation – and the subsequent ways in which we seek to incentivize it – in order to more effectively bridge research and analysis of the process itself with the science and policy underpinning it.

Traditional research into the efficiency and effectiveness of drug development programs has tended to focus on the ‘inputs’ and process trends in product development, quantifying the innovation as discrete units. At the opposite end of the research spectrum are potential measures that could be categorized as “value” or “outcomes” metrics. Identifying the appropriate measures across this spectrum – from inputs and technological progress through outcomes and value – and how such metrics can be in conversation with each other to improve the innovation process will be the focus of this expert workshop. On October 14, the Center for Health Policy at Brookings, under a cooperative agreement with the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, convened a roundtable discussion that engaged key stakeholders from throughout the innovation ecosystem to explore the factors and characteristics that could improve our understanding of what constitutes modern “innovation” and how best to track its progress.

Event Materials

• FINAL 1014 BrookingsFDA Agenda
• FINAL 1014 BrookingsFDA Participant List

       

It has been hailed as the most significant discovery in biology since polymerase chain reaction allowed for the mass replication of DNA samples. CRISPR-Cas9 is an inexpensive and easy-to-use gene-editing method that promises applications ranging from medicine to industrial agriculture to biofuels. Currently, applications to treat leukemia, HIV, and cancer are under experimental development.¹ However, new technical solutions tend to be fraught with old problems, and in this case, ethical and legal questions loom large over the future.

Disagreements on ethics

The uptake of this method has been so fast that many scientists have started to worry about inadequate regulation of research and its unanticipated consequences.² Consider, for instance, the disagreement on research on human germ cells (eggs, sperm, or embryos) where an edited gene is passed onto offspring. Since the emergence of bioengineering applications in the 1970s, the scientific community has eschewed experiments to alter human germline and some governments have even banned them.³ The regulation regimes are expectedly not uniform: for instance, China bans the implantation of genetically modified embryos in women but not the research with embryos.

Last year, a group of Chinese researchers conducted gene-editing experiments on non-viable human zygotes (fertilized eggs) using CRISPR.⁴ News that these experiments were underway prompted a group of leading U.S. geneticists to meet in March 2015 in Napa, California, to begin a serious consideration of ethical and legal dimensions of CRISPR and called for a moratorium on research editing genes in human germline.⁵ Disregarding that call, the Chinese researchers published their results later in the year largely reporting a failure to precisely edit targeted genes without accidentally editing non-targets. CRISPR is not yet sufficiently precise.

CRISPR reignited an old debate on human germline research that is one of the central motivations (but surely not the only one) for an international summit on gene editing hosted by the U.S. National Academies of Sciences, the Chinese Academy of Sciences, and the U.K.'s Royal Society in December 2015. About 500 scientists as well as experts in the legal and ethical aspects of bioengineering attended.⁶ Rather than consensus, the meeting highlighted the significant contrasts among participants about the ethics of inquiry, and more generally, about the governance of science. Illustrative of these contrasts are the views of prominent geneticists Francis Collins, Director of the National Institutes of Health, and George Church, professor of genetics at Harvard. Collins argues that the “balance of the debate leans overwhelmingly against human germline engineering.” In turn, Church, while a signatory of the moratorium called by the Napa group, has nevertheless suggested reasons why CRISPR is shifting the balance in favor of lifting the ban on human germline experiments.⁷

The desire to speed up discovery of cures for heritable diseases is laudable. But tinkering with human germline is truly a human concern and cannot be presumed to be the exclusive jurisdictions of scientists, clinicians, or patients. All members of society have a stake in the evolution of CRISPR and must be part of the conversation about what kind of research should be permitted, what should be discouraged, and what disallowed. To relegate lay citizens to react to CRISPR applications—i.e. to vote with their wallets once applications hit the market—is to reduce their citizenship to consumer rights, and public participation to purchasing power.⁸ Yet, neither the NAS summit nor the earlier Napa meeting sought to solicit the perspectives of citizens, groups, and associations other than those already tuned in the CRISPR debates.⁹

The scientific community has a bond to the larger society in which it operates that in its most basic form is the bond of the scientist to her national community, is the notion that the scientist is a citizen of society before she is a denizen of science. This bond entails liberties and responsibilities that transcend the ethos and telos of science and, consequently, subordinates science to the social compact. It is worth recalling this old lesson from the history of science as we continue the public debate on gene editing. Scientists are free to hold specific moral views and prescriptions about the proper conduct of research and the ethical limits of that conduct, but they are not free to exclude the rest of society from weighing in on the debate with their own values and moral imaginations about what should be permitted and what should be banned in research. The governance of CRISPR is a question of collective choice that must be answered by means of democratic deliberation and, when irreconcilable differences arise, by the due process of democratic institutions.

Patent disputes

More heated than the ethical debate is the legal battle for key CRISPR patents that has embroiled prominent scientists involved in perfecting this method. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office initiated a formal contestation process, called interference, in March 2016 to adjudicate the dispute. The process is likely to take years and appeals are expected to extend further in time. Challenges are also expected to patents filed internationally, including those filed with the European Patent Office.

To put this dispute in perspective, it is instructive to consider the history of CRISPR authored by one of the celebrities in gene science, Eric Lander.¹⁰ This article ignited a controversy because it understated the role of one of the parties to the patent dispute (Jennifer Doudna and Emmanuelle Charpentier), while casting the other party as truly culminating the development of this technology (Feng Zhang, who is affiliated to Lander’s Broad Institute). Some gene scientists accused Lander of tendentious inaccuracies and of trying to spin a story in a manner that favors the legal argument (and economic interest) of Zhang.

Ironically, the contentious article could be read as an argument against any particular claim to the CRISPR patents as it implicitly questions the fairness of granting exclusive rights to an invention. Lander tells the genesis of CRISPR that extends through a period of two decades and over various countries, where the protagonists are the many researchers who contributed to the cumulative knowledge in the ongoing development of the method. The very title of Lander’s piece, “The Heroes of CRISPR” highlights that the technology has not one but a plurality of authors.

A patent is a legal instrument that recognizes certain rights of the patent holder (individual, group, or organization) and at the same time denies those rights to everyone else, including those other contributors to the invention. Patent rights are thus arbitrary under the candle of history. I am not suggesting that the bureaucratic rules to grant a patent or to determine its validity are arbitrary; they have logical rationales anchored in practice and precedent. I am suggesting that in principle any exclusive assignation of rights that does not include the entire community responsible for the invention is arbitrary and thus unfair. The history of CRISPR highlights this old lesson from the history of technology: an invention does not belong to its patent holder, except in a court of law.

Some scientists may be willing to accept with resignation the unfair distribution of recognition granted by patents (or prizes like the Nobel) and find consolation in the fact that their contribution to science has real effects on people’s lives as it materializes in things like new therapies and drugs. Yet patents are also instrumental in distributing those real effects quite unevenly. Patents create monopolies that, selling their innovation at high prices, benefit only those who can afford them. The regular refrain to this charge is that without the promise of high profits, there would be no investments in innovation and no advances in life-saving medicine. What’s more, the biotech industry reminds us that start-ups will secure capital injections only if they have exclusive rights to the technologies they are developing. Yet, Editas Medicine, a biotech start-up that seeks to exploit commercial applications of CRISPR (Zhang is a stakeholder), was able to raise $94 million in its February 2016 initial public offering. That some of Editas’ key patents are disputed and were entering interference at USPTO was patently not a deterrent for those investors.

Towards a CRISPR democratic debate

Neither the governance of gene-editing research nor the management of CRISPR patents should be the exclusive responsibility of scientists. Yet, they do enjoy an advantage in public deliberations on gene editing that is derived from their technical competence and from the authority ascribed to them by society. They can use this advantage to close the public debate and monopolize its terms, or they could turn it into stewardship of a truly democratic debate about CRISPR.

The latter choice can benefit from three steps. A first step would be openness: a public willingness to consider and internalize public values that are not easily reconciled with research values. A second step would be self-restraint: publicly affirming a self-imposed ban on research with human germline and discouraging research practices that are contrary to received norms of prudence. A third useful step would be a public service orientation in the use of patents: scientists should pressure their universities, who hold title to their inventions, to preserve some degree of influence over research commercialization so that the dissemination and access to innovations is consonant with the noble aspirations of science and the public service mission of the university. Openness, self-restraint, and an orientation to service from scientists will go a long way to make of CRISPR a true servant of society and an instrument of democracy.

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Other reading: See media coverage compiled by the National Academies of Sciences.

¹Nature: an authoritative and accessible primer. A more technical description of applications in Hsu, P. D. et al. 2014. Cell, 157(6): 1262–1278.

²For instance, see this reflection in Science, and this in Nature.

³More about ethical concerns on gene editing here: http://www.geneticsandsociety.org/article.php?id=8711

⁴Liang, P. et al. 2015. Protein & Cell, 6, 363–372

⁵Science: A prudent path forward for genomic engineering and germline gene modification.

⁶Nature: NAS Gene Editing Summit.

⁷While Collins and Church participated in the summit, their views quoted here are from StatNews.com: A debate: Should we edit the human germline. See also Sciencenews.org: Editing human germline cells sparks ethics debate.

⁸Hurlbut, J. B. 2015. Limits of Responsibility, Hastings Center Report, 45(5): 11-14.

⁹This point is forcefully made by Sheila Jasanoff and colleagues: CRISPR Democracy, 2015 Issues in S&T, 22(1).

¹⁰Lander, E. 2016. The Heroes of CRISPR. Cell, 164(1-2): 18-28.

       

Summary

Global education plays an important role in contributing to U.S. foreign policy objectives. In a recent speech, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton highlighted education, along with health, agriculture, security, and local governance as the core areas for U.S. international development investment. She emphasized the importance of education, particularly of girls and youth, in improving global stability, speeding economic growth, and helping global health, all of which advance U.S. interests in the world.

But how effective has the U.S. government been in supporting global education? Unfortunately, its many good education activities and programs are not leveraged for maximum impact on the ground, especially in situations of armed conflict and state fragility. Challenges of U.S. foreign assistance—for example, fragmentation across multiple agencies, lack of policy coherence, diminished multilateral engagement—generally affects its work in education. Luckily some of the core strengths of U.S. assistance have an impact as well, specifically the large amount of resources (in total terms, if not relative terms) devoted to education and the vast breadth and depth of American academic, philanthropic and NGO partners engaged in pioneering work on education in the developing world.

This report analyzes the effectiveness of U.S. government education work specifically in relation to conflict-affected and fragile states. Findings across five domains—global reach, resources, technical expertise, policy and multilateral partnerships—show that U.S. education aid falls critically short of what it is capable of achieving. The U.S. government has substantial strengths in this area, especially in global reach, resources, and technical expertise, demonstrating a real comparative advantage in the field of education in situations of conflict and fragility. However, its fragmented policy across agencies and its limited multilateral engagement prevent it from maximizing its strengths, leaving it punching below its weight on this important issue. In this sense, the U.S. government is a classic underachiever, failing to efficiently deploy its many capabilities and potential for maximum impact.

There has never been a better time for looking at the aid-effectiveness of U.S. government education work. The Obama administration is bringing increased focus on the Paris Principles for Aid Effectiveness to its development initiatives. The U.S. Congress is actively engaged with pending legislative action to modernize foreign assistance and improve U.S. support for universal education. Two major reviews of foreign assistance are underway: the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review led by the Department of State and USAID, and the Presidential Study Directive on U.S. Global Development Policy led by the White House.

Questions about foreign assistance reform asked in these two reviews can be applied to the education sector. For example, how can the U.S. government improve its education assistance by using a “whole-of-government” approach, by focusing on comparative advantages and strengths, and by improving coordination and by increasing multilateral engagement?

Careful analysis and answers to these questions can help propel the U.S. from its current position as an underachiever to being a leader in global education, specifically in contexts of conflict and state fragility.

This report makes nine specific recommendations, many of which could be achieved without any substantial increase in funding, that would enable the U.S. government to greatly increase the effectiveness of its education aid to populations living in contexts of conflict and state fragility.

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Overview

Increasing educational attainment is likely to reduce conflict risk, especially in countries like Pakistan that have very low levels of primary and secondary school enrollment. Education quality, relevance and content also have a role to play in mitigating violence. Education reform must therefore be a higher priority for all stakeholders interested in a more peaceful and stable Pakistan. Debate within the country about education reform should not be left only to education policymakers and experts, but ought to figure front and center in national dialogues about how to foster security. The price of ignoring Pakistan’s education challenges is simply too great in a country where half the population is under the age of 17.

There has been much debate concerning the roots of militancy in Pakistan, and multiple factors clearly come into play. One risk factor that has attracted much attention both inside Pakistan and abroad is the dismal state of the national education sector. Despite recent progress, current school attainment and literacy levels remain strikingly low, as does education spending. The Pakistani education sector, like much of the country’s public infrastructure, has been in decline over recent decades. The question of how limited access to quality education may contribute to militancy in Pakistan is more salient now than ever, given the rising national and international security implications of continued violence.

The second half of 2009 witnessed not only the Pakistani government stepping up action against insurgents but also the release of a new Pakistan National Education Policy that aspires to far-reaching and important reforms, including a commitment to increase investment in education—from 2 to 7 percent of gross domestic product. Hundreds of millions of dollars in international education aid have been newly pledged by donor countries. This renewed emphasis on education represents a substantial opportunity to seek to improve security in Pakistan and potentially also globally over the medium to long term. Policymakers both inside and outside Pakistan should give careful consideration to whether and how education investments can promote peace and stability, taking into account what we now know about the state of the education sector and the roots of militancy.

This report takes a fresh look at the connection between schools, including but not limited to Pakistan’s religious seminaries, known as “madrasas,” and the rising militancy across the country. Poor school performance across Pakistan would seem an obvious area of inquiry as a risk factor for conflict. Yet to date, the focus has been almost exclusively on madrasas and their role in the mounting violence. Outside Pakistan, relatively little attention has been given to whether and how the education sector as a whole may be fueling violence, over and above the role of the minority of militant madrasas.

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Despite the undeniable benefits of education to society, the educational needs, particularly in the world’s poorest countries, remain strikingly great. There are more than 67 million children not enrolled in primary school around the world, millions of children who are enrolled in school but not really learning, and too few young people are advancing to secondary school (van der Gaag and Adams 2010). Consider, for instance, the number of children unable to read a single word of connected text at the end of grade two: more than 90 percent in Mali, more than 50 percent in Uganda, and nearly 33 percent in Honduras (USAID n.d.).

With more young people of age 12 to 24 years today than ever before who are passing through the global education system and looking for opportunities for economic and civic participation, the education community is at a crossroads. Of the 1.5 billion young people in this age group, 1.3 billion live in developing countries (World Bank 2007). The global community set the goal of achieving universal primary education by 2015 and has failed to mobilize the resources necessary, as UNESCO estimates that $16.2 billion in external resources will be need to reach this goal.

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Read the executive summary »

Results from this report were presented at an April 6 Center on Universal Education event at the Brookings Institution.

Learn more about the launch event »

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INTRODUCTION

In recent years, there has been a resurgence of interest in the issue of inequality. Part of this resurgence can be traced to new evidence of persistent and widening wealth gaps. Average incomes may be converging globally as a result of high growth in emerging markets, stronger growth in many poor countries, and slow growth in rich countries. However, the evidence also shows that within countries a parallel process of income divergence, marginalization and rising inequality is also taking place. Put differently, the rising tide of global prosperity is not lifting all boats.

Much of the international debate on inequality focuses on the distribution of income across and within countries. Other dimensions of inequality have received less attention. This is unfortunate. Amartya Sen has described development as “a process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy” by building human capabilities or their capacity to lead the kind of life they value. Income is a means to that end but it is a limited indicator of well-being. Moreover, a person’s income reflects not just personal choice but also their opportunities for improving health, literacy, political participation and other areas. Education is one of the most basic building blocks for the “real freedoms” that Sen describes. People denied the chance to develop their potential through education face diminished prospects and more limited opportunities in areas ranging from health and nutrition, to employment, and participation in political processes. In other words, disparities in education are powerfully connected to wider disparities, including international and intra-country income inequalities. This is why education has been identified as one of the most critical factors in breaking down the disadvantages and social inequalities that are limiting progress toward the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)—development targets adopted by the international community for 2015.

Understanding patterns of educational inequality is critical at many levels. Ethical considerations are of paramount importance. Most people would accept that children’s educational achievements should not be dictated by the wealth of their parents, their gender, their race or their ethnicity. Disparities in educational opportunities are not just inequalities in a technical sense, they are also fundamental in equities—they are unjust and unfair. In an influential paper, John Roemer differentiated between inequalities that reflect factors such as luck, effort and reasonable reward, and those attributable to circumstances that limit opportunity (Roemer 1988).1 While the dividing line may often be blurred, that distinction has an intuitive appeal. Most people have a high level of aversion to the restrictions on what people—especially children—are able to achieve as a result of disparities and inherited disadvantages that limit access to education, nutrition or health care (Wagstaff, 2002). There is a wide body of opinion across political science, philosophy and economics that equal opportunity—as distinct from equality of outcomes—is a benchmark of egalitarian social justice. The theories of distributive justice associated with thinkers such as Amartya Sen, John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin and John Roemer argue, admittedly from very different perspectives, that public policy should aim at equalizing opportunity to counteract disadvantages associated with exogenous circumstances over which individuals or social groups have no control. Given the role of education as a potential leveler of opportunity, it is a national focal point for redistributive social justice.

Considerations of economic efficiency reinforce the ethical case for equalizing educational opportunities. Education is a powerful driver of productivity, economic growth, and innovation. Econometric modeling for both rich and poor countries suggests that an increase in learning achievement (as measured by test score data) of one standard deviation is associated on average with an increase in the long-run growth rate of around 2 percent per capita annually (Hanushek and Wößmann, 2010; Hanushek, 2009; Hanushek and Wößmann, 2008). Such evidence points to the critical role of education and learning in developing a skilled workforce. Countries in which large sections of the population are denied a quality education because of factors linked to potential wealth, gender, ethnicity, language and other markers for disadvantage are not just limiting a fundamental human right. They are also wasting a productive resource and undermining or weakening the human capital of the economy.

International development commitments provide another rationale for equalizing educational opportunities. This is for two reasons. First, the commitments envisage education for all and achievement of universal primary education by 2015. Second, there is mounting evidence that inequality is acting as a brake on progress toward the 2015 goals. Since around 2005, the rate of decline in the out-of-school population has slowed dramatically. Based on current trends, there may be more children out of school in 2015 than there were in 2009. Caution has to be exercised in interpreting short-run trends, especially given the weakness of data. However, the past three editions of the UNESCO Education for All Global Monitoring Report (GMR) have highlighted the role of inequality in contributing to the slowdown with governments struggling to reach populations that face deeply entrenched disadvantages (UNESCO, 2008, 2010, 2011). Therefore, picking up the pace toward the 2015 goals requires a strengthened focus on equity and strategies that target the most marginalized groups and regions of the world (Sumner and Tiwari, 2010; UN-DESA, 2009; UNESCO, 2010). It should be added that disparities in education relate not just to access, but also to learning achievement levels.

Accelerated progress in education would generate wider benefits for the MDGs. Most of the world’s poorest countries are off-track for the 2015 MDG target of halving income poverty and a long way from reaching the targets on child survival, maternal health and nutrition. Changing this picture will require policy interventions at many levels. However, there is overwhelming evidence showing that education—especially of young girls and women—can act as a potent catalyst for change. On one estimate, if all of sub-Saharan Africa’s mothers attained at least some secondary education, there would be 1.8 million fewer child deaths in the region each year. Thus while education may lack the “quick fix” appeal of vaccinations, it can powerfully reinforce health policy interventions.

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INTRODUCTION

In August, 2010 the government of Kenya adopted a new constitution. This followed a referendum in which an overwhelming majority of Kenyans voted for change. The decisive impetus for reform came from the widespread violence and political crisis that followed the 2007 election. While claims of electoral fraud provided the immediate catalyst for violence, the deeper causes were to be found in the interaction of a highly centralized ‘winner-take-all’ political system with deep social disparities based in part on group identity (Hanson 2008).

Provisions for equity figure prominently in the new constitution. Backed by a bill of rights that opens the door to legal enforcement, citizenship rights have been strengthened in many areas,including access to basic services. ‘Equitable sharing’ has been introduced as a guiding principle for public spending. National and devolved governments are now constitutionally required to redress social disparities, target disadvantaged areas and provide affirmative action for marginalized groups.

Translating these provisions into tangible outcomes will not be straightforward. Equity is a principle that would be readily endorsed by most policymakers in Kenya and Kenya’s citizens have provided their own endorsement through the referendum. However, there is an ongoing debate over what the commitment to equity means in practice, as well as over the pace and direction of reform. Much of that debate has centered on the constitutional injunction requiring ‘equitable sharing’ in public spending.

On most measures of human development, Kenya registers average outcomes considerably above those for sub-Saharan Africa as a region. Yet the national average masks extreme disparities—and the benefits of increased prosperity have been unequally shared.

There are compelling grounds for a strengthened focus on equity in Kenya. In recent years, the country has maintained a respectable, if less than spectacular, record on economic growth. Social indicators are also on an upward trend. On most measures of human development, Kenya registers average outcomes considerably above those for sub-Saharan Africa as a region. Yet the national average masks extreme disparities—and the benefits of increased prosperity have been unequally shared. Some regions and social groups face levels of deprivation that rank alongside the worst in Africa. Moreover, the deep fault lines running through society are widely perceived as a source of injustice and potential political instability.

High levels of inequality in Kenya raise wider concerns. There has been a tendency in domestic debates to see ‘equitable sharing’ as a guiding principle for social justice, rather than as a condition for accelerated growth and enhanced economic efficiency. Yet international evidence strongly suggests that extreme inequality—especially in opportunities for education— is profoundly damaging for economic growth. It follows that redistributive public spending has the potential to support growth.

The current paper focuses on a group of 12 counties located in Kenya’s Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASALs). They are among the most disadvantaged in the country. Most are characterized by high levels of income poverty, chronic food insecurity and acute deprivation across a wide range of social indicators.

Nowhere is the deprivation starker than in education. The ASAL counties account for a disproportionately large share of Kenya’s out-of-school children, pointing to problems in access and school retention. Gender disparities in education are among the widest in the country. Learning outcomes for the small number of children who get through primary school are for the most part abysmal, even by the generally low national average standards.

Unequal public spending patterns have played no small part in creating the disparities that separate the ASAL counties from the rest of Kenya—and ‘equitable sharing’ could play a role in closing the gap. But what would a more equitable approach to public spending look like in practice?

This paper addresses that question. It looks in some detail at education for two reasons. First, good quality education is itself a powerful motor of enhanced equity. It has the potential to equip children and youth with the skills and competencies that they need to break out of cycles of poverty and to participate more fully in national prosperity. If Kenya is to embark on a more equitable pattern of development, there are strong grounds for prioritizing the creation of more equal opportunities in education. Second, the education sector illustrates many of the wider challenges and debates that Kenya’s policymakers will have to address as they seek to translate constitutional provisions into public spending strategies. In particular, it highlights the importance of weighting for indicators that reflect need in designing formulae for budget allocations.

Our broad conclusion is that, while Kenya clearly needs to avoid public spending reforms that jeopardize service delivery in wealthier counties, redistributive measures are justified on the grounds of efficiency and equity.

The paper is organized as follows. Part 1 provides an overview of the approach to equity enshrined in the constitution. While the spirit of the constitution is unequivocal, the letter is open to a vast array of interpretations. We briefly explore the implications of a range of approaches. Our broad conclusion is that, while Kenya clearly needs to avoid public spending reforms that jeopardize service delivery in wealthier counties, redistributive measures are justified on the grounds of efficiency and equity. Although this paper focuses principally on basic services, we caution against approaches that treat equity as a matter of social sector financing to the exclusion of growth-oriented productive investment.

Part 2 provides an analysis of some key indicators on poverty, health and nutrition. Drawing on household expenditure data, the report locates the 12 ASAL counties in the national league table for the incidence and depth of poverty. Data on health outcomes and access to basic services provide another indicator of the state of human development. While there are some marked variations across counties and indicators, most of the 12 counties register levels of deprivation in poverty and basic health far in excess of those found in other areas.

Part 3 shifts the focus to education. Over the past decade, Kenya has made considerable progress in improving access to basic education. Enrollment rates in primary education have increased sharply since the elimination of school fees in 2003. Transition rates to secondary school are also rising. The record on learning achievement is less impressive. While Kenya lacks a comprehensive national learning assessment, survey evidence points to systemic problems in education quality. In both access and learning, children in the ASAL counties—especially female children—are at a considerable disadvantage. After setting out the national picture, the paper explores the distinctive problems facing these counties.

In Part 4 we look beyond Kenya to wider international experience. Many countries have grappled with the challenge of reducing disparities between less-favored and more-favored regions. There are no blueprints on offer. However, there are some useful lessons and guidelines that may be of some relevance to the policy debate in Kenya. The experience of South Africa may be particularly instructive given the weight attached to equity in the post-apartheid constitution.

Part 5 of the paper explores a range of approaches to financial allocations. Converting constitutional principle into operational practice will require the development of formulae-based approaches. From an equitable financing perspective there is no perfect model. Any formula that is adopted will involve trade-offs between different goals. Policymakers have to determine what weight to attach to different dimensions of equity (for example, gender, income, education and health), the time frame for achieving stated policy goals, and whether to frame targets in terms of outcomes or inputs. These questions go beyond devolved financing. The Kenyan constitution is unequivocal in stipulating that the ‘equitable sharing’ provision applies to all public spending. We therefore undertake a series of formula-based exercises illustrating the allocation patterns that would emerge under different formulae, with specific reference to the 12 ASAL focus counties and to education.

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INTRODUCTION

With fewer than three years until the planned end-date of the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), attention is rapidly turning to what will follow. The elaboration of the next global development agenda is a complex, multi-pronged process that is academic, political and practical, involving experts from a myriad of social and economic sectors and representing a cross-section of constituencies. While the formal U.N. process is still in the early stages, the ongoing discourse (predominantly occurring in the global north, but not exclusively) has introduced several potential frameworks for this agenda. This paper describes the leading frameworks proposed for the post-2015 global development agenda and discusses how education and learning fit within each of those frameworks. While many within the education community are working to develop a cohesive movement to advance an “access plus learning” agenda, it remains equally important to engage proactively with the broader development community to ensure that education fits within the agreed upon overarching organizing framework.

The frameworks described below represent a snapshot of current thinking in 2012. On the road to 2015, the education community will need to refine and sharpen its thinking with respect to how learning is incorporated into the prevailing framework. The seven frameworks that will be addressed in this paper are:

1. Ending Absolute Poverty
2. Equity and Inclusion
3. Economic Growth and Jobs
4. Getting to Zero
5. Global Minimum Entitlements
6. Sustainable Development
7. Well-Being and Quality of Life

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In the 13 years since the dawn of the new millennium, significant progress has been made in addressing some of the world’s most important problems. One billion fewer people live in extreme poverty, 3 million children’s lives are saved annually and 610 million children in developing countries are enrolled in primary school, more than ever before. However, this progress has not been shared evenly around the globe. Populations affected by weak systems of governance and that suffer violence and disasters have systematically been left behind.

They are much less likely to enjoy progress vis-à-vis any of the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which include eradicating extreme poverty and hunger, improving children and women’s health, and enrolling children in school. No country classified as a “fragile state,” for example, has met all eight of the MDGs. Children born in low-income, conflict-affected countries are twice as likely to die before the age of five years, twice as likely to lack access to clean water and more than three times as likely to not attend school than children living in peaceful, low-income countries. People living in poverty, many of whom are affected by conflict, are more vulnerable to the effects of climate change and disasters. Children are especially affected, and those from the poorest families are up to 10 times more likely to bear the brunt of environmental disasters linked to climate change.

The needs of people living in fragile states are an urgent priority for our time, and thus will almost certainly be prominent in the next round of global development goals. As the global community reflects on the new agenda that will replace the MDGs when they expire in 2015, it will do well to take stock of the existing strategies for supporting the needs of populations in fragile states. A range of strategies are undoubtedly needed, and there is good reason why there is a heavy emphasis on the economic, legal and security dimensions of development efforts in fragile states. However, efforts in the social sphere are equally needed, and education is one important strategy for supporting populations in fragile states that was often overlooked until recently.

This report provides a broad review of the field of education in fragile states and charts a new agenda for maximizing education’s contribution to the development and well-being of people living in these contexts. We hope it serves as a comprehensive introduction to the topic for those coming to this issue for the first time as well as provides new insights for those already actively engaged in the subject. The arguments we make here are based on evidence developed both from careful analysis and synthesis of the latest available data as well as primary research.

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Federal Reserve chair Janet Yellen just gave a speech in Philadelphia that acknowledges a weak jobs report last Friday. She rightly cautions us not to place too much weight on any single month’s numbers. Overall, her talk seems to have raised confidence in the financial markets about where the economy is heading, based on a wider range of recent indicators besides the numbers reported in the jobs report, for example, on consumer spending and home construction. These suggest areas of continued strength in the economy.

Still, the report last Friday was really lousy, and not really a one-off event (and not just due to the Verizon strike). Since the end of 2015, the job growth numbers have been on a pretty steady downward trend, with growth above 200,000 in only one month (February). A few other indicators in the report were also quite disappointing: the numbers of workers in part-time jobs because they can’t find full-time work bounced back up; and labor force participation dropped considerably. Indeed, about 800,000 workers have left the labor force in the last 2 months, including many who are well below retirement age. Their exit reverses some of the progress in labor force participation we had seen late last year and early this year.

On the other hand, not all numbers in the report were terrible. Wage growth held up reasonably well. Over the past 2 months, wages have risen by over 3 percent (on an annualized basis), suggesting a labor market that is tight enough to finally generate some earnings improvements for workers who already have jobs.

Overall, the different indicators highlight two sets of forces driving the labor market: Demand-side problems, suggesting employers still need too few workers to generate full employment; and supply-side problems, where worker availability and skills are starting to constrain the amount of hiring going on.

Indeed, the latter problems might explain the peculiar combination of weak and strong indicators we see in the report. For instance, if the drop in labor force participation is permanent, then the 4.7 percent unemployment rate accurately suggests that the amount of slack in the labor market is lower than we thought. Employers are likely finding it a bit harder to hire the workers with the skills and experience they really want. Consequently, our long economic expansion is finally translating into higher wage growth for those already employed or about to be.

Another possibility, perhaps, is that productivity growth is finally rebounding a bit, after the dismal numbers we’ve observed in the past few years, where GDP growth has been modest but employment growth has been strong. Indeed, some recovery in productivity is a precondition for real wage growth to last, even in a tighter labor market. In this scenario, output growth would now be more robust than employment growth, reversing some of the striking declines we’ve observed in the productivity numbers.

Of course, what might be most convincing is a combination of the labor demand- and supply-side stories, along the following lines: the labor market is gradually approaching capacity, though it is not there yet. I don’t think it will get there until we are closer to 4 percent unemployment. But employer difficulties finding skilled workers matter more in this type of market than in the earlier years of recovery after the Great Recession. Such pressure raises wages for employed workers and those with appropriate skill levels. On the other hand, workers with weaker skills still face dismal prospects, and their exit from the labor force reflects their bleak prospects. The growth of labor demand might really be shrinking, as productivity rebounds a bit and as weakness in business investment and export demand are felt in the job market.

We won’t know for sure how much of this story is accurate until we get more jobs and productivity reports over the next few months. But, in the meantime, my bet is on just such a mixed reading, which suggests that a very gradual lifting of economic stimulus is appropriate, without, however, moving too quickly in the opposite direction.

      

Employment is down among everyone between the ages of 16 and 64—particularly among teens, but with a great deal of variation by geography, race, and education. The disparity between blacks and whites is especially stark. For example, unemployment among white young adults peaked at 14% in 2010—still considerably lower than unemployment rates for black young adults at any point in the 2008 to 2014 time period. Unemployment for black 20- to 24-year-olds rose to 29.5% in 2010 and fell to 22.3% in 2014, compared to 10.3% among whites in 2014.

While there is no silver bullet, higher levels of education and work experience clearly improve job prospects down the line for young people. There are multiple strategies local and regional leaders can use to build more structured pathways into employment.

Teens and young adults (referring to 16- to 19-year-olds and 20- to 24-year-olds, respectively) are not monolithic populations. Age is an obvious differentiator, but so are a number of other factors, such as educational attainment, skill level, interests, parental support, and other life circumstances.  Schools, families, and neighborhoods all play a role in a young person’s trajectory—both positive and negative. But at the most basic level, a program for a 17-year-old high school student is likely not appropriate for a 23-year-old, regardless of educational attainment. Successful programs integrate education, training, work-readiness, and youth development principles, but the particular blend of these elements and settings vary: more school-based and educationally focused programs for younger youth, and more community-based and career-focused programs with strong ties to education for older youth.

An admittedly non-comprehensive review includes the following types of promising and proven programs:  

For high school students:

• Paid internship programs, such as Urban Alliance and Genesys Works
• High school programs that bridge school and work with occupationally-focused courses and career exposure, such as Career Academies, Linked Learning, High Tech High, Advanced Career, Alamo Academies, and P-Tech, some of which also incorporate post-secondary courses and credentials into their programs
• Youth apprenticeships, such as state programs in Georgia and Wisconsin 

For out-of-school youth and young adults:

• Highly structured programs offering work readiness and technical skills development, often in partnership with community colleges, and coupled with paid internships, such as Year Up, i.c.stars, npower, and Per Scholas
• Programs that offer stipends and combine academics, job training, mentoring, and supportive services while carrying out community improvement projects, such as YouthBuild and Youth Corps

The sobering fact is that promoting employment and economic security among young people is not a straightforward proposition. To succeed in today’s economy and earn middle-class wages, a young person needs to complete several steps: graduate from high school or earn an alternate credential; enroll in and complete some post-secondary education or job training; preferably gain meaningful work experience; and enter the labor market with in-demand skills. (A decent economy and some luck help, too.) There are many points along that path from which a young person can get off-track, particularly young people of color and those from high-poverty neighborhoods. And while high youth unemployment is increasingly in the news these days, the difficulties youth without college degrees face in finding good jobs has been a problem for decades.

Programs such as the ones listed above are part of the solution. But they are not enough, given the magnitude of the problem. In order to produce better employment outcomes at scale, leaders from all sectors and levels of government need to make broader shifts in how education and workforce programs are designed, and how they interact with each other and employers. That is a heavy lift, but it is worth it to address the high costs imposed by the status quo: high unemployment, poverty, and untapped potential.  

      

       

       

       

Jonathan Rauch describes the concept of honest graft in Washington politics and policymaking. Politics needs good leaders, but it needs good followers even more, and they don’t come cheap. Loyalty gets you only so far, and ideology is divisive. Political machines need to exist, and they need to work.

       

The Federal Reserve last week released transcripts of Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meetings that took place in 2008 amidst a worsening global financial crisis. Sarah Binder describes what was found amongst the transcripts. Alongside financial and economic crises facing the Fed that year, the Fed faced a crisis as a political institution.  

       

During his presentation at the University of Michigan/Urban Land Institute Real Estate Forum, Christopher B. Leinberger discusses the impact walkable urbane places has and will have on metropolitan development patterns, the market reasons for this change and how to strategically manage it.

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Demand for more walkable, mixed use neighborhoods is growing across the United States. However, the challenges associated with fi nancing these developments are allowing much of this demand to go unmet. This paper discusses how more, and more upfront, patient equity in walkable projects—from various sources and providers—would facilitate their development, and yield high returns over the long term. The paper also examines how patient equity contributed to the success of several such developments built over the past 15 years, illustrating untapped potential. Finally, it notes the role the public sector can play in providing patient equity investments.

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It is hard to find good news these days, especially coming from Sacramento, the capital of one of the most hard-pressed states in the country. Yet an evolving model of development is emanating from the metropolitan area that is being watched carefully around the country.

This model could inspire sweeping national transportation, energy and climate change legislation and future infrastructure investment and real estate development.

The model started with the much-admired Blueprint Project, led by the Sacramento Area Council of Governments. Next came Senate Bill 375, calling for regional transportation and development plans that minimize auto dependency, reduce climate change gas emissions and encourage walkable urban development. The next steps are the Sacramento Regional Transit Master Plan and Transit-Oriented Guidelines, to be released in May. Taken together, they offer a bold effort to give the market what it wants: the choice of the well-known drivable suburban or walkable urban development, the basis of the next American Dream.

For the past half-century, American households demanded and got only one way of living and working, the suburban way that meant driving. Basically, California invented this way of life and exported it across the country and around the world. We all reveled in it. The songs of the Beach Boys and Jan and Dean still echo through my mind, reminding me of a way of life and a way of developing our communities that was seductive at the time.

Little did we know of the unintended consequences of drivable suburban development pattern, including:

• Land consumption eight to 12 times that of population growth.
• Significant increase in car-miles driven and foreign oil consumed, mostly from hostile countries.
• The onset of the obesity, diabetes and asthma epidemics related to a car-dependent lifestyle, especially among our children who cannot even walk to school anymore.
• Household income diverted from wealth building to paying for a fleet of depreciating cars, taking at least 25 percent of income vs. less than 5 percent a century ago.
• The quality of life for the community goes down when more drivable suburban development occurs, such as the next strip mall. This leads to not-in-my-backyard opposition. According to a soon-to-be-released Brookings Institution study, car-dependent households emit three times the climate change gases, such as carbon dioxide, as a walkable urban household.

Yet these consequences, which evoke much hand-wringing, do not tend to motivate behavioral change. That change comes when consumers vote with their pocketbooks; this they have done. There is pent-up demand for walkable urban development, with evidence everywhere you look. This includes research of consumer preferences and market research showing that walkable urban housing has held its value during this recession while the bulk of price declines occurred in fringe suburban housing.

Unfortunately, many metropolitan areas enforce zoning laws that prohibit building higher-density, walkable urban development. There is great NIMBY opposition to it. And the necessary infrastructure for a choice of transportation options from walking and biking to riding transit, along with cars, is generally not available.

Yet Sacramento is showing the rest of the state and nation how to do it. The Blueprint is widely regarded as a state and national model of regional development planning. The proposed Regional Transit Master Plan, along with the Transit-Oriented Development Guidelines, will provide the extension of the transit system while helping to make walkable urban development acceptable around the stations.

Another step is to provide management to each of these walkable urban, Transit-Oriented Development places, such as Station 65, a proposed 500,000-square-foot mixed-used project to include residential units, office and retail space, and a hotel and restaurants. These management organizations would be modeled on the Downtown Sacramento Partnership. In fact, many of these Transit-Oriented Development places can subcontract with the partnership to provide services in the early years.

Finally, these walkable urban, transit-oriented places need to develop a conscious affordable housing strategy. The current affordable housing strategy in Sacramento is "drive until you qualify" – which is obviously bankrupt. It is crucial to have a conscious strategy since it is going to take a generation to catch up with the pent-up demand for walkable urban housing and commercial development.

According to Brookings Institution research, there should be eight to 12 regionally significant, walkable urban, transit-oriented places in the region. Today there are only three: downtown, midtown and Old Sacramento. The opportunity for locating and building five to nine additional walkable urban, transit-oriented places and building far more development in the existing three would be worth billions of dollars and would represent a more sustainable way of living.

Sacramento can provide a model for the country, one that we certainly need.

       

What if I told you I’d found a surefire way to decrease community involvement in our local schools while at the same time increasing the costs of providing education for taxpayers? Probably not a political winner, eh? And yet, for well over 100 years we’ve adopted such an approach to governing America’s public schools.

I’m talking of course, about the widespread and increasingly questionable practice of local school district governments holding their school board elections “off-cycle” so that they are contested apart from regular national elections.

Just how significant and widespread are “off-cycle” school board elections? And what are the consequences of using off-cycle elections for the tone and direction of education policy? UC Berkeley Political Scientist Sarah Anzia recently penned a terrific book examining the causes and consequences of off-cycle elections in American politics in which she finds that 90 percent of states hold at least some municipal races apart from major national elections and three quarters of states do so for school board elections. Data from the National School Boards Association seem to confirm Anzia’s descriptive account on the prevalence of these elections.

By exploiting the occasional episode in which a change in state law forced localities to move their elections “on cycle,” Anzia is able to provide some pretty rigorous causal evidence that off-cycle elections decrease voter turnout and equip organized interests (e.g. teachers unions) to obtain more favorable policy outcomes. Anzia’s findings mesh nicely with other work done by University of Pennsylvania Political Scientist, Marc Meredith, who found that when school boards are given the authority to choose election dates for raising revenue (e.g. bond elections) boards will “manipulate” the timing of elections in predictable ways to ensure an electorate that is most favorable to increased school spending.

"While most citizens are tuned into the presidential primary contests this year, the important reality is that thousands of school board members will be 'elected' by tiny and unrepresentative electorates prior to next November’s general election."

While most citizens are tuned into the presidential primary contests this year, the important reality is that thousands of school board members will be “elected” by tiny and unrepresentative electorates prior to next November’s general election. This isn’t an accident or an oversight. The helpless position of today’s “education voter” is a predictable consequence of Progressive era reforms that sought to “take politics out of education.” As Columbia Professor, Jeffrey Henig, explains in his insightful and wide-ranging book, The End of Exceptionalism in American Education, the widespread use of single-purpose governments that are insulated from the electorate has been a hallmark of American school governance that is only recently beginning to come undone.

Advocates of off-cycle elections sometimes contend that holding school elections apart from major federal elections helps foster a more informed electorate. But shouldn’t the onus be on those who defend off-cycle elections to demonstrate better outcomes in districts that cling to a policy that often results in higher costs to taxpayers and diminishes small-d democracy. Of course it’s fair and important to ask, “How much democracy is good for our schools?” However, there are at least three reasons to be skeptical that the benefits of using “off-cycle” elections outweigh the costs:

First, I’m unaware of any scholarly evidence that the voters who participate in off-cycle elections are significantly more informed than the electorates participating in on-cycle elections. More importantly, I am not aware of any scholarly research that demonstrates a linkage between off-cycle elections and better student achievement outcomes. To the contrary, my friend and collaborator Arnie Shober (Lawrence University) and I found a strong association between a district’s relative academic performance and the use of on-cycle elections in a 2014 analysis that we undertook for the Fordham Institute. Although that report could not establish any causal relationship between on-cycle elections and better student achievement (clearly we could not randomly assign on-cycle elections), the fact that we found a positive correlation between on-cycle school board elections and a district’s academic performance arguably puts the ball back in the court of those who would prefer diminished citizen participation and higher fiscal costs.

Second, on the subject of higher costs, consider the takeaway from a recent piece in Governing Magazine that quotes Rice University Political Scientist and local elections expert, Melissa Marschall.  It paraphrases Marschall, saying “There's no doubt about it. Holding concurrent elections is bound to increase turnout…Holding elections less frequently should save them [local governments] money.” In short, even if some benefits (a marginally more informed electorate?) could in theory be demonstrated, one would also need to account for known costs: lower citizen participation and more frequent elections that school districts cannot piggyback onto national or statewide elections.

Third and finally, as Eitan Hersh explains in a hard-hitting recent post on FiveThirtyEight, there’s more than a tinge of hypocrisy when it comes to those who defend off-cycle elections. Ironically, while the Democratic Party and organized labor often advocate for policies that enhance workplace democracy and reduce barriers to voter participation (i.e., opposing voter ID laws, supporting same day registration and vote by mail), these two groups have, according to Hersh, led the charge to retain off-cycle school board elections that all but assure lower and more unrepresentative turnout.  

Admittedly, there’s no perfect approach to governing American K-12 education. And, governance “reform” is hardly a panacea for improving our schools. Nonetheless, as Noel Epstein wisely observed in her 2004 volume, Who’s in Charge Here?, when education governance is fragmented ordinary citizens are challenged to hold policy-makers accountable because it is difficult for the public to mobilize and readily identify which political authority or authorities are responsible. The bottom line: we don’t do the electorate any additional favors by purposefully staggering school board races across multiple off-year election cycles. Consolidating the school election calendar is a small, but nonetheless sensible step in the right direction.  

       

       

       

       

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A Statesman's Forum with Federica Mogherini, Foreign Minister of Italy

On May 14, the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings, in partnership with the Council for the United States and Italy, will host Italian Foreign Minister Federica Mogherini for an address on Italy’s foreign policy during a period of geopolitical turmoil. In her remarks, Mogherini will offer perspectives on recent developments on the frontiers of Europe and explore how Italy and the U.S. can work together, along with the European Union and NATO, to address the ongoing challenges in Ukraine, the Mediterranean and beyond.

Federica Mogherini has been minister for foreign affairs since February 2014. She was previously a member of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committees of the Chamber of Deputies and chair of the Italian Delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of NATO. She has been active in promoting nuclear disarmament in the Italian parliament, including a successfully adopted resolution supporting the nuclear disarmament visions and plans of President Obama and U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon.

Brookings Acting Deputy Director for Foreign Policy Steven Pifer will introduce Minister Mogherini. Michael Calingaert of Brookings and the Council for the U.S. and Italy will moderate a question and answer session at the conclusion of the minister’s remarks.

Join the conversation on Twitter using #Mogherini

      

With more than 700 deaths reported over three days last week, and with a confirmed 800,000 more migrants waiting in Libya to attempt the crossing into Europe, it is becoming increasingly clear that Italy could become the new Greece in the global refugee crisis, and that the central Mediterranean could become the new Aegean.

The dirty deal cut between the European Union and Turkey this spring seems to be working: It’s effectively shut down the eastern Mediterranean route to Europe. But it has also pushed those attempting to reach the continent onto the arguably more dangerous central Mediterranean route, which claimed thousands of lives last summer. Now we’re seeing the consequences.

It’s clear that this crisis will not be resolved in Libya. The country may be ground zero for migration from North Africa to southern Europe—the result of a power vacuum left by Western powers after the fall of Muammar al-Qaddafi in 2011—but coming up with a solution that involves this troubled country will be difficult, to put it mildly. Libya is a failed state. Or rather, it is a jigsaw of four ethnic groups (Arab, Berber, Tuareg, and Toubou) and several dozen Ashraf tribes with no serious central authority to speak of. While a unity government and a draft constitution are in place, the former effectively controls only parts of Tripoli, while the latter is littered with both procedural deficiencies and substantive flaws.

Libya is also a security nightmare. The Islamic State controls over 150 miles of the coast around the city of Sirte, while dozens of militias vie for supremacy in localized, low-intensity conflicts throughout the country. The increasing military involvement of both the United States and its European allies in Libya is testimony to the concern elicited by the Islamic State’s presence. Were this not enough, Libya has a terrible record when it comes to its treatment of migrants and asylum seekers. The country never signed up to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol; it is host to detention centers where migrants survive in atrocious conditions; and it has signed up to appalling migration deals with Italy under Silvio Berlusconi. Multiple reports talk of the regular abuses, which include abysmal sanitary conditions, beatings, torture, hard labor, and even murder, which migrants have suffered in the country.

Up until recently, European officials appeared to be discussing plans to strike a deal with Libya similar to the one cut with Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s government in Turkey. Italian Interior Minister Angelino Alfano, for example, repeatedly claimed that what Europe needed was a migration compact with Libya along the lines of the one Brussels signed with Ankara in March. But such a deal, for the time being at least, is hardly a likely prospect. The deal with Turkey rested on the assumption that, with the right incentives in place, Ankara could exercise a baseline level of control over its borders. Brussels should not worry about Libya’s willingness to fulfill the key provisions of a similar migration compact. What Europeans should be concerned about, rather, is that the Libyan state—with its malfunctioning government, which lacks a bare minimum of administrative capacity—has no ability to fulfill them.

In the long run, Libya and Europe need to seek a comprehensive solution to this migration crisis. But with the high season for smuggling and trafficking across the Mediterranean almost upon us, an interim solution is critical.

Libya, which sits 280 miles from the southernmost point of mainland Italy, is the primary launching point for those seeking to cross from Africa to Europe. But it remains only one variable within the broader migration equation. An interim solution for the current crisis needs a broader focus and should involve three geographic areas: Libya, the countries sharing land borders with Libya, and the Mediterranean Sea itself.

In Libya, EU governments should pressure the unity government to immediately sign up to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 protocol. These would provide a firm legal framework within which all stakeholders would have to operate. Signing them would make it clear that Libya is ready to respect the rights of migrants under international law. And, crucially, it would mandate Libya to respect refugees’ right, in particular, to non-refoulement—that is, to not be returned to countries where they risk physical harm or abuse. Secondly and where the security situation allows, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Organization for Migration, and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees should be provided with all necessary means to massively scale up their presence in the country. By doing so, they would be able to become crucial representatives for the rights of migrants and asylum seekers.

Finally—and with the explicit permission of the unity government—the European Union should start patrolling Libyan territorial waters, while international humanitarian organizations must take over the management of Libyan detention centers where migrants are held. Because Libyan authorities do not exercise any meaningful control over the coastline and because they lack the resources to adequately administer the detention centers they are supposedly managing, these measures would only technically—but not substantively—infringe upon the central government’s sovereignty.

Europe must also seek to form partnerships with Libya’s neighbors—a strategy it appears to be beginning to pursue. Countries sharing land borders with Libya have a significant comparative advantage over Tripoli when it comes to being candidates for partnerships: They have (relatively) stable governments. Algeria, Chad, Egypt, Niger, Sudan, and Tunisia face tremendous challenges in a variety of policy areas, yet they have the bare minimum of what it takes to resolve those challenges: established state structures.

These countries are often the countries of origin or earlier transit for the sub-Saharan migrants who converge on Libya as a springboard to Europe. Crucially, the European Union has a well-established relationship with all these governments through the second revision of the Cotonou Agreement between the European Union and African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries. More specifically, the Khartoum Process for East Africa, the Rabat Process for West Africa, and the EU strategy for the Sahel provide regional frameworks within which Europe and its partner countries can address migration issues. These regular and structured dialogues between European and African governments provide a system of financial and diplomatic rewards for African countries that proactively engage with migration issues. In particular, they’ve resulted in concrete projects that aim to discourage irregular migration by establishing readmission agreements while providing legal avenues for those trying to get to Europe, such as temporary migration plans.

It is high time for Brussels to further increase cooperation by providing additional resources to address migration issues: Europe must enable its African partners to set up projects that contribute to creating employment opportunities, ensuring food and nutrition security, improving migration management, and promoting conflict prevention. The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa should substantially be boosted for this purpose.

Europe appears to be taking steps to make migration control a cornerstone of its relationship with its African neighbors. Ad hoc migration compacts are in the works with selected origin and transit countries, including Ethiopia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal, and proposals are being made to launch a comprehensive €62 billion investment plan to tackle the long-term root causes of economic migration. The EU has renewed its focus on re-admissions to these countries, prioritizing speedy returns for those whose asylum claims are rejected over establishing formal readmission agreements, which is a sign of Europe’s determination to push this through—though also a warning of the potential dodginess of the various deals in the making.

Lastly, Brussels must do its homework where it is most able to bring about change: in the Mediterranean Sea and along Europe’s southern coast. The EU’s naval Operation Sophia in the south-central Mediterranean is trying to tackle migrant smuggling at sea. Its geographic scope, however, is significantly more limited compared with the Operation Mare Nostrum carried out by the Italian Navy and later superseded by Frontex’s Operation Triton. This should be expanded again. At the same time, the mandate of the operation should be widened to explicitly encourage search-and-rescue operations on top of its primary aim of disrupting smugglers’ networks. On its Italian shores, Europe should intensify its support for Italian authorities engaged in the establishment and management of so-called migrant hot spots. Indeed, while Rome has fulfilled most of its obligations by setting up new headquarters and boosting its processing rates, its European partners are struggling to make available specialized personnel for the hot spots and to relocate migrants already in Italy.

The ideas above are only a short-term interim solution, however. In the medium to long term, the international community needs to address the tremendous underlying challenges producing chaos in Libya. The newly established Government of National Accord must secure the support of all ethnic groups and major tribes. Having done that, the Islamic State must be rooted out through a very high-intensity but hopefully brief and localized conflict. Finally, a minimum degree of administrative capacity must be re-established beyond Tripoli.

All of the above require meaningful engagement with Libya on the part of Europe that will probably take years to reap benefits. Until that is forthcoming, an interim solution must be found, for the sake of the hundreds of thousands of lives at risk.

The piece was originally published in Foreign Policy. 

       

Although there has been some progress in forming a national unity government in Libya, “unity” is a rather inapplicable word for the country. In reality, friction between various political actors remains high. Ultimately, perhaps a form of disunity—confederation, rather than centralization—is the best model for Libya.

Libyan politics: A primer

During the summer of 2014, the Libyan leadership, after an initial hint of cooperation, split into two governments: 

• One, headquartered in Tobruk and based on a secular matrix, was recognized internationally. It received support from the House of Representatives and was abetted by General Khalifa Haftar and his so-called National Libyan Army. Externally, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Russia have supported this government because of its anti-Islamist ideology. In May 2014, Haftar launched "Operation Dignity" against the Islamist militias, supported by the Zintan brigades (consisting of the Civic, al-Sawaiq, and al-Qaaqa brigades), and the militias coming from the ethnic minorities of Tebu and Fezzan.
• The other, headquartered in Tripoli, was Islamic in nature. It was supported by the new General National Congress (GNC) and was part of the Libya Dawn group of pro-Islamist militias (which included groups from Misrata, Amazigh, and Tuareg). Qatar, Sudan, and Turkey have supported this government for different reasons, including to earn a more prominent place on the global stage or to support the Muslim Brotherhood. 

But it gets more complicated, since it wasn’t just the Tobruk- and Tripoli-based governments that competed to fill the power vacuum post-Gadhafi. The constellation of militias and brigades has changed continuously. There are Salafist groups such as:

• Ansar al-Sharia Libya (or ASL, located between Benghazi and Derna); 
• Muhammad Jamal Network (between Benghazi and Derna);
• Al-Murabitun (in the southeast, around Ghat, Ubari, Tasawah, and Murzuq);
• Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (or AQIM, in the southwest and northeast of Libya); and
• Ansar al-Sharia Tunisia (or AST, located between Derna and Ajdabiya). 

Then in 2015, an Islamic State (or ISIS) cell—made up of about 3,000 Tunisians, Yemenis, Algerians, and Libyans, especially former supporters of the Gadhafi regime and members of Ansar al-Sharia—began to take hold in the city of Sirte, Gadhafi's hometown. Sirte is in an oil-rich desert area with tremendous strategic value, lying between the two regions of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. And Misratan militias treated Sirte ruthlessly after Gadhafi’s fall, prompting many locals to welcome ISIS. So it was no accident that ISIS chose that spot, or that it stepped into the Libyan power vacuum more broadly: Libya is strategically important for eventually expanding across North Africa; it’s a launching point for criminal trafficking in the Mediterranean; and there is a potential to exploit huge energy resources, as ISIS has done to a degree in Iraq. 

Then in December 2015 in Morocco, the Government of National Unity (GNA) signed an agreement by which Fayez Serraj became prime minister. But General Haftar and the government in Tobruk didn’t support the move, and the security environment across the country is still abysmal. Despite the assurances from United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) Special Envoy Martin Kobler that Libya would achieve stability, Libya is still seriously fragmented. 

Today, the real fight is not even between Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, per se, because the two regions—along with Fezzan—are so divided internally. Serraj was barely allowed to arrive in Tripoli this March, for instance—only thanks to the intervention of the international community. The GNC (with Prime Minister Khalifa Gwell and President Nouri Abusahmain) immediately dubbed Serraj’s cabinet "illegal," but then a month later decided to disband in favor of Serraj’s GNA. The government in Tobruk, led by President of the House of Representatives Aguila Saleh Issa, has still not given his full endorsement.

Bright spots?

In spite of these political frictions, there have been small signs of progress. Foreign ministers from other countries and even the prime minister of Malta have arrived in Tripoli as a sign that the new political situation is formalizing. And while embassies remain closed, there is a sense that things are moving in a positive direction. Given this, in late April Serraj asked the international community to intervene in order to secure oil wells, theoretically protected by Jadran Ibrahim and his Petroleum Facilities Guard (PFG), a powerful allied militia in Tripoli. But while the international community has seemed ready—including the Italian government, which has taken a leadership role—accusations of local weakness and Western meddling complicate the Libyan political arena. 

ISIS, meanwhile, is suffering setbacks, having been attacked in Sirte from the south, west, and east by a collection of GNA forces, Misrata militia brigades, and the PFG. The GNA forces are currently in the center of Sirte, clashing with ISIS and gaining terrain every day. ISIS seems to be weaker than many thought (indicating that estimates of its numbers were wrong) and now may be fleeing south—to Fezzan—where its strategy can be more fluid and less based on territorial control. 

Re-considering the fragmentation problem

The persistent fragmentation in Libya is what is most worrying. Internal divisions are the product of decades of Gadhafi’s reckless governing—he kept his citizens from each other and from the rest of the world and deprived them of any solid governmental or administrative structure that could keep the country stable in the event of a "post-regime" moment. And looking even further back, it’s important to remember that Tripolitania and Cyrenaica were never aligned, even during the two decades of rebellion against Italy. The Italians used the old "divide et impera" (divide and conquer) strategy, digging real "furrows of blood"—in the words of British scholar Edward E. Evans-Pritchard in 1949—between Libyan tribes. 

And today? A serious agreement between the main political factions—the Government of National Unity and the House of Representatives—seems out of reach. Meanwhile, few of the fundamental institutions required for the development and governance of a modern country are in place. Libya has invested little in education, and both corruption and unemployment are off the charts. Despite immense energy resources, the economy is contracting. Oil production has declined from 500,000 barrels per day in 2013 to 300,000 in January 2016, and not because deposits have depleted. And tourism, it goes without saying, isn’t taking place. 

Fayez Serraj, Libyan prime minister-designate under the proposed unity government, attends a meeting with officials of municipal council of Tripoli in Tripoli, Libya. Photo credit: Reuters/Ismail Zitouny.

Instead, there have been thousands of deaths and a massive outflow of refugees. While UNSMIL’s efforts have been commendable, the international community should seriously consider how to do more in Libya. It’s better to devise and implement an intervention plan now than wait for a true emergency in Libya. The international community must think about and articulate a real strategy, not merely implement tactical operations. Given the dramatically deteriorated security situation today, it seems impossible to imagine a non-security related intervention, even in defense of the soldiers called to the simple mission of protecting the new coalition government. 

One approach to consider is helping Libyans build a confederal state, divided into three large regions: Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Fezzan (or perhaps more if the Libyan people deem it appropriate). Perhaps it is time that such provinces become more autonomous—following different paths as they choose, based on their unique ethnic, social, religious, and political origins. This is an extreme solution, of course. But it is clear that the international community, which had been so much a part of the Libyan revolution, cannot now permit the failure of Libya as a state.

The paradox of deconstructing to construct, in this case, can work. The long-advocated national-level solution of political unity does not, in fact, seem possible. Instead, a confederation of the three regions built on the original disposition of tribes and natural borders could probably assure a deeper stability. Regional governments could better protect local interests in security, economic reconstruction, and governance. The international community should thus start from the bottom, emphasizing local solutions, supporting local actors, and helping to empower Libyans to choose their leaders at a local level. This is not to rule out a central government someday, but would mean that such a government would be somewhat less influential. It’s an incredibly difficult and long plan, but probably the only one that can work. 

       

Event Information

The Brookings Doha Center (BDC) hosted a panel discussion on April 21, 2015 regarding Libya’s displacement crisis amid the country’s ongoing violence. The panelists were Houda Mzioudet, a journalist, researcher, and commentator on Libyan and Tunisian affairs; Megan Bradley, a non-resident fellow at the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement and assistant professor at McGill University, and Ibrahim Sharqieh, the deputy director of the BDC. Sultan Barakat, the BDC’s director of research, moderated the event, which was attended by members of Qatar's diplomatic, academic, and media community.

Sultan Barakat opened the discussion by explaining that the main difference between refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) is whether they are able to cross a border. By doing so, refugees gain access to certain types of status and assistance. Otherwise, both groups’ experience of being uprooted is similar, as they are likely to lose their livelihoods, friends, family, and end up in a difficult environment where they are at the mercy of others. Barakat argued that the international community has proven it cannot deal with these challenges, especially in a dignified way, and called for a reexamination of the 1951 Refugee Convention.

Ibrahim Sharqieh then described the displacement crisis within Libya, starting with the 2011 revolution that removed Gadhafi from power. He reported that the number of IDPs in the wake of the fighting reached 550,000, most of whom fled for political reasons, as they were Gadhafi supporters. He said that most IDPs returned to their homes after Gadhafi’s defeat, with the numbers falling to 56,000 by early 2014, though some groups such as the Tawerghans and the Mashashya tribe continued to face difficult situations. Sharqieh noted that due to Libya’s current civil war, the number of IDPs has now increased to 400,000. Many of them are scattered over 35 towns and cities, often lacking shelter due to the small number of available camps. He added that Libya’s IDPs often get caught in crossfire between militia groups, particularly in Benghazi and near Tripoli’s airport, and their movements have been restricted. He found that IDPs from Tawergha at the Janzour camp near Tripoli faced discrimination when they left the camp, which extended to their children that attend area schools.

According to Sharqieh, the ultimate solution is a successful transition where there is national reconciliation and the establishment of a transitional justice law, but he noted that this is not very likely because of the ongoing civil war and presence of rival governments. In the meantime, he expressed that parties to the conflict have an obligation to protect IDPs, providing humanitarian support and education as well. Sharqieh also advocated for IDPs being represented in the ongoing U.N.-sponsored negotiations to ensure that their situation is addressed. He reported that the Tawerghans are highly organized, in communication with the state, and have been able to forge some agreements with Misrata, while more recently displaced IDPs are basically just on the run.

Houda Mzioudet then discussed the Libyans who have crossed into Tunisia, noting that Tunisians historically have not considered Libyans refugees because of their close relations. She said that in 2011 these Libyans’ presence was not considered a major problem, as many found refuge with Tunisian families in the south and Tunisia received U.N. support. She noted, however, that a new wave of Libyans last summer had complicated matters, as these communities were more politically and ideologically diverse. Asked by Barakat whether refugees were bringing Libya’s politics with them, Mzioudet said the Libyans were accused at one time of trying to stir up trouble, but the government took a firm stance against them getting involved in Tunisia’s politics.

Mzioudet argued that the main concern now is how Libyans can be assisted, as many of them have lost trust in the Libyan authorities and are fearful of approaching the Libyan embassy. She reported that Libyans are now living in a state of limbo: they do not need visas, which enables them to live underground, but also prevents them from getting jobs. Mzioudet described this as a challenge for Tunisian authorities, as clear information about these Libyans is hard to come by. She cited estimates of their numbers ranging from the government’s 1.5 million (roughly 10 percent of Tunisia’s population) to a recent study’s 300,000-400,000.

Mzioudet noted that the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has encouraged Libyans to come forward and register, but many have refused to do so. She also recounted that the Tunisia’s extradition of ex-Libyan Prime Minister Al-Baghdadi Al-Mahmoudi caused an uproar and frightened many Libyans. Though Mzioudet noted that civil society groups have done much to help Libyan refugee communities, the U.N. has prioritized other needs and Tunisia is not recognized as a host country by international community. She added that at this point some Libyans are not able to make ends meet and some women have turned to prostitution as a result.

Megan Bradley’s presentation stressed the need for a holistic approach to Libya’s displacement crisis and the importance of thinking about the relationships between the refugee and IDP populations. She explained that the accepted durable solutions for each were similar: local integration in the country of asylum or community where they are sheltering, resettlement to a third country or community, or voluntary repatriation in conditions of safety and dignity. Bradley noted that the expectation generally seems to be that repatriation and return will be the predominant approach for Libyan refugees and IDPs, as occurred remarkably quickly following the revolution. She said this was possible largely because Libyans were able to finance their own returns—rare in displacement situations. Similarly, many displaced Libyans are continuing to depend on their own resources, which Bradley warned is not sustainable.

Bradley went on to make four specific points. First, she emphasized that under international law, the return of displaced persons must be voluntary. She argued that the vast majority of Libyan exiles have legitimate security concerns and should benefit from protections against refoulement, defined as the expulsion of vulnerable individuals. Secondly, Bradley said it was time to think about resources and increased donor contributions, challenging as it may be. She then turned to transitional justice and reconciliation, noting how the overly punitive nature of Libya’s political isolation law and the concept of collective responsibility had needlessly increased displacement. Lastly, Bradley called for delivering current support in ways that can lay groundwork for durable solutions, such as getting Libyan children in schools, providing adequate healthcare, and bringing them out of the shadows.

When Barakat asked about European support for Tunisia, Bradley noted that these countries have a huge potential role to play. At the same time, she suggested that the Tunisian government has not forceful enough in requesting their assistance. With regards to the migration crisis in the Mediterranean, Bradley and the other panelists urged the international community and especially the European Union to put greater emphasis on resolving the political vacuum in Libya and elsewhere on the continent, while allowing for resettlement and legal labor migration in the meantime. In response to a suggestion from an attendee that Libyans should not be considered refugees because they are all still receiving stipends from Libyan institutions, Bradley countered that refugee status has nothing to do with financial resources, but the need for protection. Mzioudet added that some Libyans have reported that their salaries have been withheld, perhaps for past misdeeds, pushing them into destitution.

Sharqieh condemned the failure to recognize what are clearly refugees in Tunisia as such, suggesting that it is convenient for the UNHCR and government of Tunisia because it limits their obligations. Still, he held that many IDPs would return home given effective rule of law and a reliable judicial system, though otherwise they could not risk it. Barakat closed the discussion by suggesting that, considering the trend of intractable conflicts, it was time for a regional approach to handling the resulting displacement issues.

Video

• Uprooted, unprotected: Libya’s displacement crisis
• المقتلعون غير المحميين: أزمة النازحين في ليبيا

Transcript

• Event Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

• libya transcript

      

Event Information

Register for the Event

With international attention focused on the humanitarian emergencies in Syria and Iraq, the escalating crisis in Libya has gone overlooked. Scores of those displaced during the 2011 Libyan revolution have been unable to return to their homes, while over a million more have been uprooted in the subsequent violence. Hundreds of thousands of Libyans remain displaced within their country, while countless more have sought shelter in neighboring states such as Tunisia. At the same time, human traffickers are taking advantage of the collapse of order in Libya, sending more and more boats across the Mediterranean filled with asylum seekers and migrants desperate to reach Europe. With the vast majority of international actors having pulled out of Libya in the summer of 2014, humanitarian assistance for needy populations is in short supply, and solutions to the crisis seem far from sight.

On April 24, the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement convened a discussion on the humanitarian consequences of the violence in Libya, focusing on the implications for those in Libya and for the country’s neighbors. Brookings Nonresident Fellow Megan Bradley drew on recent research on Libya’s displacement crisis. Speakers also included Kais Darragi of the Embassy of the Republic of Tunisia and Shelly Pitterman of the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Elizabeth Ferris, senior fellow and co-director of the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement moderated the event and offered opening remarks.

 

Audio

• An overlooked crisis: Humanitarian consequences of the conflict in Libya

Transcript

• Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

• 20150424_libya_humanitarian_transcript

      

With more than 700 deaths reported over three days last week, and with a confirmed 800,000 more migrants waiting in Libya to attempt the crossing into Europe, it is becoming increasingly clear that Italy could become the new Greece in the global refugee crisis, and that the central Mediterranean could become the new Aegean.

The dirty deal cut between the European Union and Turkey this spring seems to be working: It’s effectively shut down the eastern Mediterranean route to Europe. But it has also pushed those attempting to reach the continent onto the arguably more dangerous central Mediterranean route, which claimed thousands of lives last summer. Now we’re seeing the consequences.

It’s clear that this crisis will not be resolved in Libya. The country may be ground zero for migration from North Africa to southern Europe—the result of a power vacuum left by Western powers after the fall of Muammar al-Qaddafi in 2011—but coming up with a solution that involves this troubled country will be difficult, to put it mildly. Libya is a failed state. Or rather, it is a jigsaw of four ethnic groups (Arab, Berber, Tuareg, and Toubou) and several dozen Ashraf tribes with no serious central authority to speak of. While a unity government and a draft constitution are in place, the former effectively controls only parts of Tripoli, while the latter is littered with both procedural deficiencies and substantive flaws.

Libya is also a security nightmare. The Islamic State controls over 150 miles of the coast around the city of Sirte, while dozens of militias vie for supremacy in localized, low-intensity conflicts throughout the country. The increasing military involvement of both the United States and its European allies in Libya is testimony to the concern elicited by the Islamic State’s presence. Were this not enough, Libya has a terrible record when it comes to its treatment of migrants and asylum seekers. The country never signed up to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol; it is host to detention centers where migrants survive in atrocious conditions; and it has signed up to appalling migration deals with Italy under Silvio Berlusconi. Multiple reports talk of the regular abuses, which include abysmal sanitary conditions, beatings, torture, hard labor, and even murder, which migrants have suffered in the country.

Up until recently, European officials appeared to be discussing plans to strike a deal with Libya similar to the one cut with Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s government in Turkey. Italian Interior Minister Angelino Alfano, for example, repeatedly claimed that what Europe needed was a migration compact with Libya along the lines of the one Brussels signed with Ankara in March. But such a deal, for the time being at least, is hardly a likely prospect. The deal with Turkey rested on the assumption that, with the right incentives in place, Ankara could exercise a baseline level of control over its borders. Brussels should not worry about Libya’s willingness to fulfill the key provisions of a similar migration compact. What Europeans should be concerned about, rather, is that the Libyan state—with its malfunctioning government, which lacks a bare minimum of administrative capacity—has no ability to fulfill them.

In the long run, Libya and Europe need to seek a comprehensive solution to this migration crisis. But with the high season for smuggling and trafficking across the Mediterranean almost upon us, an interim solution is critical.

Libya, which sits 280 miles from the southernmost point of mainland Italy, is the primary launching point for those seeking to cross from Africa to Europe. But it remains only one variable within the broader migration equation. An interim solution for the current crisis needs a broader focus and should involve three geographic areas: Libya, the countries sharing land borders with Libya, and the Mediterranean Sea itself.

In Libya, EU governments should pressure the unity government to immediately sign up to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 protocol. These would provide a firm legal framework within which all stakeholders would have to operate. Signing them would make it clear that Libya is ready to respect the rights of migrants under international law. And, crucially, it would mandate Libya to respect refugees’ right, in particular, to non-refoulement—that is, to not be returned to countries where they risk physical harm or abuse. Secondly and where the security situation allows, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Organization for Migration, and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees should be provided with all necessary means to massively scale up their presence in the country. By doing so, they would be able to become crucial representatives for the rights of migrants and asylum seekers.

Finally—and with the explicit permission of the unity government—the European Union should start patrolling Libyan territorial waters, while international humanitarian organizations must take over the management of Libyan detention centers where migrants are held. Because Libyan authorities do not exercise any meaningful control over the coastline and because they lack the resources to adequately administer the detention centers they are supposedly managing, these measures would only technically—but not substantively—infringe upon the central government’s sovereignty.

Europe must also seek to form partnerships with Libya’s neighbors—a strategy it appears to be beginning to pursue. Countries sharing land borders with Libya have a significant comparative advantage over Tripoli when it comes to being candidates for partnerships: They have (relatively) stable governments. Algeria, Chad, Egypt, Niger, Sudan, and Tunisia face tremendous challenges in a variety of policy areas, yet they have the bare minimum of what it takes to resolve those challenges: established state structures.

These countries are often the countries of origin or earlier transit for the sub-Saharan migrants who converge on Libya as a springboard to Europe. Crucially, the European Union has a well-established relationship with all these governments through the second revision of the Cotonou Agreement between the European Union and African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries. More specifically, the Khartoum Process for East Africa, the Rabat Process for West Africa, and the EU strategy for the Sahel provide regional frameworks within which Europe and its partner countries can address migration issues. These regular and structured dialogues between European and African governments provide a system of financial and diplomatic rewards for African countries that proactively engage with migration issues. In particular, they’ve resulted in concrete projects that aim to discourage irregular migration by establishing readmission agreements while providing legal avenues for those trying to get to Europe, such as temporary migration plans.

It is high time for Brussels to further increase cooperation by providing additional resources to address migration issues: Europe must enable its African partners to set up projects that contribute to creating employment opportunities, ensuring food and nutrition security, improving migration management, and promoting conflict prevention. The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa should substantially be boosted for this purpose.

Europe appears to be taking steps to make migration control a cornerstone of its relationship with its African neighbors. Ad hoc migration compacts are in the works with selected origin and transit countries, including Ethiopia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal, and proposals are being made to launch a comprehensive €62 billion investment plan to tackle the long-term root causes of economic migration. The EU has renewed its focus on re-admissions to these countries, prioritizing speedy returns for those whose asylum claims are rejected over establishing formal readmission agreements, which is a sign of Europe’s determination to push this through—though also a warning of the potential dodginess of the various deals in the making.

Lastly, Brussels must do its homework where it is most able to bring about change: in the Mediterranean Sea and along Europe’s southern coast. The EU’s naval Operation Sophia in the south-central Mediterranean is trying to tackle migrant smuggling at sea. Its geographic scope, however, is significantly more limited compared with the Operation Mare Nostrum carried out by the Italian Navy and later superseded by Frontex’s Operation Triton. This should be expanded again. At the same time, the mandate of the operation should be widened to explicitly encourage search-and-rescue operations on top of its primary aim of disrupting smugglers’ networks. On its Italian shores, Europe should intensify its support for Italian authorities engaged in the establishment and management of so-called migrant hot spots. Indeed, while Rome has fulfilled most of its obligations by setting up new headquarters and boosting its processing rates, its European partners are struggling to make available specialized personnel for the hot spots and to relocate migrants already in Italy.

The ideas above are only a short-term interim solution, however. In the medium to long term, the international community needs to address the tremendous underlying challenges producing chaos in Libya. The newly established Government of National Accord must secure the support of all ethnic groups and major tribes. Having done that, the Islamic State must be rooted out through a very high-intensity but hopefully brief and localized conflict. Finally, a minimum degree of administrative capacity must be re-established beyond Tripoli.

All of the above require meaningful engagement with Libya on the part of Europe that will probably take years to reap benefits. Until that is forthcoming, an interim solution must be found, for the sake of the hundreds of thousands of lives at risk.

The piece was originally published in Foreign Policy. 

       

Although there has been some progress in forming a national unity government in Libya, “unity” is a rather inapplicable word for the country. In reality, friction between various political actors remains high. Ultimately, perhaps a form of disunity—confederation, rather than centralization—is the best model for Libya.

Libyan politics: A primer

During the summer of 2014, the Libyan leadership, after an initial hint of cooperation, split into two governments: 

• One, headquartered in Tobruk and based on a secular matrix, was recognized internationally. It received support from the House of Representatives and was abetted by General Khalifa Haftar and his so-called National Libyan Army. Externally, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Russia have supported this government because of its anti-Islamist ideology. In May 2014, Haftar launched "Operation Dignity" against the Islamist militias, supported by the Zintan brigades (consisting of the Civic, al-Sawaiq, and al-Qaaqa brigades), and the militias coming from the ethnic minorities of Tebu and Fezzan.
• The other, headquartered in Tripoli, was Islamic in nature. It was supported by the new General National Congress (GNC) and was part of the Libya Dawn group of pro-Islamist militias (which included groups from Misrata, Amazigh, and Tuareg). Qatar, Sudan, and Turkey have supported this government for different reasons, including to earn a more prominent place on the global stage or to support the Muslim Brotherhood. 

But it gets more complicated, since it wasn’t just the Tobruk- and Tripoli-based governments that competed to fill the power vacuum post-Gadhafi. The constellation of militias and brigades has changed continuously. There are Salafist groups such as:

• Ansar al-Sharia Libya (or ASL, located between Benghazi and Derna); 
• Muhammad Jamal Network (between Benghazi and Derna);
• Al-Murabitun (in the southeast, around Ghat, Ubari, Tasawah, and Murzuq);
• Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (or AQIM, in the southwest and northeast of Libya); and
• Ansar al-Sharia Tunisia (or AST, located between Derna and Ajdabiya). 

Then in 2015, an Islamic State (or ISIS) cell—made up of about 3,000 Tunisians, Yemenis, Algerians, and Libyans, especially former supporters of the Gadhafi regime and members of Ansar al-Sharia—began to take hold in the city of Sirte, Gadhafi's hometown. Sirte is in an oil-rich desert area with tremendous strategic value, lying between the two regions of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. And Misratan militias treated Sirte ruthlessly after Gadhafi’s fall, prompting many locals to welcome ISIS. So it was no accident that ISIS chose that spot, or that it stepped into the Libyan power vacuum more broadly: Libya is strategically important for eventually expanding across North Africa; it’s a launching point for criminal trafficking in the Mediterranean; and there is a potential to exploit huge energy resources, as ISIS has done to a degree in Iraq. 

Then in December 2015 in Morocco, the Government of National Unity (GNA) signed an agreement by which Fayez Serraj became prime minister. But General Haftar and the government in Tobruk didn’t support the move, and the security environment across the country is still abysmal. Despite the assurances from United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) Special Envoy Martin Kobler that Libya would achieve stability, Libya is still seriously fragmented. 

Today, the real fight is not even between Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, per se, because the two regions—along with Fezzan—are so divided internally. Serraj was barely allowed to arrive in Tripoli this March, for instance—only thanks to the intervention of the international community. The GNC (with Prime Minister Khalifa Gwell and President Nouri Abusahmain) immediately dubbed Serraj’s cabinet "illegal," but then a month later decided to disband in favor of Serraj’s GNA. The government in Tobruk, led by President of the House of Representatives Aguila Saleh Issa, has still not given his full endorsement.

Bright spots?

In spite of these political frictions, there have been small signs of progress. Foreign ministers from other countries and even the prime minister of Malta have arrived in Tripoli as a sign that the new political situation is formalizing. And while embassies remain closed, there is a sense that things are moving in a positive direction. Given this, in late April Serraj asked the international community to intervene in order to secure oil wells, theoretically protected by Jadran Ibrahim and his Petroleum Facilities Guard (PFG), a powerful allied militia in Tripoli. But while the international community has seemed ready—including the Italian government, which has taken a leadership role—accusations of local weakness and Western meddling complicate the Libyan political arena. 

ISIS, meanwhile, is suffering setbacks, having been attacked in Sirte from the south, west, and east by a collection of GNA forces, Misrata militia brigades, and the PFG. The GNA forces are currently in the center of Sirte, clashing with ISIS and gaining terrain every day. ISIS seems to be weaker than many thought (indicating that estimates of its numbers were wrong) and now may be fleeing south—to Fezzan—where its strategy can be more fluid and less based on territorial control. 

Re-considering the fragmentation problem

The persistent fragmentation in Libya is what is most worrying. Internal divisions are the product of decades of Gadhafi’s reckless governing—he kept his citizens from each other and from the rest of the world and deprived them of any solid governmental or administrative structure that could keep the country stable in the event of a "post-regime" moment. And looking even further back, it’s important to remember that Tripolitania and Cyrenaica were never aligned, even during the two decades of rebellion against Italy. The Italians used the old "divide et impera" (divide and conquer) strategy, digging real "furrows of blood"—in the words of British scholar Edward E. Evans-Pritchard in 1949—between Libyan tribes. 

And today? A serious agreement between the main political factions—the Government of National Unity and the House of Representatives—seems out of reach. Meanwhile, few of the fundamental institutions required for the development and governance of a modern country are in place. Libya has invested little in education, and both corruption and unemployment are off the charts. Despite immense energy resources, the economy is contracting. Oil production has declined from 500,000 barrels per day in 2013 to 300,000 in January 2016, and not because deposits have depleted. And tourism, it goes without saying, isn’t taking place. 

Fayez Serraj, Libyan prime minister-designate under the proposed unity government, attends a meeting with officials of municipal council of Tripoli in Tripoli, Libya. Photo credit: Reuters/Ismail Zitouny.

Instead, there have been thousands of deaths and a massive outflow of refugees. While UNSMIL’s efforts have been commendable, the international community should seriously consider how to do more in Libya. It’s better to devise and implement an intervention plan now than wait for a true emergency in Libya. The international community must think about and articulate a real strategy, not merely implement tactical operations. Given the dramatically deteriorated security situation today, it seems impossible to imagine a non-security related intervention, even in defense of the soldiers called to the simple mission of protecting the new coalition government. 

One approach to consider is helping Libyans build a confederal state, divided into three large regions: Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Fezzan (or perhaps more if the Libyan people deem it appropriate). Perhaps it is time that such provinces become more autonomous—following different paths as they choose, based on their unique ethnic, social, religious, and political origins. This is an extreme solution, of course. But it is clear that the international community, which had been so much a part of the Libyan revolution, cannot now permit the failure of Libya as a state.

The paradox of deconstructing to construct, in this case, can work. The long-advocated national-level solution of political unity does not, in fact, seem possible. Instead, a confederation of the three regions built on the original disposition of tribes and natural borders could probably assure a deeper stability. Regional governments could better protect local interests in security, economic reconstruction, and governance. The international community should thus start from the bottom, emphasizing local solutions, supporting local actors, and helping to empower Libyans to choose their leaders at a local level. This is not to rule out a central government someday, but would mean that such a government would be somewhat less influential. It’s an incredibly difficult and long plan, but probably the only one that can work. 

       

On August 26, the Brookings Institution hosted a panel discussion of the findings of the 2015 Financial and Digital Inclusion Project Report and Scorecard. Chief among the report’s findings was the rapid growth of financial products and services targeted at the world’s unbanked population.  Much of the growth stems from innovations in digital payments systems and non-bank financial services.  For example, systems like M-Pesa in Kenya allow customers to store money on their mobile phones and easily transfer it to other M-Pesa users.  Advancing financial inclusion will greatly benefit the two billion people worldwide that still lack access to any financial services.

The report itself ranks a set of 21 countries on four continents chosen for their efforts to promote financial inclusion.  The criteria used to score each country include country commitment, mobile capacity, regulatory environment, and adoption.  The results show that several pathways to financial inclusion exist, from mobile payments systems to so-called “branchless” banking services.  Places that lack traditional banks have seen financial inclusion driven by mobile operators, while others have experimented with third-party agent banking in areas that lack bank branches.   

The panel drew financial inclusion and mobile payments experts from the government, industry, and non-profit groups.  Each panelist touted the benefits of financial inclusion from their own perspective.  Women especially have much to gain from financial inclusion since they have historically faced the most obstacles to opening financial accounts.  In developing countries, a mobile payments system grants women greater privacy, control, and safety compared to cash payments.  Traceable digital payments also make it easier to combat corruption and money laundering.  Salaries paid to government employees and transfer payments to low-income households can be sent straight to a mobile payment account, eliminating opportunities for bribe seeking and theft. 

According to the panelists, financial inclusion can also drive economic growth in developing countries.  As financial services expand, they will also increase in sophistication, allowing customers to do more with their money.  For example, a payments record can be used to establish a credit history for loan applications, and digital savings accounts with interest can help customers protect their wealth against inflation.  These same systems can also be used to provide insurance coverage, reducing financial uncertainty for low-income populations.

The proliferation of financial services has many benefits, but it will also create policy challenges if regulations do not keep up with financial innovation.  Requiring several forms of identification to purchase a mobile phone or open a bank account presents an obstacle to low income and rural customers that live far away from government offices that issue identification. Broad coordination between telecom regulators, ID issuers, banking authorities, and other government agencies is often necessary for lowering barriers to accessing financial services.

It is telling that many countries included in the report are looking to other developing countries for policies to promote financial inclusion.  The scarcity of traditional banks combined with new methods of accessing financial services opens avenues to financial inclusion not seen in most developed countries. Established banking industries and the accompanying regulations leave fewer opportunities for financial innovation, but countries with large unbanked populations can start with a clean slate. Over the next two years, FDIP will continue to monitor and report on developments in financial inclusion around the world.

Send comments on the 2015 FDIP Report and Scorecard and suggestions for future reporting to FDIPComments@brookings.edu.

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

      

Good afternoon Chair Ayotte, Ranking Member Cantwell, and Members of the Subcommittee. Thank you very much for the opportunity to testify today on the important topic of domestic unmanned aircraft systems (UAS).

I am a nonresident senior fellow in Governance Studies and the Center for Technology Innovation at the Brookings Institution. I am also a National Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford, and a professor at UCLA, where I hold appointments in the Electrical Engineering Department and the Department of Public Policy. The views I am expressing here are my own, and do not necessarily represent those of the Brookings Institution, Stanford University or the University of California.

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President Obama's announcement last month that earlier this year a “U.S. counterterrorism operation” had killed two hostages, including an American citizen, has become a fresh occasion for questioning the rationales for continuing attacks from unmanned aerial vehicles aimed at presumed, suspected, or even confirmed terrorists. This questioning is desirable, although not mainly for hostage-related reasons connected to this incident. Sometimes an incident has a sufficient element of controversy to stoke debate even though what most needs to be debated is not an issue specific to the incident itself. More fundamental issues about the entire drone program need more attention than they are getting.

The plight of hostages held by terrorists has a long and sometimes tragic history, almost all of which has had nothing to do with drones. Hostage-taking has been an attractive terrorist tool for so long partly because of the inherent advantages that the hostage-holders always will have over counterterrorist forces. Those advantages include not only the ability to conceal the location of hostages—evidently a successful concealment in the case of the hostages mentioned in the president's announcement—but also the ability of terrorists to kill the hostages themselves and to do so quickly enough to make any rescue operation extraordinarily difficult. Even states highly skilled at such operations, most notably Israel, have for this reason suffered failed rescue attempts.

It is not obvious what the net effect of operations with armed drones is likely to be on the fate of other current or future hostages. The incident in Pakistan demonstrates one of the direct negative possibilities. Possibly an offsetting consideration is that fearing aerial attack and being kept on the run may make, for some terrorists, the taking of hostages less attractive and the management of their custody more difficult. But a hostage known to be in the same location as a terrorist may have the attraction to the latter of serving as a human shield.

The drone program overall has had both pluses and minuses, as anyone who is either a confirmed supporter or opponent of the program should admit. There is no question that a significant number of certified bad guys have been removed as a direct and immediate consequence of the attacks. But offsetting, and probably more than offsetting, that result are the anger and resentment from collateral casualties and damage and the stimulus to radicalization that the anger and resentment provide. There is a good chance that the aerial strikes have created more new terrorists bent on exacting revenge on the United States than the number of old terrorists the strikes have killed.

This possibility is all the more disturbing in light of what appears to be a significant discrepancy between the official U.S. posture regarding collateral casualties and the picture that comes from nonofficial sources of reporting and expertise. The public is at a disadvantage in trying to judge this subject and to assess who is right and who is wrong, but what has been pointed out by respected specialists such as Micah Zenko is enough to raise serious doubt about official versions both of the efforts made to avoid casualties among innocents and of how many innocents have become victims of the strikes.

The geographic areas in which the drone strikes are most feasible and most common are not necessarily the same places from which future terrorist attacks against the United States are most likely to originate. The core Al-Qaeda group, which has been the primary target and concern in northwest Pakistan, is but a shadow of its former self and not the threat it once was. Defenders of the drone strikes are entitled to claim that this development is in large part due to the strikes. But that leaves the question: why keep doing it now?

The principal explanation, as recognized in the relevant government circles, for the drone program has been that it is the only way to reach terrorists who cannot be reached by other tools or methods. It has been seen as the only counterterrorist game that could be played in some places. That still leaves more fundamental questions about the motivations for playing the game.

Policy-makers do not use a counterterrorist tool just because the tool is nifty—although that may be a contributing factor regarding the drones—but rather because they feel obligated to use every available tool to strike at terrorists as long as there are any terrorists against whom to strike. In the back of their minds is the thought of the next Big One, or maybe even a not so big terrorist attack on U.S. soil, occurring on their watch after not having done everything they could to prevent it, or doing what would later be seen in hindsight as having had the chance to prevent it.

The principal driver of such thoughts is the American public's zero tolerance attitude toward terrorism, in which every terrorist attack is seen as a preventable tragedy that should have been prevented, without fully factoring in the costs and risks of prevention or of attempted prevention. Presidents and the people who work for them will continue to fire missiles from drones and to do some other risky, costly, or even counterproductive things in the cause of counterterrorism because of the prospect of getting politically pilloried for not being seen to make the maximum effort on behalf of that cause.

This piece was originally published by The National Interest.