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Cloud computing services over the Internet have the potential to spur a significant increase in government efficiency and decrease technology costs, as well as to create incentives and online platforms for innovation. Adoption of cloud computing technologies could lead to new, efficient ways of governing.

On April 7, the Brookings Institution hosted a policy forum that examines the economic benefits of cloud computing for local, state, and federal government. Federal Chief Information Officer Vivek Kundra delivered a keynote address on the role of the government in developing and promoting cloud computing. Brookings Vice President Darrell West moderated a panel of experts and detailed the findings in his paper, "Saving Money through Cloud Computing," which analyzes its governmental cost-savings potential.

After the program, panelists took audience questions.

Video

• Cloud Computing a Fiscally Smart Move
• Cloud Computing Saves Money, Makes Government More Open
• Cloud Computing Will Fundamentally Change Government Operations
• Government on Cloud Will Yield Cost-Effective System

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• The Economic Gains of Cloud Computing

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• Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

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Executive Summary

Government information technology is subject to a variety of rules, regulations, and procurement policies.  Computing is treated differently depending on whether the platform is based on desktops, laptops, mobile devices, or remote file servers known as cloud computing.  There are differences between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government, as well as in the level of privacy and security expected for various applications.  

Some people perceive higher security on desktop or laptop computers and lower security with the cloud because the latter’s information is stored remotely through third-party commercial providers.  In reality, though, there are serious security threats to all electronic information regardless of platform, and cloud server providers often take security more seriously than mass consumers or government officials employing weak passwords on their local computers. 

In this paper, I review current federal IT policy and discuss rules, practices, and procedures that limit innovation.  There are a variety of obstacles that make it difficult for policymakers to take full advantage of the technological revolution that has unfolded in recent years.  After outlining these issues, I make recommendations on policy changes required to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of federal computing. 

My specific recommendations include:

1. Public officials should develop more consistent rules on computing across desktop, laptop, mobile, and cloud platforms.  
2. The use of video, collaboration, and social networking should be authorized for congressional offices.  This would make legislative branch policy consistent with that of the executive branch.
3. Judicial branch computing should be modernized, with greater emphasis on cloud computing. 
4. There should be a more uniform certification process for federal agencies.  Right now, each agency is responsible for certifying its own applications.  It makes sense to have a “joint authorization board” with the power to review management services and certify particular products for use across the government. 
5. Congress should update the Electronic Communications Privacy Act to change the process by which law enforcement agents obtain electronic information.  Instead of using a prosecutor’s subpoena, legislation should require a “probable cause” search warrant that is approved by a judge.  This would provide greater safeguards in terms of online content, pictures, geolocation data, and e-mails.
6. Privacy rights should be placed on the same footing regardless of whether a person is using desktop or cloud computing.  It makes little sense to have weaker standards on one platform than another.  Consumers and government decision-makers expect the same level of protection whether they are accessing information on a desktop, laptop, mobile, or cloud storage system. 
7. Congress should amend the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act to strengthen penalties for unwanted intrusion into computing systems.  The law has inconsistent penalties and prosecutors have found that it is hard to prosecute cyber-crimes. 
8. Apps.gov represents a big step forward and government use should be expanded because it makes procurement easier and speeds public sector innovation.  It is a model of how the government can reinvent itself through digital technology in ways that improve efficiency and effectiveness.
9. Countries need to harmonize their laws on cloud computing so as to reduce current inconsistencies in regard to privacy, data storage, security processes, and personnel training,  
10. There should be mechanisms for data exchange that encourage portability across platforms.  We should avoid vendor lock-in that precludes data exchange.
11. Data on uptime, downtime, recover time, archiving, and maintenance schedules would help build public trust by providing information on computing performance.

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The U.S. government spends billions of dollars each year on computer hardware, software and file servers that may no longer be necessary. Currently, the public sector makes relatively little use of cloud computing, even though studies suggest substantial government savings from a migration to more Internet-based computing with shared resources.

On July 21, the Center for Technology Innovation at Brookings hosted a policy forum on steps to enhance public sector adoption of cloud computing innovations. Brookings Vice President Darrell West moderated a panel of experts, including David McClure of the General Services Administration, Dawn Leaf of the National Institute for Standards and Technology, and Katie Ratte of the Federal Trade Commission. West released a paper detailing the policy changes required to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of federal computing.

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• Moving to the Cloud: How the Public Sector Can Leverage the Power of Cloud Computing

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Although research suggests that considerable efficiencies can be gained from cloud computing technology, concerns over privacy and security continue to deter government and private-sector firms from migrating to the cloud. By its very nature, storing information or accessing services through remote providers would seem to raise the level of privacy and security risks. But is such apprehension warranted? What are the real security threats posed to individuals, business and government by cloud computing technologies? Do the cost-saving benefits outweigh the dangers?

On October 26, the Brookings Institution hosted a policy forum on the privacy and security challenges raised by cloud computing. Governance Studies Director Darrell West moderated a panel of technology industry experts examining how cloud computing systems can generate innovation and cost savings without sacrificing privacy and security. West will also present findings from his forthcoming paper “Privacy, Security, and Innovation in Cloud Computing.”

After the program, panelists took audience questions.

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• Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Many web services are examples of cloud computing, from storage and backup sites such as Flickr and Dropbox to online business productivity services such as Google Docs and Salesforce.com. Cloud computing offers a potentially attractive solution to customers keen to acquire computing infrastructure without large up-front investment, particularly in cases where their demand may be variable and unpredictable, as a means of achieving financial savings, productivity improvements and the wider flexibility that accompanies Internet-hosting of data and applications.

The greater flexibility of a cloud computing service as compared with a traditional outsourcing contract may be offset by reduced certainty for the customer in terms of the location of data placed into the cloud and the legal foundations of any contract with the provider. There may be unforeseen costs and risks hidden in the terms and conditions of such services.

This document reports on a detailed survey and analysis of the terms and conditions offered by cloud computing providers.

The survey formed part of the Cloud Legal Project at the Centre for Commercial Law Studies (CCLS), within the School of Law at Queen Mary, University of London, UK. Funded by a donation from Microsoft, but academically independent, the project is examining a wide range of legal and regulatory issues arising from cloud computing. The project's survey of 31 cloud computing contracts from 27 different providers, based on their standard terms of service as offered to customers in the E.U. and U.K., found that many include clauses that could have a significant impact, often negative, on the rights and interests of customers. The ease and convenience with which cloud computing arrangements can be set up may lull customers into overlooking the significant issues that can arise when key data and processes are entrusted to cloud service providers. The main lesson to be drawn from the Cloud Legal Project’s survey is that customers should review the terms and conditions of a cloud service carefully before signing up to it.

The survey found that some contracts, for instance, have clauses disclaiming responsibility for keeping the user’s data secure or intact. Others reserve the right to terminate accounts for apparent lack of use (potentially important if they are used for occasional backup or disaster recovery purposes), for violation of the provider’s Acceptable Use Policy, or indeed for any or no reason at all. Furthermore, whilst some providers promise only to hand over customer data if served with a court order, others state that they will do so on much wider grounds, including it simply being in their own business interests to disclose the data. Cloud providers also often exclude liability for loss of data, or strictly limit the damages that can be claimed against them – damages that might otherwise be substantial if a failure brought down an e-commerce web site.

Although in some U.S. states, in E.U. countries and in various other jurisdictions the validity of such terms may be challenged under consumer protection laws, users of cloud services may face practical obstacles to bringing a claim for data loss or privacy breach against a provider that seems local online but is, in fact, based in another continent. Indeed, service providers usually claim that their contracts are subject to the laws of the place where they have their main place of business. In many cases this is a US state, with a stipulation that any dispute must be heard in the provider’s local courts, regardless of the customer’s location.

Perhaps the most disconcerting discovery of the Cloud Legal Project’s survey was that many providers claimed to be able to amend their contracts unilaterally, simply by posting an updated version on the web. In effect, customers are put on notice to download lengthy and complex contracts, on a regular basis, and to compare them against their own copies of earlier versions to look for changes.

The cloud computing market is still developing rapidly, and potential cloud customers should be aware that there may be a mismatch between their expectations and the reality of cloud providers' service terms, and be alive to the possibility of unexpected changes to the terms.

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Our former Brookings colleague Rebecca Blank, now at the Commerce Department, is today leading the first meeting of the Obama Administration’s Innovation Advisory Board, looking at the innovative capacity and economic competitiveness of the United States.

I applaud the effort.  Nothing is more important to America’s longterm competitiveness than emphasizing innovation.  As the council looks to the private sector and global markets, I urge it to examine how the U.S. government can lead innovation and contribute to economic growth.  The best place to look is new and emerging digital technologies that can make government more accessible, accountable, responsive and efficient for the people who use government services every day.

Here are some of the recommendations I made in a recent paper I wrote with colleagues here at Brookings as part of our “Growth Through Innovation” initiative:

• Save money and gain efficiency by moving federal IT functions “to the cloud,” i.e., using advances in cloud computing to put software, hardware, services and data storage through remote file servers.

• Continue to prioritize the Obama administration’s existing efforts to put unparalleled amounts of data online at Data.gov and other federal sites, making it easier and cheaper for citizens and businesses to access the information they need.

• Use social media networks to deliver information to the public and to solicit feedback to improve government performance.

• Integrate ideas and operations with state and local organizations, where much of government innovation is taking place today. 

• Apply the methods of private-sector business planning to the public sector to produce region-specific business plans that are low cost and high impact.

These improvements in government services innovations in the digital age can help spur innovation and support a robust business climate.  And, as a sorely needed side benefit, they can also serve to eliminate some of the current distrust and even contempt for government that has brought public approval of the performance of the federal government to near historic lows.  

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While research suggests that considerable efficiencies can be gained from cloud computing technology, concerns over privacy and security continue to deter governments and private-sector firms from migrating to the cloud. Senator Amy Klobuchar (D-Minn.) has advanced discussion of the “Cloud Computing Act of 2011,” draft legislation that would address these challenges by encouraging the U.S. government to negotiate with other countries to establish consistent laws related to online security and cloud computing. The bill also creates new enforcement tools for investigating and prosecuting those who violate online privacy and security laws.

On June 16, the Brookings Institution hosted a forum on the policy proposals in the Cloud Computing Act of 2011. Discussion included an overview of the international policy implications as governments and firms adjust to a coherent legal framework, changes and innovations in public procurement, and challenges for private industry as it balances consumer needs and compliance with these proposed cloud computing safeguards.

After the program, panelists took audience questions.

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• Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

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Executive Summary

The move to the cloud is one of the defining information technology trends of the early 21st century. By providing businesses, universities, government agencies, and other entities with access to shared and often physically dispersed computing resources, cloud computing can simultaneously offer increased flexibility, reduced cost, and access to a wider array of services.

Cloud computing has also created a set of new challenges. For example, the issues of privacy and security in the cloud are well recognized and have been extensively discussed in the business and popular press. However, one critical issue that has received very little attention with respect to cloud computing is export control.

In the broadest sense, export control relates to regulations that the United States and many other countries have put in place to restrict the export of various sensitive items, information, and software.

There is an inherent tension between cloud computing and export control. While the concept of the cloud is centered on the premise of removing the need to track the details of data movement among various destinations, export control regulations are built largely around restrictions tied to those very movements.

If cloud computing is to reach its full potential, it is critical for providers and users of cloud services to address its implications with respect to export control. It is equally important to adapt the export control regulations to reflect the increasing prevalence of cloud computing in a manner that preserves the ability of American companies to benefit from the efficiencies of the cloud while also ensuring that American national security and foreign policy interests are adequately protected.

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In his new book The Mobile Wave: How Mobile Intelligence Will Change Everything (Vanguard Press, 2012), CEO of MicroStrategy Michael Saylor examines the transformative possibilities of mobile computing on business, society, economies and everyday life. Saylor argues that mobile technologies such as smartphones and tablet computers – “the fifth wave of computer technology” – will be indispensible tools for modern life and completely alter how we live.

On October 5, the Center for Technology Innovation at Brookings hosted a forum on mobile computing and its monumental impact on our future. Moderated by Vice President Darrell West, Michael Saylor discussed key highlights from his book and offered insights as to what sort of change we can expect from the macro level down to the most mundane of everyday humans tasks.

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• Riding the Mobile Wave: The Future of Mobile Computing

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• Transcript (.pdf)

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The first instance of “cloud” computing came in 2006, when Amazon released its Elastic Compute Cloud, a service for consumers to lease space on virtual machines to run software. Now, the cloud enables the transfer and storage of data around the world, in an almost seamless fashion. Using cloud services are a seamless experience from the consumer perspective. This ease of use obscures significant regulation from governments on both sides of the Atlantic. The Safe Harbor Principles is a framework that ensures that personal consumer data being transferred from the EU to the US is still subject to a level of security in compliance with the EU’s stricter regulation on data protection. US companies must be certified within this framework, in order to transfer consumer data outside the EU.

A comprehensive data privacy arrangement that satisfies both sides of the Atlantic is necessary to preserve the free flow of data, and the resulting commerce, between the two regions. Speaking at the 2014 Cloud Computing Policy Conference, Cameron F. Kerry suggested that neither side of the Atlantic can afford to partition the Internet. Currently trade negotiators are assessing the viability including an update to Safe Harbor Principles as a part of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).

TTIP and the Future of Trade

The NSA revelations last year have only increased support for further regulation over the transfer of personal data in the cloud, especially in the European Union (EU). The revelations have also brought to light significant differences in the European and US conceptions of privacy. The ruling by the European Court of Justice on the “right to be forgotten” is a recent example of this transatlantic divide. In EU countries, citizens can now request Google to take down links from search results that lead users to potentially damaging information.

There are several disputes that negotiators must first resolve. Europeans would prefer that American regulators take a more active role in cases where US firms are violating the Safe Harbor principles. EU officials have also indicated they would like to include a mechanism to send an alert if data were improperly shared with US law enforcement officials. The expansion of the codes of conduct within the cloud would serve as a major step towards finalizing TTIP. A European Commission Analysis finds that TTIP would inject about $130 billion into the US economy. Ultimately both the EU and the US have so much to gain that both nations must find a way to resolve these thorny issues.

Kevin Risser contributed to this post.

Since 2009 the federal government started the process of replacing local computers with cloud platforms. A recent report from the Congressional Research Service (CRS) provides an interesting view into the progress of these investments. It reveals the benefits that public agencies gain when using cloud services and the barriers they face when making the transition.

Advantages of Cloud Computing

Cloud computers are superior to locally-run data centers for a variety of reasons. The CRS report identifies six specific cloud benefits:

• Cost- Cloud computer platforms use resources more efficiently than local servers. An organization that uses local Information Technology (IT) must invest in the infrastructure to support computer systems at times of peak demand. However, most times companies or government agencies require only a fraction of that computing power. Cloud computing allows organizations to pay for all of the resources they need and avoid costly investments in rarely used local IT systems.
• Energy Efficiency- Cloud computing data centers benefit from economies of scale to run more efficiently than local servers. In some cases this can result in huge energy savings. For a large cloud computing center it also makes economic sense to invest in green energy sources like wind or solar for power.
• Availability- Cloud computing systems make it easy for any device with an Internet connection to access files or software. However, if a facility temporarily loses Internet access the files on cloud system are inaccessible. Alternatively, a locally administered IT system could function without Internet connectivity.
• Agility- Cloud systems can make it easier to upgrade operating systems and applications. The available computing power also means that memory intensive software packages are cost effective.
• Security- Cloud providing companies also have the financial resources to purchase the tools necessary to ensure that networks remain safe.
• Reliability- Cloud systems can save data onto multiple servers. If a single server goes down due to a cyberattack or another issue, the data is available on another server.

Government Investments in the Cloud

Determining the exact size of government cloud computing expenditures is difficult. Government spending on IT has increased every year from 2001 to 2013 when it reached a peak of $81 billion. In the three subsequent years it has decreased. Cloud computing expenditures likely represent a tiny fraction of that total. Market research firms have estimated that the federal government spends between $1.4 billion and $7 billion on cloud computers annually.

Trends in Total Federal Investment in Information Technology

Source: Congressional Research Service

Challenges for Migrating to the Cloud

The federal government has encountered several barriers in its plan to shift more functions to cloud platforms:

• High Federal Security Requirements- The government faces new advanced persistent threats routinely. System-wide security updates are necessary more often than for private sector organizations. The short update cycle provides a unique challenge to cloud providers.
• Adopting New Technologies- Government agencies have ingrained cultures that are slow to change. This shift from locally-based servers to the cloud can be slow and tedious for this reason.
• Ancillary Technologies- Cloud technologies are known for their flexibility. However, government agencies may lack the necessary IT infrastructure or speedy Internet connections that leverage the maximum potential of the cloud.
• Technical Know How- Cloud platforms require specialized knowledge to administer. Many government agencies lack the necessary experts to oversee a migration to the cloud.
• IT Expenditure- Migration to the cloud can involve expensive initial costs. Additional funding is necessary to facilitate the shift to the cloud.

The Future of the Government Cloud

An analysis of the costs and benefits of cloud migration uncover a few specific barriers that the federal government must overcome to earn the full value from new technologies. First, lawmakers must be willing to spend more now to save money later. Cloud systems are cheaper to run than local administered servers but the initial transition costs are high. Current funding levels, which are trending down, are too low to finance such a change. Privacy and security are also major challenges. Government servers host troves of data that Americans expect to remain private. Converting these systems to the cloud will require the government’s full confidence that cloud systems are at least as secure. New legislation is likely necessary to achieve the complimentary goals of privacy and security.

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In December 2009, the Saban Center for Middle East Policy conducted a day-long simulation of the diplomatic and military fallout that could result from an Israeli military strike against the Iranian nuclear program. In this Middle East Memo, Kenneth M. Pollack analyzes the critical decisions each side made during the wargame.

The simulation was conducted as a three-move game with three separate country teams. One team represented a hypothetical American National Security Council, a second team represented a hypothetical Israeli cabinet, and a third team represented a hypothetical Iranian Supreme National Security Council. The U.S. team consisted of approximately ten members, all of whom had served in senior positions in the U.S. government and U.S. military. The Israel team consisted of a half-dozen American experts on Israel with close ties to Israeli decision-makers, and who, in some cases, had spent considerable time in Israel. Some members of the Israel team had also served in the U.S. government. The Iran team consisted of a half-dozen American experts on Iran, some of whom had lived and/or traveled extensively in Iran, are of Iranian extraction, and/or had served in the U.S. government with responsibility for Iran.

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INTRODUCTION

Influencing the Islamic Republic of Iran has proven to be a perennial conundrum for American presidents. The complexity of Iranian politics and the intractability of the problems posed by Tehran’s revolutionary theocracy may explain why, over the course of three decades, each U.S. administration has been forced to revise its initial approach to Iran in hopes of achieving better outcomes. The overall result has been an American tendency to oscillate between engagement and pressure, with frustratingly limited results.

And so it goes for the Obama administration. After an initial, high-profile effort to draw Tehran into a serious dialogue both to resolve the nuclear issue as well as transcend it, Washington now finds itself pivoting away from diplomatic engagement to a more coercive policy centered around economic pressure. The shift comes amidst a dramatic new context within the Islamic Republic, characterized by historic turmoil on the streets and bitter divisions among the elites, and at a moment when the international urgency surrounding Tehran’s nuclear ambitions has never been greater. This context raises the stakes and heightens the sensitivities of getting U.S. policy on Iran right after so many years of failure.

The turn toward sanctions is a predictable one. Sanctions have proven to be an instrument of American policy toward Tehran for the past thirty years. American use of economic pressure as a means of dissuading Iranian malfeasance began with the freezing of Iranian assets after Iranian students seized the U.S. Embassy in Tehran in 1979 and culminated in the nearly comprehensive ban on trade and investment in Iran that has been in place since the Clinton administration. But, despite the appeal of sanctions, their protracted duration underlines their limitations—particularly when they are unilateral—as a mechanism for categorically revising Iranian policy. Still, many find sanctions attractive because the overall track record of Iranian decision-making demonstrates that Tehran often considers the costs and benefits of its policy options in determining its course. As Iran’s internal strife exacerbates the regime’s vulnerabilities, the prospects for international consensus around new economic restrictions appear more realistic than ever before.

To examine the options and implications for using sanctions to address the multi-faceted challenges of Iran, the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution held a half-day symposium in late October 2009. The workshop featured off-the-record panel discussions led by experts on Iranian internal politics and the key actors shaping the diplomatic landscape. The conclusions from that session are presented below.

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Introduction: Despite the launch of indirect, “proximity” talks between Palestinians and Israelis, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas continues to resist a resumption of direct negotiations with Israel absent a full settlement freeze. As chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and president of the Palestinian Authority (PA), Abbas also insists that any new negotiations pick up where previous talks left off in December 2008 and that the parties spell out ahead of time a clear “endgame,” including a timetable for concluding negotiations. While these may seem like unreasonable preconditions, Palestinian reluctance to dive headfirst into yet another round of negotiations is rooted in some genuine, hard-learned lessons drawn from nearly two decades of repeated failures both at the negotiating table and on the ground.

Not only have negotiations failed to bring Palestinians closer to their national aspirations but the peace process itself has presided over (and in some ways facilitated) a deepening of Israel’s occupation and an unprecedented schism within the Palestinian polity. Such failures have cost the Palestinian leadership dearly in terms of both its domestic legitimacy and its international credibility. While it remains committed to a negotiated settlement with Israel based on a two-state solution, the PLO/PA leadership has been forced to rethink previous approaches to the peace process and to negotiations, as much for its own survival as out of a desire for peace.

Haunted by past failures, Palestinian negotiators are now guided, to varying degrees, by six overlapping and sometimes conflicting lessons:

1. Realities on the ground must move in parallel with negotiations at the table.

2. Don’t engage in negotiations for their own sake.

3. Agreements are meaningless without implementation.

4. Incrementalism does not work.

5. Avoid being blamed at all costs.

6. Don’t go it alone.

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Introduction:

In the ebb and flow of Middle East diplomacy, the two interrelated issues of an Israeli-Syrian peace settlement and Washington’s bilateral relationship with Damascus have gone up and down on Washington’s scale of importance. The election of Barack Obama raised expectations that the United States would give the two issues the priority they had not received during the eight years of the George W. Bush administration. Candidate Obama promised to assign a high priority to the resuscitation of the Arab-Israeli peace process, and separately to “engage” with Iran and Syria (as recommended by the Iraq Study Group in 2006).

In May 2009, shortly after assuming office, President Obama sent the assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs, Jeffrey Feltman, and the senior director for the Middle East in the National Security Council, Daniel Shapiro, to Damascus to open a dialogue with Bashar al-Asad’s regime. Several members of Congress also travelled to Syria early in Obama’s first year, including the chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, John Kerry, and the chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Howard Berman. In addition, when the president appointed George Mitchell as special envoy to the Middle East, Mitchell named as his deputy Fred Hof, a respected expert on Syria and the Israeli-Syrian dispute. Last summer, both Mitchell and Hof visited Damascus and began their give and take with Syria.

And yet, after this apparent auspicious beginning, neither the bilateral relationship between the United States and Syria, nor the effort to revive the Israeli-Syrian negotiation has gained much traction. Damascus must be chagrined by the fact that when the Arab-Israeli peace process is discussed now, it is practically equated with the Israeli-Palestinian track. This paper analyzes the difficulties confronting Washington’s and Jerusalem’s respective Syria policies and offers an approach for dealing with Syria. Many of the recommendations stem from lessons resulting from the past rounds of negotiations, so it is important to understand what occurred.

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INTRODUCTION

Later this month, Egyptians will go to the polls, or attempt to, in order to vote in the country’s parliamentary elections. The elections will unlikely be a democratic affair in the Western sense. In fact, opposition candidates, voters, citizen groups—essentially everyone other than government representatives—are fully expecting the elections to be a violent and rigged episode. For easy reference, one can look to the June elections for the Shura Council, or upper house of Parliament, in which the governing National Democratic Party (NDP) managed to land 80 out of a possible 84 seats. Those elections were marked by violence and allegations of rampant violations.

Elections in Egypt are not generally democratic, they do not necessarily reflect the will of the people, and they will invariably usher in a house in which the NDP has an unshakeable majority. More so, the elected body has very little control over the government and none over the president, who, thanks to some creative constitutional amendments in 2007, can dissolve the Parliament at will. Election results are apparently so preordained that many have questioned the wisdom of participating at all. Opposition groups, among them the National Alliance for Change (NAC), led by former International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) head and current political reformer Mohamed ElBaradei, have been calling for a boycott. ElBaradei told reporters at a Ramadan Iftar meeting on September 7 that voting “would go against the national will.” Many political analysts and some members of the opposition have echoed the belief that participation in the elections only gives credence to a fundamentally flawed system and perpetuates the state myth of a democratic nation.

The above argument certainly has its merits, but it misses the point. Elections in Egypt are not about who wins seats—that is usually a foregone conclusion. They are about the “how and the what,” in the sense that they are oases of political activity, demand, and dissension in an otherwise arid climate. In that way, every election fought represents losses and gains for the respective participants in ways that invariably influence the following elections. Also, the ballot boxes can yield surprising results—as in the case of the 2005 elections when the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) gained a jawdropping 88 of 454 seats in the elections for the lower house. This outcome certainly would not have come about if the Brotherhood had not participated. To be sure, there are also significant, detrimental changes that happen as a direct consequence of the elections, among them constitutional amendments designed to hobble the opposition’s ability to field candidates and campaign. Still, for opposition parties and movements, boycotting the elections is the equivalent of throwing away the only political participation they have. It would mean relinquishing any visibility or influence and it would mean admitting to their supporters that they are essentially mere window dressings in the democratic façade. Arguably, this is a reason why these elections have only ever been boycotted once, in 1990. The Egyptian political arena is one where contestants scrabble for the smallest patch of ground. The high moral ground simply does not figure into it.

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Introduction:

There is an Egyptian proverb that says those who worry about demons will tend to run into them. Like much folk wisdom, it has solid psychological foundations; the likelihood of a problem rearing its head often appears to be exacerbated by constantly fretting about it. Ever since Hosni Mubarak stepped down as president of Egypt on February 11, 2011, the demon named “Now What?” has been keeping the Israeli government up at night. On August 18, it finally leapt up at them.

That day, a group of armed men attacked Israeli buses, as well as civilian and military vehicles north of Eilat, near the Egyptian border. Eight Israelis, both civilians and soldiers, were killed. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) set off in hot pursuit, shooting at the attackers from a helicopter. The helicopter crew either failed to notice, or ignored, that they were shooting over the Egyptian side of the border. In the pursuit, three Egyptians— an officer and two enlisted men—were killed and another three later died of their wounds. Israeli minister of defense Ehud Barak, while blaming Palestinian groups for the assault, made comments to the effect that the attacks were largely Egypt’s fault as there had been a major security collapse in Egypt since the former regime had been ousted six months earlier.

The way matters unfolded over the next few days pointedly illustrated the answer to a question that had been asked repeatedly both by international media and the Israeli government since Hosni Mubarak’s ouster: What did Egypt’s January 25 Revolution mean for Israel? The simplest answer is that it is no longer business as usual. The relationship between Egypt and Israel has changed and both countries will have to navigate new waters carefully and wisely.

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Last winter, Salafi parties in Egypt proved themselves a formidable political force, winning a quarter of the vote in the country’s first elections in the post-Mubarak era. For many in Washington, the unexpected strength of Egypt’s conservative religious groups raised unsettling questions about the future of U.S.-Egyptian relations and America’s security interests in the region.

Will the political success of Salafis turn Egypt into an anti-American power and strengthen jihadist groups like al-Qa’ida that are bent on using violence against the United States and its allies?

In the Saban Center Middle East Memo, William McCants, a Middle East specialist at CNA and adjunct faculty at Johns Hopkins University, examines the implications of the Salafis’ turn to, and success in, electoral politics. McCants argues that while political participation may not moderate Salafis’ positions on social issues, it will likely erode the strength of their most extreme and violent affiliates. For this reason, America’s interests may be best served when Salafis play a role in post-revolution politics.

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• The Lesser of Two Evils: The Salafi Turn to Party Politics in Egypt

In the wake of the U.S. military departure from Iraq and in the midst of Iran’s continued defiance of the international community over its nuclear program, is a new security arrangement for the Gulf in order? If so, is the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) capable of such a task, or should other institutions be considered?

In the Saban Center’s newest Middle East Memo, Security in the Persian Gulf: New Frameworks for the Twenty-First Century, Saban Center Senior Fellow Kenneth Pollack examines the possibility of developing a new security architecture for the region.

Pollack analyzes security arrangements in other parts of the world and focuses on two options:  expanding the GCC and turning it into a formal military alliance and creating an arrangement modeled on the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. In weighing each option, Pollack finds that the latter can better furnish a path toward peace and security.

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• Security in the Persian Gulf: New Frameworks for the Twenty-First Century

The Saban Center for Middle East Policy joined with the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War in June 2012 to host a one-day crisis simulation that explored the implications of spillover from the ongoing violence in Syria. The simulation examined how the United States and its allies might address worsening instability in Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, Turkey, and elsewhere in the Middle East as a result of the internecine conflict in Syria.

The Saban Center’s Middle East Memo, “Unraveling the Syria Mess: A Crisis Simulation of Spillover from the Syrian Civil War,” authored by simulation conveners Kenneth M. Pollack, Frederick W. Kagan, Kimberly Kagan, and Marisa C. Sullivan, presents key lessons and observations from the exercise.

Among the key findings:

• A humanitarian crisis alone is unlikely to spur the international community to take action in Syria.
   
• Turkey is a linchpin in any effort to end the fighting in Syria, but Washington and Ankara may not see eye-to-eye on what the end game should be.
   
• U.S. history in Iraq and Lebanon make intervention there unlikely, even if spillover causes a renewal of large-scale violence.

The simulation suggested a tension between U.S. political antipathy toward greater involvement in Syria and the potential strategic desirability of early action.

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• Unraveling the Syria Mess

Introduction

The issue of Iran has become a central preoccupation for the international community in recent months, thanks to the intersection of the historic changes in the region, an American presidential election, sharpening rhetoric from Israel, and Tehran’s relentless determination to advance its nuclear capabilities. The focus of policymakers in Washington and around the world remains fixed on the options for forestalling Iran’s determined march toward a nuclear weapons capability. This is the appropriate objective; the best possible outcome for maintaining peace and security in the Gulf and avoiding a deeply destabilizing nuclear arms race remains a credible, durable solution that curtails Iran’s nuclear ambitions. And while achieving such an outcome remains profoundly problematic, largely as a result of Tehran’s intransigence, preventing Iran from crossing the nuclear weapons threshold—either through persuasion, coercion, or some combination of the two—remains fully and unambiguously within the capabilities of the international community.

The shadow cast by Tehran has created a particularly intense sense of existential anxiety for the smaller Gulf states, including Kuwait, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Oman. After all, these are the same states whose civil orders were repeatedly disrupted by Iranian subversion and sponsorship of terrorism during the first decade after Iran’s Islamic revolution, and whose thriving economies rely on unimpeded access to the global commons. The events of the past decade have only exacerbated the smaller Gulf states’ endemic sense of insecurity. Iran has achieved a synergistic, sometimes even parasitic, relationship with the leadership of post-Saddam Iraq that, together with Tehran’s longstanding relationships with Syria and Lebanese Hizballah, greatly enables its bid for predominance in the heart of the Middle East. Today, the uncertainties surrounding the implications of regional flux have left Tehran simultaneously weakened and emboldened—a particularly dangerous combination for this particular array of Iranian leaders.

With Iran’s nuclear program advancing by the month and its efforts to tilt the regional balance in its favor growing more forceful, the small states of the Persian Gulf must face the distinct dilemma of preparing for the possible worst-case scenario of the nuclearization of their neighborhood, while participating ever more robustly in the international efforts to preclude that very possibility. In some respects, the Gulf states’ situation is unique. Unlike Israel, another small state that perceives an existential threat from Iran, the Gulf states cannot fall back upon either a presumptive nuclear deterrent or a primordial bond to the body politic of the world’s only remaining superpower. And in contrast to Iran’s other neighbors, the vast resources and history of ideological and territorial disputes between the Gulf states and Tehran significantly intensify the stakes. Even before the Gulf became the vital transportation corridor for global energy, the fault line in the regional balance of power had always run between the northern states and their southern rivals. The mere possibility that the north may gain a nuclear advantage is reshaping the security environment for Iran’s neighbors in the Gulf.

Because the threat of Iran looms large, the exigency of considering the widest possible array of alternative prospects for the evolution of this protracted crisis is important. This paper tackles the scenarios that successive American presidents have deemed unacceptable—an Iranian development or acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability or of nuclear weapons themselves—and the implications that such scenarios would have for the global nonproliferation regime and regional security, with a particular focus on the special challenges faced by Iran’s southern neighbors. To protect against threats along their borders, the Gulf states have traditionally hedged their bets by seeking balanced relations with their more powerful neighbors while cultivating extra-regional allies. That formula is already changing, as evidenced by a new assertiveness in Gulf states’ postures toward Tehran and a new creativity in deploying strategies for deterring and mitigating Iran’s efforts to extend its influence and/or destabilize its neighbors. The Gulf states must transform this tactical innovation into a full-fledged new hedging policy: one that deploys every possible tool to prevent a nuclear Iran while taking every possible step to prepare for such an eventuality.

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• Thinking the Unthinkable: The Gulf States and a Nuclear Iran

With violent protests following the second anniversary of the Egyptian revolution, and calls for a new unified government amid dire comments about the stability of Egypt, the world’s attention is again on President Morsi and his country. This follows a tumultuous period last month, when Egyptians went to the polls and ratified a new constitution. The document, criticized as hurried, incomplete, and lacking in consensus is enormously contentious.

In the Saban Center’s newest Middle East Memo, The View From a Distance: Egypt’s Contentious New Constitution, nonresident fellow Mirette F. Mabrouk gives a broad overview of the new constitution, and provides context and analysis for specific sections.

Mabrouk outlines several ways in which, she argues, the document is shaky on the protection of freedoms and rights, particularly those of women, some religious minorities and minors. Mabrouk also encourages analysts to stop viewing this situation as an Islamist/ secular divide, arguing that idea is too simplistic, and lacks the context for greater understanding of Egypt’s domestic politics.

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• The View From a Distance: Egypt’s Contentious New Constitution

Iraq has been rekindled. Whether it will merely be singed or immolated entirely remains to be seen, but the fire is burning again.

Most Americans stopped caring about Iraq long ago. That’s an inescapable reality but also an unfortunate mistake. Iraq is not just a painful and divisive memory or a cudgel to take up against one’s political rival, it is a very real interest. Today, Iraq has surpassed Iran to claim the spot as the second largest oil exporter in OPEC, behind only Saudi Arabia. Iraq’s steadily climbing oil production has been critical to reducing oil prices, and its collapse into renewed civil war would endanger our fragile economic recovery.

Moreover, just as spillover from the Syrian civil war is helping to re-ignite the Iraqi civil war, so renewed chaos and strife in Iraq could once again threaten other important oil producers like Kuwait, Iran and even Saudi Arabia. As it has in the past, Iraq is again becoming a hub for al-Qa’ida’s regional presence.

Just as unfortunately, the problems of Iraq will not be easily healed. They are not the product of ancient hatreds, a canard that resurfaces with the outbreak of each such civil war. Instead they are principally the products of our own mistakes. We caused the Iraqi civil war, we healed it briefly, and then we left it to fester all over again. It is not that Iraqis had no say in the matter, no free will. Only that they were acting within circumstances that we created and those circumstances have driven their actions.

Thus, understanding where the Iraqis may end up requires understanding how we brought them to where they are. And here again, America’s determination to turn its back on the experience of Iraq is a dangerous hindrance. The problems sucking Iraq back into the vortex of civil war are merely the latest manifestation of the powerful forces that the United States unleashed as a result of our botched occupation from 2003 to 2006. Minor adjustments and small fixes are highly unlikely to be able to cope with them. Averting a relapse of the civil war may require a combination of moves akin to those that the United States and Iraqis engineered between 2007 and 2009, and that is exceptionally unlikely.

This essay traces the course of Iraq’s fortunes from the American invasion in 2003 through the civil war of 2005-2008 and the endangered effort at reconstruction that followed. Only by seeing the full course of Iraq’s narrative arc during this period is it possible to understand both Iraq’s present, and its likely future—as well as what would probably be needed to produce a better outcome than those that currently seem most plausible.

It is not a hopeful story, but it is an important one. It is the critical piece to understanding the possibilities for Iraq as we fret over its renewed downward course. And it is a warning about what would likely be required to address the analogous Syrian civil war raging next door, as well as the dangers of allowing that war to rage unchecked.

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• The Fall and Rise and Fall of Iraq

The crisis in Syria continues with no end in sight, and in the Saban Center's latest Middle East Memo, Breaking the Stalemate: The Military Dynamics of the Syrian Civil War and Options for Limited U.S. Intervention, Saban Center Senior Fellow Kenneth Pollack argues that until there is a breakthrough on the battlefield, there will be no breakthroughs at the negotiating table.

In his paper, Pollack lays out the military advantages and disadvantages of both the opposition and the regime's forces, and looks at how different opportunities for U.S. intervention can affect those critical dynamics. This analysis provides a much-needed counterpoint to the debate over the possible cost of U.S. options in Syria with an analysis of their likely impact on the conflict.

Highlights include:

• The strengths and weaknesses of the opposition, including: greater numbers, a history of deprivation of political power, the aid of Islamist militias affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafist groups, and support from Arab and Western countries.
   
• The strengths and weaknesses of the regime, including: motivation to defend against a determined majority, a geographic advantage, the remnants of the Syrian armed forces, help of foreign contingents like Hizballah, and the support of foreign countries like Iran and reportedly Russia and China.
   
• Options for U.S. interventions to break the stalemate, including:

  • Training and equipping the opposition.
  • Stopping the resupply of the regime in order to diminish its ability to generate firepower.
  • Attacking regime infrastructure targets, such as military bases, power-generation plants and transportation choke points like bridges.
  • Establishing and maintaining a no-fly zone.
  • Engaging in a tactical air campaign against regime ground forces.

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During much of the past three years, the Syrian civil war has been the most prominent item on the Middle Eastern political agenda and has dominated the political-diplomatic discourse in the region and among policy makers, analysts and pundits interested in its affairs. 

Preoccupation with the Syrian crisis has derived from the sense, apparent since its early phases, that it was much more than a domestic issue. It has, indeed, become a conflict by-proxy between Iran and its regional rivals and the arena of American-Russian competition. It has also had a spillover effect on several neighboring countries and has been a bellwether for the state of the Arab Spring.

As the conflict festered it also prompted a broader discussion and debate over the future of the Arab State system. The collapse of Syria, the ongoing fighting in Iraq, and the general instability in the Middle East has led some observers to question whether the very geography of the region will be changed. Robin Wright, a journalist and scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, argues that “the map of the modern Middle East, a political and economic pivot in the international order, is in tatters.” Wright also warns that competing groups and ideologies are pulling the region apart: “A different map would be a strategic game changer for just about everybody, potentially reconfiguring alliances, security challenges, trade and energy flows for much of the world, too.”  Similarly, Parag Khanna, a senior fellow at the New America Foundation, argues, “Nowhere is a rethinking of “the state” more necessary than in the Middle East.” He contends that “The Arab world will not be resurrected to its old glory until its map is redrawn to resemble a collection of autonomous national oases linked by Silk Roads of commerce.” Lt. Colonel Joel Rayburn, writing from the Hoover Institution, points out that the alternative may not be new states but rather simply collapse. “If watching the fall or near-fall of half a dozen regimes in the Arab Spring has taught us anything, it should be that the Arab states that appeared serenely stable to outsiders for the past half century were more brittle than we have understood,” warning darkly, “This conflict could very well touch us all, perhaps becoming an engine of jihad that spews forth attackers bent on bombing western embassies and cities or disrupting Persian Gulf oil markets long before the fire burns out.” 

This discussion touches on a key question: Will the collapse of one or several other Arab states produce a new order in the region? 

The regional order has been threatened before, but today’s challenge is unique. Syria is what has prompted the latest reevaluation of the Skyes-Picot borders, but many of the problems predated the Syrian civil war. Ambitious monarchs in the 1930s and 1940s challenged the order after the colonial period. The doctrine of Pan-Arab Nationalism and Gamal Abd al-Nasir’s messianic leadership in the 1950s and by Saddam Hussein in 1990 again posed a threat. Now it is now challenged not by a powerful state or a sweeping ideology but by the weakness of several Arab states that seem to be on the verge of implosion or disintegration.

This paper assesses the situation in Syria, with an emphasis on what might lead to its de facto partition or lasting collapse. It then examines Syria’s neighbors and their prospects for stability. The paper concludes by exploring how the United States, Israel and Iran might affect this tenuous balance.

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• The End of Sykes-Picot?: Reflections on the Prospects of the Arab State System

This summer, the world has watched as an al Qaeda offshoot, the Islamic State group, launched a militant offensive into Iraq, seizing large swaths of land. This Center for Middle East Policy’s Middle East Memo, Kurdistan Rising: To Acknowledge or Ignore the Unraveling of Iraq, examines how the fall of Iraq’s key city of Mosul has changed matters for Kurds in Iraq, and the necessity for American policymakers to take stock of the reality of the Kurdistan Region in this “post-Mosul” world.

Highlights: 

• A look at the Kurds of Iraq, their history and how the United States has largely spurned a partnership with them. Having been autonomous in Iraq since 1991, the Kurds heeded the aspirations of the United States in 2003 to assist in the removal of the Baath regime of Saddam Hussein, and played by the rules of the game established in the post-2003 period, albeit unwillingly at times. However, they have consistently refused to follow a path that would result in relinquishing the powers they enjoy. They have even taken steps to extend their autonomy to the point of having economic sovereignty within a federal Iraq, thus bringing them into serious dispute with Baghdad and the government of Nouri al-Maliki and earning the rebuke of the United States.

• An examination of how, since 2011, failed U.S. and European policies aimed at healing Iraq’s sectarian and ethnic fissures have contributed to the current situation. By so strongly embracing the concept of Iraq’s integrity as crucial to American interests in the region, key allies and partners have been marginalized along the way.

• Policy recommendations for the United States and its western allies, given that the Kurdistan region now stands on the threshold of restructuring Iraq according to its federal or confederal design, or exercising its full right to self-determination and seceding from Iraq. By ignoring the realities of Kurdish strength in Iraq, U.S. and European powers run the risk of losing influence in the only part of Iraq that can be called a success story, and antagonizing what could be a key ally in an increasingly unpredictable Middle East.

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• Kurdistan Rising: To Acknowledge or Ignore the Unraveling of Iraq

Complexity and ambivalence are inherent in Israel’s relationship with its Middle Eastern environment. Israel’s national security agenda is shaped by the hostility of a large part of the Arab and Muslim worlds. During the past 66 years, Israel has been able to crack the wall of Arab hostility, to make peace with two Arab neighbors, and to establish semi-normal relations with several Arab states. But the Arab-Israeli conflict, and its Palestinian core in particular, rages on, and Iran has joined the fray as a powerful and determined adversary.

In Israel, debates over the state’s identity, its place and role in the region, and the more specific issues of the future of the West Bank and Israel’s relationship with the Palestinians, govern the country’s politics and national discourse. The March 2015 Israeli elections are being conducted over a wide range of issues, but they are seen first and foremost as a referendum on these key questions. Politics and policy can hardly be separated. Appearances can be misleading. Currently, the focus of the election campaign seems to be on socio-economic issues. The main challenger of Netanyahu’s current government and potential right-wing coalition is “The Zionist Camp” led by Isaac Herzog and Tzipi Livni. They are strong advocates of reviving a peace process with the Palestinians, but they realize that the Israeli public has drifted to the right. Furthermore, the primaries in the Labor Party produced a left-leaning list of candidates. But whatever the current drift of the campaign, in the elections’ immediate aftermath, whoever forms the next government will have to deal primarily with the Palestinian issue and the national security challenges facing the country.

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• Israel and the Changing Middle East