Beijing briefing: Party power remains a male preserve The World Today mhiggins.drupal 27 September 2022

Yu Jie explores why so few women have won leadership roles in Communist China.

UPDATE: Since this article was published at the end of September, the incoming members of the Politburo and the Standing Committee were announced at the 20th Chinese Communist Party Congress on October 22. The party broke more than two decades of convention by not appointing any women to the Politburo or its Standing Committee. The sole woman among the outgoing 19th CCP Politburo, Sun Chunlan, will retire. Only 33 women rank among the 376 members of the 20th CPC Central Committee, which elects the Politburo - less than one in 10.

As the curtain of the 20th Chinese Communist Party Congress gets ready to rise, the lack of female representation in Beijing’s corridors of power attracts international attention once again.

Female participation in Chinese finance, science, sports or other aspects of society is relatively healthy. Yet there has never been a single woman at the apex of power in the party nor any who has held a seat on the Politburo Standing Committee, the supreme decision-making body for the party and the state.

Historically, China has been run by a number of powerful women starting in 307BC during the first imperial era of the Middle Kingdom. In the Qin Dynasty the Queen Dowager Xuan held de facto power for 35 years during the Warring States period.

More than 2,000 years later, Empress Dowager Cixi wined and dined her European visitors at the Imperial Summer Palace. She was also responsible for the demise of the late Qing Dynasty. Their legacies continue to fascinate and inspire stories in contemporary China.

In modern times, Mao Zedong, one of the founders of the Chinese Communist Party, proclaimed that ‘women hold up half of the sky’. While Chinese law states that women and men should have equal rights in all aspects of political life, the reality is that women remain marginalized in politics, even after the economic and social transformation seen in the past few decades. Chinese men continue to dominate political power.

The top three party, military or state leadership positions have never been filled by a woman and none of China’s 26 ministers is female. There is only one woman among the 31 party bosses that control China’s provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions and only one woman among the 25 members of the all-powerful Politburo, and she oversaw the government’s response to the Covid pandemic. She is Vice-Premier Sun Chunlan, a former party boss of Fujian Province. Among the 371 members of the Central Committee, which elects the Politburo, there are only 30 women, which is less than one in 10.

Women are less likely to join the Communist Party

It is difficult to explain why female participation in the Chinese elite politics is so low but social convention certainly plays its part. Despite increasing financial independence and much improved career prospects, Chinese women are still expected to run the household and look after the children while holding down a full-time job. This surely reduces opportunities to seek public offices.

Although unspoken, China’s experience of handing power to a woman may be another reason why the party is hesitant to put a female in charge. Jiang Qing, better known to the outside world as Madame Mao, was China’s de-facto First Lady until 1976. She was one of the architects of the ‘Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution’, which ushered in a decade of chaos and political upheaval and brought the country to a standstill.

Successive leaders have been determined to prevent a repeat of this misfortune so no woman has been chosen for a top leadership role. But perhaps the main reason for the absence of women in top positions is the way people move up the party ranks.

Women make up around 49 per cent of China’s 1.4 billion population, yet they account for only about 30 per cent of the Chinese Communist Party membership. Once inside the party they are often handed less competitive positions. Rising through the ranks requires party members to achieve certain career breakthroughs. Such success makes them eligible to participate in high politics.

The majority of China’s top leaders have served as a party chief of a province or municipality, a position women rarely achieve. Consequently, few female candidates are considered eligible for more senior roles.

By the time they qualify for Politburo membership, too often they are fast approaching the retirement age for Chinese women politicians: 55. As it is rare to secure a spot on the Politburo under that age, women are virtually ruled out from joining this exclusive group of 25 people.

The Iron Lady of China

There has been one exception since the early 2000s. Vice-Premier Wu Yi, who is known as the Iron Lady of China, was described by Forbes magazine as the third most powerful woman in the world. She led China into the World Trade Organization and successfully bid for the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games. However, her success has been an exception, not a rule.

While Chinese women have been given a nominal egalitarian status with female astronauts, female Olympic champions and female Nobel Prize laureates in place, beneath the surface older practices of patriarchy still hold firm. Liberated or not, the quest for a Chinese female leader under the Communist Party is a long way off.

China Party Congress: Xi’s political blueprint The World Today rescobales.drupal 28 September 2022

In the second of her three-part series on the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, Yu Jie outlines two key policy themes we can expect Xi to define: ‘common prosperity’ and ‘self-reliance’.

What can we expect from the Party Congress?

In mid-October five years ago, the 19th Party Congress opened with Xi Jinping delivering a political report lasting three-and-a-half hours. He will repeat the performance on October 16, the opening day of this year’s 20th Party congress.

Bland as its name may be, this political report is one of the Party Congress’s core items of business. It remains the most authoritative public account of the Chinese Communist Party’s path on all major policy fronts, containing a laundry list of policies undertaken by the outgoing Central Committee in the past five years, while putting forward guidance for future policy.

It represents the view of the current Politburo Standing Committee and that of the CCP. The 20th Congress report is a collegial effort and should not be considered Xi’s personal manifesto, nor should it be counted as another of his speeches to his comrades.

However, as general-secretary of the party for the past decade, it will most probably reflect many of the elements that Xi has influenced.

What are China’s political priorities?

No matter how complicated the geopolitics of the world becomes, Xi sticks to the conservative approach that has served his country well for past centuries: that China prioritizes the management of its own affairs.

Since the Cold War ended, two recurring themes have dominated the political report: the economy and security. For the 20th session, Xi will use the phrases ‘common prosperity’ as shorthand for the economy and ‘self-reliance’ for security.

Xi introduced the slogan ‘common prosperity’ at the start of his third term in August 2021. His aim was to close the income gap, address regional economic inequality and improve social welfare provision. Rebalancing social inequality was seen as essential to avoid the social disruption witnessed in other parts of the world.

Xi’s concept of ‘common prosperity’ was influenced by his childhood experiences living in exile in a remote village in Shanxi Province, in northwest China, during the Cultural Revolution. The ensuing upheaval was to prove a tragedy for his family and a disaster for the country.

His ambition is to define progress not in terms of producing double-digit growth but in dealing with the long-standing challenge of scarcities across different sections of society to meet ‘people’s ever-growing needs for a better life’. This direction was indicated at the 19th Party Congress by the term ‘shifting the principal contradiction’.

What state is the Chinese economy in?

Xi may have arrived at the right diagnosis but he has so far failed to find a cure that invokes ‘common prosperity’. After sweeping regulatory measures, the CCP has clamped down on its most successful private companies and spooked investors. While providing 80 per cent of China’s jobs, private enterprises are worried that the ‘common prosperity’ initiative may jeopardize their business.

Equally, Beijing’s zero-Covid policy has discouraged much-needed investment and failed to win the hearts and minds of Chinese youth, who have suffered most, both economically and socially.

The challenge facing Xi over the next five years will be to manage the financial risks in downsizing China’s property sector while coming out of a rigidly imposed Covid lockdown without reducing economic growth to such an extent that it damages the personal wealth of millions of people.

One hopes that Xi’s policies in future will be based on an innovative reading of the first-century phrase ‘seeking truth from facts’ adopted by Mao Zedong and last promoted as the political philosophy of Deng Xiaoping in the Seventies. A healthy market economy is not only essential for China’s development but as the only means of maintaining the party’s legitimacy, something vital for Xi.

Does China need more security?

China’s weakened export markets and less-friendly relations with the United States have encouraged it to become more self-reliant. Expect an emphasis on greater self-sufficiency in sectors of strategic importance to form a substantial part of this year’s political report.

In view of increased international hostility, Xi and his lieutenants have publicly recognized the need to take control of production and supply chains. These supply chains need to become ‘self-determined, self-controlled’ they have said, voicing frustration that the highest value-added elements of the Chinese tech sector remain reliant on overseas suppliers and vulnerable to geopolitical tensions.

Equally, on food and energy security, Russia’s invasion in Ukraine has exacerbated China’s already fragile food supplies as both countries are vital sources of food imports. Xi has already called for a ‘comprehensive thrift strategy’ to manage China’s food and energy needs.

Beijing is equally worried about the increase in oil and commodity prices which is driving up the cost of living. This may push parts of Chinese society out of ‘common prosperity’ and into ‘common poverty’, as it threatens to in some parts of Europe.

For the next five years, Xi needs to strike a balance between ‘common prosperity’ and ‘self-reliance’ to mitigate the storms ahead. He cannot afford to lockdown the world’s second largest economy indefinitely.

The hope is that the 20th Party congress will bring much-needed course corrections.

Read the two further articles in this series: the first provides a guide to why the Chinese Communist Party Congress matters; the third analyses the foreign policy issues likely to be discussed at the congress.  

China's Party Congress: a dose of foreign policy realism is needed The World Today mhiggins.drupal 11 October 2022

In the final article of three on the 20th Chinese Communist Party Congress, which opens on 16 October, Yu Jie argues that Beijing must show more pragmatism about Taiwan and the West.

How important is foreign policy at the congress?  

The political reports delivered to the delegates of the week-long 20th Chinese Communist Party Congress, which happens every five years, follow a Marxist-Leninist formula. Economics and the means of production form the base, while politics and society fill in the superstructure. 

We can expect sections on the work of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), ideological discussion, economics, domestic politics, foreign affairs, cultural reform and social developments. Usually, the report prioritizes big domestic political issues.  

The political report typically sheds some light on the status of, and relationships between, senior party members. It can also provide insights into the political fortunes of various interest groups. The report acts as a summary of the party’s achievements and its plans – expressed as the lowest common denominator of consensus between competing factions. 

This year’s congress should be no different, and the political reshuffle that takes place is likely to signal how Beijing intends to rise to the many challenges at home and abroad. 

Given China’s growing power and its fraught relationship with the West, this year’s congress is expected to feature serious discussion on weighty foreign affairs issues affecting Beijing, and which will have long-lasting implications for the rest of the world.  

Which geopolitical issues will be priorities?  

When it comes to foreign affairs, China’s priorities rarely change. The CCP seeks to create a stable external environment to foster its domestic economic development. This conservative maxim was advocated in the 1980s by China’s then-paramount leader, Deng Xiaoping, and it will continue to guide Beijing’s relationships after this congress. 

While we don’t know the exact details of this year’s political report, we can expect discussion on relations with the US-led West, a possible shift in the relationship between Beijing and Moscow, and elaboration on China’s ties with the Global South.  

Notably, it’s likely that a separate chapter of the political report will see Taiwan treated alongside the special administrative regions of Hong Kong and Macau, signalling the party’s commitment to its claims over the contested island.  

Despite a chorus of nationalistic rhetoric surrounding the issue of Taiwan, Beijing will be careful not to stumble into an international conflict which risks causing colossal damage on all fronts. The choice of language on the so-called ‘Taiwan question’ in this political report will serve as a bellwether as to how, if at all, the party might fundamentally shift its views regarding Taiwan and deviate from the principle of ‘peaceful reunification’, the policy stated at every congress since 1979. 

How have China’s relations with the West worsened?  

President Richard Nixon’s visit to China in 1972, the first by an American president to the Communist nation, kicked off five decades of relative stability. However, as China’s global influence has grown, so have Washington’s fears.  

The relationship has transitioned from the cooperation and relative stability that existed under President George W. Bush and President Hu Jintao in the early 2000s, into one characterized by volatility and competition under Xi Jinping, Joe Biden and Donald Trump. These tensions are almost certain to continue in Xi’s likely third term. 

Elements of China’s relationship with the West, such as cooperation over military and aviation technology, are becoming far more competitive. At the same time, trade and investment, once viewed as strong ties, have been rapidly deteriorating – as seen, for example, by several major publicly listed Chinese state-owned enterprises and large private companies withdrawing from the New York Stock Exchange.  

Will Beijing stand by the Kremlin despite Russia’s invasion of Ukraine?  

At the same time, Beijing’s close relationship with Moscow and its lack of opposition to Russia’s war in Ukraine have put China in an awkward position. The CCP has realized that cooperation with its long-standing ally and neighbour must come with substantial limits to avoid undermining its own political priorities and interests.  

Russia’s recklessness may spur Xi and the CCP’s senior leadership to minimize the economic, financial and political risks associated with the Kremlin’s pursuit of war against a country aligned with, and supported by, the West.  

Will China continue to support its regional partners?  

On its ties with the Global South, Beijing began to rethink its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as the US-led Indo-Pacific strategy gained geopolitical momentum. Regions of Southeast Asia and South Asia received a lot of funding and resources for BRI projects, as seen with Chinese support for the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.  

Xi also recently introduced the Global Development and Global Security initiatives, which the political report should flesh out. 

Beijing is fully aware that it can only prosper if its regional partners prosper, and it can only achieve resource security and border stability if its southern and western neighbours in Myanmar and Afghanistan cease to fight over land and resources. 

Chinese foreign policy over the last five years has been a strange combination of high-octane rhetoric and patient pragmatism. To respond to this contradiction, the congress could be used as an opportunity to inject a dose of realism.  

Read the two further articles in this series: the first is a guide to why the Chinese Communist Party Congress matters; the second discusses the key domestic policy themes that Xi Jinping is expected to outline at this year’s congress.

Xi Jinping prepares the Communist party for new reality Expert comment NCapeling 20 October 2022

Political report reflects a worsened economic and diplomatic position as Xi knows his unprecedented third term as leader will be judged on results.

In stark contrast to the aura of triumphant glory that greeted Xi Jinping at the last National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 2017, this week’s convocation opened with an air of sobriety.

Amid a domestic economic downturn and a return to enmity with Western liberal democracies, Xi offered his own recipe for party legitimacy and the country’s economic survival in the lengthy executive summary of his political report to the CCP congress. The prime keyword was security, with some 73 mentions, underscored with a message of self-reliance.

The periodic report acts as a summary of the party’s achievements and of its future plans, with both expressed as the lowest common denominator of consensus between competing voices in the CCP. It thus typically sheds some light on relationships among senior party members and insights into the political fortunes of important intraparty groups.

Most portions of the new report combined Xi’s personal preferences with concessions to the reality of what is necessary for China’s economic survival. Both ends point to an urgent prioritization of economic and political self-reliance for Xi’s third term as party general secretary.

Holistic concept of security

On the domestic front, much emphasis was given to enhancing national security and promoting equitable growth.

Since even before COVID-19, Xi has advocated a holistic conceptualization of security that includes food, the internet, energy and manpower. Reflecting Beijing’s deep anxieties about high-tech development and its frustrations with dependence on overseas suppliers vulnerable to the vagaries of geopolitical tensions, the political report noted the need for China’s supply chains to become more “self-determined and self-controlled.”

Xi, though, went further to stress the importance of improving scientific education and grooming and attracting the necessary talent to accelerate China’s quest to achieve breakthroughs in semiconductor production and overcome development choke points created by Western technological monopolies.

As China has traditionally relied on connectivity with the rest of the world to support innovation and attract talent, a turn toward autarky is not a viable option, given Xi’s technological priorities. Yet the renewed mention of his ‘dual circulation’ strategy in the report signals that Beijing is indeed turning to domestic consumption and homegrown technological prowess as the means to provide the rising wealth that the Chinese people have come to expect from the Communist Party.

Worsening Sino-US relations and tightening access to overseas markets for Chinese companies have prompted party leaders not only to reconsider the country’s sources of economic growth but have also forced them to reconfigure their approach to foreign affairs.

Judging by his report summary, Xi has completely abandoned the ‘new type of great power relations’ concept used repeatedly in the last two editions of his congressional update to refer to his preferred approach to relations with the US-led West.

The omission shows that Beijing has concluded that its fraught relationship with advanced developed nations is here to stay, with little prospect of improvement soon. To this end, China needs to prepare for the worst of decoupling and become more self-reliant in terms of markets and technologies.

In place of the discarded concept, Xi stressed that China should further develop its ties with the global South through the Global Development Initiative and the Global Security Initiative he announced earlier this year. These efforts aim to reshape the global governance agenda in multilateral forums and to project Beijing’s influence on the developing world.

Meanwhile, the party’s latest official rhetoric about the Belt and Road Initiative shows it is no longer a one-size-fits-all slogan but on its way to becoming a genuine tool of trade and investment promotion with China’s near neighbors but with provincial governments taking the lead rather than Beijing.

With the central government grappling with the country’s domestic economic woes, its spending spree on development assistance has had to come to an end. The new political report clearly signals this change.

A modern socialist society is still the aim

The current economic downturn and dangerous geopolitical tensions have not dented the CCP’s ambitions to build a modern socialist society by 2035 and thus join the world’s club of upper middle-income countries, but this is easier said than done.

Labour Party Conference – International affairs networking brunch 24 September 2024 — 11:00AM TO 12:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 16 September 2024 Labour – Grace 1 Suite, Hilton Hotel, Liverpool

Hosted by Sir Simon Fraser, Chairman of Chatham House.

This event is taking place at the Hilton Hotel, Grace 1 Suite, Liverpool.

You are warmly invited to join us for an exclusive networking brunch at the 2024 Labour Party Conference.

Sir Simon Fraser, Chairman of Chatham House, and Olivia O’Sullivan, Director of Chatham House’s UK in the World Programme, will deliver opening remarks, followed by an interactive networking session where you will have the chance to engage with a wide range of stakeholders. Join us to connect with key senior parliamentary, corporate and media attendees at the Labour Party Conference.

This event will be taking place outside of the secure zone.

In conversation with Martin Griffiths: How can a divided world address conflict? 1 October 2024 — 10:00AM TO 11:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 16 September 2024 Chatham House and Online

The former United Nations Under-Secretary-General describes how a weakening multilateralism system and dysfunctional political diplomacy can be revitalized by a humanitarian approach.

Jesper V. Olsen
Dec 1, 2005; 4:2010-2021
Technology

Advice for Fantasy Writers

This article is by Toni Šušnjar.
Note: This is Part Two of a two-part essay. Here is the link to Part One.

Feudal Army

Feudal army is a complex beast: it may include landed troops, mercenaries, town militias, conscripted peasants, or any combination of these. Thus estimating size of a feudal army will require estimating size of each element of the listed, and the size of field army will never be an exact proportion of the total military force available – or often even able to be estimated.

Landed troops are perhaps easiest to estimate – but even that is not simple. In 15th century Germany, it was generally held that 20 hufen (plots) were required to support a man-at-arms (armored cavalryman) while 10 hufen were required for a lightly armored cavalryman (typically a mounted crossbowman). Hufe was a single peasant’s plot or 121 406 m2. In theory, a state with million men and 85% rural population should have been able to raise 12 750 cavalry, as per the calculation below:

• 1 000 000 men * 0,85 = 850 000 men = 170 000 plots;
• lance (gleve) = 1 man at arms + 2 light cavalrymen (note that historically size of lance varied – this is just an example) = 40 plots
• 170 000 plots = 4 250 lances = 4 250 men-at-arms + 8 500 light cavalrymen

This gives a total of 1,275% of population.

Continue reading Size of Armies Part 2 at Mythic Scribes.

Professor Sir Laurence Martin (1928-2022) News release NCapeling 3 May 2022

Professor Sir Laurence Martin, director of Chatham House from 1991-96, has died aged 93.

Professor Sir Laurence Martin was one of the UK’s leading experts on international security with a particular interest in nuclear strategy.

Before joining Chatham House, he was Professor of War Studies at King’s College, London and Vice Chancellor of Newcastle University. He was also appointed Deputy Lieutenant of Tyne and Wear as well as holding several distinguished professorships.

His most well-known work was Two-Edged Sword: Armed Forces in the Modern World which was also the subject of the BBC’s Reith Lectures he gave in 1981.

Sir Laurence led Chatham House as the world was entering the post-Cold War era, a time when international relations were in a state of flux which, as he wrote in International Affairs, provided grounds for optimism that ‘the objective conditions exist to eliminate violent and mutually harmful conflict at least between the major powers’.

Professor Martin worked hard to ensure the financial sustainability of the institute following the loss of core funding from the UK government in the 1980s. By modernizing its approach to fundraising, he was able to invest in a much-needed refurbishment of the House, as well as the institute’s first foray onto the internet.

This enabled Chatham House to communicate with new audiences beyond its members, event attendees, and readers of printed reports, The World Today magazine, and International Affairs journal. He paid particular attention to the need for the institute to communicate its ideas to those making policy as well as wider audiences.

In addition to strengthening the institute’s research, he was keen to continue engaging its members in discussions to develop a well- informed understanding of international affairs.

On the 75th anniversary of Chatham House in 1995, he wrote that its role was ’providing the evidence and, above all, encouraging the habit of mind, to facilitate prudent, if possible optimistic, but never utopian judgements about world affairs’. Today’s staff would agree this role remains at the heart of delivering the institute’s mission.

Selected works

• Two-Edged Sword: Armed Forces in the Modern World
• The Reith Lectures: The Two-Edged Sword
• British Foreign Policy: Challenges and Choices for the 21st Century

Synapse loss is associated with motor and cognitive decline in multiple neurodegenerative disorders, and the cellular redistribution of tau is related to synaptic impairment in tauopathies, such as Alzheimer's disease and frontotemporal dementia. Here, we examined the cellular distribution of tau protein species in human tau overexpressing line 66 mice, a transgenic mouse model akin to genetic variants of frontotemporal dementia. Line 66 mice express intracellular tau aggregates in multiple brain regions and exhibit sensorimotor and motor learning deficiencies. Using a series of anti-tau antibodies, we observed, histologically, that nonphosphorylated transgenic human tau is enriched in synapses, whereas phosphorylated tau accumulates predominantly in cell bodies and axons. Subcellular fractionation confirmed that human tau is highly enriched in insoluble cytosolic and synaptosomal fractions, whereas endogenous mouse tau is virtually absent from synapses. Cytosolic tau was resistant to solubilization with urea and Triton X-100, indicating the formation of larger tau aggregates. By contrast, synaptic tau was partially soluble after Triton X-100 treatment and most likely represents aggregates of smaller size. MS corroborated that synaptosomal tau is nonphosphorylated. Tau enriched in the synapse of line 66 mice, therefore, appears to be in an oligomeric and nonphosphorylated state, and one that could have a direct impact on cognitive function.

As the ruling party claims victory in Georgia’s disputed election, Western condemnation is no longer enough Expert comment LToremark 29 October 2024

As tens of thousands take to the streets to protest the election results, Georgia faces a familiar crisis – with a few key differences.

As the people of Georgia went to the polls on 26 October, many were hoping not only for a democratic change of government but also for an end to one-party dominance and a return to the path of European integration. The previously weak and divided opposition had grouped itself into four major electoral centres, promising a coalition government and framing these elections as a choice between Europe and Russia. 

Ahead of the election, President Salome Zourabishvili had put forward the Georgian Charter, a blueprint for a stable and democratic transition to a new style of governance and for initiating reforms to fulfil conditions for EU accession. It was signed by all pro-European and pro-Western opposition parties. 

The official election results gave the ruling Georgian Dream party a 54 per cent majority in contrast with exit polls that gave the opposition a 10 per cent lead. President Zourabishvili and the opposition parties refuse to recognize the results, beginning a long process of contestation with allegations of fraud and street protests. As the disappointment sets in and the streets once again replace the ballot box as a conduit for democratic change, there is a sense of déja vu.

Georgia has seen this before. A party sweeps to power on the tide of popular protest, initiates reforms to meet public expectations but, by the end of its second term, it takes an authoritarian turn. As it overstays its welcome, it starts manipulating elections to cling to power. People once again take to the streets and a new party wins by a landslide only to repeat the same cycle. But with each turn, the grip the ruling elites have on power gets stronger and the methods they use become more sophisticated. State security becomes equated with regime stability, leaving no space for normal democratic contestation or expressions of dissent. 

Although what is happening in Georgia fits this familiar pattern, there are some consequential differences. 

First, these were the first fully proportional elections. Previously, a mixed system of representation meant that the incumbency always had an advantage by dominating majoritarian districts. A new electoral system had created a not unreasonable expectation that these elections, if held freely, would result in a coalition government. The hope was this could help break the vicious cycle of Georgian politics, sustained by an extreme form of majoritarianism and a winner-takes-all political culture.

The Georgian Dream party was contesting its fourth consecutive term against a backdrop of falling popularity and growing societal mobilization in opposition to its authoritarian inclinations. Despite all this, it secured – some would insist manufactured – an absolute majority in elections that international observers say were marred by serious irregularities and fell short of democratic standards. 

The second important difference is that these elections were not only about saving Georgia’s democracy but also about rescuing its European perspective. Since Georgia was granted EU candidate status in December 2023, its parliament has adopted Russian-style laws on foreign agents and combating LGBTIQ+ ‘propaganda’. 

It has also adopted a strongly Eurosceptic political discourse, pushing back on international criticism and accusing EU and US officials of interference in domestic affairs and disregard for Georgia’s sovereignty. In response, the EU has suspended accession talks with Georgia indefinitely while the US has imposed targeted sanctions on high-ranking Georgian officials and judges. 

Georgia’s democratic backsliding at home and its pivot away from the West are both simultaneous and interrelated. It was widely hoped these elections would be a course correction and return Georgia to the path of European and Euro-Atlantic integration. The election results, if they stick, will prevent this from happening. A Georgian Dream government will not work to fulfil conditions for EU accession, viewed as a challenge to its hold on power. 

The third and final difference is that these elections took place in the context of heightened geopolitical confrontation. The Georgian Dream ‘victory’ is a win for anti-liberal, conservative forces around the world championed, among others, by Hungary’s Viktor Orbán. He was the first to congratulate Georgian Dream for its declared success and even visited Tbilisi in a show of solidarity and ideological alignment. 

The election result is also a win for Russia. It strengthens Moscow’s influence in the South Caucasus, which has waned as a result of the war in Ukraine and the fall of Nagorny-Karabakh. Russian officials and propagandist were quick to congratulate Georgian Dream, wishing them success in standing up to Western pressures and offering help in case things got tough. 

From Moscow’s perspective, Georgia’s elections are part of a global hybrid war. They represent a local battle in the ongoing geopolitical contest between Russia and the West, between the rules-based global order and competitive multipolarity. 

As Georgia repeats a familiar pattern, what do the election results mean for its future? While clear predictions are difficult at this stage, it is worth bearing in mind that as the democratic resilience of the Georgian society has strengthened over time, so too has the state capacity to supress and control. 

Following its snap election, Japanese politics has entered uncharted waters Expert comment LToremark 5 November 2024

Prime Minister Ishiba’s election gamble has failed. Japan now faces another period of political uncertainty, which could affect its international standing.

In Japan’s snap election on 27 October, the ruling coalition of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and New Komeito lost the overwhelming majority it had held since the 2012 general election. The ruling coalition now has 215 seats, leaving it 18 seats short of a majority. 

The largest opposition party is the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDP), which gained 50 seats to 148. The second largest opposition party is the Japan Innovation Party (Ishin), which lost six seats to 38, and the third largest opposition party is the National Democratic Party (NDP), which gained 21 seats to 28.

But the opposition is divided and there is no real appetite to form a coalition government. This will likely result in a hung parliament, which will further destabilize Japan’s government.

The election results reveal three key things  about the state of Japanese politics and what comes next.

First, that Prime Minister Ishiba’s snap election gamble has failed. The aim was for Ishiba, a non-mainstream member of the LDP, to strengthen the party base and stabilize his administration. But with the ruling coalition losing its majority, the party base has been further weakened and the Ishiba administration is now more likely to be short-lived. LDP voters as well as the public in general  had hoped that Ishiba, as the ‘opposition within the party’, would change the LDP’s structure and government policies, eliminate the uncertainty surrounding party funding and increase transparency on how MPs use public funds to finance political activities.

However, when Ishiba became LDP leader and prime minister, he abandoned his previously more critical stance and prioritized carrying on the policies of the mainstream LDP, leaving his supporters feeling betrayed.

Second, while the ruling coalition has been punished, the people of Japan still did not vote for a change of government. The opposition is divided and, despite its gains in this election, the CDP is not fully committed to take the lead and consolidate the opposition to form a coalition. The CDP also suffers from internal division. The left wing of the party would prefer a coalition with the Communist Party, while the right wing of the party does not want to form a coalition with the LDP or the Communist Party, preferring a partner such as the NDP.

Third, the NDP has become the key to future Japanese politics. By becoming the minority ruling party, the NDP is in a position to control the fate of Ishiba administration. While the CDP has no intention of cooperating with the LDP, the NDP is more willing to do so in order to implement its own policies. As the budget cannot be passed without the NDP’s cooperation, the ruling coalition will have no choice but to accept the NDP’s policy of substantial tax cuts through the expansion of tax credits. It will also likely have to accept an option for married couples to decide their family names, which requires a change of civil codes and is something it has been reluctant to do so far. 

If the NDP’s demands are rejected, a no-confidence motion will likely be submitted and passed, leaving the Ishiba cabinet with no choice but to resign or dissolve the House of Representatives (the lower house of Japan’s parliament).

But the NDP has chosen to not form a coalition with the ruling party and enter government. Why? From the NDP’s point of view, forming a coalition with the LDP, would mean getting involved in the LDP’s internal turmoil – something it wishes to avoid. In addition, elections to the House of Councillors (upper house of parliament) will be held in the summer of 2025. The NDP may have judged that it will have a better chance of implementing its policies by cooperating with the government on a case-by-case basis, rather than forming a coalition with a party that is losing public support and risk following suit.

The minority ruling system that has emerged after the election is extremely rare in Japan’s political history and is likely to make its politics even more unstable in the years ahead. The Ishiba administration will probably be able to survive until the budget is passed in March next year by cooperating with the NDP, but beyond that its prospects are unclear.

As the House of Councillors elections get closer, some in the LDP may say that they cannot fight the election with Ishiba as prime minister. If so, they may choose the option of a same-day election for the lower and the upper house. The cost of an election campaign is significant, and the LDP’s financial strength gives it an advantage in the case of a same-day election. There is also a strong possibility that the public will choose the LDP to regain stability in government. However, this election has shown that public distrust of the LDP is high, and if Ishiba continues to be pushed around by the NDP, his party’s chances of winning would be reduced.

Japanese politics has entered uncharted waters, where the patterns and customs of the past do not apply. There are now doubts both at home and abroad as to whether Ishiba, who has a weak party base, will be able to stay on and steer the government. Over the past decade, the Abe and Kishida administrations have provided Japan with political stability, which has in turn enhanced its international presence. An unstable political system, with frequent changes of government, will likely lead to a decline in Japan’s international influence.

There is also a risk that US–Japan relations  could become unstable. Although the NDP does not have a strong agenda to change the course of this relationship, Ishiba may struggle to keep the promise made by his predecessors to increase defence spending. Ishiba’s nationalist posture could also create a confrontational relationship with the United States, while his weak leadership means he may not seek to invest in strengthening the US–Japan alliance. 

Donald Trump’s win in the US presidential election could pose a further risk. Although Trump might be open to Ishiba’s demand for parity with the US, he could become irritated with Ishiba’s weak domestic position. Ishiba may not be able to make decisions – or a deal with Trump – unless the NDP agrees to it.

New Strategic Partnership with the Robert Bosch Stiftung News Release jon.wallace 23 November 2020

The Robert Bosch Stiftung becomes a founding donor to Chatham House’s second century.

CARM1 is a protein arginine methyltransferase (PRMT) that acts as a coactivator in a number of transcriptional programs. CARM1 orchestrates this coactivator activity in part by depositing the H3R17me2a histone mark in the vicinity of gene promoters that it regulates. However, the gross levels of H3R17me2a in CARM1 KO mice did not significantly decrease, indicating that other PRMT(s) may compensate for this loss. We thus performed a screen of type I PRMTs, which revealed that PRMT6 can also deposit the H3R17me2a mark in vitro. CARM1 knockout mice are perinatally lethal and display a reduced fetal size, whereas PRMT6 null mice are viable, which permits the generation of double knockouts. Embryos that are null for both CARM1 and PRMT6 are noticeably smaller than CARM1 null embryos, providing in vivo evidence of redundancy. Mouse embryonic fibroblasts (MEFs) from the double knockout embryos display an absence of the H3R17me2a mark during mitosis and increased signs of DNA damage. Moreover, using the combination of CARM1 and PRMT6 inhibitors suppresses the cell proliferation of WT MEFs, suggesting a synergistic effect between CARM1 and PRMT6 inhibitions. These studies provide direct evidence that PRMT6 also deposits the H3R17me2a mark and acts redundantly with CARM1.

Expert

Expert

N. R. Ikonomov and S. P. Suetin
Trans. Moscow Math. Soc. 83 (), 33-54.
Abstract, references and article information

Mining, Minerals and Metals Expert Roundtable: Forest-Smart Mining Report Launch 10 May 2019 — 5:30PM TO 6:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 12 April 2019 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Taiwan Charts a New Course After Elections Expert comment sysadmin 19 January 2016

The resounding victory for the opposition marks a decisive break with the past and could make life much more difficult for Beijing.

A victory for Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in Taiwan’s presidential election on Saturday had been widely predicted. But the margin of victory, and the crushing defeat suffered by the ruling Kuomintang (KMT) in the concurrent legislative elections, could mean a conclusive shift in both the country’s domestic politics and its important relationship with Beijing.

Why the DPP won

President elect Tsai Ing-wen’s victory was no close run thing nor was it a result of a split in the opposition vote as was claimed for her predecessor. The KMT ran a disastrously inept presidential campaign. The farcical way in which they first chose then unseated a totally unsuitable candidate simply underlined their lack of cohesion or purpose. This came on top of an unconvincing record in administration that showed the party to be increasingly tired, self-destructive and out of touch. Eric Chu, the eventual replacement choice, had neither the time nor the charisma to put things right.

Moreover, on the key issue of mainland policy, the KMT had come to be seen as serving more a party interest than a national one. It now appears that a majority in Taiwan believe that the DPP will more effectively champion and promote their interests in relation to China than the KMT. The coup de theatre of the meeting of the presidents of China and Taiwan in November had no discernible electoral impact. More widely, the view of the national identity as a Taiwanese one rather than a Chinese or hybrid Chinese/Taiwanese one has taken firm hold. The DPP responded more effectively to this new political climate.

What it means for relations with Beijing

Relations between Taiwan and the mainland can only become more difficult now, but quite how that works out in practical terms remains to be seen. It seems unlikely that China will choose, initially at least, to row back from the agreements reached with the outgoing administration, but further progress will be problematic. A new basis needs to be worked out for political negotiations, and neither side will wish to compromise its position. It is likely that there will be increasingly hard line and even bellicose rhetoric emanating from some quarters in China, but it will remain more measured on the official side. The reality of China’s military and economic power remains there for all to see.

The last DPP administration saw heightened tensions in US/China/Taiwan relations. The US will no doubt be arguing for calm and caution with both sides. All the official pronouncements so far from the DPP have been moderate. There is no desire for a confrontational policy from Taiwan, but equally Tsai made it clear that she was determined that ‘our democratic system, national identity, and international space must be respected. Any form of suppression will harm the stability of cross strait relations.’

A new era

President elect Tsai will be able to form and run an administration free from the shackles of a hostile legislature that made life so difficult for the first DPP administration under Chen Shui-bian, and her party can now claim a convincing popular mandate. She won by a margin of twelve percentage points over her rivals.

But the new administration faces real challenges, even beyond mainland policy. Taiwan’s economy has been relatively stagnant. There are increasing demands for new style politics. In her victory speech Tsai spoke of her wish to respond to the desire of the people for a government that is more willing to listen and one that is more transparent and accountable. She will want to escape from the shadow of the corruption that blighted the last DPP administration.

The DPP now has full control of Taiwan’s political processes for the first time ever, but equally significantly the pretensions of the KMT to be the natural ruling party in Taiwan have been dealt a devastating blow. Taiwan’s democracy has moved into a new era.

To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback

Artificial Intelligence Apps Risk Entrenching India’s Socio-economic Inequities Expert comment sysadmin 14 March 2018

Artificial intelligence applications will not be a panacea for addressing India’s grand challenges. Data bias and unequal access to technology gains will entrench existing socio-economic fissures.

Artificial intelligence (AI) is high on the Indian government’s agenda. Some days ago, Prime Minister Narendra Modi inaugurated the Wadhwani Institute for Artificial Intelligence, reportedly India’s first research institute focused on AI solutions for social good. In the same week, Niti Aayog CEO Amitabh Kant argued that AI could potentially add $957 billion to the economy and outlined ways in which AI could be a ‘game changer’.

During his budget speech, Finance Minister Arun Jaitley announced that Niti Aayog would spearhead a national programme on AI; with the near doubling of the Digital India budget, the IT ministry also announced the setting up of four committees for AI-related research. An industrial policy for AI is also in the pipeline, expected to provide incentives to businesses for creating a globally competitive Indian AI industry.

Narratives on the emerging digital economy often suffer from technological determinism — assuming that the march of technological transformation has an inner logic, independent of social choice and capable of automatically delivering positive social change. However, technological trajectories can and must be steered by social choice and aligned with societal objectives. Modi’s address hit all the right notes, as he argued that the ‘road ahead for AI depends on and will be driven by human intentions’. Emphasising the need to direct AI technologies towards solutions for the poor, he called upon students and teachers to identify ‘the grand challenges facing India’ – to ‘Make AI in India and for India’.

To do so, will undoubtedly require substantial investments in R&D, digital infrastructure and education and re-skilling. But, two other critical issues must be simultaneously addressed: data bias and access to technology gains.

While computers have been mimicking human intelligence for some decades now, a massive increase in computational power and the quantity of available data are enabling a process of ‘machine learning.’ Instead of coding software with specific instructions to accomplish a set task, machine learning involves training an algorithm on large quantities of data to enable it to self-learn; refining and improving its results through multiple iterations of the same task. The quality of data sets used to train machines is thus a critical concern in building AI applications.

Much recent research shows that applications based on machine learning reflect existing social biases and prejudice. Such bias can occur if the data set the algorithm is trained on is unrepresentative of the reality it seeks to represent. If for example, a system is trained on photos of people that are predominantly white, it will have a harder time recognizing non-white people. This is what led a recent Google application to tag black people as gorillas.

Alternatively, bias can also occur if the data set itself reflects existing discriminatory or exclusionary practices. A recent study by ProPublica found for example that software that was being used to assess the risk of recidivism in criminals in the United States was twice as likely to mistakenly flag black defendants as being at higher risk of committing future crimes.

The impact of such data bias can be seriously damaging in India, particularly at a time of growing social fragmentation. It can contribute to the entrenchment of social bias and discriminatory practices, while rendering both invisible and pervasive the processes through which discrimination occurs. Women are 34 per cent less likely to own a mobile phone than men – manifested in only 14 per cent of women in rural India owning a mobile phone, while only 30 per cent of India’s internet users are women.

Women’s participation in the labour force, currently at around 27 per cent, is also declining, and is one of the lowest in South Asia. Data sets used for machine learning are thus likely to have a marked gender bias. The same observations are likely to hold true for other marginalized groups as well.

Accorded to a 2014 report, Muslims, Dalits and tribals make up 53 per cent of all prisoners in India; National Crime Records Bureau data from 2016 shows in some states, the percentage of Muslims in the incarcerated population was almost three times the percentage of Muslims in the overall population. If AI applications for law and order are built on this data, it is not unlikely that it will be prejudiced against these groups.

(It is worth pointing out that the recently set-up national AI task force is comprised of mostly Hindu men – only two women are on the task force, and no Muslims or Christians. A recent article in the New York Times talked about AI’s ‘white guy problem’; will India suffer from a ‘Hindu male bias’?)

Yet, improving the quality, or diversity, of data sets may not be able to solve the problem. The processes of machine learning and reasoning involve a quagmire of mathematical functions, variables and permutations, the logic of which are not readily traceable or predictable. The dazzle of AI-enabled efficiency gains must not blind us to the fact that while AI systems are being integrated into key socio-economic systems, their accuracy and logic of reasoning have not been fully understood or studied.

The other big challenge stems from the distribution of AI-led technology gains. Even if estimates of AI contribution to GDP are correct, the adoption of these technologies is likely to be in niches within the organized sector. These industries are likely to be capital- rather than labour-intensive, and thus unlikely to contribute to large-scale job creation.

At the same time, AI applications can most readily replace low- to medium-skilled jobs within the organized sector. This is already being witnessed in the outsourcing sector – where basic call and chat tasks are now automated. Re-skilling will be important, but it is unlikely that those who lose their jobs will also be those who are being re-skilled – the long arch of technological change and societal adaptation is longer than that of people’s lives. The contractualization of work, already on the rise, is likely to further increase as large industries prefer to have a flexible workforce to adapt to technological change. A shift from formal employment to contractual work can imply a loss of access to formal social protection mechanisms, increasing the precariousness of work for workers.

The adoption of AI technologies is also unlikely in the short- to medium-term in the unorganized sector, which engages more than 80 per cent of India’s labor force. The cost of developing and deploying AI applications, particularly in relation to the cost of labour, will inhibit adoption. Moreover, most enterprises within the unorganized sector still have limited access to basic, older technologies – two-thirds of the workforce are employed in enterprises without electricity. Eco-system upgrades will be important but incremental. Given the high costs of developing AI-based applications, most start-ups are unlikely to be working towards creating bottom-of-the-pyramid solutions.

Access to AI-led technology gains is thus likely to be heavily differentiated – a few high-growth industries can be expected, but these will not necessarily result in the welfare of labour. Studies show that labour share of national income, especially routine labour, has been declining steadily across developing countries.

We should be clear that new technological applications themselves are not going to transform or disrupt this trend – rather, without adequate policy steering, these trends will be exacerbated.

Policy debates about AI applications in India need to take these two issues seriously. AI applications will not be a panacea for addressing ‘India’s grand challenges’. Data bias and unequal access to technology gains will entrench existing socio-economic fissures, even making them technologically binding.

In addition to developing AI applications and creating a skilled workforce, the government needs to prioritize research that examines the complex social, ethical and governance challenges associated with the spread of AI-driven technologies. Blind technological optimism might entrench rather than alleviate the grand Indian challenge of inequity and growth.

This article was originally published in the Indian Express.

Dr. Abiy Tasissa of Tufts University, discusses the mathematics he and colleagues used to study particle collider data, including optimal transport and optimization. Collider physics often result in distributions referred to as jets. Dr. Tasissa and his team used "Earth Mover's Distance" and other mathematical tools to study the shape of jets. "It is interesting for me to see how mathematics can be applied to study these fundamental problems answering fundamental equations in physics, not only at the level of formulating new ideas, which is, in this particular case, a notion of distance, but also how the importance of designing fast optimization algorithms to be able to actually compute these distances," says Dr. Tasissa.

firehouse.ie posted a photo:

firehouse.ie posted a photo:

Simão Correia
Proc. Amer. Math. Soc. 152 (), 5117-5136.
Abstract, references and article information

Jan Draisma and Thomas Karam
Proc. Amer. Math. Soc. 152 (), 5083-5093.
Abstract, references and article information

The Math Community Educational Outreach (Math CEO) program at the University of California, Irvine (UCI) will receive the 2025 AMS Award for an Exemplary Program or Achievement in a Mathematics Department.

Founded in 2014, UCI’s Math CEO is an after-school math enrichment program aimed at increasing the number of talented students in STEM from diverse backgrounds by fostering mathematical exploration, mentor development, and community engagement.

From the citation

The University of California, Irvine (UCI) Math CEO program is recognized for its exceptional contributions to the mathematics community and society at large. Established in 2014 by professors Alessandra Pantano and Li-Sheng Tseng, Math CEO targets students from Title I middle schools, providing them with a high-quality after-school math enrichment program. This program brings middle-school students to the UCI campus to work in small groups with undergraduate mentors, many of whom are also from historically marginalized groups, to engage in challenging mathematical tasks and encourage exploration. 

From September 2019 to June 2024, Math CEO engaged a total of 1,221 youth, with 48.6% identifying as female. The ethnic background of the participants was predominantly Latinx (93.5%), with smaller representations of Asian, white, and multiethnic students. In the same five-year period, Math CEO engaged 553 undergraduate mentors, 62.2% of whom were female. The mentors’ ethnic backgrounds were diverse, with significant representation of Asian (52%) and Latinx (30%) students. The undergraduate mentors, many of whom pursue careers in education, receive training in culturally responsive teaching practices and equity in education, significantly impacting their professional development. In a post-survey, 52.3% of the undergraduate mentors expressed interest in teaching or working in education and 45.9% were likely to pursue professions working with children or families.

Recognizing the central role of families in supporting Latinx youth, Math CEO involves parents through bilingual workshops that enhance community awareness of college pathways and financial opportunities. 

Math CEO has been the foundation for numerous research projects in mathematics education, supported by NSF grants, leading to publications and program growth. The program’s success is evident in its expansion to high schools and other regions in Southern California, including a new branch at California State University, Dominguez Hills. Math CEO continues to make a substantial impact on underserved youth, demonstrating a model of systemic, reproducible change that can be implemented by others.

Response of Alessandra Pantano, UCI Math CEO

I am deeply honored to receive the AMS Award for an Exemplary Program in a Mathematics Department on behalf of the UCI Math CEO team. This wonderful award recognizes the work of many colleagues, graduate students, and undergraduate students in developing and delivering the UCI Math Community Educational Outreach (Math CEO) program. For over a decade, Math CEO has provided creative and culturally responsive math enrichment opportunities for hundreds of underprivileged middle-school students, many of which have since “graduated” to high school or even college. Leading this exceptional and dedicated team of volunteers has been the highest pride of my professional life. A special thanks to my partners-in-crime, Prof. Li-Sheng Tseng, codirector of Math CEO, and former graduate student Andres Forero Cuervo, academic coordinator for Math CEO: We could have never done this without you. I look forward to pushing this activity forward and continuing to dedicate my energy to help kids in our county find the way to express their potential – in math and in life! A big thanks to the colleagues who nominated us and to the AMS for recognizing our efforts.  

History of the program

The UC Irvine Math Community Educational Outreach (Math CEO) program was founded in 2014 by math faculty Alessandra Pantano and Li-Sheng Tseng in collaboration with Santa Ana Unified math teacher Jasmina Matasovic. The founders shared a belief that low standardized test scores in underserved communities do not reflect students’ interest and potential to succeed in STEM. Math CEO runs free, weekly, after-school math enrichment sessions, welcoming all youth regardless of math achievement. Starting with only 25 students from one middle school, the program has grown and engaged nearly two thousand students in all, from multiple school districts in Southern California.

About the award

The annual AMS Award for an Exemplary Program or Achievement in a Mathematics Department was established in 2004 and first given in 2006. This award recognizes a department which has distinguished itself by undertaking an unusual or particularly effective program of value to the mathematics community, internally or in relation to the rest of society. Departments of mathematical sciences in North America that offer at least a bachelor’s degree in mathematical sciences are eligible. The award amount is currently $5,000. The award will be presented at the 2025 Joint Mathematics Meetings in Seattle.

Learn more about the award and previous recipients.

Contact: AMS Communications.

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The American Mathematical Society is dedicated to advancing research and connecting the diverse global mathematical community through our publications, meetings and conferences, MathSciNet, professional services, advocacy, and awareness programs.
 

Long hailed as dancehall's most controversial figure, Vybz Kartel has always commanded the spotlight with his edgy lyrics and unfiltered persona. But since his release from prison in July, Kartel has begun to show a surprising transformation that'...

Bacterial low-copy-number plasmids require partition (par) systems to ensure their stable inheritance by daughter cells. In general, these systems consist of three components: a centromeric DNA sequence, a centromere-binding protein and a nucleotide hydrolase that polymerizes and functions as a motor. Type III systems, however, segregate plasmids using three proteins: the FtsZ/tubulin-like GTPase TubZ, the centromere-binding protein TubR and the MerR-like transcriptional regulator TubY. Although the TubZ filament is sufficient to transport the TubR-centromere complex in vitro, TubY is still necessary for the stable maintenance of the plasmid. TubY contains an N-terminal DNA-binding helix-turn-helix motif and a C-terminal coiled-coil followed by a cluster of lysine residues. This study determined the crystal structure of the C-terminal domain of TubY from the Bacillus cereus pXO1-like plasmid and showed that it forms a tetrameric parallel four-helix bundle that differs from the typical MerR family proteins with a dimeric anti-parallel coiled-coil. Biochemical analyses revealed that the C-terminal tail with the conserved lysine cluster helps TubY to stably associate with the TubR-centromere complex as well as to nonspecifically bind DNA. Furthermore, this C-terminal tail forms an amphipathic helix in the presence of lipids but must oligomerize to localize the protein to the membrane in vivo. Taken together, these data suggest that TubY is a component of the nucleoprotein complex within the partitioning machinery, and that lipid membranes act as mediators of type III systems.

Programmed ribosomal frameshifting (PRF) is a mechanism used by arteriviruses like porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome virus (PRRSV) to generate multiple proteins from overlapping reading frames within its RNA genome. PRRSV employs −1 PRF directed by RNA secondary and tertiary structures within its viral genome (canonical PRF), as well as a noncanonical −1 and −2 PRF that are stimulated by the interactions of PRRSV nonstructural protein 1β (nsp1β) and host protein poly(C)-binding protein (PCBP) 1 or 2 with the viral genome. Together, nsp1β and one of the PCBPs act as transactivators that bind a C-rich motif near the shift site to stimulate −1 and −2 PRF, thereby enabling the ribosome to generate two frameshift products that are implicated in viral immune evasion. How nsp1β and PCBP associate with the viral RNA genome remains unclear. Here, we describe the purification of the nsp1β:PCBP2:viral RNA complex on a scale sufficient for structural analysis using small-angle X-ray scattering and stochiometric analysis by analytical ultracentrifugation. The proteins associate with the RNA C-rich motif as a 1:1:1 complex. The monomeric form of nsp1β within the complex differs from previously reported homodimer identified by X-ray crystallography. Functional analysis of the complex via mutational analysis combined with RNA-binding assays and cell-based frameshifting reporter assays reveal a number of key residues within nsp1β and PCBP2 that are involved in complex formation and function. Our results suggest that nsp1β and PCBP2 both interact directly with viral RNA during formation of the complex to coordinate this unusual PRF mechanism.

12 August 2020

27 August 2020

28 August 2020