Gasoline purchases are an essential part of the American way of life. There were about 250 million motor vehicles in the United States in 2008 – just under a vehicle per person. Americans drive an average of more than 11,000 miles per year and gasoline purchases are an essential part of most households’ budgets. Between 1995 and 2003, gasoline prices in the U.S. averaged about $1.49 a gallon, with average prices rising above $2.00 in 2004. By the summer of 2008, gasoline prices had reached a national average of $4.11 per gallon. At that time, Americans earning less than $15,000 a year were spending as much as 15 percent of their household income on gasoline – double the proportion from seven years earlier. In addition, unpredictable fuel costs make planning monthly household expenditures difficult, which can be detrimental to individual welfare and even to the overall economy.

Gasoline prices fell in the aftermath of the 2009 economic crisis. Prior and during the financial crisis, rising gasoline prices were seen as a symptom of an uncertain economic situation, as well as evidence of the questionable sustainability of our future oil supply. Gasoline prices abated along with the decrease of economic activity that accompanied the onset of the recession, reaching their minimum in late December 2008. A few months later, as the economy entered a gradual recovery phase, gasoline prices also trended upward. In contrast to the previous period of great uncertainty about future oil supplies, however, these price trends were considered more positively as signs of the U.S. economic recovery.

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The Roma people, the largest minority group in Europe and in many European countries, trail other ethnic groups in almost every characteristic that defines well-being. Perhaps of greatest importance, the Roma are less educated than other ethnic groups. But they also suffer from excess health problems, high unemployment, poverty, and political weakness. The Roma population of Bulgaria is certainly no less disadvantaged than the Roma in other countries. An especially poignant example of Bulgarian Roma disadvantage is that the death rate among children under age 1, a prime indicator of children’s health in any nation, is 25 per 1,000 for Roma children as compared with 9.9 for children of Bulgarian ethnic origin. The mathematics of death almost before life gets started is a symbolic indicator of the Roma burden in Bulgaria. Similarly, research conducted for UNICEF by the University of York shows that the poverty rate among Roma children in Bulgaria is 92 percent, perhaps the highest poverty rate for any ethnic group in Europe. By contrast, the poverty rate among children of Bulgarian heritage is less than half as high at 43 percent.

It is not surprising, then, that over at least the past decade, the European Union (EU) and most European governments, joined by the Open Society Foundation, the World Bank, and other organizations, have created important initiatives to address all these problems. It is possible to think that now is an historic moment in which European governments and dominant ethnic groups, after eight or nine centuries of the most pernicious types of discrimination against the Roma, are finally, albeit often reluctantly, admitting the problems facing their Roma populations and their own role in creating and sustaining these problems. Equally important, most of the Central and Eastern European (CEE) governments, where discrimination against the Roma has been and continues to be particularly intense, are gradually adopting policies to address the problems.

To the extent that the moment of Roma opportunity has arrived, perhaps the most important force moving Bulgaria and other CEE nations in the direction of integration and inclusion is the EU. In the period leading up to the ascension of Bulgaria and other CEE nations to membership in the EU, all the new member states were required to meet a host of conditions required by the EU as the price of admission. Among these conditions were laws outlawing discrimination and requiring equality of educational opportunity. The CEE nations complied with the EU directive to pass such laws, but implementation of the laws in Bulgaria and other nations has been something less than aggressive.

Nor is EU ascension the only force driving the CEE nations to reduce discrimination against the Roma and other minorities. The Open Society, the World Bank, and a number of other private organizations, including several Roma nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), have initiated a sweeping program to promote inclusion of the Roma in the civil society of the CEE nations. Called the “Decade of Roma Inclusion” (2005-2015) the initiative is notable for getting all the CEE nations (plus Spain) to participate, to commit themselves to activities designed to promote inclusion and nondiscrimination, and to make a financial commitment to a fund administered by the World Bank to promote the initiative. As a part of the initiative, Bulgaria and the other participating nations originated ten-year action plans. The Bulgarian action plan, the purpose of which is to create a set of goals and activities that will promote Roma integration, includes proposals for education, health care, housing, employment, discrimination and equal opportunity, and culture.

An important part of the Decade program was the establishment of the Roma Education Fund in 2005. Eight nations (Canada, Greece, Ireland, Netherlands, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK), as well as several international agencies including the Open Society, pledged a total of 34 million Euros to support Fund activities during the Roma decade. The major goal of the fund is to “support policies and programs which ensure quality education for Roma, including the desegregation of education systems.”

By joining the EU, Bulgaria and the other CEE nations brought themselves into a well-developed culture of inclusion and a complex system of interlocking laws and agencies that not only outlaw exclusion and discrimination, but provide funds to implement inclusion policies and to monitor the extent to which EU nations are aggressively implementing these laws. The laws and directives include the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, the Racial Equality Directive, and several others. It would be a mistake to conclude that every EU member, even the original 15 EU nations with relatively more advanced economies and longer histories as democracies than the CEE nations, faithfully implement every component of the various legal requirements of being an EU member. Even so, EU requirements and funds have initiated both profound legal changes and a host of programs to increase the social, economic, political, and cultural inclusion of the Roma as well as studies and evaluations that bring some light to the actual situation of the Roma and other minorities in member nations. Given the all but inevitable distance between the laws on inclusion and discrimination the CEE nations passed in order to join the EU and the actual implementation of those laws, studies commissioned by various EU agencies and NGOs illuminate the gaps between policies and implementation.

An excellent example of such illumination is a 2006 study commissioned by the Economic and Scientific Policy program of the European Parliament. The report is a hard-hitting assessment of the status of Roma throughout Europe with regard to their legal status and socio-economic conditions. The latter category includes assessments of Roma exclusion from employment, education, social services, health care, and community integration. The upshot of the report is that although there may be some progress in these important areas of integration, the Roma are still a second-class group throughout the CEE nations. Seemingly, good laws have not yet produced good results. Laws may be changed, but changing human behavior and culture takes longer.

CEE governments and their defenders are reluctant to admit the lamentable lack of progress in Roma integration. In part for this reason, the European Commission, based on extensive evidence from evaluations, surveys, and news reports of often ferocious discrimination against the Roma, felt the need to publish “An EU Framework for National Roma Integration Strategies up to 2020” in April 2011. The need for a new framework is a clear signal that the EU Commission believes the CEE governments in general and Bulgaria in particular are not achieving the results the EU hoped for when it approved these nations for EU membership and is therefore trying to push the governments of these nations into further action.

Following publication of the Framework, the Open Society released one of the most thorough and provocative reports on the situation faced by the Roma in Europe and strategies that should be adopted to attack the wide range of Roma disadvantages. Appropriately entitled “Beyond Rhetoric,” the Open Society report includes entire chapters on two issues that I will examine in more detail below.

First, the Open Society strongly recommends that nations collect ethnically disaggregated data. Logically enough, the report holds that it is impossible to document the effects of policy initiatives on the Roma and other groups unless outcome data, including measures of health, education, housing, employment, income, and death rates by age, are collected for individual ethnic groups. So important are ethnically disaggregated data that the report goes so far as to recommend that, if necessary, governments should change their statistical systems to “incorporate ethnic data components into regular statistical surveys.” A second recommendation that deserves special attention is the report’s emphasis on early childhood education and care. Virtually every report about the Roma emphasizes the vital importance of education in fighting Roma exclusion, but the Open Society report strongly recommends that nations implementing the EU Framework should “give urgent consideration” to establishing an early child development fund to “support innovative early development programs and allow for scale up of what works.”

Beyond these specific recommendations, the Open Society report emphasizes that the EU Commission stated explicitly in its Framework document that “member states do not properly use EU money for the purpose of effective social and economic integration of Roma. As if this judgment, which seems to represent the views of many EU agencies, the World Bank, the Open Society, and many Roma groups themselves, needed additional reinforcement, a United Nations expert on minority issues visited Bulgaria this summer and called upon the government to “turn its policies on Roma integration into concrete action.” She went on to give what seems to represent the views of all these groups on the flaws in the Bulgarian government’s approach to fighting Roma exclusion: “Many policies seem to remain largely only rhetorical undertakings aimed at external audiences – official commitments that are not fulfilled in practice.” The result, according to the UN expert, is that “all the evidence demonstrates that Roma remain in desperate circumstances at the very bottom of the socio-economic ladder.” In particular, she mentioned that the access of Roma children to quality education “remains overwhelmingly unfulfilled.”

If CEE nations are now entering a period in which governments will be working, often ineffectively or at a very modest pace, to improve the conditions of the Roma, judging by the efforts of other nations to reduce discrimination against minority groups and by the stately rate of progress so far in the CEE nations, it can be assumed that the fight for Roma equality in Bulgaria will be measured in decades. In the U.S., for example, the Civil Rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s was largely successful. By the mid-1960s, vital court decisions had dismantled major parts of the system of legal discrimination against blacks and the federal government had enacted programs to ensure voting rights and other fundamental rights to blacks. To enhance the legal war on poverty and discrimination, the federal government also initiated an army of social programs designed to boost the education, health, employment, housing, and political participation of the poor in general and blacks in particular. Yet today, nearly half a century after achieving legal rights and the initiation of large-scale government inclusion programs, blacks (and Hispanics) still trail whites by large margins in education, income, housing, poverty levels, and health. Although achieving significant progress against discrimination may require decades or generations, discrimination will not diminish until strong legal, economic, and social forces are mobilized against it. Expecting a long struggle cannot be a reason not to begin.

If the history of making substantial progress in overcoming ethnic discrimination in the U.S. can serve as a rough comparison to the situation of the Roma in CEE nations, several factors are going to be vital in the fight of the Roma to overcome discrimination and exclusion in Bulgaria and throughout Europe. These factors include an antidiscrimination plan, aggressive implementation of the plan by all levels of government, leadership by the Roma themselves, educational progress by Roma children and young adults, political activism by the Roma people, a media committed to accurate reporting and fairness, and a civil society that reflects underlying public opinion favoring integration and opposed to discrimination. Most of these factors appear to be present in Bulgaria, often in rudimentary and brittle form, but present and in many cases moving in the right direction nonetheless. The progress that is just now beginning can be greatly enhanced by the efforts of groups that have the resources, the will, and the vision to roll up their sleeves and help promote Roma inclusion.

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On Valentine’s Day, even a dismal scientist’s mind turns to love. It’s a powerful feeling, with a value that goes far beyond the millions of chocolate boxes and bouquets that will be delivered this Feb. 14.

Survey data from the Gallup Organization, where Justin works as a senior scientist, allow us to take a uniquely deep look at the state of love around the world. In 2006 and 2007, Gallup went to 136 countries and asked people, “Did you experience love for a lot of the day yesterday?” It’s the largest such dataset ever collected.

The good news: Ours is a loving world. On a typical day, about 70 percent of people worldwide reported a love-filled day. In the U.S., 81 percent felt love, as did 81 percent of Canadians and 79 percent of Italians. Germany and the U.K. were less loving, with slightly less than 3 in 4 people reporting feeling loved. Surprisingly, the same was true of the supposedly romantic French. And if you’re in Japan, please hug someone: Only 59 percent of Japanese said they had experienced love the previous day.

Across the world as a whole, the widowed and divorced are the least likely to experience love. Married folks feel more of it than singles. People who live together out of wedlock report getting even more love than married spouses -- an interesting factoid for conservatives worried about the effects of cohabitation. Women get more love than men, particularly in the U.S.

Young Love

If you’re young and not feeling all that loved this Valentine’s Day, don’t despair: You’re not alone. Young adults are among the least likely to experience love. It gets better with age, ultimately peaking in the mid-30s or mid-40s in most countries before fading again into the twilight years.

Money is related to love. Those with more household income are slightly more likely to experience the feeling. Roughly speaking, doubling your income is associated with being about 4 percentage points more likely to be loved. Perhaps having more money makes it easier to find time for love.

That said, the data aren’t necessarily telling us that money can buy you love. It’s possible that other factors correlated with income, such as height or appearance, are the real source of attraction. Or maybe being loved gives you a boost in the labor market.

What’s perhaps more striking is how little money matters on a global level. True, the populations of richer countries are, on average, slightly more likely to feel loved than those of poorer countries. But love is still abundant in the poorer countries: People in Rwanda and the Philippines enjoyed the highest love ratios, with more than 9 in 10 people providing positive responses. Armenia, Uzbekistan, Mongolia and Kyrgyzstan, with economic output per person in the middle of the range, all had love ratios of less than 4 in 10.

Fun facts aside, we think there is a deeper and more consequential purpose to the study of love. Think about what love means to you. To us, it means caring about others and being cared for. Love is valuable, even if it is absent from both our national accounts and our political discourse.

In the language of economics, love is a form of insurance. It involves bonds of reciprocity that provide support when we’re feeling down, when we’re sick and when times are tough.

More broadly, love has the power to mitigate the free-rider and moral hazard problems associated with social (and private) insurance. Bailing out a bank might encourage executives to take bigger risks in the future, but helping loved ones down on their luck has fewer incentive problems because our loved ones typically care for us in return. Such mutually beneficial relationships make us all more resilient in times of crisis. This is why the household remains one of the most powerful institutions for organizing not just families but also our economic lives.

If we can find more love for our fellow citizens, our society will function better. Hard as this may be to achieve in an era when trust in government, business and one another is low, it’s worth the effort. When you expand the boundaries of trust and reciprocity, you expand the boundaries of what is possible.

Note: This content was first published on Bloomberg View on February 13, 2013.

Justin Wolfers, professor of Economics and Public Policy at the University of Michigan, re-joins Brookings, Vice President and Economic Studies Co-Director Karen Dynan announced today.  Wolfers was a visiting fellow from 2010-2011.

A world-renowned empirical economist, Wolfers will continue in his role as co-editor, along with David Romer of the University of California, of the Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (BPEA), the flagship economic journal of the Institution.  He will continue his focus on labor economics, macroeconomics, political economy, economics of the family, social policy, law and economics, public economics, and behavioral economics. His appointment as senior fellow will last 13 months.

Wolfers is also a research associate with the National Bureau for Economic Research, a research affiliate of the Centre for Economic Policy Research in London, a research fellow of the German Institute for the Study of Labor, and a senior scientist for Gallup, among other affiliations. He is a contributor for Bloomberg View, NPR Marketplace, and the Freakonomics website and was named one of the 13 top young economists to watch by the New York Times.  Wolfers did his undergraduate work at the University of Sydney, Australia and received his Master’s and Ph.D. in Economics from Harvard University.  He is a dual Australian-U.S. national and was once an apprentice to a bookie which led to his interest in prediction markets. 

“We are pleased to re-welcome Justin back to Economic Studies,” said Dynan. “His work continues to challenge the conventional wisdom, and we look forward to collaborating with him once again.” 

“Justin is outstanding at communicating economic ideas to a wide audience, as evidenced by his regular writings for media as well as his large social media presence,” added Ted Gayer, co-director of Economic Studies.

“I have enormous affection for the Brookings Institution, which provides not only a home for deep scholarly research, but also an unmatched platform for engaging the policy debate,” said Wolfers.  “The Economic Studies program has a rich history of being the go-to place for policymakers, and I look forward to coming back and engaging in debate with my colleagues there.”

In a new essay, “The New Challenge to Market Democracies,” Senior Fellow William Galston argues that “the centrality of economic well-being in our politics reflects long-held assumptions about the purposes of our politics. If economic growth and well-being are in jeopardy, so are our political arrangements.”

Galston, the Ezra K. Zilkha Chair in Governance Studies, makes the case that economic growth and well-being are indeed in jeopardy for a variety of reasons, including: wage growth that has just kept up with inflation; family and household incomes that remain below their pre-Great Recession peak; the share of national income going to wages and salaries is as low as it’s been in nearly 50 years; and a difficult jobs situation in which workers are getting paid less, the number of people working part-time who want full-time work remains high, and few new jobs offer middle range incomes. “These trends,” Galston writes, “bode ill for the future of the middle class; many parents now doubt that their children will enjoy the same opportunities that they did.”

Galston offers three broad policy prescriptions related to employment and tax reform:

1. “We should adopt full employment as a high-priority goal of economic policy and welcome the wage increases that it would generate.”
2. “We should use the tax code to restore the relationship between wage increases and productivity gains.”
3. “We should adopt a strong presumption against provisions of the tax code that treat some sources of income more favorably than wages and salaries,” which includes scrapping tax expenditures that “disproportionately benefit upper-income investors.”

Calling economic growth a “moral enterprise” as well as a material goal, Galston—acknowledging economist Benjamin Friedman—concludes that:

the central question the United States now faces is whether the next generation will again achieve broadly shared prosperity or rather experience the stagnation of living standards. Broad prosperity is both the oil that lubricates the machinery of government and the glue that binds our society together. Economic stagnation means a continuation of gridlocked, zero-sum politics and a turn away from the spirit of generosity that only a people confident of its future can sustain.

Read “The New Challenge to Market Democracies.”

One of global society’s foremost structural changes underway is its rapid aggregate shift from farmbased to city-based economies. More than half of humanity now lives in urban areas, and more than two-thirds of the world’s economies have a majority of their population living in urban settings. Much of the gradual movement from rural to urban areas is driven by long-term forces of economic progress. But one corresponding downside is that city-based societies become increasingly disconnected—certainly physically, and likely psychologically—from the practicalities of rural livelihoods, especially agriculture, the crucial economic sector that provides food to fuel humanity.

The nature of agriculture is especially important when considering the tantalizingly imminent prospect of eliminating extreme poverty within a generation. The majority of the world’s extremely poor people still live in rural areas, where farming is likely to play a central role in boosting average incomes. Agriculture is similarly important when considering environmental challenges like protecting biodiversity and tackling climate change. For example, agriculture and shifts in land use are responsible for roughly a quarter of greenhouse gas emissions.

As a single word, the concept of “agriculture” encompasses a remarkably diverse set of circumstances. It can be defined very simply, as at dictionary.com, as “the science or occupation of cultivating land and rearing crops and livestock.” But underneath that definition lies a vast array of landscape ecologies and climates in which different types of plant and animal species can grow. Focusing solely on crop species, each plant grows within a particular set of respective conditions. Some plants provide food—such as grains, fruits, or vegetables—that people or livestock can consume directly for metabolic energy. Other plants provide stimulants or medication that humans consume—such as coffee or Artemisia—but have no caloric value. Still others provide physical materials—like cotton or rubber—that provide valuable inputs to physical manufacturing.

One of the primary reasons why agriculture’s diversity is so important to understand is that it defines the possibilities, and limits, for the diffusion of relevant technologies. Some crops, like wheat, grow only in temperate areas, so relevant advances in breeding or plant productivity might be relatively easy to diffuse across similar agro-ecological environments but will not naturally transfer to tropical environments, where most of the world’s poor reside. Conversely, for example, rice originates in lowland tropical areas and it has historically been relatively easy to adopt farming technologies from one rice-growing region to another. But, again, its diffusion is limited by geography and climate. Meanwhile maize can grow in both temperate and tropical areas, but its unique germinating properties render it difficult to transfer seed technologies across geographies.

Given the centrality of agriculture in many crucial global challenges, including the internationally agreed Sustainable Development Goals recently established for 2030, it is worth unpacking the topic empirically to describe what the term actually means today. This short paper does so with a focus on developing country crops, answering five basic questions: 

1. What types of crops does each country grow? 

2. Which cereals are most prominent in each country? 

3. Which non-cereal crops are most prominent in each country? 

4. How common are “cash crops” in each country? 

5. How has area harvested been changing recently? 

Readers should note that the following assessments of crop prominence are measured by area harvested, and therefore do not capture each crop’s underlying level of productivity or overarching importance within an economy. For example, a local cereal crop might be worth only $200 per ton of output in a country, but average yields might vary across a spectrum from around 1 to 6 tons per hectare (or even higher). Meanwhile, an export-oriented cash crop like coffee might be worth $2,000 per ton, with potential yields ranging from roughly half a ton to 3 or more tons per hectare. Thus the extent of area harvested forms only one of many variables required for a thorough understanding of local agricultural systems. 

The underlying analysis for this paper was originally conducted for a related book chapter on “Agriculture’s role in ending extreme poverty” (McArthur, 2015). That chapter addresses similar questions for a subset of 61 countries still estimated to be struggling with extreme poverty challenges as of 2011. Here we present data for a broader set of 140 developing countries. All tables are also available online for download.

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• Cropshares_tables_clean
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• WB income class
• WBcodescountrycode

Created within a year of each other, the World Bank and the United Nations were born out of a shared response to the Second World War. The war created a constituency willing to invest resources and ideals in a system of multilateral cooperation. In the words of one of their architects, these institutions were to create a “New Deal for a new world.”

Today we face another period of global disorder. The number of armed conflicts worldwide has tripled from four to 11 since 2007. 2014 was the most lethal year since the end of the Cold War, according to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program. In the same year, the total number of deaths from terrorism increased by 80 percent, to close to 37,000, the largest yearly increase in the last 15 years, according to the Institute for Economics and Peace.

The fallout is clear. The number of people affected by humanitarian crises has almost doubled in the past decade, with 125 million people requiring humanitarian assistance. Displacement is at a post-World War II high with 60 million people around the world forced from their homes, often within their own countries. Roughly two-thirds of U.N. peacekeepers today and almost 90 percent of personnel in U.N. Special Political Missions are working in and on countries where there is little peace to keep.

Responding to this challenge, the U.N. and its member states led major reviews in 2015 of the tools and approaches used to respond to conflict. These reviews looked at peacekeeping operations, the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security, and the U.N.’s peacebuilding architecture.

These reviews underscored that while humanitarian assistance can mitigate suffering, and peacekeepers can stabilize situations, they alone cannot create lasting peace, development, and prosperity. 

Responding to this challenge requires a new global partnership to prevent violent conflict, reduce humanitarian need, and sustain peace. This partnership must reaffirm our commitment to humanity and chart a course for change, as the secretary-general has called for in his recent report for the World Humanitarian Summit.

Taking place just before the World Humanitarian Summit, the ministerial meeting of the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (IDPS) in Stockholm is a key moment at which the principles of the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, in particular the TRUST and FOCUS components, could be used to provide a foundation for this effort.

Peacebuilding and statebuilding, however, are political. Technical instruments must be aligned with and informed by a political strategy owned by national governments and developed in consultation with its people. This is as true at the global level as it is in each country.

The first step is normative. In 2015, through the Addis Ababa Action Agenda and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, member states committed to a future that aims to leave no one behind. The International Dialogue, the New Deal, and the g7+ were important foundations, asserting the links between development and peace captured in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG). However, the SDGs are universal. Goal 16 on just, peaceful, and inclusive societies is an ambition of all countries, not only those identified internationally as conflict-affected, and other goals—for example SDG 1 on ending poverty and SDG 10 on reducing inequality—are critical to peace in conflict-affected states. A statement at Stockholm should be made clarifying the linkages between the specific focus of the New Deal and the universal goals of the SDGs (and their affiliated processes).

The second is ownership. Peace and development are first and foremost a national responsibility. The New Deal provides a framework that brings together multilateral and bilateral partners of conflict-affected countries. However, it has functioned primarily as a tool for the targeting of aid, not its management. To achieve the SDGs in 2030 we need to equip national partners with the tools to address the drivers of conflict. That is where a revitalized New Deal can play an important role. While the SDGs are now the overarching framework, making more significant progress on the TRUST and FOCUS components of the New Deal will be essential contributions to the implementation of the 2030 Agenda. Commitments to ownership, the use of country systems, and mobilization of national resources should be restated and given life in Stockholm.

The last is resources. Resolving conflict requires multi-year financing addressing the drivers of conflict rather than short-term responses.  While official development assistance (ODA) to conflict-affected countries has increased over the last dozen years or so, in 2013, peacebuilding support to legitimate politics, security, and justice systems represented only 16 percent (or $6.8 billion) of the $42 billion in gross development assistance for 31 conflict-affected countries (see Figure 1). At a very moment of global crisis, as of January 1, 2016 and for the first time in its history, the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund will not reach its $100 million annual allocation target endorsed by the secretary-general and donors. Stockholm needs to demonstrate a commitment to peacebuilding and statebuilding that goes beyond words, and commit to more resources devoted to conflict-affected countries and more resources targeting the drivers of conflict.

The U.N. has been a supporter of the New Deal from the beginning, recognizing it as a model for partnership between conflict-affected states and their development partners. A political, prioritized strategy for peacebuilding and statebuilding is necessary to support full implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals in conflict-affected states. The New Deal provides inspiration for such a strategy. The question for Stockholm is whether inspiration alone will be sufficient.

Note: Special thanks goes to Jago Salmon for his contributions. This blog reflects the views of the author only and does not reflect the views of the Africa Growth Initiative. Similarly, the views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations.

At a time of decelerating regional growth in sub-Saharan Africa, South Africa—one of the continent’s leading economies—is facing the brunt of concurrent external and domestic growth shocks. During a Brookings event on April 14, 2016 moderated by Africa Growth Initiative Director Amadou Sy, South African minister of finance, the Honorable Pravin Gordhan, provided cause for encouragement, as he highlighted strategies that South Africa is implementing to reverse slowing growth trends, boost social cohesion, and springboard inclusive, sustainable development.

Throughout the event, Minister Gordhan emphasized that South Africa is refocusing its efforts on implementing homegrown policies to mitigate the effects of global and domestic shocks: “Our approach is not to keep pointing outside our borders and say, ‘That’s where the problem is.’ We've got our own challenges and difficulties, and potential and opportunities. And it's important to focus on those, and rally South Africans behind that set of initiatives so that we could go wherever we can in terms improving the situation.”

He began by explaining the major growth problems facing South Africa, including first-level structural challenges—consistent electricity supply and labor relations—as well as deeper structural challenges, for instance, reforming the oligopolistic sectors of its economy. To address these issues, he expanded on what collaborative, multi-stakeholder efforts would be necessary. Watch:

Contending with infrastructure needs—particularly energy and logistical, but also social, such as water and sanitation, health care, and educational facilities—will play a significant role in overcoming these aforementioned challenges. Minister Gordhan explained how the government aims to fill existing infrastructure gaps through innovative financing mechanisms. Watch:

Later in the event, Sy pressed Minister Gordhan on plans for implementation for the country’s ambitious goals. As an example, Minister Gordhan underlined “Operation Phakisa,” a results-driven approach to fast-track the implementation of initiatives to achieve development objectives. The government intends to use this methodology to address a number of social priorities, including unlocking the potential of South Africa’s coastlines and oceans. Watch:

Urbanization in South Africa and sub-Saharan Africa as a whole is widespread and increasing, creating a demand for governments to both maintain their infrastructure as well as harness their energy and human capacity. Cities, especially those in South Africa’s Gauteng Province (Johannesburg, Pretoria, and Ekurhuleni), will continue to be crucial engines of economic development if municipal governance systems effectively manage the region’s expected rapid urbanization in the years to come. Minister Gordhan discusses some of the lessons learned from the Gauteng city region. Watch:

In sum, referring to the confluence of adverse global conditions and internal problems currently affecting South Africa, Minister Gordhan stated, “Whenever you are in the middle of a storm it looks like the worst thing possible—but storms don’t last forever.” He did not doubt the ability of the South African people to weather and emerge stronger from the storm, offering: “Ultimately South Africans are hopeful, are optimistic and resilient.”

You can watch the full event here. 

Video

• Pravin Gordhan notes the major growth challenges in South Africa
• Pravin Gordhan on addressing South Africa’s infrastructure gaps
• Pravin Gordhan on implementation of South Africa's development objectives
• Pravin Gordhan on the vital role of cities in economic development in South Africa

Event Information

The Building Bridges Coalition was launched at the Brookings Institution in June 2006 to promote the role of volunteer service in achieving development goals and to highlight research and policy issues across the field in the United States and abroad. Among other efforts, the coalition promotes innovation, scaling up, and best practices for international volunteers working in development.

On June 14, the Brookings Institution and the Building Bridges Coalition co-hosted a 10th anniversary forum on the role of volunteers in achieving the United Nation’s Sustainable Development Goals for 2030 and on the coalition’s impact research. General Stanley McChrystal was the keynote speaker and discussed initiatives to make a year of civilian service as much a part of growing up in America as going to high school.

Afterwards, three consecutive panels discussed how to provide a multi-stakeholder platform for the advancement of innovative U.S.-global alliances with nongovernmental organizations, faith-based entities, university consortia, and the private sector in conjunction with the launch of the global track of Service Year Alliance.

For more information on the forum and the Building Bridges Coalition, click here.

Video

• Welcoming remarks and featured speaker
• Panel 1 — Role of volunteer service in achieving the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals
• Panel 2 — Policy perspective: National and international service in the next administration
• Panel 3 — One million Americans in global service: The role of faith-based service

Audio

• International volunteer service and the 2030 development agenda

Transcript

• Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

• 20160614_volunteering_development_transcript

The adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the Paris agreement on climate action present a unique opportunity to set the world on a path towards better and more sustainable development outcomes. Delivering sustainable infrastructure at scale lies at the heart of this agenda. Infrastructure is a major driver of growth and inclusive development. Delivered in more sustainable ways, it is also key to tackling climate change, as it currently accounts for around 60 percent of the world’s greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. This means investing more, and better, in renewable energy, cleaner transport, efficient and resilient water systems, and smarter cities. 

The world will need to invest upwards of $6 trillion annually in sustainable infrastructure in the next 15 years, more than double the current level. As much as three-quarters of the incremental investment will need to take place in emerging and developing economies, with the largest part in middle-income countries. This presents a great challenge in mobilizing resources and better integrating climate sustainability in infrastructure. Strong and concerted actions will be needed across public and private sectors, and at national and international levels, including important transformations in the way infrastructure investment is developed, financed, and implemented. More than half of the financing will need to be mobilized from the private sector. 

Public policy has a central role to play in meeting this challenge, both because the public sector itself is a major investor in infrastructure and because public policy provides signals and sets the regulatory and institutional framework that influence the actions of private investors and consumers. Soundness, clarity, and credibility of public policy are especially important for infrastructure investments, given their longevity, public good characteristics, associated externalities, and inevitable and intimate links to government policies. There are four key roles for public policy:

• Articulating national strategies for sustainable infrastructure. Sustainability must be fully integrated in national strategies and plans; addressing one group of projects at a time will not do. The G-20 can provide leadership in setting out clear and coherent national strategies for sustainable infrastructure, linked to intended nationally determined contributions (INDCs) announced ahead of the Paris meeting. National infrastructure strategies should in turn be embedded in overall national investment and growth strategies and macroeconomic frameworks.


• Improving the policy environment. In getting prices right to shift incentive structures towards low-carbon infrastructure, the highest priority attaches to removal of fossil-fuel subsidies and implementation of carbon pricing. To attract more private investment, policy risk and costs of doing business must be reduced. Improvement of policy frameworks and financing mechanisms for public-private partnerships (PPPs) needs particular attention, as this will be an increasingly important investment modality.


• Strengthening public investment management. Public investment has in general been on a declining trend, exacerbating infrastructure gaps. This trend must be reversed. Also, public investment in research and development (R&D) in sustainable infrastructure should be boosted. Public investment management capacities will need substantial enhancement. Strengthening project pipelines is a priority, including incorporating sustainability criteria in project preparation, public procurement, and PPPs.


• Mobilizing financing. Governments must expand their own fiscal space, through tax and expenditure reform and better use of balance sheets, as well as find innovative ways to leverage more private finance and lower its cost. Carbon pricing and improved property taxation in particular have the potential to raise substantial revenue as well as improve the tax structure. With the large role of urban areas in sustainable infrastructure, subnational fiscal reform should empower cities. Through risk mitigation and other instruments, development capital (both traditional development assistance and new climate finance) should be used in ways to achieve more leverage. Multilateral development banks (MDBs) have a key role in this regard and their capacities will need to be boosted. Promoting infrastructure as an asset class will help unlock financing from the large pools of savings held by institutional investors. Middle-income countries in particular should step up efforts to develop domestic capital markets.

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2016: The turning point

Policymakers and development practitioners now face a new set of challenges in the aftermath of the global consensus triumvirate Addis Agenda—2030 Agenda—Paris Agreement: [1] implementation, follow-up, and review. Development policy professionals must tackle these while at the same time including the three pillars of sustainable development—social development, economic growth, and environmental protection—and the above three global consensus’ cross-sectoral natures—all while working in a context where policy planning is still performed in silos. They also must incorporate the universality of these new agreements in the light of different national circumstances—different national realities, capacities, needs, levels of development, and national policies and priorities. And then they have to significantly scale up resource allocation and means of implementation (including financing, capacity building, and technology transfer) to make a difference and enhance novel multi-stakeholder partnerships to contain the surge of global flows of all kinds (such as migration, terrorism, diseases, taxation, extreme weather, and digital revolution) in a resolutely interconnected world. Quite an ambitious task!

Given the above complexities, new national and global arrangements are being made to honor the commitments put forth to answer these unprecedented challenges. Several African governments have already started establishing inter-ministerial committees and task forces to ensure alignment between the global goals and existing national planning processes, aspirations, and priorities.

With the international community, Africa is preparing for the first High-Level Political Forum since the 2030 Agenda adoption in July 2016 on the theme “Ensuring that no one is left behind.” In order to inform the 2030 Agenda’s implementation leadership, guidance, and recommendations, six African countries [2] of 22 U.N. Member States, volunteered to present national reviews on their work to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), a unique opportunity to provide an uncompromising reality check and highlight levers to exploit and limits to overcome for impact.

Paralleling Africa’s groundwork, the United Nations’ efforts for coordination have been numerous. They include an inter-agency task force to prepare for the follow-up forum to Financing For Development timed with the Global Infrastructure Forum that will consult on infrastructure investment, a crucial point for the continent; an appointed 10-representative group to support the Technology Facilitation Mechanism that facilitates the development, transfer and dissemination of technologies for the SDGs, another very important item for Africa; and an independent team of advisors to counsel on the longer-term positioning of the U.N. development system in the context of the 2030 Agenda, commonly called “U.N. fit for purpose,” among many other endeavors.

These overwhelming bureaucratic duties alone will put a meaningful burden on Africa’s limited capacity. Thus, it is in the interest of the continent to pool its assets by taking advantage of its robust regional networks in order to mitigate this obstacle in a coherent and coordinated manner, and by building on the convergence between the newly adopted texts and Agenda 2063, the African Union’s 50-year transformation blueprint, with the help of pan-African institutions.

Besides national and global, there is a third level of consideration: the regional one. Indeed, the three major agreements in 2015 emphasized support to projects and cooperation frameworks that foster regional and subregional integration, particularly in Africa. [3] Indeed, common and coherent industrial policies for regional value chains developed by strengthened regional institutions and sustained by a strong-willed transformational leadership are gaining traction towards Africa’s insertion into the global economy.

Africa has long made regional economic integration within its main “building blocs,” the eight Regional Economic Communities (RECs), a core strategy for development. The continent is definitely engaged in this path: Last summer, three RECs, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African Community (EAC), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), launched the Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA) that covers 26 countries, over 600 million people, and $1 trillion GDP. The tripartite arrangement paves the way towards Africa’s own mega-regional one, the Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA), and the realization of one broad African Economic Community. If regionalization allows free movement of people, capital, goods, and services, the resulting increased intra-African connectivity will boost trade within Africa, promote growth, create jobs, and attract investments. Ultimately, it should ignite industrialization, innovation, and competitiveness. To that end, pan-African institutions, capitalizing on the recent positive continental performances, are redoubling their efforts to build an enabling environment for policy and regulation harmonization and economies of scale.

Importantly, infrastructure, without which no connectivity is possible, is undeniably the enabling bedrock to all future regionalization plans. Together with market integration and industrial development, infrastructure development is one of the three pillars of the TFTA strategy. Similarly, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) Agency, the technical body of the African Union (AU) mandated with planning and coordinating the implementation of continental priorities and regional programs, adopted regional integration as a strategic approach to infrastructure. In fact, in June 2014, the NEPAD Agency organized the Dakar Financing Summit for Infrastructure, culminating with the adoption of the Dakar Agenda for Action that lays down options for investment mobilization towards infrastructure development projects, starting with 16 key bankable projects stemming from the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA). These “NEPAD mega-projects to transform Africa” are, notably, all regional in scope.

See the full map of NEPAD’s 16 mega-projects to transform Africa here »

Supplementing NEPAD and TFTA, the Continental Business Network was formed to promote public-private dialogue with regard to regional infrastructure investment. The Africa50 Infrastructure Fund was constituted as a new delivery platform commercially managed to narrow the massive infrastructure finance gap in Africa evaluated at $50 billion per annum.

The development of homegrown proposals and institutional advances observed lately demonstrate Africa’s assertive engagement towards accelerating infrastructure development, thereby regionalization. At the last AU Summit, the NEPAD Heads of State and Government Orientation Committee approved the institutionalization of an annual PIDA Week hosted at the African Development Bank (AfDB) to follow up on the progresses made.

The energy partnerships listed below illustrate the possible gain from adopting trans-boundary approaches for implementation and follow-up: the Africa Power Vision (APV) undertaken with Power Africa; the ECOWAS Centre for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency (ECREEE) model accompanying the Sustainable Energy for All (SE4ALL) Africa Hub efforts; and the Africa GreenCo solution that is to bank on PIDA.

• Africa Power Vision: African ministers of power and finance gathered at the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos in 2014 decided to create the APV. The vision provides a strategic template harnessing resources to fast-track access to modern energy for African households, businesses, and industries. It draws up a shortlist of African-driven regional priority energy projects mostly extracted from the PIDA Priority Action Program, which is the PIDA short-term pipeline to be completed by 2020. The game changer Inga III hydropower project, the iconic DESERTEC Sahara solar project, and the gigantic North-South Interconnection Transmission Line covering almost the entire TFTA are among the 13 selected projects. The APV concept note and implementation plan entitled “From vision to action” developed by the NEPAD Agency, in collaboration with U.S. government-led Power Africa initiative, was endorsed at the January 2015 AU Summit. The package elaborates on responses to counter bottlenecks to achieve quantifiable targets, the “acceleration methodology” based on NEPAD Project Prioritization Considerations Tool (PPCT), risk mitigation, and power projects’ financing. Innovative design was thought to avoid duplication, save resources, improve coordination and foster transformative action with the setting up of dual-hatted Power Africa – APV Transaction Advisors, who supervise investment schemes up to financial closure where and when there is an overlap of energy projects or common interest. Overall, the APV partnership permits a mutualization of expertise while at the same time, since it is based on PIDA, promoting regional economic integration for electrification.

• ECOWAS Centre for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency: U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon launched the Sustainable Energy for All initiative worldwide as early as 2011 with the triple objective of ensuring universal access to modern energy services, doubling the rate of improvement of energy efficiency, and doubling the share of renewable energy in the global energy mix by 2030. Since its inception, SE4ALL prompted a lot of enthusiasm on the continent, and is now counting 44 opt-in African countries. As a result, the SE4ALL Africa Hub was the first regional hub to be launched in 2013. Hosted at the AfDB in partnership with the AU Commission, NEPAD Agency, and the U.N. Development Program (UNDP), its role is to facilitate the implementation of SE4ALL on the continent. The SE4ALL Africa Hub 3rd Annual Workshop held in Abidjan last February showed the potential of this “creative coalition” (Yumkella, 2014) to deliver on areas spanning from national plans of action, regionally concerted approaches in line with the continental vision, to SDG7 on energy, to climate Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) made for the Paris Agreement. Above all, the workshop displayed the hub’s ability to efficiently kick-start the harmonization of processes for impact among countries. Forasmuch as all ECOWAS Member States opted-in to SE4ALL, the West African ministers mandated their regional energy center, ECREEE, to coordinate the implementation of the SE4ALL Action Agendas (AAs), which are documents outlining country actions required to achieve sustainable energy objectives, and from then Investment Prospectuses (IPs), the documents presenting the AAs investment requirements. As a result, the ECOWAS Renewable Energy Policy (EREP) and the Energy Efficiency Policy (EEEP) were formulated and adopted; and a regional monitoring framework to feed into a Global Tracking Framework, the SE4ALL measuring and reporting system, is now being conceived. The successful ECREEE model, bridging national inventory and global players, is about to be duplicated in two other African regions, EAC and SADC, with the support of the U.N. Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO).

• Africa GreenCo: Lastly, initiatives like Africa GreenCo are incubating. This promising vehicle, currently funded by a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation, envisions itself as an independently managed power trader and broker to move energy where needed. Indeed, Africa GreenCo aims to capitalize on PIDA power projects: In its capacity as intermediary creditworthy off taker, it plans to eventually utilize their regional character as a value addition to risk guarantee. To date, Africa GreenCo is refining the legal, regulatory, technical, and financial aspects of its future structure and forging links with key stakeholders in the sector (member states, multilateral development banks, African regional utilities for generation and interconnection called Power Pools) ahead of the completion of its feasibility study in June 2016.

The above-mentioned partnerships are encouraging trends towards more symbiotic multi-stakeholders cooperation. As they relate to home-crafted initiatives, it is imperative that we do not drift away from a continental vision. Not only do Africa-grown plans have higher chance of success than the one-size-fits-all imported solutions, but consistent and combined efforts in the same direction reinforce confidence, emulation, and attract supportive attention. It implies that the fulfillment of intergovernmental agreements requires first and foremost their adaptation to local realities in a domestication process that is respectful of the policy space. Mainstreaming adjustments can be later conducted according to evidence-based and data-driven experiments. Between these global engagements and national procedures, the regional dimension is the indispensable link: Enabling countries to bypass the artificiality of borders inherited from colonial times and offering concrete options to eradicate poverty in a united-we-stand fashion. Regional integration is therefore a prelude to sustainable development operationalization within Africa and a key step towards its active partaking in the global arena. Regionalization can also trigger international relations shift provided that it encompasses fair multilateralism and sustainable management of global knowledge. Indeed, the resulting openness and the complexity encountered are useful parameters to enrich the conception of relevant local answers.

These success stories show the great potential for new experiments and synergies. To me, they inspire the promise of a better world. The one I like to imagine is characterized by mutually beneficial ecosystems for the people and the planet. It encourages win-win reverse linkages, or in other words, more positive spillovers of developing economies on industrial countries. It is a place where, for example, an African region could draw lessons from the Greek crisis and the other way around: China could learn from Africa’s Maputo Development Corridor for its Silk Road Economic Belt. Twin institutes performing joint research among regional knowledge hubs would flourish. Innovative Fab Labs would be entitled to strive after spatial adventure with e-waste material recycled into 3D printers. In that world, innovative collaborations in science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) would be favored and involve not only women but also the diaspora in order to develop environmentally sound technical progress. Commensurate efforts, persistent willingness, indigenous ingenuity, and unbridled creativity place this brighter future within our reach.

Beyond the recognition of the African voice throughout the intergovernmental processes, Africa should now consolidate its gains by firmly maintaining its position and safeguarding its winnings throughout the preliminary phase. The continent should urgently set singular tactics with the greatest potential in terms of inclusiveness and creation of productive capacity. While doing so, African development actors should initiate a “learning by doing” virtuous cycle to create an endogenous development narrative cognizant of adaptable best practices as well as failures. Yet the only approach capable of generating both structural transformation and informative change that are in line with continentally own and led long-term strategies is … regional integration.

Event Information

China’s meteoric rise lifted its economy but damaged its environment, and it has new aspirations to leadership on the global stage. Africa has enormous natural capital and is hungry for development. How can they collaborate? Their interests may intersect within a model of development that invests in natural capital instead of prizing only extraction.

On July 11th, the Brookings Tsinghua-Center, in collaboration with GreenPoint Group and School of Public Policy and Management at Tsinghua University, hosted the panel Sustainability within the China-Africa Relationship: Governance, Investment, and Natural Capital. The panel was moderated by SMPP Associate Professor and IMPA director Zheng Zhenqing, and featured Mr. Peter Seligmann, chairman and CEO of Conservation International; Professor Qi Ye, director of the Brookings Tsinghua-Center; Honorable Minister Anyaa Vohiri of the Environmental Protection Agency of Liberia; Professor Pang Xun, expert on official direct assistance and the politics of aid; and Mr. Rule Jimmy Opelo, Permanent Deputy Secretary of the Ministry of Environment, Wildlife and Tourism of Botswana.

Professor and Dean of School of Public Policy and Management Xue Lan gave the opening remarks, highlighting that both China and Africa face the challenge of balancing development and sustainability. Minister Vohiri then presented on the challenges and great potential of Africa's vast, untapped renewable energy resources before Professor Zheng opened the panel. Framing China and Africa as global partners with the common aspiration of growing sustainable, the panelists discussed the need for developing economies to recognize that the health of their environment is inseparable from the health of their economies.

Questions concerning the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals and Millennium Development goals presented conservation as a global issue requiring global governance. Mr. Seligmann forwarded the idea that sustainable development as enlightened self-interest has entered mainstream thought, asserting that the challenge now lies in crafting region-specific policies and plans of implementation. The importance of cooperation surfaced as a common theme. Mr. Opelo examined the possibilities of South-South cooperation, and Professor Qi provided a history for the emergence of natural capital as a concept before underlining the need for government to collaborate with civil society and the private sector.

The highlighted benefits of Sino-African cooperation ranged from the greater political freedom afforded to aid recipient countries when there is donor competition to Africa's potential "leapfrog" development to a green economy if it obtains sufficient investment. Professor Qi spoke of the lessons provided by China’s evolution from a parochial developing country into the world’s leader in sustainable development. Professor Pang emphasized the benefits both to China and to African countries when the influence of conditional aid from the United States is diluted by Chinese competition. Minister Vohiri and Mr. Opelo discussed the challenges of balancing conservation enforcement with the provision of basic needs, concluding that China's capital and knowledge could help Africa develop its economy in a sustainable direction. The panelists closed by addressing questions from the audience that problematical transparency problems with China's current model of development in Africa, the sustainability of green energy subsidies, the threats of mining and poaching, and Africa's role in addressing a global environmental crisis to which it largely did not contribute.

Xue Lan gave the opening remarks

Minister Vohiri delivered keynote remarks

Transcript

• Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

• Sustainability within the ChinaAfrica relationship governance investment and natural capital

Editor's note: By any measurable standard, Egypt is more vulnerable to violence and insurgency today than it had been before the Arab Spring. Since the overthrow of former President Mohammed Morsi in 2013, Egypt has seen shocking levels of repression. In Shadi Hamid's August 6 piece in Foreign Policy, Hamid makes the argument that the end result of the Egyptian coup turned out to be a gift to the Islamic State group.

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi came to power on a classic strongman platform. He was no liberal or democrat — and didn’t claim to be — but promised stability and security at a time when most Egyptians had grown exhausted from the uncertainties of the Arab Spring.

Increasingly, U.S. President Barack Obama’s administration seems to accept this premise. In the span of the past week, the United States has delivered eight F-16s to Egypt, relaunched the U.S.-Egypt “strategic dialogue,” and said it would resume “Bright Star,” the joint military exercise suspended after the military coup of July 3, 2013.

Sisi’s raison d’être of security and stability, however, has been undermined with each passing month. By any measurable standard, Egypt is more vulnerable to violence and insurgency today than it had been before. On July 1, as many as 64 soldiers were killed in coordinated attacks by Egypt’s Islamic State affiliate, which calls itself the Province of Sinai. It was the worst death toll in decades, and came just days after the country’s chief prosecutor, Hisham Barakat, was assassinated.

If this is what a “stability-first” approach looks like, Egypt’s future is dark indeed. Of course, it shouldn’t be surprising that the country is growing less secure: Since the overthrow of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohamed Morsi on July 3, 2013, Egypt has seen shocking levels of repression. On Aug. 14, 2013, it witnessed the worst mass killing in its modern history, with at least 800 killed in mere hours when security forces violently dispersed two pro-Morsi sit-ins in Cairo. WikiThawra, a project of the Egyptian Center for Economic and Social Rights, estimates that nearly 36,500 people were arrested or detained from the day of the coup through May 15, 2014 — one can only imagine how high that figure has grown a year later.

Since April 2015, meanwhile, at least 163 Egyptians have “disappeared.” As one prisoner recalled of his time at Azouli, a military jail which can’t be seen by civilians: “There is no documentation that says you are there. If you die at Azouli, no one would know.”

This repression, which targets not just Islamists but also secular and liberal opposition activists, makes the resort to violence and terror more likely among at least some Egyptians. There is a growing trend of academic literature pointing to the link between tyranny and terror: In a widely cited 2003 study, for example, academics Alan Krueger and Jitka Maleckova conclude, “The only variable that was consistently associated with the number of terrorists was the Freedom House index of political rights and civil liberties.”

Not all repression is created equal, however. I have argued that low-to-moderate levels of repression do not necessarily have a radicalizing effect. What we are seeing in Egypt today, however, is not your run-of-the-mill authoritarianism but something deeper and more frightening. This is eradication, driven, no less, by popular and populist sentiment.

The end result is that the Egyptian coup turned out to be a gift to the Islamic State. You don’t have to take my word for this: The jihadi group itself clearly thinks it benefited from Morsi’s overthrow. In its first statement after the coup, Islamic State spokesman Abu Mohamed al-Adnani, addressing the Muslim Brotherhood and other mainstream Islamists, says, “You have been exposed in Egypt.” He refers to “democracy” and the Brotherhood as “the two idols [which] have fallen.”

Of course, jihadis had long been making this argument, particularly after the Muslim Brotherhood in Iraq took part in successive U.S.-backed governments after the 2003 Iraq war. Al Qaeda and its ilk gleefully described the Muslim Brotherhood as al-Ikhwan al-Muflisun, or the Bankrupt Brotherhood — a play on its Arabic name. But while al Qaeda may have achieved a measure of sympathy in the Middle East after the Sept. 11 attacks, it was never, and never could be, a real threat to the Brotherhood’s model of political change. It was proficient at staging terrorist attacks but proved unable to carry its successes into the realm of governance. More importantly, al Qaeda’s vision for state building, to the extent that it had one, failed to capture the attention of the world or the imagination of tens of thousands of would-be fighters and fellow travelers.

The same cannot be said about the Islamic State, whose seemingly irrational apocalyptic vision coexists with an unusually pronounced interest in governance. As Yale University’s Andrew March and Mara Revkin laid out in considerable detail, the group has, in fact, developed fairly elaborate institutional structures. In the ideological and theological realms, the Islamic State is not just Baathist brutality in Islamic garb: Rather, it has articulated a policy toward Christian minorities based on a 7th-century pact, an approach to Islamic economic jurisprudence, and even a theory of international relations.

The Islamic State’s unlikely successes in governance undermine a key premise of mainstream Islamists — that because of their gradualism, pragmatism, and “competence,” they, rather than extremists, are better suited to delivering on bread-and-butter issues. In fact, the opposite appeared to be true: Brotherhood-style gradualism and a willingness to work through the democratic process hadn’t worked. One senior Brotherhood official told me, as we sat in a café on the outskirts of Istanbul, “If I look at the list of mistakes the Brotherhood made, this is the biggest one: trying to fix the system from inside gradually.”

Even those who otherwise abhor the Islamic State’s ideology might find themselves susceptible to the argument that violence “worked,” while peaceful participation didn’t. It’s an argument that the Islamic State and its affiliates have repeatedly tried to drive home: In one recruitment video, a young Egyptian man — a judge in one of the Islamic State’s sharia courts — tells the camera that “[Islamist groups that participate in elections] do not possess the military power or the means to defend the gains they have achieved through elections. After they win, they are put in prison, they are killed in the squares, as if they’d never even won … as if they had never campaigned for their candidates.”

Needless to say, this particular pitch wouldn’t have been possible in 2013, when Morsi was still in power, or even in 2012, when the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces was in charge. In short, the Egyptian coup — coupled with the subsequent massacres and never-ending crackdown — has given the arguments made by al Qaeda in the 2000s more power than ever before.

There’s no denying that violence surged following the coup. According to the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, the month of the coup, July 2013, saw a massive uptick in violence, from 13 attacks the month before to 95 attacks. The number of attacks dipped in subsequent months — to 69 in August and 56 in September — but remained significantly higher than before the coup. The pre- and post-coup discrepancy becomes even more obvious when we zoom out further: From July 2013 to May 2015, there were a total of 1,223 attacks over 23 months, an average of 53.2 attacks per month. In the 23 months prior to June 2013, there were a mere 78 attacks, an average of 3.4 attacks per month.

If the coup had nothing or little to do with this, it would stand as one of the more remarkable coincidences in the recent history of Middle East politics. Of course, other variables may have contributed to this surge in violence. The flow of arms from Libya and the Islamic State’s growing international stature, for instance, would have played a destabilizing role no matter what happened with Egypt’s domestic politics. But neither of those developments can account for such a sharp increase in attacks over such a relatively short period of time. Civil conflict in Libya resulted in a more porous border and an increase in arms smuggling as early as 2012, while the Islamic State’s expansion didn’t register in a serious way in the broader region until the summer of 2014, when the group took over the Iraqi city of Mosul.

That leaves us with the coup and what it wrought — namely the Sisi regime’s increasingly repressive measures — as the key event that helped spark the wave of violence. How many people, who otherwise wouldn’t have taken up arms, took up arms because of the coup and the subsequent crackdown? Obviously, there is no way to know for sure. The strength of Ansar Beit al-Maqdis, the group that eventually pledged allegiance to the Islamic State and renamed itself Province of Sinai, is estimated to be in the thousands, so even a tiny increase of, say, 500 militants — representing 0.00055 percent of Egypt’s overall population — would have an outsized effect. Recruitment, however, takes time, so it is unlikely this would have mattered in the days immediately after the coup.

The more likely short-term explanation is that militants viewed the coup as an opportune moment to intensify their activities. They would have done so for two main reasons: First, the Egyptian military — an organization, like any other, with finite resources — was preoccupied with securing major urban centers and clamping down on the Brotherhood. Second, militants likely wagered that they could seize on the wave of Islamist anger and anti-military sentiment.

Ansar Beit al-Maqdis exploited the “narrative” of the local Sinai population, which was already predisposed to distrust state institutions after years of economic neglect and heavy-handed security policies. Not surprisingly, then, residents were more likely to oppose the coup than most other Egyptians. The founders of Ansar Beit al-Maqdis, many of whom hail from North Sinai, knew this as well as anyone. The jihadi group, before pledging allegiance to the Islamic State in November 2014, was almost entirely focused on police and military targets, and would generally couch such attacks as “revenge for the security forces’ suppression of Islamist dissidents.”

Electoral results from 2011 to 2014 offer additional insight into patterns of political support in the Sinai. South Sinai has generally been more pro-regime and less supportive of militant activity, due in part to its economic dependence on the tourism industry. North Sinai, however, is a different story: In each of the four major electoral contests during the transition period, voters there supported Islamist positions and candidates at a significantly higher percentage than the national average. For example, in the 2012 presidential election, 61.5 percent of North Sinai voters cast their ballots for Morsi, compared to 51.7 percent nationally.

While the coup and its brutal aftermath contributed to a sustained increase in monthly attacks — as well as an increase in the lethality of attacks — we still see considerable variation in militant activity. From November 2013 to July 2014, for example, there is a dip, with the monthly average falling to about 22 attacks per month. Yet, even at this lower point, the average number of attacks is still more than 640 percent above the monthly pre-coup average. Starting in January 2015, militant activity jumps up sharply again to 107 attacks, from only nine in December. Again, there are any number of factors that could have played a role in this new surge in violence, but there is only one factor that changes dramatically during this period and that can account for such an unusual uptick in attacks: the military’s hasty creation of a “security zone” along the border with Gaza.

On Oct. 24, 2014, at least 33 Egyptian soldiers were killed, in what was, until then, the deadliest attack on security personnel since the coup. Ansar Beit al-Maqdis claimed responsibility. In response, Egyptian authorities moved to establish a buffer zone, forcing up to 10,000 residents to evacuate their homes, some with only 48 hours notice. The Egyptians military’s narrow security lens and harsh tactics have, in effect, further alienated local residents and helped fuel the insurgency. Shortly after the army began “relocating” villages, the number of attacks increased once again, but this time to previously unheard-of levels. The first five months of 2015 saw an average of 114.6 attacks, with an all-time high of 138 attacks in May.

This is not to say that the creation of a buffer zone transformed people into ideological hard-liners in a matter of weeks, but, rather, that groups like the Islamic State seek to exploit local grievances and depend on local sympathy to stage successful attacks. Zack Gold, a researcher who specializes on the Sinai, wrote that due to the army’s scorched-earth tactics, “whole swaths of North Sinai civilization no longer exist.” One resident of the border town of Rafah, after learning his home would be destroyed, said: “I won’t lie. I’m more afraid of the army than the jihadis. When you’re oppressed, anyone who fights your oppression gets your sympathy.” Another Sinai resident, according to journalist Mohannad Sabry, said that after 90 percent of his village was destroyed in a security campaign, around 40 people took up arms, where through 2013, he knew of only five Ansar Beit al-Maqdis members in the village.

It might be hard to imagine why the Egyptian army would appear so intent on alienating the very citizens whose help it needs to defeat the insurgency. Yet, this appears to be Sisi’s approach to conflict resolution across the country — more state power, more control, and more repression. As the saying goes, when all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail. Because authoritarian regimes are forged and sustained by force, they are perhaps the worst candidates to develop a nuanced, holistic counterinsurgency strategy.

Then again, Egypt starts from a different set of assumptions than the United States does. At the most basic level, the Egyptian government fails the first test of counterterrorism, which requires correctly identifying who the actual terrorists are. It continues to act as if the Islamic State and the Muslim Brotherhood are interchangeable — something that no Western intelligence agency takes seriously. As a result, Egypt has made itself a burden. The Egyptian regime is not — and, more importantly, cannot be — a reliable counterterrorism partner. This is no accident of circumstance. Hoping and claiming to fight terrorism, Egypt, however unwittingly, is fueling an insurgency.

Hillary Clinton isn’t often in the business of offering unsolicited advice to her Republican—or even Democratic—rivals in the presidential race. However, in a CNN interview with Alisyn Camerota on January 12, 2015, Hillary Clinton did just that. She did something quite taboo. She talked about the presidential transition.

Her comments did not flow from confidence that she would be elected president—a confidence she may indeed have. Her words came from experience, pragmatism and reality. They were words that did not simply reflect her own approach to a candidacy or a prospective administration. It was advice to everyone running for president about the right thing to do—not for themselves, but for the American public.

Clinton said:

I want to think hard—if I do get the nomination, right then and there—how we organize the White House, how we organize the Cabinet, what’s the legislative agenda. You know, the time between an election and an inauguration is short. You can’t wait. I mean, you can’t take anything for granted; you need to keep working as hard as you possibly can. But I think it’s important to start planning because we know what happens if you get behind in getting your agenda out, in getting your appointments made. You lose time, and you’re not doing the work the American people elected you to do.

Presidential candidates almost never speak of a transition until they are declared the president-elect in the late hours of the Tuesday following the first Monday in November. Candidates fear being accused of taking the election for granted, or “measuring the drapes.” They worry such planning will signal to voters an off-putting overconfidence.

Those fears may be legitimate, but acting on those concerns can be dangerous. If a voter believes a candidate should not prepare for a new administration until they are officially elected, that leaves the president-elect about 11 weeks to ready themselves for the busiest, most complicated, most important job in the world. In those 11 weeks, a president-elect would need to think not just about the 15 Cabinet secretaries who serve as the most visible political appointees in government, but literally hundreds and thousands of other posts. (One dirty little secret is that the President of the United States appoints over 3,000 people to his or her administration.)

Presidents have to think about the structure, order, and sequence of their legislative agenda. They need to communicate their intentions and plans to congressional leadership. They need to think about organizing a White House. The truth is from president to president, the White House looks the same from the outside, but is structured and functions dramatically differently on the inside. Presidents have myriad important decisions to make that will set the tone and agenda for the following four years and will affect every American in some way. Eleven weeks is not enough time. Clinton acknowledges this.

Clinton’s “bold” statement actually reflects a reality in American politics. As soon as an individual accepts his or her party’s presidential nomination, they are entitled to funding, office space, and government email and technology as part of the transition process. The Office of Personnel Management is involved, as is (of late) the Office of Presidential Personnel for the outgoing administration. The presidential transition is an essential part of democracy, policymaking, administration, and the continuity of government. Every four years, the government supports two transitions—one that comes to be and one that closes up shop.

In one way however, Hillary Clinton is entirely wrong. Waiting until you receive the nomination is too late to begin thinking about the transition. As I have written before, every presidential candidate should start thinking about a transition as soon as they announce their candidacy. They don’t need a full Cabinet chosen on Day 1 of the campaign, but they should designate one or two close advisers to organize for the process, begin considering names for posts, think through the types of policies to propose in the first 100 days, and begin what is one of the most complicated managerial tasks in the world.

Hillary Clinton is right “it is important to start planning,” and it’s also never too early to do so. I hope Clinton’s claim that one should start upon securing the nomination is a reflection of that fear of the “drape measuring” accusation. I hope she is planning her transition now. I hope Bernie Sanders and Ted Cruz and Donald Trump and John Kasich and everyone else is planning their transition right now. It’s essential. Clinton knows the challenges of setting up a White House and the complications that early disorganization can cause; she saw that dysfunction first hand in 1993. But most candidates have also worked in or around the White House or have been in politics long enough to know the importance of an effective transition. And candidates who haven’t, like Donald Trump and Carly Fiorina, should be more inclined to set up a transition early, as they have more managerial experience than anyone else in the race.

To this end, I have a modest proposal. It probably won’t happen. It’s likely one that candidates would fear, and it would likely only be effective if everyone is on board. Every current presidential candidate should sign a pledge committing to two things. First, by February 1, 2016, they will designate at least one staffer, adviser or confidante as a transition director.  Second, they will not publicly criticize another candidate—of either party—for having a transition staffer or team in place. Call it a “Transition Truce.” But the reality is that such a pledge—and the actions behind it—are essential for a better functioning, better prepared, more effective administration, no matter who it is who swears the oath exactly one year from today.

Event Information

Thailand has been under military rule since May 2014, when General Prayuth Chan-Ocha and the Royal Thai Army seized power after deposing democratically elected Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra. Current Prime Minister Prayuth has systematically postponed elections on the grounds of prioritizing order and drafting a new constitution to restore democracy. Since the coup, Thai authorities have used the murky lèse-majesté law to curtail opposition to the monarchy, while the country’s economy has languished.

On February 24, the Center for East Asia Policy Studies at Brookings hosted an event to explore the root causes of Thailand’s political crisis, the implications of an upcoming royal succession, and the possibilities for the road ahead. The event was moderated by Senior Fellow Richard Bush.  Panelists included Duncan McCargo, professor of political science at the University of Leeds, Joshua Kurlantzick, senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Don Pathan, an independent security analyst based in Thailand.

 Please follow the conversation on Twitter at #ThaiPolitics

Audio

• Kingdom at a crossroads: Thailand’s uncertain political trajectory

Transcript

• Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

• 20160224_thailand_political_crisis_transcript

Bernie Sanders may have had no foreign policy advisers until this week, but he can justly claim to have proposed one of the boldest and radical foreign policy ideas of the 2016 presidential campaign. In what he describes as the most important speech of his campaign—on Democratic Socialism at Georgetown University in November 2015—Sanders called on the United States to fight terrorism in the same way it waged the Cold War. He said: “We must create an organization like NATO to confront the security threats of the 21st century” and we must “expand our coalition to include Russia and members of the Arab League.”

NATO was created in 1949 to give the United States a way to forward-deploy its forces so they would immediately be entangled in a war if the Soviets attacked Western Europe. The most important feature of NATO was the mutual defense clause, whereby an attack on one would be treated as an attack on all. In a new NATO to fight terrorism, the United States could find itself having to deploy tens of thousands of troops throughout the Middle East to fight ISIS. The United States may even be treaty-bound to use its troops to fight alongside Russia in Chechnya. 

If that sounds very unlike Bernie Sanders, it's because it is. It is clear from the speech that Sanders had very little idea what NATO actually is or why it was founded. He was looking for a way to pass the burden of fighting terrorism on to other nations, particularly Muslim nations. Lacking any clear idea as to how to do this, a formal treaty must have seemed as good a way as any. Sanders would surely say that he meant an alliance without a mutual defense pact and without the United States taking the lead. But such an organization currently exists—it is called the counter-ISIS coalition. Presidents Bush and Obama also both sought ways to deepen cooperation with Russia and Arab countries on terrorism without a formal NATO-style alliance, which led to the situation Sanders decries. In any event, the new NATO served its purpose. Sanders could later claim to have given a speech on foreign policy. The specifics of the idea went un-scrutinized. 

Mind the gap

Bernie Sanders’ foreign policy remains a mystery because he has said so little about it. Unlike Donald Trump, who has been vocal about his foreign policy views for many decades, Sanders has focused his message on inequality and the nefarious influence of big money in politics. Recently though, he has begun to come out of his shell. He regularly invokes his opposition to the Iraq War in an effort to negate Hillary Clinton’s superior experience in foreign policy. Sanders clearly hopes that this vote will enable him to win over many Barack Obama supporters who remain suspicious of Clinton. In recent weeks, some foreign policy experts have sketched out how Sanders could build on Obama’s foreign policy legacy and distinguish himself from Clinton. 

Sanders-Obama is the real foreign policy fault-line in the Democratic Party.

The conventional wisdom of the foreign policy debate in the Democratic Party sees an Obama wing that is skeptical of military intervention and a Clinton wing that is more willing to use American power overseas. This is a paradigm that Sanders would certainly endorse and hope to capitalize on but it is not an apt description of the 2016 divide. There is a reason why Obama has come close to endorsing Clinton and has left no doubt that he sees her as his true heir. The gap between Sanders and Obama is much greater than between Clinton and Obama. Obama is an avowed globalist who looked outward, even as he was campaigning in Iowa in 2007. Sanders is a liberal nationalist who looks inward, not just in his rhetoric but in his policy. 

A Sanders nomination would be a striking repudiation not just of Clinton but of Obama’s worldview and message. Sanders-Obama is the real foreign policy fault-line in the Democratic Party. 

Obama 2008: Looking outward

Obama’s 2008 campaign is now shrouded in mythology. He is often described as unlikely a candidate as Sanders. Forgotten is the fact that weeks after he started, he secured the support of major donors and dozens of foreign policy experts. He was always the favorite of a particular part of the establishment. He was young but he had thought about the world and America’s role in it. In 2005, he hired Samantha Power to be his foreign policy adviser in the Senate. His 2006 book "The Audacity of Hope" had a chapter on foreign policy that culled ideas from think tank row. 

In April 2007, a full 18 months before the election, Obama gave a revealing interview to The New York Times' David Brooks in which he spoke about the influence that American theologian Reinhold Niebuhr had on his foreign policy. Niebuhr was a seminal figure in U.S. diplomatic thinking during the Cold War and is credited with developing the most sophisticated critique of American idealism. Obama said that Niebuhr provided:

“the compelling idea that there’s serious evil in the world, and hardship and pain. And we should be humble and modest in our belief we can eliminate those things. But we shouldn’t use that as an excuse for cynicism and inaction. I take away...the sense we have to make these efforts knowing they are hard, and not swinging from naïve idealism to bitter realism.”

Some of these themes would reappear in his extraordinary speech in Oslo in 2010 on receiving the Nobel Peace Prize. 

Throughout the 2008 campaign, Obama spoke about reviving American leadership and presenting a new face to the world. In his announcement speech in Springfield in 2007, Obama said “ultimate victory against our enemies will come only by rebuilding our alliances and exporting those ideals that bring hope and opportunity to millions around the globe.” In his acceptance speech in Chicago, he spoke to “those watching tonight from beyond our shores”. “Our stories are singular,” he said, “but our destiny is shared and a new dawn of American leadership is at hand.” 

Obama’s challenge in office, and the challenge of progressives after the Iraq War, was to develop a foreign policy that remained faithful to his internationalist ideals while resisting calls for large-scale military interventions. In this, his record was mixed. The Middle East stands out as a major failure but he had successes elsewhere. He helped rescue the international financial system, he deepened U.S. engagement in Asia, he negotiated several trade deals, and he secured a controversial nuclear deal with Iran. Throughout, he articulated a case for a liberal brand of American exceptionalism and for continued U.S. global leadership. 

Sanders 2016: Drawing inward

That is now at risk, not just by the prospect of a Trump presidency but also from within the Democratic primary. Sanders has had remarkable success with a campaign message that is entirely inwardly focused. Read his speeches, whether at Georgetown or on the stump, and you will see a sharp change of tone from Obama of 2008. Gone are the passages on a new era of American global leadership. Gone are the messages for people beyond these shores. Gone is the optimism about America’s global role. Gone too is the sense that the United States, flawed as it is, has a positive and indispensable role to play in upholding the international order. 

Rhetorically, Sanders is deeply pessimistic about the United States and its role in the world. For Sanders, America is not getting better—it’s getting worse, including on Obama’s watch. And, woe betide those who think that America can be any more successful abroad. In his Georgetown speech, he said that the first element of his foreign policy would be an acknowledgement of how America gets it wrong so frequently. In addition to the Iraq War, he mentioned the toppling of Mossadegh in Iran in 1953, of Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954, of Goulart in Brazil in 1964, and of Allende in Chile in 1973. 

[Sanders] offered no examples of how the United States has made the world a better place.

Apart from the ham-fisted description of NATO, he offered no examples of how the United States has made the world a better place. The toppling of foreign leaders is not, for him, even partially balanced out by successes in promoting democracy in Chile in 1987 or in Eastern Europe in the early 1990s, or in Indonesia in 1998. He did not mention the Kosovo intervention in 1999, which he actually supported at the time. The speech was not without irony however. Sanders organized the domestic section, on democratic socialism, around Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s 1944 State of the Union speech but made no mention of FDR’s heroic—and frequently risky—efforts to win the war and the post-war world.

As the campaign has progressed, Sanders has been pressed on what he would do if he were to be elected president. He said in a February Democratic debate that the “key doctrine of the Sanders administration would be no, we cannot continue to do it alone, we need to work in coalition.” The very idea that a Democratic candidate could make the unilateralist charge against Obama, one of the most multilateral presidents in modern American history, is itself remarkable and rather implausible. 

The very idea that a Democratic candidate could make the unilateralist charge against Obama, one of the most multilateral presidents in modern American history, is itself remarkable and rather implausible.

But this has not deterred Sanders. He has repeatedly argued that the Obama administration has not done enough to get Muslim nations to fight ISIS. At Georgetown he declared, “We need a commitment from these [Muslim] countries that the fight against ISIS takes precedence over the religious and ideological differences that hamper the kind of cooperation we desperately need.” Quite how Sanders would accomplish this was left unsaid. The reason ISIS is difficult to defeat is because Muslim nations see other challenges, particularly the sectarian struggle with Iran, as a much greater threat to their vital interests. 

Simply saying that the president can will other countries to act contrary to what they see as their vital interests is about as plausible as Trump persuading Mexico to pay for his wall. Clinton has repeatedly recognized the challenges associated with persuading Muslim countries to take on more of the anti-ISIS fight, but Sanders has just doubled down on his charge against Obama. “I’ll be dammed,” he told CNN, “if the kids of Vermont have to defend the Royal Saudi family” and take the lead in the fight against ISIS, even if is just with air power. 

On economic policy, Sanders offers an even more radical departure from Obama’s legacy. Sanders has opposed all U.S. trade agreements throughout his political career, including General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). In 2005, he sponsored a bill calling on the United States to withdraw from the World Trade Organization. He has called for tariffs to prevent American industry from investing in China, Vietnam, and Mexico. He was the only Democrat to vote against the Import-Export Bank and he opposed the expansion of the H1-B visa program for high-skilled workers. 

He has offered no positive vision for the world economy and sees it as a zero sum game—either American workers’ win or other nations do. Obama indulged in anti-trade rhetoric, as has Clinton, in the heat of a primary campaign, but Sanders is different. He has consistently sought to disengage from the global economy—the same one that Obama did so much to save in 2009. This is no small matter. As the global economy flirts with recession and a new crisis, this time originating in China, the rest of the world is asking if America can continue to lead or if it is all tapped out. 

He has consistently sought to disengage from the global economy.

A President Sanders would not try to destroy America’s alliances like Donald Trump or leave the Middle East entirely like Rand Paul. But, he would surely try to hide from the world and tend to matters at home. He will be immediately tested by allies and adversaries alike as they try to find the limits of his commitments. All presidents are tested of course—especially those, including Obama and Clinton, who promise to focus on the home front— but they usually try to respond in a resolute way to dispel the concerns. Obama sent additional troops to Afghanistan in 2009, for example. Sanders will probably resist the pressure and focus on his domestic agenda, thus exacerbating foreign crises. He would surely feel a sense of betrayal as America’s allies failed to take up what he considered to be a fair share of the burden. 

America in the world?

2016 is a very different world than 2008. Then, Obama and Democrats saw a world that was full of opportunity, despite the financial crisis and wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. They believed the United States could offer a new face, and a new form of leadership, to the world. When we look back on 2016, it will surely be the year when the United States and much of the rest of the world faced a choice about whether to look outward or turn inward. It is not just the Republican and Democratic primary. Britain will vote on June 23 whether to leave the European Union. Germany and much of the rest of Europe will decide whether to close its borders to refugees.

When we look back on 2016, it will surely be the year when the United States and much of the rest of the world faced a choice about whether to look outward or turn inward.

Of all these tests, the biggest by far is in the United States. Republican and Democratic foreign policy populism is different, of course. Trump and his supporters are both terrified by threats from overseas and determined to lash out as viciously as possible against anything and everything associated with them. To his great credit, Sanders has not peddled fear of the other. His supporters are not frightened by the world. But they are disappointed in it and largely agnostic about what happens outside the United States. The left used to be inherently internationalist, but today Sanders sees no opportunity to lead, only risks of becoming embroiled in someone else’s problems. Sanders will not tear down the liberal international order but he does want to avoid doing much to uphold it. 

Sanders, his aspiring advisers, and much of the media have an interest in situating his foreign policy worldview within the Obama-Clinton paradigm but it is simply not consistent with what he is saying or with what he has done in the very recent past (never mind decades ago). Obama and Clinton obviously differ on some elements on U.S. foreign policy. It is not about large-scale invasions, as is commonly thought. Clinton is not about to send tens of thousands of ground troops to Syria. Rather, she tends to favor small-scale action early on in a conflict to tip the balance while Obama is extremely cautious about a slippery slope. Clinton also tends to see world politics more in terms of power politics while Obama often speaks as if we are headed toward a post-national, more global system. But this all pales in comparison to fundamental questions about whether the United States ought to be engaged in the world, not just militarily but also economically. Obama was elected on a platform of renewing American leadership in the world. He will soon find out if Democrats want to stay on the broad path he set.

The GOP presidential primary process has taken us to places we couldn’t have dreamed mere months ago. Donald Trump’s apparently ever-growing lead—and the foundering of more mainstream candidates like Ted Cruz, Marco Rubio, and John Kasich—carries serious implications for America’s role in the world. As top Republican strategists and political pundits alike toss around ideas for slowing Trump’s momentum—in part due to major concerns about how he’s staked out his foreign policy—I’ll add one more idea into the mix: convince Rubio and Kasich to agree, now and in public, to share a Republican ticket.

It would go like this: John Kasich would drop out of the presidential race before Tuesday, March 15—when winner-take-all votes occur in both Florida and Ohio—and encourage his supporters to vote for Marco Rubio (who performed better than Kasich on Super Tuesday). Rubio, appearing with Kasich at that press conference, would accept Kasich’s endorsement and then promise him the vice presidential spot on the ticket if he (Rubio) were chosen to be the Republican presidential nominee. This Rubio-Kasich team would be promised to the voters even as the primary process marched on. A vote for Rubio would henceforth be viewed (by the candidates and their allies at least) as a vote for Rubio-Kasich together.

The March 15 votes constitute perhaps the last best chance to stop Trump’s march to the nomination. More to the point here, they’re a chance of ensuring that a Republican candidate with a traditional internationalist worldview remains in the race until the convention. Even Hillary Clinton supporters should arguably welcome such a voice on the GOP side, as it could keep the national political discourse more constructive and less demeaning as November approaches.

To be somewhat more specific: Trump is known for his views critical of Mexico, many Muslims, immigration, refugees, trade, and U.S. allies like Japan and South Korea (in light of their purported unwillingness to share the burden of the common defense). He is also known for cozying up to President Vladimir Putin of Russia, and for vague but emphatic talk of getting America back in the habit of winning again. In addition, he advocates more extreme and ruthless measures in the war on terror. 

Whatever the risks, it certainly seems more promising than the path either one of them is on now.

While Rubio is no dove, he has wrestled with the intricacies and complexities of foreign policy during his time in the Senate, and much more than has Trump. He has serious views on the use of force and defense policy, seasoned by reality. Most centrally, he has a Reagan-like view of America’s place in the world—as a country that is stern and unyielding towards its enemies, but open and welcoming to the vast majority of foreigners and foreign nations. This positive, internationalist outlook is in marked contrast to Trump’s worldview. Kasich’s views are much closer to Rubio than to Trump, of course, though he may be more measured and moderate in some of his pro-defense views than Rubio. 

In many foreign policy issues and beyond, Rubio seems more conservative than Kasich. But of course, some divergence of views is inevitable for any eventual presidential ticket—it is even healthy, to an extent. And the kinds of expertise the two men bring to the national debate are largely complimentary, since Kasich has focused more on domestic policy in recent years and Rubio more on national security matters. In other ways, like their strong religious faiths, they seem natural teammates.

Shake it up

Of course, the goal of this Rubio-Kasich ticket would be to win both Florida and Ohio in March. These are not only delegate-rich, winner-take-all states in the nominating process, but key swing states in general elections. Whether or not the Democratic nominee could ultimately best that ticket come November, the Rubio-Kasich team would have a powerful call on super-delegates at any brokered Republican convention if it already had wins in the nation’s two most important swing states under its belt. It would have demonstrated strength in two states that the GOP nominee will badly want to win in the November election.

Polls show that Kasich is stronger than Rubio in Ohio and Rubio is stronger than Kasich in Florida; both trail Trump in both places. However, their combined tallies match up reasonably well with Trump. Beyond that, the shock effect of this kind of partnership—between an accomplished sitting governor and a bright young senator—could change the race’s dynamics enough to bring them even more votes. It will raise eyebrows and cause many to take a second look at the race. Whatever the risks, it certainly seems more promising than the path either one of them is on now.

The preemptive formation of a Rubio-Kasich presidential team in early March would be a highly unusual step. But it’s already a highly unusual year. Put differently, desperate circumstances call for desperate—or at least dramatic—measures. This kind of a true structural change in the primary process promises a greater likelihood of shaking GOP voters up than big speeches by Mitt Romney or warnings from other parts of the GOP establishment. Kasich and Rubio should consider it.

Not the least worrying feature of these chaotic times is that the members of my transatlantic analyst tribe—whether American or European—have stopped being smug or snarky about goings-on on the other side of the Atlantic. For two decades, the mutual sniping was my personal bellwether for the rude (literally) health of the relationship.

No more. Now my American neocon buddies are lining up to sign scorching open letters against the GOP frontrunner, begging the Brits not to brexit, and lambasting Obama because he’s not doing more to help German Chancellor Angela Merkel. Heck, they would even let him take in Syrian (Muslim Syrian, if necessary!) refugees if it helps her. 

My fellow Europeans have been shocked into appalled politeness by the recognition that The Donald has genuine competition in the U.K.’s Boris Johnson, France’s Marine le Pen, Hungary’s Viktor Orban, the Netherlands’ Geert Wilders, Slovakia’s Robert Fico, Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, or Russia’s Vladimir Putin. They recognize that the roar of Trump’s supporters is echoed on streets and social media websites across their own continent—including in my country, Germany, which is reeling after taking in more than a million refugees last year.

Adding to the general weirdness, parliamentarians of Germany’s Die Linke (successor to East Germany’s Communist party) have been casting longing glances at the Bernie Sanders phenomenon. "Who would have thought a democratic Socialist could get this far in America?" tweeted Stefan Liebich. His fellow Member of Parliament Wolfgang Gehrcke, a co-founder of the West German Communist Party DKP in 1968, wistfully confessed his regret on German national radio recently at never having visited the United States. The Linke has been getting precious little traction out of the turmoil at home, despite their chief whip Sahra Wagenknecht, who rocks a red suit and is herself no slouch at inflammatory rhetoric.

Like [political elites], we [analysts] mostly ignored or took for granted that the essential domestic underpinnings of foreign policy were hardwired into our constitutional orders: political pluralism, economic opportunity, inclusion.

One would have to be made of stone not to be entertained by all this. Rather less funny is the fact that we, the analysts, have been as badly surprised by these developments as the politicians. We are indeed guilty of much of the same complacency that political elites are currently being punished for on both sides of the Atlantic. Like them, we mostly ignored or took for granted that the essential domestic underpinnings of foreign policy were hardwired into our constitutional orders: political pluralism, economic opportunity, inclusion. In other words, a functioning representative democracy and a healthy social contract. 

That was a colossal oversight. George Packer’s "The Unwinding" is a riveting depiction of the unraveling of America. Amanda Taub, Thomas Frank, and Thomas Edsall have written compelling recent pieces about the fraying economic and social conditions which offer a potent explanation for the current dark mood of much of the American electorate. Yet "Europe" could be substituted for "America" in many of these studies with equal plausibility. 

A thread which runs through all these analyses is the enormous fear and anger directed at international trade—a feeling stoked masterfully by Trump, but likewise by his European counterparts. Another common element is the increasing inability of representative democracy and its politicians to deal with these problems—whether because they are being deliberately undermined (e.g. by Russia), or are simply overwhelmed by it all. 

“Europe“ could be substituted for “America“ in many of these studies with equal plausibility.

The implications for foreign and security policy are already on view. Western governments find themselves increasingly on the defensive at home as they try to grapple with fierce divisions in Europe and in the transatlantic alliance on how to handle war and human misery in the Middle East, to prevent Europe’s eastern neighborhood from succumbing to failure, to save a faltering transatlantic trade agreement, and to support and protect the liberal global order. Even Chancellor Merkel, who has been pushing hard for an EU-Turkey deal to manage the flow of refugees to Europe, is finding herself besieged at home by an insurgent challenger in form of the right-wing Alternative for Germany (AfD).

So, as you watch the primaries in Washington, D.C. and Wyoming (March 12) and Florida, Illinois, Missouri, Ohio, and North Carolina (March 15), you may also want to give some attention to three regional elections in my country. Three of Germany’s sixteen states or Länder—Baden-Württemberg, Rhineland-Palatinate, and Saxony-Anhalt—go to the polls, on what Germany’s media are already calling Super Sunday. The AfD, which was only founded in 2013 (when it narrowly missed the 5 percent threshold to get into the federal legislature), is already present in five states. It is expected to rake in double-digit percentages in all three upcoming votes.

One thing’s for sure already: There will be little to be smug about.

“It’s probably the most interesting presidential election I’ve seen in my lifetime,” I said to an American friend the moment I arrived to Washington. My friend was upset. “For you it’s interesting,” he said. “For us it’s painful.”

“What you’ve just said rings a bell,” I said. “This is exactly, word for word, what I keep saying to foreign journalists who come to Israel to write a story.” Covering politics in Israel is like covering a professional wrestling fight: the rivals exchange numerous hits, shout at each other, humiliate each other, disregard every rule, but in most cases the outcome is known in advance.

Covering politics in Israel is like covering a professional wrestling fight...in most cases the outcome is known in advance.

Americans are supposed to play their political game in a cooler way. At least, this is the impression a foreign correspondent get when he lands here, directly from the boiling quarrels of the Middle East. 

I had the opportunity to cover almost all the U.S. presidential campaigns since Jimmy Carter’s victory over Gerald Ford in 1974. I loved it—I loved the town halls and the rallies in remote places, where people are kind and willing to answer every clueless question from a foreign reporter; I loved the access to the candidates, weeks and months before the secret service builds a wall between them and real life; I loved the hectic atmosphere, described so well in the “Making of the President” books by Theodore H. White; I loved to see how little-known candidates like Bill Clinton or Barack Obama evolve, grow, and flourish; and I enjoyed every chapter: the spins, the buzz, the role played by big money.

The election campaign seems to be different this time: It looks different; it sounds different. The key word is anger—anger dominated the selection process in both parties. Angry voters elected angry candidates. If a candidate was not angry enough—e. g. Jeb Bush—the voters judged him unfit for the job.

The election campaign seems to be different this time: It looks different; it sounds different. The key word is anger.

An accidental tourist like me pauses here for a long list of questions: how do we quantify anger? Is it limited to the ballots or can it evaporate at some point and turn into violent acts, as Donald Trump has insinuated time and again? Is it a reflection of the bitterness of specific, limited constituencies or is it something much more widespread, an outrage of a generation or a class of Americans who feel that they were betrayed by the political and business elite, by the establishment? How to explain the Trump phenomenon, the Sanders phenomenon? 

The obvious answer is the economic collapse of 2008: the people who fell victim to the 2008 crisis, who lost a home or a job or had to give up college for their children are now in revolt. Why now and not earlier? Because four years ago they were struggling to survive; they were busy. Politicizing emotions is a long process; sometimes it takes years.

Tip O'Neill, speaker of the house in the second half of the previous century, taught us that all politics is local. There is a lot of truth in it even today, but is it the whole truth? In the flat world of 2016, local politics are executed in a global way. All politics are local and global at the same time. Political actions spread from country to country like the Zika virus, using social media as carriers.

The young Sanders supporters I met in Brooklyn, during the last Democratic debate, were not much different from the young Israelis I met in Tel Aviv in the summer of 2011, when hundreds of thousands of Israelis took to the streets. Those Israelis complained about similar things: high prices, loss of employment security, difficulty getting a decent job, and the ever-growing gap between expectations and reality. They were promised to live in the land of opportunity; the opportunity was not there—not for them.

Politicizing emotions is a long process; sometimes it takes years.

They complained bitterly about the banks and the major corporations. They became so big that the government has no choice but to subsidize them when they lose money. And the people who run them get huge salaries and bonuses on the expense of the shareholders and the general public. Israel used to be a social democratic society, with a strong middle class and a relatively narrow gap between rich and poor. Now the rich are very rich and get richer, and the less fortunate are left behind.

The protest was fueled by social media: another similarity between Tel Aviv and the young voters in Brooklyn and elsewhere. The brazenness, the bluntness, the rudeness of the social media culture affected the political discourse. It became less cordial and more personal. 

Israelis were not alone. The Arab Spring predated the Israeli Summer. Greece and Spain followed. Occupy Wall Street, a smaller, more radical protest movement, appeared on the streets of major American cities in the fall of 2011. It was inspired by the protests in the Arab countries and in Spain. The demonstrators faded away after a while, but they left their mark: political agendas have changed dramatically, governments fell, conventions were shuttered. It remains to be seen if and how they will contribute to social justice and equality.

In Israel, the demand for social justice captured a prominent place on the national agenda; several activists in the protest movement were elected to the Knesset; the rhetoric has changed, priorities didn't. Not really. Most Israelis were not prepared for a revolution, not even a moderate revolution, Bernie Sanders-style. 

I have no way to know what lies ahead for the American society. What I can see so far is a unique electoral season, characterized by unusual, almost bizarre candidates, their qualification for the job questionable, and a long, destructive battle over votes. For many Americans it is painful. People in other countries can only wonder: is it the best America is able to produce? 

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U.S. policy towards South Asia has changed considerably over the last seven decades. The nature of U.S. engagement with different countries in the region has varied over time, as has the level of U.S. interest. While India and Pakistan have received the most attention from Washington, the United States has also been engaging with Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, albeit to different degrees. 

On May 19, The India Project at Brookings hosted a panel discussion exploring the past and present U.S approaches towards South Asia, based on Senior Fellow Stephen Cohen’s new book, “The South Asia Papers: A Critical Anthology of Writings” (Brookings Institution Press, 2016). Panelists also assessed the Obama administration’s policies toward the region, and the challenges and opportunities that lie ahead for the next U.S. administration. Fellow Tanvi Madan, director of The India Project, moderated the discussion.

After the discussion, the panelists took questions.

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• U.S. policy toward South Asia: Past, present, and future

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• U.S. policy toward South Asia: Past, present, and future

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• India's Energy and Climate Policy

Keeping with tradition, we start the year with a compendium of forecasts for 2016 from our guest bloggers and ourselves.  At the end of the year, we will assess how we did (for last year’s forecasting performance, click here).

The prevailing sentiment about economic developments during 2016 is decidedly mixed. There are positive and negative views, sometimes from the same source. Here is a sampling:

On the negative side, “emerging economies will continue to disappoint;” “ODA will be squeezed by refugee costs (and climate change financing commitments);” “geopolitical tensions will remain;” “the dollar will be stronger with a severe impact on emerging economies;” and a range of idiosyncratic, political risks: weak governance and terrorist threats in Kenya; declining investor confidence and rising social strife in South Africa; corruption scandals in Brazil; and low oil prices coupled with domestic and geopolitical tensions in Russia.

On the positive side, “oil prices will remain low;” “the Islamic State will be defeated;” “the effect of monetary policy normalization will be very limited;” “food prices will remain low or fall, helping reduce global hunger;” “African countries will improve cereal yields;” “OECD countries will accept a record number of refugees and migrants;” “oil exporters will reform their economies;” and “peace agreements to end the wars in Syria, Libya and Yemen will be signed.”

An emerging theme is whether the disappointments in developing country growth in 2015 stem from idiosyncratic factors in specific countries—especially the BRICS, Turkey, and Indonesia—or whether those idiosyncratic factors, often associated with domestic political developments, are symptomatic of a broader issue of a slowing down of global convergence. Indeed, this theme of whether convergence remains a strong force that will continue to dominate developing country prospects, or a weak force that is all too easily offset by other factors, will likely remain one of the critical unknowns of 2016.

In summary, it is fair to say that with views as diverse as those we received, the picture for 2016 is complicated to say the least.

There is no analytical clarity in the global economy, despite forecasts from most major organizations (e.g., the IMF) that growth will be better in 2016 than in 2015 in every region except perhaps East Asia (although Asia will still probably record higher growth than anywhere else).

The fears generated by a slowing of one of the main engines of the global economy over the past decade, namely China, are palpable. The big story of 2016 is perhaps that it is an emerging economy, China, which is the major source of uncertainty over this year’s global outlook. While prospects for the major advanced economies—the USA, Europe, and Japan—are relatively stable, it is the developing world where there is the least clarity over the short- term outlook. Certainly, the volatility in global stock markets in the first days of the year suggests that volatility, risk aversion, and differences of views over short-term developments are all high as 2016 begins.

But there is at least one bright note. Almost certainly, prospects will improve for almost 200 million people who were living in countries that last year remained outside the scope of a normally functioning global economy. In Myanmar, Argentina, Venezuela, Cuba, and Iran, economic conditions will improve as a result of recent political developments. In addition, in 2016 there will probably be at least 100 million more people joining the global middle class—those living in households with incomes of $10-100 a day (2005 PPP). Good news for them but a reminder that the task of moving towards a world with sustainable consumption and production patterns remains huge.

There was one consensus thread among our bloggers—all the Europeans appear consumed by the Euro 2016 soccer event (“Spain, France, or Germany will win”), while only one blogger dared to comment on the Olympics (that Brazil would do twice as well as in 2012). It seems that sports will be less complicated than economics in 2016.

In the past decade, a remarkable shift has occurred in the development landscape. Specifically, acknowledgment of the central role of the private sector in contributing to, even driving, economic growth and global development has grown rapidly. The data on financial flows are dramatic, indicating reversal of the relative roles of official development assistance and private financial flows. This shift is also reflected in the way development is framed and discussed, never more starkly than in the Addis Abba Action Agenda and the new set of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which the SDGs follow, focused on official development assistance. In contrast, while the new set of global goals does not ignore the role of official development assistance, they reorient attention to the role of the business sector (and mobilizing host country resources).

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has been in the vanguard of donors in recognizing the important role of the private sector to development, most notably via the agency’s launch in 2001 of a program targeted on public-private partnerships (PPPs) and the estimated 1,600 USAID PPPs initiated since then. This paper provides a quantitative and qualitative presentation of USAID’s public-private partnerships and business sector participation in those PPPs. The analysis offered here is based on USAID’s PPP data set covering 2001-2014 and interviews with executives of 17 U.S. corporations that have engaged in PPPs with USAID.

The genesis of this paper is the considerable discussion by USAID and the international development community about USAID’s PPPs, but the dearth of information on what these partnerships entail. USAID’s 2014 release (updated in 2015) of a data set describing nearly 1,500 USAID PPPs since 2001 offers an opportunity to analyze the nature of those PPPs.

On a conceptual level, public-private partnerships are a win-win, even a win-win-win, as they often involve three types of organizations: a public agency, a for-profit business, and a nonprofit entity. PPPs use public resources to leverage private resources and expertise to advance a public purpose. In turn, non-public sectors—both businesses and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)—use their funds and expertise to leverage government resources, clout, and experience to advance their own objectives, consistent with a PPP’s overall public purpose. The data from the USAID data set confirm this conceptual mutual reinforcement of public and private goals.

The goal is to utilize USAID’s recently released data set to draw conclusions on the nature of PPPs, the level of business sector engagement, and, utilizing interviews, to describe corporate perspectives on partnership with USAID.

The arguments regarding “why” PPPs are an important instrument of development are well established. This paper presents data on the “what”: what kinds of PPPs have been implemented and in what countries, sectors, and income contexts. There are other research and publications on the “how” of partnership construction and implementation. What remains missing are hard data and analysis, beyond the anecdotal, as to whether PPPs make a difference—in short, is the trouble of forming these sometimes complex alliances worth the impact that results from them?

The goal of this paper is not to provide commentary on impact since those data are not currently available on a broad scale. Similarly, this paper does not recommend replicable models or case studies (which can be found elsewhere), though these are important and can help new entrants to join and grow the field. Rather, the goal is to utilize USAID’s recently released data set to draw conclusions on the nature of PPPs, the level of business sector engagement, and, utilizing interviews, to describe corporate perspectives on partnership with USAID.

The decision to target this research on business sector partners’ engagement in PPPs—rather than on the civil society, foundation, or public partners—is based on several factors. First, USAID’s references to its PPPs tend to focus on the business sector partners, sometimes to the exclusion of other types of partners; we want to understand the role of the partners that USAID identifies as so important to PPP composition. Second, in recent years much has been written and discussed about corporate shared value, and we want to assess the extent to which shared value plays a role in USAID’s PPPs in practice.

The paper is divided into five sections. Section I is a consolidation of the principal data and findings of the research. Section II provides an in-depth “data picture” of USAID PPPs drawn from quantitative analysis of the USAID PPP data set and is primarily descriptive of PPPs to date. Section III moves beyond description and provides analysis of PPPs and business sector alignment. It contains the results of coding certain relevant fields in the data set to mine for information on the presence of business partners, commercial interests (i.e., shared value), and business sector partner expertise in PPPs. Section IV summarizes findings from a series of interviews of corporate executives on partnering with USAID. Section V presents recommendations for USAID’s partnership-making.

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Brookings today releases a report USAID’s Public-Private Partnerships: A Data Picture and Review of Business Engagement, which will be the subject of a public discussion on March 8 featuring a panel of Jane Nelson (Harvard University), Ann Mei Chang (U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)), Johanna Nesseth Tuttle (Chevron Corp.), and Sarah Thorn (Wal-Mart Stores Inc.).

The report is based on USAID’s database of 1,481 public-private partnerships (PPPs) from 2001 to 2014 and a series of corporate interviews.

The value of those partnerships totals $16.5 billion, two-thirds from non-U.S. government sources – private companies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), foundations, and non-U.S. public institutions. Over 4000 organizations have served as resource partners in these PPPs.  Fifty-three percent are business entities, 32 percent are from the non-profit world, and 25 percent are public institutions. Eighty-five organizations have participated in five or more PPPs, led by Microsoft (62), Coca Cola (36), and Chevron (33).

The partnerships are relatively evenly distributed among three major regions—Africa, Latin American/Caribbean, and Asia—but 36 percent of the value of all PPPs is from partnerships that are global in reach.

In analyzing the data, the researchers found that 77 percent of PPPs included one or more business partner, and that 83 percent of these partnerships are connected to a business partner’s commercial interest (either shared value or more indirect strategic interest). In almost 80 percent of those PPPs, the business partner contributes some form of corporate expertise to the partnership.

The purpose of the March 8 panel discussion is to examine the report but also to go beyond by addressing outstanding questions like: how should the impact of public-private partnerships be identified, measured, and evaluated? Is shared value the Holy Grail linking corporate interest to public goods and achieving sustainable results? Where do public-private partnerships fit in USAID’s strategy for engaging the private sector in development, particularly in light of the emphasis on the role of business in advancing the new set of Sustainable Development Goals?

We hope you can join us for what should prove to be an engaging discussion.

Thursday, South Africa’s highest court found President Zuma guilty of violating the constitution as he refused to reimburse the large sum of money spent on improvements to his personal home. Between 2010 and 2014, the home located in the president’s rural hometown of Nkandla received improvement which cost an estimated $23 million. The improvements include a chicken coop, an amphitheater, a swimming pool, and a helipad. President Zuma has stated that the improvements were necessary to ensure his security and should consequently be paid for with taxpayers’ money. In 2014, public prosecutor Thuli Madonsela ruled that the president should repay part of the taxpayers’ money spent on the improvements of his personal home. In refusing to do so, he violated the country’s constitution “by not complying with a decision by the public protector, the national watchdog.” The court has given the National Treasury 60 days to determine the sum the president must repay. The opposition has stated that they will seek Zuma’s impeachment.

In other South African news, this week, the rand strengthen against the U.S. dollar and reached its highest value since December 8, 2015, the day before President Zuma fired former Finance Minister Nhlanla Nene. The strengthening of the rand was coupled with the strengthening of other Emerging Markets currencies. This hike follows the statement from Federal Reserve Chair Janey Yellen, reiterating the importance to raise U.S. interest rates cautiously, amid risks in the global economy. Investors—weighting prospects of higher U.S. borrowing costs—were holding off in acquiring emerging-market assets.

This week, 17 Angolan activists were sentenced to jail time for rebellion against the government of Jose Eduardo dos Santos. The sentences ranged from two years to eight and a half years. Last June, the activists were arrested during a book club meeting focusing on Gene Sharp’s book titled From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation—a book on nonviolence and resistance to repressive regimes. Monday, the activists were charged and sentenced with acts of rebellion, planning mass action of civil disobedience, and producing fake passports, among other charges. Amnesty International has accused the Angolan court of wrongfully convicting the activists and using the judicial system to “silence dissenting views.”

Later in the week, in response to the jailing of the young activists, the Portuguese branch of hacking group Anonymous claimed the shutdown of 20 government websites, including that of the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, among others. In a Facebook post claiming the attack, the group states, “The real criminals are outside, defended by the capitalist system that increasingly spreads in the minds of the weak.” The functionality of the websites has been restored.  

On Monday, March 28, the U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) withdrew $472 million in aid from the government of Tanzania after the result of the last weekend’s disputed presidential election rerun in the semi-autonomous archipelago of Zanzibar was announced. Incumbent President Ali Mohamed Shein of the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi party was declared the winner with 91.4 percent of the vote. However, the rerun was boycotted by the opposition Civic United Front party over the cancellation of last October’s election by the Zanzibar Electoral Commission. The commission claimed the October poll was fraudulent, while the opposition says the allegations of fraud were fabricated to thwart a victory by their candidate.

The MCC was planning a number of power and infrastructure projects in Tanzania, but its development assistance programming is conditional upon beneficiaries meeting certain standards of good governance. The MCC’s board of directors held a vote on Monday, in which they determined that Tanzania was no longer eligible to partner with the MCC given the election outcome. Although the loss of the MCC partnership is a sizable blow to the Tanzanian government, the Tanzanian finance minister appeared optimistic that the power projects would continue despite the MCC’s decision, as he stated: “We weren’t surprised at all because we were prepared for whatever the outcome. We will implement those projects using local sources of fund and the support of from other development partners.” Meanwhile, 10 out of the country’s 14 key western donors withdrew general budget support to Tanzania over the contested election.

As of last week, it has been a full year since the U.S. Export-Import (Ex-Im) Bank—the government export credit agency which lends money to foreign buyers of American exports—has been unable to approve loans over $10 million. This is because Senator Richard Shelby, Republican of Alabama, is single-handedly holding up the nomination of a third member to the Ex-Im Bank’s five person board; all transactions over $10 million require board approval, and short of its required quorum of three members, no major loans can get through. Looking beyond the immediate fight over Ex-Im, however, underlying trends in both American and international politics suggest commercial diplomacy is on the rise.

The Ex-Im Bank is but one of many instruments of American commercial diplomacy; there is a wide range of policies the government uses to actively help individual American companies compete abroad. Through the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), the U.S. government sells political risk insurance to American firms investing in “risky” developing countries. Moreover, U.S. ambassadors frequently lobby foreign governments to award procurement contracts to American firms. Similarly, officials from the Department of State, Department of Commerce, and Office of the U.S. Trade Representative often advocate for U.S. companies involved in investment disputes with foreign governments. What distinguishes active commercial diplomacy from general foreign economic policy—such as signing trade agreements—is that in involves deploying the resources and reputation of the government to help specific firms in particular transactions, rather than broadly setting the rules of the road for all firms to follow. It represents a significantly greater co-mingling of interests and activities between public and private actors.

While both Secretary of State John Kerry and Secretary of Commerce Penny Pritzker have placed considerable emphasis on advancing commercial diplomacy, the long running struggle to keep Ex-Im operating underlines the political fault lines that cut through the issue. On the one hand, as highlighted in the Ex-Im fight, commercial diplomacy can be criticized as crony capitalism or corporate welfare. Government resources are being used to support private gains. Thus those who prefer free and unfettered markets may see commercial diplomacy as simply another form of unnecessary government intervention, akin to industrial policy. At the same time, as globalization has come under attack from both the left and the right in this election cycle, it is easy to see how encouraging further globalization through commercial diplomacy could face populist pushback. Those supporting commercial diplomacy tend to favor greater integration in the global economy—a view which has found little support in the 2016 campaigns to date.

And yet, the current trends in American political debates over globalization may ultimately presage more, not less, reliance on commercial diplomacy. If politicians increasingly view the global economy through a zero-sum, mercantilist lens, they may be more eager to use the power and purse of the U.S. government to help American firms “win” abroad. Indeed, Congress, which has historically been more protectionist than the executive branch, has also consistently pushed the State Department to do more to actively defend the interests of U.S. companies operating overseas (see, for example, here and here). Aggressively fighting to help U.S. companies win contracts and compete abroad could be one plank of an “America First” policy. Thus even if America, and the world, becomes more protectionist, foreign economic policy may become even more preoccupied with assertive commercial diplomacy, even as interest in seeking mutual benefits through economic liberalization subsides.

If the U.S. government does start to prioritize more actively helping American firms in their foreign operations, it will still have a ways to go to catch up to many other countries. China, of course, is well known for using state resources to advance the commercial goals of Chinese firms venturing abroad—which should not be surprising, given that many of these firms are state-owned enterprises. But a number of other advanced democracies—including Japan, Korea, Germany, and France—also have closer and more coordinated relationships between big business and government than the U.S. does. And most of these countries show no signs of slowing down. As a recent report (PDF) from the Ex-Im bank notes, “In the wake of slowing global growth, foreign export credit agencies are becoming more aggressive.” In fact, some of these agencies are capitalizing on Ex-Im’s current plight, offering American companies export financing in return for the promise of job creation. General Electric Co., for instance, recently announced it would expand production in France because Coface, the French equivalent of Ex-Im, will finance GE projects in a number of emerging markets—the type of financing that GE used to get from Ex-Im.

Looking forward, unilateral disarmament in the competitive world of commercial diplomacy—as the U.S. is currently doing with the Ex-Im Bank—is likely to become increasingly rare. The ultimate effects of this accelerating international competition, in both economic and political terms, remain to be seen.

Often the biggest challenge for older cities and close-in suburbs is not a lack of affordable housing but a need to grow, hold, and attract middle-income households and to foster mixed-income neighborhoods. This creates a policy dilemma: While federal policymakers target limited federal housing assistance to persons with the greatest needs, doing so can create concentrations of poverty within already challenged cities and suburbs. This approach also can set limits that hinder efforts to create the middle-income and mixed-income areas needed for revitalization in older communities.

The metro program hosts and participates in a variety of public forums. To view a complete list of these events, please visit the metro program's Research and Commentary page which provides copies of major speeches, PowerPoint presentations, event transcripts, and event summaries.

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