At the very heart of the American idea is the notion that, unlike in other places, we can start from nothing and through hard work have everything. That nothing we can imagine is beyond our reach. That we will pull up stakes, go anywhere, do anything to make our dreams come true. But what if that's just a myth? What if the truth is something very different? What if we are…stuck?

I. What does it mean to be an American?

Full disclosure: I'm British. Partial defense: I was born on the Fourth of July. I also have made my home here, because I want my teenage sons to feel more American. What does that mean? I don't just mean waving flags and watching football and drinking bad beer. (Okay, yes, the beer is excellent now; otherwise, it would have been a harder migration.) I'm talking about the essence of Americanism. It is a question on which much ink—and blood—has been spent. But I think it can be answered very simply: To be American is to be free to make something of yourself. An everyday phrase that's used to admire another ("She's really made something of herself") or as a proud boast ("I'm a self-made man!"), it also expresses a theological truth. The most important American-manufactured products are Americans themselves. The spirit of self-creation offers a strong and inspiring contrast with English identity, which is based on social class. In my old country, people are supposed to know their place. British people, still constitutionally subjects of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth, can say things like "Oh, no, that's not for people like me." Infuriating.

Americans do not know their place in society; they make their place. American social structures and hierarchies are open, fluid, and dynamic. Mobility, not nobility. Or at least that's the theory. Here's President Obama, in his second inaugural address: "We are true to our creed when a little girl born into the bleakest poverty knows that she has the same chance to succeed as anybody else because she is an American; she is free, and she is equal, not just in the eyes of God but also in our own."

Politicians of the left in Europe would lament the existence of bleak poverty. Obama instead attacks the idea that a child born to poor parents will inherit their status. "The same chance to succeed as anybody else because she is an American…."

Americanism is a unique and powerful cocktail, blending radical egalitarianism (born equal) with fierce individualism (it's up to you): equal parts Thomas Paine and Horatio Alger. Egalitarian individualism is in America's DNA. In his original draft of the Declaration of Independence, Thomas Jefferson wrote that "men are created equal and independent," a sentiment that remained even though the last two words were ultimately cut. It was a declaration not only of national independence but also of a nation of independents.

The problem lately is not the American Dream in the abstract. It is the growing failure to realize it. Two necessary ingredients of Americanism—meritocracy and momentum—are now sorely lacking.

America is stuck.

Almost everywhere you look—at class structures, Congress, the economy, race gaps, residential mobility, even the roads—progress is slowing. Gridlock has already become a useful term for political inactivity in Washington, D. C. But it goes much deeper than that. American society itself has become stuck, with weak circulation and mobility across class lines. The economy has lost its postwar dynamism. Racial gaps, illuminated by the burning of churches and urban unrest, stubbornly persist.

In a nation where progress was once unquestioned, stasis threatens. Many Americans I talk to sense that things just aren't moving the way they once were. They are right. Right now this prevailing feeling of stuckness, of limited possibilities and uncertain futures, is fueling a growing contempt for institutions, from the banks and Congress to the media and big business, and a wave of antipolitics on both left and right. It is an impotent anger that has yet to take coherent shape. But even if the American people don't know what to do about it, they know that something is profoundly wrong.

II. How stuck are we?

Let's start with the most important symptom: a lack of social mobility. For all the boasts of meritocracy—only in America!—Americans born at the bottom of the ladder are in fact now less likely to rise to the top than those situated similarly in most other nations, and only half as likely as their Canadian counterparts. The proportion of children born on the bottom rung of the ladder who rise to the top as adults in the U.S. is 7.5 percent—lower than in the U.K. (9 percent), Denmark (11.7), and Canada (13.5). Horatio Alger has a funny Canadian accent now.

It is not just poverty that is inherited. Affluent Americans are solidifying their own status and passing it on to their children more than the affluent in other nations and more than they did in the past. Boys born in 1948 to a high-earning father (in the top quarter of wage distribution) had a 33 percent chance of becoming a top earner themselves; for those born in 1980, the chance of staying at the top rose sharply to 44 percent, according to calculations by Manhattan Institute economist Scott Winship. The sons of fathers with really high earnings—in the top 5 percent—are much less likely to tumble down the ladder in the U. S. than in Canada (44 percent versus 59 percent). A "glass floor" prevents even the least talented offspring of the affluent from falling. There is a blockage in the circulation of the American elite as well, a system-wide hardening of the arteries.

Exhibit A in the case against the American political elites: the U. S. tax code. To call it Byzantine is an insult to medieval Roman administrative prowess. There is one good reason for this complexity: The American tax system is a major instrument of social policy, especially in terms of tax credits to lower-income families, health-care subsidies, incentives for retirement savings, and so on. But there are plenty of bad reasons, too—above all, the billions of dollars' worth of breaks and exceptions resulting from lobbying efforts by the very people the tax system favors.

So fragile is the American political ego that we can't go five minutes without congratulating ourselves on the greatness of our system, yet policy choices exacerbate stuckness.

The American system is also a weak reed when it comes to redistribution. You will have read and heard many times that the United States is one of the most unequal nations in the world. That is true, but only after the impact of taxes and benefits is taken into account. What economists call "market inequality," which exists before any government intervention at all, is much lower—in fact it's about the same as in Germany and France. There is a lot going on under the hood here, but the key point is clear enough: America is unequal because American policy moves less money from rich to poor. Inequality is not fate or an act of nature. Inequality is a choice.

These are facts that should shock America into action. For a nation organized principally around the ideas of opportunity and openness, social stickiness of this order amounts to an existential threat. Although political leaders declare their dedication to openness, the hard issues raised by social inertia are receiving insufficient attention in terms of actual policy solutions. Most American politicians remain cheerleaders for the American Dream, merely offering loud encouragement from the sidelines, as if that were their role. So fragile is the American political ego that we can't go five minutes without congratulating ourselves on the greatness of our system, yet policy choices exacerbate stuckness and ensure decline.

In Britain (where stickiness has historically been an accepted social condition), by contrast, the issues of social mobility and class stickiness have risen to the top of the political and policy agenda. In the previous U.K. government (in which I served as director of strategy to Nick Clegg, the deputy prime minister), we devoted whole Cabinet meetings to the problems of intergenerational mobility and the development of a new national strategy. (One result has been a dramatic expansion in pre-K education and care: Every 3- and 4-year-old will soon be entitled to 30 hours a week for free.) Many of the Cabinet members were schooled at the nation's finest private high schools. A few had hereditary titles. But they pored over data and argued over remedies—posh people worrying over intergenerational income quintiles.

Why is social mobility a hotter topic in the old country? Here is my theory: Brits are acutely aware that they live in a class-divided society. Cues and clues of accent, dress, education, and comportment are constantly calibrated. But this awareness increases political pressure to reduce these divisions. In America, by contrast, the myth of classlessness stands in the way of progress. The everyday folksiness of Americans—which, to be clear, I love—serves as a social camouflage for deep economic inequality. Americans tell themselves and one another that they live in a classless land of open opportunity. But it is starting to ring hollow, isn't it?

III. For black Americans, claims of equal opportunity have, of course, been false from the founding.

They remain false today. The chances of being stuck in poverty are far, far greater for black kids. Half of those born on the bottom rung of the income ladder (the bottom fifth) will stay there as adults. Perhaps even more disturbing, seven out of ten black kids raised in middle-income homes (i.e., the middle fifth) will end up lower down as adults. A boy who grows up in Baltimore will earn 28 percent less simply because he grew up in Baltimore: In other words, this supersedes all other factors. Sixty-six percent of black children live in America's poorest neighborhoods, compared with six percent of white children.

Recent events have shone a light on the black experience in dozens of U. S. cities.

Behind the riots and the rage, the statistics tell a simple, damning story. Progress toward equality for black Americans has essentially halted. The average black family has an income that is 59 percent of the average white family's, down from 65 percent in 2000. In the job market, race gaps are immobile, too. In the 1950s, black Americans were twice as likely to be unemployed as whites. And today? Still twice as likely.

From heeding the call "Go west, young man" to loading up the U-Haul in search of a better job, the instinctive restlessness of America has always matched skills to work, people to opportunities, labor to capital.

Race gaps in wealth are perhaps the most striking of all. The average white household is now thirteen times wealthier than the average black one. This is the widest gap in a quarter of a century. The recession hit families of all races, but it resulted in a wealth wipeout for black families. In 2007, the average black family had a net worth of $19,200, almost entirely in housing stock, typically at the cheap, fragile end of the market. By 2010, this had fallen to $16,600. By 2013—by which point white wealth levels had started to recover—it was down to $11,000. In national economic terms, black wealth is now essentially nonexistent.

Half a century after the passing of the Civil Rights Act, the arc of history is no longer bending toward justice. A few years ago, it was reasonable to hope that changing attitudes, increasing education, and a growing economy would surely, if slowly, bring black America and white America closer together. No longer. America is stuck.

IV. The economy is also getting stuck.

Labor productivity growth, measured as growth in output per hour, has averaged 1.6 percent since 1973. Male earning power is flatlining. In 2014, the median full-time male wage was $50,000, down from $53,000 in 1973 (in the dollar equivalent of 2014). Capital is being hoarded rather than invested in the businesses of the future. U. S. corporations have almost $1.5 trillion sitting on their balance sheets, and many are busily buying up their own stock. But capital expenditure lags, hindering the economic recovery.

New-business creation and entrepreneurial activity are declining, too. As economist Robert Litan has shown, the proportion of "baby businesses" (firms less than a year old) has almost halved since the late 1970s, decreasing from 15 percent to 8 percent—the hallmark of "a steady, secular decline in business dynamism." It is significant that this downward trend set in long before the Great Recession hit. There is less movement between jobs as well, another symptom of declining economic vigor.

Americans are settling behind their desks—and also into their neighborhoods. The proportion of American adults moving house each year has decreased by almost half since the postwar years, to around 12 percent. Long-distance moves across state lines have as well. This is partly due to technological advances, which have weakened the link between location and job prospects, and partly to the growth of economic diversity in cities; there are few "one industry" towns today. But it is also due to a less vibrant housing market, slower rates of new business creation, and a lessening in Americans' appetite for disruption, change, and risk.

This geographic settling is at odds with historic American geographic mobility. From heeding the call "Go west, young man" to loading up the U-Haul in search of a better job, the instinctive restlessness of America has always matched skills to work, people to opportunities, labor to capital. Rather than waiting for help from the government, or for the economic tide to turn back in their favor, millions of Americans changed their life prospects by changing their address. Now they are more likely to stay put and wait. Others, especially black Americans, are unable to escape the poor neighborhoods of their childhood. They are, as the title of an influential book by sociologist Patrick Sharkey puts it, Stuck in Place.

There are everyday symptoms of stuckness, too. Take transport. In 2014, Americans collectively spent almost seven billion hours stuck motionless in traffic—that's a couple days each. The roads get more jammed every year. But money for infrastructure improvements is stuck in a failing road fund, and the railophobia of politicians hampers investment in public transport.

Whose job is it to do something about this? The most visible symptom of our disease is the glue slowly hardening in the machinery of national government. The last two Congresses have been the least productive in history by almost any measure chosen, just when we need them to be the most productive. The U. S. political system, with its strong separation among competing centers of power, relies on a spirit of cross-party compromise and trust in order to work. Good luck there.

V. So what is to be done?

As with anything, the first step is to admit the problem. Americans have to stop convincing themselves they live in a society of opportunity. It is a painful admission, of course, especially for the most successful. The most fervent believers in meritocracy are naturally those who have enjoyed success. It is hard to acknowledge the role of good fortune, including the lottery of birth, when describing your own path to greatness.

There is a general reckoning needed. In the golden years following World War II, the economy grew at 4 percent per annum and wages surged. Wealth accumulated. The federal government, at the zenith of its powers, built interstates and the welfare system, sent GIs to college and men to the moon. But here's the thing: Those days are gone, and they're not coming back. Opportunity and growth will no longer be delivered, almost automatically, by a buoyant and largely unchallenged economy. Now it will take work.

The future success of the American idea must now be intentional.

Entrepreneurial, mobile, aspirational: New Americans are true Americans. We need a lot more of them.

There are plenty of ideas for reform that simply require will and a functioning political system. At the heart of them is the determination to think big again and to vigorously engage in public investment. And we need to put money into future generations like our lives depended on it, because they do: Access to affordable, effective contraception dramatically cuts rates of unplanned pregnancy and gives kids a better start in life. Done well, pre-K education closes learning gaps and prepares children for school. More generous income benefits stabilize homes and help kids. Reading programs for new parents improve literacy levels. Strong school principals attract good teachers and raise standards. College coaches help get nontraditional students to and through college. And so on. We are not lacking ideas. We are lacking a necessary sense of political urgency. We are stuck.

But we can move again if we choose.

In addition to a rejuvenation of policy in all these fields, there are two big shifts required for an American twenty-first-century renaissance: becoming open to more immigration and shifting power from Washington to the cities.

VI. America needs another wave of immigration.

This is in part just basic math: We need more young workers to fund the old age of the baby boomers. But there is more to it than that. Immigrants also provide a shot in the arm to American vitality itself. Always have, always will. Immigrants are now twice as likely to start a new business as native-born Americans. Rates of entrepreneurialism are declining among natives but rising among immigrants.

Immigrant children show extraordinary upward-mobility rates, shooting up the income-distribution ladder like rockets, yet by the third or fourth generation, the rates go down, reflecting indigenous norms. Among children born in Los Angeles to poorly educated Chinese immigrants, for example, an astonishing 70 percent complete a four-year-college degree. As the work of my Brookings colleague William Frey shows, immigrants are migrants within the U. S., too, moving on from traditional immigrant cities—New York, Los Angeles—to other towns and cities in search of a better future. Entrepreneurial, mobile, aspirational: New Americans are true Americans. We need a lot more of them.

This makes a mockery of our contemporary political "debates" about immigration reform, which have become intertwined with race and racism. Some Republicans tap directly into white fears of an America growing steadily browner. More than four in ten white seniors say that a growing population of immigrants is a "change for the worse"; half of white boomers believe immigration is "a threat to traditional American customs and values." But immigration delves deeper into the question of American identity than it does even issues of race. Immigrants generate more dynamism and aspiration, but they are also unsettling and challenging. Where this debate ends will therefore tell us a great deal about the trajectory of the nation. An America that closes its doors will be an America that has chosen to settle rather than grow, that has allowed security to trump dynamism.

VII. The second big shift needed to get America unstuck is a revival of city and state governance.

Since the American Dream is part of the national identity, it seems natural to look to the national government to help make it a reality. But cities are now where the American Dream will live or die. America's hundred biggest metros are home to 67 percent of the nation's population and 75 percent of its economy. Americans love the iconography of the small town, even at the movies—but they watch those movies in big cities.

Powerful mayors in those cities have greater room for maneuvering and making an impact than the average U. S. senator. Even smaller cities and towns can be strongly influenced by their mayor.

There are choices to be made. Class divisions are hardening. Upward mobility has a very weak pulse. Race gaps are widening.

The new federalism in part is being born of necessity. National politics is in ruins, and national institutions are weakened by years of short-termism and partisanship. Power, finding a vacuum in D. C., is diffusive. But it may also be that many of the big domestic-policy challenges will be better answered at a subnational level, because that is where many of the levers of change are to be found: education, family planning, housing, desegregation, job creation, transport, and training. Amid the furor over Common Core and federal standards, it is important to remember that for every hundred dollars spent on education, just nine come from the federal government.

We may be witnessing the end of many decades of national-government dominance in domestic policy-making (the New Deal, Social Security, Medicare, welfare reform, Obamacare). The Affordable Care Act is important in itself, but it may also come to have a place in history as the legislative bookend to a long period of national-policy virtuosity.

The case for the new federalism need not be overstated. There will still be plenty of problems for the national government to fix, including, among the most urgent, infrastructure and nuclear waste. The main tools of macroeconomic policy will remain the Federal Reserve and the federal tax code. But the twentieth-century model of big federal social-policy reforms is in decline. Mayors and governors are starting to notice, and because they don't have the luxury of being stuck, they are forced to be entrepreneurs of a new politics simply to survive.

VIII. It is possible for America to recover its earlier dynamism, but it won't be easy.

The big question for Americans is: Do you really want to? Societies, like people, age. They might also settle down, lose some dynamism, trade a little less openness for a little more security, get a bit stuck in their ways. Many of the settled nations of old Europe have largely come to terms with their middle age. They are wary of immigration but enthusiastic about generous welfare systems and income redistribution. Less dynamism, maybe, but more security in exchange.

America, it seems to me, is not made to be a settled society. Such a notion runs counter to the story we tell ourselves about who we are. (That's right, we. We've all come from somewhere else, haven't we? I just got here a bit more recently.) But over time, our narratives become myths, insulating us from the truth. For we are surely stuck, if not settled. And so America needs to decide one way or the other. There are choices to be made. Class divisions are hardening. Upward mobility has a very weak pulse. Race gaps are widening. The worst of all worlds threatens: a European class structure without European welfare systems to dull the pain.

Americans tell themselves and the world that theirs is a society in which each and all can rise, an inspiring contrast to the hereditary cultures from which it sprang. It's one of the reasons I'm here. But have I arrived to raise my children here just in time to be stuck, too? Or will America be America again?

Editor's note: This piece originally appeared in Esquire.

       

Everyone is struggling to understand why so many whites—including many who are not suffering economically—are rallying to the angry words and fearful music of Donald Trump's presidential campaign. Meanwhile, blacks and other minorities are sticking with the status-quo incrementalism of Hillary Clinton. It's an odd juxtaposition, but there's an explanation, one with far-reaching ramifications. A wide and growing optimism gap has opened between poor and middle-class whites and their counterparts of other races—and the former are the congenital pessimists.

My research finds deep divisions in our country—not just in terms of income and opportunity, but in terms of hopes and dreams. The highest costs of being poor in the U.S. are not in the form of material goods or basic services, as in developing countries, but in the form of unhappiness, stress, and lack of hope. What is most surprising, though, is that the most desperate groups are not minorities who have traditionally been discriminated against, but poor and near-poor whites. And of all racial groups in poverty, blacks are the most optimistic about their futures.

Based on a question in a Gallup survey asking respondents where they expected their life satisfaction to be in five years (on a 0-10 point scale), I find that among the poor, the group that scores the highest is poor blacks. The least optimistic group by far is poor whites. The average score of poor blacks is large enough to eliminate the difference in optimism about the future between being poor and being middle class (e.g. removing the large negative effect of poverty), and they are almost three times more likely to be higher up on the optimism scale than are poor whites. Poor Hispanics are also more optimistic than poor whites, but the gaps between their scores are not as large as those between blacks and whites.

In terms of stress—a marker of ill-being—there are, again, large differences across races. Poor whites are the most stressed group and are 17.8 percent more likely to experience stress in the previous day than middle-class whites. In contrast, middle-class blacks are 49 percent less likely to experience stress than middle-class whites, and poor blacks are 52 percent less likely to experience stress than poor whites (e.g. their odds of experiencing stress are roughly half those of poor whites.

Why does this matter? Individuals with high levels of well-being have better outcomes; they believe in their futures and invest in them. In contrast, those without hope for their futures typically do not make such investments. Remarkably, the poor in the U.S. (on average) are less likely to believe that hard work will get them ahead than are the poor in Latin America. Their lack of hope is even evident in the words they use, as David Leonhardt (2015) found in a Google search. The words of the wealthy—such as iPads, foam rollers, and exotic travel destinations—reflect knowledge acquisition and health-conscious behaviors; those of the poor -- such as guns, video games, diabetes, and fad diets—reflect desperation, short-term outlooks, and patched-together solutions.

What explains optimism among poor blacks compared to their white counterparts? Some scholars, such as Jeremy Jackson at the University of Michigan, highlight high levels of resilience and a strong sense of community among blacks, something which our data also suggests. There also may be an Obama effect, given the historical marker made by the election of the first African-American president, and support for President Obama remained steady among blacks over the course of his tenure.

And despite visible manifestations of black frustration, as in Baltimore and Ferguson, Mo., and continued gaps in wage, mobility, and education outcomes, there has been black progress. As Eduardo Porter of the New York Times wrote in 2015, at the same time that the gaps in achievement and proficiency have widened across income groups, they have narrowed between blacks (and Hispanics) and whites: The proficiency gap between the poor and the rich is nearly twice as large as that between black and white children. The overall black-white wage gap has also narrowed (black males earned 69 percent of the median wage for white males in 1970 and 75 percent by 2013 [CPS, 2014]).The gap in life expectancy between blacks and whites has also narrowed to its lowest point in history—3.4 years , at 75.6 years for blacks and 79 years for whites.

Poor and high school-educated whites have fallen in status, at least in relative terms. Andrew Cherlin (2016) finds that poor and middle-class blacks are more likely to compare themselves to parents who were worse off than they are, while most blue-collar whites are insecure and facing much more competition for jobs than their parents did. And the markers of their desperation are increasingly evident. Take the increase in mortality rates related to opioid addiction, suicide and other preventable causes among uneducated whites—but not blacks and Hispanics—which was first highlighted in a 2015 study by Anne Case and Angus Deaton, and has since been reported by others, including Joel Achenbach, Dan Keating, and colleagues (2016) in the Washington Post.

Another part of this story is the increasing distance between the lives of those at the top and bottom of the income distribution. Fear of falling behind is even starker if “success” is increasingly out of reach. Sergio Pinto and I (2016), for example, find that poor respondents who live in more unequal cities and suburbs report more stress and worry than those in more equal ones (based on Gallup data). And both poor and rich respondents who live in more unequal areas are less likely to report having family and friends they can rely on in times of need.

The American Dream of prosperity, equal opportunity, and stable democracy is being challenged by increasing income inequality, the hollowing out of the middle class, decreasing wages and increased insecurity for low-skilled workers, and rising mortality rates. We were, until recently, caught by surprise by the depth and breadth of the problem. If it does nothing else positive for our country, the widespread alarm caused by Donald Trump’s political rise and his promises to build walls, ban trade, and create further divisions within our society has woken us up.

The depth and scope of this problem requires difficult political fixes, such as long-term investments in public health and education. It requires developing new forms of social assistance—and language—which encourage hope rather than stigmatize poor recipients—something that Latin Americans have done successfully in recent years. It also requires reducing the distance between the lives of the rich and the poor, so that attaining success—and living the American Dream—is not something that seems forever out of reach for the poor. Finally, tracking well-being as a complement to GDP, as many countries are already doing, would provide an important gauge of the happiness and health of our society in the future—and prevent us from being as surprised by such trends as we were this time.

Carol Graham is the Leo Pasvolsky senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and author of “Happiness for All? Unequal Lives and Hopes in the Land of the Dream” (Princeton University Press, forthcoming).

       

On June 23, Brookings hosted the release of the Immigrants, Immigration Reform, and 2016 Election Survey, a joint project with the Public Religion Research Institute (PRRI). The associated report entitled, How immigration and concern about cultural change are shaping the 2016 election finds an American public anxious and intensely divided on matters of immigration and cultural change at the forefront of the 2016 Election.

Dr. Robert Jones, CEO of PRRI, began the presentation by highlighting Americans’ feelings of anxiety and personal vulnerability. The poll found, no issue is more critical to Americans this election cycle than terrorism, with nearly seven in ten (66 percent) reporting that terrorism is a critical issue to them personally. And yet, Americans are sharply divided on questions of terrorism as it pertains to their personal safety. Six in ten (62 percent) Republicans report that they are at least somewhat worried about being personally affected by terrorism, while just 44 percent of Democrats say the same. 

On matters of cultural change, Jones painted a picture of a sharply divided America. Poll results indicate that a majority (55 percent) of Americans believe that the American way of life needs to be protected from foreign influence, while 44 percent disagree.  Responses illustrate a stark partisan divide:

74 percent of Republicans and 83 percent of Trump supporters believe that foreign influence over the American way of life needs to be curtailed.  Just 41 percent of Democrats agree, while a majority (56 percent) disagrees with this statement. Views among white Americans are sharply divided by social class, the report finds. While 68 percent of the white working class agrees that the American way of life needs to be protected, fewer than half (47 percent) of white college-educated Americans agree.

Jones identified Americans’ views on language and “reverse discrimination” as additional touchstones of cultural change. Americans are nearly evenly divided over how comfortable they feel when they encounter immigrants who do not speak English: 50 percent say this bothers them and 49 percent say it does not. 66 percent of Republicans and 77 percent of Trump supporters express discomfort when coming into contact with immigrants who do not speak English; just 35 percent of Democrats say the same.

 

Americans split evenly on the question of whether discrimination against whites, or “reverse discrimination,” is as big of a problem as discrimination against blacks and other minorities (49 percent agree, 49 percent disagree). Once again, the partisan differences are considerable: 72 percent of Republicans and 81 percent of Trump supporters agree that reverse discrimination is a problem, whereas more than two thirds (68 percent) of Democrats disagree.

On economic matters, survey results indicate that nearly seven in ten (69 percent) Americans support increasing the tax rate on wealthy Americans, defined as those earning over $250,000 a year. This represents a modest increase in the share of Americans who favor increasing the tax rate relative to 2012, but a dramatic increase in the number of Republicans who favor this position.

 

The share of  Republicans favoring increasing the tax rate on wealthy Americans jumped from 36 percent in 2012 to 54 percent in 2016—an 18 point increase. Democrats and Independents views on this position remained relatively constant, increasing from 80 to 84 percent and 61 to 68 percent approval respectively.

Finally, on matters of immigration, Americans are divided over whether immigrants are changing their communities for the better (50 percent) or for the worse (49 percent). Across party lines, however, Americans are more likely to think immigrants are changing American society as a whole than they are to think immigrants are changing the local community. This, Jones suggested, indicates that Americans’ views on immigration are motivated by partisan ideology more than by lived experience. 

At the conclusion of Dr. Jones’s presentation, Brookings senior fellow in Governance Studies, Dr. William Galston moderated a panel discussion of the poll’s findings. Karlyn Bowman, a senior fellow and research coordinator at the American Enterprise Institute, observed that cultural anxiety has long characterized Americans’ views on immigration. Never, Bowman remarked, has the share of Americans that favor immigrants outpaced the share of those who oppose immigrants. Turning to the results of the PRRI survey, Bowman highlighted the partisan divide influencing responses to the proposition that the United States place a temporary ban on Muslims. The strong level of Republican support for the proposal--64 percent support among Republicans--compared to just 23 percent support among Democrats has more to do with fear of terrorism than anxiety about immigration, she argued.

Henry Olsen, a senior fellow at the Ethics and Public Policy Center, remarked that many Americans feel that government should do more to ensure protection, prosperity, and security -- as evidenced by the large proportion of voters who feel that their way of life is under threat from terrorism (51%), crime (63%), or unemployment (65%).  In examining fractures within the Republican Party, Olsen considered the ways in which Trump voters differ from non-Trump voters, regardless of party affiliation. On questions of leadership, he suggested, the fact that 57% of all Republicans agree that we need a leader “willing to break some rules” is skewed by the high proportion of Trump supporters (72%) who agree with that statement. Indeed, just 49% of Republicans who did not vote for Trump agreed that the country needs a leader willing to break rules to set things right.

Joy Reid, National Correspondent at MSNBC, cited the survey’s findings that Americans are bitterly divided over whether American culture and way of life has changed for the better (49 percent) or the worse (50 percent) since the 1950s. More than two-thirds of Republicans (68 percent) and Donald Trump supporters (68 percent) believe the American way of life has changed for the worse since the 1950s. Connecting this nostalgia to survey results indicating anxiety about immigration and cultural change, Reid argued that culture—not economics—is the primary concern animating many Trump supporters.

       

Event Information

Register for the Event

With a number elections now underway in Europe and the United States, populist politicians are gaining support by tapping into frustration with the lingering effects of the global financial crisis and the eurocrisis, mounting fears of terrorism, concerns surrounding record levels of migration, and growing doubt over political elites’ abilities to address these and other crises. The global economic order is already beginning to be impacted by the mounting political pressure against it. Trade deals such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership that form the cornerstone of the global economic order have met with significant resistance. Brexit’s reverberations have already been felt in international markets. Fissures within the European Union and American anxiety towards a U.S. global role could have a pronounced impact on the international economic system.

On July 14, the Brookings Project on International Order and Strategy (IOS) hosted an event tied to the recent publication of Nonresident Senior Fellow Daniel Drezner’s new paper, “Five Known Unknowns about the Next Generation Global Political Economy.” The event was an opportunity to discuss the future of the global economic order given rising populism and discontent with globalization. Panelists included Nonresident Senior Fellow Daniel Drezner, professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University; Caroline Atkinson, head of Google’s global public policy team and former White House deputy national security advisor for international economics; and David Wessel, director of the Brookings Hutchins Center on Fiscal and Monetary Policy.

Thomas Wright, director of IOS, provided brief opening remarks and moderated the discussion.

Video

• The future of the global economic order in an era of rising populism

Audio

• The future of the global economic order in an era of rising populism

Transcript

• Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

• 20160714_global_economic_order_transcript

       

       

       

Editor's Note: As part of the 2014 Midterm Elections Series, Brookings scholars and outside experts will weigh in on issues that are central to this year's campaigns, how the candidates are engaging those topics, and what will shape policy for the next two years.

Since the Citizens United decision, political spending by outside groups has been shaping voters’ opinions before Election Day and public policy afterwards.  Spending patterns that began after the 2010 decision will continue during the upcoming midterms: nonparty, outside spending will flow through two distinct pipelines—super PACs and politically active nonprofits. This time around there seems to be a partisan split to the spending, with Democrats leaning towards super PACs and Republicans relying more on dark money nonprofits. But whichever tool is used to funnel money into competitive races, imperfect or non-existent disclosure rules leave voters unable to determine whether access and influence is being sold to highest bidder.

Shining a brighter light on super PAC and nonprofit campaign spending would not cleanse the system of all of its corrupting influences, but it would help to restore citizens’ trust in government by eliminating the secrecy that makes voters believe their elected officials have something to hide. More disclosure would also result in the equally important outcome of demonstrating that government trusts us, its citizens, with information about how the influence industry works.   

When Thomas Jefferson wrote, “Whenever the people are well-informed, they can be trusted with their own government...whenever things get so far wrong as to attract their notice, they may be relied on to set them to rights,” he certainly could not have conceived of secret money’s impact on elections and policy-making. But every year that goes by with Congress failing to address secret campaign spending challenges the founding father’s time-tested wisdom.

When the Supreme Court decided Citizens United, it was either willfully blind or sorely naïve about the state of political finance disclosure. Justice Kennedy swept aside concerns about the corrupting influence of unlimited political spending by claiming that, “With the advent of the Internet, prompt disclosure of expenditures can provide shareholders and citizens with the information needed to hold corporations and elected officials accountable for their positions. . . This transparency enables the electorate to make informed decisions and give proper weight to different speakers and messages.”

Unfortunately, no such prompt disclosure existed at the time, nor has Congress been able to pass any improvements to the transparency regime since then. In the case of super PACs, while information about donors must eventually be disclosed to the Federal Election Commission (FEC), disclosures can be delayed by up to three months.  This is not an inconsequential delay, especially when contributions come are in the multi-million dollar range.

There is even less disclosure by politically active nonprofits.  Their overall expenditures are only disclosed after the election in annual reports filed with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The donors to dark money groups may never be known, as the law does not require the names of donors to such groups to be disclosed. Yet more than 55 percent of advertising has been paid for by dark money groups, and 80 percent advertising benefitting Republican candidates has been paid for with undisclosed funds according to the New York Times. 

Congress and the executive branch have no shortage of methods to make money in politics more transparent, but have so far failed to demonstrate they respect voters enough to entrust us with that information.  The Real Time Transparency Act (S. 2207, H.R. 4442) would ensure that contributions of $1000 or more to candidates, parties and PACs, including super PACs, are disclosed within 48 hours. It would also require electronic filing of campaign finance reports.  The DISCLOSE Act, S. 2516, would disclose contributors to political nonprofits entrusting voters with information that currently is only known to the candidates who may benefit from dark money contributions. 

Affirmative congressional action would be the strongest signal that government trusts its citizens, but executive branch agencies can also take important steps to make political finance information more transparent. The IRS is in the process of reforming rules to better clarify when a nonprofit is a political organization and thus must disclose its donors.  The Securities and Exchange Commission can likewise modify its rules to require publicly traded companies to disclose their political activities.

Many large donors have gone to great lengths to take their political activities underground, claiming they fear attacks in the form of criticism or boycotts of their companies.  But just as participating in the political process through contributing to election efforts is an expression of free speech, so is criticizing such efforts.  Yet until campaign finance information is fully and quickly made public, the first amendment rights of voters and their ability to participate fully in our democracy are drastically shortchanged.

      

It is no secret that American elections are getting wildly expensive. If you are unlucky enough to live in a swing state or a state with a competitive race for US House, US Senate or Governor, you know that every even numbered year means frequent phone calls, a barrage of campaign mail, and endless television ads. Candidates want your vote, and sometimes it seems their strategy is to annoy the average voter into turning out to the polls.

However, beyond direct candidate appeals, outside groups are now spending heavily on competitive races of all types. Many statewide campaigns now cost tens of millions of dollars, and interest groups, PACs, and other organizations are ponying up with substantial sums to try to reach voters and do one of two things. They either try to convince you one candidate deserves your vote or dissuade you from voting for the other candidate.

How much money is flowing into races beyond what candidates themselves spend? The answer is staggering. Below we profile the 20 most expensive Senate races since 2010 in terms of independent expenditures. The chart shows not only how expensive races are, but the extent to which outside groups seek to influence electoral outcomes.  

This chart shows that races are getting more expensive. Among these races, only two (Colorado and Pennsylvania) are from 2010. Half (10) of the races are being waged this cycle, and even though data are updated through Sunday, the totals are certain to rise. Those ten races alone have totaled over $435 million in spending in those states.

The totals provide a small picture into the magnitude of money in American politics. The totals exclude direct candidate spending and spending by other, outside groups not subject to as rigorous FEC disclosure requirements.

As campaigns continue to become more expensive and outside groups see participation in elections as a path toward influencing outcomes of both races and policy, there is one political certainty: over the next two to four years, many of the campaigns on this list will be displaced by future, more expensive campaigns for the Senate.

      

The use of economic resources to support election campaigns is an essential ingredient of democratic competition. Often viewed as a malady of democracy, campaign finance is actually part of the normal workings of democratic life. However, it is indisputable that money is capable of inflicting significant distortions on politics and policymaking. When there is a failure to regulate money in the political process or existing regulation is ineffectual, the legitimacy of democratic processes can be jeopardized.

These concerns are particularly relevant to Latin America, a region plagued by a highly unequal income distribution, and where organized crime has a major presence, transacts billions of dollars each year in illicit business, and has the potential to corrupt democratic institutions. In this policy brief, Kevin Casas-Zamora and Daniel Zovatto offer practical guidance for making campaign finance regulation feasible and increasing its likelihood of success. In undertaking reform, countries should prioritize the most urgently needed changes with the broadest political consensus. Proposals for reform include:

• Establish greater control over private funding of parties and election campaigns;

• Create a public subsidy system to ensure fair access for parties and candidates to adequate funding to finance both regular day-to-day operations and election campaigns;

• Adopt mechanisms to keep campaign spending from skyrocketing;

• Craft party and candidate reporting systems to increase accountability, transparency, and disclosure; and

• Establish a graduated and credible system of sanctions for the chief financial officers of political parties in the event of violations of the rules in force.

Downloads

• The cost of democracy: Campaign finance in Latin America

       

Editor’s Note: This post was originally published by the Institute of Governmental Studies. Thomas Mann is also Resident Scholar at IGS.

Donald Trump and the Amen chorus of Republican presidential aspirants may have appeared to monopolize the capacity to make fantastical claims about what’s wrong with America and how to fix it. But a rival has appeared on the scene, outlining a very different fantasy plan to run for president on the Democratic side of the aisle.

Harvard law professor Lawrence Lessig looks meek—a dead ringer for Mr. Peepers—yet is anything but. Lessig built an impressive career in legal scholarship on the regulation of cyberspace, and the mild-mannered, soft-spoken academic became a cult hero among libertarians fearful of increasing legal restrictions on copyright, trademark and the electromagnetic spectrum. But Lessig’s transformation into a political activist was spurred by his personal revelation that money in politics is the root of all our governing problems. Eliminate the dependence of elected officials on private donors and the formidable obstacles to constructive policymaking will crumble. Simple but searing truth, or a caricature of a complex governing system shaped by institutions, ideas/ideologies, and interests?

Lessig became a whirlwind of energy and organization to promote his new values and beliefs, leading efforts to “Change Congress,” convene a second constitutional convention, raise awareness of corruption in politics through the “New Hampshire Rebellion,” and start the “Mayday PAC,” a super PAC designed to end all super PACs. He wrote the bestselling book Republic, Lost: How Money Corrupts Congress—and A Plan to Stop It, delivered a series of popular TED talks, and tirelessly traveled the country with his PowerPoint.

With none of these enterprises yet bearing fruit, Lessig has decided to raise the stakes. He has announced that if he receives $1 million from small donors by September, he will seek the Democratic presidential nomination, running as a “referendum candidate.” His single-issue platform, built around the concept of “Citizen Equality,” consists of “true” campaign finance reform supplemented by electoral reform (to weaken the influence of gerrymandering) and voting rights. His goal is to use the election to build a mandate for political reform that will cure our democratic ills. Lessig will apparently have nothing to say about anything other than political reform, insisting that his issue should be and can be the number one priority of voters in the 2016 elections. If nominated and elected, President Lessig will serve in office only long enough to enact the Citizen Equality Act and then resign, turning over the powers and responsibilities of the office to the vice president. Recently he generously informed the Vice President that he would happily enable a third Joe Biden term by selecting him as his running mate.

The hubris of the Harvard Professor is breathtaking. In virtually every respect, his strategy is absurd. Lessig’s political reform agenda is stymied by Republicans, not Democrats. Why not direct his energies where the opposition resides? All of the current Democratic presidential candidates support the thrust of these reforms. But saying that this is their highest priority is likely to harm, not boost, their candidacies. Why would even the most ardent supporter of the three pillars of Lessig’s reform agenda cast a ballot solely on this basis? Big and important issues divide the two parties today and the stakes of public action or inaction are huge. We don’t have the luxury of using the election to try to build a mandate for a set of political reforms that would have no chance of passing in the face of GOP opposition and would be of only incremental utility if they did.

Campaign finance does play a corrosive role in our democracy and I have invested much of my career grappling with it. There is no doubt that money in elections facilitates the transfer of economic inequality into political inequality, and the spectacle of several hundred plutocrats dominating the finance of our elections should be a target of serious reform efforts in the courts and the Congress. At the same time it is foolish to imagine that campaign finance is the only route for private wealth to influence public policy or that its reform will dramatically transform the policy process. Money did not prevent the major legislative enactments of 2009-2010—including the stimulus, student loans, the Affordable Care Act, and financial services reform. Nor is it likely to be the critical factor on climate change, immigration, infrastructure or jobs and wages; which party wins the White House and whether control with Congress is unified or divided is key. If anything, the Lessig campaign is likely to weaken the forces for political reform by demonstrating just how small the relative priority for this action is.

Trump offers the country his outsider status, success in building his personal wealth, an outsized personality, a brashness in asserting how easily he can solve the country’s problems, and a hearty appetite for and skill in stoking the anger and fears of a segment of the country. He feeds the notion that a strong, fearless, wily leader, inexperienced and mostly uninformed in politics and governing, can be the man on a white horse saving a great country losing its exceptional status. His claim that all politicians are bought by private interests—a claim Lessig eagerly embraces—fits well with his grandiose claims that he alone can fix what ails the country. A significant segment of Republican voters, presumably not well versed in the American constitutional system are attracted to him, at least enough for him to be a factor in this election campaign.

Lessig is a far less commanding presence but his ambition burns no less than that of Trump. The notoriety, celebrity, and adoring audiences are heady stuff, even if on a much smaller scale. Lessig told Bloomberg that Trump’s candidacy is evidence that his reform message is taking hold. Lessig said, Trump “strikes people as credible when he says all these people (politicians) are bought—I used to buy them …Trump is saying the truth.” Lessig will be a minor figure in this election and the causes for which he fights are unlikely to advance from it. Both Lessig and Trump, despite their differences in visibility and importance in the election, will have contributed to the dumbing down of American politics, a reality that will bring tears to the eyes of civics teachers and political science professors across the country.

       

I was honored today to speak at the kick off meeting of the new ReFormers Caucus. This group of over 100 former members of the U.S. Senate, the House, and governors of both parties, has come together to fight for meaningful campaign finance reform. In the bipartisan spirit of the caucus, I shared speaking duties with Professor Richard Painter, who was the Bush administration ethics czar and my predecessor before I had a similar role in the Obama White House. 

As I told the distinguished audience of ReFormers (get the pun?) gathered over lunch on Capitol Hill, I wish they had existed when in my Obama administration role I was working for the passage of the Disclose Act. That bill would have brought true transparency to the post-Citizens United campaign finance system, yet it failed by just one vote in Congress.  But it is not too late for Americans, working together, to secure enhanced transparency and other campaign finance changes that are desperately needed.  Momentum is building, with increasing levels of public outrage, as reflected in state and local referenda passing in Maine, Seattle and San Francisco just this week, and much more to come at the federal, state and local level.

       

Event Information

Register for the Event

As the sixth anniversary of Citizens United v. FEC approaches on January 21, both experts and ordinary citizens believe the United States is confronting a campaign finance crisis. Citizens United and related court cases have unleashed a flood of dark money that many believe could drown our democracy. It is estimated that over $5 billion will be spent on the 2016 presidential race—more than 3 times the amount spent in 2008 (already the most expensive election cycle in history). A comprehensive poll conducted by the New York Times and CBS News in the spring of 2015 showed that 84 percent of adults—including 90 percent of Democrats and 80 percent of Republicans—believe that money has too much influence in American political campaigns. Even the richest Americans agreed: 85 percent of adults making $100,000 or more share that same belief.

There has been much handwringing about this state of affairs. But there has been too little public attention paid to finding solutions. On the sixth anniversary of Citizens United, the Governance Studies program at Brookings hosted current and former government officials, lobbyists, donors, advocates, and other experts to discuss how to resolve the campaign finance crisis. They focused on innovative reform efforts at the federal, state, and local levels which offer the hope of addressing the problem of big money in politics.

Panelists will included:

Cheri Beasley, Associate Justice, North Carolina Supreme Court
Daniel Berger, Partner, Berger & Montague, P.C.
John Bonifaz, Co-Founder and President, Free Speech for People
Norman L. Eisen, U.S. Ambassador to the Czech Republic (2011-2014); Special Assistant and Special Counsel to the President (2009-2011); Visiting Fellow, The Brookings Institution
Bruce Freed, Founder and President, Center for Political Accountability
Steve Israel, Member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-NY)
Roger Katz, Chair, Government Oversight Committee, Maine State Senate (R)
Allen Loughry, Justice, Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
Chuck Merin, Executive Vice President, Prime Policy Group; Lobbyist
Connie Morella, Ambassador to OECD (2003-2007); Member, U.S. House of Representatives (R-Md., 1987-2003)
Jeffrey Peck, Principal, Peck Madigan Jones; Lobbyist
Nick Penniman, Executive Director, Issue One
Trevor Potter, Commissioner, Federal Election Commission (1991-1995; Chairman,1994)
John Pudner, Executive Director, Take Back Our Republic
Ann Ravel, Commissioner, Federal Election Commission (Chairwoman, 2015)
Timothy Roemer, Ambassador to India (2009-2011); Member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Ind., 1991-2003); member 9/11 Commission; Senior Strategic Advisor to Issue One
John Sarbanes, Member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Md.)
Claudine Schneider, Member, U.S. House of Representatives (R-R.I.,1981-1991)
Peter Schweizer, President, Government Accountability Institute
Zephyr Teachout, CEO, Mayday PAC
Lucas Welch, Executive Director, The Pluribus Project
Fred Wertheimer, Founder and President, Democracy 21
Tim Wirth, Member, U.S. Senate (D-Colo.,1987-1993); Member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Colo.,1975-1987)
Dan Wolf, Chair, Committee on Steering and Policy, Massachusetts State Senate (D)

Click here for a full agenda.

Video

• The campaign finance crisis in America and how to fix it - Part 1
• The campaign finance crisis in America and how to fix it - Part 2
• The campaign finance crisis in America and how to fix it - Part 3
• The campaign finance crisis in America and how to fix it - Part 4

Audio

• The campaign finance crisis in America and how to fix it: A solutions summit (Part 1)
• The campaign finance crisis in America and how to fix it: A solutions summit (Part 2)
• The campaign finance crisis in America and how to fix it: A solutions summit (Part 3)
• The campaign finance crisis in America and how to fix it: A solutions summit (Part 4)

Transcript

• Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

• Solution Summits Agenda120
• 20160121_campaign_finance_summit_transcript

       

Campaign finance is a key issue for the quality of democracy. As we noted in a recently-published book of which we are co-authors, and which we had the honor to present in the Hall of Former Presidents of the Legislative Assembly last February 11 (El costo de la Democracia: Ensayos sobre el financiamiento político en América Latina, UNAM, Mexico City, 2015), it is important because of an inescapable fact: While democracy has no price, it does have an operating cost. The use of economic resources is an essential element for democratic competition. More than a pathology of democracy, political financing, when well-regulated, is a normal part of democratic life.

Yet it is undeniable that money is capable of introducing distortions in the democratic process. Its unequal distribution impacts, first, on the real possibilities enjoyed by the parties and the candidates to take their message to the voters. Second, having money gives individuals and social groups a differentiated possibility of participating in elections and exercizing their influence over the candidates through their contributions. This is vital for democracy. When political power is simply a reflection of economic power, the principle of “one person, one vote” loses meaning. Third, fundraising efforts offer obvious opportunities for the articulation of exchanges between donors and those who make decisions on public affairs, or at least for the continual appearance of conflicts of interest. This can be very problematic in the case of Latin America, where there is a risk of money from organized crime penetrating the campaigns.

And so it is not surprising that the issue is on the political agenda in many countries of the region, just as it has been for a long time in Costa Rica. Costa Rica introduced public financing for political parties in 1956, making it the second country in the world to do so, after Uruguay. Nonetheless, the generosity of the government contribution did not avoid a long succession of scandals associated with the issue, a history that includes figures ranging from Robert Vesco and Manuel Antonio Noriega to Carlos Hank González and the illegal donations from the government of Taiwan. 

The wounds left by each of these episodes gave way to worthy yet incomplete regulatory efforts. Most important has been the reform of the Electoral Code approved in 2009, which among many necessary changes prohibited corporate contributions to the political parties. And not only legislative action has made a difference. The Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court has also made a difference by lifting bank secrecy on financing, a very important decision that has been pointed to internationally.

Each of these steps has been moving the country in the right direction. This is worth underscoring: At a time when it is so easy to revile the Costa Rican political system, it should be recognized that in terms of political financing the country is, in general, better situated than it was 20 or 30 years ago. All the evidence we have indicates that private contributions today are less important in our campaigns than one generation ago. We can state with great certainty that our parties are financing more than 80% of the cost of their campaigns with the state contribution. That is good news.

However, the current regulatory framework presents problems such as:

a) It continues to be a regulatory system that is somehow upside down: It meticulously keeps tabs on the use of the state contribution by the parties, which does not give rise to conflicts of interest, while it is much less effective when it comes to verifying the truth of the information the parties provide about their private sources of financing, which do have the potential to compromise the autonomy of the political system. Correcting this imbalance, getting the Supreme Electoral Tribunal to prioritize monitoring private financing and to devote more resources to it, would not only be a way to straighten out its priorities, but frankly, all the parties would also breathe a sigh of relief.

b) The system of advances on the state contribution continues to be very limited (only 15% of the subsidy is disbursed before the presidential election and nothing in the case of municipal elections). It is time to admit that eliminating the system whereby the contributions were distributed in advance payments, which existed from 1971 to 1991 (when 50% was disbursed in advances), caused grave prejudice to the political system. The weakness of the advanced disbursement has ended up leaving the parties at the mercy of banks and lenders during the campaigns. Worse still, today the possibility of a party receiving loans during the campaign against its electoral expectations depends entirely on the fickle behavior of the opinion polls. This is unfair and risky, as the OAS electoral observation missions have noted.

c) The legal framework does little to limit parties’ spending on advertising, one of the most effective ways to reduce outlays during campaigns and to bring about fairness in electoral competition, which is one of the most important objectives in improving the current system. One must evaluate the advisability of adopting a system of advertising slots (provided free of charge by those holding concessions for the radio spectrum or purchased by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal and then made available to the parties) as has been done, with a positive outcome, by other democracies in the region such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and Mexico.

d) The current regulatory framework has serious vulnerabilities at the local level. Requiring the parties to file a single financial report with the contribution they receive nationwide (the same system that exists for the presidential election) is insufficient when in practice there are 81 local elections in which each candidate raises and spends money autonomously. Let’s be clear: Relatively little is known about who finances the campaigns at the local level in Costa Rica. This would not matter much except that the experience of other countries – from Mexico to Colombia – shows that local campaigns are the preferred point of entry for organized crime to penetrate the electoral structures. Reinforcing the financial controls on municipal elections is one of the country’s most urgent tasks in relation to campaign finance.

Costa Rica has made major strides in regulating political financing. Yet there is an urgent need to address the weaknesses in the current regulatory framework. There are bills in the legislative pipeline, such as No. 18,739, introduced by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal in April 2013, that incorporate almost all the reforms suggested here and that provide an excellent basis for moving this inevitable discussion forward. 

We will have to address the problems in the current regulatory framework sooner or later. The question is whether we will do so before or after the next scandal. Let’s hope that, for once, we act on time.

This piece was originally published by International IDEA. 

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

Researchers from the Brookings Metropolitan Policy Program have released new Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) data from the IRS on federal individual income tax filers. The interactive data are available for all ZIP codes, cities, counties, metropolitan areas, states, state legislative districts, and congressional districts in the U.S. Users can also find new MetroTax model estimates of the EITC-eligible population in 2012 based on the latest American Community Survey data.

From the 2012 MetroTax model, here are 10 facts about EITC-eligible tax filers

• 71.1 million people live in tax units that are eligible
• 31.1 million children live in eligible households
• 72.8% of eligible filers speak English
• 50.9% are white
• 36.1% received food stamps at some point in the last year
• 25.8% are married filing jointly
• 13.2% have earned a bachelor’s degree or higher
• The median adjusted gross income is $13,638
• 12.7% of eligible filers work in the retail trade industry
• 13.6% work in office and administrative occupations

Read the blog post by Jane Williams and Elizabeth Kneebone to learn more and also visit the EITC interactive.

      

After years of irresponsible fiscal management, Puerto Rico has few good options to address its growing debt crisis. But in most tales of bad behavior, there comes a point where continued punishment for past mistakes becomes counterproductive. We're reaching that point on Puerto Rico, and the Barack Obama administration has put forward a sensible new approach. 

(Citigroup, my employer, has various business relationships with Puerto Rico, including serving as underwriter and market maker in various securities. I've had no involvement in those activities, and this column represents my personal views, not those of Citi.)

Puerto Rico's population and its economy are about 10 percent smaller than they were a decade ago. The poverty rate is 45 percent, only about 40 percent of adults are in the labor force, and unemployment is more than 11 percent. 

Given these dire economic indicators, it's not surprising that Puerto Rico has a serious debt problem. At this point, the territory's total liabilities amount to more than 160 percent of the economy, and debt service is projected to be more than a third of government revenue. Over the next five years, the fiscal deficit looks to be $28 billion, and although the Puerto Rican government has proposed aggressive policy actions, these could, at best, only cut the deficit in half. Because the territory's fiscal dynamic is unsustainable, its uninsured debt is selling at discounts of 30 to 70 percent. 

Something has to give. Which brings us to the White House's plan.

The first imperative is to restore economic growth. For this, there are no magic bullets, but one useful strategy is to extend the Earned Income Tax Credit to Puerto Rico. The EITC is one of the most powerful, market-friendly mechanisms for encouraging labor force participation, and its absence in Puerto Rico makes no sense.

The Obama administration also proposes removing an anomaly in the Medicaid system. If Medicaid treated Puerto Rico in the same way as it does the 50 states, the federal government would pay for an estimated 83 percent of its Medicaid costs. But because Medicaid payments to the territory are capped, the federal government has generally paid only 15 to 20 percent. In addition, temporary Medicaid payments enacted as part of the Affordable Care Act are almost exhausted, posing a near-term threat to Puerto Rico's Medicaid program.

Establishing an EITC in Puerto Rico and adjusting the share of Medicaid payments paid by the federal government make sense from a fairness perspective. The EITC piece would encourage work, and the Medicaid component would attenuate fiscal pressure on the island. These steps would, though, come at a cost to the federal budget, probably in the billions of dollars per year. The administration should clarify both the amounts involved and how they would be financed. 

The island's fiscal governance also needs to be strengthened. Its accounting systems have been shoddy, and revenue estimates have been overly rosy. A period of external oversight is appropriate, to improve transparency and budgetary rigor. 

Finally, there's the hard question of what to do about the existing overhang of debt. Write-offs are inevitable; the only question is how to do them in a structured and timely way. We have bankruptcy laws precisely to handle this sort of situation, which would otherwise involve overlapping negotiations with multiple creditors (Puerto Rico has 18 different debt issuers and 20 creditor committees) and probably extended lawsuits. 

At the very least, Congress should extend Chapter 9 bankruptcy laws to Puerto Rico's cities and public corporations. Municipalities in the states enjoy this protection, and there's no reason to treat cities in Puerto Rico differently than those in Florida or Texas. This step would cover about a third of the territory's debt. 

The more controversial question, though, is whether Puerto Rico's government should also have access to bankruptcy protection. State governments do not, but the administration proposes that territories such as Puerto Rico should. 

Bankruptcy would not necessarily mean that less debt would be repaid. So it is not clear that the traditional argument against bankruptcy protection -- that it would raise future borrowing costs -- carries much force. Negotiated write-offs and default would have largely the same effect, but would probably take longer and be messier. Among the options left, the administration's is the least bad. 

The plan requires legislation, and in today's polarized Congress, that's a daunting prospect. But as former Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner once emphasized, in a crisis, "plan beats no plan." the administration has one. Its congressional opponents don't.

Editor's Note: this op-ed originally appeared on Bloomberg View.

       

This originally appeared in “Insight,” a publication of Grantmakers for Children, Youth, and Families.

For many in the United States, American poverty conjures images of urban blight or remote Appalachian hardship that motivated the War on Poverty in the 1960s. But the geography of poverty in the U.S. has shifted well beyond its historical confines (Kneebone and Berube, 2013). During the first decade of the 2000s, the poor population living in suburbs of the nation’s largest metropolitan areas for the first time outstripped the poor population living in central cities, and poverty continues to grow faster today in the suburbs.¹ This trend has been even more pronounced for those living below twice the federal poverty line—equivalent to $48,500 for a family of four in 2015—which roughly mirrors the population eligible to receive the federal Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC).

Although it was not originally billed as an antipoverty program, in its 40 years, the EITC has become one of the nation’s most effective tools for lifting low-income workers and their families above the poverty line. In 2013 alone, Brookings estimates that the EITC lifted 6.2 million people, including 3.1 million children, out of poverty (Kneebone and Holmes, 2014). What follows is a discussion of the EITC’s growing importance to recipients in light of the new geography of poverty, its role in boosting local economies, and how expanding participation in the program and paying the credit differently could enhance its effectiveness as a local economic stabilizer.

The shifting geography of poverty challenges traditional approaches to combat poverty through investments in place.

When President Johnson declared a War on Poverty in 1964, poverty in the U.S. was primarily urban or rural. This was also the case in 1975 when the EITC was created: Nearly a million more low-income individuals at that time lived in rural areas or big cities than in the suburbs of major metropolitan areas.² Place-based antipoverty interventions dating to the War on Poverty were thus designed with these two geographies—especially cities—in mind. Brookings estimates that today, the federal government spends about $82 billion per year across more than 80 place-focused antipoverty programs, spread across 10 agencies (Kneebone and Berube, 2013). Many are not well-suited to suburban contexts, for several reasons.

First, suburban poverty is more geographically diffuse than urban poverty. Suburban communities tend to be less densely populated than cities and larger in size, and cover more total area. Whereas centralized services might be appropriate in an urban context because they are easily accessible to many in need, it is more difficult to achieve those economies of scale in the suburbs, where residents live farther apart and have limited access to transit. Many competitive federal grant programs allocate points based on population served and population density, implicitly favoring large central cities.

Second, suburban municipalities may lack the experience and administrative capacity needed to sustain services for low-income families and communities. Cities have dealt with poverty longer, and have had more time to develop strategies and structures to support their poor populations. Some of this capacity stemmed explicitly from Community Action Agencies, one of the original War on Poverty programs, which was intended to spur local innovation. Small suburban communities by and large did not have this same experience. Because of their relatively small size, suburban governments may not be able to achieve the administrative scale needed to deliver effective safety-net programs.

Third, many suburban communities lack the economic scale and fiscal structure needed to fund services for low-income residents. Because many small municipalities are limited in how they are permitted to raise revenues—typically through a combination of property and sales taxes—they are especially prone to financial instability caused by the very economic conditions that also generate greater need for services. As poverty suburbanizes, small suburban communities simultaneously face rising demand and falling tax revenues to support those services. Moreover, tax “competition” among many small suburbs within a metro area can further erode the fiscal capacity and political will for these jurisdictions to support people in need.

The new geography of poverty makes direct investments in low-income individuals and families—like the EITC—even more important.

The mismatch between existing place-based antipoverty strategies and the places where poverty is growing fastest heightens the importance of investing directly and effectively in low-income individuals and families through programs such as the EITC. Following its expansion in the mid-1990s, the EITC became the most significant cash transfer program available to low-income working families. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS, 2014) estimates that approximately 79 percent of EITC-eligible taxpayers nationally claim the credit each year—a remarkably strong participation rate among federal safety-net programs.

The high program participation rate and growth over time in EITC expenditures reflects both increases in the credit’s generosity and growing need. In 2000, according to our analysis of IRS Stakeholder Partnerships, Education and Communities (IRS-SPEC) data, total EITC expenditures topped $42 billion (in 2013 dollars). In 2013, they approached $65 billion, equivalent to approximately 80 percent of the amount spent by the federal government on place-based poverty interventions.³

Analysis of IRS-SPEC data further suggests that the EITC’s geographic incidence closely tracks the shifting geography of need. From 2000 to 2013, the number of suburban filers claiming the EITC rose by 62 percent, compared to 33 percent in cities. Changes in the distribution of EITC claims mirrored changes in the location of poor and near-poor populations, particularly growth in the suburbs.⁴ And because lower-income suburban communities (where at least 40 percent of residents are poor or near-poor) are becoming more diverse, too—60 percent of their residents are non-white or Hispanic—the EITC also effectively reduces growing race-based income gaps in suburbs.⁵

EITC dollars support local economies.

The EITC benefits not only low-income families, but also the wider communities in which they live. Although it is widely regarded today as one of the country’s most successful antipoverty programs, the EITC was originally designed to be a temporary economic stimulus measure, in the Tax Reduction Act of 1975 (Nichols and Rothstein, 2015). During the 2000s, more local and state governments made a concerted push to expand participation in the EITC among eligible filers, in part to inject more federal dollars into their local economies (Berube, 2006a).

There are several mechanisms through which the EITC could benefit local economies. California State University researchers categorize the local economic impact of EITC refunds as the sum of direct effects (EITC recipients spending their refunds), indirect effects (business spending in response to EITC recipient spending), and induced effects (changes in household income and spending patterns caused by direct and indirect effects). Together, these effects represent the local “multiplier” effect (Avalos and Alley, 2010). Their estimates for California counties suggest that, in many cases, the credit creates local economic impacts equivalent to at least twice the amount of EITC dollars received.

Direct economic effects result from EITC recipients spending a portion of their refund locally, supporting local businesses and jobs. Consumer surveys show that low-income families spend a relatively large share of their income on groceries and other necessities, which tend to be purchased locally. Analysis of those surveys links tax refund season to increased likelihood of consumer activity as well as larger purchases (Adams, Einav, and Levin, 2009). People spend more, and more frequently, during tax refund season.

The EITC also supports local communities in less obvious ways. The concept of “tax incidence” reflects that the party being taxed, or receiving a tax credit, may not bear its full costs (or reap its benefits) because others shift their behavior in response to the tax. Along these lines, Jesse Rothstein estimates that as much as 36 cents of every dollar of EITC received flows to employers, because by enabling workers to better make ends meet on low wages, the credit effectively lowers the cost of labor. Those lower labor costs may, in turn, allow local employers to hire more local workers (Nichols and Rothstein, 2015).

Finally, emerging evidence suggests that progressive tax expenditures like the EITC can enhance intergenerational income mobility for local children, possibly by counteracting credit constraints that many low-income families face (Chetty, Hendren, Kline, and Saez, 2015). In areas with larger state EITCs, low-income children are more likely to move up the income ladder over time.

The local impact of the EITC depends on how, and how many, eligible filers claim the credit.

The local impact of the EITC also depends on whether eligible workers and families file tax returns and claim the credit. As noted above, the IRS estimates that 79 percent of those eligible to receive the EITC nationally claim it. Given local variation in characteristics associated with uptake, there is likely also considerable local variation in EITC participation (Berube, 2005). Efforts to increase participation locally can thus increase the level of investment communities receive from the program.

Research has identified several factors associated with EITC participation rates among the eligible population. Eligible filers less likely to claim the credit include those who live in rural areas, are self-employed, do not have qualifying children, do not speak English well, are grandparents, or recently changed their filing status (IRS, 2015). One study suggests that communities with moderately sized immigrant populations may exhibit lower EITC participation rates, due perhaps to less robust social networks or more dispersed/heterogeneous populations that may limit awareness of the credit (Berube, 2006b).

Recent research also suggests that EITC participation is higher in areas with more tax preparers, who may promote greater local awareness of the credit (Chetty, Friedman, and Saez, 2012). While individuals who enlist the help of tax preparers are more likely to receive the EITC, they may face significant fees that blunt the credit’s overall impact (Berube, 2006a). Expanding access to volunteer tax preparation services or simple, free online filing could help preserve more of the credit’s value for low-income families and their communities.

To maximize the EITC’s role as a local economic stabilizer, we should consider periodic payment options.

 The EITC already functions as an important antipoverty tool for low-income workers and families, and a boon to local economic stability. Communities should nonetheless be interested in efforts to connect taxpayers to a portion of their EITC throughout the year, rather than only as a lump-sum refund at tax time.

Debt features significantly on the balance sheets of EITC recipients. Recent research finds that about 95 percent of EITC recipients have debt of some kind, and that large shares of refunds are dedicated to debt payments or deferred expenses (such as car repair). Recipients do not use the majority of EITC refunds to pay for monthly expenses, despite the fact that their wages typically cover only two-thirds of those expenses (Halpern-Meekin, Edin, Tach, and Sykes, 2015).

Paying a portion of filers’ anticipated EITC periodically (and directly, rather than through employers like the defunct Advance EITC program) in smaller amounts over the course of a year could help them cope with these spending constraints and avoid taking on debt (Holt, 2008). By enabling families to better keep up with spending on regular items most often purchased locally—rent, food, vehicle maintenance—periodic payments could also support local economies. And by improving families’ liquidity, such payments could reduce reliance on high-cost financial products such as payday loans.

The EITC continues to gain importance as place-based strategies lag behind poverty’s suburbanization, and communities seek ways to maximize public investment in the face of budget constraints at all levels. The program lifts millions of working individuals and families out of poverty each year regardless of their location, and in doing so also supports community financial stability. An expanded EITC—at the federal, state, or local level—with options for periodic payment and better alternatives to high-cost tax preparation could provide even stronger support to low-income families and the places where they live.

References

Adams, W., Einav, L., and Levin, J. (2009). Liquidity constraints and imperfect information in subprime lending. American Economic Review. 99(1), 49–84. Retrieved from http://web.stanford.edu/~jdlevin/Papers/Liquidity.pdf

Avalos, A., and Alley, S. (2010). The economic impact of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) in California. California Journal of Politics and Policy. 2(1). Retrieved from http://escholarship.org/uc/item/2jj0s1dn

Berube, A. (2005). Earned income credit participation—What we (don’t) know. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. Retrieved from http://www.brookings.edu/metro/eitcparticipation.pdf

Berube, A. (2006a). Using the Earned Income Tax Credit to stimulate local economies. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. Retrieved from http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2006/11/childrenfamilies-berube/berube20061101eitc.pdf

Berube, A. (2006b). ¿Tienes EITC? A study of the Earned Income Tax Credit in immigrant communities, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. Retrieved from  http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2005/4/childrenfamilies-berube02/20050412_tieneseitc.pdf

Chetty, R., Friedman, J., and Saez, E. (2012). Using differences in knowledge across neighborhoods to uncover the impacts of the EITC on earnings (NBER Working Paper Series no. 18232). Retrieved from http://eml.berkeley.edu/~saez/chetty-friedman-saezNBER13EITC.pdf

Chetty, R., Hendren, N., Kline, P., and Saez, E. (2015). The economic impacts of tax expenditures: Evidence from spatial variation across the U.S. Retrieved from http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/14rptaxexpenditures.pdf

Halpern-Meekin, S., Edin, K., Tach, L., and Sykes, J. (2015). It’s not like I’m poor: How working families make ends meet in a post-welfare world, Oakland, CA: University of California Press.

Holt, S. D. (2008). Periodic payment of the Earned Income Tax Credit. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. Retrieved from http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2008/06/0505-metroraise-supplement-holt

Internal Revenue Service. (2014). Statistics for tax returns with EITC. Retrieved from http://www.eitc.irs.gov/EITC-Central/eitcstats

Internal Revenue Service. (2015). About EITC. Retrieved from http://www.eitc.irs.gov/EITC-Central/abouteitc

Kneebone, E., and Berube, A. (2013). Confronting suburban poverty in America. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

Kneebone, E., and Holmes, N. Fighting poverty at tax time through the EITC. Retrieved from http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/the-avenue/posts/2014/12/16-poverty-tax-eitc-kneebone-holmes

Nichols, A., and Rothstein, J. (2015). The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) (NBER Working Paper Series no. 21211). Retrieved from http://www.nber.org/papers/w21211.pdf

       

Each year, one in five households filing a federal income tax return claims the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). Targeted primarily to lower-income workers with children, it is one of many credits and deductions filers take each year on their federal income tax forms. However, unlike typical credits and deductions, the EITC is a refundable credit, meaning that after offsetting what is owed to the government filers receive the remainder of the benefit as a refund.

By supplementing earnings for low- and moderate-income households, the EITC helps bridge the gap between what the labor market provides and what it takes to support a family. It encourages and rewards work and has become one of the nation’s largest and most effective anti-poverty programs. In contrast to other work support and poverty alleviation programs, it achieves this with very little bureaucracy beyond what otherwise exists to administer the tax code.

Although the EITC began in 1975 as a small credit (no more than $400), a number of targeted expansions in subsequent years mean that today the EITC’s assistance can be considerable. In 2015, a single parent with three children working full-time all year at the federal minimum wage ($7.25 an hour) is eligible for a credit of $6,242, a boost of more than 40 percent above her earnings of $15,080 (though combined it still leaves her 12 percent below the federal poverty level).

However, the only way to obtain these substantial benefits is to claim the EITC on the annual federal income tax return. While lump-sum payments have perceived benefits (such as being able to pay off debts, make larger purchases, or force savings), the EITC’s single annual disbursement can present a challenge for the working parent trying to make ends meet throughout the year. It can also be problematic for households wanting to stretch out their refund as an emergency savings reserve.

My 2008 paper, “Periodic Payment of the Earned Income Tax Credit,” proposed an option that would allow a family to receive a portion of the EITC outside of tax time, striking a balance between lump-sum delivery and the need for resources throughout the year. Specifically, half of the credit could be claimed in four payments spread out during the year, while the remaining credit would continue to be paid as part of the tax refund.

Since then, several significant developments have occurred. A little-used option for receiving some of the EITC in each paycheck ended in 2010. In 2014, the federal government initiated a new tax credit advance payment process to subsidize health insurance premiums through monthly disbursement of the Affordable Care Act’s Premium Tax Credit. Other countries providing assistance similar to the EITC have continued to innovate and offer access to benefits during the year. Finally, members of Congress and think tanks have proposed alternatives to a single lump-sum disbursement of the EITC, and others have begun to explore and experiment with alternatives, most notably in Chicago, where a 2014 pilot program made quarterly payments to 343 households.

In light of these developments, this paper reviews the author’s original EITC periodic payment proposal, examines emerging alternatives, and addresses the following key questions:

• What is the demand for periodic payment alternatives?
  
  
• What benefits will accrue from the availability of periodic payment?
  
  
• What risks are associated with periodic payment and how can they be managed?
  
  
• What is the administrative feasibility of periodic payment?

The emerging answers point a way forward for identifying different distribution options that would enhance the EITC’s value to low- and moderate-income working families.

Downloads

• Report

       

As the holiday season rolls around each year, it often carries a hefty price tag that can strain family budgets. In a survey of low-income taxpayers using volunteer tax preparation services, three-quarters of respondents listed December as a time of year when it’s hardest to make ends meet. But it’s not the only one. Low-income families go through a constant year-round balancing act of juggling bills, going without, asking family and friends for help, and taking on debt when they fall behind.

Many of these families benefit from the Earned Income Tax Credit, which supplements earnings for low-income workers. The EITC has proven to be one of the nation’s most effective anti-poverty programs, and for some families can represent up to 40 percent of their annual income. For the one in five American households that receive the EITC in their refunds, tax time gives them a chance to catch up financially as they start the New Year. But by summer, many recipients once again find themselves struggling paycheck to paycheck to shore up budget gaps, or scrambling to deal with unforeseen financial shocks, like a car breaking down or an unplanned medical expense.

Providing alternative payment options that deliver the credit outside of tax time would go a long way toward boosting economic stability year round for these families. In his new paper “Periodic payment of the Earned Income Tax Credit revisited,” Steve Holt explores the range of proposals that have emerged in recent years to provide more options for delivering the EITC during the year, and shares some lessons learned from early experiments to test those options.

Most notably, the Center for Economic Progress in Chicago recently completed a year-long pilot which offered 343 households the option of receiving half of their expected EITC in four payments in advance of tax time. The results of the pilot were overwhelmingly positive. Compared to EITC recipients in the control group, participants who received periodic payments missed fewer bills and racked up fewer late fees. They were less likely to resort to payday lenders or have to borrow money from family and friends. And they reported less food insecurity and decreased financial stress throughout the year. What’s more, after completing the pilot, 90 percent of the participants reported a preference for periodic payment over the standard lump sum.

More experimentation needs to be done to determine effective ways to replicate and expand on the advanced-payment pilot in Chicago. And future experimentation should also include pilots that test proposals for deferred savings mechanisms. These options, like CFED’s Rainy Day EITC proposal, would allow EITC filers to put a portion of their credit in a savings account and receive a bonus match as an incentive to save. Though structured differently than advanced payment options, the end goal of deferred savings proposals is the same: providing greater financial stability to low-income families outside of tax time.

A growing share of our economy’s jobs are in the low-wage industries and occupations in which many EITC-eligible taxpayers work (as illustrated by new national, state, and metro data from Brookings MetroTax model on characteristics of the EITC-eligible population). The EITC is an incredibly effective policy tool that helps bridge the gap between what the labor market provides and what it takes to support a family. But we can make the EITC work better for working families by offering alternative payment options that can help promote economic security year round.

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In November 2008, President George W. Bush convened the first G-20 summit in Washington to address the worst global financial economic crisis since the Great Depression. This summit provided a long-overdue opportunity for a dramatic and lasting change in global governance. This was followed by the election of Barack Obama, who had campaigned on a distinctly different foreign policy platform compared with his Republican rival, Senator John McCain. These two events were no mere coincidence.

The global crisis has moved the United States, along with the rest of the world, toward a new global economic order, with the G-20 summit as one of the principal manifestations of the new global governance system. Of course, movement toward this new economic arrangement and progress toward reformed global governance are not inevitable. It will take a clear and sustained commitment to a new set of values and strong leadership, especially from President Obama and the United States, to ensure that the G-20 summit is not a short-lived exception to what had been a long-standing stalemate in global governance reform. The effectiveness of the G-20 in addressing the global economic crisis could lay the foundation for a new global order and provide the impetus for the many other necessary global governance reforms. Whether or not this happens will depend to a significant extent on the direction chosen by President Obama.

The president’s vision of inclusion and openness and his approach to governing, which favors innovative and far-reaching pragmatic responses to key national and global challenges, make him a great candidate for this role. In due course the G-20 summit can also serve as a platform for addressing other pressing global issues, including trade, climate change, energy and food security and reform of global institutions. To achieve such an outcome, President Obama and other world leaders need to demonstrate a clear vision and strong leadership starting at the G-20 Summit in Pittsburgh and beyond.

“Old Economic Order” versus “New Economic Order”

From recent debates on foreign policy and global governance, we have identified two different perspectives or sets of principles underlying the approaches toward U.S. and global foreign policy. Table 1 summarizes the key elements of what we call the “Old Economic Order” in juxtaposition to the “New Economic Order.”

Table 1: Old versus New Economic Order

(Note: This table is adapted from one first presented by the authors in a seminar at the IMF in June 2007. See www.imf.org/external/np/seminars/eng/2007/glb/bl030607.pdf )

In the Old Order, the nation state is the point of departure, stressing the importance of sovereignty and national interest as the key principles driving a unilateral and assertive foreign policy. In contrast, the New Order’s starting point considers that we live in a global society, where interdependency and recognition of common interests are the key principles to be pursued in reciprocal relations and with mutual respect across borders. Under the Old Order the rules of national power politics prevail, as competing blocs and fixed alliances strive for predominance, with “hard power” if necessary. Instead, the New Order operates on the basis of a new multilateralism, which builds on the prevalence of global networks in all spheres of life and multiple coalitions across borders, where bargaining for compromise and the tools of “soft power” prevail. Finally, the Old Order promotes the notion that a single economic and political model should prevail, while the New Order accepts that different economic and political models coexist and compete side by side.

In the most simple terms, the Old Order broadly reflects the principles underlying the foreign policy agenda of the Bush administration and Senator John McCain’s presidential platform, while the New Order approximates those underpinning the platform of Senator Barack Obama’s presidential campaign and of his administration’s foreign policy stance. Key elements of the Old Order (except the last one) have also been attributed to the current foreign policy approach of Russia, while New Order principles can be ascribed to the European Union.

In fact, what is reflected in these two approaches is the difference between twentieth-century principles of foreign policy versus principles appropriate to today’s realities. We believe there are three interrelated sets of drivers of change that necessitate moving from the Old Order to the New Order. These drivers include the changing global demographic and economic balance, emerging global threats and the need for a more effective global governance system.

Drivers of Change

The first driver of change is the shifting global demographic and economic balance. By 2050, the world population is projected to reach 9.1 billion, up from 6.4 billion today, with the increase occurring almost entirely in today’s developing countries. China is widely predicted to be the largest economy in the early 2040s, with the U.S. economy in second place and India’s in third. Other emerging market economies, including Brazil, Indonesia and Russia, will be important economic players, while individual European countries will recede in importance. Continental Eurasia will be the new hub of global integration as China, India, Russia, the European Union and the Middle East’s energy-producing countries knit their economies ever closer together. The United States will remain a superpower, but only one among others. Together, the major world powers will have to confront the fact that people in poorer and weaker states will feel left behind. Simultaneously, cross-border networks—economic and political, public and private, elite and grassroots, legitimate and illegitimate—will continue to grow and will weaken the traditional hold states have over the economic, financial, social and political actions of their citizens. These networks will create bonds that will either reinforce or undermine global stability.

The second driver of change is a set of emerging global threats:

• The current financial and economic crisis—triggered by poor macroeconomic management and lax financial regulation—reflects the realities of long-term financial imbalances among key economies. It proves the difficulties of managing a highly interdependent global financial system in the absence of agreed-upon global financial surveillance, supervision and regulation. It is likely that risks of global financial stress will continue in the coming decades.
• Global disparities will increase as the rich and the rapidly growing economies do well, while many poor and stagnating countries are left behind. There is potential for rising disparities within countries, too. These inequities will reinforce risks of domestic and cross-border conflict and terrorism. At the same time, the United States and other industrialized countries face a progressive loss of traditional industries, jobs and wages. Aging populations and overburdened pension systems will challenge their fiscal stability and may lead to groundswells of anti-globalization sentiments.
• Rising food and energy prices, environmental threats and the risks of global epidemics—reinforced by population pressures—particularly affect the poorest countries.
• Growing global interdependencies across borders and sectoral lines mean that individual countries can no longer address these threats alone and that a global response has to be coordinated across sectors.

The third driver of change is the growing and widespread recognition that the current system of global governance has become increasingly fragmented, ineffective, outdated and resistant to change. This systemic weakness is reflected in the persistent stalemate on many of the pressing global issues—most notably the Doha trade round—but also on global poverty, climate change and the risk of pandemics. Moreover, global institutions have become unrepresentative in the face of the changed global economic and political balances. Hence their legitimacy is suffering badly, and yet there is stalemate in the reform of individual international organizations.

Together, these three factors have made the principles of the Old Order irrelevant and strongly point in the direction of a New Order. They represent the new reality for governments, citizens and international institutions and force them to adopt new principles and reform existing institutions.

While the drivers are strong and the new global reality is seemingly unassailable, change is not inevitable. Old habits die hard. In the United States, traditions of self-reliance and “exceptionalism” continue to shape Americans’ views of the rest of the world. At the same time, the widespread belief in the virtues of unfettered markets and low taxes, the influence of special interests for protection (agriculture, labor, old industry, banking) and the prevailing fractiousness of political decision-making may well undermine President Obama’s efforts to move toward a new global paradigm. Compounding the entrenchment of the Old Order, new nations that are still recovering from centuries of colonialism—facing economic and political instability and wishing to catch up with the successful industrial countries—are lured to a strong sovereign nation state, unfettered control over their borders and their citizens, and a confrontational approach to foreign policy. Even the much admired willingness of the Europeans to give up sovereignty in favor of supranational institutions has its limits, not least when it comes to giving up their prerogatives of dominating the governing boards of the international financial institutions and other global forums.

Leadership, conviction and persistence will be required among many actors on the global stage to ensure there is progress toward effective reform of global institutions. This potential for change is exemplified by the recent emergence of the G-20 summit as a vehicle for global governance.

The G-20 Summit—Origins, Options and Obstacles

Origins. The G-20 summit had its origins in the annual meetings of the G7—the leaders of a group of seven major Western industrial countries who gathered annually starting in the 1970s, initially to enhance economic and financial policy coordination in reaction to a major financial crisis. After the break-up of the Soviet Union, the G8 was formed by the addition of the Russian Federation. The G8 increasingly became preoccupied with global economic and political issues—in effect assuming the role of a global steering group. But widespread criticism began to mount about its role. The G8 summits were seen as ritualistic in process, ineffective in impact and increasingly unrepresentative in the face of global population and economic shifts, and hence lacking in legitimacy as a global steering group. The onset of the global financial crisis in mid-2008 pushed President George W. Bush into convening the G-20 Summit on November 15, 2008.

The ministerial-level G-20 was first created in the aftermath of the 1997-98 East Asia financial crisis. By convening representatives from 10 industrialized economies and 10 emerging market economies, the G-20 presented a much more geographically and culturally diverse group than the G8. With about 90 percent of the world’s economy and two thirds of the world’s population, the G-20 is also much more representative than the G8. Emerging market economies have been fully engaged in managing the proceedings of the meetings of G-20 finance ministers and central bank governors. It is therefore not surprising that there had been persistent calls by some experts and politicians for using the G-20 as a platform to replace the G8. While moving from G8 to G-20 summit might not create an optimal global steering group, it is a pragmatic and effective step, especially in response to crisis.

Options. Will the G-20 be a short-lived experiment or will it prove an effective tool of global governance? Various options are under debate among experts and practitioners. One possibility is to return to the G8 summits like the one Italy hosted in 2009 and Canada plans to host in 2010. There is concern that the G-20 format is too unwieldy for effective exchanges among the key players. Hence, there will be continuing debates about reducing the size of the summit to somewhere between thirteen and sixteen members, as reflected in the recent proposal by the French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, to create a G14. However, there are pressures to expand the number of participants to include more countries and to expand regional representation. Then there are proposals to develop a constituency-based approach to membership, with universal participation as in the case of the international financial institutions. Further, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and a United Nations Commission chaired by Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz propose to establish an Economic Security Council at the UN.

None of these options will likely materialize in the foreseeable future. Instead there are two probable outcomes: The first is the continuation of the G-20 summit with a gradually expanding mandate beyond the current crisis. For this to be successful, it is critical that the G-20 format proves its effectiveness in the coming months and years. This outcome has three requirements: that the number of participants does not expand; that participants focus on a limited number of action items; and that a small but effective secretariat is established to support and monitor the G-20 summit with logistics and technical expertise.

The most likely alternative to the G-20 summit is what is frequently referred to as “variable geometry.” Under this scenario, selected world leaders would convene on specific topics in shifting constellations, with participation of the most important actors decided separately for each topic. For example, the G-20 might continue to meet on global financial and economic matters for some time to come, while different groups would convene for action on climate change, nuclear proliferation or other topics. Support for this plan appears to be emerging from the Obama administration. It co-convened the summit on climate change at the tail-end of the 2009 G8 Summit, hosts the September 2009 G-20 economic summit in Pittsburgh and has called for a summit on nuclear non-proliferation in the spring of 2010. The challenge for summits of “variable geometry” is the ever-shifting number and composition of participants, the difficulty of systematic organization and follow-up and continuing debates about who would convene the summits, when, and with what participation.

Obstacles. As we look ahead, we see a number of challenges for the evolution of global summits beyond the G8, whether toward an effective G-20 or some alternative, especially summits of variable geometry. These challenges emanate from the diverging interests of four sets of players: the United States, Europe, the new emerging powers and the rest of the world.

For the foreseeable future, active U.S. leadership is needed to overcome inertia and collective action problems in addressing global challenges and breaking the stalemate in global governance reform. The Obama administration appears to strongly support a paradigm shift toward a new global order, but so far has not announced its position on summit modalities.

Europe is a key player and has proven a major obstacle to global governance reform as it continues to claim far too many chairs at the G-20 (and in other global forums and institutions) for its economic and demographic weight. In effect, Europeans can either retain their over-representation, which gives them a fragmented voice and weakens their influence while also weakening the global institutions; or they can bundle their votes, chairs and voice for greater impact and to ensure more effective international organizations. Unfortunately, the current stalemate on internal EU governance reform blocks any new European approach to global governance reform.

The new emerging powers, especially China, India and Brazil, will face the challenge of moving beyond their traditional role of the “excluded” and “representatives of the South.” They will need to accept co-responsibility for solving global problems and creating effective global governance institutions. They will have to look beyond issue-specific South-South coalitions to North-South coalitions where it is in their and the global interest (e.g., the push for international financial institution reform, for EU for consolidation, for the completion of the Doha Round, etc.). There are hopeful signs that this is beginning to happen. South Korea’s leadership of next year’s G-20 represents a critical test of whether the new powers are ready to participate and conduct a G-20 forum at the leaders’ level, not only ministerial.

Finally, there is the challenge of how to include the “excluded.” The G-20 is much more inclusive than the G8, but it still leaves out a majority of countries with a third of the world’s population. Options for associating the rest of the world with the summit include ad hoc outreach (as the G8 has done), expanding regional representation (as already practiced with the EU), introducing a constituency approach (as for the IFIs) and seeking a closer alignment with the UN (perhaps through an Economic Security Council). With the exception of the first two—which risk further expanding the number of participants at G-20 summits—none of the other options are likely to materialize soon. However, G-20 leaders will have to be sensitive to the needs of the “excluded” and ensure that the interests of the poorest countries are not neglected.

Conclusion

Great changes in the economic and political balance among countries, global threats and an antiquated global governance system confront the world community today. With the economic crisis as an immediate driver and a new U.S. president, the G-20 summit format has the potential to make a real shift in the global economic order in which a new set of values underpin the way countries and people cooperate across borders. To the extent that President Obama has articulated his vision of the global order and America’s role in it, we believe he is headed in the direction that stresses common interests in a global society, the need for multilateral action and understanding for alternative approaches to economic and political development. This is very promising. The effectiveness of the G-20 in addressing the global economic crisis could lay the foundation for a new global order and provide the impetus for the many other necessary global governance reforms.

However, Europe, China and India are also critical for progress. Moreover, if President Obama is believed to fail the test of competence at home or a major shock hits the United States, a reversal is possible in the U.S. In any case, significant changes in global governance will take time to transpire. We may well see a long period of transition with only gradual improvement in current institutions. In the meantime, pressures for increased regionalism, bilateral deals among the big players, geopolitical competition among power blocs and growing instability and threats from the “excluded” will undermine international cooperation and the whole idea of a global order.

The G-20 summit forum represents a great opportunity for world leaders to begin to put into action the principles of a new global order. It will allow them to address the immediate global financial and economic crisis in a collaborative spirit. And in due course the G-20 summit can also serve as a platform for addressing other pressing global issues, including trade, climate change, energy and food security, and reform of global institutions. To achieve such an outcome, President Obama and other world leaders need to demonstrate a clear vision and strong leadership at the G-20 Summit in Pittsburgh and beyond.

Downloads

• Download

      

Nearly eight years after a U.S.-led invasion toppled the Taliban regime, Afghanistan remains far from stable. As President Barack Obama considers alternatives to increasing the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan, his administration’s new counternarcotics strategy meshes well with counterinsurgency and state-building efforts in the country. It is a welcome break from previous ineffective and counterproductive policies. The effectiveness of the policy with respect to counternarcotics, counterinsurgency and state-building, however, will depend on the operationalization of the strategy. The details are not yet clear, but the strategy potentially faces many pitfalls.

Efforts to bankrupt the Taliban through eradication are futile and counterproductive since they cement the bonds between the population and the Taliban. But interdiction is very unlikely to bankrupt the Taliban either. Security needs to come first before any counternarcotics policy has a chance of being effective. Counterinsurgent forces can prevail against the Taliban, without shutting down the Taliban drug income, by adopting an appropriate strategy that provides security and rule of law to the population and by sufficiently beefing up their own resources vis-à-vis the Taliban. Rural development is a long term and multifaceted effort. Simplistic strategies that focus simply on price ratios or try to raise risk through “seed-burn-seed” approaches are ineffective. Wheat replacement strategy as a core of the alternative livelihoods effort is singularly inappropriate for Afghanistan. Shortcuts do not lead to sustainable policies that also mitigate conflict and enhance state-building.

The Obama administration will need to reduce expectations for quick fixes and present realistic timelines to Congress, the U.S. public and the international community for how long rural development and other counternarcotics policies in Afghanistan will take to show meaningful and sustainable progress that advances human security of the Afghan people, mitigates conflict and enhance state building. Unless this is conveyed, there is a real danger that even a well-designed counternarcotics policy will be prematurely and unfortunately discarded as ineffective.

The New Strategy in Afghanistan’s Context

In summer 2009, the Obama administration unveiled the outlines of a new counternarcotics policy in Afghanistan. The new policy represents a courageous break with previous misguided efforts there and thirty years of U.S. counternarcotics policies around the world. Instead of emphasizing premature eradication of poppy crops, the new policy centers on increased interdiction and rural development. This approach strongly enhances the new counterinsurgency policy focus on providing security to the rural population, instead of being preoccupied with the numbers of incapacitated Taliban and al Qaeda.

In Afghanistan, somewhere between a third and a half of its GDP comes from poppy cultivation and processing and much of the rest from foreign aid, so the illicit poppy economy determines the economic survival of a large segment of the population. This is true not only of the farmers who cultivate opium poppy frequently in the absence of viable legal and illegal economic alternatives. But, as a result of micro- and macro-economic spillovers and the acute paucity of legal economic activity, much of the economic life in large cities is also underpinned by the poppy economy. After a quarter century of intense poppy cultivation, the opium poppy economy is deeply entrenched in the socio-economic fabric of the society. Islamic prohibitions against opiates notwithstanding, the poppy economy inevitably underlies Afghanistan’s political arrangements and power relations. Profits from taxing poppy cultivation and protecting smuggling rings bring substantial income to the Taliban. A recent CRS report (August 2009) estimates the income at $70-$100 million per year, which accounts for perhaps as much as half of Taliban income. But many other actors in Afghanistan profit from the opium poppy economy in a similar way: former warlords cum government officials; members of Afghanistan’s police; tribal chiefs; and independent traffickers.

Moreover, the Taliban and many others who protect the opium poppy economy from efforts to suppress it derive much more than financial profits. Crucially, they also obtain political capital from populations dependent on poppy cultivation. Such political capital is a critical determinant of the success and sustainability of the insurgency since public support or at least acceptance are crucial enablers of an insurgency. Indeed, as I detail in my forthcoming book, Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs, along with providing order that the Afghan government is systematically unable to provide and capitalizing on Ghilzai Pashtun sentiments of being marginalized, protection of the poppy fields is at the core of the Taliban support. By not targeting the farmers, the new counternarcotics strategy is thus synchronized with the counterinsurgency efforts because it can deprive the Taliban of a key source of support. Its overall design also promises to lay the necessary groundwork for substantial reductions in the size and impacts of the illicit economy in Afghanistan.

However, while appropriate in its overall conception, the new strategy has pitfalls. Specifically how to operationalize interdiction and rural development will to a great extent determine the effectiveness of the strategy—not only with respect to the narrow goal of narcotics suppression, but also with respect to counterinsurgency and state-building. While many of the details still remain to be developed, some of those that have trickled out give reasons for concern.

Effects of Previous Eradication-Centered Policy

During the 2008-09 growing season, the area of cultivation in Afghanistan fell by 22% to 123,000 hectares and opium production fell by 10 percent to 6,900 metric tons (mt). Much of this decline in cultivation was driven by market forces largely unrelated to policy: After several years of massive overproduction in Afghanistan that surpassed the estimated global market for opiates by almost three times, opium prices were bound to decline. Even at 6,900 mt, production still remains twice as high as world demand, leading to speculation that someone somewhere is stockpiling opiates.

More significant, the persistence of high production betrays the ineffectiveness of simplistic policies, such as premature forced eradication before alternative livelihoods are in place, which since 2004 (until the new Obama strategy) was the core of the counternarcotics policy in Afghanistan. Policies that fail to address the complex and multiple structural drivers of cultivation and ignore the security and economic needs of the populations dependent on poppy cultivation generate vastly counterproductive effects with respect to not only counternarcotics efforts, but also counterinsurgency, stabilization and state building.

The eastern Afghan province of Nangarhar provides a telling example. For decades, Nangarhar has been one of the dominant sources of opium poppy. But over the past two years, as a result of governor Gul Agha Shirzai’s suppression efforts—including bans on cultivation, forced eradication, imprisonment of violators and claims that NATO would bomb the houses of those who cultivate poppy or keep opium—cultivation declined to very low numbers. This has been hailed as a major success to be emulated throughout Afghanistan.

In fact, the economic and security consequences were highly undesirable. The ban greatly impoverished many, causing household incomes to fall 90% for many and driving many into debt. As legal economic alternatives failed to materialize, many coped by resorting to crime, such as kidnapping and robberies. Others sought employment in the poppy fields of Helmand, yet others migrated to Pakistan where they frequently ended up recruited by the Taliban. The population became deeply alienated from the government, resorting to strikes and attacks on government forces. Districts that were economically hit especially severely, such as Khogiani, Achin and Shinwar, have become no-go zones for the Afghan government and NGOs. Although those tribal areas have historically been opposed to the Taliban, the Taliban mobilization there has taken off to an unprecedented degree. The populations began allowing the Taliban to cross over from Pakistan, and U.S. military personnel operating in that region indicate that intelligence provision to Afghan forces and NATO has almost dried up. Tribal elders who supported the ban became discredited, and the collapse of their legitimacy is providing an opportunity for the Taliban to insert itself into the decision-making structures of those areas. And all such previous bans in the province, including in 2005, turned out to be unsustainable in the absence of legal economic alternatives. Thus, after the 2005 ban, for example, poppy cultivation inevitably swung back.

The Ingredients of Success

Security
The prerequisite for success with respect to narcotics is security, i.e. sustained state control of territory. Without it, Afghanistan cannot be stabilized and the state strengthened; nor can counternarcotics policies be effective. Whether one adopts iron-fisted eradication or sustainable rural development as the core of a counternarcotics policy, security is essential. Without security first, counternarcotics efforts have not yet succeeded anywhere. Suppression without alternative livelihoods in place requires firm control of the entire territory to prevent illicit crop displacement and harsh suppression of the population dependent on illicit crops. Apart from being problematic with respect to human rights, this harsh approach is also very costly politically. Rural development requires security, otherwise investment will not come in, the population will not make risky long-term investments in legal crops and structural drivers of cultivation will not be effectively addressed. Development under a hail of bullets simply does not work, and in the context of insecurity, illicit economies persist and dominate.

Nor have counternarcotics policies, such as eradication or interdiction, succeeded in bankrupting or severely weakening any belligerent groups profiting from drugs anywhere in the world. Not in China, Thailand, Burma, Peru, Lebanon or even Colombia. Instead, they cement the bonds between marginalized populations dependent on illicit crops and belligerents plus severely reduce human intelligence flows to the counterinsurgent forces.

But counterinsurgent forces can prevail against insurgents and terrorists without stopping or reducing the terrorists’ drug-based financial inflows—either by increasing their own forces and resources vis-à-vis the belligerents or by adopting a smarter strategy that is either militarily more effective or wins the hearts and minds. This was the case in China, Thailand, Burma, and Peru where counterinsurgents succeeded without eradication. Evidence that counterinsurgent forces can prevail without bankrupting the belligerents through eradication also holds in the case of Colombia where the FARC has been weakened militarily not because of the aerial spraying of coca fields, but in spite of it. Today, more coca is grown there than at the beginning of Plan Colombia; but as a result of U.S. resources and training, Colombian forces were capable of greatly weakening the FARC even though forced eradication virtually eliminated human intelligence from the population to the government.

Interdiction with the Right Focus
The broad focus of the new counternarcotics strategy on interdiction is well placed, but interdiction’s effectiveness will depend on its objectives and execution. Just like eradication, interdiction will not succeed in bankrupting the Taliban. The Taliban has many other sources of income, including donations from Pakistan and the Middle East, taxation of legal economic activity, smuggling with legal goods, wildlife and illicit logging. In fact, it rebuilt itself in Pakistan between 2002 and 2004 without access to the poppy economy. Overall, drug interdiction has a very poor record in substantially curtailing belligerents’ income, with only a few successes registered in, for example, highly localized settings in Colombia and Peru.

Instead, the objective of the policy should be to reduce the coercive and corrupting power of organized crime groups. But achieving that requires a well-designed policy and a great deal of intelligence. Previous interdiction efforts in Afghanistan have in fact had the opposite effect: they eliminated small traders and consolidated the power of big traffickers, giving rise to the vertical integration of the industry. They also strengthened the bonds between some traffickers and the Taliban (although many traffickers continue to operate independently or are linked to the government).

Large-scale interdiction that targets entire networks and seeks to eliminate local demand for opium from local traders, which some are arguing for, is extraordinarily resource-intensive given the structure of the Afghan opium industry. Prioritization will need to be given to devoting scarce resources to drug interdiction or directly to counterinsurgency. The odds of success are not high. But even if such an interdiction strategy did succeed in shutting down local demand, the policy would become counterproductive since in local settings its effects would approximate the effects of eradication, thus once again alienating the population. Such large-scale interdiction is thus not currently appropriate for Afghanistan.

But even the NATO-led selective interdiction of targeting designated Taliban-linked traffickers (the United States has identified fifty such traffickers) is not free from pitfalls. First, selective interdiction can actually provide opportunities for the Taliban to directly take over the trafficking role or strengthen the alliance between the remaining traffickers and the Taliban, thus achieving the opposite of what it aims for. In fact, interdiction measures in Peru and Colombia frequently resulted in tightening the belligerents-traffickers nexus and belligerents’ takeover of trafficking.

Second, uncalibrated interdiction can provoke intense turf wars among the remaining traffickers, thus intensifying violence in the country and muddling the battlefield picture by introducing a new form of conflict. Mexico provides a vivid example of such an undesirable outcome. In the Afghan tribal context, such turf wars can easily become tribal or ethnic warfare.

Third, such selective interdiction can also send the message that the best way to be a trafficker is to be a member of the Afghan government, thus perpetuating a sense of impunity and corruption and undermining long-term state building and legitimacy.

Finally, the effectiveness of interdiction is to a great extent dependent on the quality of rule of law in Afghanistan plus the capacity and quality of the justice and corrections systems, all of which are woefully lacking in Afghanistan and are deeply corrupt.

Comprehensive Rural Development
Rural development appropriately lies at the core of the new strategy because, despite the enormous challenges, it has the best chance to effectively and sustainably strengthen the Afghan state and reduce the narcotics economy. But for rural development to do that, it needs to be conceived as broad-based social and economic development that focuses on improvements in human capital—including health care and education—and addresses all of the structural drivers of opium poppy cultivation. In Afghanistan, these drivers include insecurity; lack of physical infrastructure (such as roads), electrification and irrigations systems; lack of microcredit; lack of processing facilities; and the absence of value-added chains and assured markets. They also include lack of land titles and, increasingly, the fact that land rent by sharecroppers has become dependent on opium poppy cultivation as land concentration has increased over the past eight years. Poppy cultivation and harvesting are also very labor-intensive, thus offering employment opportunities unparalleled in the context of Afghanistan’s economy.

The price-profitability of poppy in comparison to other crops is only one of the drivers and frequently not the most important one. Without other structural drivers being addressed, farmers will not switch to licit crops even if they fetch more money than the illicit ones. By the same token, however, farmers are frequently willing to sacrifice some profit and forgo illicit crop cultivation as long as the licit alternatives bring them sufficient income and address all of the structural drivers, including the insecurity to which farmers are exposed in illicit economies.

Unfortunately, the wheat distribution program that was the core of rural development in Afghanistan last year (and that is slated to be its key component this year) is likely to be woefully ineffective for several reasons. First, in 2008, the program was based solely on an unusually high price ratio of wheat to poppy, driven by poppy overproduction and a global shortage of wheat. However, this price ratio is unlikely to hold; Afghanistan’s wheat prices are dictated anyway by surrounding markets, such as Pakistan and Kazakhstan. Second, the program did nothing to address the structural drivers. In fact, it had counterproductive effects because the free distribution of wheat undermined local markets in seeds. Afghan farmers can obtain seeds; their challenge lies in how to obtain profit afterwards. Thus, some sold the wheat seed instead of cultivating it. Third, those who actually cultivated wheat frequently did so not for profit, but for subsistence to minimize costs of buying cereals on the market. In fact, because of land distribution issues, many Afghan farmers do not have access to enough land to cover even their subsistence needs with wheat monocropping. A key lesson from alternative development over the past thirty years is that monocropping substitution strategies are particularly ineffective. Fourth, if all of current poppy farmers switched to wheat cultivation, Afghanistan would experience a great increase in unemployment since wheat cultivation employs 88% less labor than poppy cultivation and harvesting do.

Instead of wheat, rural development in Afghanistan needs to emphasize diversified high-value, high-labor-intensive crops, such as fruits, vegetables and specialty items like saffron. Generating lasting off-farm income opportunities will also be important, but even more challenging than jump-starting legal agromarkets.

After eight years of underresourcing and neglecting agriculture development, the new counternarcotics policy’s focus on the farm is appropriate. But the new strategy needs to take care not to throw away the baby with the bath water. The effort still needs to include developing value-added chains and assured internal and external markets plus enabling sustained access to them. Once again, thirty years of history of alternative livelihoods show that without value-added chains and accessible markets even productive legal farms become unsustainable and farmers revert back to illicit crops.

Finally, rural development requires time. Perhaps in no country in the world since Mao wiped out poppy cultivation in China in the 1950s did counternarcotics efforts face such enormous challenges as they do in Afghanistan—in terms of the scale of the illicit economy, its centrality to the overall economy of the country and hence its vast marco- and micro-economic and political effects, the underdevelopment of the country and its human capital and the paucity of viable economic alternatives. Even under much more auspicious circumstances along all the above dimensions, counternarcotics rural development in Thailand took thirty years.

Conclusion

Clearly, there is a need to quickly bring some economic, social and rule of law improvements to the lives of the Afghan people. Without such quick, visible and sustainable change, it will become impossible to rebuild the confidence of the Afghan people in the future, harness their remaining aspirations and to persuade them that the central state with support of the international community is preferable to the Taliban or local warlord- or tribal-based fiefdoms. But there is an equal need to urge strategic patience in the United States—both for counterinsurgency and for counternarcotics.

Eradication can be a part of the mix of counternarcotics policies, but should only be adopted in areas that are free of violent conflict and where sufficient legal economic alternatives are available to the population. Interdiction needs to focus on reducing the coercive and corrupting power of crime groups. Before interdiction measures are undertaken, an analysis of second and third- order effects needs to be conducted. It needs to be carefully calibrated with the strength of law enforcement in Afghanistan to avoid provoking dangerous turf wars, ethnic violence and cementing the relationship between the Taliban and the traffickers. It also needs to target top traffickers linked to the Afghan government. Interdiction needs to encompass building the justice and corrections system in Afghanistan and broad rule of law efforts. Rural development needs to address all structural drivers of poppy cultivation. It needs to focus not only on the farm, but also on value-added chains and assured markets. It needs to emphasize diversified high-value, high-labor intensive crops, and not center on wheat.

Evaluations of counternarcotics policies need to back away from simplistic and inappropriate measures, such as the numbers of hectares eradicated or traffickers caught. Instead, the measures need to encompass the complexity of the issue, including, size of areas cultivated with licit as well as illicit crops, human development indexes, levels of education, the number of resource-poor farmers dependent on illicit crops for basic subsistence or vulnerable to poverty-driven participation in illicit economies, food security, availability of legal microcredit, prevalence of land titles and accessibility of land, infrastructure density and cost of infrastructure use (such as road tolls), availability of non-belligerent dispute resolution and arbitrage mechanisms, quality of property rights, prevalence of value-added chains, and accessibility of markets. The United States and its allies must reduce public expectations for quick fixes and dedicate increased resources to rural development for a long time. Although U.S. forces do not need to stay in Afghanistan for decades, economic development will take that long.

Downloads

• Download

      

Policy Brief #172

Why Institutions Matter

When experts and pundits are asked what the president and Congress should do to promote economic growth, they typically respond with a list of policies, often mixed with stylistic and political suggestions. Few focus on institutional change, which is too easy to conflate with yawn-inducing “governmental reorganization.”

This neglect of institutions is always a mistake, never more than in times of crisis. Throughout American history, profound challenges have summoned bursts of institutional creativity, with enduring effects. The dangerous inadequacies of the Articles of Confederation set the stage for a new Constitution. The Civil War resulted in three amendments that resolved—at least in principle—our founding ambivalence between the people and the states as the source of national authority, between the states and the nation as the locus of citizenship, and between slavery and the equality the Declaration of Independence had proclaimed and promised. Similarly, the Federal Reserve Board, Bretton Woods international economic system, Department of Defense, National Security Council, CIA, Congressional Budget Office and Department of Homeland Security all arose through changes occasioned by great challenges to the nation.

Today’s economic crisis is reflected in three distinct but linked deficits—the fiscal deficit, the savings deficit and the investment deficit. Meeting these challenges and laying the foundation for sustained economic growth will require institutional as well as policy changes. 

	RECOMMENDATIONS
	Today’s economic crisis is characterized by three distinct but linked deficits—the fiscal deficit, the savings deficit and the investment deficit. Meeting these challenges and laying the foundation for sustained economic growth will require institutional as well as policy changes. The following institution-based recommendations would help the nation meet the current economic crisis and could help prevent future crises of similar destructiveness. To promote fiscal sustainability, change longterm budget procedures and create empowered commissions—answerable to Congress but largely insulated from day-to-day politics. To boost savings, consider new mandatory individual retirement accounts as a supplement to Social Security. To improve public investment, create a National Infrastructure Bank with public seed capital—this entity would mobilize private investment and force proposed projects to pass rigorous cost-benefit analysis as well as a market test. Today’s polarized political system is an obstacle to reform in every area, including the economy. A multi-year collaboration between Brookings and the Hoover Institution produced a series of suggestions. At least two of those suggestions are worth adopting: Alter redistricting authority, so state legislatures can no longer practice gerrymandering. Experiment, in a few willing states, with compulsory voting—to move politicians away from the red-meat politics of appealing only to their bases, which now dominate elections, and toward a more moderate and consensual politics.

Institutional reform

Promoting fiscal sustainability

Setting the federal budget on a sustainable course is an enormous challenge. If we do nothing, we will add an average of nearly $1 trillion to the national debt every year between now and 2020, raising the debt/ GDP ratio to a level not seen since the early 1950s and sending the annual cost of servicing the debt sky-high. Restoring pay-as-you-go budgeting and putting some teeth in it are a start, but not nearly enough. We need radical changes in rules and procedures.

One option, recently proposed by a bipartisan group that includes three former directors of the Congressional Budget Office, would change the giant entitlement programs: Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid. The new rules would require a review every five years to determine whether projected revenues and outlays are in balance. If not, Congress would be required to restore balance through dedicated revenue increases, benefits cuts or a combination. After a financial crisis in the early 1990s, Sweden introduced a variant of this plan, which has worked reasonably well.A number of Brookings scholars—including Henry Aaron, Gary Burtless, William Gale, Alice Rivlin and Isabel Sawhill—have suggested a Value Added Tax (VAT) as part of a program of fiscal and tax reform. Burtless offers an intriguing proposal that would link a VAT to health care finance. Revenue from the VAT would be dedicated to—and would cover—the federal share of health care programs. If the federal cost rises faster than proceeds from the VAT, Congress would have to either raise the VAT rate or cut back programs to fit the flow of funds. The system would become much more transparent and accountable: because the VAT rate would appear on every purchase, citizens could see for themselves the cost of federal support for health care, and they could tell their representatives what balance they prefer between increased rates and reduced health care funding.

Another option draws on the experience of the Base Realignment and Closure Commission, which enables the military to surmount NIMBY politics and shut down unneeded bases. The basic idea is straightforward: once the independent commission settles on a list of proposed closures, Congress has the option of voting it up or down without amendment. A similar idea undergirds the president’s “fast-track” authority to negotiate proposed trade treaties, which Congress can reject but cannot modify.

Suitably adapted, this concept could help break longstanding fiscal logjams. Here is one way it might work. Independent commissions with members from both political parties could submit proposals in designated areas of fiscal policy. To increase bipartisan appeal, each proposal would require a super-majority of the commission. In the House and Senate, both the majority and the minority would have the opportunity to offer only a single amendment. This strategy of “empowered commissions” changes the incentive structure in Congress, reducing negative logrolling to undermine the prospects of proposals that would otherwise gain majority support.

Empowered commissions represent a broader strategy—using institutional design to insulate certain activities from regular and direct political pressure. For example, the Constitution mandates that federal judges, once confirmed, hold office during “good behavior” and receive salaries that Congress may not reduce during their term of service. (By contrast, many states subject judges to regular election and possible recall.) In another striking example, members of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Board are appointed to 14-year non-renewable terms, limiting the ability of the executive branch to change its membership rapidly and removing governors’ incentives to trim their policy sails in hopes of reappointment. Additionally, action by neither the president nor any other entity in the executive branch is required to implement the Fed’s decisions, and Fed chairmen have been known to take steps that vex the Oval Office.

This strategy is controversial. Officials with populist leanings often argue that fundamental decisions affecting the economy should be made through transparent democratic processes. The counterargument: experience dating back to the founding of the republic suggests that when interest rates and the money supply are set at the whim of transient majorities, economic growth and stability are at risk.

Boosting savings

An adequate supply of capital is a precondition of long-term economic growth, and household saving is an important source of capital. During the 1960s, U.S. households saved 12 percent of their income; as recently as the 1980s, that figure stood at 8 percent. By 2005–2006, the savings rate dipped into negative territory, and today it stands at a meager 3 percent. In recent years, funds from abroad—principally Asia— filled the capital gap. But evidence is accumulating that foreign governments have reached the limit of their appetite (or tolerance) for U.S. debt. To avert a capital shortage and soaring interest rates, which would choke off growth, we must boost private savings as we reduce public deficits.

For a long time, tax incentives for saving have been the tool of choice. But as evidence mounts that these incentives are less effective than hoped, policy experts are turning to alternatives. One rests on a key finding of behavioral economics: default settings have a large impact on individual conduct and collective outcomes. If you require people to opt in to enter a program, such as 401(k) retirement plans, even a modest inconvenience will deter many of them from participating. But if you reverse the procedure— automatically enrolling them unless they affirmatively opt out—you can boost participation.

To achieve an adequate rate of private saving, we may need to go even further. One option is a mandatory retirement savings program to supplement Social Security. Workers would be required to set aside a fixed percentage of earnings and invest them in generic funds—equities, public debt, private debt, real estate, commodities and cash. For those who fail to designate a percentage allocation for each fund, a default program would take effect. (Participants always would have the option of regaining control.) As workers near retirement age, their holdings would be automatically rebalanced in a more conservative direction. One version of this proposal calls for “progressive matching,” in which low-earning individuals receive a subsidy equal to half their payroll contributions; those making more would get a smaller match along a sliding scale, and those at the top would receive no match at all.

This strategy requires careful institutional and programmatic design. To ensure maximum benefits to wage earners, the private sector would be allowed to offer only funds with very low costs and fees. To ensure that the program actually boosts net savings, individuals would be prohibited from withdrawing funds from their accounts prior to retirement; except in emergencies, they would not be allowed to borrow against their accounts; and they would be prohibited from using them as collateral. And a clear line would be drawn to prevent government interference in the private sector: while government-administered automatic default investments would be permitted, government officials could not direct the flow of capital to specific firms.

Improving public investment

The investment deficit has a public face as well. Since the early 19th century, government has financed and helped build major infrastructure projects—roads, bridges, ports and canals, among others, have spurred economic growth and opened new domestic and international markets. Recently, however, public infrastructure investment has fallen well short of national needs, and often has been poorly targeted. Americans travelling and working abroad are noticing that U.S. infrastructure is falling behind not only advanced countries’ but rapidly developing countries’ as well. A study by Emilia Istrate and Robert Puentes of Brookings’s Metropolitan Policy Program, presented in a December 2009 report entitled “Investing for Success,” documents three key shortcomings of federal infrastructure investment: it lacks long-term planning, fails to provide adequately for maintenance costs, and suffers from a flawed project selection process as benefits are not weighed rigorously against costs.

Istrate and Puentes explore several strategies for correcting these deficiencies. One of the most promising is a National Infrastructure Bank (NIB), to require benefit-cost analyses of proposed projects, break down financial barriers between related types of investment (facilitating inter-modal transportation, for example), and improve coordination across jurisdictional lines. The NIB could be funded through a modest initial infusion of federal capital designed to attract private capital. Projects receiving loans from the NIB would have to provide for depreciation and document the sources of funds to repay the face amount of each loan, plus interest. In short, the NIB would be more than a conduit for the flow of federal funds; it would function as a real bank, imposing market discipline on projects and making infrastructure investments attractive to private capital, partly by providing flexible subordinated debt.

Istrate and Puentes identify diverse problems that designers of an NIB would confront. Insulating the selection process from political interference would pose serious difficulties, as would providing federal seed capital without increasing the federal deficit and debt. Requiring the repayment of loans could skew project awards away from projects that cannot easily charge user fees—wastewater and environmental infrastructure projects, for example. Despite these challenges, a properly designed bank could increase the quantity of infrastructure investment while improving its effectiveness, reducing bottlenecks and promoting economic efficiency. The potential benefits for long-term growth would be considerable.

Creating the Political Conditions for Reform

The rise of political polarization in recent decades has made effective action much more difficult for the U.S. government. Polarization has impeded efforts to enact even the progrowth reforms sketched in this paper. A multiyear collaboration between the Brookings and Hoover Institutions—resulting in a two-volume report, Red and Blue Nation?, with Volume One published in 2006 and Volume Two in 2008— has mapped the scope of the phenomenon. This effort has shown that, while political elites are more sharply divided than citizens in general, citizens are more likely now to place themselves at the ends of the ideological spectrum than they were as recently as the 1980s. With a smaller political center to work with, even leaders committed to bipartisan compromise have been stymied. The fate of President Bush’s 2005 Social Security proposal illustrates the difficulty of addressing tough issues in these circumstances.

It might seem that the only cure for polarization is a shift of public sentiment back toward moderation. The Brookings-Hoover project found, however, that changes in institutional design could reduce polarization and might, over time, lower the partisan temperature. Here are two ideas, culled from a much longer list.

Congressional redistricting

While population flows account for much of the growth in safe seats dominated by strong partisans, recent studies indicate that gerrymanders account for 10 to 36 percent of the reduction in competitive congressional districts since 1982. This is not a trivial effect.

Few Western democracies draw up their parliamentary districts in so patently politicized a fashion as do U.S. state legislatures. Parliamentary electoral commissions, operating independently and charged with making reasonably objective determinations, are the preferred model abroad.

Given the Supreme Court’s reluctance to enter the thicket of redistricting controversies, any changes will be up to state governments. In recent years, voter initiatives and referenda in four states—Washington, Idaho, Alaska and Arizona—have established nonpartisan or bipartisan redistricting commissions. These commissions struggle with a complicated riddle: how to enhance competitiveness while respecting other parameters, such as geographic compactness, jurisdictional boundaries, and the desire to consolidate “communities of interest.” Iowa’s approach, where a nonpartisan legislative staff has the last word, is often cited as a model but may be hard to export to states with more demographic diversity and complex political cultures. Arizona has managed to fashion some workable, empirically based standards that are yielding more heterogeneous districts and more competitive elections.

Incentives to participate

Another depolarizing reform would promote the participation of less ideologically committed voters in the electoral process. Some observers do not view the asymmetric power of passionate partisans in U.S. elections as a cause for concern: Why shouldn’t political decisions be made by the citizens who care most about them? Aren’t those who care also better informed? And isn’t their intensive involvement an indication that the outcome of the election affects their interests more than it affects the interests of the non-voters? While this argument has surface plausibility, it is not compelling. Although passionate partisanship infuses the system with energy, it erects road-blocks to problem-solving. Many committed partisans prefer gridlock to compromise, and gridlock is no formula for effective governance.

To broaden the political participation of less partisan citizens, who tend to be more weakly connected to the political system, several major democracies have made voting mandatory. Australia, for one, has compulsory voting; it sets small fines for non-voting that escalate for recidivism, with remarkable results. The turnout rate in Australia tops 95 percent, and citizens regard voting as a civic obligation. Near-universal voting raises the possibility that a bulge of casual voters, with little understanding of the issues and candidates, can muddy the waters by voting on non-substantive criteria, such as the order in which candidates’ names appear on the ballot. The inevitable presence of some such “donkey voters,” as they are called in Australia, does not appear to have badly marred the democratic process in that country.

Indeed, the civic benefits of higher turnouts appear to outweigh the “donkey” effect. Candidates for the Australian Parliament have gained an added incentive to appeal broadly beyond their partisan bases. One wonders whether members of Congress here in the United States, if subjected to wider suffrage, might also spend less time transfixed by symbolic issues that are primarily objects of partisan fascination, and more time coming to terms with the nation’s larger needs. At least campaigns continually tossing red meat to the party faithful might become a little less pervasive.

The United States is not Australia, of course. Although both are federal systems, the U.S. Constitution confers on state governments much more extensive control over voting procedures. While it might not be flatly unconstitutional to mandate voting nationwide, it would surely chafe with American custom and provoke opposition in many states. Federalism American-style also has some unique advantages, including its tradition of using states as “laboratories of democracy” that test reform proposals before they are elevated to consideration at the national level. If a few states experiment with compulsory voting and demonstrate its democracy- enriching potential, they might, in this way, smooth the path to national consideration.  

Conclusion

In challenging times, political leaders undertake institutional reform, not because they want to, but because they must. Our own era—a period of profound economic crisis—is no exception. Even in circumstances of deep political polarization, both political parties have accepted the need to restructure our system of financial regulation.

As well, recognition is growing that we face three key challenges—a fiscal deficit, a savings deficit and an investment deficit—that have eluded control by existing institutions and, unless checked, will impede long-term economic growth. The question is whether we will be able to adopt the needed changes in an atmosphere of reflection and deliberation, or whether we will delay until a worse crisis compels us to act.

Downloads

• Download Policy Brief

      

Policy Brief #182

Protection of people from oppressive governments, civil conflict and disasters has moved to the top of the international agenda. The United Nations Security Council authorized all measures necessary to protect civilians in Libya as the airstrikes began. Humanitarian agencies-working in more places and under more difficult conditions than ever before-are grappling with the aftermath of Japan's massive earthquake even as they are also working with displaced people in Haiti and Ivory Coast and responding to hundreds of thousands of people fleeing Libya. And increasingly these agencies are not only trying to assist people through provision of relief items, but also trying to protect them. But with so many global organizations mobilizing to protect civilians when disasters strike and conflicts break out, the concept of protection has begun to lose its distinctive meaning.

Can anyone "do" protection? In The Politics of Protection: The Limits of Humanitarian Action (Brookings Institution Press, 2011), I describe how protection has been stretched to include all manner of important activities-from provision of food to curriculum development, from advocacy to monitoring, from building latrines to voter registration. Beyond affirming the responsibility of governments to protect their people, international law offers no clear guidance on how to translate the principles of protection into action.

Given the likelihood that conflicts will continue and natural disasters will increase in the future, much more attention is needed on the question of protection, which has emerged over the years from international humanitarian law, refugee law and human rights law. The most visible part of the international humanitarian system is the vast array of U.N. agencies and nongovernmental organizations. Yet military forces, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and thousands of civil society organizations are also major actors in humanitarian response. This brief describes observations and recommendations on protection in humanitarian work culled from my forthcoming book.

	RECOMMENDATIONS
	With changes in the nature of conflict and with the likelihood of increasing severity and frequency of sudden-onset disasters because of climate change, more attention needs to be paid to understanding how humanitarian actors can-and cannot-protect people. The United Nations and other humanitarian actors should consider the following recommendations: Humanitarian agencies need to re-evaluate what protection means in the context of today's conflicts and to recognize their own limitations in keeping people safe. If they are serious about protecting people, they need to work with national military and police forces which have the resources to provide such physical protection. This is hard for humanitarian agencies that see their work as grounded in principles of impartiality, independence and neutrality. NGOs should review their current policies and practices on protection to ensure that they are not promising more than they can deliver or being used as a cover for the lack of effective political action.   " As the term "protection of civilians" has come to mean different things for different actors, the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs should develop a very short summary statement of what it means to protect civilians that can be broadly used by a range of different communities and individuals in different contexts. The office should then collect the best practices to illustrate how protection of civilians is effectively carried out on the ground.   As both conflicts and disasters take on a distinctive form when they occur in urban areas, much more work is needed to retool humanitarian assistance for urban environments. This means that humanitarian agencies need to work with municipal authorities in preparing for and responding to urban residents affected by violence and disasters.   In light of the fact that climate change is likely to result in more large-scale and varied types of displacement, U.N. agencies and researchers should analyze the gaps in international legal protection for those forced to leave their countries because of climate change-induced environmental factors. Guidelines should be developed to assist governments considering evacuation or relocation of populations from areas likely to be affected by natural disasters or climate change.   Given the pace of technological change taking place with robotic armaments, the International Committee of the Red Cross should convene a group of experts from the military research and international law communities to begin to identify the gaps in international humanitarian law resulting from the widespread use of those technologies.

Downloads

• Download Policy Brief

       

Editor's Note, Oct. 12, 2011: Congress has passed a trio of trade agreements negotiated during the George W. Bush administration and recently submitted by President Obama. The authors of this policy brief say the pacts with South Korea, Colombia and Panama will boost U.S. exports significantly, especially in the key automotive, agricultural and commercial services sectors.

Policy Brief #183

A trio of trade agreements now pending before Congress would benefit the United States both economically and strategically. Carefully developed accords with South Korea, Colombia and Panama will boost U.S. exports significantly, especially in the key automotive, agricultural and commercial services sectors.

Among the other benefits are:

• increased U.S. competitiveness
• enhancement of U.S. diplomatic and economic postures in East Asia and Latin America
• new investment opportunities
• better enforcement of labor regulation and
• improved transparency in these trading partners’ regulatory systems.

The pacts are known as Free Trade Agreements, or FTAs. The Korean agreement (KORUS) was negotiated in 2006-2007 and revised in 2010. The Colombian agreement (COL-US, sometimes known as COL-US FTA) was signed in 2006. The agreement with Panama (PFTA, sometimes known as the Panama Trade Promotion Agreement) was signed in 2007. All have the support of the Obama administration.

	RECOMMENDATIONS
	The three FTAs will substantially reduce these trading partners’ tariffs on U.S. goods, opening large markets for U.S. commerce and professional services. In combination, they will increase the size of the U.S. economy by about $15 billion. Furthermore, they will help reverse a slide in U.S. market influence in two important and increasingly affluent regions of the globe. Approval of all three agreements is in the national interest. To move forward, both Congress and the administration should take these appropriate steps: Congress should approve the trade agreements with Korea (KORUS), Colombia (COL-US) and Panama (PFTA) without additional delays.   To maximize the trade and investment benefits of KORUS, the administration should actively engage in the KORUS working groups, such as the Professional Services Working Group.   Similarly, the U.S. Trade Representative should participate in the Joint Committee’s scheduled annual meetings, in order to maintain a highlevel focus on U.S.-Korea trade, drive further trade liberalization and enable the committee to serve as a forum for broader discussions on trade in East Asia.   The Colombia-U.S. Joint Committee should include representatives of Colombia’s Trade and Labor Ministers with their US counterparts. The presence of the Labor minister should facilitate progress under the FTA through strengthened labor standards and timely implementation of all elements of the agreed-upon action plan. This Committee and specialized working groups could increase the pace of bilateral interaction and help officials identify important areas for discussion, negotiation and agreement.   Panama has ratified the Tax Information and Exchange Agreement which entered into force on April 2011. Panama and the US should strengthen bilateral communication so that collaboration in the battle against money laundering is pushed even further with greater cooperation.

Economic Effects of the Korea Agreement

The economic benefits to the United States from KORUS are especially significant, as the agreement will provide preferential market access to the world’s 11th largest—and a fast-growing—economy. In 2010, U.S.-Korea trade was worth $88 billion, comprising U.S. exports of $39 billion and imports of $49 billion, making Korea the United States’ seventh largest trading partner. According to the independent, quasi-judicial U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC), exports resulting from KORUS will increase the U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) by up to $12 billion. This constitutes a remarkable gain in both real and percentage terms.

To the United States, KORUS offers diverse economic advantages. Most strikingly, KORUS will open Korea’s service market to U.S. exports, allowing the United States to exploit its competitive advantages in financial services, education and information and communications technologies. The agreement also will lead to increased imports from Korea, which in turn will help the United States achieve greater economic specialization. The likely effects of more specialization—and of increased Korean investment in the United States—include greater U.S. efficiency, productivity, economic growth and job growth. Meanwhile, U.S. investors will gain new opportunities in the increasingly active Asia-Pacific region.

Lately, passage of KORUS has assumed enhanced importance with the impasse in the World Trade Organization’s Doha Round. No longer can the United States reasonably anticipate that Doha will lead to improved access to the Korean market. Moreover, an FTA between Korea and the European Union (EU) that took effect July 1st confers preferential access to European exporters, undermining the competitiveness of U.S. businesses in Korea. Even before the European FTA, the United States had been losing valuable ground in Korea. Between 2000 and 2010, the United States fell from first to third in the ranking of Korea’s trading partners (reversing positions with China), as U.S. products declined from 18 to only 9 percent of Korean imports. Failure to approve the agreement can be expected to lead to a further decline. These moves will strongly assist U.S. producers of electronic equipment, metals, agricultural products, autos and other consumer goods. For example, agricultural exports are expected to rise $1.8 billion per year.

On the services front, KORUS will increase U.S. businesses’ access to Korea’s $560 billion services market. Financial services providers, the insurance industry and transportation firms stand to benefit substantially. KORUS usefully builds on the link between investment and services by improving the ability of U.S. law firms to establish offices in Korea. In addition, the agreement establishes a Professional Services Working Group that will address the interests of U.S. providers of legal, accounting and engineering services, provided that U.S. representatives engage actively in the group. KORUS also requires that regulations affecting services be developed transparently and that the business community be informed of their development and have an opportunity to provide comments, which the Korean government must answer.

On the investment front, KORUS affords a chance to strengthen a bilateral investment relationship that probably is underdeveloped. In 2009, the U.S. foreign direct investment flow to Korea was $3.4 billion, while there was a net outflow of Korean foreign direct investment to the United States of $255 million. KORUS supports market access for U.S. investors with investment protection provisions, strong intellectual property protection, dispute settlement provisions, a requirement for transparently developed and implemented investment regulations and a similar requirement for open, fair and impartial judicial proceedings. All this should markedly improve the Korean investment climate for U.S. business. It will strengthen the rule of law, reducing uncertainty and the risk of investing in Korea.

On the governance side, KORUS establishes various committees to monitor implementation of the agreement. The most significant of these is the Joint Committee that is to meet annually at the level of the U.S. Trade Representative and Korea’s Trade Minister to discuss not only implementation but also ways to expand trade further. KORUS establishes committees to oversee the goods and financial services commitments, among others, and working groups that will seek to increase cooperation between U.S. and Korean agencies responsible for regulating the automotive sector and professional services. These committees and working groups, enriched through regular interaction between U.S. and Korean trade officials, should increase levels of trust and understanding of each county’s regulatory systems and help officials identify opportunities to deepen the bilateral economic relationship.

Strategic Effects of the Korea Agreement

Congressional passage of KORUS will send an important signal to all countries in the Asia-Pacific region that the United States intends to remain economically engaged with them, rather than retreat behind a wall of trade barriers, and is prepared to lead development of the rules and norms governing trade and investment in the region. KORUS will provide an important economic complement to the strong, historically rooted U.S. military alliance with Korea. It also will signal a renewed commitment by the United States in shaping Asia’s economic architecture.

The last decade has seen declining U.S. economic significance in Asia. Just as the United States has slipped from first to third in its ranking as a trading partner of Korea, similar drops are occurring with respect to Japan, Indonesia, Malaysia and other Asia-Pacific economic powers. In all of Northeast and Southeast Asia, the United States has only one FTA in effect, an accord with the Republic of Singapore. Passage of KORUS now would be particularly timely, both as a sign of U.S. engagement with Asia and as a mechanism for ensuring robust growth in U.S.-Asia trade and investment.

To illustrate how KORUS might affect U.S. interests throughout the region, consider regulatory transparency. The KORUS transparency requirements could serve as a model for how countries can set and implement standards. They might for example, influence the unfolding Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations, talks that could set the stage for a broader Asia-Pacific FTA. U.S. producers, investors and providers of commercial and professional services could only benefit from a regional trend toward greater transparency and the lifting of barriers that would ensue. Other KORUS provisions favorable to the United States could function as similar benchmarks in the development of U.S. relations with Asia-Pacific nations and organizations.

Effects of the Colombia Agreement

COL-US will also strengthen relations with a key regional ally and open a foreign market to a variety of U.S. products. Bilateral trade between Colombia and the United States was worth almost $28 billion in 2010. COL-US is expected to expand U.S. GDP by approximately $2.5 billion, which includes an increase in U.S. exports of $1.1 billion and an increase of imports from Colombia of $487 million.

COL-US offers four major advantages:

• It redresses the current imbalance in tariffs. Ninety percent of goods from Colombia now enter the United States duty-free (under the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act). COL-US will eliminate 77 percent of Colombia’s tariffs immediately and the remainder over the following 10 years.
   
• It guarantees a more stable legal framework for doing business in Colombia. This should lead to bilateral investment growth, trade stimulation and job creation.
   
• It supports U.S. goals of helping Colombia reduce cocaine production by creating alternative economic opportunities for farmers.
   
• It addresses the loss of U.S. competitiveness in Colombia, in the wake of Colombian FTAs with Canada and the EU as well as Latin American sub-regional FTAs.

With respect to trade in goods, U.S. chemical, rubber and plastics producers will be key beneficiaries of COL-US, with an expected annual increase in exports in this combined sector of 23 percent, to $1.9 billion, relative to a 2007 baseline according to the ITC. The motor vehicles and parts sector is expected to see an increase of more than 40 percent. In the agriculture sector, rice exports are expected to increase from a 2007 baseline of $2 million to approximately $14 million (the corresponding increases would be 20 percent for cereal grains and 11 percent for wheat).

These and other gains will result from the gradual elimination of tariffs and from provisions that reduce non-tariff barriers as well. Among the latter, the most important changes would be increased transparency and efficiency in Colombia’s customs procedures and the removal of some sanitary and phytosanitary (or plant quarantine) restrictions. With respect to trade in services, Colombia has agreed to a number of so-called "WTO-plus" commitments that will expand U.S. firms’ access to Colombia’s $166 billion services market. For instance, the current requirement that U.S. firms hire Colombian nationals will be eliminated, and many restrictions on the financial sector will be removed.

On the investment front, the potential advantages to the United States also are substantial. In 2009, the U.S. flow of foreign direct investment into Colombia was $1.2 billion, which amounted to 32 percent of that nation’s total inflows. COL-US improves the investment climate in Colombia by providing investor protections, access to international arbitration and improved transparency in the country’s legislative and regulatory processes. These provisions will reduce investment risk and uncertainty.

COL-US presents significant improvements in the transparency of Colombia’s rule-making process, including opportunities for interested parties to have their views heard. COL-US also requires that Colombia’s judicial system conform with the rule of law for enforcing bilateral commitments, such as those relating to the protection of intellectual property. In addition to access to international arbitration for investors, COL-US includes dispute settlement mechanisms that the two governments can invoke to enforce each other’s commitments. Taken as a whole, these provisions offer an important benchmark for further developments in Colombia’s business environment. The transparency requirement alone could reduce corruption dramatically.

Labor rights have been a stumbling block to congressional approval of COL-US. The labor chapter of the agreement guarantees the enforcement of existing labor regulations, the protection of core internationally recognized labor rights, and clear access to labor tribunals or courts. In addition, in April 2011, Colombia agreed to an Action Plan strengthening labor rights and the protection of those who defend them. In the few months the plan has been in effect, Colombia has made important progress in implementation. It has reestablished a separate and fully equipped Labor Ministry to help protect labor rights and monitor employer-worker relations. It has enacted legislation authorizing criminal prosecutions of employers who undermine the right to organize or bargain collectively. It has partly eliminated a protection program backlog, involving risk assessments. And, it has hired more labor inspectors and judicial police investigators.

Besides economic benefits, COL-US offers sizable strategic benefits. It would fortify relations with an important ally in the region by renewing the commitment to the joint struggle against cocaine production and trade. Under the agreement, small and medium-sized enterprises in labor-intensive Colombian industries like textiles and apparel would gain permanent access to the U.S. consumer market. With considerable investments, Colombia would be able to compete with East Asia for these higher quality jobs, swaying people away from black markets and other illicit activities.

While Congress deliberates, the clock is ticking. Colombia is also looking at other countries as potential trade and investment partners in order to build its still underdeveloped infrastructure and reduce unemployment. Complementing its FTAs with Canada, the EU, and several countries in the region, Colombia has initiated formal trade negotiations with South Korea and Turkey and is moving toward negotiations with Japan. A perhaps more telling development is China’s interest in building an inter-oceanic railroad in Colombia as an alternative to the Panama Canal: on July 11th President Juan Manuel Santos signed a bilateral investment treaty with China (and the UK) and is expected to meet Chinese President Hu Jintao in the fall.

Effects of the Panama Agreement

Although Panama’s economy is far smaller than Korea’s or even Colombia’s, the PFTA will deliver important economic and strategic benefits to the United States. Considerable gains will take place in U.S. agriculture and auto manufacturing. Moreover, the PFTA will strengthen the U.S. presence in the region, allowing for the stronger promotion of democratic institutions and market-based economies.

U.S. merchandise exports to Panama topped $2.2 billion in 2009. The PFTA’s elimination of tariffs and reduction in non-tariff barriers will cause this figure to grow. For example, rice exports are expected to increase by 145 percent, pork exports by 96 percent and beef exports by 74 percent, according to the ITC. Exports of vehicles are expected to increase by 43 percent. The PFTA also guarantees access to Panama’s $21 billion services market for U.S. firms offering portfolio management, insurance, telecommunications, computer, distribution, express delivery, energy, environmental, legal and other professional services.

Panama’s trade-to-GDP ratio in 2009 was 1.39, highlighting the preponderance of trade in Panama’s economy and the international orientation of many of its sectors. Following passage of the PFTA, Panama will eliminate more than 87 percent of tariffs on U.S. exports immediately. The remaining tariffs will be removed within 10 years for U.S. manufactured goods and 15 years for agricultural and animal products.

PFTA protections to investors—similar to protections accorded under KORUS and COL-US—are especially valuable, as Panama receives substantial investments associated with sectors that will benefit from both from the expansion of the canal and from other infrastructure projects. A fair legal framework, investor protections and a dispute settlement mechanism, all features of the PFTA, are almost certain to increase U.S. investments in Panama. Panama’s Legislature also recently approved a Tax Information Exchange Agreement with the United States and amended current laws to foster tax transparency and strengthen intellectual property rights. These are crucial steps in preventing the use of Panamanian jurisdiction as a haven for money laundering activities.

Panamanian laws and regulations prohibiting strikes or collective bargaining were a concern that initially delayed implementation of the PFTA. But, these laws have been changed, with the exception of a requirement that 40 workers (not the recommended 20) are needed to form a union; the 40-worker requirement has been kept partly because labor groups in Panama support it. The PFTA’s labor chapter protects the rights and principles outlined in the International Labor Organization’s 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.

Besides offering economic advantages to the United States, the PFTA is a strategic agreement. Strengthening economic links with Panama should bolster the U.S. capacity to address cocaine trafficking in the region, in light of Panama’s location as Colombia’s gateway to North America. The importance of the canal, now undergoing an expansion that will double its shipping capacity, further underscores the U.S. need to strengthen bilateral relations with Panama.

The time to act is now. Like Colombia, Panama has been negotiating with economic powerhouses other than the United States. It recently signed a trade agreement with Canada and an Association Agreement with the EU. Delaying passage of the PFTA would generate a loss of market share for a variety of sectors of the U.S. economy.

Conclusion

All three FTAs encourage trade by removing tariff and non-tariff barriers. All the agreements provide access to large services markets, foster transparency and offer significant strategic advantages to the United States. Congress should approve each of them now.

The authors would like to thank Juan Pablo Candela for his assistance with this project.

Downloads

• Download Policy Brief

       

Policy Brief #184

The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA) approved in September 2011 constitutes the most significant overhaul of the American patent system in decades. This policy brief examines some key patent law changes and studies mandated by the legislation, and provides recommendations for companies on successfully navigating the new landscape. [Editor's Note: the legislation was signed into law by President Obama on September 16, 2011.]

Perhaps most notably, the new law will move the United States away from a “first to invent” system and closer to the “first to file” approach used in much of the rest of the world. Other important changes include a new proceeding in the U .S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) for third-party challenges to the validity of a recently issued patent, an expanded mechanism for a third party to provide information to the PTO that could be used to narrow or eliminate claims in a pending patent application being prosecuted by a commercial rival, and the introduction of a new, broadly applicable patent infringement defense based on prior commercial use.

	RECOMMENDATIONS
	Under the “first to file” provision of the AIA, companies should be more careful when producing pre-filing disclosures for venues such as conferences and trade shows, with the understanding that under the AIA those disclosures may play a much larger role than in the past with respect to patentability of the associated IP.   Under the AIA, rights to an invention prior to a filing date will depend more on the history of relevant disclosures and less on nonpublic, internal company documents such as laboratory notebooks. All companies—large and small—should consider how to modify their procedures for protecting, evaluating, and filing patents on their inventions accordingly.   The AIA provides a grace period during which inventors can disclose their invention without losing the right to patent it, but leaves uncertainty regarding the definition of “disclosure”. Companies should carefully monitor case law and PTO actions that will undoubtedly help clarify this issue in the coming years.   Companies should reevaluate the extent and manner to which they use provisional patent applications to preserve IP rights.   In light of the increased number of mechanisms available to challenge the validity of pending and issued patents, companies engaged in patent prosecution should reconsider the tradeoffs of performing their own thorough prior art searches during patent prosecution. By finding and disclosing relevant prior art to the PTO, companies may reduce the likelihood that the disclosed prior art will be used successfully against them in future validity challenges.

In addition, there are several other aspects of the AIA that do not change patent law, but may have far reaching consequences. For example, an AIA mandated study by the Government Accountability Office promises to furnish vitally important information on the economic impact of patent litigation by non-practicing entities, and will almost certainly influence future patent legislation. Under the AIA, the hurdles small businesses face in protecting their patents internationally will also receive attention through a PTO study.

It will take many years to develop a mature body of case law and legal scholarship on the full impact of the AIA. What is clear today is that it will profoundly impact the ways that patents are filed, prosecuted, and litigated in the coming years. Companies and other entities that retool their patent strategies to address these changes will be in a much stronger position to maximize the value of their intellectual property (IP) portfolios.

First Inventor to File

One of the most significant components of the AIA concerns the move from a first to invent system to a first to file system. Under this provision, which takes effect 18 months after the AIA is enacted into law, an inventor may win the race to create the invention but lose the race to file the corresponding patent application, and thus lose the right to patent the invention.

However, the AIA includes an important exception in the form of a grace period allowing an inventor or others who obtained information from the inventor to make disclosures regarding the invention in advance of filing a patent application, as long as the application is filed within one year after the first disclosure. Some form of grace period has been a feature of the U.S. patent landscape since the 19th century, and allows an inventor time to examine the commercial practicability of the invention, engage in discussions with potential partners and customers and secure the resources necessary to draft a patent application.

The inclusion of both first to file language and a grace period in the new patent law creates what could amount to a hybrid between first to invent and first to file. For example, in the case of two inventors who independently disclose the same invention immediately following its conception, both the pre-AIA “first to invent” law and the post- AIA “first to file” law can favor the earlier discloser, who is by definition the earlier inventor if the disclosure is truly immediate. However, in the absence of disclosure in advance of a patent filing, pre-AIA law favors the earlier inventor, while the AIA “first to file” provision will favor the earlier filer.

As a result, under the AIA inventors and the companies that employ them must think much more carefully about how to manage pre-filing disclosures. Put simply, silence can be costly. To the extent that a company remains quiet about an invention while contemplating whether or not to pursue patent protection, it stands exposed to the possibility of losing the right to do so if a competitor files first. A company wishing to avoid this risk faces the additional challenge that the AIA does not specifically define what constitutes “disclosure” sufficient to preserve patentability. The use of provisional patent applications, which offer advantages including a more formalized way to document the dates and content of disclosures than activities such as presentations at trade shows, should also be reevaluated in light of the AIA.

Some companies may find themselves targeted by competitors’ disclosures engineered specifically to foreclose patent opportunities. To reduce vulnerability to such attacks, companies can engage in preemptive “defensive” disclosures, but must be mindful of the impacts of these disclosures on their own patent filing deadlines.

In addition, employees engaged in intellectual property creation can be made aware that there is an increased need to pursue timely steps to secure patent protection on new inventions. Internal company systems for documenting, reporting, and rewarding innovations can be modified to better match the provisions of the AIA. Companies should also consider the budgetary impact of the AIA in terms of the amount and timing of expenditures.

It is important to recognize that the AIA leaves substantial differences between the patent laws in the United States and those in other countries. For example, unlike in the United States both pre- and post-AIA, in Europe an inventor’s own public disclosures in the year prior to a patent filing can be invalidating prior art. To the extent that for financial or other reasons a company needs to defer filing a U.S. patent application to a future date, in one sense the systems have actually moved farther apart. This is due to what amounts to a newly incentivized option to buy some measure of protection in the U.S. by disclosing in advance of a filing at the cost of losing patentability in Europe. This requires careful consideration of disclosure plans.

Best Mode and Invalidity

The AIA does not alter the requirement that a patent application must “set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out” the invention. However, somewhat paradoxically, for proceedings commenced on or after the date of its enactment, the AIA eliminates the alleged failure to follow this requirement as grounds for asserting invalidity.

This change has the potential to alter a fundamental compact between an inventor and the government that is at the core of the patent system, which grants a patent holder the right to exclude others from practicing an invention in exchange for disclosing the best mode contemplated by the inventor. The AIA eliminates the failure to make this disclosure as grounds for asserting invalidity. Some inventors may view this as creating an incentive to intentionally withhold information on how to best carry out an invention.

Supplemental Examination

The AIA creates a new supplemental examination procedure, effective one year after enactment, allowing a patent owner to request that the PTO perform a supplemental examination to “consider, reconsider, or correct information believed to be relevant” to a patent. Subject to certain exceptions, this process can prevent a patent from being “held unenforceable on the basis of conduct” relating to this information.

The supplemental examination provision is particularly relevant to inequitable conduct allegations that are frequently raised by defendants in patent litigation. Defendants often try to identify information relating to the prosecution of patents that have been asserted against them that, in their view, indicates inequitable conduct rendering the patents unenforceable. Supplemental examination provides a way for a patent owner to preemptively attempt to inoculate a patent against such allegations.

Pre-Issuance Submissions

Beginning one year after the AIA is enacted, third parties will have the option of providing pre-issuance submissions of prior art accompanied by “a concise description of the asserted relevance of each submitted document” to the PTO in connection with a pending application. Such submissions can be used, for example, to attempt to prevent or hinder the issuance of a patent that the submitting party views as detrimental to its interests. However, to the extent that a patent examiner finds the arguments provided through a pre-issuance submission unconvincing, the resulting patent might actually be strengthened, not weakened.

Prior Commercial Use Defense to Infringement

Since 1999, alleged infringers of business method patents have had access to a “prior use” provision that can constitute a defense against infringement, provided certain conditions are met. For patents issued on or after the date of enactment of the AIA, the prior use defense can be applied, subject to certain exceptions, to patent infringement claims covering a much broader range of subject matter “consisting of a process, or consisting of a machine, manufacture, or composition of matter used in a manufacturing or other commercial process.”

Post-Grant Review Proceedings

Post-grant review proceedings are conducted through the PTO in order to reconsider alreadyissued patents, and can lead to the confirmation, cancellation, withdrawal, or modification of patent claims. T he phrase “post-grant review” is sometimes used to broadly refer to multiple types of post-grant proceedings including the ex parte and inter partes reexaminations available under pre- AIA patent law, and sometimes to more narrowly refer to a specific new review option created by the AIA (in fact, in the AIA itself the phrase is used in both the broad and narrow meanings).

Under pre-AIA patent law, a requester wishing to initiate an ex parte or inter partes reexamination provides the PTO with one or more published prior art references and an explanation why those references, in the view of the requester, raise a “substantial new question of patentability.” The PTO can either grant or deny the request; if the request is granted, an ex parte reexamination proceeds without any further input from the requester (unless the requester is the patent owner), while in an inter partes reexamination the requester participates during the reexamination process.

Both types of reexaminations have proven to be highly effective ways for third parties to challenge the validity of issued patent claims, often in tandem with or as a lower cost alternative to challenges adjudicated through the Federal court system and the International Trade Commission. According to data released by the PTO in June 2011, 92% of the requests for ex parte reexamination filed since the proceeding was introduced in the 1980s have been granted, and fewer than one quarter of patents subject to ex parte reexamination have emerged without any claim changes or cancellations. Inter partes reexamination was introduced in 1999; since then 95% of inter partes reexamination requests have been granted, and only 13% of patents subject to inter partes reexamination have survived with all claims confirmed.

The AIA leaves ex parte reexamination in place, but a year after enactment will replace inter partes reexaminations with “inter partes review” proceedings adjudicated by a newly renamed Patent Trial and Appeal Board within the PTO. The pre-AIA threshold to grant an inter partes reexamination of a “substantial new question of patentability” will be replaced with a higher threshold requiring that the PTO find a “reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the petition.” This higher standard will also be applied to inter partes reexaminations filed during the transition period immediately following enactment of the AIA and preceding the shift to inter partes review. Inter partes review requests must be filed no earlier than nine months (and in some cases longer) after the grant or reissue of the patent being challenged.

Additionally, the AIA creates a new “post-grant review” process through which a petitioner who is not the patent owner can request the cancellation as invalid of one or more claims of a patent granted or reissued within the previous nine months. The PTO can authorize a post-grant review if the information presented by the petitioner, “if not rebutted, would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least one of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” Under the AIA this threshold can be satisfied not only using traditional invalidity arguments based on settled law, but also by a petition that raises “a novel or unsettled legal question that is important to other patents or patent applications.” This language amounts to an invitation to address “novel or unsettled” legal questions through the PTO, raising a number of issues relating to respective roles the courts and the PTO will play in resolving them.

For companies engaged in or threatened with patent litigation or those that simply want to launch a pre-emptive strike at patents held by a competitor, post-grant review introduces a new way to challenge patents. The AIA contains estoppel and other provisions intended to prevent a requester from having two bites at the apple by challenging a claim in both a PTO post-grant (or inter partes) review and a civil action or International Trade Commission proceeding. However, in some circumstances these provisions may turn out to be largely toothless, since patent cases often involve multiple defendants who form joint defense groups and engage in coordinated attacks on patent validity. There is nothing in the AIA preventing one defendant from challenging claim validity through a post-grant or inter partes review and another from simultaneously or later asserting invalidity of the same claims in the federal court system or at the International Trade Commission.

The AIA also expressly provides that, starting one year after enactment, statements by a patent owner filed in a federal court or with the PTO regarding claim scope can be cited to the PTO for consideration in ex parte, inter partes, and post-grant review proceedings to determine claim meaning.

Other Provisions

In addition to codifying many changes to patent law, including those described above, the AIA contains other provisions that will likely have a significant impact on the operation of the PTO and on future patent legislation. Several of these provisions are discussed below.

Fee Diversion

One of the most controversial aspects of the patent reform debate has pertained to the practice of fee diversion, which arises because the PTO takes in an amount in fees that exceeds its appropriation. The Senate version (S. 23) of the AIA passed in March 2011 provided for the creation of a fund that would have allowed the PTO roll over excess funds into future fiscal years. However, in the House version (H.R. 1249) passed in June 2011 that became the template for the final legislation, this provision was removed and replaced with a newly established “Patent and Trademark Fee Reserve Fund” to be held in the treasury and into which excess fees will be deposited. This approach does not cleanly put the fee diversion issue to rest, and the details of how the reserve fund will be managed in future years remain unclear.

Studies Mandated by the AIA

The AIA mandates several studies, including one to be performed by the Government Accountability Office to examine the “consequences of litigation by non-practicing entities, or by patent assertion entities,” to gather data, among other things, on the volume of litigation, the number of cases found to be without merit, the costs to patent holders, licensees, licensors, and inventors, the economic impact of this litigation, and the “benefit to commerce, if any, supplied by non-practicing entities or patent assertion entities that prosecute such litigation.”

“Non-practicing entities” and “patent assertion entities” are terms that are sometimes used to describe companies that have little or no business other than the assertion of patents. Patent litigation involving these entities has grown significantly in recent years, in large part due to the potential for large judgments and settlements. The GAO study provides an opportunity for an unbiased examination of a significant aspect of the litigation environment, and is likely to produce information that will be valuable in drafting future patent legislation.

The AIA also mandates that the PTO perform a study on international patent protections for small businesses. T he financial burden of obtaining international patent protection is particularly heavy for small companies due to the combined costs of performing many different country-specific filings. As a result, many small companies either avoid foreign filings altogether, or perform foreign filings only for a small subset set of countries and only for the patents that they believe to be the most valuable. A goal of the AIA-mandated study is to determine whether to recommend establishing a loan or grant program to help small businesses defray the costs associated with international patent protection.

It is likely the study will conclude that such a program would be beneficial to small businesses, but it is just as likely that implementing it will prove to be extremely difficult in the current budgetary environment. However, the study may influence future patent legislation in the United States and abroad, and may be useful in multilateral discussions regarding international patent protection.

Conclusion

The AIA will reshape how United States patents are obtained, challenged, and valued in acquisition, licensing, and litigation settlement discussions. Companies that overhaul their intellectual property strategies in light of the provisions of the AIA will be in a better position to maximize the value of their patent portfolios and to strengthen their options in patent litigation matters.

Downloads

• Download Policy Brief

       

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A few influential Americans have begun to suggest that the United States should reduce its long-standing security commitment to Taiwan. Some say that Taiwan itself has chosen to improve relations with China, so the island has less need for advanced U.S. weaponry and a defense pledge. Others argue that Washington, to avoid unnecessary tensions with a rising China, should accommodate Beijing on the most neuralgic issue—Taiwan.

The first group overstates the limits of the ongoing Taiwan-China détente. True, progress has been made in normalizing, liberalizing, and institutionalizing the economic relationship. But, to the disappointment of many Chinese, none has occurred on political and security issues, because the Taiwan public is not ready to go there and serious conceptual differences exist on how to get there anyway. So the prospects for cross-Strait relations in the near-term are for modest, incremental progress only, or a stall.

The second group misunderstands the benefits and costs of a significant American accommodation to China regarding Taiwan (e.g. by sharply cutting back arms sales). In fact, Washington has frictions with China on a growing list of issues. Conceding to Beijing on Taiwan will not help us elsewhere. Moreover, our friends and allies (e.g. Japan and Korea) will worry that the United States might sacrifice their interests next for the sake of good relations with China. Finally, the primary reason China has failed to incorporate Taiwan on its terms is not U.S. arms sales but because its negotiating position is unacceptable to the Taiwan public.

As China rises and seeks to reshape East Asia more to its liking, how the United States responds will be a critical variable. It needs the right mix of accommodation and firmness. Giving way on Taiwan will neither pacify Beijing nor assure our allies.

---

Introduction

Should the United States abandon Taiwan? Until recently, even to pose such a question would have been unthinkable in Washington. While the U.S. relationship with Taiwan may have had its ups and downs over the past six decades, but the strong American commitment has endured. But now, individuals who previously served in senior positions in the U.S. government are calling it into question. Theirs is not a modest proposal, and it deserves careful examination.

Some observers believe that Taiwan has become a strategic liability. They remind us that China regards the settlement of the Taiwan problem as its internal affair, yet the United States continues to provide the island with advanced weaponry and at least an implicit pledge to come to its defense. They echo Chinese diplomats who argue that our arms sales are the major obstacle to good U.S.-China relations. (These diplomats also assert that U.S. arms sales both discourage Taipei to negotiate seriously with Beijing and encourage Taiwanese politicians who have separatist agendas.) Therefore, it is argued, the United States needs to reconsider fundamentally its security support for Taiwan.

The most prominent voice for this point of view is Zbigniew Brzezinski, Jimmy Carter’s national security adviser. He argues that the hostility that arms sales foster in Beijing precludes whatever strategic cooperation a declining United States can secure from a rising China. Moreover, he says, “it is doubtful that Taiwan can indefinitely avoid a more formal connection with China,” and points to some version of the unification formula Beijing used for Hong Kong as a possible basis. That in turn would end the island’s need to depend on the United States for its security.[1] Others in this camp, more or less, include retired admiral Bill Owens, retired ambassador Chas Freeman, Charles Glaser of George Washington University, and the members of a policy panel assembled by the Miller Center of the University of Virginia.[2]

To make the conversation even more interesting, there are two other versions of this abandonment idea, ones that start with how Taiwan has changed since 2008:

• At least one conservative Congressman, a long-time supporter of Taiwan, believes that Taiwan was now working with an “autocratic China,” and since he opposes autocracy, the island’s government no longer deserved his support.[3] That is, Taiwan has abandoned U.S. values, which is bad, so he has abandoned Taiwan.
   
• A Portland State University scholar has argued that Taiwan seems to have decided that its own best interests require it to accommodate to China and rely much less on the United States (as Finland accommodated the Soviet Union during the Cold War). But in his view, this is good for Washington because it eliminates a long-time burden.[4]  And a Taiwan scholar recently argued that it was in the island’s own interest to get out of the middle of the China-U.S. rivalry.[5]

In the abstract, it should not be surprising that some Americans are rethinking U.S. support for Taiwan. We live in a new world. China’s power and international role are growing. It is in the interest of the United States to maximize areas of cooperation and mutual benefit with Beijing where possible, even as we demonstrate firmness when it overreaches (as it has). It is not in the U.S. interest to act in ways that lead Chinese leaders to conclude that America pursues a policy of containment. So, this logic goes, perhaps Washington should end commitments that are so offensive to China that it will not cooperate with the United States on projects of strategic value to us. Moreover, as the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) becomes more capable, America may find it harder operationally to honor its commitments to Taiwan, even if it wished to do so.

Taiwan Shifts Strategy

To sort through these competing ideas, it is necessary to understand how U.S.-China-Taiwan relations have changed in the last five years and what it means for U.S. policy.

For twenty-five years, Taiwan has faced a serious dilemma. On the one hand, many Taiwan companies benefit from investing in China to produce goods for the Chinese and international markets. On the other hand, China wishes to end Taiwan’s separate political status on terms similar to that used for Hong Kong, which most Taiwan people oppose. From around 1995 to 2008, Taiwan’s response to China’s political goals was to emphasize the island’s sovereignty, which only led Beijing to fear that Taiwan’s leaders intended to create a totally independent country. China in turn built up military capabilities to deter what it feared, which only made Taiwan more anxious. Washington worried that this action-reaction spiral might lead to war, and it periodically opposed some of Taipei’s initiatives.

Ma Ying-jeou won Taiwan’s 2008 presidential election by articulating a different vision: that the island could better preserve its prosperity, freedom, dignity, and security by engaging China rather than provoking it. Engagement would focus first on enhancing economic cooperation, thus avoiding contentious and unproductive political arguments. Expanding business ties would yield concrete benefits for both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Opening Taiwan universities to Mainland students would fill out enrollments and expose Chinese young people to a democratic society. In short, Ma believed, Taiwan could give China such a large stake in peace that it would not dare to risk that stake by coercing the island into submission. He made significant progress during his first term in removing obstacles to business and liberalizing trade, most notably in reaching an Economic Cooperation Framework agreement with China in 2010, the first step toward creating a free-trade area. Taiwan bounced back fairly quickly from the global economic crisis and had 4 percent growth in 2011. A growing stream of Chinese tourists buoyed some sectors of the Taiwan economy, and the number of Mainland students grew steadily.

Ma had another reason for engaging China: the United States. Taipei’s relations with Washington had suffered before 2008 because U.S. officials feared Taiwan’s political initiatives would spark a Chinese over-reaction, creating a conflict that might require American intervention. The reduction of tensions that Ma’s policies brought about calmed Washington’s fears and increased U.S. confidence that Taiwan’s intentions were constructive. The Bush and Obama administrations responded by improving U.S.-Taiwan relations, by approving three large arms-sales packages and extending other benefits.

Yet Ma’s China policy was not a total accommodation to Chinese wishes. Even though Beijing in 2009 exerted pressure on Taiwan to move toward political and security talks, Ma pushed back, and for good reason. The Taiwan public was not yet ready to support them, particularly the approximately 25 percent who retain the goal of total independence. In any case, there were serious conceptual differences between the two sides, specifically whether Taiwan was a sovereign entity for purposes of cross-Strait relations and the island’s international role. On the security side, China continued to build up its military capabilities relevant to Taiwan—particularly ballistic and cruise missiles. According to one think-tank’s analysis, an intensive missile barrage by the PLA can now ground Taiwan’s air force in the very early stages of a conflict, and Taiwan’s current defense strategy depends on its aircraft getting off the ground.[6] So Ma has spurned Chinese proposals for a peace accord because he does not see how it would improve Taiwan’s security, and his caution has persisted to this day.

In effect, Ma has pursued a mixed or hedging strategy toward China: engage it in areas that both benefit Taiwan and encourage Chinese restraint (economics and education); deflect Beijing on proposals that are not in the island’s interests (politics and security); and preserve a good relationship with the United States (to guard against the worst). A significant part of the Taiwan public—known as the Green Camp—was not happy with Ma’s mix of engagement and firmness. They feared he had put the island on a slippery slope to subordination and unification on China’s terms. The Greens would have preferred more firmness and less engagement. Yet so far, Ma’s strategy has the backing of the majority of island’s public, usually known as the Blue Camp. In the last election apparently, around 55 percent of voters approved of his approach while 45 percent remained skeptical or deeply opposed. 

Back to the Question of Abandonment

The fact that Ma is hedging the island’s bets should be reassuring to Americans who worry that Taiwan is, in effect, “abandoning the United States” for the sake of relations with China. Such strategic appeasement would only be happening if Taipei were willing to concede to Beijing on political and security matters. Yet Taiwan has been unwilling to abandon its claim that it is a sovereign entity and accept a solution similar to that applied to Hong Kong. Instead, it asserts what Ma calls “the sovereignty of the Republic of China.” Moreover, Taipei sees a continuing need for a deterrent against China’s use of its growing military capabilities. Even as it sees the value of enhancing Beijing’s stake in peace, it does not fully trust statements of peaceful intentions. And it is certainly not prepared to terminate its special security relationship with the United States.[7]

The more difficult question is whether the United States, for the sake of its own relationship with China, should, in effect, abandon Taiwan. China believes that U.S. political and security support for Taiwan is the primary reason it has not achieved its unification goal, because it fortifies the confidence of the island’s leaders that they can get away with refusing to negotiate on PRC terms. So Beijing believes that if it could induce Washington to end arms sales to Taiwan’s military, drop even an implicit commitment to defend the island if attacked, and support unification, its problem would be solved. So China would be very pleased if the United States abandoned Taiwan, and has suggested that if only Washington ended arms sales, U.S.-China relations would be problem free.

American analysts have offered several compelling reasons why the United States should not dissociate itself from Taiwan as long as Taiwan desires American support:[8]

• Although Taiwan has at times been the most important source of U.S.-China conflict, it is not the only one. For example, Beijing’s goals in East Asia are not limited to bringing the island back into the PRC fold. In addition, it seeks to expand its security perimeter away from its eastern and southern coast, where it was for decades. That in turn has meant that the PLA navy and air force are operating increasingly in the traditional domain of U.S. and Japanese forces.[9] Removing Taiwan as a problem would in no way end or reduce this mutual impingement; it would only change its location. Taiwan aside, Beijing would still regard American “socialization” as negative.
   
• U.S. allies and partners—Japan, the Republic Korea, and others not necessarily in the Asian region—have have much at stake in Washington’s future approach to Taiwan. Simply put, a United States that would abandon Taiwan could abandon them. Of course, there may be hypothetical reasons why America might withdraw support that stem from Taiwan’s policies rather than its own commitment. So the reasons for any abandonment would be important. But the fear remains.
   
• Whatever China says, U.S. arms are actually not the reason that Beijing has been unable to bring Taiwan “into the embrace of the Motherland.” More to the point, China has not been able to persuade Taiwan’s government and public to accept its formula, which is called “one country, two systems” and was the one used for Hong Kong. If China were to make an offer that was actually to Taiwan’s liking, it would not refuse because of U.S. arms sales. Of course, a weak and friendless Taiwan might conclude that it had no choice but to settle on whatever terms it could extract. But that is not an outcome to which Washington should be a party (nor is it really in China’s interest to gain Taiwan through intimidation).
   
• Finally, how a status quo United States and a reviving China cope with each other—their key foreign policy challenge for the rest of the century—will be played out over the next few decades in a series of test cases. North Korea, maritime East Asia, and Iran are a few of them. Taiwan is another. While active U.S. opposition to Taiwan’s unification with the Mainland would understandably lead Beijing to infer that our intentions are hostile across the board, supporting Beijing’s approach when Taipei objects would be a serious demonstration of weakness.

Should the United States concede to China on Taiwan, the lessons that Beijing would learn about the intentions of the United States would likely discourage its moderation and accommodation on other issues like Korea or maritime East Asia; in that respect, America’s friends and allies are right. Continuity of U.S. policy toward Taiwan will not guarantee that China’s actions in other areas will support the status quo, but it increases the likelihood that it will. Conversely, a China that addresses its Taiwan problem with creativity and due regard to the views on the island says something positive about what kind of great power the PRC will be. A more aggressive approach, one that relies on pressure and intimidation, signals reason for concern about its broader intentions. In this regard, Taiwan is the canary in the East Asian coal mine.

A Slippery Slope?

Even if Taipei does not make a proactive strategic decision to appease Beijing, and even if Washington does not seek to curry Chinese favor by sacrificing Taiwan’s interests, there remains the possibility that Taiwan might undermine itself through inattention or neglect. That is, Taiwan might assume that Beijing’s intentions are so benign that it is prepared to accept some version of the status quo over the long term. Yet China has a different objective—ending Taiwan’s de facto independence more or less on its terms—and it may not have infinite patience. The danger is, therefore, that a frustrated China might seek to exploit the power asymmetry between the two sides of the Strait and intimidate Taiwan into accepting “an offer it can’t refuse.”

So what can Taiwan do to forestall that day? The first thing is to not create the impression in Beijing that the door on unification is closing forever—which Taiwan is currently doing. In addition, there are things it can do at the margin to strengthen itself and therefore increase the confidence needed to resist PRC pressure.

• Economically, sustain the island’s competitiveness in shifting to a knowledge-based economy, and by liberalizing its economic ties with all its major trading partners, not just China. This will require eliminating some protectionist barriers, but the structural adjustment thus created will work to Taiwan’s benefit.
   
• Politically, reform the political system so that it does a better job of addressing the real challenges that Taiwan faces (rather than focusing on relatively superficial issues).
   
• Also politically, foster a clearer sense of what it means to say that Taiwan or the ROC is a sovereign entity, not just for its role in the international system but also regarding cross-Strait relations.
   
• Militarily, enhance the deterrent capabilities of Taiwan’s armed forces in ways that raise the costs and uncertainties for Beijing if it were ever to mount an intimidation campaign.

None of these forms of self-strengthening will be easy. But they will buoy Taiwan’s psychological confidence and reduce the chances of PRC pressure in the first place.

Because the United States has an interest in China approaching its Taiwan “test case” in a constructive manner—that is, avoiding intimidation and accommodating Taiwan’s concerns—it should help Taiwan where it can to improve its odds. The most obvious ways are economically, by drawing Taiwan into the circle of high-quality liberalization, and militarily, by supporting innovative and cost-effective ways to enhance deterrence.

Downloads

• Download the policy brief

       

Event Information

The Metropolitan Policy Program at Brookings, hosted The Political Geography of America's Purple States: Five Trends That Will Decide the 2008 Election, a briefing on a new series of reports on the political demography of "purple" states in the 2008 election.

Purple states-or states where the current balance of political forces does not decisively favor one party or the other-will play an undeniably pivotal role in the upcoming election and include: Virginia and Florida in the South; the Intermountain West states of Colorado, New Mexico, Nevada, and Arizona; Michigan, Missouri, and Ohio in the Heartland; and Pennsylvania.

On October 10, 2008 at the National Press Club in Washington DC, authors William Frey and Ruy Teixeira highlighted the political and demographic trends in these 10 battleground states, focusing not only on their role in the 2008 election, but their position as toss-ups in years to come.

The session opened with an overview of the demographic shifts shaping all the contested states studied, and evolved into a detailed presentation of the trends that are testing and reshaping the balance of their voting populations, focusing particularly on five trends that Frey and Teixeira believe will decide the 2008 election. Feedback from James Barnes, political correspondent for the National Journal, helped shape the conversation.

Event Materials

• Agenda
• Presentation
• Biographies

       

This is the fourth in a series of reports on the demographic and political dynamics under way in key “battleground” states, deemed to be crucial in deciding the 2008 election. As part of the Metropolitan Policy Program’s Blueprint for American Prosperity, this series will provide an electoral component to the initiative’s analysis of, and prescriptions for, bolstering the health and vitality of America’s metropolitan areas, the engines of the U.S. economy. This report focuses on two major battleground states in the South, Virginia and Florida, which serve as bookends to an emerging New South.

Virginia and Florida have eligible voter populations that are rapidly changing. White working class voters are declining sharply while white college graduates are growing and minorities, especially Hispanics and Asians, are growing even faster. These changes are having their largest effects in these states’ major metropolitan areas, particularly Miami and rapidly-growing Orlando and Tampa in Florida’s I-4 Corridor and the suburbs of Washington, D.C. in Northern Virginia. Other large metro areas in these states are also feeling significant effects from these changes and will contribute to potentially large demographically related political shifts in the next election.

In Virginia, these trends will have their strongest impact in the fast-growing and Democratic-trending Northern Virginia area, where Democrats will seek to increase their modest margin from the 2004 election. The trends could also have big impacts in the Richmond and Virginia Beach metros, where Democrats will need to compress their 2004 deficits. Overall, the GOP will be looking to maintain their very strong support among Virginia’s declining white working class, especially in the conservative South and West region. The Democrats will be reaching out to the growing white college graduate group, critical to their prospects in Northern Virginia and statewide. The Democrats will also be relying on the increasing number of minority voters, who could help them not just in Northern Virginia, but also in the Virginia Beach metro and the Richmond and East region.

In Florida, these trends will have their strongest impacts in the fast-growing I-4 Corridor (36 percent of the statewide vote), which, while Democratic2 trending, is still the key swing region in Florida, and in the Miami metro, largest in the state and home to 27 percent of the vote. The trends could also have big impacts in the South and North, where Democrats will be looking to reduce their 2004 deficits in important metros like Jacksonville (North) and Sarasota and Cape Coral (South). Across the state, the GOP needs to prevent any erosion of support among white working class voters, especially among Democratic-trending whites with some college. They will also seek to hold the line among white college graduates, whose support levels for the GOP are high but declining over time. Finally, the support of the growing Hispanic population is critical to GOP efforts to hold the state, but this group is changing generationally and in terms of mix (more non-Cuban Hispanics), which could open the door to the Democrats.

Both of these states are near the top of the lists of most analysts’ list of battleground states for November 2008. Florida was a very closely contested state in both 2000 and 2004 (especially 2000). But Virginia’s status as a battleground is new to 2008. Yet in both states the contested political terrain reflects the dynamic demographic changes occurring within them. With 27 and 13 electoral votes, respectively, all eyes will be on Florida and Virginia on election night.

Downloads

• Download
• Maps and Figures, Part One
• Maps and Figures, Part Two

       

This is the third in a series of reports on the demographic and political dynamics under way in key “battleground” states, deemed to be crucial in deciding the 2008 election. As part of the Metropolitan Policy Program’s Blueprint for American Prosperity, this series will provide an electoral component to the initiative’s analysis of and prescriptions for bolstering the health and vitality of America’s metropolitan areas, the engines of the U.S. economy. This report focuses on three major battleground states in the Midwest—Ohio, Michigan, and Missouri—and finds that:

Ohio, Michigan and Missouri all feature eligible voter populations dominated by white working class voters. However, this profile is changing, albeit more slowly than in faster-growing states like Colorado or Arizona, as the white working class declines and white college graduates and minorities, especially Hispanics, increase. The largest effects are in these states’ major metropolitan areas— Cleveland, Columbus, and Cincinnati in Ohio: Detroit in Michigan; and St. Louis and Kansas City in Missouri— especially in their suburbs.

In Ohio, these trends could have their strongest impact in the fast-growing and Democratic-trending Columbus metro, where Democrats will seek to tip the entire metro in their favor by expanding their margin in Franklin County and reducing their deficit in the suburbs. The trends could also have big impacts in the Cleveland metro (especially its suburbs), in the Cincinnati metro (especially Hamilton County) and in the mediumsized metros of the Northeast (Akron, Canton, and Youngstown). Overall, the GOP will be looking to maintain their support among the declining white working class, especially among whites with some college, who have been trending Democratic. Also critical to their prospects is whether the growing white college-educated group will continue its movement toward the Democrats.

In Michigan, these trends will likely determine whether the fast-growing and populous Detroit suburbs continue shifting toward the Democrats, a development which would tip the Detroit metro (44 percent of the statewide vote) even farther in the direction of the Democrats. The trends will also have a big impact on whether the GOP can continue their hold on the conservative and growing Southwest region of the state that includes the Grand Rapids metro. The GOP will seek to increase its support among white college graduates, who gave the GOP relatively strong support in 2004, but have been trending toward the Democrats long term.

In Missouri, these trends will have their strongest impact on the two big metros of Democratic-trending St. Louis (38 percent of the vote)—especially its suburbs— and GOP-trending Kansas City (20 percent of the statewide vote). The Democrats need a large increase in their margins out of these two metros to have a chance of taking the state, while the GOP simply needs to hold the line. The trends will also have a significant impact on the conservative and growing Southwest region, the bulwark of GOP support in the state, where the Republicans will look to generate even higher support levels. The GOP will try to maintain its support from the strongly pro-GOP white college graduate group, which has been increasing its share of voters as it has trended Republican.

These large, modestly growing states in the heartland of the United States will play a pivotal roll in November’s election. Though experiencing smaller demographic shifts than many other states, they are each changing in ways that underscore the contested status of their combined 48 Electoral College votes in this year’s presidential contest.



Table Of Contents:
Executive Summary » 
Introduction and Data Sources and Definitions » 
Ohio » 
Michigan » 
Missouri » 
Endnotes »

Downloads

• Download

       

Nearly a week after the death of 18 year-old Michael Brown in Ferguson, Mo., protests continue in the 21,000-person suburban community on St. Louis’ north side and around the nation.

Amid the social media and news coverage of the community’s response to the police shooting of the unarmed teenager, a picture of Ferguson and its history has emerged.

The New York Times and others have described the deep-seated racial tensions and inequalities that have long plagued the St. Louis region, as well as the dramatic demographic transformation of Ferguson from a largely white suburban enclave (it was 85 percent white as recently as 1980) to a predominantly black community (it was 67 percent black by 2008-2012).

But Ferguson has also been home to dramatic economic changes in recent years. The city’s unemployment rate rose from roughly 7 percent in 2000 to over 13 percent in 2010-12. For those residents who were employed, inflation-adjusted average earnings fell by one-third. The number of households using federal Housing Choice Vouchers climbed from roughly 300 in 2000 to more than 800 by the end of the decade.

Amid these changes, poverty skyrocketed. Between 2000 and 2010-2012, Ferguson’s poor population doubled. By the end of that period, roughly one in four residents lived below the federal poverty line ($23,492 for a family of four in 2012), and 44 percent fell below twice that level.

These changes affected neighborhoods throughout Ferguson. At the start of the 2000s, the five census tracts that fall within Ferguson’s border registered poverty rates ranging between 4 and 16 percent. However, by 2008-2012 almost all of Ferguson’s neighborhoods had poverty rates at or above the 20 percent threshold at which the negative effects of concentrated poverty begin to emerge. (One Ferguson tract had a poverty rate of 13.1 percent in 2008-2012, while the remaining tracts fell between 19.8 and 33.3 percent.)

Census Tract-Level Poverty Rates in St. Louis County, 2000

Census Tract-Level Poverty Rates in St. Louis County, 2008-2012

As dramatic as the growth in economic disadvantage has been in this community, Ferguson is not alone.

Within the nation’s 100 largest metro areas, the number of suburban neighborhoods where more than 20 percent of residents live below the federal poverty line more than doubled between 2000 and 2008-2012. Almost every major metro area saw suburban poverty not only grow during the 2000s but also become more concentrated in high-poverty neighborhoods. By 2008-2012, 38 percent of poor residents in the suburbs lived in neighborhoods with poverty rates of 20 percent or higher. For poor black residents in those communities, the figure was 53 percent.

Like Ferguson, many of these changing suburban communities are home to out-of-step power structures, where the leadership class, including the police force, does not reflect the rapid demographic changes that have reshaped these places.

Suburban areas with growing poverty are also frequently characterized by many small, fragmented municipalities; Ferguson is just one of 91 jurisdictions in St. Louis County. This often translates into inadequate resources and capacity to respond to growing needs and can complicate efforts to connect residents with economic opportunities that offer a path out of poverty.

And as concentrated poverty climbs in communities like Ferguson, they find themselves especially ill-equipped to deal with impacts such as poorer education and health outcomes, and higher crime rates. In an article for Salon, Brittney Cooper writes about the outpouring of anger from the community, “Violence is the effect, not the cause of the concentrated poverty that locks that many poor people up together with no conceivable way out and no productive way to channel their rage at having an existence that is adjacent to the American dream.” 

None of this means that there are 1,000 Fergusons-in-waiting, but it should underscore the fact that there are a growing number of communities across the country facing similar, if quieter, deep challenges every day.

A previous version of this post misstated the Ferguson unemployment rate in 2000. It has since been corrected.