From Syria and Iraq to Libya and Yemen, the Middle East is once again rife with conflict. Much of the fighting is along sectarian lines, but can it really be explained simply as a “Sunni versus Shia” battle? What explains this upsurge in violence across the region? And what role can or should the United States play?

In a new Analysis Paper, F. Gregory Gause, III frames Middle East politics in terms of a new, regional cold war in which Iran and Saudi Arabia compete for power and influence. Rather than stemming from sectarian rivalry, this new Middle East cold war results from the weakening of Arab states and the creation of domestic political vacuums into which local actors invite external support.

Read "Beyond Sectarianism: The New Middle East Cold War"

Gause contends that military power is not as useful in the regional competition as transnational ideological and political connections that resonate with key domestic players. The best way to defuse the conflicts, he argues, is to reconstruct stable political orders that can limit external meddling.

Noting the limits in U.S. capacity to do so, Gause recommends that the United States take a modest approach focused on supporting the states that actually govern, acting multilaterally, and remembering that core U.S. interests have yet to be directly threatened.

Read the full paper in English or Arabic.

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• Arabic PDF

      

Brookings Doha Center Analysis Paper, December 1, 2014

Intense turmoil in Syria and Iraq has created socio-political vacuums in which jihadi groups have been able to thrive. The Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) had proven to be the strongest and most dynamic of these groups, seizing large swathes of territory in Syria and Iraq. Shortly after routing Iraqi forces and conquering Mosul in June 2014, ISIS boldly announced the establishment of a caliphate and renamed itself the Islamic State (IS). How did IS become such a powerful force? What are its goals and characteristics? What are the best options for containing and defeating the group?

In a new Brookings Doha Center Analysis Paper, Charles Lister traces IS’s roots from Jordan to Afghanistan, and finally to Iraq and Syria. He describes its evolution from a small terrorist group into a bureaucratic organization that currently controls thousands of square miles and is attempting to govern millions of people. Lister assesses the group’s capabilities, explains its various tactics, and identifies its likely trajectory.

According to Lister, the key to undermining IS’s long-term sustainability is to address the socio-political failures of Syria and Iraq. Accordingly, he warns that effectively countering IS will be a long process that must be led by local actors. Specifically, Lister argues that local actors, regional states, and the international community should work to counter IS’s financial strength, neutralize its military mobility, target its leadership, and restrict its use of social media for recruitment and information operations.

      

Nearly two years after ousting President Muhammad Morsi, Egypt’s military continues to crack down on the Muslim Brotherhood. Much like during Egypt’s 1952-54 political transition, the recent interactions between the powerful armed state bureaucracy and the influential religious organization have had a major impact on the country’s political trajectory. In both instances, the military and Muslim Brotherhood initially cooperated before ultimately clashing violently. How has each entity determined what approach to take toward the other? What does a continued imbalance in civil-military relations mean for Egypt’s future?

In a new Brookings Doha Center Analysis Paper, Omar Ashour examines the legacies and patterns of cooperation and conflict between the leaderships of Egypt’s military and the Muslim Brotherhood. Relying on extensive field research, he analyzes how each entity has made its critical decisions regarding the other by applying various decision-making models. Ashour considers the impact of cost-benefit analysis, organizational dynamics, factional disputes, and psychological factors to gain a deep understanding of the leaders’ motives.

Read "Collusion to Crackdown: Islamist-Military Relations in Egypt"

Ashour concludes that Egypt's prospects for social stability and economic recovery will remain bleak if the relationship between the military and the Muslim Brotherhood is not redefined within institutional, democratic rules of political competition. He argues that Egypt’s military should embrace a balanced civil-military relationship to realize broad, long-term benefits and avoid otherwise inevitable and costly clashes with segments of Egyptian society. As for the Muslim Brotherhood, Ashour recommends that it reevaluate its recent decisions and work to develop a sustained, solid, and cross-ideological civilian front that can pressure the military to leave politics and allow for democratization.

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International jihad has undergone a wholesale internal revolution in recent years. The dramatic emergence of the Islamic State (IS) and its proclamation of a Caliphate means that the world no longer faces one Sunni jihadi threat, but two, as IS and al-Qaida compete on the global stage. What is the relationship between the groups and how do their models differ? Is IS’s rapid organizational expansion sustainable? Can al-Qaida adapt and respond?

Read "Jihadi Rivalry: The Islamic State Challenges al-Qaida"

In a new Brookings Doha Center Analysis Paper, Charles Lister explores al-Qaida and IS’s respective evolutions and strategies. He argues that al-Qaida and its affiliates are now playing a long game by seeking to build alliances and develop deep roots within unstable and repressed societies. IS, on the other hand, looks to destabilize local dynamics so it can quickly seize control over territory.

Lister finds that the competition between IS and al-Qaida for jihadi supremacy will continue, and will likely include more terrorist attacks on the West. Accordingly, he calls for the continued targeting of al-Qaida leaders, the disruption of jihadi financial activities, and greater domestic intelligence and counter-radicalization efforts. Lister concludes, however, that state instability across the Muslim world must be addressed or jihadis will continue to thrive.

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In 2011, Libya’s revolution knocked most of its oil production offline for months, resulting in a loss of nearly 2 percent of global production and a corresponding increase in oil prices. The security of energy exports and energy transit from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, given its paramount importance to the global economy, has long been a concern. The current, very unsettled political situation in the region has made that concern even more salient.

Read "Risky Routes: Energy Transit in the Middle East"

In a new Brookings Doha Center Analysis Paper, Robin Mills identifies the key points of vulnerability in MENA energy supply and transit, including the pivotal Strait of Hormuz and a number of important pipelines. Mills also assesses the impact of possible disruptions on both the global economy and MENA states themselves.

Mills argues that to mitigate such disruptions, infrastructural, institutional, and market approaches must be used together. Mills highlights the need for improved assessments of the viability of various infrastructure projects and calls for the development of regional institutional arrangements that can better manage transit crises as they arise.

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Seven years ago, New Zealand recognized that if its people did not have sufficient assets as they aged, they would either face economic stress in retirement or place pressure on the government for costly additional benefits, and thus the KiwiSaver program was born. Designed to help citizens build retirement security, it guides individuals with limited financial experience while also giving them complete control of their finances. Benefits of this national automatic enrollment retirement savings plan include a $1,000 kick-start, employer contributions, and an annual tax credit. New Zealand Since its inception in July 2007, KiwiSaver has been deemed a great success, with over half of the eligible population as members, and over 70 percent of 18-24 year olds participating. Although membership continues to grow, it is at a slower rate than that seen in previous years.

Could the success of KiwiSaver mean that a similar program – at either the national or state level – might work here? On July 8^th, Diana Crossan, former Retirement Commissioner for New Zealand, will offer her insights into the KiwiSaver program and its impact on New Zealand saving, retirement security, and financial literacy. Ben Harris and David John, deputy directors of the Retirement Security Project at Brookings, will reflect on the role such a program might play in the U.S.

Email international@aarp.org to RSVP » 

      

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Longevity annuities—a financial innovation that provides protection against outliving your money late in life—have the potential to reshape the retirement security landscape. Typically bought at retirement, a longevity annuity offers a guaranteed stream of income beginning in ten or 20 years at a markedly lower cost than a conventional annuity that begins paying out immediately. Sales have grown rapidly and it will be even easier to purchase the annuities in the future given new Treasury regulations. While economists have touted the attractiveness of longevity annuities as a way to ensure the ability to maintain one’s living standards late in life, significant barriers to a robust market remain—including lack of consumer awareness, questions about product value, and employer concerns with taking on fiduciary responsibility by offering these products to their employees.

Can longevity annuities overcome these barriers to find widespread popularity among Americans retirees? On November 6, the Retirement Security Project hosted a panel of experts to discuss the potential for these products to contribute to the economic security of older Americans, in addition to policy reforms that could lead to greater take-up by retirement plan sponsors and consumers alike. Following a presentation by Katharine Abraham that laid out the issues, two panels of prominent experts added their insights on the promise and challenges of this burgeoning market.

Video

• Better Financial Security in Old-Age? The Promise of Longevity Annuities
• Understanding Longevity Annuities
• Eliminating Barriers to Market Development
• Longevity Annuities Are Not Necessarily Niche Products
• The Adverse Selection Issue

Audio

• Better Financial Security in Old-Age? The Promise of Longevity Annuities

Transcript

• Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

• 06_retirement_longevity_annuities_abraham_harris
• longevity_annuities_presentation_abraham
• 20141106_longevity_annuities_transcript

      

Increasingly, many Marylanders are unprepared for retirement.

The US has the broadest range of retirement savings options in the world. There are thousands of retirement products offered. But most Marylanders don’t use them.

The need is growing. The Baby Boomers are the largest generation in history. They will live longer in retirement than any generation in history.

But – financially – many are not prepared. Many have virtually no retirement savings: more than a third those within ten years of retirement age have saved less than $10,000. $10,000 invested and spent over the average person’s retirement works out to about $1,000 of income per year. Even with Social Security, that’s not much to live on.

Fears about retirement are the #1 economic concern. Many Marylanders know they’re unprepared – and they’re worried about it. Concerns about retirement security are now more broadly based than the cost of health care, fear of job loss or other economic concerns – and have been for over a decade.3 Those concerns have grown since the financial crisis, even though the stock market has recovered. Many know they’ll have to defer retirement—and many fear they will never be able to afford to retire at all.

The key to retirement saving is having a retirement plan and contributing to it every paycheck. But many businesses, including most smaller businesses, don’t offer retirement plans. As a result 1,000,000 Marylanders working in private businesses across the State don’t have a retirement plan. There are, of course, individual retirement accounts (IRAs) -- but almost no one uses them who didn’t get access through an employer-based plan via payroll deduction.

Having a plan is essential, but not a panacea. Even when plans are available, many employees don’t join. Many who do contribute and save less than they need to meet their own goals. Even with plans, many will need to save more.

The challenge continues at retirement, because most of these plans are paid out in a single lump sum payment—few plans offer reliable retirement income for life that traditional pensions do. Since most retirees do not consult financial advisors and are not financial experts themselves, some who live longer than average or are unlucky in their investments will find that they haven’t saved enough and will exhaust their savings.

They will, of course, have Social Security. That’s why it’s so important that Social Security be both preserved and strengthened. But the average monthly benefit in Maryland is about $1,300 and for most people Social Security covers only a fraction of their basic needs in retirement. Most Marylanders will need additional income from retirement savings – and the State of Maryland can help them get it.

Other states and other governments are making it easier for people to save and for private employers to help them do it. Maryland should, too. Acting now will save Maryland taxpayers millions in the future.

California, Massachusetts, and Illinois have already enacted legislation. Illinois created a new program that requires employers who have no retirement plan to automatically enroll their employees in a state-created program. Massachusetts authorized a program for uncovered employees of non-profits. California created a board to plan and propose program similar to that in Illinois. Similar legislation is being or has been introduced in some fifteen other states – states all across the country with varying political orientations, populations, and economic bases.

Although there are many variations under consideration, these programs generally provide for an automatic payroll deduction of a set amount unless the employee opts out. Funds are to be invested professionally and may be pooled to achieve higher returns and lower costs. Those who cannot or do not want to make complex financial decisions are not required to do so – their contributions are placed automatically into a reliable fund or set of funds.

In order to ensure that employers – many of whom are small businesses – can participate in a program, it must be designed to help them avoid significant disruption, expense or administrative burden. This can be accomplished by enabling employers to use current payroll processes to help their employees to build retirement security, without requiring employers to make contributions themselves.

If Maryland doesn’t act now, Maryland taxpayers will face higher costs for decades to come.

These plans are designed to be self-sustaining: their operating costs are paid for by plan contributions and the State would not assume any obligations. In practice, however, these plans will end up saving taxpayer funds: If Maryland doesn’t act now, Maryland taxpayers will face higher costs for decades to come, as retirees are forced to turn to State assistance instead of living on their own savings.

There are many ways to improve retirement security. The key is for businesses to help their employees save, without becoming overburdened themselves.

Task Force is not recommending any one approach, but strongly recommends that Maryland join other states, by developing and implementing a plan that helps Marylanders have more secure retirements.We recommend development of a specific state-based program that meets Maryland’s needs from the options discussed in our report.

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Introduction

Many American workers do not have access to employer-sponsored payroll deduction plans for retirement saving. Groups with low rates of access include younger workers, members of minority groups, and those with low-to-moderate incomes. 1 Small business employees are especially at risk. Only about 14 percent of businesses with 100 or fewer employees offer their employees a retirement plan, leaving between 51 and 71 percent of the roughly 42 million people who work for a small business without access to an employer-administered plan (Government Accountability Office 2013).

Lack of access makes it difficult to build retirement wealth. A study by the Employee Benefit Research Institute (2014) shows that 62 percent of employees with access to an employer-sponsored plan held more than $25,000 in saving balances and 22 percent had $100,000 or more. In contrast, among those without access to a plan, 94 percent held less than $25,000 and only three percent hold $100,000 or more. Although workers without an employer-based plan can contribute to Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs), very few do.2 But employees at all income levels tend to participate at high rates in plans that are structured to provide guidance about the decisions they should make (Wu and Rutledge 2014).

With these considerations in mind, many experts and policy makers have advocated for increased retirement plan coverage. While a national approach would be desirable, there has been little legislative progress to date. States, however, are acting. Three states have already created state-sponsored retirement saving plans for small business employees, and 25 are in some stage of considering such a move (Pension Rights Center 2015). John and Koenig (2014) estimate that 55 million U.S. wage and salary workers between the ages of 18 and 64 lack the ability to save for retirement through an employer-sponsored payroll deduction plan. Among such workers with wages between $30,000 and $50,000 only about one out of 20 contributes regularly to an IRA (Employee Benefit Research Institute 2006).

This paper highlights a variety of issues that policymakers will need to address in creating and implementing an effective state-sponsored retirement saving plan. Section II discusses policy design choices. Section III discusses management issues faced by states administering such a plan, employers and employees. Section IV is a short conclusion.

Note: this paper was presented at a October 7, 2015 Brookings Institution event focused on state retirement policies.

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In recent weeks, the Obama Administration has taken the two most important steps in nearly a decade to increase access to retirement savings for more than 55 million Americans who currently do not participate in a retirement saving plan.

The Treasury Department's myRA program, launched this month, will help new savers and the self-employed start accounts without risk or fees. And earlier this week, the Department of Labor clarified rules that will make it easier for states to create retirement savings plans for small business employees.

myRA

The new myRAs provide another way for new savers to build small nest eggs. They will also help consultants, contract employees, and part-time workers save for retirement or for emergencies. 

For employees, myRAs are payroll deduction savings accounts designed to meet the needs of new savers and lower income workers.  They have no fees, cost nothing to open, and allow savers to regularly contribute any amount.  Savings are invested in US Treasury bonds, so savers can’t lose principal, an important feature for low-income workers who might otherwise abandon plans if they face early losses.  Those who are not formal employees and thus lack access to an employer-sponsored plan can participate in myRA through direct withdrawals from a checking or other bank account. 

As the growing “gig economy” creates more independent workers, the myRA will be a valuable entry to the private retirement system.  These workers might otherwise retire on little more than Social Security. All workers can build myRA balances by redirecting income tax refunds into their accounts. Because a myRA is a Roth IRA (that is, contributions are made from after-tax income), savers can withdraw their own contributions at any time without penalties or tax liability.  

When a myRA reaches $15,000, it must be rolled into another account, and Treasury may make it possible for workers to transfer these savings into funds managed by one of several pre-approved private providers.  MyRAs won’t replace either state-sponsored plans or employer-related pension or retirement savings plans.  However, they will make it possible for new and lower-income savers as well as the self-employed to build financial security without risk or fees.  

State-Sponsored Retirement Savings Plans

The DOL announcement gave the green light to several state models, including Automatic IRAs, marketplace models, and Multiple Employer Plans.  About two dozen states are considering these plans and, so far, Illinois and Oregon have passed “Secure Choice” plans based on the Automatic IRA, while Washington State has passed a marketplace plan.

DOL’s proposed Automatic IRA rules (open for a 60 day comment period) would let states administer automatic enrollment payroll deduction IRAs provided that the plans meet certain conditions for selecting or managing the investments and consumer protections.  States would also have to require businesses to offer such a plan if they don’t already offer their employees a pension or other retirement savings plan. Companies that are not required to offer an Automatic IRA or other plan, but decide to join the state plan voluntarily could still be subject to ERISA. The Retirement Security Project at the Brookings Institution first designed the Automatic IRA, which was proposed by the Administration before being adopted by some states.

In a separate interpretation, DOL allowed states to offer marketplace plans without being subject to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).  These plans are essentially websites where small businesses may select pre-screened plans that meet certain fee or other criteria.  Under the DOL guidance, these marketplaces may include ERISA plans, but states cannot require employers to offer them.   However, if states sponsor a marketplace model, they could also require employers without other plans to offer Automatic IRAs.

Finally, DOL’s rules let states administer Multiple Employer Plans (MEPs), where individual employers all use the same ERISA-covered model plan.  MEPs are usually simplified 401(k)-type plans. Because the state would be acting on behalf of participating employers, it could assume some functions that would otherwise be the responsibility of the employer. These include handling ERISA compliance, selecting investments, and managing the plan.

The Retirement Security Project has issued a paper and held an event discussing ways states could create small business retirement savings plans. The paper is available here and the event is available here.

Together, the two initiatives—the new MyRA and the state-sponsored plans-- could greatly increase the number of American workers who’ll be able to supplement their Social Security benefits with personal savings.

       

Many American workers do not have access to employer-sponsored payroll deduction plans for retirement saving. Groups with low rates of access include younger workers, members of minority groups, and those with low-to-moderate incomes. Small business employees are especially at risk. Only about 14 percent of businesses with 100 or fewer employees offer their employees a retirement plan, leaving between 51 and 71 percent of the roughly 42 million people who work for a small business without access to an employer-administered plan (Government Accountability Office 2013).

Lack of access makes it difficult to build retirement wealth. A study by the Employee Benefit Research Institute (2014) shows that 62 percent of employees with access to an employer-sponsored plan held more than $25,000 in saving balances and 22 percent had $100,000 or more. In contrast, among those without access to a plan, 94 percent held less than $25,000 and only 3 percent hold $100,000 or more. Although workers without an employer-based plan can contribute to Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs), very few do. But employees at all income levels tend to participate at high rates in plans that are structured to provide guidance about the decisions they should make (Wu and Rutledge 2014).

With these considerations in mind, many experts and policy makers have advocated for increased retirement plan coverage. While a national approach would be desirable, there has been little legislative progress to date. States, however, are acting. Three states have already created state-sponsored retirement saving plans for small business employees, and 25 are in some stage of considering such a move (Pension Rights Center 2015).

This policy brief, based on John and Gale (2015), highlights a variety of issues that policymakers will need to address in creating and implementing an effective state-sponsored retirement saving plan.

Download "Policy Design and Management Issues for State Retirement Saving Plans" »

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• Download the policy brief

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

America is becoming a more class-stratified society, contrary to the nation’s self-image as a socially dynamic meritocracy. In particular, the barriers are hardening between the upper middle class and the majority below them. As New York Times contributor Tom Edsall writes (“How the Other Fifth Lives"), “The self-segregation of a privileged fifth of the population is…creating a self-perpetuating class at the top, which is ever more difficult to break into.”

This separation of the upper middle class by income, wealth, occupation and neighborhood has created a social distance between those of us who have been prospering in recent decades, and those who are feeling left behind, angry and resentful, and more like to vote for To-Hell-With-Them-All populist politicians. As I told Charles Homans, also writing on class for the Times, “The upper middle class are surprised by the rise of Trump. The actual middle class is surprised we’re surprised.”

Edsall cited my earlier essay, “The Dangerous Separation of the American Upper Middle Class,” and quoted me as follows:

“The top fifth have been prospering while the majority lags behind. But the separation is not just economic. Gaps are growing on a whole range of dimensions, including family structure, education, lifestyle, and geography. Indeed, these dimensions of advantage appear to be clustering more tightly together, each thereby amplifying the effect of the other.”

Multidimensional affluence

Just as certain disadvantages can cluster together, creating multidimensional poverty, so advantages may cluster together, resulting in multidimensional advantage. Is there more clustering of advantages at the top of American society? Yes.

The top fifth of households by income obviously have more money than the 80 percent below them. What about other advantages? Let’s take just three: marriage, employment and education. (See Sean Reardon and Kendra Bischoff’s paper on the geographical segregation of affluence). You would expect people in top-quintile households to be more likely to have a graduate or professional degree; to have two earners in the family; and perhaps also to be married. You would be right.

The difference in the proportion of the top fifth with each of these other advantages compared to the bottom four-fifths is around 20 percentage points (we restrict our analysis to those aged 40-50). For example, in 1979 a forty-something year-old in the top income quintile was about 6 percentage points more likely to be married that one in the bottom 80 percent. Now the gap is 17 percentage points.

This is hardly surprising. More education and more earners in the home will increase the chances that you make it into the top quintile for your age cohort. But it is noteworthy that the extent to which these different dimensions of advantage overlap has been steadily increasing over time. Along with the increased association between top-quintile income and marriage, the differentials for graduate education and two-earner status have each increased by around 10 percentage points between 1979 and 2014.

How to inherit upper middle class status: Marriages and master’s degrees

Particularly striking is the increase in the “marriage gap” between the upper middle class and the rest. This is an important factor in the transmission of class status to the next generation, since married couples are more likely to stay together, and stable families predict better outcomes for children.

Similarly, the adults with high levels of education are likely to raise children who end up towards the top of the educational distribution. In fact, the intergenerational persistence of education is even greater than of income, as some of our earlier work shows (“The Inheritance of Education”). Almost half (46 percent) the children of parents in the top education quintile end up in the top education quintile themselves. Three in four (76 percent) stayed in one of the top two education quintiles.

Class gaps

F. Scott Fitzgerald famously said: "Let me tell you about the very rich. They are different from you and me.” Ernest Hemingway’s later response was: “Yes, they have more money.” Today what separates the rich from the rest is not just money, but family life, education, zip code, and so on. This is a point made by a number of scholars, including recently both Robert Putnam in Our Kids and Charles Murray in Coming Apart. Our empirical analysis confirms that different kinds of advantage are increasingly overlapping with each other.

The framing of inequality in terms of social class used to feel distinctly un-American. No longer.

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Editor’s note: This piece originally appeared in Real Clear Markets.

      

Ron Haskins and Isabel Sawhill were just awarded the 2016 Daniel Patrick Moynihan Prize by the American Academy of Political and Social Science. The honor is presented to “a leading policymaker, social scientist, or public intellectual whose career demonstrates the value of using social science evidence to advance the public good.” In this case, however, for the first time the award was awarded jointly.

Here at Brookings, Belle and Ron have forged a powerful and unique intellectual partnership, founding and elevating the Center on Children and Families and producing world-class work on families, poverty, opportunity, evidence, parenting, work and education, and much more besides.

5 skills for successful bipartisanship

The Association highlighted Belle and Ron’s bipartisanship. This was appropriate, given that the two have different political backgrounds, and work with people across the political spectrum. The skills and attributes they display in order to work in this way are:

1. Deep respect for the views of others regardless of their politics.
2. Reverence for the evidence and for the facts.
3. A willingness to adapt their views to the facts, rather than (as so often in this town), the other way around. This has been true even when it has made their life more difficult with people on “their” side of the political spectrum.
4. A desire to work hard to bring ideas to bear on public policy. The point is to do good work, but also to have real impact.
5. An insatiable intellectual curiosity to find out more, push new boundaries, and to keep learning. (Both of them have new books out, of course.)

These attributes, when you think about it, are those every decent scholar should aspire to. Belle and Ron have shown us that the skills for bipartisanship turn out to be essentially the same skills as those required for good scholarship.

The mighty oak foundations of evidence in policy

In his remarks at the Prize lecture, Ron focused on the rise, importance, and prospects for evidence-based policy. Ron has tackled this subject at book length in Show Me the Evidence. Here is part of what Ron had to say:

“Perhaps the most important social function of social science is to find and test programs that will reduce the nation’s social problems. The exploding movement of evidence-based policy and the many roots the movement is now planting, offer the best chance of fulfilling this vital mission of social science, of achieving, in other words, exactly the outcomes Moynihan had hoped for. Today, evidence-based policy rests on the mighty oak of program evaluation in general and the random assignment study in particular.”

Ron highlighted the growth of Pay for Success programs, the Obama administration’s emphasis on evidence-based initiatives, and the creation of the Ryan/Murray Commission on Evidence-Based Policy.

Ron argued that it was right to be skeptical about the likely impact of any particular intervention. But this is not to say that policy doesn’t work—just that some policies work, others don’t, and it good to know the difference. In his slides, Ron lists some programs that have been shown to have demonstrable, sustainable impact—what he described as “his entry in the evidence-based policy sweepstakes.”

But there are plenty of challenges ahead, including the need to improve our understanding of implementation; and the following critical question: “When a program fails, what’s next?” Ron argued that the answer should not be to simply pull the funding, but to work on improving performance.

Better contraception for a fair society: Evidence-based policy in action

Belle highlighted the work captured in her latest book, Generation Unbound, on how to reduce the damaging rise of unintended pregnancies and births in the U.S. Over 40 percent of children are born outside of marriage, and 60 percent of births to single women under age 30 are unplanned. In the spirit of being faithful to the facts, and focused on what works, Belle showed the costs of unintended pregnancies for poverty, family stability, and opportunity. Child poverty rates have increased, Belle estimates, by about 25 percent since 1970 because of changes in family structure.

So what are the solutions? In the spirit of following the evidence, Belle argued that the goal must be to help people plan for rather than drift into pregnancy, by broadening access to and use of long-acting reversible contraception. The best example is the intrauterine device, or IUD. The risks of pregnancy for women using this method of contraception are very much lower than for condoms or the pill: 

A fact-based analysis of a problem, followed by an evidence-based approach to solutions: Belle’s work on contraception (sometimes alongside Ron) is a perfect example of bipartisanship, impact-oriented scholarship and a commitment to evidence.

Downloads

• Download Isabel Sawhill's presentation
• Download Ron Haskins's presentation

      

“A society of equals is a society in which disadvantages do not cluster,” say Jonathan Wolff and Avner de-Shalit in their book Disadvantage. Low income matters greatly in itself, of course. But it also matters because it brings other difficulties along with it, like poor health and/or a lack of health insurance. An important goal of policy is to “de-cluster” these disadvantages.  

Increased health insurance coverage has had a modest impact on access

In recent years, the State of Colorado, embracing and going beyond the Affordable Care Act, has increased health insurance coverage, especially among low-income residents. Between 2009 and 2015, the proportion of Coloradans with annual family incomes below $30,000 who were uninsured fell from one in four to one in ten.

Clearly this is good news. But the expansion of insurance has so far had a modest impact on healthcare utilization, at least according to the Colorado Health Access Survey. The Survey includes questions such as, “Have you visited a health care professional or health care facility in the past 12 months?,” and “Was there any time that you did not get doctor care that you needed because of cost?” On these and similar questions, there was relatively little change between 2009 and 2015.

Why didn’t improved health insurance coverage lead to increased use of health care resources? It may be that the survey questions simply aren’t capturing improvements in utilization rates. A more detailed study of the ACA expansion in Oregon did find an increase in utilization, along with improvements on a number of financial hardship indicators. The Colorado survey does seem to suggest financial improvement: the share of low-income white residents that reported trouble paying medical bills fell by just over 3 percentage points from 2009 to 2015; for minority residents the figure was just over 6 percentage points. It’s hard to know, however, how much of this trend is driven by the stronger economy, and how much is driven by the ACA expansion. It is also possible that people are now able to access more appropriate care, for instance using primary care, rather than resorting to the emergency room.

Dental care coverage means most low-income Coloradans now visit the dentist

Utilization rates have clearly increased in one area, however: dental health. Medicaid covers dental care for children, so Colorado’s Medicaid expansion increased the number of children in the state with government-sponsored dental insurance. In 2014, Colorado also became one of the few states to introduce limited adult dental coverage. As a result of these policy reforms, the share of low-income Coloradans with insurance for dental care has increased sharply:

Over the same time period, the proportion of low-income Coloradans who visited a dentist—especially minorities—increased, too:

Better living through dentistry

Dentistry is an important part of the health care system, and dental disease is a serious health issue. Four in ten poor Americans suffer from untreated tooth decay, according to some researchers. Better dental care helps low-income people in a range of ways, from avoiding emergency rooms, to having healthier pregnancies, and even succeeding in the job market. The dramatic improvements in dental coverage and dental care in Colorado show that the connection between policy reforms and improved quality of life can sometimes be quite straightforward. 

      

As every good teacher knows, education is not just about academics. It is about broadening horizons and discovering passions. (The root of education is the Latin e ducere, meaning “to draw out.”) From this perspective, extra-curricular activities count for a great deal. But as Robert Putnam highlights in his book Our Kids, there are growing class gaps in the availability of music, sports, and other non-classroom activities.

Fewer field trips?

Schools under pressure may also cut back on field trips outside the school walls to parks, zoos, theaters, or museums. In the 2008-09 school year, 9 percent of school administrators reported eliminating field trips, according to the annual surveys by the American Association of School Administrators (AASA). That figure rose through the recession:

Just 12 percent of the administrators surveyed about 2015-16 said they had brought back their field trips to pre-recession levels. Museums around the country report hosting fewer students, from Los Angeles and Sarasota, to Minneapolis, and Columbia, Missouri. None of this is definitive proof of a decline in field trips, since we are relying on a single survey question. But it suggests a downward trend in recent years.

Museums help with science tests

If some children are missing out on field trips, does it matter? They may be nice treats, but do they have any real impact, especially when they take time away from traditional learning? There is some evidence that they do.

Middle school children with the chance to go on a field trip score higher on science tests, according to a 2015 study by Emilyn Ruble Whitesell.

She studied New York City middle schools with teachers in Urban Advantage, a program that gives science teachers additional training and resources—as well as vouchers for visiting museums. In some schools, the Urban Advantage teachers used the field trip vouchers more than others. Whitesell exploits this difference in her study, and finds that attending a school with at least 0.25 trips per student increased 8^th grade scores by 0.026 standard deviations (SD). The odds of a student passing the exam improved by 1.2 percentage points. There were bigger effects for poor students, who saw a 0.043 SD improvement in test scores, and 1.9 percentage point increase in exam pass rates.

Art broadens young minds

Students visiting an art museum show statistically significant increases in critical thinking ability and more open-minded attitudes, according to a randomized evaluation of student visits to the Crystal Bridges Museum in northwest Arkansas. One example: those who visited the museum more often agreed with statements like: “I appreciate hearing views different from my own” and “I think people can have different opinions about the same thing.” The effects are modest. But the intervention (a single day at the museum) is, too. Again, there were larger effects for poor students:

All this needs to be put in perspective. In comparison with the challenge of closing academic gaps and quality teaching, field trips are small beer. But schools create citizens as well as undergraduates and employees. It matters, then, if we have allowed field trips to become a casualty of the great recession.

      

Like many Brits, I’m reeling. Everyone knew that the "Brexit" referendum was going to be close. But deep down I think many of us assumed that the vote would be to remain in the European Union. David Cameron had no realistic choice but to announce that he will step down.

Mr. Cameron’s fall can be traced back to a promise he made in the 2010 election to cap the annual flow of migrants into the U.K. at less than 100,000, "no ifs, no buts."Membership in the EU means free movement of labor, so this was an impossible goal to reach through direct policy. I served in the coalition government that emerged from the 2010 election, and this uncomfortable fact was clear from the outset. I don’t share the contents of briefings and meetings from my time in government (I think it makes good government harder if everyone is taking notes for memoirs), but my counterpart in the government, Mr. Cameron’s head of strategy, Steve Hilton, went public in the Daily Mail just before this week’s vote.

Steve recalled senior civil servants telling us bluntly that the pledged target could not be reached. He rightly fulminated about the fact that this meant we were turning away much more skilled and desirable potential immigrants from non-EU countries in a bid to bring down the overall number. What he didn’t say is that the target, based on an arbitrary figure, was a foolish pledge in the first place.

Mr. Cameron was unable to deliver on his campaign pledge, and immigration to the U.K. has been running at about three times that level. This fueled anger at the establishment for again breaking a promise, as well as anger at the EU. In an attempt to contain his anti-European right wing, Mr. Cameron made another rash promise: to hold a referendum.

The rest, as they say, is history. And now, so is he.

Immigration played a role in the Brexit campaign, though it seems that voters may not have made a clear distinction between EU and non-EU inward movement. Still, Thursday’s vote was, at heart, a plebiscite on what it means to British. Our national identity has always been of a quieter kind than, say the American one. Attempts by politicians to institute the equivalent of a Flag Day or July Fourth, to teach citizenship in schools, or to animate a “British Dream” have generally been laughed out of court. Being British is an understated national identity. Indeed, understatement is a key part of that identity.

Many Scots, Welsh and Northern Irish feel a much stronger affinity to their home nation within the U.K. than they do to Great Britain. Many Londoners look at the rest of England and wonder how they are in the same political community. These splits were obvious Thursday.

Identity politics has tended in recent years to be of the progressive kind, advancing the cause of ethnic minorities, lesbians and gays, and so on. In both the U.K. and the U.S. a strongly reactionary form of identity politics is gaining strength, in part as a reaction to the cosmopolitan, liberal, and multicultural forms that have been dominant. This is identity politics of a negative kind, defined not by what you are for but what you are against. A narrow majority of my fellow Brits just decided that at the very least, being British means not being European. It was a defensive, narrow, backward-looking attempt to reclaim something that many felt had been lost. But the real losses are yet to come.

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Editor's Note: This piece originally appeared in the Wall Street Journal's Washington Wire.

       

Editor's note: This piece originally appeared in the Wall Street Journal's Washington Wire on July 11, 2016. Theresa May has since succeeded David Cameron as UK prime minister.

Theresa May is poised to become Britain’s next prime minister on Wednesday. This means there is a reasonable chance the post-Brexit whirlwind of U.K. politics will quiet somewhat. Here are seven things that stand out about the next PM:

1. Her experience. Ms. May has been in the top ranks of British politics for almost two decades. She is one of the longest-serving home secretaries, overseeing domestic security, law and order, and immigration. With the exception of Michael Gove, who was knocked out early in the contest, she was by far the most experienced candidate in the race.

2. Her resilience. Ms. May is what Americans call a tough cookie. When I was in government, she was the Cabinet minister with whom David Cameron least liked to tangle. When Ms. May said no, she meant no. This did not always lead to perfect policy outcomes, of course. But few in Westminster doubt her strength.

3. Modernizing instincts. As the Conservative Party’s first female chairman, Ms. May pointed out in 2002 that to many voters the Tories were seen as the “nasty party” and that reform was essential. She helped to lay the ground for David Cameron to emerge as a new, more moderate face of the Conservative Party. Ms. May was also one of the first senior Conservatives to back same-sex marriage.

4. She backed Remain. As the only leadership candidate who was on the losing side of the Brexit vote, she is, paradoxically, well-placed to unite the Conservative Party in parliament. Most Tory MPs were, like Ms. May, in the Remain camp. But she was a lukewarm Remainer and has a history of being skeptical of European institutions–including the European Convention on Human Rights–which will endear her to Brexiteers. Already she has made it clear that “Brexit means Brexit” and that she will only trigger Article 50, which governs the process by which an EU member exits, when she has her negotiating position worked out. So far, so good. (Particularly for those worried about market volatility and the U.K. economy in the wake of the June 23 referendum.)

5. Government stability. Given her strong support among parliamentary colleagues, Ms. May is not likely to feel any need to trigger an emergency general election. Instead, she can make the case that the U.K. needs a stable government during the lengthy Brexit negotiations to come (and she’ll be right). Labour politicians calling for an election are whistling in the wind, especially given their own leadership civil war.

6. Gender issues and non-issues. Theresa May is about to become the U.K.’s second female prime minister and there has been refreshingly little commentary on her gender. The only real exception was the row caused by her opponent Andrea Leadsom, who clumsily implied in a recent interview that not being a mother made Ms. May less qualified. (Ms. Leadsom apologized shortly before dropping out of the contest.) If Labour MPs manage to dislodge their leader, Jeremy Corbyn (an outcome that may be decided in court), the favorite to succeed him is Angela Eagle, who is married to a woman.

7. Redressing the class balance. The United Kingdom has been run by posh people, since, well, forever. But David Cameron’s crowd was a particularly upper-crust bunch, mostly educated at private schools. Ms. May, by contrast, went to a comprehensive high school (in American English, a public school). To the extent that there is need for more class diversity among governing elites, this is another piece of good news.

None of this alters the disastrous economic implications of the Brexit vote. But by turning to May, the Conservatives will be better prepared to secure a period of stable government, with a little more class and gender diversity thrown in for good measure. That’s about the best one could hope for.

       

As a rhetorical ideal, greater opportunity is hard to beat. Just about all candidates for high elected office declare their commitments to promoting opportunity – who, after all, could be against it? But opportunity is, to borrow a term from the philosopher and political theorist Isaiah Berlin, a "protean" word, with different meanings for different people at different times.

Typically, opportunity is closely entwined with an idea of upward mobility, especially between generations. The American Dream is couched in terms of a daughter or son of bartenders or farm workers becoming a lawyer, or perhaps even a U.S. senator. But even here, there are competing definitions of upward mobility.

It might mean being better off than your parents were at a similar age. This is what researchers call "absolute mobility," and largely relies on economic growth – the proverbial rising tide that raises most boats.

Or it could mean moving to a higher rung of the ladder within society, and so ending up in a better relative position than one's parents.

Scholars label this movement "relative mobility." And while there are many ways to think about status or standard of living – education, wealth, health, occupation – the most common yardstick is household income at or near middle age (which, somewhat depressingly, tends to be defined as 40).

As a basic principle, we ought to care about both kinds of mobility as proxies for opportunity. We want children to have the chance to do absolutely and relatively well in comparison to their parents.

On the One Hand…

So how are we doing? The good news is that economic standards of living have improved over time. Most children are therefore better off than their parents. Among children born in the 1970s and 1980s, 84 percent had higher incomes (even after adjusting for inflation) than their parents did at a similar age, according to a Pew study. Absolute upward income mobility, then, has been strong, and has helped children from every income class, especially those nearer the bottom of the ladder. More than 9 in 10 of those born into families in the bottom fifth of the income distribution have been upwardly mobile in this absolute sense.

There's a catch, though. Strong absolute mobility goes hand in hand with strong economic growth. So it is quite likely that these rates of generational progress will slow, since the potential growth rate of the economy has probably diminished. This risk is heightened by an increasingly unequal division of the proceeds of growth in recent years. Today's parents are certainly worried. Surveys show that they are far less certain than earlier cohorts that their children will be better off than they are.

If the story on absolute mobility may be about to turn for the worse, the picture for relative mobility is already pretty bad. The basic message here: pick your parents carefully. If you are born to parents in the poorest fifth of the income distribution, your chance of remaining stuck in that income group is around 35 to 40 percent. If you manage to be born into a higher-income family, the chances are similarly good that you will remain there in adulthood.

It would be wrong, however, to say that class positions are fixed. There is still a fair amount of fluidity or social mobility in America – just not as much as most people seem to believe or want. Relative mobility is especially sticky in the tails at the high and low end of the distribution. Mobility is also considerably lower for blacks than for whites, with blacks much less likely to escape from the bottom rungs of the ladder. Equally ominously, they are much more likely to fall down from the middle quintile.

Relative mobility rates in the United States are lower than the rhetoric about equal opportunity might suggest and lower than people believe. But are they getting worse? Current evidence suggests not. In fact, the trend line for relative mobility has been quite flat for the past few decades, according to work by Raj Chetty of Stanford and his co-researchers. It is simply not the case that the amount of intergenerational relative mobility has declined over time.

Whether this will remain the case as the generations of children exposed to growing income inequality mature is not yet clear, though. As one of us (Sawhill) has noted, when the rungs on the ladder of opportunity grow further apart, it becomes more difficult to climb the ladder. To the same point, in his latest book, Our Kids – The American Dream in Crisis, Robert Putnam of Harvard argues that the growing gaps not just in income but also in neighborhood conditions, family structure, parenting styles and educational opportunities will almost inevitably lead to less social mobility in the future. Indeed, these multiple disadvantages or advantages are increasingly clustered, making it harder for children growing up in disadvantaged circumstances to achieve the dream of becoming middle class.

The Geography of Opportunity

Another way to assess the amount of mobility in the United States is to compare it to that found in other high-income nations. Mobility rates are highest in Scandinavia and lowest in the United States, Britain and Italy, with Australia, Western Europe and Canada lying somewhere in between, according to analyses by Jo Blanden, of the University of Surrey and Miles Corak of the University of Ottawa. Interestingly, the most recent research suggests that the United States stands out most for its lack of downward mobility from the top. Or, to paraphrase Billie Holiday, God blesses the child that's got his own.

Any differences among countries, while notable, are more than matched by differences within Pioneering work (again by Raj Chetty and his colleagues) shows that some cities have much higher rates of upward mobility than others. From a mobility perspective, it is better to grow up in San Francisco, Seattle or Boston than in Atlanta, Baltimore or Detroit. Families that move to these high-mobility communities when their children are still relatively young enhance the chances that the children will have more education and higher incomes in early adulthood. Greater mobility can be found in places with better schools, fewer single parents, greater social capital, lower income inequality and less residential segregation. However, the extent to which these factors are causes rather than simply correlates of higher or lower mobility is not yet known. Scholarly efforts to establish why it is that some children move up the ladder and others don't are still in their infancy.

Models of Mobility

What is it about their families, their communities and their own characteristics that determine why they do or do not achieve some measure of success later in life?

To help get at this vital question, the Brookings Institution has created a life-cycle model of children's trajectories, using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth on about 5,000 children from birth to age 40. (The resulting Social Genome Model is now a partnership among three institutions: Brookings, the Urban Institute and Child Trends). Our model tracks children's progress through multiple life stages with a corresponding set of success measures at the end of each. For example, children are considered successful at the end of elementary school if they have mastered basic reading and math skills and have acquired the behavioral or non-cognitive competencies that have been shown to predict later success. At the end of adolescence, success is measured by whether the young person has completed high school with a GPA average of 2.5 or better and has not been convicted of a crime or had a baby as a teenager.

These metrics capture common-sense intuition about what drives success. But they are also aligned with the empirical evidence on life trajectories. Educational achievement, for example, has a strong effect on later earnings and income, and this well-known linkage is reflected in the model. We have worked hard to adjust for confounding variables but cannot be sure that all such effects are truly causal. We do know that the model does a good job of predicting or projecting later outcomes.

Three findings from the model stand out. First, it's clear that success is a cumulative process. According to our measures, a child who is ready for school at age 5 is almost twice as likely to be successful at the end of elementary school as one who is not.

This doesn't mean that a life course is set in stone this early, however.

Children who get off track at an early age frequently get back on track at a later age; it's just that their chances are not nearly as good. So this is a powerful argument for intervening early in life. But it is not an argument for giving up on older youth.

Second, the chances of clearing our last hurdle – being middle class by middle age (specifically, having an income of around $68,000 for a family of four by age 40) – vary quite significantly. A little over half of all children born in the 1980s and 1990s achieved this goal. But those who are black or born into low-income families were very much less likely than others to achieve this benchmark.

Third, the effect of a child's circumstances at birth is strong. We use a multidimensional measure here, including not just the family's income but also the mother's education, the marital status of the parents and the birth weight of the child. Together, these factors have substantial effects on a child's subsequent success. Maternal education seems especially important.

The Social Genome Model, then, is a useful tool for looking under the hood at why some children succeed and others don't. But it can also be used to assess the likely impact of a variety of interventions designed to improve upward mobility. For one illustrative simulation, we hand-picked a battery of programs shown to be effective at different life stages – a parenting program, a high-quality early-edcation program, a reading and socio-emotional learning program in elementary school, a comprehensive high school reform model – and assessed the possible impact for low-income children benefiting from each of them, or all of them.

No single program does very much to close the gap between children from lower- and higher-income families. But the combined effects of multiple programs – that is, from intervening early and often in a child's life – has a surprisingly big impact. The gap of almost 20 percentage points in the chances of low-income and high-income children reaching the middle class shrinks to six percentage points. In other words, we are able to close about two-thirds of the initial gap in the life chances of these two groups of children. The black-white gap narrows, too.

Looking at the cumulative impact on adult incomes over a working life (all appropriately discounted with time) and comparing these lifetime income benefits to the costs of the programs, we believe that such investments would pass a cost-benefit test from the perspective of society as a whole and even from the narrower prospective of the taxpayers who fund the programs.

What Now?

Understanding the processes that lie beneath the patterns of social mobility is critical. It is not enough to know how good the odds of escaping are for a child born into poverty. We want to know why. We can never eliminate the effects of family background on an individual's life chances. But the wide variation among countries and among cities in the U.S. suggests that we could do better – and that public policy may have an important role to play. Models like the Social Genome are intended to assist in that endeavor, in part by allowing policymakers to bench- test competing initiatives based on the statistical evidence.

America's presumed exceptionalism is rooted in part on a belief that class-based distinctions are less important than in Western Europe. From this perspective, it is distressing to learn that American children do not have exceptional opportunities to get ahead – and that the consequences of gaps in children's initial circumstances might embed themselves in the social fabric over time, leading to even less social mobility in the future.

But there is also some cause for optimism. Programs that compensate at least to some degree for disadvantages earlier in life really can close opportunity gaps and increase rates of social mobility. Moreover, by most any reasonable reckoning, the return on the public investment is high.

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Editor's note: This piece originally appeared in the Milken Institute Review.

       

China's economy sailed through the financial crisis unscathed — at least in the short run.

When the global crisis hit, the country's government-owned banks started lending out lots more money. The money came largely from the savings accounts of ordinary Chinese people. It went largely to finance big construction projects, which helped keep China's economy growing.

"It sort of explains why China recovered so quickly," Hu Angang, an economist at Tsinghua University, told us. Indeed, China's strong showing through the crisis was seen by some as a vindication of the large role Chinese government plays in steering the country's economy.

But if it turns out China doesn't need all that new stuff it's building, the country will face an economic reckoning, says Michael Pettis, who teaches finance at Peking University in Beijing.

For Pettis, China's economic miracle is just the latest, largest version of a familiar story. A government in a developing country funnels tons of money into construction. This increases economic activity for a while, but the country ultimately overbuilds — and the loans start going bad.

"In every single case it ended up with excessive debt," Pettis says. "In some cases a debt crisis, in other cases a lost decade of very, very slow growth and rapidly rising debt. And no one has taken it to the extremes China has."

The counterpoint to Pettis's argument: China is extreme. It's a country of a billion people, growing at an incredible rate. The country needs to build lots of new stuff — new roads, new power plants, new buildings.

It's been this way for decades, says Arthur Kroeber, who runs the Chinese research firm Dragonomics. When he first arrived in Beijing in 1985, the city had just finished building a new ring road — a highway that runs in a loop circle around the city center. It was so empty that he and his wife rode their bikes down the middle of the highway.

Listen to the full interview on npr.org»

      

Editor's Note: In the coming decade, China’s economic growth is projected to slow from its long-run average annual rate of 10 percent, sustained over the past three decades. The imminent slowdown also reflects a variety of specific structural challenges. Arthur Kroeber argues that responding effectively to these challenges requires a broad set of reforms in the financial sector, fiscal policy, pricing of key factors such as land and energy which are now subject to extensive government manipulation, and the structure of markets.

In the coming decade, China’s economic growth will certainly slow from the long-run average annual rate of 10% sustained over the past three decades. In part this is a natural slowdown in an economy that is now quite large (around US$7 trillion at market exchange rates) and solidly middle-income (per capita GDP of about US$7,500, at purchasing power parity). Despite the certainty of this slowdown, China’s potential growth rate remains high: per-capita income is still far below the level at which incomes in the other major northeast Asian economies (Japan, South Korea and Taiwan) stopped converging with the US level; the per-capita capital stock remains low, suggesting the need for substantial more investment; and the supply of low-cost labor from the traditional agricultural sector has not yet been exhausted. All these factors suggest it should be quite possible for China to achieve average annual real GDP growth of at least 7% a year through 2020.[1]

But the imminent slowdown also reflects a variety of specific structural challenges which require active policy response. Inadequate policies could result in a failure of China to achieve its potential growth rate. Three of the most prominent structural challenges are a reversal of demographic trends from positive to negative; a substantial secular decline in the contribution of exports to growth; and the very rapid increase in credit created by the 2009-10 stimulus program, which almost certainly led to a substantial reduction of the return on capital. Responding effectively to these challenges requires a broad set of reforms in the financial sector, fiscal policy, pricing of key factors such as land and energy which are now subject to extensive government manipulation, and the structure of markets. This paper will argue that financial sector reform is the best and most direct way to overcome these three major structural challenges.

1. China’s growth potential

There are several strong reasons to believe that China has the potential to sustain a fairly rapid rate of GDP growth for at least another decade. We define “fairly rapid” as real growth of 7% a year, which is a very high rate for an economy of China’s size (US$7 trillion), but substantially below the average growth rate since 1980, which has been approximately 10%.

The most general reason for this belief is that China’s economic growth model most closely approximates the successful “catch-up” growth model employed by its northeast Asian neighbors Japan, South Korea and Taiwan in the decades after World War II. The theory behind “catch-up” growth is simply that poor countries whose technological level is far from the global technological frontier can achieve substantial convergence with rich-country income levels by copying and diffusing imported technology. Achieving this catch-up growth requires extensive investments in enabling infrastructure and basic industry, and an industrial policy that focuses on promoting exports. The latter condition is important because a disciplined focus on exports forces companies to keep up with improvements in global technology; in effect, a vibrant export sector is one (and probably the most efficient) mechanism for importing technology.

A survey of 96 major economies from 1970 to 2008 shows that 14 achieved significant convergence growth, defined as an increase of at least 10 percentage points in per capita GDP relative to the United States (at purchasing power parity). Eight of these countries were on the periphery of Europe and so presumably benefited from the spillover effects of western Europe’s rapid growth after World War II, and from the integration of eastern and western Europe after 1990. The other six were Asian export-oriented economies: Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, Thailand and China. Most of these countries experienced a period of very rapid convergence with US income levels and then a sharp slowdown or leveling off. On average, rapid convergence growth ended when the country’s per capita GDP reached 55% of the US level. The northeast Asian economies that China most closely resembles were among the most successful: convergence growth in Japan, Taiwan and South Korea slowed at 90%, 60% and 50% of US per capita income respectively. In 2010 China’s per capita income was only 20% of the US level. Based on this comparative historical experience, it seems plausible that China could enjoy at least one more decade of relatively rapid growth, until its per capita income reaches 40% or more of the US level.[2]

So China’s growth potential is fairly clear. But realizing this potential is not automatic: it requires a constant process of structural reform to unlock labor productivity gains and improve the return on capital. The urgency of structural reform is particularly acute now. To understand why, we now examine three structural factors that are likely to exert a substantially negative effect on economic growth in coming years.

2. Challenges to growth

When considering China’s structural growth prospects, it is necessary to take account of at least three major challenges to growth. Over the past three decades, rapid economic growth has been supported by favorable demographics, a very strong contribution from exports, and a large increase in the stock of credit. The demographic trend is now starting to go into reverse, the export contribution to growth has slowed dramatically in the last few years, and the expansion of credit cannot be safely sustained for more than another year or two at most.

Demographics. From 1975 to 2010, China’s “dependency ratio”—the ratio of the presumably non-working (young people under the age of 15 and old people above the age of 64) to the presumably working (those aged 15-64) fell from approximately 0.8 to 0.4. Over the same period the “prime worker ratio”—the ratio of people aged 20-59 to those 60 and above—stayed roughly stable at above 5. Both of these ratios indicate that China’s economy enjoyed a very high ratio of workers to non-workers. This situation is favorable for economic growth, because it implies that with a relatively small number of dependent mouths to feed, workers can save a higher proportion of their incomes, and the resulting increase in aggregate national saving becomes available for investment in infrastructure and basic industry.

Over the next two decades, however, these demographic trends will reverse. The dependency ratio will rise, albeit slowly at first, and the prime worker ratio will decline sharply from 5 today to 2 in the early 2030s. These demographic shifts are likely to exert a drag on economic growth, for two reasons.

The first impact, which is already being felt, is a reduction in the supply of new entrants into the labor force—those aged 15-24. This cohort has fluctuated between 200m and 230m since the early 1990s, and in 2010 it stood at the upper end of that range. By 2023 it will have fallen by one-third, to 150m, a far lower figure than at any point since China began economic reforms in 1978. Because the supply of new workers is falling relative to demand for labor, wage growth is likely to accelerate above the rate of labor productivity growth, which appears to be in decline from the very high levels achieved in 2000-2010. As a result, unit labor costs will start to rise (a trend already in evidence in the manufacturing sector since 2004) and inflationary pressures will build. In order to keep inflation at a socially acceptable level, the government will be forced to tighten monetary policy and reduce the trend rate of economic growth.

The second impact will be the large increase in the population of retirees relative to the number of workers available to support them. This is the effect described by the prime worker ratio, which currently shows that there are five people of prime working age for every person of likely retirement age. As this ratio declines, the overall productivity of the economy slows, and the health and pension costs of supporting an aging population rise. The combination of these two effects can contribute to a dramatic slowdown in economic growth: during the period when Japan’s prime worker ratio fell from 5 to 2 (1970-2005), the trend GDP growth rate fell from 8% to under 2% (though demographics, of course, does not explain all of this decline). Over the next 20 years China’s prime worker ratio will decline by exactly the same amount as Japan’s did from 1970-2005.

Export challenge. Another element of China’s extraordinary growth was its rapidly growing export sector. Exports are a crucial component of catch-up growth in poor economies because, as explained above, they act as a vector of technology transfer: in order to remain globally competitive, exporters must continually upgrade their technology (including their processes and management systems) to keep up with the continuous advance of the global technological frontier.

Precisely measuring the impact of exports on economic growth is tricky, because what matters is not headline export value (which contains contributions from imported components and materials), but the domestic value added content of exports. In addition, a dynamic export sector is likely to have indirect impacts on the domestic economy through the wages paid to workers, the long-run effect of technological upgrading and so on. If we ignore these second-round impacts and focus simply on the direct contribution to GDP growth of domestic value added in exports, we find that exports contributed 4.6 percentage points to GDP growth on average in 2003-07. In other words, exports accounted for about 40% of economic growth during that period.[3]

Such a high export contribution to growth is on its face unsustainable for a large continental economy like China’s, and in fact the export contribution has slowed substantially since the 2008 global financial crisis. In 2008-11 the average contribution of export value added to GDP growth was just 1.5 percentage points – about one-third the 2003-07 average. It is likely that the export contribution to growth will fall even further in coming years.

Credit challenge. China responded to the global financial crisis with a very large economic stimulus program which was financed by a large increase in the credit stock. The ratio of non-financial credit (borrowing by government, households and non-financial corporations) rose from 160% in 2008 to over 200% in 2011. While the overall credit/GDP ratio remains lower than the 250% that is typical for OECD nations, a rapid increase in the credit stock in a short period of time, regardless of the level, is frequently associated with financial crisis. In China’s case, it is evident that the majority of the increase in the credit stock reflects borrowing by local governments to finance infrastructure projects which are likely to produce economic benefit in the long run but which in many cases will result in immediate financial losses.[4] To avert a potential banking sector crisis, therefore, it would be prudent for government policy to target first a stabilization and then a decline in the credit/GDP ratio.

The good news is that China has recent experience of deflating a credit bubble. In the five years after the Asian financial crisis (1998-2003), the credit/GDP ratio rose by 40 percentage points (the same amount as in 2008-11) as the government financed infrastructure spending to offset the impact of the crisis. Over the next five years (2003-08), the credit/GDP ratio fell by 20 points, as nominal GDP growth (17% a year on average) outstripped the annual growth in credit (15%). This experience suggests that, in principle, it should be possible to reduce the annual growth in credit significantly without torpedoing economic growth.

The bad news is that the 2003-08 deleveraging occurred within the context of the extremely favorable demographics, and unusually robust export growth that we have just described. Not only are these conditions unlikely to be repeated in the coming decade, both these factors are likely to exert a drag on GDP growth. Given this backdrop, any reduction in the rate of credit growth must be accompanied by extensive measures to ensure that the productivity of each yuan of credit issued is far higher than in the past.

3. The role of financial sector reform

The three growth challenges described above are diverse, but they are reflections of a single broader issue which is that China’s ability to maintain rapid growth mainly through the mobilization of factors (labor and capital) is decreasing. Much of the high-speed growth of the last decade derived from a rapid increase in labor productivity which was in turn a function of an extremely high investment rate: as the amount of capital per worker grew, the potential output of each worker grew correspondingly (“capital deepening”). But the investment rate, at nearly 49% of GDP in 2011, must surely be close to its peak, since it is already 10 percentage points higher than the maximum rates ever reached by Japan or South Korea. So the amount of labor productivity gain that can be achieved in future by simply adding volume to the capital stock must be far less than during the last decade, when the investment/GDP ratio rose by 10 percentage points.

The obvious corollary is that if China’s ability to achieve rapid gains in labor productivity and economic growth through mobilization of capital is declining, these gains must increasingly be achieved by improved capital efficiency. More specifically, the tightening of the labor supply implied by the demographic transition means that unit labor cost growth will accelerate; all things being equal this means that consumer price inflation will be structurally higher in the next decade than it was for most of the last. This in turn means that nominal interest rates will need to be higher. As the cost of capital rises, the average rate of return on capital must also increase; otherwise a larger share of projects will be loss-making and the drag on economic growth will become pronounced.

On the export side, the dramatic slowdown in the contribution to economic growth from exports means the loss of a certain amount of “easy” productivity gains. Greater productivity of domestic capital could help offset the deceleration in productivity growth from the external sector. Finally, as just noted, the need to arrest or reverse the rapid rise in the credit/GDP ratio means that over the next several years, a given amount of economic growth must be achieved with a smaller amount of credit than in the past—in other words, the average return on capital (for which credit here serves as a proxy) must rise.

Conceptually this is all fairly straightforward. The problem for policy makers is that measuring the “productivity of capital” on an economy-wide basis is not at all straightforward. In principle, one could measure the amount of new GDP created for each incremental increase in the capital stock (the incremental capital output ratio or ICOR). But in practice calculating ICOR is cumbersome, and depends heavily on various assumptions, such as the proper depreciation rate. Moreover, in an industrializing economy like China’s, the ratio of capital stock to GDP tends to rise over time and therefore the ICOR falls; this does not mean that the economy misallocates capital but simply that it experiences capital deepening. Sorting out efficiency effects from capital deepening effects is a vexing task.[5]

A more practical approach is simply to examine the ratio of credit to GDP. There is no one “right” level of credit to GDP, since different economies use different proportions of debt and equity finance. But the trends in the credit to GDP ratio in a single country (assuming there is no major shift in the relative importance of debt and equity finance), which are easily measured, can serve as a useful proxy for trends in the productivity of capital, and provide some broad guidelines for policy.

Figure 1 shows the ratio of total non-financial credit to GDP in China since 1998 (all figures are nominal). Total non-financial credit comprises bank loans, bonds, external foreign currency borrowing, and so-called “shadow financing” extended to the government, households and non-financial corporations; it excludes fund-raising by banks and other financial institutions. This measure is similar to the measure of “total social financing” recently introduced by the People’s Bank of China. 

This shows, as noted previously, that the credit to GDP ratio rose sharply from 160% of GDP in 2008 to 200% in 2010. The current ratio is not abnormally high: many OECD countries have credit/GDP ratios of 250% or so, and Japan’s is around 350%. But it is obvious that the trend increase is worrying: if credit/GDP continues to rise at 20 percentage points a year then by 2015 it would hit 300%, a level much higher than is normal in healthy economies. It seems intuitively clear that to ensure financial stability, policy should target a stabilization or decline in the credit/GDP ratio. Success in this policy would imply that the productivity of credit, and capital more generally, improves.

The large increase in the credit/GDP ratio in 2008-10 is not unprecedented. Following the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, the total credit stock rose from 143% of GDP in 1998 to 186% in 2003, an increase of 43 percentage points in five years, as a result of government spending on infrastructure and the creation of new consumer lending markets (notably home mortgages). During this period the credit stock grew at an average annual rate of 15.9%, but nominal GDP grew at just 10% a year.

Over the next five years, 2004-08, the average annual growth in total credit decelerated only slightly, to 14.8%. But thanks to a gigantic surge in productivity growth—caused by a combination of the delayed effect of infrastructure spending, deep market reforms (such as the restructuring of the state owned enterprise sector), and a boom in exports—nominal GDP growth surged to an average rate of 18.3%. As a consequence, the credit/GDP ratio declined to 160% in 2008, a decline of 26 percentage points from the peak five years earlier.

This experience shows that, in a developing country like China, it is quite possible to deflate a credit bubble relatively quickly and painlessly. To do so, however, two conditions must be met: the projects financed during the credit bubble must, in the main, be economically productive in the long run even if they cause financial losses in the short run; and structural reforms must accompany or quickly follow the credit expansion, in order to unlock the productivity growth that will enable deleveraging through rapid economic growth rather than through a painful recession. These conditions were clearly met during the 1998-2008 period: the expanded credit of the first five years mainly went to economically useful infrastructure such as highways, telecoms networks and port facilities; and deep structural reforms improved the efficiency of the state sector, expanded opportunities for the private sector, and created a new private housing market. This combination of infrastructure and reforms helped lay the groundwork for the turbo-charged growth of 2004-08.

The credit expansion of 2008-10, following the global financial crisis, was about the same magnitude as the credit expansion of a decade earlier: the credit/GDP ratio rose 40 percentage points, from 160% to 200%. But the expansion was much more rapid (occurring over two years instead of five), and while the bulk of credit probably did finance economically productive infrastructure, there is evidence that the sheer speed of the credit expansion led to far greater financial losses. A large proportion of the new borrowing was done by local government window corporations, often with little or no collateral and in many cases with no likelihood of project cash flows ever being large enough to service the loans. A plausible estimate of eventual losses on these loans to local governments is Rmb2-3 trn, or 4-7% of 2011 GDP.

Furthermore, whereas in the late 1990s restructuring of the state enterprise sector and creation of the private housing market took off at the same time the government began to expand credit, the 2008-10 credit expansion occurred without any significant accompanying structural reforms. In sum we have significantly less reason to be confident about the foundations for economic growth over the next five years than would have been the case in 2003.

On the assumption that the trend rate of nominal GDP growth over the next five years is likely be quite a bit less than in 2003-08, just how difficult will it be for China to stabilize or better yet reduce the credit to GDP ratio? For the purposes of analysis, Figure 1 proposes two scenarios. Both assume that nominal GDP will grow at an average rate of 13% in 2012-2015 (combining real growth of 7.5% a year with economy-wide inflation of 5.5%). The “stabilization” scenario assumes that total credit grows at the same 13% rate, stabilizing the credit/GDP ratio at around 200%. The “deleveraging” scenario assumes that credit growth falls to 9.5% a year, enabling a reduction in the credit/GDP ratio of 25 percentage points to 175%--about the same magnitude as the reduction of 2003-08.

A quick glance suggests that achieving either of these two outcomes will be far more difficult than in the previous deleveraging episode. In 2003-08, the average annual rate of credit growth was just one percentage point lower than during the credit bubble of 1998-2003. In other words, the work of deleveraging was accomplished almost entirely through economic growth, rather than through any material constraint on credit.

In the three years following the global financial crisis, by contrast, total credit expanded by 22.7% a year, generating nominal GDP growth of 14.1% on average. The required drop in average annual credit growth is 10 percentage points under the stabilization scenario and 13 points under the deleveraging scenario, while nominal GDP growth declines by only a point. In other words, this episode is likely to be the reverse of the 2003-08 episode: deleveraging will need to come almost entirely from a constraint on credit, rather than from economic growth.



Another way of looking at this is to examine the relationship between incremental credit and incremental GDP—that is, how many yuan of new GDP arise with each new yuan of credit. This calculation is presented in Figure 2. This shows that in 1998-2003 each Rmb1 of new credit generated Rmb0.39 of new GDP; this figure rose to 0.72 in 2003-08, an 84% increase in the productivity of credit. The GDP payoff from new credit in 2008-10 was far worse than in 1998-2003. Simply to stabilize the credit/GDP ratio at its current level will require a 73% increase in credit productivity. To achieve the deleveraging scenario, a 150% improvement will be required.

The good news is that under the deleveraging scenario, the average productivity of credit in 2011-2015 only needs to be the same as it was in 2003-08. In principle, this should be achievable. But as previously noted, the mechanism of improvement needs to be quite different this time round. In 2003-08, the productivity of credit rose because credit growth remained roughly constant while GDP growth surged, thanks to structural reforms that accelerated returns to both capital and labor. Over the next several years, by contrast, the best that can be hoped for is that GDP growth will remain roughly constant. Consequently any improvement in credit productivity must come from constraining the issuance of new credit, while substantially raising the efficiency of credit allocation and hence the returns to credit.

What are the main mechanisms for improving the efficiency of credit, and of financial capital more generally? Broadly speaking, there are two: diversification of credit channels, and more market-based pricing of credit. Historically most credit has been issued by large state-owned banks, which are subject to political pressure in their lending decisions, and the majority of credit has gone to state-owned enterprises. Diversifying the channels of credit to include a broader range of financial institutions, a more vigorous bond market, and even by encouraging the creation of dedicated small- and medium-size enterprise lending units within the big banks, should improve credit allocation by giving greater credit access to borrowers who were previously shut out simply by virtue of a lack of political connections. Over the past decade government policy has been broadly supportive of the diversification of credit channels: specialized consumer credit, leasing and trust companies have been allowed to flourish, and there is some anecdotal evidence that SME lending at the state owned banks has begun to pick up steam.

The government has been far more reluctant, however, to embrace systematic measures for improving the pricing of credit. Bank interest rates remain captive to the policy of regulated deposit rates. Guaranteed low deposit rates means that banks have little incentive to seek out and properly price riskier assets, and are content to earn a fat spread on relatively conservative loan books. Bond markets, which in more developed economies form the basis for pricing of financial risk, are in China large in primary issuance, but small in trading volumes. The majority of bonds are purchased by banks and other financial institutions and held to maturity, make them indistinguishable from bank loans. Active secondary market trading by a wide range of participants is the essential mechanism by which bond prices become the basis for financial risk pricing.

4. Conclusions and recommendations

China still has potential for another decade of relatively high speed growth, but a combination of structural factors means that “high speed” in future likely means a trend GDP growth rate of around 7%, well below the historic average of 10%. Moreover, a combination of negative trends in demographics and the external sector, and the need to constrain credit growth after the enormous credit expansion of 2008-2010, mean the obstacles to realizing this potential growth rate are quite large. In order to overcome these obstacles, the efficiency of credit, and of capital more generally, must be improved. A large increase in credit efficiency was achieved in the previous economic deleveraging episode of 2003-08, but that increase in efficiency resulted mainly from an acceleration in GDP growth due to capital deepening, rather than from a constraint on credit. Over the next several years, the best that can plausibly be achieved is a stabilization of nominal GDP growth at approximately the current level. Any increase in credit efficiency must therefore come from a constraint on credit growth and direct improvements in credit allocation, rather than from capital-intensive economic growth.

In order to achieve this improvement in credit efficiency, three improvements to China’s financial architecture are urgently needed. First, the diversification of financial channels should continue to be expanded, notably through the acceptance and proper regulation of so-called “shadow financing” activities, which reflect market pressure for higher returns to depositors and greater credit availability (at appropriate prices) for riskier borrowers. Second, the ceiling on bank deposit rates should gradually be lifted and ultimately abolished, in order to give banks incentives for increased lending at appropriate prices to riskier borrowers who (it is to be hoped) will deliver a higher risk-adjusted rate of return than current borrowers. Third, steps should be taken to increase secondary trading on bond markets, in order to enable these markets to assume their appropriate role as the basis of financial risk pricing. Particular stress should be laid on diversifying the universe of financial institutions permitted to trade on bond markets, to include pension funds, specialized fixed-income mutual funds and other institutional investors with a vested interest in active trading to maximize both short- and long-term returns.

 

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Event Information

China’s outbound investment is expected to increase by leaps and bounds in the next decade. Chinese companies are poised to become a major economic force in the global economy. Outbound direct investment by Chinese companies presents unprecedented opportunities for both Chinese companies and their global partners.

The relatively brief history of Chinese companies’ outbound investment indicates, however, that Chinese outbound FDI faces many hurdles both at home and in the destination countries. How can we assess the regulatory, financial, labor, environmental and political risks faced by Chinese multinational companies? What remedies can mitigate such risks for the Chinese firms, for the host countries of Chinese investment and for the Chinese government and people?

The Brookings-Tsinghua Center for Public Policy co-hosted with the 21st Century China Program at UC San Diego, and in collaboration with the Enterprise Research Institute and Tsinghua’s School of Public Policy and Management, a two-day conference at Tsinghua University in Beijing, China, on September 23 and 24, 2013. The conference gathered leading experts, policy makers and corporate leaders to examine the latest research on trends and patterns of Chinese outbound direct investments; the regulatory framework and policy environment in China and destination countries (particularly, but not only in the U.S.); and the implications of Chinese outbound direct investment for China’s economic growth and the global economy. Keynote speakers of each day were Jin Liqun, chairman of China International Capital Corporation, and Gary Locke, U.S. ambassador to China. Mr. Jin suggested that China’s foreign direct investment companies should cooperate with local firms and be willing to talk to the local governments about their problems. Ambassador Locke, on the other hand, introduced the advantages of the U.S. as an investment destination country. He also agreed that investors were supposed to get local help to achieve success.

The audiences included major Chinese companies, service providers in the area of overseas direct investment, policy makers and scholars.

Read more about the speakers and the conference agenda »

Video

• Overview of China's Overseas Investments: Trends, Patterns and Comparison
• Chinese ODI: Motivation and Policy Environment
• Risk Management in Chinese ODI
• China's Outbound Direct Investment - Gary Locke Keynote Address
• Regulatory Environments in Destination Countries (Non-U.S.)
• Regulatory Environments in Destination Countries (Focusing on the U.S.)
• Labor, Environment, and Community Relations in Destination Countries

Transcript

• Keynote speech of U.S. Ambassador to China Gary Locke (.pdf)

Event Materials

• Remarks of Ambassador Locke
• Brian Beglin slides
• Daniel Levine slides
• Jiang Heng slides
• LIU Qian
• Matt Ferchen slides
• Steve Olson slides
• Tang Xiaoyang slides
• Thilo Hanemann slides
• Weiyi Shi slides
• Kang Rongping slides
• Duan Zhirong slides