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Diabetes Management Issues for Patients With Chronic Kidney Disease

Kerri L. Cavanaugh
Jul 1, 2007; 25:90-97
Feature Articles




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Application of Adult-Learning Principles to Patient Instructions: A Usability Study for an Exenatide Once-Weekly Injection Device

Gayle Lorenzi
Sep 1, 2010; 28:157-162
Bridges to Excellence




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Helping Patients Make and Sustain Healthy Changes: A Brief Introduction to Motivational Interviewing in Clinical Diabetes Care

Michele Heisler
Oct 1, 2008; 26:161-165
Practical Pointers




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What's So Tough About Taking Insulin? Addressing the Problem of Psychological Insulin Resistance in Type 2 Diabetes

William H. Polonsky
Jul 1, 2004; 22:147-150
Practical Pointers




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No-Failure Design and Disaster Recovery: Lessons from Fukushima

One of the striking aspects of the early stages of the nuclear accident at Fukushima-Daiichi last March was the nearly total absence of disaster recovery capability. For instance, while Japan is a super-power of robotic technology, the nuclear authorities had to import robots from France for probing the damaged nuclear plants. Fukushima can teach us an important lesson about technology.

The failure of critical technologies can be disastrous. The crash of a civilian airliner can cause hundreds of deaths. The meltdown of a nuclear reactor can release highly toxic isotopes. Failure of flood protection systems can result in vast death and damage. Society therefore insists that critical technologies be designed, operated and maintained to extremely high levels of reliability. We benefit from technology, but we also insist that the designers and operators "do their best" to protect us from their dangers.

Industries and government agencies who provide critical technologies almost invariably act in good faith for a range of reasons. Morality dictates responsible behavior, liability legislation establishes sanctions for irresponsible behavior, and economic or political self-interest makes continuous safe operation desirable.

The language of performance-optimization  not only doing our best, but also achieving the best  may tend to undermine the successful management of technological danger. A probability of severe failure of one in a million per device per year is exceedingly  and very reassuringly  small. When we honestly believe that we have designed and implemented a technology to have vanishingly small probability of catastrophe, we can honestly ignore the need for disaster recovery.

Or can we?

Let's contrast this with an ethos that is consistent with a thorough awareness of the potential for adverse surprise. We now acknowledge that our predictions are uncertain, perhaps highly uncertain on some specific points. We attempt to achieve very demanding outcomes  for instance vanishingly small probabilities of catastrophe  but we recognize that our ability to reliably calculate such small probabilities is compromised by the deficiency of our knowledge and understanding. We robustify ourselves against those deficiencies by choosing a design which would be acceptable over a wide range of deviations from our current best understanding. (This is called "robust-satisficing".) Not only does "vanishingly small probability of failure" still entail the possibility of failure, but our predictions of that probability may err.

Acknowledging the need for disaster recovery capability (DRC) is awkward and uncomfortable for designers and advocates of a technology. We would much rather believe that DRC is not needed, that we have in fact made catastrophe negligible. But let's not conflate good-faith attempts to deal with complex uncertainties, with guaranteed outcomes based on full knowledge. Our best models are in part wrong, so we robustify against the designer's bounded rationality. But robustness cannot guarantee success. The design and implementation of DRC is a necessary part of the design of any critical technology, and is consistent with the strategy of robust satisficing.

One final point: moral hazard and its dilemma. The design of any critical technology entails two distinct and essential elements: failure prevention and disaster recovery. What economists call a `moral hazard' exists since the failure prevention team might rely on the disaster-recovery team, and vice versa. Each team might, at least implicitly, depend on the capabilities of the other team, and thereby relinquish some of its own responsibility. Institutional provisions are needed to manage this conflict.

The alleviation of this moral hazard entails a dilemma. Considerations of failure prevention and disaster recovery must be combined in the design process. The design teams must be aware of each other, and even collaborate, because a single coherent system must emerge. But we don't want either team to relinquish any responsibility. On the one hand we want the failure prevention team to work as though there is no disaster recovery, and the disaster recovery team should presume that failures will occur. On the other hand, we want these teams to collaborate on the design.

This moral hazard and its dilemma do not obviate the need for both elements of the design. Fukushima has taught us an important lesson by highlighting the special challenge of high-risk critical technologies: design so failure cannot occur, and prepare to respond to the unanticipated.




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Robustness and Locke's Wingless Gentleman

Our ancestors have made decisions under uncertainty ever since they had to stand and fight or run away, eat this root or that berry, sleep in this cave or under that bush. Our species is distinguished by the extent of deliberate thought preceding decision. Nonetheless, the ability to decide in the face of the unknown was born from primal necessity. Betting is one of the oldest ways of deciding under uncertainty. But you bet you that 'bet' is a subtler concept than one might think.

We all know what it means to make a bet, but just to make sure let's quote the Oxford English Dictionary: "To stake or wager (a sum of money, etc.) in support of an affirmation or on the issue of a forecast." The word has been around for quite a while. Shakespeare used the verb in 1600: "Iohn a Gaunt loued him well, and betted much money on his head." (Henry IV, Pt. 2 iii. ii. 44). Drayton used the noun in 1627 (and he wasn't the first): "For a long while it was an euen bet ... Whether proud Warwick, or the Queene should win."

An even bet is a 50-50 chance, an equal probability of each outcome. But betting is not always a matter of chance. Sometimes the meaning is just the opposite. According to the OED 'You bet' or 'You bet you' are slang expressions meaning 'be assured, certainly'. For instance: "'Can you handle this outfit?' 'You bet,' said the scout." (D.L.Sayers, Lord Peter Views Body, iv. 68). Mark Twain wrote "'I'll get you there on time' - and you bet you he did, too." (Roughing It, xx. 152).

So 'bet' is one of those words whose meaning stretches from one idea all the way to its opposite. Drayton's "even bet" between Warwick and the Queen means that he has no idea who will win. In contrast, Twain's "you bet you" is a statement of certainty. In Twain's or Sayers' usage, it's as though uncertainty combines with moral conviction to produce a definite resolution. This is a dialectic in which doubt and determination form decisiveness.

John Locke may have had something like this in mind when he wrote:

"If we will disbelieve everything, because we cannot certainly know all things; we shall do muchwhat as wisely as he, who would not use his legs, but sit still and perish, because he had no wings to fly." (An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 1706, I.i.5)

The absurdity of Locke's wingless gentleman starving in his chair leads us to believe, and to act, despite our doubts. The moral imperative of survival sweeps aside the paralysis of uncertainty. The consequence of unabated doubt - paralysis - induces doubt's opposite: decisiveness.

But rational creatures must have some method for reasoning around their uncertainties. Locke does not intend for us to simply ignore our ignorance. But if we have no way to place bets - if the odds simply are unknown - then what are we to do? We cannot "sit still and perish".

This is where the strategy of robustness comes in.

'Robust' means 'Strong and hardy; sturdy; healthy'. By implication, something that is robust is 'not easily damaged or broken, resilient'. A statistical test is robust if it yields 'approximately correct results despite the falsity of certain of the assumptions underlying it' or despite errors in the data. (OED)

A decision is robust if its outcome is satisfactory despite error in the information and understanding which justified or motivated the decision. A robust decision is resilient to surprise, immune to ignorance.

It is no coincidence that the colloquial use of the word 'bet' includes concepts of both chance and certainty. A good bet can tolerate large deviation from certainty, large error of information. A good bet is robust to surprise. 'You bet you' does not mean that the world is certain. It means that the outcome is certain to be acceptable, regardless of how the world turns out. The scout will handle the outfit even if there is a rogue in the ranks; Twain will get there on time despite snags and surprises. A good bet is robust to the unknown. You bet you!


An extended and more formal discussion of these issues can be found elsewhere.




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Beware the Rareness Illusion When Exploring the Unknown

Here's a great vacation idea. Spend the summer roaming the world in search of the 10 lost tribes of Israel, exiled from Samaria by the Assyrians 2700 years ago (2 Kings 17:6). Or perhaps you'd like to search for Prester John, the virtuous ruler of a kingdom lost in the Orient? Or would you rather trace the gold-laden kingdom of Ophir (1 Kings 9:28)? Or do you prefer the excitement of tracking the Amazons, that nation of female warriors? Or perhaps the naval power mentioned by Plato, operating from the island of Atlantis? Or how about unicorns, or the fountain of eternal youth? The Unknown is so vast that the possibilities are endless.

Maybe you don't believe in unicorns. But Plato evidently "knew" about the island of Atlantis. The conquest of Israel is known from Assyrian archeology and from the Bible. That you've never seen a Reubenite or a Naphtalite (or a unicorn) means that they don't exist?

It is true that when something really does not exist, one might spend a long time futilely looking for it. Many people have spent enormous energy searching for lost tribes, lost gold, and lost kingdoms. Why is it so difficult to decide that what you're looking for really isn't there? The answer, ironically, is that the world has endless possibilities for discovery and surprise.

Let's skip vacation plans and consider some real-life searches. How long should you (or the Libyans) look for Muammar Qaddafi? If he's not in the town of Surt, maybe he's Bani Walid, or Algeria, or Timbuktu? How do you decide he cannot be found? Maybe he was pulverized by a NATO bomb. It's urgent to find the suicide bomber in the crowded bus station before it's too late - if he's really there. You'd like to discover a cure for AIDS, or a method to halt the rising global temperature, or a golden investment opportunity in an emerging market, or a proof of the parallel postulate of Euclidean geometry.

Let's focus our question. Suppose you are looking for something, and so far you have only "negative" evidence: it's not here, it's not there, it's not anywhere you've looked. Why is it so difficult to decide, conclusively and confidently, that it simply does not exist?

This question is linked to a different question: how to make the decision that "it" (whatever it is) does not exist. We will focus on the "why" question, and leave the "how" question to students of decision theories such as statistics, fuzzy logic, possibility theory, Dempster-Shafer theory and info-gap theory. (If you're interested in an info-gap application to statistics, here is an example.)

Answers to the "why" question can be found in several domains.

Psychology provides some answers. People can be very goal oriented, stubborn, and persistent. Marco Polo didn't get to China on a 10-hour plane flight. The round trip took him 24 years, and he didn't travel business class.

Ideology is a very strong motivator. When people believe something strongly, it is easy for them to ignore evidence to the contrary. Furthermore, for some people, the search itself is valued more than the putative goal.

The answer to the "why" question that I will focus on is found by contemplating The Endless Unknown. It is so vast, so unstructured, so, well ..., unknown, that we cannot calibrate our negative evidence to decide that whatever we're looking for just ain't there.

I'll tell a true story.

I was born in the US and my wife was born in Israel, but our life-paths crossed, so to speak, before we were born. She had a friend whose father was from Europe and lived for a while - before the friend was born - with a cousin of his in my home town. This cousin was - years later - my 3rd grade teacher. My school teacher was my future wife's friend's father's cousin.

Amazing coincidence. This convoluted sequence of events is certainly rare. How many of you can tell the very same story? But wait a minute. This convoluted string of events could have evolved in many many different ways, each of which would have been an equally amazing coincidence. The number of similar possible paths is namelessly enormous, uncountably humongous. In other words, potential "rare" events are very numerous. Now that sounds like a contradiction (we're getting close to some of Zeno's paradoxes, and Aristotle thought Zeno was crazy). It is not a contradiction; it is only a "rareness illusion" (something like an optical illusion). The specific event sequence in my story is unique, which is the ultimate rarity. We view this sequence as an amazing coincidence because we cannot assess the number of similar sequences. Surprising strings of events occur not infrequently because the number of possible surprising strings is so unimaginably vast. The rareness illusion is the impression of rareness arising from our necessary ignorance of the vast unknown. "Necessary" because, by definition, we cannot know what is unknown. "Vast" because the world is so rich in possibilities.

The rareness illusion is a false impression, a mistake. For instance, it leads people to wrongly goggle at strings of events - rare in themselves - even though "rare events" are numerous and "amazing coincidences" occur all the time. An appreciation of the richness and boundlessness of the Unknown is an antidote for the rareness illusion.

Recognition of the rareness illusion is the key to understanding why it is so difficult to confidently decide, based on negative evidence, that what you're looking for simply does not exist.

One might be inclined to reason as follows. If you're looking for something, then look very thoroughly, and if you don't find it, then it's not there. That is usually sound and sensible advice, and often "looking thoroughly" will lead to discovery.

However, the number of ways that we could overlook something that really is there is enormous. It is thus very difficult to confidently conclude that the search was thorough and that the object cannot be found. Take the case of your missing house keys. They dropped from your pocket in the car, or on the sidewalk and somebody picked them up, or you left them in the lock when you left the house, or or or .... Familiarity with the rareness illusion makes it very difficult to decide that you have searched thoroughly. If you think that the only contingencies not yet explored are too exotic to be relevant (a raven snatched them while you were daydreaming about that enchanting new employee), then think again, because you've been blinded by a rareness illusion. The number of such possibilities is so vastly unfathomable that you cannot confidently say that all of them are collectively negligible. Recognition of the rareness illusion prevents you from confidently concluding that what you are seeking simply does not exist.

Many quantitative tools grapple with the rareness illusion. We mentioned some decision theories earlier. But because the rareness illusion derives from our necessary ignorance of the vast unknown, one must always beware.

Looking for an exciting vacation? The Endless Unknown is the place to go. 




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Squirrels and Stock Brokers, Or: Innovation Dilemmas, Robustness and Probability

Decisions are made in order to achieve desirable outcomes. An innovation dilemma arises when a seemingly more attractive option is also more uncertain than other options. In this essay we explore the relation between the innovation dilemma and the robustness of a decision, and the relation between robustness and probability. A decision is robust to uncertainty if it achieves required outcomes despite adverse surprises. A robust decision may differ from the seemingly best option. Furthermore, robust decisions are not based on knowledge of probabilities, but can still be the most likely to succeed.

Squirrels, Stock-Brokers and Their Dilemmas




Decision problems.
Imagine a squirrel nibbling acorns under an oak tree. They're pretty good acorns, though a bit dry. The good ones have already been taken. Over in the distance is a large stand of fine oaks. The acorns there are probably better. But then, other squirrels can also see those trees, and predators can too. The squirrel doesn't need to get fat, but a critical caloric intake is necessary before moving on to other activities. How long should the squirrel forage at this patch before moving to the more promising patch, if at all?

Imagine a hedge fund manager investing in South African diamonds, Australian Uranium, Norwegian Kroners and Singapore semi-conductors. The returns have been steady and good, but not very exciting. A new hi-tech start-up venture has just turned up. It looks promising, has solid backing, and could be very interesting. The manager doesn't need to earn boundless returns, but it is necessary to earn at least a tad more than the competition (who are also prowling around). How long should the manager hold the current portfolio before changing at least some of its components?

These are decision problems, and like many other examples, they share three traits: critical needs must be met; the current situation may or may not be adequate; other alternatives look much better but are much more uncertain. To change, or not to change? What strategy to use in making a decision? What choice is the best bet? Betting is a surprising concept, as we have seen before; can we bet without knowing probabilities?

Solution strategies.
The decision is easy in either of two extreme situations, and their analysis will reveal general conclusions.

One extreme is that the status quo is clearly insufficient. For the squirrel this means that these crinkled rotten acorns won't fill anybody's belly even if one nibbled here all day long. Survival requires trying the other patch regardless of the fact that there may be many other squirrels already there and predators just waiting to swoop down. Similarly, for the hedge fund manager, if other funds are making fantastic profits, then something has to change or the competition will attract all the business.

The other extreme is that the status quo is just fine, thank you. For the squirrel, just a little more nibbling and these acorns will get us through the night, so why run over to unfamiliar oak trees? For the hedge fund manager, profits are better than those of any credible competitor, so uncertain change is not called for.

From these two extremes we draw an important general conclusion: the right answer depends on what you need. To change, or not to change, depends on what is critical for survival. There is no universal answer, like, "Always try to improve" or "If it's working, don't fix it". This is a very general property of decisions under uncertainty, and we will call it preference reversal. The agent's preference between alternatives depends on what the agent needs in order to "survive".

The decision strategy that we have described is attuned to the needs of the agent. The strategy attempts to satisfy the agent's critical requirements. If the status quo would reliably do that, then stay put; if not, then move. Following the work of Nobel Laureate Herbert Simon, we will call this a satisficing decision strategy: one which satisfies a critical requirement.

"Prediction is always difficult, especially of the future." - Robert Storm Petersen

Now let's consider a different decision strategy that squirrels and hedge fund managers might be tempted to use. The agent has obtained information about the two alternatives by signals from the environment. (The squirrel sees grand verdant oaks in the distance, the fund manager hears of a new start up.) Given this information, a prediction can be made (though the squirrel may make this prediction based on instincts and without being aware of making it). Given the best available information, the agent predicts which alternative would yield the better outcome. Using this prediction, the decision strategy is to choose the alternative whose predicted outcome is best. We will call this decision strategy best-model optimization. Note that this decision strategy yields a single universal answer to the question facing the agent. This strategy uses the best information to find the choice that - if that information is correct - will yield the best outcome. Best-model optimization (usually) gives a single "best" decision, unlike the satisficing strategy that returns different answers depending on the agent's needs.

There is an attractive logic - and even perhaps a moral imperative - to use the best information to make the best choice. One should always try to do one's best. But the catch in the argument for best-model optimization is that the best information may actually be grievously wrong. Those fine oak trees might be swarming with insects who've devoured the acorns. Best-model optimization ignores the agent's central dilemma: stay with the relatively well known but modest alternative, or go for the more promising but more uncertain alternative.

"Tsk, tsk, tsk" says our hedge fund manager. "My information already accounts for the uncertainty. I have used a probabilistic asset pricing model to predict the likelihood that my profits will beat the competition for each of the two alternatives."

Probabilistic asset pricing models are good to have. And the squirrel similarly has evolved instincts that reflect likelihoods. But a best-probabilistic-model optimization is simply one type of best-model optimization, and is subject to the same vulnerability to error. The world is full of surprises. The probability functions that are used are quite likely wrong, especially in predicting the rare events that the manager is most concerned to avoid.

Robustness and Probability

Now we come to the truly amazing part of the story. The satisficing strategy does not use any probabilistic information. Nonetheless, in many situations, the satisficing strategy is actually a better bet (or at least not a worse bet), probabilistically speaking, than any other strategy, including best-probabilistic-model optimization. We have no probabilistic information in these situations, but we can still maximize the probability of success (though we won't know the value of this maximum).

When the satisficing decision strategy is the best bet, this is, in part, because it is more robust to uncertainty than another other strategy. A decision is robust to uncertainty if it achieves required outcomes even if adverse surprises occur. In many important situations (though not invariably), more robustness to uncertainty is equivalent to being more likely to succeed or survive. When this is true we say that robustness is a proxy for probability.

A thorough analysis of the proxy property is rather technical. However, we can understand the gist of the idea by considering a simple special case.

Let's continue with the squirrel and hedge fund examples. Suppose we are completely confident about the future value (in calories or dollars) of not making any change (staying put). In contrast, the future value of moving is apparently better though uncertain. If staying put would satisfy our critical requirement, then we are absolutely certain of survival if we do not change. Staying put is completely robust to surprises so the probability of success equals 1 if we stay put, regardless of what happens with the other option. Likewise, if staying put would not satisfy our critical requirement, then we are absolutely certain of failure if we do not change; the probability of success equals 0 if we stay, and moving cannot be worse. Regardless of what probability distribution describes future outcomes if we move, we can always choose the option whose likelihood of success is greater (or at least not worse). This is because staying put is either sure to succeed or sure to fail, and we know which.

This argument can be extended to the more realistic case where the outcome of staying put is uncertain and the outcome of moving, while seemingly better than staying, is much more uncertain. The agent can know which option is more robust to uncertainty, without having to know probability distributions. This implies, in many situations, that the agent can choose the option that is a better bet for survival.

Wrapping Up

The skillful decision maker not only knows a lot, but is also able to deal with conflicting information. We have discussed the innovation dilemma: When choosing between two alternatives, the seemingly better one is also more uncertain.

Animals, people, organizations and societies have developed mechanisms for dealing with the innovation dilemma. The response hinges on tuning the decision to the agent's needs, and robustifying the choice against uncertainty. This choice may or may not coincide with the putative best choice. But what seems best depends on the available - though uncertain - information.

The commendable tendency to do one's best - and to demand the same of others - can lead to putatively optimal decisions that may be more vulnerable to surprise than other decisions that would have been satisfactory. In contrast, the strategy of robustly satisfying critical needs can be a better bet for survival. Consider the design of critical infrastructure: flood protection, nuclear power, communication networks, and so on. The design of such systems is based on vast knowledge and understanding, but also confronts bewildering uncertainties and endless surprises. We must continue to improve our knowledge and understanding, while also improving our ability to manage the uncertainties resulting from the expanding horizon of our efforts. We must identify the critical goals and seek responses that are immune to surprise. 




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Picking a Theory is Like Building a Boat at Sea


"We are like sailors who on the open sea must reconstruct their ship
 but are never able to start afresh from the bottom." 
Otto Neurath's analogy in the words of Willard V. Quine

Engineers, economists, social planners, security strategists, and others base their plans and decisions on theories. They often argue long and hard over which theory to use. Is it ever right to use a theory that we know is empirically wrong, especially if a true (or truer) theory is available? Why is it so difficult to pick a theory?

Let's consider two introductory examples.

You are an engineer designing a robot. You must calculate the forces needed to achieve specified motions of the robotic arms. You can base these calculations on either of two theories. One theory assumes that an object comes to rest unless a force acts upon it. Let's call this axiom A. The other theory assumes that an object moves at constant speed unless a force acts upon it. Let's call this axiom G. Axiom A agrees with observation: Nothing moves continuously without the exertion of force; an object will come to rest unless you keep pushing it. Axiom G contradicts all observation; no experiment illustrates the perpetual motion postulated by the axiom. If all else is the same, which theory should you choose?

Axiom A is Aristotle's law of inertia, which contributed little to the development of mechanical dynamics. Axiom G is Galileo's law of inertia: one of the most fruitful scientific ideas of all time. Why is an undemonstrable assertion - axiom G - a good starting point for a theory?

Consider another example.

You are an economist designing a market-based policy to induce firms to reduce pollution. You will use an economic theory to choose between policies. One theory assumes that firms face pure competition, meaning that no single firm can influence market prices. Another theory provides agent-based game-theoretic characterization of how firms interact (without colluding) by observing and responding to price behavior of other firms and of consumers.

Pure competition is a stylized idealization (like axiom G). Game theory is much more realistic (like axiom A), but may obscure essential patterns in its massive detail. Which theory should you use?

We will not address the question of how to choose a theory upon which to base a decision. We will focus on the question: why is theory selection so difficult? We will discuss four trade offs.

"Thanks to the negation sign, there are as many truths as falsehoods;
we just can't always be sure which are which." Willard V. Quine

The tension between right and right. The number of possible theories is infinite, and sometimes it's hard to separate the wheat from the chaff, as suggested by the quote from Quine. As an example, I have a book called A Modern Guide to Macroeconomics: An Introduction to Competing Schools of Thought by Snowdon, Vane and Wynarczyk. It's a wonderful overview of about a dozen theories developed by leading economic scholars, many of them Nobel Prize Laureates. The theories are all fundamentally different. They use different axioms and concepts and they compete for adoption by economists. These theories have been studied and tested upside down and backwards. However, economic processes are very complex and variable, and the various theories succeed in different ways or in different situations, so the jury is still out. The choice of a theory is no simple matter because many different theories can all seem right in one way or another.

"The fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing." Archilochus

The fox-hedgehog tension. This aphorism by Archilochus metaphorically describes two types of theories (and two types of people). Fox-like theories are comprehensive and include all relevant aspects of the problem. Hedgehog-like theories, in contrast, skip the details and focus on essentials. Axiom A is fox-like because the complications of friction are acknowledged from the start. Axiom G is hedgehog-like because inertial resistance to change is acknowledged but the complications of friction are left for later. It is difficult to choose between these types of theories because it is difficult to balance comprehensiveness against essentialism. On the one hand, all relevant aspects of the problem should be considered. On the other hand, don't get bogged down in endless details. This fox-hedgehog tension can be managed by weighing the context, goals and implications of the decision. We won't expand on this idea since we're not considering how to choose a theory; we're only examining why it's a difficult choice. However, the idea of resolving this tension by goal-directed choice motivates the third tension.

"Beyond this island of meanings which in their own nature are true or false
lies the ocean of meanings to which truth and falsity are irrelevant." John Dewey

The truth-meaning tension. Theories are collections of statements like axioms A and G in our first example. Statements carry meaning, and statements can be either true or false. Truth and meaning are different. For instance, "Archilochus was a Japanese belly dancer" has meaning, but is not true. The quote from Dewey expresses the idea that "meaning" is a broader description of statements than "truth". All true statements mean something, but not all meaningful statements are true. That does not imply, however, that all untrue meaningful statements are false, as we will see.

We know the meanings of words and sentences from experience with language and life. A child learns the meanings of words - chair, mom, love, good, bad - by experience. Meanings are learned by pointing - this is a chair - and also by experiencing what it means to love or to be good or bad.

Truth is a different concept. John Dewey wrote that

"truths are but one class of meanings, namely, those in which a claim to verifiability by their consequences is an intrinsic part of their meaning. Beyond this island of meanings which in their own nature are true or false lies the ocean of meanings to which truth and falsity are irrelevant. We do not inquire whether Greek civilization was true or false, but we are immensely concerned to penetrate its meaning."

A true statement, in Dewey's sense, is one that can be confirmed by experience. Many statements are meaningful, even important and useful, but neither true nor false in this experimental sense. Axiom G is an example.

Our quest is to understand why the selection of a theory is difficult. Part of the challenge derives from the tension between meaning and truth. We select a theory for use in formulating and evaluating a plan or decision. The decision has implications: what would it mean to do this rather than that? Hence it is important that the meaning of the theory fit the context of the decision. Indeed, hedgehogs would say that getting the meaning and implication right is the essence of good decision making.

But what if a relevantly meaningful theory is unprovable or even false? Should we use a theory that is meaningful but not verifiable by experience? Should we use a meaningful theory that is even wrong? This quandary is related to the fox-hedgehog tension because the fox's theory is so full of true statements that its meaning may be obscured, while the hedgehog's bare-bones theory has clear relevance to the decision to be made, but may be either false or too idealized to be tested.

Galileo's axiom of inertia is an idealization that is unsupported by experience because friction can never be avoided. Axiom G assumes conditions that cannot be realized so the axiom can never be tested. Likewise, pure competition is an idealization that is rarely if ever encountered in practice. But these theories capture the essence of many situations. In practical terms, what it means to get the robotic arm from here to there is to apply net forces that overcome Galilean inertia. But actually designing a robot requires considering details of dissipative forces like friction. What it means to be a small business is that the market price of your product is beyond your control. But actually running a business requires following and reacting to prices in the store next door.

It is difficult to choose between a relevantly meaningful but unverifiable theory, and a true theory that is perhaps not quite what we mean.

The knowledge-ignorance tension. Recall that we are discussing theories in the service of decision-making by engineers, social scientists and others. A theory should facilitate the use of our knowledge and understanding. However, in some situations our ignorance is vast and our knowledge will grow. Hence a theory should also account for ignorance and be able to accommodate new knowledge.

Let's take an example from theories of decision. The independence axiom is fundamental in various decision theories, for instance in von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility theory. It says that one's choices should be independent of irrelevant alternatives. Suppose you are offered the dinner choice between chicken and fish, and you choose chicken. The server returns a few minutes later saying that beef is also available. If you switch your choice from chicken to fish you are violating the independence axiom. You prefer beef less than both chicken and fish, so the beef option shouldn't alter the fish-chicken preference.

But let's suppose that when the server returned and mentioned beef, your physician advised you to reduce your cholesterol intake (so your preference for beef is lowest) which prompted your wife to say that you should eat fish at least twice a week because of vitamins in the oil. So you switch from chicken to fish. Beef is not chosen, but new information that resulted from introducing the irrelevant alternative has altered the chicken-fish preference.

One could argue for the independence axiom by saying that it applies only when all relevant information (like considerations of cholesterol and fish oil) are taken into account. On the other hand, one can argue against the independence axiom by saying that new relevant information quite often surfaces unexpectedly. The difficulty is to judge the extent to which ignorance and the emergence of new knowledge should be central in a decision theory.

Wrapping up. Theories express our knowledge and understanding about the unknown and confusing world. Knowledge begets knowledge. We use knowledge and understanding - that is, theory - in choosing a theory. The process is difficult because it's like building a boat on the open sea as Otto Neurath once said. 




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Jabberwocky. Or: Grand Unified Theory of Uncertainty???


Jabberwocky, Lewis Carroll's whimsical nonsense poem, uses made-up words to create an atmosphere and to tell a story. "Billig", "frumious", "vorpal" and "uffish" have no lexical meaning, but they could have. The poem demonstrates that the realm of imagination exceeds the bounds of reality just as the set of possible words and meanings exceeds its real lexical counterpart.

Uncertainty thrives in the realm of imagination, incongruity, and contradiction. Uncertainty falls in the realm of science fiction as much as in the realm of science. People have struggled with uncertainty for ages and many theories of uncertainty have appeared over time. How many uncertainty theories do we need? Lots, and forever. Would we say that of physics? No, at least not forever.

Can you think inconsistent, incoherent, or erroneous thoughts? I can. (I do it quite often, usually without noticing.) For those unaccustomed to thinking incongruous thoughts, and who need a bit of help to get started, I can recommend thinking of "two meanings packed into one word like a portmanteau," like 'fuming' and 'furious' to get 'frumious' or 'snake' and 'shark' to get 'snark'.

Portmanteau words are a start. Our task now is portmanteau thoughts. Take for instance the idea of a 'thingk':

When I think a thing I've thought,
I have often felt I ought
To call this thing I think a "Thingk",
Which ought to save a lot of ink.

The participle is written "thingking",
(Which is where we save on inking,)
Because "thingking" says in just one word:
"Thinking of a thought thing." Absurd!

All this shows high-power abstraction.
(That highly touted human contraption.)
Using symbols with subtle feint,
To stand for something which they ain't.

Now that wasn't difficult: two thoughts at once. Now let those thoughts be contradictory. To use a prosaic example: thinking the unthinkable, which I suppose is 'unthingkable'. There! You did it. You are on your way to a rich and full life of thinking incongruities, fallacies and contradictions. We can hold in our minds thoughts of 4-sided triangles, parallel lines that intersect, and endless other seeming impossibilities from super-girls like Pippi Longstockings to life on Mars (some of which may actually be true, or at least possible).

Scientists, logicians, and saints are in the business of dispelling all such incongruities, errors and contradictions. Banishing inconsistency is possible in science because (or if) there is only one coherent world. Belief in one coherent world and one grand unified theory is the modern secular version of the ancient monotheistic intuition of one universal God (in which saints tend to believe). Uncertainty thrives in the realm in which scientists and saints have not yet completed their tasks (perhaps because they are incompletable). For instance, we must entertain a wide range of conflicting conceptions when we do not yet know how (or whether) quantum mechanics can be reconciled with general relativity, or Pippi's strength reconciled with the limitations of physiology. As Henry Adams wrote:

"Images are not arguments, rarely even lead to proof, but the mind craves them, and, of late more than ever, the keenest experimenters find twenty images better than one, especially if contradictory; since the human mind has already learned to deal in contradictions."

The very idea of a rigorously logical theory of uncertainty is startling and implausible because the realm of the uncertain is inherently incoherent and contradictory. Indeed, the first uncertainty theory - probability - emerged many centuries after the invention of the axiomatic method in mathematics. Today we have many theories of uncertainty: probability, imprecise probability, information theory, generalized information theory, fuzzy logic, Dempster-Shafer theory, info-gap theory, and more (the list is a bit uncertain). Why such a long and diverse list? It seems that in constructing a logically consistent theory of the logically inconsistent domain of uncertainty, one cannot capture the whole beast all at once (though I'm uncertain about this).

A theory, in order to be scientific, must exclude something. A scientific theory makes statements such as "This happens; that doesn't happen." Karl Popper explained that a scientific theory must contain statements that are at risk of being wrong, statements that could be falsified. Deborah Mayo demonstrated how science grows by discovering and recovering from error.

The realm of uncertainty contains contradictions (ostensible or real) such as the pair of statements: "Nine year old girls can lift horses" and "Muscle fiber generates tension through the action of actin and myosin cross-bridge cycling". A logically consistent theory of uncertainty can handle improbabilities, as can scientific theories like quantum mechanics. But a logical theory cannot encompass outright contradictions. Science investigates a domain: the natural and physical worlds. Those worlds, by virtue of their existence, are perhaps coherent in a way that can be reflected in a unified logical theory. Theories of uncertainty are directed at a larger domain: the natural and physical worlds and all imaginable (and unimaginable) other worlds. That larger domain is definitely not coherent, and a unified logical theory would seem to be unattainable. Hence many theories of uncertainty are needed.

Scientific theories are good to have, and we do well to encourage the scientists. But it is a mistake to think that the scientific paradigm is suitable to all domains, in particular, to the study of uncertainty. Logic is a powerful tool and the axiomatic method assures the logical consistency of a theory. For instance, Leonard Savage argued that personal probability is a "code of consistency" for choosing one's behavior. Jim March compares the rigorous logic of mathematical theories of decision to strict religious morality. Consistency between values and actions is commendable says March, but he notes that one sometimes needs to deviate from perfect morality. While "[s]tandard notions of intelligent choice are theories of strict morality ... saints are a luxury to be encouraged only in small numbers." Logical consistency is a merit of any single theory, including a theory of uncertainty. However, insisting that the same logical consistency apply over the entire domain of uncertainty is like asking reality and saintliness to make peace.




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Why We Need Libraries, Or, Memory and Knowledge


"Writing is thinking in slow motion. We see what at normal speeds escapes us, can rerun the reel at will to look for errors, erase, interpolate, and rethink. Most thoughts are a light rain, fall upon the ground, and dry up. Occasionally they become a stream that runs a short distance before it disappears. Writing stands an incomparably better chance of getting somewhere.

"... What is written can be given endlessly and yet retained, read by thousands even while it is being rewritten, kept as it was and revised at the same time. Writing is magic." 
Walter Kaufmann

We are able to know things because they happen again and again. We know about the sun because it glares down on us day after day. Scientists learn the laws of nature, and build confidence in their knowledge, by testing their theories over and over and getting the same results each time. We would be unable to learn the patterns and ways of our world if nothing were repeatable.

But without memory, we could learn nothing even if the world were tediously repetitive. Even though the sun rises daily in the east, we could not know this if we couldn't remember it.

The world has stable patterns, and we are able to discover these patterns because we remember. Knowledge requires more than memory, but memory is an essential element.

The invention of writing was a great boon to knowledge because writing is collective memory. For instance, the Peloponnesian wars are known to us through Thucydides' writings. People understand themselves and their societies in part through knowing their history. History, as distinct from pre-history, depends on the written word. For example, each year at the Passover holiday, Jewish families through the ages have read the story of the Israelite exodus from Egypt. We are enjoined to see ourselves as though we were there, fleeing Egypt and trudging through the desert. Memory, recorded for all time, creates individual and collective awareness, and motivates aspirations and actions.

Without writing, much collective memory would be lost, just as books themselves are sometimes lost. We know, for instance, that Euclid wrote a book called Porisms, but the book is lost and we know next to nothing about its message. Memory, and knowledge, have been lost.

Memory can be uncertain. We've all experienced that on the personal level. Collective memory can also be uncertain. We're sometimes uncertain of the meaning of rare ancient words, such as lilit in Isaiah (34:14) or gvina in Job (10:10). Written traditions, while containing an element of truth, may be of uncertain meaning or veracity. For instance, we know a good deal, both from the Bible and from archeological findings, about Hezekiah who ruled the kingdom of Judea in the late 8th century BCE. About David, three centuries earlier, we can be much less certain. Biblical stories are told in great detail but corroboration is hard to obtain.

Memory can be deliberately corrupted. Records of history can be embellished or prettified, as when a king commissions the chronicling of his achievements. Ancient monuments glorifying imperial conquests are invaluable sources of knowledge of past ages, but they are unreliable and must be interpreted cautiously. Records of purported events that never occurred can be maliciously fabricated. For instance, The Protocols of the Elders of Zion is pure invention, though that book has been re-published voluminously throughout the world and continues to be taken seriously by many people. Memory is alive and very real, even if it is memory of things that never happened.

Libraries are the physical medium of human collective memory, and an essential element in maintaining and enlarging our knowledge. There are many types of libraries. The family library may have a few hundred books, while the library of Congress has 1,349 km of bookshelves and holds about 147 million items. Libraries can hold paper books or digital electronic documents. Paper can perish in fire as happened to the Alexandrian library, while digital media can be erased, or become damaged and unreadable. Libraries, like memory itself, are fragile and need care.

Why do we need libraries? Being human means, among other things, the capacity for knowledge, and the ability to appreciate and benefit from it. The written record is a public good, like the fresh air. I can read Confucius or Isaiah centuries after they lived, and my reading does not consume them. Our collective memory is part of each individual, and preserving that memory preserves a part of each of us. Without memory, we are without knowledge. Without knowledge, we are only another animal.




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Habit: A Response to the Unknown


David Hume explained that we believe by habit that logs will burn, stones will fall, and endless other past patterns will recur. No experiment can prove the future recurrence of past events. An experiment belongs to the future only until it is implemented; once completed, it becomes part of the past. In order for past experiments to prove something about the future, we must assume that the past will recur in the future. That's as circular as it gets.

But without the habit of believing that past patterns will recur, we would be incapacitated and ineffectual (and probably reduced to moping and sobbing). Who would dare climb stairs or fly planes or eat bread and drink wine, without the belief that, like in the past, the stairs will bear our weight, the wings will carry us aloft, and the bread and wine will nourish our body and soul. Without such habits we would become a jittering jelly of indecision in the face of the unknown.

But you can't just pull a habit out of a hat. We spend great effort instilling good habits in our children: to brush their teeth, tell the truth, and not pick on their little sister even if she deserves it.

As we get older, and I mean really older, we begin to worry that our habits become frozen, stodgy, closed-minded and constraining. Younger folks smile at our rigid ways, and try to loosen us up to the new wonders of the world: technological, culinary or musical. Changing your habits, or staying young when you aren't, isn't always easy. Without habits we're lost in an unknowable world.

And yet, openness to new ideas, tastes, sounds and other experiences of many sorts can itself be a habit, and perhaps a good one. It is the habit of testing the unknown, of acknowledging the great gap between what we do know and what we can know. That gap is an invitation to growth and awe, as well as to fear and danger.

The habit of openness to change is not a contradiction. It is simply a recognition that habits are a response to the unknown. Not everything changes all the time (or so we're in the habit of thinking), and some things are new under the sun (as newspapers and Nobel prize committees periodically remind us).

Habits, including the habit of open-mindedness, are a good thing precisely because we can never know for sure how good or bad they really are.




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MOOCs and the Unknown


MOOCs - Massive Open Online Courses - have fed hundreds of thousands of knowledge-hungry people around the globe. Stanford University's MOOCs program has taught open online courses to tens of thousands students per course, and has 2.5 million enrollees from nearly every country in the world. The students hear a lecturer, and also interact with each other in digital social networks that facilitate their mastery of the material and their integration into global communities of the knowledgable. The internet, and its MOOC realizations, extend the democratization of knowledge to a scale unimagined by early pioneers of workers' study groups or public universities. MOOCs open the market of ideas and knowledge to everyone, from the preacher of esoteric spirituality to the teacher of esoteric computer languages. It's all there, all you need is a browser.

The internet is a facilitating technology, like the invention of writing or the printing press, and its impacts may be as revolutionary. MOOCs are here to stay, like the sun to govern by day and the moon by night, and we can see that it is good. But it also has limitations, and these we must begin to understand.

Education depends on the creation and transfer of knowledge. Insight, invention, and discovery underlay the creation of knowledge, and they must precede the transfer of knowledge. MOOCs enable learners to sit at the feet of the world's greatest creators of knowledge.

But the distinction between creation and transfer of knowledge is necessarily blurred in the process of education itself. Deep and meaningful education is the creation of knowledge in the mind of the learner. Education is not the transfer of digital bits between electronic storage devices. Education is the creation or discovery by the learner of thoughts that previously did not exist in his mind. One can transfer facts per se, but if this is done without creative insight by the learner it is no more than Huck Finn's learning "the multiplication table up to six times seven is thirty-five".

Invention, discovery and creation occur in the realm of the unknown; we cannot know what will be created until it appears. Two central unknowns dominate the process of education, one in the teacher's mind and one in the student's.

The teacher cannot know what questions the student will ask. Past experience is a guide, but the universe of possible questions is unbounded, and the better the student, the more unpredictable the questions. The teacher should respond to these questions because they are the fruitful meristem of the student's growing understanding. The student's questions are the teacher's guide into the student's mind. Without them the teacher can only guess how to reach the learner. The most effective teacher will personalize his interaction with the learner by responding to the student's questions.

The student cannot know the substance of what the teacher will teach; that's precisely why the student has come to the teacher. In extreme cases - of really deep and mind-altering learning - the student will not even understand the teacher's words until they are repeated again and again in new and different ways. The meanings of words come from context. A word means one thing and not another because we use that word in this way and not that. The student gropes to find out how the teacher uses words, concepts and tools of thought. The most effective learning occurs when the student can connect the new meanings to his existing mental contexts. The student cannot always know what contexts will be evoked by his learning.

As an interim summary, learning can take place only if there is a gap of knowledge between teacher and student. This knowledge gap induces uncertainties on both sides. Effective teaching and learning occur by personalized interaction to dispel these uncertainties, to fill the gap, and to complete the transfer of knowledge.

We can now appreciate the most serious pedagogic limitation of MOOCs as a tool for education. Mass education is democratic, and MOOCs are far more democratic than any previous mode. This democracy creates a basic tension. The more democratic a mode of communication, the less personalized it is because of its massiveness. The less personalized a communication, the less effective it is pedagogically. The gap of the unknown that separates teacher and learner is greatest in massively democratic education.

Socrates inveighed against the writing of books. They are too impersonal and immutable. They offer too little room for Socratic mid-wifery of wisdom, in which knowledge comes from dialog. Socrates wanted to touch his students' souls, and because each soul is unique, no book can bridge the gap. Books can at best jog the memory of learners who have already been enlightened. Socrates would probably not have liked MOOCs either, and for similar reasons.

Nonetheless, Socrates might have preferred MOOCs over books because the mode of communication is different. Books approach the learner through writing, and induce him to write in response. In contrast, MOOCs approach the learner through speech, and induce him to speak in response. Speech, for Socrates, is personal and interactive; speech is the road to the soul. Spoken bilateral interaction cannot occur between a teacher and 20 thousand online learners spread over time and space. That format is the ultimate insult to Socratic learning. On the other hand, the networking that can accompany a MOOC may possibly facilitate the internalization of the teacher's message even more effectively than a one-on-one tutorial. Fast and multi-personal, online chats and other networking can help the learners to rapidly find their own mental contexts for assimilating and modifying the teacher's message.

Many people have complained that the internet undermines the permanence of the written word. No document is final if it's on the web. Socrates might have approved, and this might be the greatest strength of the MOOC: no course ever ends and no lecture is really final. If MOOCs really are democratic then they cannot be controlled. The discovery of knowledge, like the stars in their orbits, is forever on-going, with occasional supernovas that brighten the heavens. The creation of knowledge will never end because the unknown is limitless. If MOOCs facilitate this creation, then they are good. 








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New Theory & Psychology: Early Critical Theory and Beck’s Cognitive Theory

Two articles in the most recent issue of Theory & Psychology may interest AHP readers. Full details below. “How lost and accomplished revolutions shaped psychology: Early Critical Theory (Frankfurt School), Wilhelm Reich, and Vygotsky,” by Gordana Jovanovi?. Abstract: On the occasion of recent centenaries of revolutions in Europe (1917, 1918–19), this article examines, within a … Continue reading New Theory & Psychology: Early Critical Theory and Beck’s Cognitive Theory




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Forthcoming HOPOS Special Issue on Descriptive Psychology and Völkerpsychologie

Two pieces forthcoming in a special issue of HOPOS, the official journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science, will be of interest to AHP readers. The special issue, “Descriptive Psychology and Völkerpsychologie—in the Contexts of Historicism, Relativism, and Naturalism,” is guest-edited by Christian Damböck, Uljana Feest, and Martin Kusch. Full details … Continue reading Forthcoming HOPOS Special Issue on Descriptive Psychology and Völkerpsychologie




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This Essential Mineral Linked To COVID-19 Recovery

An essential mineral in the body have been linked to recovery of COVID-19 patients.

Support PsyBlog for just $5 per month. Enables access to articles marked (M) and removes ads.

→ Explore PsyBlog's ebooks, all written by Dr Jeremy Dean:




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The Breakfast That Boosts Weight Loss By 65%

The food lowers cravings for high-sugar and high-fat foods and suppresses appetite during the day.

Support PsyBlog for just $5 per month. Enables access to articles marked (M) and removes ads.

→ Explore PsyBlog's ebooks, all written by Dr Jeremy Dean:




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The Best Material For A Homemade COVID-19 Mask

The best type of fabric for a breathable but effective COVID-19 mask.

Support PsyBlog for just $5 per month. Enables access to articles marked (M) and removes ads.

→ Explore PsyBlog's ebooks, all written by Dr Jeremy Dean:




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How Phone Counseling May Help Save Lives During the Covid-19 Lockdown

With the covid-19 pandemic now affecting virtually every country on earth, it is understandable that much of the world’s focus has been on protecting people’s physical health. Hand washing and social distancing is important in the fight against the coronavirus. However, it is important to remember that mental health issues may lead to loss of […]




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Charles Barkley believes in the hot hand fallacy – when it comes to poker, anyway

NBA legend and recreational gambler Charles Barkley is presented with the following hypothetical on ESPN radio: You are winning big at the poker table when a beautiful woman sits down next to you. “Do you stay with the hands or do you leave?” Barkley: “Bro, gambling is so fickle, I love to gamble, when you [...]




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The landfill nudge shows up at a Whole Foods in Lake Forest, Illinois

Hat tip: Brad Bennett




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“Mandate-Schmandate,” Rick Perry and the HPV vaccine – by Richard Thaler

Nudge blog note: Last night’s Republican debate prompted Richard Thaler to weigh in on Rick Perry’s handling of an HPV vaccine executive order, but not the policy itself. Also, Thaler recently started tweeting. Follow him. By Richard Thaler In the Republican Presidential debate last night at the Reagan library a question emerged about Rick Perry’s [...]




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A devious little marketing nudge

Courtesy of computer security provider Lavasoft (spotted by a sharp behavioral graduate student at Booth). Yes, you can click the grayed-out button on the left and “update” to the free software.  




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Where is behavioral economics headed in the world of marketing?

The Nudge blog sat down (electronically) with John Kenny, Senior Vice President of Strategic Planning in Draftfcb’s Chicago office, to explore whether behavioral economics is just a fad in marketing or a legitimate tool to help the industry perform better. Starting with the Institute of Decision Making, Draftfcb has been one of the leaders in [...]




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Here’s how Washington State’s nudge for state park donations works via its web site

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does resurge work : Resurge weight reduction supplement is a distinct advantage program that would bolster your ascent to control. It will change you and make you more grounded than at any other time with improved wellbeing that can assist you with getting away from heftiness. This Resurge audit tells how the Supplement will help your lack of sleep and weight reduction cause. Improved digestion change will enable the body to acquire vitality.




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Seeking Participants for a Study on How COVID-19 is Affecting Sex and Relationships

The COVID-19 coronavirus pandemic is causing a number of societal changes that are new to nearly all of us, with governments around the world locking down cities and countries in an attempt to slow the spread of the virus. This situation is pushing some people together, but pulling others apart—and we’ve never seen anything quite like it in the modern era. Countless media articles have been written about the ways in which this is affecting people’s sex lives and relationships; however, most of them are purely speculative. This led some of my colleagues at the Kinsey Institute and I to wonder what’s really happening—and we’ve designed a study to help us better understand how emergency situations like this affect people’s sexual and romantic lives, which may help us to better plan and prepare for similar events in the future.



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Women Who Buy Sex: Why They Do It, And What Their Experiences Are Like

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Why The Pandemic is Making Some People Horny--But Turning Others Off

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What are the Most Effective Pick-Up Lines? Here’s What the Science Says

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Lockdown Reading Recommendations for People Who Like to Read About Sex

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Sex and Psychology Podcast: Maintaining a Healthy Intimate Life During Lockdown and Social Distancing

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Sex and Psychology Podcast: SexTech, Sexting, and Dick Pics in the Time of COVID-19

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Podcasts on the Science of Sex to Get You Through the Lockdown

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  • Sex and Relationships in the Media

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Fact Check: Does Pubic Hair Grooming Increase the Risk of Getting an STI?

Sexually transmitted infections (STIs) are on the rise, and many people are curious about the reasons why. While the cause is obviously multifactorial, some have suggested that at least part of the rise in STIs may be due to increasing rates of pubic hair grooming in men and women alike. Given that it’s not uncommon for people to experience cuts and skin irritation from genital grooming practices, it at least sounds plausible in theory that pubic hair shaving could potentially increase infection risk. But what does the research actually say?




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How can we control the coronavirus pandemic? | Adam Kucharski

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Why COVID-19 is hitting us now -- and how to prepare for the next outbreak | Alanna Shaikh

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Without farmers, you'd be hungry, naked and sober | Eric Sannerud

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2 questions to uncover your passion -- and turn it into a career | Noeline Kirabo

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The quest for the coronavirus vaccine | Seth Berkley

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How to create meaningful connections while apart | Priya Parker

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How we can navigate the coronavirus pandemic with courage and hope | Rabbi Lord Jonathan Sacks

Rabbi Lord Jonathan Sacks offers thoughts on how we can navigate the coronavirus pandemic with courage, hope and empathy. With wisdom and clarity, he speaks on leadership, fear, death, hope and how we could use this moment to build a more just world. Watch for a special, impromptu prayer about halfway through the conversation. (This virtual conversation is part of the TED Connects series, hosted by head of TED Chris Anderson and head of curation Helen Walters. Recorded March 30, 2020)