EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In the face of unprecedented global challenges, effective global cooperation increasingly requires a partnership between state and non-state actors. Many international institutions now involve non-state actors in arenas that were once the exclusive province of states. The paper analyzes the evolution of civil society participation in the governance of international institutions and highlights the shift from a model based on consultation toward a model of multistakeholder governance. The paper argues that consultation is a less effective approach to involving civil society in achieving the mission of these institutions and suggests that more robust forms of multi-stakeholder participation by civil society can foster greater accountability and better deliberation. It analyzes competing claims about the desirability of including civil society in the governance of international institutions and suggests that an emerging constituency model can promote more effective multi-stakeholder governance. Constituency structures are already central features of several global health institutions and are now being contemplated by institutions in other sectors, including by the Education for All—Fast Track Initiative.

Multi-stakeholder approaches to governance are likely to become more widespread in the years to come in order to harness the contributions of a plethora of private actors engaged in responding to a wide range of global challenges. Even with enhanced cooperation between states, it is increasingly clear that non-state actors are essential to responding to key challenges across a wide range of sectors. Although it is possible to imagine expanded cooperation between state and non-state actors without opening up the governance structures of international institutions, it is less likely that these institutions will be successful in the longrun without a shift toward greater multi-stakeholder involvement in the institutions themselves.

Downloads

• Download Full Paper

       

Despite the undeniable benefits of education to society, the educational needs, particularly in the world’s poorest countries, remain strikingly great. There are more than 67 million children not enrolled in primary school around the world, millions of children who are enrolled in school but not really learning, and too few young people are advancing to secondary school (van der Gaag and Adams 2010). Consider, for instance, the number of children unable to read a single word of connected text at the end of grade two: more than 90 percent in Mali, more than 50 percent in Uganda, and nearly 33 percent in Honduras (USAID n.d.).

With more young people of age 12 to 24 years today than ever before who are passing through the global education system and looking for opportunities for economic and civic participation, the education community is at a crossroads. Of the 1.5 billion young people in this age group, 1.3 billion live in developing countries (World Bank 2007). The global community set the goal of achieving universal primary education by 2015 and has failed to mobilize the resources necessary, as UNESCO estimates that $16.2 billion in external resources will be need to reach this goal.

Read the full report »

Read the executive summary »

Results from this report were presented at an April 6 Center on Universal Education event at the Brookings Institution.

Learn more about the launch event »

Downloads

• Executive Summary
• Download the Full Report

       

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, there has been a resurgence of interest in the issue of inequality. Part of this resurgence can be traced to new evidence of persistent and widening wealth gaps. Average incomes may be converging globally as a result of high growth in emerging markets, stronger growth in many poor countries, and slow growth in rich countries. However, the evidence also shows that within countries a parallel process of income divergence, marginalization and rising inequality is also taking place. Put differently, the rising tide of global prosperity is not lifting all boats.

Much of the international debate on inequality focuses on the distribution of income across and within countries. Other dimensions of inequality have received less attention. This is unfortunate. Amartya Sen has described development as “a process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy” by building human capabilities or their capacity to lead the kind of life they value. Income is a means to that end but it is a limited indicator of well-being. Moreover, a person’s income reflects not just personal choice but also their opportunities for improving health, literacy, political participation and other areas. Education is one of the most basic building blocks for the “real freedoms” that Sen describes. People denied the chance to develop their potential through education face diminished prospects and more limited opportunities in areas ranging from health and nutrition, to employment, and participation in political processes. In other words, disparities in education are powerfully connected to wider disparities, including international and intra-country income inequalities. This is why education has been identified as one of the most critical factors in breaking down the disadvantages and social inequalities that are limiting progress toward the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)—development targets adopted by the international community for 2015.

Understanding patterns of educational inequality is critical at many levels. Ethical considerations are of paramount importance. Most people would accept that children’s educational achievements should not be dictated by the wealth of their parents, their gender, their race or their ethnicity. Disparities in educational opportunities are not just inequalities in a technical sense, they are also fundamental in equities—they are unjust and unfair. In an influential paper, John Roemer differentiated between inequalities that reflect factors such as luck, effort and reasonable reward, and those attributable to circumstances that limit opportunity (Roemer 1988).1 While the dividing line may often be blurred, that distinction has an intuitive appeal. Most people have a high level of aversion to the restrictions on what people—especially children—are able to achieve as a result of disparities and inherited disadvantages that limit access to education, nutrition or health care (Wagstaff, 2002). There is a wide body of opinion across political science, philosophy and economics that equal opportunity—as distinct from equality of outcomes—is a benchmark of egalitarian social justice. The theories of distributive justice associated with thinkers such as Amartya Sen, John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin and John Roemer argue, admittedly from very different perspectives, that public policy should aim at equalizing opportunity to counteract disadvantages associated with exogenous circumstances over which individuals or social groups have no control. Given the role of education as a potential leveler of opportunity, it is a national focal point for redistributive social justice.

Considerations of economic efficiency reinforce the ethical case for equalizing educational opportunities. Education is a powerful driver of productivity, economic growth, and innovation. Econometric modeling for both rich and poor countries suggests that an increase in learning achievement (as measured by test score data) of one standard deviation is associated on average with an increase in the long-run growth rate of around 2 percent per capita annually (Hanushek and Wößmann, 2010; Hanushek, 2009; Hanushek and Wößmann, 2008). Such evidence points to the critical role of education and learning in developing a skilled workforce. Countries in which large sections of the population are denied a quality education because of factors linked to potential wealth, gender, ethnicity, language and other markers for disadvantage are not just limiting a fundamental human right. They are also wasting a productive resource and undermining or weakening the human capital of the economy.

International development commitments provide another rationale for equalizing educational opportunities. This is for two reasons. First, the commitments envisage education for all and achievement of universal primary education by 2015. Second, there is mounting evidence that inequality is acting as a brake on progress toward the 2015 goals. Since around 2005, the rate of decline in the out-of-school population has slowed dramatically. Based on current trends, there may be more children out of school in 2015 than there were in 2009. Caution has to be exercised in interpreting short-run trends, especially given the weakness of data. However, the past three editions of the UNESCO Education for All Global Monitoring Report (GMR) have highlighted the role of inequality in contributing to the slowdown with governments struggling to reach populations that face deeply entrenched disadvantages (UNESCO, 2008, 2010, 2011). Therefore, picking up the pace toward the 2015 goals requires a strengthened focus on equity and strategies that target the most marginalized groups and regions of the world (Sumner and Tiwari, 2010; UN-DESA, 2009; UNESCO, 2010). It should be added that disparities in education relate not just to access, but also to learning achievement levels.

Accelerated progress in education would generate wider benefits for the MDGs. Most of the world’s poorest countries are off-track for the 2015 MDG target of halving income poverty and a long way from reaching the targets on child survival, maternal health and nutrition. Changing this picture will require policy interventions at many levels. However, there is overwhelming evidence showing that education—especially of young girls and women—can act as a potent catalyst for change. On one estimate, if all of sub-Saharan Africa’s mothers attained at least some secondary education, there would be 1.8 million fewer child deaths in the region each year. Thus while education may lack the “quick fix” appeal of vaccinations, it can powerfully reinforce health policy interventions.

Downloads

• Download the full report

       

INTRODUCTION

In August, 2010 the government of Kenya adopted a new constitution. This followed a referendum in which an overwhelming majority of Kenyans voted for change. The decisive impetus for reform came from the widespread violence and political crisis that followed the 2007 election. While claims of electoral fraud provided the immediate catalyst for violence, the deeper causes were to be found in the interaction of a highly centralized ‘winner-take-all’ political system with deep social disparities based in part on group identity (Hanson 2008).

Provisions for equity figure prominently in the new constitution. Backed by a bill of rights that opens the door to legal enforcement, citizenship rights have been strengthened in many areas,including access to basic services. ‘Equitable sharing’ has been introduced as a guiding principle for public spending. National and devolved governments are now constitutionally required to redress social disparities, target disadvantaged areas and provide affirmative action for marginalized groups.

Translating these provisions into tangible outcomes will not be straightforward. Equity is a principle that would be readily endorsed by most policymakers in Kenya and Kenya’s citizens have provided their own endorsement through the referendum. However, there is an ongoing debate over what the commitment to equity means in practice, as well as over the pace and direction of reform. Much of that debate has centered on the constitutional injunction requiring ‘equitable sharing’ in public spending.

On most measures of human development, Kenya registers average outcomes considerably above those for sub-Saharan Africa as a region. Yet the national average masks extreme disparities—and the benefits of increased prosperity have been unequally shared.

There are compelling grounds for a strengthened focus on equity in Kenya. In recent years, the country has maintained a respectable, if less than spectacular, record on economic growth. Social indicators are also on an upward trend. On most measures of human development, Kenya registers average outcomes considerably above those for sub-Saharan Africa as a region. Yet the national average masks extreme disparities—and the benefits of increased prosperity have been unequally shared. Some regions and social groups face levels of deprivation that rank alongside the worst in Africa. Moreover, the deep fault lines running through society are widely perceived as a source of injustice and potential political instability.

High levels of inequality in Kenya raise wider concerns. There has been a tendency in domestic debates to see ‘equitable sharing’ as a guiding principle for social justice, rather than as a condition for accelerated growth and enhanced economic efficiency. Yet international evidence strongly suggests that extreme inequality—especially in opportunities for education— is profoundly damaging for economic growth. It follows that redistributive public spending has the potential to support growth.

The current paper focuses on a group of 12 counties located in Kenya’s Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASALs). They are among the most disadvantaged in the country. Most are characterized by high levels of income poverty, chronic food insecurity and acute deprivation across a wide range of social indicators.

Nowhere is the deprivation starker than in education. The ASAL counties account for a disproportionately large share of Kenya’s out-of-school children, pointing to problems in access and school retention. Gender disparities in education are among the widest in the country. Learning outcomes for the small number of children who get through primary school are for the most part abysmal, even by the generally low national average standards.

Unequal public spending patterns have played no small part in creating the disparities that separate the ASAL counties from the rest of Kenya—and ‘equitable sharing’ could play a role in closing the gap. But what would a more equitable approach to public spending look like in practice?

This paper addresses that question. It looks in some detail at education for two reasons. First, good quality education is itself a powerful motor of enhanced equity. It has the potential to equip children and youth with the skills and competencies that they need to break out of cycles of poverty and to participate more fully in national prosperity. If Kenya is to embark on a more equitable pattern of development, there are strong grounds for prioritizing the creation of more equal opportunities in education. Second, the education sector illustrates many of the wider challenges and debates that Kenya’s policymakers will have to address as they seek to translate constitutional provisions into public spending strategies. In particular, it highlights the importance of weighting for indicators that reflect need in designing formulae for budget allocations.

Our broad conclusion is that, while Kenya clearly needs to avoid public spending reforms that jeopardize service delivery in wealthier counties, redistributive measures are justified on the grounds of efficiency and equity.

The paper is organized as follows. Part 1 provides an overview of the approach to equity enshrined in the constitution. While the spirit of the constitution is unequivocal, the letter is open to a vast array of interpretations. We briefly explore the implications of a range of approaches. Our broad conclusion is that, while Kenya clearly needs to avoid public spending reforms that jeopardize service delivery in wealthier counties, redistributive measures are justified on the grounds of efficiency and equity. Although this paper focuses principally on basic services, we caution against approaches that treat equity as a matter of social sector financing to the exclusion of growth-oriented productive investment.

Part 2 provides an analysis of some key indicators on poverty, health and nutrition. Drawing on household expenditure data, the report locates the 12 ASAL counties in the national league table for the incidence and depth of poverty. Data on health outcomes and access to basic services provide another indicator of the state of human development. While there are some marked variations across counties and indicators, most of the 12 counties register levels of deprivation in poverty and basic health far in excess of those found in other areas.

Part 3 shifts the focus to education. Over the past decade, Kenya has made considerable progress in improving access to basic education. Enrollment rates in primary education have increased sharply since the elimination of school fees in 2003. Transition rates to secondary school are also rising. The record on learning achievement is less impressive. While Kenya lacks a comprehensive national learning assessment, survey evidence points to systemic problems in education quality. In both access and learning, children in the ASAL counties—especially female children—are at a considerable disadvantage. After setting out the national picture, the paper explores the distinctive problems facing these counties.

In Part 4 we look beyond Kenya to wider international experience. Many countries have grappled with the challenge of reducing disparities between less-favored and more-favored regions. There are no blueprints on offer. However, there are some useful lessons and guidelines that may be of some relevance to the policy debate in Kenya. The experience of South Africa may be particularly instructive given the weight attached to equity in the post-apartheid constitution.

Part 5 of the paper explores a range of approaches to financial allocations. Converting constitutional principle into operational practice will require the development of formulae-based approaches. From an equitable financing perspective there is no perfect model. Any formula that is adopted will involve trade-offs between different goals. Policymakers have to determine what weight to attach to different dimensions of equity (for example, gender, income, education and health), the time frame for achieving stated policy goals, and whether to frame targets in terms of outcomes or inputs. These questions go beyond devolved financing. The Kenyan constitution is unequivocal in stipulating that the ‘equitable sharing’ provision applies to all public spending. We therefore undertake a series of formula-based exercises illustrating the allocation patterns that would emerge under different formulae, with specific reference to the 12 ASAL focus counties and to education.

Downloads

• 08 financing kenya watkins

       

INTRODUCTION

With fewer than three years until the planned end-date of the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), attention is rapidly turning to what will follow. The elaboration of the next global development agenda is a complex, multi-pronged process that is academic, political and practical, involving experts from a myriad of social and economic sectors and representing a cross-section of constituencies. While the formal U.N. process is still in the early stages, the ongoing discourse (predominantly occurring in the global north, but not exclusively) has introduced several potential frameworks for this agenda. This paper describes the leading frameworks proposed for the post-2015 global development agenda and discusses how education and learning fit within each of those frameworks. While many within the education community are working to develop a cohesive movement to advance an “access plus learning” agenda, it remains equally important to engage proactively with the broader development community to ensure that education fits within the agreed upon overarching organizing framework.

The frameworks described below represent a snapshot of current thinking in 2012. On the road to 2015, the education community will need to refine and sharpen its thinking with respect to how learning is incorporated into the prevailing framework. The seven frameworks that will be addressed in this paper are:

1. Ending Absolute Poverty
2. Equity and Inclusion
3. Economic Growth and Jobs
4. Getting to Zero
5. Global Minimum Entitlements
6. Sustainable Development
7. Well-Being and Quality of Life

Downloads

• Download the full paper

       

In the 13 years since the dawn of the new millennium, significant progress has been made in addressing some of the world’s most important problems. One billion fewer people live in extreme poverty, 3 million children’s lives are saved annually and 610 million children in developing countries are enrolled in primary school, more than ever before. However, this progress has not been shared evenly around the globe. Populations affected by weak systems of governance and that suffer violence and disasters have systematically been left behind.

They are much less likely to enjoy progress vis-à-vis any of the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which include eradicating extreme poverty and hunger, improving children and women’s health, and enrolling children in school. No country classified as a “fragile state,” for example, has met all eight of the MDGs. Children born in low-income, conflict-affected countries are twice as likely to die before the age of five years, twice as likely to lack access to clean water and more than three times as likely to not attend school than children living in peaceful, low-income countries. People living in poverty, many of whom are affected by conflict, are more vulnerable to the effects of climate change and disasters. Children are especially affected, and those from the poorest families are up to 10 times more likely to bear the brunt of environmental disasters linked to climate change.

The needs of people living in fragile states are an urgent priority for our time, and thus will almost certainly be prominent in the next round of global development goals. As the global community reflects on the new agenda that will replace the MDGs when they expire in 2015, it will do well to take stock of the existing strategies for supporting the needs of populations in fragile states. A range of strategies are undoubtedly needed, and there is good reason why there is a heavy emphasis on the economic, legal and security dimensions of development efforts in fragile states. However, efforts in the social sphere are equally needed, and education is one important strategy for supporting populations in fragile states that was often overlooked until recently.

This report provides a broad review of the field of education in fragile states and charts a new agenda for maximizing education’s contribution to the development and well-being of people living in these contexts. We hope it serves as a comprehensive introduction to the topic for those coming to this issue for the first time as well as provides new insights for those already actively engaged in the subject. The arguments we make here are based on evidence developed both from careful analysis and synthesis of the latest available data as well as primary research.

Downloads

• Download the full paper

       

       

       

       

       

Ghana attained middle-income status after rebasing its National Accounts, pushing per capita gross domestic product (GDP) of the country above $1,000 in 2007. After recovering from economic recession in 1984 on account of the Bretton Woods sponsored economic reform introduced at that time, Ghana’s growth has been remarkably strong, with its lowest economic growth of 3.3 percent recorded in 1994. The country’s growth rate reached its peak of 15 percent in 2011 on the back of the commencement of commercial production of oil, making it one of the fastest growing economies globally during that year. This has translated into increased per capita income, which reached a high of about $1,900 in 2013.

The concern, however, has been the ability of the country to sustain this growth momentum given the level and quality of education and skills, and, more importantly, the failure of this strong growth performance to be translated into the creation of productive and decent jobs, improved incomes and livelihoods. The structure of the economy remains highly informal, with a shift in the country’s national output composition from agriculture to low-value service activities in the informal sector. The commencement of commercial production of oil raised the share of the industrial sector in national output. However, the continuous decline in manufacturing value added undermines Ghana’s economic transformation effort to promote high and secure incomes and improve the livelihoods of the people.

Structural change towards higher value added sectors, and upgrading of technologies in existing sectors, is expected to allow for better conditions of work, better jobs, and higher wages. But the low level and quality of human resources not only diverts the economy from its structural transformation path of development but also makes it difficult for the benefits of growth to be spread through the creation of gainful and productive employment. Thus, productive structural economic transformation hinges on the level and quality of education and labor skills. A highly skilled, innovative and knowledgeable workforce constitutes a key ingredient in the process of structural economic transformation, and as productive sectors apply more complex production technologies and research and development activities increase the demand for education and skills. However, the observed weak human capital base does not provide a strong foundation for structural economic transformation of Ghana.

Ghana’s employment growth lags behind economic growth, with an estimated employment elasticity of output of 0.47, suggesting that every 1 percent of annual economic growth yields 0.47 percent growth of total employment.

There is also widespread concern about the quality of the country’s growth in terms of employment and inequality, as well as general improvement in the livelihood of the people (see Alagidede et al. 2013; Aryeetey et al. 2014; Baah-Boateng 2013). A key indicator for measuring the extent to which macroeconomic growth results in gains in the welfare of the citizenry is the quality of jobs that the economy generates. Ghana’s employment growth lags behind economic growth, with an estimated employment elasticity of output of 0.47 (see Baah-Boateng 2013), suggesting that every 1 percent of annual economic growth yields 0.47 percent growth of total employment. Besides the slow rate of job creation is the dominance of vulnerable employment and the working poverty rate in the labor market. In 2010, 7 out of 10 jobs were estimated to be vulnerable while only 1 out of 5 jobs could be considered as productive jobs that meet the standard of decent work (Baah-Boateng and Ewusi 2013). Workers in vulnerable employment tend to lack formal work arrangements as well as elements associated with decent employment such as adequate social security and recourse to effective social dialogue mechanisms (Sparreboom and Baah-Boateng 2011). The working poverty rate remains a challenge with one out of every five persons employed belonging to poor households.

The article seeks to provide an analytical assessment of Ghana’s economic growth as one of Africa’s growth giants over a period of more than two decades and the implication for labour market and livelihood outcomes. Growth of labor productivity at the national and sectoral level is examined, as well as the sectoral contribution to aggregate productivity growth. The article also analyses the effect of growth on employment and the employment-poverty linkage in terms of elasticity within the growth-employment-poverty nexus in Ghana. It also delves into a discussion of the constraints on growth and productive employment from both demand and supply perspectives, and identifies skills gaps and the opportunities offered in the country, which has experienced strong growth performance. The article has five sections, with an overview of Ghana’s economic growth performance in Section 2, after this introductory section. This is followed by an overview of the developments in the labor market, specifically in the area of employment, unemployment, poverty, and inequality in Ghana in Section 3. The growth-employment-poverty linkage analysis is carried out in Section 4 followed by a discussion of constraints to growth and employment generation in Section 5. Section 6 provides a summary and conclusion, with some policy suggestions for the future.

Downloads

• Download the full paper (PDF)

      

Over the past two decades, Ghana’s economy experienced an average annual growth rate of 5.8 percent, and became a low-middle income country in 2007. Though Ghana’s average annual employment growth between 1993 and 2013 has been higher than sub-Saharan Africa’s—3.7 percent versus 3.0 percent—its overall employment growth has not kept up with its economic growth. Notably, Ghana’s impressive economic growth has largely stemmed from crude oil exports, mining, and financial intermediation—all sectors and subsectors in which labor absorption is low. Given these trends, Ghana’s ability to transform its growth gains into better livelihoods for its citizens is being challenged.

In their paper, Understanding Ghana’s growth success story and job creation challenges, Ernest Aryeetey and William Baah-Boateng examine the sustainability of the high growth Ghana has experienced over the last two decades and advise Ghanaian policymakers to rethink their growth strategy.

For a more in-depth look at these and related topics, such as labor productivity, you can read the full paper here.

Ghana’s labor trends

Like in many other sub-Saharan African countries, the agriculture sector is the largest employer in Ghana, though its employment share is decreasing from 61.1 percent in 1984 to 44.7 percent in 2013. In addition, while industry’s employment share has slightly grown from 13.7 percent to 14.6 percent over the same period (and the manufacturing subsector has decreased from 10.9 percent to 9.1 percent), services has grown from 25 percent to 40.9 percent—leading to what the authors refer as a “missing middle.”

As noted above, the authors emphasize that the sectors that have been driving Ghana’s growth are not labor-intensive, namely mining, oil extraction, and finance. While labor has been moving from agriculture to services, the authors note that the trend “may not reflect a structural and productive transformation,” largely because the jobs created in the services sector are mostly informal and have low productivity. Indeed, services sector maintained the lowest annual average growth of labor productivity between 1992 and 2013. As part of these shifts, informal employment—which represented 88 percent of Ghanaian employment in 2013—grew by 3.7 percent on average while formal employment grew by only 2.6 percent during this period.

Unemployment in Ghana remains low, at 5.2 percent, though has experienced significant swings from 2.8 percent in 1984 to 10.4 percent in 2000 to 3.1 percent in 2006. The authors note, though, that these numbers might be deceptive due to the high numbers of informal, vulnerable, and “discouraged workers” (those who are jobless and available for work but fail to make the effort to seek work for various reasons) in Ghana. In fact, they state that, in 2006, after accounting for discouraged workers the unemployment rate more than doubled from 3.1 percent to 6.5 percent.

Vulnerable employment and the working poor

Despite Ghana’s relatively low unemployment rate, many laborers still live in poverty: According to the authors, 22 percent of working people are poor. Many others work in “vulnerable employment”—which the authors define as “a measure of people employed under relatively precarious circumstances indicated by their status in employment. It consists of own account and contributing family work that are less likely to have formal work arrangements, access to benefit or social protection programs, and are more ‘at risk’ to economic cycles (ILO 2009).” This definition is opposed to “productive employment,” or “paid employment and self-employed with employees.” Vulnerable workers are usually found in the informal sector and tend to have lower earnings—a situation exacerbating the ever-widening earnings gap and growing income inequality.

According to the authors, working poverty is closely linked with vulnerable employment, for which seven of 10 jobs in Ghana qualify (Table 1).  Some policies, which could combat working poverty, have been somewhat ineffective in reducing poverty: For example, Ghana has been consistent in raising its minimum wage, keeping it largely above the rate of inflation, but this policy tends to only affect those in the formal sector, leaving out workers in the informal sector. This trend has also increased Ghana’s inequality: The Gini coefficient increased from 35.4 percent in 1987/88 to 42.3 percent in 2013.

Table 1: Quantity and quality of employment (percent of employed)

Economic sector	1984	1992	1999	2000	2006	2010	2013
Employment-to-population (ratio, SSA)	—	64.3	64.1	64.1	64.9	65.2	65.5
Employment-to-population (ratio, Ghana)	80.2	72.9	73.9	66.9	67.7	67.4	75.4
Economic sector
Agriculture	61.1	62.2	55.0	53.1	54.9	41.6	44.7
Industry	13.7	10.0	14.0	15.5	14.2	15.4	14.6
Manufacturing (part of industry)	10.9	8.2	11.7	10.7	11.4	10.7	9.1
Service	25.2	27.8	31.0	31.5	30.9	43.0	40.9
Institutional sector
Public	10.2	8.4	6.2	7.2	5.7	6.4	5.9
Private	6.0	6.1	7.5	8.9	7.0	7.4	6.1
Informal	83.8	85.5	86.1	83.9	87.3	86.2	88.0
Type of employment
Paid employees	16.2	16.8	13.8	16.0	17.5	18.2	22.5
Self-employment	69.6	81.3	68.7	73.4	59.5	60.8	52.6
Contributing family worker	12.5	1.9	17.2	6.8	20.4	11.6	22.3
Other	1.7	—	0.3	3.8	2.6	9.4	2.6
Quality of employment
Gainful/productive employment*	20.9	—	—	21.2	22.0	23.1	28.7
Vulnerable employment**	77.4	82.5	80.8	74.9	75.4	67.5	68.7
Working poverty	—	48.7	35.4	—	25.6	—	22.3

Notes: * Gainful/productive employment comprises paid employment and self-employed with employees.

** Vulnerable employment comprises own account and contribution family work.

Source: Computed from Ghana Living Standards Survey (GLSS) 3, 4, 5, and 6; Population Census 1984, 2000, and 2010.

Overall, though, Ghana has made great strides. Vulnerable employment has been declining, and productive employment has risen, gains the author attributes to the drop in working poverty—down from 48.7 percent in 1992 to 22.3 percent two decades later (Table 1). However, they also hint that these improvements could have been even larger had job growth been concentrated in paid employment and self-employed with employees.

The skills gap

In their paper, the authors posit that job creation has occurred in less productive sectors due to a lack of skills and education in the workforce—and skill-intensive jobs/vacancies are instead getting filled by foreign laborers. While the proportion of the labor force with no formal education has significantly fallen from 44.1 percent in 1992 to 25.6 percent in 2013, post-primary education rates have barely risen—from 5.7 percent to 12.1 percent during that same period for secondary, vocational, and technical education. Tertiary is even less—from 2 percent to 5.4 percent. Ghanaian universities have not been training engineers, scientists, and technical workers that could increase the productivity and grow the industrial sector. A shortage of technical and vocational skills also limits this sector. Thus, the authors note, employers are forced to look outside of the country to find the workers with the skills required to do the job. The authors emphasize:

[P]roductive structural economic transformation hinges on the level and quality of education and labour skills. A highly skilled, innovative, and knowledgeable workforce constitutes a key ingredient in the process of structural economic transformation, and as productive sectors apply more complex production technologies and research and development activities increase the demand for education and skills. However, the observed weak human capital base does not provide a strong foundation for structural economic transformation of Ghana.

At the same time, the more educated in Ghana also tend to be more likely to be unemployed due to limited job creation for them in the formal sector. In 2013, the unemployment rates for those with secondary education and above (including tertiary) was over 6 percent. The unemployment rate for those with basic education or less was under 3.3 percent. The authors suggest that this trend is due to the fact that those with less education are more likely to take an informal job, while more educated laborers struggle to find jobs in the small formal sector.

Recommendations

Though Ghana has outperformed many of its sub-Saharan neighbors in terms of job creation and growth, its challenges with declining manufacturing, high informal employment, and low education attainment endanger its momentum. To tackle these obstacles, the authors recommend:

1. Adjust the priorities of the growth strategy to promote manufacturing, and reconsider the goal of economic growth for growth’s sake by acknowledging that sustainable growth must be coupled with generation of productive and high-earning jobs for all.
2. Create a manufacturing and business-friendly environment by addressing the country’s high interest rates, high taxes, and chronic energy problems, among others.
3. Enact policies to enhance the high-productivity, high-labor-absorbing agricultural sector, such as improving agricultural extension, develop irrigation plans, among others.
4. Develop policies to increase the number of secondary school graduates as well as students studying science, technology, engineering, and math.

For further discussion and recommendations, read the full paper here.

Note: The African Lions project is a collaboration among United Nations University-World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER), the University of Cape Town’s Development Policy Research Unit (DPRU), and the Brookings Africa Growth Initiative, that provides an analytical basis for policy recommendations and value-added guidance to domestic policymakers in the fast-growing economies of Africa, as well as for the broader global community interested in the development of the region. The six papers, covering Mozambique, Kenya, Ghana, South Africa, Ethiopia, and Nigeria, explore the key constraints facing African economies as they attempt to maintain a long-run economic growth and development trajectory.

      

American voters are angry. But while the ill effects of globalization top their list of grievances, nobody is well served when complex economic issues are reduced to bumper-sticker slogans – as they have been thus far in the presidential campaign.

It is unfair to dismiss concerns about globalization as unfounded. America deserves to have an honest debate about its effects. In order to yield constructive solutions, however, all sides will need to concede some inconvenient truths – and to recognize that globalization is not the same phenomenon it was 20 years ago.

Protectionists fail to see how the United States’ eroding industrial base is compatible with the principle that globalization boosts growth. But the evidence supporting that principle is too substantial to ignore.

Recent research by the McKinsey Global Institute (MGI) echoes the findings of other academics: global flows of goods, foreign direct investment, and data have increased global GDP by roughly 10% compared to what it would have been had those flows never occurred. The extra value provided by globalization amounted to $7.8 trillion in 2014 alone.

And yet, the shuttered factories dotting America’s Midwestern “Rust Belt” are real. Even as globalization generates aggregate growth, it produces winners and losers. Exposing local industries to international competition spurs efficiency and innovation, but the resulting creative destruction exacts a substantial toll on families and communities.

Economists and policymakers alike are guilty of glossing over these distributional consequences. Countries that engage in free trade will find new channels for growth in the long run, the thinking goes, and workers who lose their jobs in one industry will find employment in another.

In the real world, however, this process is messy and protracted. Workers in a shrinking industry may need entirely new skills to find jobs in other sectors, and they may have to pack up their families and pull up deep roots to pursue these opportunities. It has taken a popular backlash against free trade for policymakers and the media to acknowledge the extent of this disruption.

That backlash should not have come as a surprise. Traditional labor-market policies and training systems have not been equal to the task of dealing with the large-scale changes caused by the twin forces of globalization and automation. The US needs concrete proposals for supporting workers caught up in structural transitions – and a willingness to consider fresh approaches, such as wage insurance.

Contrary to campaign rhetoric, simple protectionism would harm consumers. A recent study by the US President’s Council of Economic Advisers found that middle-class Americans gain more than a quarter of their purchasing power from trade. In any event, imposing tariffs on foreign goods will not bring back lost manufacturing jobs.

It is time to change the parameters of the debate and recognize that globalization has become an entirely different animal: The global goods trade has flattened for a variety of reasons, including plummeting commodity prices, sluggishness in many major economies, and a trend toward producing goods closer to the point of consumption. Cross-border flows of data, by contrast, have grown by a factor of 45 during the past decade, and now generate a greater economic impact than flows of traditional manufactured goods.

Digitization is changing everything: the nature of the goods changing hands, the universe of potential suppliers and customers, the method of delivery, and the capital and scale required to operate globally. It also means that globalization is no longer exclusively the domain of Fortune 500 firms.

Companies interacting with their foreign operations, suppliers, and customers account for a large and growing share of global Internet traffic. Already half of the world’s traded services are digitized, and 12% of the global goods trade is conducted via international e-commerce. E-commerce marketplaces such as Alibaba, Amazon, and eBay are turning millions of small enterprises into exporters. This remains an enormous untapped opportunity for the US, where fewer than 1% of companies export– a far lower share than in any other advanced economy.

Despite all the anti-trade rhetoric, it is crucial that Americans bear in mind that most of the world’s customers are overseas. Fast-growing emerging economies will be the biggest sources of consumption growth in the years ahead.

This would be the worst possible moment to erect barriers. The new digital landscape is still taking shape, and countries have an opportunity to redefine their comparative advantages. The US may have lost out as the world chased low labor costs; but it operates from a position of strength in a world defined by digital globalization.

There is real value in the seamless movement of innovation, information, goods, services, and – yes – people. As the US struggles to jump-start its economy, it cannot afford to seal itself off from an important source of growth.

US policymakers must take a nuanced, clear-eyed view of globalization, one that addresses its downsides more effectively, not only when it comes to lost jobs at home, but also when it comes to its trading partners’ labor and environmental standards. Above all, the US needs to stop retrying the past – and start focusing on how it can compete in the next era of globalization.

Editor's note: this piece first appeared on Project-Syndicate.org.

      

In a recent analysis, I highlighted how employment and disconnection among young people vary by age, race, and place. In this podcast, I dig deeper into the data on the Washington, D.C. region. Although the area generally performs well on employment measures, not all young people are faring equally well.

Listen to the full podcast segment here: 

       

Globalization has been hugely beneficial to Asia. Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, Singapore, Hong Kong, Thailand, and China have reaped lasting benefits from worldwide investment flows, knowledge exchanges, and rapid economic growth. And while globalization undoubtedly made the rich even richer, the poor also benefitted.

Several Asian economies saw the emergence of a large middle class and the virtual elimination of poverty. The rural poor received higher wages after finding better quality manufacturing jobs in urban centers. And with improvements in technology and expanded trade, there was optimism about job prospects. In ethnically diverse societies such as Malaysia, globalization contributed significantly to the reduction of racial tensions rather than exacerbate them, contrary to what is happening in the West.

There is no question that the West has also benefited from globalization. The United Kingdom and the United States have seen huge gains in the services sector, especially in financial services. However, the accompanying income inequality is of a different hue than in Asia. Younger, better educated workers located in cosmopolitan urban centers such as New York and London have seen a phenomenal increase in their income. On the other hand, older, less educated workers in the rusting industrial belts of northern England and America have lost their jobs to manufacturers overseas. Instead of jobs with good growth prospects enjoyed by several generations in the past, the quality of jobs has deteriorated and there is little hope among the rust belt’s working class that this situation can be turned around. Worst, there is a perception that politicians don’t care. The recent voting patterns in the U.S. and the U.K. are a clear reflection of this despondence.

How did Asia achieve a shared prosperity from globalization with consistent domestic political support while the rich countries have struggled and are suffering the political blowback? 

The answer may lie in the heavy investment made by Asian governments in human capital (education and health) to prepare the workforce to take advantage of the high wage manufacturing jobs created by globalized investment. This was complemented by public investment in infrastructure to continue to attract foreign investment. The fiscal deficits associated with large public investment in human capital and physical infrastructure were tolerated because the political and economic benefits of preparing the workforce for new jobs were considered worthwhile objectives.

Both the U.S. and the U.K, in contrast, have underinvested in infrastructure and in “skilling up” the labor force to make the transition to new and better jobs from the ones lost to lower wage workers in Asia.  In the U.K, it happened under the watch of the incumbent conservative government. While presenting to Parliament the result of the recent referendum to the European Union, Prime Minister David Cameron spoke proudly of leaving behind a sound economy resting on the pillar of a sharp fiscal retrenchment—low taxes and even lower public expenditure. One result of this “sound” economy is that a large number of people are stuck in dead-end jobs and are looking for opportunities to vent their frustration.

In the U.S., the Obama administration has been hemmed in by the recalcitrant Republican Congress. Badly needed public investment in health and education to prepare workers and an overdue upgrade of infrastructure to attract investment have been thwarted by a Congress wedded to fiscal austerity. This has prolonged the pain of transition to new jobs.

The long and painful transition to productive jobs has resulted in the clamor for reneging on globalization commitments. This is misplaced because protecting jobs that are best done elsewhere is not possible without putting curbs on investment. That would be moving towards a world that globalizes misery. There is thus no alternative to a proactive government that eases the transition to new jobs in rich countries.

Of course, Asia had the advantage of preparing its work force for known job streams. Rich countries, on the other hand, have to discover new productive jobs. However, we do know that discovery is more likely if education standards improve, physical infrastructure is cutting edge, and science and research are well-funded.  

Rich countries don’t have to give up on manufacturing as a source of employment. Germany has shown the way to creating high-end manufacturing jobs in a rich-country setting. It has a highly skilled work force that produces technology-intensive products which generate a large trade surplus. There is little support in Germany for reneging on global commitments.

Dying cities, dead-end jobs, and a seemingly uncaring government feed into the perception that living standards will continue to fall. Demagogues exploiting ethnicity point the finger at immigrants and have succeeded in directing rich-country worker ire at them. This is a far cry from the democratic vision rich democracies should aspire to and is not in any away a solution to these problems.  The protest should be aimed, instead, at elected governments to play their role in facilitating the transition to the next generation of jobs.     

The world has paid heavily for Europe’s nationalistic ambitions—colonial subjugation of Africa and Asia and the two world wars are the most egregious examples. The EU is an attempt to tame those impulses by seeking to cooperatively address common challenges instead of competing for narrower nationalistic objectives. The dissolution of the EU and the weakening of other multilateral institutions because of rich countries’ failure to rise up to the globalization challenge would be truly retrogressive. 

       

Unlike prime-age Americans, who have experienced declines in employment and labor force participation since the onset of the Great Recession, Americans past 60 have seen their employment and labor force participation rates increase.

In order to understand the contrasting labor force developments among the old, on the one hand, and the prime-aged, on the other, this paper develops and analyzes a new data file containing information on monthly labor force changes of adults interviewed in the Current Population Survey (CPS).

The paper documents notable differences among age groups with respect to the changes in labor force transition rates that have occurred over the past two decades. What is crucial for understanding the surprising strength of old-age labor force participation and employment are changes in labor force transition probabilities within and across age groups. The paper identifies several shifts that help account for the increase in old-age employment and labor force participation:

• Like workers in all age groups, workers in older groups saw a surge in monthly transitions from employment to unemployment in the Great Recession.
• Unlike workers in prime-age and younger groups, however, older workers also saw a sizeable decline in exits to nonparticipation during and after the recession. While the surge in exits from employment to unemployment tended to reduce the employment rates of all age groups, the drop in employment exits to nonparticipation among the aged tended to hold up labor force participation rates and employment rates among the elderly compared with the nonelderly. Among the elderly, but not the nonelderly, the exit rate from employment into nonparticipation fell more than the exit rate from employment into unemployment increased.
• The Great Recession and slow recovery from that recession made it harder for the unemployed to transition into employment. Exit rates from unemployment into employment fell sharply in all age groups, old and young.
• In contrast to unemployed workers in younger age groups, the unemployed in the oldest age groups also saw a drop in their exits to nonparticipation. Compared with the nonaged, this tended to help maintain the labor force participation rates of the old.
• Flows from out-of-the-labor-force status into employment have declined for most age groups, but they have declined the least or have actually increased modestly among older nonparticipants.

Some of the favorable trends seen in older age groups are likely to be explained, in part, by the substantial improvement in older Americans’ educational attainment. Better educated older people tend to have lower monthly flows from employment into unemployment and nonparticipation, and they have higher monthly flows from nonparticipant status into employment compared with less educated workers.

The policy implications of the paper are:

• A serious recession inflicts severe and immediate harm on workers and potential workers in all age groups, in the form of layoffs and depressed prospects for finding work.
• Unlike younger age groups, however, workers in older groups have high rates of voluntary exit from employment and the workforce, even when labor markets are strong. Consequently, reduced rates of voluntary exit from employment and the labor force can have an outsize impact on their employment and participation rates.
• The aged, as a whole, can therefore experience rising employment and participation rates even as a minority of aged workers suffer severe harm as a result of permanent job loss at an unexpectedly early age and exceptional difficulty finding a new job.
• Between 2001 and 2015, the old-age employment and participation rates rose, apparently signaling that older workers did not suffer severe harm in the Great Recession.
• Analysis of the gross flow data suggests, however, that the apparent improvements were the combined result of continued declines in age-specific voluntary exit rates, mostly from the ranks of the employed, and worsening reemployment rates among the unemployed. The older workers who suffered involuntary layoffs were more numerous than before the Great Recession, and they found it much harder to get reemployed than laid off workers in years before 2008. The turnover data show that it has proved much harder for these workers to recover from the loss of their late-career job loss.

Download "Labor Force Dynamics in the Great Recession and its Aftermath: Implications for Older Workers" »

Downloads

• Download "Labor Force Dynamics in the Great Recession and its Aftermath: Implications for Older Workers"

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

Jonathan Rauch describes the concept of honest graft in Washington politics and policymaking. Politics needs good leaders, but it needs good followers even more, and they don’t come cheap. Loyalty gets you only so far, and ideology is divisive. Political machines need to exist, and they need to work.

       

       

This paper lays out the fundamentals of a downtown turnaround plan and the unique "private/public" partnership required to succeed. Beginning with visioning and strategic planning to the reemergence of an office market at the end stages, these 12 steps form a template for returning "walkable urbanism" downtown.

Though every downtown is different there are still common revitalization lessons that can be applied anywhere. While any approach must be customized based on unique physical conditions, institutional assets, consumer demand, history, and civic intent, this paper lays out the fundamentals of a downtown turnaround plan and the unique "private/public" partnership required to succeed. Beginning with visioning and strategic planning to the reemergence of an office market at the end stages, these 12 steps form a template for returning "walkable urbanism" downtown.

Downloads

• Download

      

In this speech at the annual meeting of the Downtown Detroit Partnership, Chris Leinberger discussed the downtown Detroit strategic planning process Brookings has started in partnership with the University of Michigan.

The metro program hosts and participates in a variety of public forums. To view a complete list of these events, please visit the metro program's Speeches and Events page which provides copies of major speeches, PowerPoint presentations, event transcripts, and event summaries.

Selected Media Coverage
Expert Offers Tips to Give Downtown a Lift
UM Land-Use Strategist: Detroit Poised for Downtown Redevelopment

Downloads

• Download

      

During his presentation at the University of Michigan/Urban Land Institute Real Estate Forum, Christopher B. Leinberger discusses the impact walkable urbane places has and will have on metropolitan development patterns, the market reasons for this change and how to strategically manage it.

This video is no longer available

      

It is hard to find good news these days, especially coming from Sacramento, the capital of one of the most hard-pressed states in the country. Yet an evolving model of development is emanating from the metropolitan area that is being watched carefully around the country.

This model could inspire sweeping national transportation, energy and climate change legislation and future infrastructure investment and real estate development.

The model started with the much-admired Blueprint Project, led by the Sacramento Area Council of Governments. Next came Senate Bill 375, calling for regional transportation and development plans that minimize auto dependency, reduce climate change gas emissions and encourage walkable urban development. The next steps are the Sacramento Regional Transit Master Plan and Transit-Oriented Guidelines, to be released in May. Taken together, they offer a bold effort to give the market what it wants: the choice of the well-known drivable suburban or walkable urban development, the basis of the next American Dream.

For the past half-century, American households demanded and got only one way of living and working, the suburban way that meant driving. Basically, California invented this way of life and exported it across the country and around the world. We all reveled in it. The songs of the Beach Boys and Jan and Dean still echo through my mind, reminding me of a way of life and a way of developing our communities that was seductive at the time.

Little did we know of the unintended consequences of drivable suburban development pattern, including:

• Land consumption eight to 12 times that of population growth.
• Significant increase in car-miles driven and foreign oil consumed, mostly from hostile countries.
• The onset of the obesity, diabetes and asthma epidemics related to a car-dependent lifestyle, especially among our children who cannot even walk to school anymore.
• Household income diverted from wealth building to paying for a fleet of depreciating cars, taking at least 25 percent of income vs. less than 5 percent a century ago.
• The quality of life for the community goes down when more drivable suburban development occurs, such as the next strip mall. This leads to not-in-my-backyard opposition. According to a soon-to-be-released Brookings Institution study, car-dependent households emit three times the climate change gases, such as carbon dioxide, as a walkable urban household.

Yet these consequences, which evoke much hand-wringing, do not tend to motivate behavioral change. That change comes when consumers vote with their pocketbooks; this they have done. There is pent-up demand for walkable urban development, with evidence everywhere you look. This includes research of consumer preferences and market research showing that walkable urban housing has held its value during this recession while the bulk of price declines occurred in fringe suburban housing.

Unfortunately, many metropolitan areas enforce zoning laws that prohibit building higher-density, walkable urban development. There is great NIMBY opposition to it. And the necessary infrastructure for a choice of transportation options from walking and biking to riding transit, along with cars, is generally not available.

Yet Sacramento is showing the rest of the state and nation how to do it. The Blueprint is widely regarded as a state and national model of regional development planning. The proposed Regional Transit Master Plan, along with the Transit-Oriented Development Guidelines, will provide the extension of the transit system while helping to make walkable urban development acceptable around the stations.

Another step is to provide management to each of these walkable urban, Transit-Oriented Development places, such as Station 65, a proposed 500,000-square-foot mixed-used project to include residential units, office and retail space, and a hotel and restaurants. These management organizations would be modeled on the Downtown Sacramento Partnership. In fact, many of these Transit-Oriented Development places can subcontract with the partnership to provide services in the early years.

Finally, these walkable urban, transit-oriented places need to develop a conscious affordable housing strategy. The current affordable housing strategy in Sacramento is "drive until you qualify" – which is obviously bankrupt. It is crucial to have a conscious strategy since it is going to take a generation to catch up with the pent-up demand for walkable urban housing and commercial development.

According to Brookings Institution research, there should be eight to 12 regionally significant, walkable urban, transit-oriented places in the region. Today there are only three: downtown, midtown and Old Sacramento. The opportunity for locating and building five to nine additional walkable urban, transit-oriented places and building far more development in the existing three would be worth billions of dollars and would represent a more sustainable way of living.

Sacramento can provide a model for the country, one that we certainly need.

       

For over 100 years, the driving force of Ohio’s economy has been the state’s so-called Big Eight cities—Columbus, Cleveland, Cincinnati, Toledo, Akron, Dayton, Canton, and Youngstown. Today, though, the driving reality of these cities is sustained, long-term population loss. The central issue confronting these cities—and the state and surrounding metropolitan area—is not whether these cities will have different physical footprints and more green space than they do now, but how it will happen.

The state must adopt a different way of thinking and a different vision of its cities’ future—and so must the myriad local, civic, philanthropic, and business leaders who will also play a role in reshaping Ohio’s cities. The following seven basic premises should inform any vision for a smaller, stronger future and subsequent strategies for change in these places:

• These cities contain significant assets for future rebuilding
  
• These cities will not regain their peak population
  
• These cities have a surplus of housing
  
• These cities have far more vacant land than can be absorbed by redevelopment
  
• Impoverishment threatens the viability of these cities more than population loss as such
  
• Local resources are severely limited
  
• The fate of cities and their metropolitan areas are inextricably inter-connected
  

These premises have significant implications for the strategies that state and local governments should pursue to address the issues of shrinking cities.

Full Paper on Ohio's Cities » (PDF)
Paper on Shrinking Cities Across the United States »

Downloads

• Full Paper

       

Editor’s Note: This piece originally was published on the Guardian’s Sustainable Business website.

I recently returned from Copenhagen, my first time to the Danish capital. Even a three day visit affirms why this city of more than 540,000 residents has received global recognition as a beacon of sustainable development. An incredible 36 percent of all commuting trips to work or school are made by bike along, in many cases, secure bike lanes that protect cyclists from cars and buses. Another 32 percent of city residents either walk or utilize the region's highly-efficient public transportation network of buses and trains.

This kind of sustainable development clearly yields significant environmental benefits. Copenhagen achieved the highest ranking in the 2009 European Green City Index, scoring in the top 10 in all eight categories, from energy efficiency to transport and environmental governance.

Growing green is obviously an environmental imperative. Yet the Copenhagen experience shows that it can be a market proposition as well, with a diverse set of economic and fiscal benefits accruing to cities that are at the vanguard of sustainable development. Cities like Copenhagen, in short, may be inventing a clean economy of place.

Monday Morning, the respected Scandinavian thinktank, recently released a report detailing the effect of building a city that is high in spatial efficiency and rich in transport choices. Some of the benefits are direct and local. Residents who cycle to work or school are healthier, so health care costs decline (by an estimated $380 million a year). Fewer cars on the road means less congestion and fewer accidents, so additional savings are realized.

Yet the big effect from sustainable development may be indirect and global, as specialized firms naturally rise and expand to meet the growing demand for clean services and clean products. Monday Morning's report finds that Copenhagen's clean sector has been a critical contributor to the region's economy in the past decade, with green exports outpacing all other sectors by growing at an astounding 77 percent between 2004 and 2009.

Cities in the U.S. are following suit. Portland, Oregon, is also internationally renowned for its commitment to sustainable development. The Portland metropolis has an expansive public transit system and an urban growth boundary to control development at the urban periphery. The city boasts a green investment fund to provide grants for residential and commercial building projects.

Now the city is striving, like Copenhagen, to reap the economic rewards of sustainable development through business formation, firm expansion, job growth and private investment. In February, Portland released its first regional export plan to double exports over five years by building on the region's distinctive economic and physical attributes. A critical pillar of this strategy involves increasing the export orientation of firms in the burgeoning clean technology sector to serve growing markets in Asia, Latin America and elsewhere.

Both Copenhagen and Portland recognize that urbanization is the dominant market-shaping trend of the century. By 2030 it is estimated that China will have one billion residents while India will have 590 million. These nations and others will demand products and services that enable development that is economically supportive, environmentally sensitive and spatially efficient. And those products and services may disproportionately emerge from firms located in cities, in mature economies and rising nations alike, which are first movers on sustainable development.

The economic benefits of sustainable development could be substantial. Last year, my program at Brookings measured the U.S. clean economy at 2.7 million jobs. That means the clean economy has more jobs than fossil-fuel related industries and is nearly twice the size of the biosciences field and 60 percent of the 4.8 million strong IT sector.

The U.S. clean economy is also incredibly diverse (sweeping across five broad categories and 39 separate clusters) and disproportionately located in the nation's top 100 cities and metropolitan areas.

Green architecture and construction services cluster illustrates the potential for growth and the reality of metropolitan concentration. This segment already employs over 56,000 people in the U.S. Some 90 percent of these jobs are located in the top 100 cities and towns (although those communities house only two-thirds of the population). The segment grew by a healthy annual average of 6.4 percent between 2003 and 2010 and includes firms such as Burns and McDonnell Engineering in Kansas City, McKinstry and Co. in Seattle, and Gensler in San Francisco. Conclusion: the clean economy of place constitutes a virtuous cycle between cities, companies, consumers and clusters.

Let me end where I began, in Copenhagen. The city is not resting on its cycling laurels but setting its sights higher, towards achieving a goal of carbon neutrality by 2025. Shakespeare was wrong: all is not rotten in the state of Denmark. Nurturing what is good — and green — embracing it and extending it could provide a platform for economic growth for decades to come.

       

Editor's Note: In this blog, Vera Songwe introduces the African Leadership Transitions Tracker, a new interactive that aims to start a broader conversation about leadership transitions and what they mean for the region and beyond.

On March 28, Nigerians voters will go to the polls to participate in their nation’s fifth election since the military handed over power to civilians in 1999. As Africa’s largest economy and an important oil exporter, this election comes at an important time for Nigeria and for the continent as a whole.

Events around this election have generated significant debate around electoral and voting processes on the continent such as the importance of a constitution, the cost, the frequency and level of contestability, and the power of incumbency in African elections. However, amid this dialogue, much less consideration has been devoted to where this election stands within the continuum of leader transitions Nigeria has experienced since it first gained independence in 1960. Nigerians have, in fact, gone through 18 leadership transitions in the last 55 years, including the untimely death of former President Umaru Masu Yar’Adua in May 2010, the multiparty elections that brought President Olusegun Obasanjo to power in 1999, and the first presidential elections that brought President Shegu Shagari to power in 1979. Nigeria’s high rate of leadership changeover should not, however, be considered illustrative of Africa’s overall story. On the contrary, a high level of diversity exists among countries in the region on this measure, with countries like Angola having had only one leadership transition since it achieved its independence in 1975, and Benin, on the other hand, undergoing an election, coup, or other type of leadership transition nearly every two years in the country’s 55-year post-independence history. However, overall in Africa today there are more peaceful and competitive leadership transitions than there have been over the last six decades. This contestability process is gaining ground across the continent, and while coups d’etat appear to be fading revolutions are gaining ground where competition has not taken hold.

The recent passing of Singapore’s 30 year-long leader Lee Kwan Yew credited with having taken Singapore from a third world country to a fully developed country in less than a generation, has brought the question of leadership and leadership transitions back to the fore. A 2010 report by Michael Spence’s Growth Commission heralds Lee Kuan Yew as the hero of Singapore’s growth story. The African Leadership Transition Tracker hopes to launch a dialogue on what the frequency, nature, and scope of leadership transitions mean for African countries’ growth, stability, and development trajectory overall. Moreover, how have transition trends in the region changed from the time of the African founding fathers and the tumultuous years of the 1960s to the present day?

As an initial step towards thinking this question through, Brookings’s African Growth Initiative is today launching the African Leadership Transitions Tracker as a resource both to inform readers about African political history and a tool to initiate analysis on what leadership changeover might mean (or not mean) for development. The Transitions Tracker specifically records all changes that have occurred at the head-of-state level in every African country between the end of the colonial period and the present day. We are hoping that recording this information and presenting it visually (and as a downloadable data set) will help start a broader conversation and support additional work on these issues. Brookings will update this data on a regular basis, and we welcome your feedback as we further refine this interactive. Moreover, the information we present today is by no means the full story—key variables are needed to complement this study, including, for example, the various political party affiliations of leaders within a country or cross tabulations with resources that seek to measure the level of citizen participation and engagement in these transitions. However, as further analysis takes place, we are hoping that the African Leadership Transitions Tracker will enrich dialogue about developments occurring in the region and place current news on elections or other types of changeover events within the broader context of the continent’s leadership story overall.  Over the next few months, we will be running a series of articles based on this data.  

Special thanks to Ehui Adovor, graduate student at George Washington University and the many AGI research assistants, analysts, and program staff that have supported this project, including Jessica Pugliese, Brandon Routman, Christina Golubski, Andrew Westbury, and Amy Copley.

      

Hong Kong’s next vote for Chief Executive (CE)—scheduled for 2017—offers a narrow pathway for improving democratic governance. The question is will a few of Hong Kong’s democratic legislators recognize the opportunity and make the necessary compromises.

As I saw in a trip to the city last week, discussions about reforming the election process are already well underway. Up until now, the CE has always been chosen by a 1200-person selection committee, mostly comprised of members willing to follow China’s lead on major political issues. Now under consideration is a plan to elect the next CE through a one-person, one-vote election (universal suffrage). The number of eligible voters would jump from 1,200 to around 5 million.

The caveat from Beijing has been that the candidates for that election would be selected by a nominating committee to be modelled on—you guessed it—the old selection committee. Pro-democracy politicians have sought a more flexible and open-ended process. It was public opposition to Beijing’s nominating committee that set off the Umbrella Movement protests last September and the 79-day occupation of several downtown thoroughfares. The democrats’ opposition to the current plan is important because the tabled proposal must receive support from two-thirds of the Legislative Council to pass, and the government doesn’t have the votes. It needs four democrats to cross the aisle and vote for the package.

Outsized importance

Hong Kong is a small place (7.25 million people), but what happens to the universal suffrage proposal has rather large implications. I have often thought that how China calibrates its choices concerning Hong Kong’s political system says something about what kind of great power it will be. This is not the defining issue of China’s revival as a great power, to be sure. How Beijing uses its growing power economically, diplomatically, and coercively is more important.

Yet most of the objects of China’s exercise of power, particularly in East Asia, are countries with informed, patriotic populations who care about the security and independence of their countries. (The only real exceptions are the islands of the East and South China Sea whose only inhabitants are seagulls.) So China will have to balance any temptation to promote its interests in more assertive ways with a sensitivity to popular feeling. Indeed, its recent “big country” mentality has caused a backlash in the “small countries” it has tried to bend to its will.

Shifting politics

So Hong Kong should be a good test of China’s sensitivity level. It is constitutionally a part of China. Its population is predominantly ethnic Chinese. The overwhelming majority of people accept their lot as Chinese citizens and would do nothing to upset the status quo. They are inherently pragmatic and understand, most of them, the benefits Hong Kong enjoys by being a part of China, including the rule of law and some political freedoms.

But a significant majority also want genuine electoral democracy. If China had granted that ten years ago, the gratitude would have been profound. But the delay has had deleterious effects. Hong Kong’s politics have become more polarized and radicalized. Political mistrust is deep and moderates have been marginalized, especially in the democratic camp. Meanwhile, the new Chinese leadership is placing greater emphasis on national security, and Beijing’s propaganda organs warn of “foreign forces” (e.g. the United States) working behind the scenes to destabilize Hong Kong.

So far, therefore, the interaction between the Chinese central government and the majority of the Hong Kong public has not gone well as it could have. Things will come to a head in a couple of weeks when the Legislative Council votes on the electoral reform proposal. The democratic camp maintains an apparently strong united front and says it will vote as a bloc against the package, which will mean that Hong Kong reverts to the past “small circle” election of the CE.

During my visit I found a couple of brave souls who believe the game is not over; the dominant mood, however, was one of pessimism. If the package goes down, there will likely be no protests, since radical forces have at least blocked what they hate, even as they didn’t secure what they wanted. If the package passes, however, there will likely be protests akin to those last fall, but not as prolonged. Whatever happens, there will be a big demonstration on or around July 1, the eighteenth anniversary of Hong Kong’s return to China. The size of that rally will be a barometer of the intensity of public feeling.

A “narrow pathway” to success?

There is a curious aspect about the package that Legislative Council will vote on. As I outlined in a Brookings blog post in late April, the proposal actually creates a narrow pathway for the democrats to first nominate and then elect one of their own as CE.

It would require, above all, a willingness on the part of at least four democrats to set aside their dissatisfaction with the undemocratic defects of the current proposal (and they do exist) and focus on the democratic opportunity that it presents. Later on, it would require the democrat camp to unite in supporting a moderate candidate who would not invite Beijing’s automatic rejection and who would have broad public support (and such individuals do exist). It should also have confidence that the majority of voters are on their side and would vote for that candidate. This is not a sure thing. The pro-Beijing members of the nominating committee will have the power not to name that person as a candidate—but rejecting a moderate, popular democrat would put them in a very awkward position.

The independent people that I spoke to in Hong Kong last week agreed with me that the current proposal creates this “narrow pathway.” But they also deplored the reality that the mutual mistrust between the democratic and pro-Beijing camps has become a serious obstacle to a sensible compromise. Radicals dominate the democratic camp. Their influence often constrains moderate democrats who might otherwise vote, as an act of conscience, for the package.

Beijing could have conducted its engagement with the Hong Kong public and the democratic camp in a much more skillful way. The priority it places on control of Hong Kong has outweighed its pledges to institute democracy. That has not changed, and it has contributed to the radicalization of Hong Kong politics. Yet the radicals, who would rather fight than win, are now providing Beijing with a pretext to take no chances.

      

The use of economic resources to support election campaigns is an essential ingredient of democratic competition. Often viewed as a malady of democracy, campaign finance is actually part of the normal workings of democratic life. However, it is indisputable that money is capable of inflicting significant distortions on politics and policymaking. When there is a failure to regulate money in the political process or existing regulation is ineffectual, the legitimacy of democratic processes can be jeopardized.

These concerns are particularly relevant to Latin America, a region plagued by a highly unequal income distribution, and where organized crime has a major presence, transacts billions of dollars each year in illicit business, and has the potential to corrupt democratic institutions. In this policy brief, Kevin Casas-Zamora and Daniel Zovatto offer practical guidance for making campaign finance regulation feasible and increasing its likelihood of success. In undertaking reform, countries should prioritize the most urgently needed changes with the broadest political consensus. Proposals for reform include:

• Establish greater control over private funding of parties and election campaigns;

• Create a public subsidy system to ensure fair access for parties and candidates to adequate funding to finance both regular day-to-day operations and election campaigns;

• Adopt mechanisms to keep campaign spending from skyrocketing;

• Craft party and candidate reporting systems to increase accountability, transparency, and disclosure; and

• Establish a graduated and credible system of sanctions for the chief financial officers of political parties in the event of violations of the rules in force.

Downloads

• The cost of democracy: Campaign finance in Latin America

      

William Galston and E.J. Dionne, Jr. make the case for universal voting – a new electoral system in which voting would be regarded as a required, civic duty. Why not treat showing up at the polls in the same way we treat a jury summons, which compels us to present ourselves at the court? Galston and Dionne argue that universal voting would enhance the legitimacy of our governing institutions, greatly increasing turnout and the diversity of the American voter base, and ease the intense partisan polarization that weakens our governing capacity.

Citing the implementation of universal voting in Australia in 1924, the authors conclude that universal voting increases citizen participation in the political process. In the United States, they write, universal voting would promote participation among citizens who are not likely to vote—those with lower levels of income and education, young adults, and recent immigrants. By evening out disparities in the electorate, universal voting would put the state on the side of promoting broad civic participation.

In addition to expanding voter participation, universal voting would improve electoral competition and curb hyperpolarization. Galston and Dionne assert that the addition of less partisan voters in the electorate, would force candidates to shift their focus from mobilizing partisan bases to persuading moderates and less committed voters. Reducing partisan rhetoric would help ease polarization and increase prospects for compromise.. Rather than focusing on symbolic, political gestures, Washington might have an incentive to tackle serious issues and solve problems.

Galston and Dionne believe that American democracy cannot be strong if citizenship is weak. And right now, they contend citizenship is strong on rights but weak on responsibilities. Making voting universal would begin to right this balance and send an important message: we all have the duty to help shape the country that has given us so much.

Galston and Dionne recognize that the majority of Americans are far from ready to endorse universal voting. By advancing a proposal that stands outside the perimeter of what the majority of Americans are likely to support, Galston and Dionne aim to enrich public debate—in the short term, by advancing the cause of more modest reforms that would increase participation; in the long term, by expanding public understanding of institutional remedies to political dysfunction. 

Downloads

• Download the paper

Audio

• Dionne and Galston discuss their paper on universal voting

      

In a new research paper—The case for universal voting: Why making voting a duty would enhance our elections and improve our government—Brookings scholars E.J. Dionne, Jr. and William Galston make the case for universal voting—an electoral system in which voting would be regarded as a required, civic duty. Why not treat showing up at the polls in the same way we treat, say, a jury summons? Dionne and Galston argue that universal voting’s benefits would include enhancing the legitimacy of our governing institutions, increasing turnout and the diversity of the American voter base, and easing the intense partisan polarization that weakens our governing capacity.

What do you think of Dionne and Galston’s proposal? Specifically, if voting and registration rules were made easier, should voting in national elections be universal and mandatory for all eligible citizens?

To voice your opinion, click the image below and vote. We will share the results on social media.

       

Recently, Bolivian President Evo Morales declared himself a “slave of the people” and said he is backing the proposed constitutional reform that would enable him to seek re-election in 2019 if that’s what the citizens want. Last Saturday, September 26, the Legislative Assembly partially amended the Constitution (by a two-thirds majority), authorizing Morales to run for the presidency once again in 2019. February 21, 2016 is set as the date of the popular referendum to validate or reject the amendment.

This amendment allows presidential re-election for two consecutive terms, rather than just one re-election, as dictated by the previous constitutional provision. The change takes into account the current presidential term (2015-2020) and clarifies that Evo and his vice president are authorized to run only one more time, that is, to seek re-election only for the 2020 to 2025 period. The opposition immediately denounced the amendment as “tailoring the law to the needs of one person”.

It should be noted that Morales and García ran and won in the 2005, 2009, and 2014 elections. The current term is the second consecutive term under the new Bolivian Constitution (adopted in 2009) and the third since they were first elected, in 2005. If he wins the elections scheduled for 2019, Evo would become one of the leaders to hold power the longest in Bolivia and throughout Latin America.

Re-election fever

This constitutional amendment, recently adopted in Bolivia, is not an isolated event. Rather, it fits within a regional trend toward re-election that has been gaining ground in Latin America over the past 20 years.

While the region ushered in democracy in the late 1970s and many clearly opposing re-election, this situation changed dramatically a few years later. The first wave of reforms favorable to immediate or consecutive re-election came in the first half of the 1990s with the impetus of Alberto Fujimori in Peru (1993), Carlos Menem in Argentina (1994), and Fernando Henrique Cardoso in Brazil (1997). From then on, several more presidents introduced reforms during their administrations to keep themselves in power. A second wave of reforms, led by Hugo Chávez, took place in the middle of the last decade, with a view to moving from immediate re-election to indefinite re-election. Chávez secured this objective via referendum in 2009.

Chávez’s example was reproduced by Daniel Ortega in 2014 in Nicaragua (the second country to allow indefinite re-election). Currently one more president, Rafael Correa (Ecuador), is promoting a reform along similar lines.

Recent reforms and trends

The years 2014 and 2015 have been full of news a about re-election. In the last 20 years the Dominican Republic has led in the number of re-election related reforms, with four from 1994 to 2015. The most recent, in July 2015, has re-established immediate re-election, enabling President Danilo Medina to run once again in May 2016 elections to aspire to a second consecutive term.

Two more countries have moved in what some might call extreme directions in 2014 and 2015. Nicaragua eliminated any impediment to re-election from the constitution in January of 2014, while Colombia moved in the opposite direction when they approved a reform prohibiting presidential re-election, in June 2015, a decade after re-election was first adopted.

On April 22, 2015, the Honduran Supreme Court declared the articles of the constitution that prohibited presidential re-election inapplicable. These articles also punished public officials and any other citizen who proposed or supported amending them, as these articles were considered not subject to reform. In 2009 the effort to call a National Constitutional Assembly after a non-binding consultation to amend the constitution and do away with this provision, led to the coup d’état that removed former President Zelaya from office.

In Brazil, the Chamber of Deputies cast an initial vote in 2015 in favor of eliminating re-elections, which is now being examined in the Senate. Most analysts consider it likely that the senate will adopt a similar position as the lower house, i.e. in favor of doing away with re-election.

Finally, one should note the cases of Ecuador and Bolivia, countries in which efforts are under way to amend the constitutions in relation to elections, in the terms analyzed above.

As a result of the reforms of the last few years, at this time 14 of the 18 countries in the region allow re-election, albeit with different specific rules. Venezuela (since 2009) and Nicaragua (since 2014) are the only countries so far that allow indefinite re-election. In five countries – Argentine, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, and the Dominican Republic – consecutive re-election is allowed, but not indefinitely (only one re-election is permitted). Nonetheless, presidents who re-founded the institutional order through constitutional assemblies have been able to benefit from a third term, leaving out the first term on the argument that it pre-dated the constitutional reforms (Bolivia and Ecuador). To these five countries we should added the above-mentioned case of Honduras.

In six other countries one can return to the presidency after an interval of one or two presidential terms. These are Chile, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Panama, Peru, and Uruguay. As we have observed, only four countries have an absolute prohibition on any type of re-election, namely Mexico, Guatemala, Paraguay, and, since last July, Colombia.

My opinion

This re-election fever is bad news for a region like ours given the institutional weaknesses, the crisis of the political parties, the growing personalization of politics, and, in several countries, hyper-presidentialism.

Something is very wrong when a president of a democracy considers himself or herself as indispensable as to change the constitution in order to stay in power. As Pope Francis noted recently; “a good leader is one who is capable of bringing up other leaders. If a leader wants to lead alone, he is a tyrant. True leadership is fruitful.”

“The leaders of today will not be here tomorrow. If they do not plant the seed of leadership in others, they are worthless. They are dictators,” he concluded.

I agree with Pope Francis. The health of a democracy depends essentially on its ability to limit the power of those in government so they cannot reshape the law to fit their personal ambitions. In other words, democracy in Latin America does not need leaders who are slaves of the people, but who are slaves to the law and the institutions.

This piece was originally published by International IDEA.

       

The European Union’s international partners often accuse it of not speaking with a single voice on key global issues. Yet, there are instances when Europe does display a coherent approach to policy-making in international affairs. In this paper for the Center on the United States and Europe, Matteo Garavoglia argues that EU Election Observation Missions (EU EOMs) are a worthy example of such occurrences.

Unlike in most other foreign policy domains, EU supranational institutions, rather than national capitals, lead EOMs' policymaking. More specifically, the European External Action Service’s Democracy and Electoral Observation Division, the European Commission’s Foreign Policy Instrument, and the European Parliament’s Directorate for Democracy Support are the key actors behind this policy area.

Writing for Brookings’s U.S.-Europe Analysis Series, Matteo Garavoglia investigates why European supranational actors are at the core of EOMs policymaking. Having done so, he analyzes the role that national governments and non-institutional agents play in conceptualizing and operationalizing EOMs. Finally, he explores ways in which Europe’s international partners could build bridges with Brussels in this policy area.

Downloads

• EU election observation policy: A supranationalist transatlantic bridge?

       

What if I told you I’d found a surefire way to decrease community involvement in our local schools while at the same time increasing the costs of providing education for taxpayers? Probably not a political winner, eh? And yet, for well over 100 years we’ve adopted such an approach to governing America’s public schools.

I’m talking of course, about the widespread and increasingly questionable practice of local school district governments holding their school board elections “off-cycle” so that they are contested apart from regular national elections.

Just how significant and widespread are “off-cycle” school board elections? And what are the consequences of using off-cycle elections for the tone and direction of education policy? UC Berkeley Political Scientist Sarah Anzia recently penned a terrific book examining the causes and consequences of off-cycle elections in American politics in which she finds that 90 percent of states hold at least some municipal races apart from major national elections and three quarters of states do so for school board elections. Data from the National School Boards Association seem to confirm Anzia’s descriptive account on the prevalence of these elections.

By exploiting the occasional episode in which a change in state law forced localities to move their elections “on cycle,” Anzia is able to provide some pretty rigorous causal evidence that off-cycle elections decrease voter turnout and equip organized interests (e.g. teachers unions) to obtain more favorable policy outcomes. Anzia’s findings mesh nicely with other work done by University of Pennsylvania Political Scientist, Marc Meredith, who found that when school boards are given the authority to choose election dates for raising revenue (e.g. bond elections) boards will “manipulate” the timing of elections in predictable ways to ensure an electorate that is most favorable to increased school spending.

"While most citizens are tuned into the presidential primary contests this year, the important reality is that thousands of school board members will be 'elected' by tiny and unrepresentative electorates prior to next November’s general election."

While most citizens are tuned into the presidential primary contests this year, the important reality is that thousands of school board members will be “elected” by tiny and unrepresentative electorates prior to next November’s general election. This isn’t an accident or an oversight. The helpless position of today’s “education voter” is a predictable consequence of Progressive era reforms that sought to “take politics out of education.” As Columbia Professor, Jeffrey Henig, explains in his insightful and wide-ranging book, The End of Exceptionalism in American Education, the widespread use of single-purpose governments that are insulated from the electorate has been a hallmark of American school governance that is only recently beginning to come undone.

Advocates of off-cycle elections sometimes contend that holding school elections apart from major federal elections helps foster a more informed electorate. But shouldn’t the onus be on those who defend off-cycle elections to demonstrate better outcomes in districts that cling to a policy that often results in higher costs to taxpayers and diminishes small-d democracy. Of course it’s fair and important to ask, “How much democracy is good for our schools?” However, there are at least three reasons to be skeptical that the benefits of using “off-cycle” elections outweigh the costs:

First, I’m unaware of any scholarly evidence that the voters who participate in off-cycle elections are significantly more informed than the electorates participating in on-cycle elections. More importantly, I am not aware of any scholarly research that demonstrates a linkage between off-cycle elections and better student achievement outcomes. To the contrary, my friend and collaborator Arnie Shober (Lawrence University) and I found a strong association between a district’s relative academic performance and the use of on-cycle elections in a 2014 analysis that we undertook for the Fordham Institute. Although that report could not establish any causal relationship between on-cycle elections and better student achievement (clearly we could not randomly assign on-cycle elections), the fact that we found a positive correlation between on-cycle school board elections and a district’s academic performance arguably puts the ball back in the court of those who would prefer diminished citizen participation and higher fiscal costs.

Second, on the subject of higher costs, consider the takeaway from a recent piece in Governing Magazine that quotes Rice University Political Scientist and local elections expert, Melissa Marschall.  It paraphrases Marschall, saying “There's no doubt about it. Holding concurrent elections is bound to increase turnout…Holding elections less frequently should save them [local governments] money.” In short, even if some benefits (a marginally more informed electorate?) could in theory be demonstrated, one would also need to account for known costs: lower citizen participation and more frequent elections that school districts cannot piggyback onto national or statewide elections.

Third and finally, as Eitan Hersh explains in a hard-hitting recent post on FiveThirtyEight, there’s more than a tinge of hypocrisy when it comes to those who defend off-cycle elections. Ironically, while the Democratic Party and organized labor often advocate for policies that enhance workplace democracy and reduce barriers to voter participation (i.e., opposing voter ID laws, supporting same day registration and vote by mail), these two groups have, according to Hersh, led the charge to retain off-cycle school board elections that all but assure lower and more unrepresentative turnout.  

Admittedly, there’s no perfect approach to governing American K-12 education. And, governance “reform” is hardly a panacea for improving our schools. Nonetheless, as Noel Epstein wisely observed in her 2004 volume, Who’s in Charge Here?, when education governance is fragmented ordinary citizens are challenged to hold policy-makers accountable because it is difficult for the public to mobilize and readily identify which political authority or authorities are responsible. The bottom line: we don’t do the electorate any additional favors by purposefully staggering school board races across multiple off-year election cycles. Consolidating the school election calendar is a small, but nonetheless sensible step in the right direction.  

       

In the U.S., the older and younger generations look very different. While older Americans are predominantly white, young Americans, like millennials, have more varied racial backgrounds. These demographic chasms have political implications: white, older Americans tend to favor conservative politics and have overwhelmingly voted for Republican candidates in past elections; younger Americans, regardless of racial identity, tend to lean left and support broadening social support programs.

In a podcast segment, I explore how these racial and political divides between generations will, no doubt, impact this year’s presidential election and races in the future.

Listen to the full podcast here:

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

Five years pass so quickly. It seems like only yesterday that EU leaders were emerging from an unseemly and apparently ad hoc appointment process to announce that Catherine Ashton, a member of the British House of Lords and a recently appointed European trade commissioner, would be the first-ever high representative for foreign affairs and security policy -- a sort of EU foreign minister. One existential currency crisis and two Russian invasions of Ukraine later, the EU is picking her successor.

With the passage of time and the rush of events, the stakes have become much higher. Yet the EU continues to select its leaders as if its postmodern continental paradise were not under siege from the south, because of the disintegration of the Arab world, and to the east, thanks to Russian aggression. Just like last time, the selection of the new high representative, Federica Mogherini, was undignified, full of haggling, and more focused on her gender, party affiliation, and nationality than on her actual qualifications for the job. And those are few: Mogherini emerged from obscurity just a few months ago to become Italy’s foreign minister.

Critics look at Mogherini’s lack of experience and assume that the EU’s underperformance in foreign policy will continue. This is a real possibility, and with crises brewing to Europe’s east and south, this is a particularly bad moment for the EU to descend into a bout of internal squabbling. But Mogherini can transcend the process that selected her and be the foreign policy representative the EU needs if she learns a few lessons from the recent past.

Back in 2009, pundits were filled with hope about the new EU foreign policy chief. The post was new and newly empowered to set up a diplomatic corps, the European External Action Service (EEAS). Against this backdrop, the choice of Ashton, an unknown British politician with no foreign policy experience, came as a cold shower. Her appointment reinforced the perception that the EU leaders’ stated resolve to raise the union’s foreign policy profile was rhetorical rather than real.

Although understandable, both the high expectations and the subsequent disappointment were misplaced. Even a high representative with an impeccable résumé would not have turned the EU into a foreign policy juggernaut. After all, the EU high representative is not a U.S. secretary of state with plenty of space to set U.S. foreign policy, but a bureaucrat operating within the much narrower limits of intergovernmental decision-making. In the EU, it is the member states -- not Brussels -- that make decisions on the most consequential issues of foreign policy.

Ashton has operated well within this limited sphere and carefully picked her issues. She has understood that the role of the high representative must change depending on the degree of agreement among the states. When there is a strong consensus, the high representative’s role most closely resembles that of a normal foreign minister -- he or she has great leeway to devise and implement policies. The 2013 normalization of relations between Serbia and Kosovo is a good case in point: there was sufficient consensus among member states that Ashton was able to spearhead an agreement between the two countries, for which she deservedly earned credit.

If there is a lack of consensus but also an imbalance of interest among member states, ad hoc groups of interested member states tend to take the initiative -- as did the United Kingdom, France, and Germany in 2003 on Iran’s nuclear program and Poland and Lithuania during Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution. The high representative’s task here is not to lead but to help devise a policy course acceptable to all member states and, once the policy has been created, lend it the political weight of the whole EU. Ashton has carefully interpreted this role in the nuclear talks with Iran, which she has conducted on behalf of the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany).

Finally, when member states have conflicting interests and all care about a particular issue, as they often do with regard to Russia, the high representative is limited to proposing lowest-common-denominator options that, however unsatisfying, represent what the EU can reasonably do. Ukraine, for better or for worse, is an example in which it would serve the EU little for the high representative to try to lead the member states to a destination that they have not (at least yet) agreed they want to go.

The high representative’s job description thus includes policy shaping, consensus building, and conflict management skills. The measure of his or her success is less a function of foreign policy chops than of the interpersonal skills the representative brings to the job. Measured against these requirements, Ashton’s record is decent. By the same token, there might be less reason to worry about Mogherini than some expect.

Mogherini is the high representative that EU leaders want. She is a woman, she is from the center-left, and she compensates the Italians for their recent losses in the international ranking of influential countries. Perhaps most significant, thanks to her lack of experience and high profile, she is unlikely to be able to challenge the member states’ principal role in EU foreign policy. Attesting to this is the fact that a number of EU member states agreed to her appointment despite having expressed concerns about Italy’s tendency to seek accommodation with Russia at a moment when Russia is invading its neighbor. However unhappy these countries may be with Mogherini’s selection, they are confident that her personal opinion on Russia will not affect the EU’s consensus-based foreign-policy-making process.

Mogherini’s weaknesses are real, but if she concentrates on what the EU high representative can realistically do, she can turn them into strengths. Her lack of defined policy positions on most issues will allow her to reflect consensus when it exists and to rely on the EEAS, which Ashton so assiduously built, to implement policies. This might make her an effective bridge builder between member states that disagree and also allows her to be more supportive than someone with a more established profile when vanguard groups of interested states want to move forward on specific issues on their own. Her lack of gravitas is more an issue of relative inexperience than a lack of personality. If she interprets correctly the multitasking role of the high representative, her standing will grow accordingly, as has happened with Ashton. Even on Russia policy, Mogherini has a unique opportunity. Although EU members are divided on what to do, Russia’s escalating aggression in Ukraine is slowly bringing them together. As an Italian associated with a relatively pro-Russian stance, her eventual calls to confront the Kremlin could be all the more effective.

The EU and the United States need a more unified and effective European foreign policy. But the EU is what it is. A U.S.-style secretary of state with a strong vision and lust for the spotlight would not transform the union because he or she would lack the legal authority and political legitimacy to do so. But a good high representative can still move the EU in the right direction, as long as he or she understands the subtleties of the role. And with the support of skilled advisers from the EEAS, Mogherini can be the high representative the EU needs.

This piece was originally published in Foreign Affairs.

      

Editor's Note: This article originally appeared on Lawfare.

Faced with the breakdown of national armies in Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Yemen, Arab states have increasingly turned toward alliances with armed militias to ensure security. Popular, anti-government protests and insurgencies for the most part precipitated the breakdown of regime military institutions, yet pre-existing internal ethnic, clan, and ideological cleavages helped to hasten the breakdown. The beleaguered state security forces have now entered into a variety of alliances—tacit or active—with militias they deem sympathetic to their interests, often organized on the basis of entrenched ethno-sectarian or tribal identities. Such militia forces supplement and at times even stand in for the weak or absent army and police as providers of local security.

On the one hand, militia forces have in certain circumstances proven effective at counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. On the other hand, they have also committed atrocities against civilians that hamper long-term efforts to build trust and stability. Their greatest risk is that, by eroding the central government’s monopolization on force, they jeopardize the territorial cohesion of the state.

In Iraq, the rise of powerful communal militias has paralleled the growth of the threat from the Islamic State. This has presented the United States with a quandary: how to combat the Islamic State by mobilizing local Sunnis while at the same time safeguarding the broader integrity of the Iraqi state and its security institutions. The national guard concept, which successive Iraqi governments have tried in the past, was seen as one way to do this. A national guard force would retain the militias’ local knowledge and roots, both unique tools necessary for a successful counterinsurgency against the Islamic State. At the same time, the guard would (at least in theory) be subject to increased oversight and control by the central government.

Other fractured Arab states, most notably Libya, have tried to implement a national guard model as a way to harness militia power, but this too has failed. Variations of hybrid, provincially-organized military forces exist in Yemen and Syria. While each case is different, the failure of national guards bears certain similarities. Examining the Iraqi case in particular can highlight the potential utility of national guards but also the parallel political and institutional reforms that are necessary to make the concept work.

False Analogies and False Starts in Iraq

The idea of creating a national guard in Iraq has been a centerpiece of U.S. engagement since the dramatic advance of the Islamic State on Tikrit and Mosul in 2014. President Obama specifically mentioned U.S. support for a national guard as a means to help Iraqi Sunnis “secure their own freedom” from the Islamic State. Much of U.S. thinking about the Iraqi National Guard (ING) was guided by the example of the Sunni Awakening of 2006 and 2007, when the United States actively recruited and “flipped” Sunni tribes that had supported the al-Qaeda-inspired insurgency. In return for guarantees of autonomy and military, financial, and political backing, the Sunni tribes were able to turn the tables on the insurgent fighters and impose a measure of peace and stability. The 2014 initiative essentially sought to reproduce this arrangement. The idea was that given proper incentives, the Sunni tribes would again fight the radical Islamists who threatened their supremacy. Over the long term, such national guard forces could be integrated formally as auxiliary troops in a federal structure, comparable in many ways to the U.S. National Guard.

Yet the Awakening analogy failed on a number of levels. The Shi’i-dominated Iraqi central government had never been enthusiastic about empowering Sunni tribes in the first place. With the dismantling of the Iraqi army in 2003, security had effectively devolved to party, tribal, and sectarian militias. Many Iraqis wondered why the United States would seek to create new militias, especially ones recently tied to al-Qaeda and other terrorists. As Iraq scholar Adeed Dawisha described, the gains in security came“not because of the state, but in spite of it.”

As the U.S. began withdrawing from Iraq in 2009 and 2010, then-Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki quickly moved to dismantle the Awakening-associated militias. Only a handful of former militia fighters received their promised positions in the police, army, or civil services. Some former militia leaders were arrested on seemingly politically-motivated charges of terrorism or subversion. Efforts to enact a Sunni-dominated super-region comparable to the federal status of the Kurdish Regional Government in the north were rebuffed, despite the provisions of Iraq’s constitution that allowed for the creation of such an entity. Politically marginalized, some Sunnis returned to their alliance with the radical mujahideen.

The election of the new prime minister Haydar al-Abadi in 2014 raised the promise of renewed Sunni-Shi’i reconciliation. Abadi expressed support for the national guard initiative and forwarded a bill to parliament in 2014. Thousands of volunteers came forward from the Sunni tribes in the west and U.S. and Iraqi officials met with tribal leaders to help solidify support. The United States began to enlist support from Iraq’s Sunni neighbors to provide training and support for the ING.

Yet resistance within Abadi’s own political coalition stymied these efforts. The National Guard bill foundered in parliamentary committee, with open questions about the extent of control vested in provincial governors and the chain of command subordinating the ING to the ministries of interior, defense, or the prime minister himself. Officers of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) regarded the militias as unfit for duty and as rivals for budget and resources. Iraq’s constitution specifically prohibited the formation of militias outside the framework of the armed forces (with an exception of the peshmergaforces of the Kurdish Regional Government). Moreover, there was concern that once the Sunnis were authorized to organize a militia, other ethno-sectarian communities, such as Christians or Turkomen,might try to follow suit out of fear of falling under the mercy of their more powerful neighbors. The ING, then, could undercut any pretense of the Iraqi state possessing a monopoly over the use of force.

At base, though, many of Iraq’s Shi’i leaders simply believed that they didn’t need Sunni support. With the ING initiative stalled in parliament, the Shi’i factions have actively cultivated Shi’i militias as part of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF, or Hashd al-Shaabi). The origins of the PMF can be traced to a statement by Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, Iraq’s senior Shi’i cleric, which explicitly called on the faithful to take up arms to defend Iraq in the face of the Islamic State onslaught in 2014. Muqtada al-Sadr’s Jaysh al-Mahdi, the Badr Organization, and other political factions quickly took the opportunity to reconstitute or expand their private armies.

Backed by Iran’s expeditionary al-Qods Force, PMF militias played a prominent role in the spring 2015 offensive against the Islamic State in Tikrit. By spring 2015, PMF counted around 60,000 men under arms. Still, the performance of these militias has been less than stellar. In the spring 2015 offensive on Tikrit, PMF forces failed repeatedly to dislodge Islamic State resistance, despite enjoying superiority in numbers. U.S. air support proved critical to allowing the offensive to proceed. Some PMF units quit the fight instead of working under American air cover. Others were involved in a campaign of terror against Sunnis, looting, kidnapping, and killing those suspected of collaborating with the Islamic State.

Awakening Again?

The prospects for the mobilization of Iraq’s Sunnis are not dead—yet. A handful of Sunni tribes joined the PMF during the Tikrit offensive. In Anbar, likely the next front in the campaign against the Islamic State, U.S. and Iraqi officials have cultivated ties with local Sunni tribes and organized some 8,000 men into Sunni PMF units. Some tribes have made their service conditional on guarantees of greater autonomy and the removal of Shi’i militia forces. Yet the intake for training programs remains slow and drop-out rates high. On the one hand, tribes continue to resent the central government. On the other hand, they fear retribution should the Islamic State return.

Abadi’s visit to Washington in April 2015 focused on expanding and enhancing security cooperation with the United States. The United States has insisted that the PMF be brought more fully under the control of the Iraqi Security Forces and that PMF units reflect the demographics of the provinces and districts in which they operate. This would mean that in ethnically-mixed areas, such as in Nineveh or Babil, each ethnic group would have its own militia proportional to its size in the locality. The Iraq Train and Equip Program (ITEP) is slowly coming online, funneling American money and weapons to various local militia forces as well as ISF.

Cooperating with the United States has been a delicate balancing act for Abadi. While Kurdish and Sunni leaders see U.S. military support as a means to their own ends, Abadi’s own Shi’i political camp—as well as his allies in Tehran—are far more wary. When the U.S. Congress passed a bill in May 2015 effectively mandating the Defense Department to bypass Baghdad and provide support for Sunni and Kurdish fighters directly, Abadi protested that this constituted a grave violation of Iraqi sovereignty.

Still, reliance on the ragtag PMF alone is not sustainable in the long term. Operating far from home and with limited training, these overwhelmingly Shi’i forces cannot be expected to become an army of occupation in Sunni areas like Tikrit or Fallujah. Ultimately, local partners will be necessary to build and maintain peace and stability. The national guard, then, may well re-emerge as a more sustainable structure for administrative and security devolution.

Lessons Learned From Failure

While analysts and policymakers naturally focus on cases of success, there are important lessons to be learned from Iraq’s failures. For countries like Iraq where central armies have more or less broken down and a bevy of militias has emerged in its stead, as in Libya, Yemen, and Syria, the national guard could represent a path to reconstituting fragile state authority.

But for this to happen, several broad principles need to be heeded:

• National guards cannot simply be conceived as short-term, improvised solutions to immediate security crises. Rather, the creation of national guards is part of the impetus of security-sector reform (SSR) and post-conflict demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) of armed groups.
• National guards must overcome the legacies of past authoritarian experiences where pro-government militias were often seen as mere thugs for the regime, not a disciplined professional fighting force. In particular, the older officer class of regular forces may see them as competitors. To build trust among the population and other military institutions, national guards should be accompanied by revisions to chain of command establishing clear relationships of authority between the guards, the police, the army, and other security agencies, and subordinating all security services to civilian authorities.
• National guard initiatives must also be accompanied by moves toward political power-sharing arrangements. The success of national guards ultimately depends not just on their short-term tactical effectiveness but on the degree of local buy-in. Constitutions can provide a structure for bolstering confidence between a central government and subnational militia forces. Since militia membership and cohesion is often based on geographic linkages—to town, municipality or province—national guards may well be a part of federalist power devolution, especially in countries with overlapping ethno-sectarian and regional cleavages.
• Western governments can assist in setting up and training national guards, but they must ensure that proper political and institutional reforms are also undertaken. In many cases, Western states provide models for how decentralized, federally-organized military forces can complement national armies and local police. The United States, for instance, has a great deal of experience with its own federalized national guard structure and can draw on this example in its train-and-equip programs. There are other potentially useful models as well, including the British Territorial Army, a part-time, volunteer force that was integrated into the British Army in the early twentieth century; the Danish Home Guard, which incorporated anti-Nazi resistance militias into a national command structure after World War II; or the Italian Carabineri, which is often discussed as a potential model for dealing with Libya’s unique security challenges.

Outside assistance to national guards must avoid exacerbating existing communal and political fault lines. Helping peripheral and minority groups set up their own armed forces can, on one hand, embolden these groups to resist the central government and, on the other hand, spur resentment from the central government and fear of future disloyalty or rebellion. These concerns become even more acute when national guards are seen as proxies for outside powers. With this in mind, the U.S. and outside powers should calibrate their assistance to both regionally-based national guards and central government forces to ensure rough parity between the two. This could entail making funding, equipment and training for the central security services contingent on a proportional commitment to strengthen the guards.

National guards are political institutions, not just military instruments. They can have far-ranging consequences for political stability and cohesion. While no panacea for the challenge of building effective states, they can play an important role in addressing security concerns and moving toward more meaningful power sharing.

      

Now well into the final year of his presidency, President Barack Obama recently gave a surprisingly frank and poignant review of his foreign policy record in an interview with Jeffrey Goldberg of The Atlantic.

There were a number of notable takeaways from their discussion, such as Obama’s critique of European allies and their lack of follow-through in regard to the Libya conflict. But a central element of the discussion was Obama’s rebuke to many critics of his foreign policy. He complained that much of the “establishment” seems to have a foreign policy playbook that requires frequent and excessive use of force whenever a crisis arises that displeases the United States. Instead, Obama called for a much more restrained, selective, and strategic approach in the employment of American military power.

Making the grade?

In many ways, I think the president is right. As I have written before, Obama’s original and very lofty goals for his presidency have generally proven elusive. Barack Obama may not be able to heal the planet, rid the Earth of nuclear weapons, or stop the oceans’ rise as his signature legacies. 

But, in fact, there is a strategy, even if it is more often implied than explicit, and even if it falls short of the president’s own preferences of what writers and historians might say about his two terms in office. It is more mundane but nonetheless important. Obama is attempting to be strategic in the most literal and relevant senses of the word—defining priorities and holding to them, even when that makes him appear indifferent or indecisive in response to certain types of crises or challenges. Yet he has shown himself willing to employ significant amounts of force when persuaded that there is no alternative.

Consider just a few of the cases that seemed to be on the president’s mind in the conversation with Goldberg:

• Syria. Obama did not use force against Syria after President Bashar Assad violated his “red line” and used chemical weapons. Here I tend to agree with the president; the key point is that Assad had to give up all (or nearly all) of his arsenal. If that could be achieved without U.S. military strikes against chemical weapons depots, so much the better (there is more to say about Syria, however, and I return to that in a minute).
• Russia. Obama did not use force against Vladimir Putin in Ukraine. The president is right: Ukraine is not an American ally, and Russia has a larger stake in its future than does America. As such, economic responses are the preferred policy tool here as well.
• China. Obama stayed firm but restrained towards China in the South China Sea. He took longer to undertake freedom of navigation exercises in response to China’s growing claims than some would have preferred. But his no-drama Obama approach has been correct, as he has left little doubt that America is committed to freedom of these international waterways. 
• Afghanistan. Obama made it harder than it had to be, and still has not given U.S. forces adequate authorities to attack the Taliban. Moreover, the U.S. military footprint there is somewhat too small. But Obama ultimately and rightly concluded that America needed to stay committed beyond his presidency.
• Iran. There is no doubt: The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is preferable to a military conflict with Iran, even for those of us who think that the deal could probably have been negotiated with tougher and better terms.
• Iraq. Yes, Obama pulled U.S. forces out too soon—but he was willing to return in 2014 once the situation deteriorated.
• Libya. We mishandled this badly and left too soon after the fall of Moammar Gadhafi. Obama is right that European allies should have done more, but he is wrong to have assumed they would get it right on their own in the first place. If we’re assessing his worldview (as opposed to his actual record), Obama has been honest and fair and acknowledged a mistake at least—though, alas, he has not found a way to meaningfully correct the policy situation since 2011.

These cases add up to a far from perfect record. But they represent a much more credible foreign policy than Obama’s critics often allege. And he has avoided unnecessary escalation in a number of situations where a less judicious president might have erred.

I give Obama reasonable marks for carefulness and strategic thinking.

Finally, however, returning to the Syria issue: On balance, Obama has been more wrong than right. Yes, he achieved a modest success in eliminating chemical weapons. Yet the war has been a travesty. Staying out has not worked any better than President George W. Bush’s approach to Iraq (even if it has of course cost far fewer American lives). Worse, Obama seems to justify his Syria policy largely by invoking Iraq—as if the 2003 invasion and occupation there were the only alternative to his minimalist approach. There have been other approaches that would involve significantly more force than we are employing now, yet far less than we used in Iraq or Afghanistan. Obama continues to refuse to consider them seriously, hinging everything on a diplomatic process that is in many ways a substitute for a real policy.

So, as with any presidency, there is more work to do, and as with any president, there is no untarnished record of systematic accomplishment. But I give Obama reasonable marks for carefulness and strategic thinking. He has been a proficient commander in chief, and it is possible that we will someday badly miss his judiciousness.

       

Editors' Note: It has perhaps never been more important to question the prevailing wisdom on the 2011 United States-led intervention in Libya, writes Shadi Hamid. Even with the benefits of hindsight, he argues, many of the criticisms of the intervention fall short. This post originally appeared on Vox.

Libya and the 2011 NATO intervention there have become synonymous with failure, disaster, and the Middle East being a "shit show" (to use President Obama’s colorful descriptor). It has perhaps never been more important to question this prevailing wisdom, because how we interpret Libya affects how we interpret Syria and, importantly, how we assess Obama’s foreign policy legacy.

Of course, Libya, as anyone can see, is a mess, and Americans are reasonably asking if the intervention was a mistake. But just because it’s reasonable doesn’t make it right.

Most criticisms of the intervention, even with the benefit of hindsight, fall short. It is certainly true that the intervention didn’t produce something resembling a stable democracy. This, however, was never the goal. The goal was to protect civilians and prevent a massacre.

Critics erroneously compare Libya today to any number of false ideals, but this is not the correct way to evaluate the success or failure of the intervention. To do that, we should compare Libya today to what Libya would have looked like if we hadn’t intervened. By that standard, the Libya intervention was successful: The country is better off today than it would have been had the international community allowed dictator Muammar Qaddafi to continue his rampage across the country.

Critics further assert that the intervention caused, created, or somehow led to civil war. In fact, the civil war had already started before the intervention began. As for today’s chaos, violence, and general instability, these are more plausibly tied not to the original intervention but to the international community’s failures after intervention.

The very fact that the Libya intervention and its legacy have been either distorted or misunderstood is itself evidence of a warped foreign policy discourse in the U.S., where anything short of success—in this case, Libya quickly becoming a stable, relatively democratic country—is viewed as a failure.

NATO intervened to protect civilians, not to set up a democracy

As stated in the U.N. Security Council resolution authorizing force in Libya, the goal of intervention was "to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack." And this is what was achieved.

In February 2011, anti-Qaddafi demonstrations spread across the country. The regime responded to the nascent protest movement with lethal force, killing more than 100 people in the first few days, effectively sparking an armed rebellion. The rebels quickly lost momentum, however.

I still remember how I felt in those last days and hours as Qaddafi’s forces marched toward Benghazi. In a quite literal sense, every moment mattered, and the longer we waited, the greater the cost.

It was frightening to watch. I didn’t want to live in an America where we would stand by silently as a brutal dictator—using that distinct language of genocidaires—announced rather clearly his intentions to kill. In one speech, Qaddafi called protesters "cockroaches" and vowed to cleanse Libya "inch by inch, house by house, home by home, alleyway by alleyway."

Already, on the eve of intervention, the death toll was estimated at somewhere between 1,000 and 2,000. (This was when the international community’s tolerance for Arab Spring–related mass killings was still fairly low.)

As Obama’s advisers saw it, there were two options for military action: a no-fly zone (which, on its own, wouldn’t do much to stop Qaddafi’s tanks) or a broader resolution that would allow the U.S. and its allies to take further measures, including establishing what amounted to a floating no-drive zone around rebel forces. The president went with the latter option.

The NATO operation lasted about seven months, with an estimated death toll of around 8,000, apparently most of them combatants on both sides (although there is some lack of clarity on this, since the Libyan government doesn’t clearly define "revolutionaries" or "rebel supporters"). A Human Rights Watch investigation found that at least 72 civilians were killed as a result of the NATO air campaign, definitively contradicting speculative claims of mass casualties from the Qaddafi regime.

Claims of "mission creep" have become commonplace, most forcefully articulated by the Micah Zenko of the Council on Foreign Relations. Zenko may be right, but he asserts rather than explains why mission creep is always a bad thing. It may be that in some circumstances, the scope of a mission should be defined more broadly, rather than narrowly.

If anything, it was the Obama administration’s insistence of minimizing the mission—including the absurd claim that it would take "days, not weeks"—that was the problem from the very start. Zenko and others never make clear how civilians could have been protected as long as Qaddafi was waging war on them.

What Libya would look like today if NATO hadn’t intervened

It’s helpful to engage in a bit of counterfactual history here. As Niall Ferguson notes in his book Virtual Alternatives, "To understand how it actually was, we therefore need to understand how it actually wasn’t."

Applied to the Libyan context, this means that we’re not comparing Libya, during or after the intervention, with some imagined ideal of stable, functioning democracy. Rather, we would compare it with what we judge, to the best of our ability, the most likely alternative outcome would have been had the U.S. not intervened.

Here’s what we know: By March 19, 2011, when the NATO operation began, the death toll in Libya had risen rapidly to more than 1,000 in a relatively short amount of time, confirming Qaddafi’s longstanding reputation as someone who was willing to kill his countrymen (as well as others) in large numbers if that’s what his survival required.

There was no end in sight. After early rebel gains, Qaddafi had seized the advantage. Still, he was not in a position to deal a decisive blow to the opposition. (Nowhere in the Arab Spring era has one side in a military conflict been able to claim a clear victory, even with massive advantages in manpower, equipment, and regional backing.)

Any Libyan who had opted to take up arms was liable to be captured, arrested, or killed if Qaddafi "won," so the incentives to accept defeat were nonexistent, to say nothing of the understandable desire to not live under the rule of a brutal and maniacal strongman.

The most likely outcome, then, was a Syria-like situation of indefinite, intensifying violence. Even President Obama, who today seems unsure about the decision to intervene, acknowledged in an August 2014 interview with Thomas Friedman that "had we not intervened, it’s likely that Libya would be Syria...And so there would be more death, more disruption, more destruction."

What caused the current Libyan civil war?

Critics charge that the NATO intervention was responsible for or somehow caused Libya’s current state of chaos and instability. For instance, after leaving the Obama administration, Philip Gordon, the most senior U.S. official on the Middle East in 2013-'15, wrote: "In Iraq, the U.S. intervened and occupied, and the result was a costly disaster. In Libya, the U.S. intervened and did not occupy, and the result was a costly disaster. In Syria, the U.S. neither intervened nor occupied, and the result is a costly disaster."

The problem here is that U.S. intervention did not, in fact, result in a costly disaster, unless we are using the word "result" to simply connote that one thing happened after a previous thing. The NATO operation ended in October 2011. The current civil war in Libya began in May 2014—a full two and a half years later. The intervention and today’s violence are of course related, but this does not necessarily mean there is a causal relationship.

To argue that the current conflict in Libya is a result of the intervention, one would basically need to assume that the outbreak of civil war was inevitable, irrespective of anything that happened in the intervening 30 months.

This makes it all the more important to distinguish between the intervention itself and the international community’s subsequent failure—a failure that nearly all the relevant actors acknowledge—to plan and act for the day after and help Libyans rebuild their shattered country.

Such measures include sending training missions to help the Libyan army restructure itself (only in late 2013 did NATO provide a small team of advisers) or even sending multinational peacekeeping forces; expanding the United Nations Support Mission in Libya’s (UNSMIL) limited advisory role; and pressuring the Libyan government to consider alternatives to a dangerous and destabilizing political isolation law.

While perhaps less sexy, the U.S. and its allies could have also weighed in on institutional design and pushed back against Libya’s adoption, backed by UNSMIL, of one of world’s most counterproductive electoral systems—single non-transferable vote—along with an institutional bias favoring independents. This combination exacerbated tribal and regional divisions while making power sharing even more difficult.

Finally, the U.S. could have restrained its allies, particularly the Gulf States and Egypt, from excessive meddling in the lead-up to and early days of the 2014 civil war.

Yet Libya quickly tumbled off the American agenda. That’s not surprising, given that the Obama administration has always been suspicious of not just military entanglements but any kind of prolonged involvement—diplomatic, financial, or otherwise—in Middle East trouble spots. Libya "was farmed out to the working level," according to Dennis Ross, who served as a special assistant to President Obama until November 2011.

There was also an assumption that the Europeans would do more. This was more than just a hope; it was an organizing principle of Obama administration engagement abroad. Analysts Nina Hachigian and David Shorr have called it the "Responsibility Doctrine": a strategy of "prodding other influential nations…to help shoulder the burdens of fostering a stable, peaceful world order."

This may be the way the world should operate, but as a set of driving assumptions, this part of the Obama doctrine has proven to be wrong at best, and rather dangerous at worst.

We may not like it—and Obama certainly doesn’t—but even when the U.S. itself is not particularly involved in a given conflict, at the very least it is expected to set the agenda, convene partners, and drive international attention toward an issue that would otherwise be neglected in the morass of Middle East conflicts. The U.S., when it came to Libya, did not meet this minimal standard.

Even President Obama himself would eventually acknowledge the failure to stay engaged. As he put it to Friedman: "I think we [and] our European partners underestimated the need to come in full force if you’re going to do this."

Yet it is worth emphasizing that even with a civil war, ISIS’s capture of territory, and as many as three competing "governments," the destruction in Libya still does not come close to the level of death and destruction witnessed in Syria in the absence of intervention.

In other words, even this "worst-case scenario" falls well short of actual worst-case scenarios. According to the Libya Body Count, around 4,500 people have so far been killed over the course of 22 months of civil war.

In Syria, the death toll is about 100 times that, with more than 400,000 killed, according to the Syrian Center for Policy Research.

We’re all consequentialists now

For the reasons outlined above, Libya’s descent into civil conflict—and the resulting power vacuum, which extremist groups like ISIS eagerly filled—wasn’t inevitable. But let’s hypothesize for a moment that it was. Would that undermine support for the original intervention?

The Iraq War, to cite the most obvious example, wasn’t wrong because it led to chaos, instability, and civil war in the country. It was wrong because the decision to intervene in the first place was not justified, being based as it was on faulty premises regarding weapons of mass destruction.

If Iraq had quickly turned out "well" and become a relatively stable, flawed, yet functioning democracy, would that have retroactively justified an unjustified war? Presumably not, even though we would all be happy that Iraq was on a promising path.

The near reverse holds true for Libya. The justness of military intervention in March 2011 cannot be undone or negated retroactively. This is not the way choice or morality operates (imagine applying this standard to your personal life). This may suggest a broader philosophical divergence: Obama, according to one of his aides, is a "consequentialist."

I suspect that this, perhaps more than narrower questions of military intervention, drives at least some of the revisionism over Libya’s legacy. If we were consequentialists, it would be nearly impossible to act anywhere without some sort of preordained guarantee that a conflict area—which likely hadn’t been "stable" for years or decades—could all of a sudden stabilize.

Was the rightness of stopping the Rwandan genocide dependent on whether Rwanda could realistically become a stable democracy after the genocide was stopped? And how could policymakers make that determination, when the stabilization of any post-conflict situation is dependent, in part, not just on factual assessments but on always uncertain questions of the international community’s political will—something that is up to politicians—in committing the necessary time, attention, and resources to helping shattered countries rebuild themselves?

The idea that Libya, because it had oil and a relatively small population, would have been a relatively easy case was an odd one. Qaddafi had made sure, well in advance, that a Libya without him would be woefully unprepared to reconstruct itself.

For more than four decades, he did everything in his power to preempt any civil society organizations or real, autonomous institutions from emerging. Paranoid about competing centers of influence, Qaddafi reduced the Libyan army to a personal fiefdom. Unlike other Arab autocracies, the state and the leader were inseparable.

To think that Libya wouldn’t have encountered at least some major instability over the course of transition from one-person rule to an uncertain "something else" is to have a view of political development completely detached from both history and reality.

A distorted foreign policy discourse

The way we remember Libya suggests that the way we talk about America’s role in the world has changed, and not for the better. Americans are probably more likely to consider the Libya intervention a failure because the U.S. was at the forefront of the NATO operation. So any subsequent descent into conflict, presumably, says something about our failure, which is something we’d rather not think about.

Outside of the foreign policy community, politicians are usually criticized for what they do abroad, rather than what they don’t do. As former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates put it, "[Qaddafi] was not a threat to us anywhere. He was a threat to his own people, and that was about it." If the U.S had decided against intervention, Libya would have likely reverted to some noxious combination of dictatorship and insurgency. But we could have shirked responsibility (a sort of inverse "pottery barn" principle—if you didn’t break it, you don’t have to fix it). We could have claimed to have "done no harm," even though harm, of course, would have been done.

There was a time when the United States seemed to have a perpetual bias toward action. The instinct of leaders, more often than not, was to act militarily even in relatively small conflicts that were remote from American national security interests. Our country’s tragic experience in Iraq changed that. Inaction came to be seen as a virtue. And, to be sure, inaction is sometimes virtuous. Libya, though, was not one of those times.

       

It’s easy to imagine a future in a decade or less when most people will have a smartphone. In our recent paper Pathways to Smarter Digital Financial Inclusion, we explore the benefits of extending financial services to the mass of lower-income people in developing countries who are currently dubious of the value that financial services can bring to them, distrustful of formal financial institutions, or uncomfortable with the treatment they expect to receive.

The report analyzes six inherent characteristics of smartphones that have the potential to change market dynamics relative to the status quo of simple mobile phones and cards. 

Customer-Facing Changes:

1. The graphical user interface.
2. The ability to attach a variety of peripheral devices to it (such as a card reader or a small printer issuing receipts).
3. The lower marginal cost of mobile data communications relative to traditional mobile channels (such as SMS or USSD).

Service Provider Changes:

4. Greater freedom to program services without requiring the acquiescence or active participation of the telco.
5. Greater flexibility to distribute service logic between the handset (apps) and the network (servers).
6. More opportunities to capture more customer data with which to enhance customer value and stickiness.

Taken together, these changes may lower the costs of designing for lower-income people dramatically, and the designs ought to take advantage of continuous feedback from users. This should give low-end customers a stronger sense of choice over the services that are relevant to them, and voice over how they wish to be served and treated.

Traditionally poor people have been invisible to service providers because so little was known about their preferences that it was not possible build a service proposition or business case around them. The paper describes three pathways that will allow providers to design services on smartphones that will enable an increasingly granular understanding of their customers. Each of the three pathways offers providers a different approach to discover what they need to know about prospective customers in order to begin engaging with them. 

Pathway One: Through Big Data

Providers will piece together information on potential low-income customers directly, by assembling available data from disparate sources (e.g. history of airtime top-ups and bill payment, activity on online social networks, neighborhood or village-level socio-demographic data, etc.) and by accelerating data acquisition cycles (e.g. inferring behavior from granting of small loans in rapid succession, administering selected psychometric questions, or conducting A/B tests with special offers). There is a growing number of data analytics companies that are applying big data in this way to benefit the poor.

Pathway Two: Through local Businesses

Smartphones will have a special impact on micro and small enterprises, which will see increasing business benefits from recording and transacting more of their business digitally. As their business data becomes more visible to financial institutions, local firms will increasingly channel financial services, and particularly credit, to their customers, employees, and suppliers. Financial institutions will backstop their credit, which in effect turns smaller businesses into front-line distribution partners into local communities.

Pathway Three: Through Socio-Financial Networks

Firms view individuals primarily as managers of a web of socio-financial relationships that may or may not allow them access to formal financial services. Beyond providing loans to “creditworthy” people, financial institutions can provide transactional engines, similar to the crowdfunding platforms that enable all people to locate potential funding sources within their existing social networks. A provider equipped with appropriate network analysis tools could then promote rather than displace people´s own funding relationships and activities. This would provide financial service firms valuable insight into how people manage their financial needs.

The pathways are intended as an exploration of how smartphones could support the development of a healthier and more inclusive digital financial service ecosystem, by addressing the two critical deficiencies of the current mass-market digital finance systems. Smartphones could enable stronger customer value propositions, leading to much higher levels of customer engagement, leading to more revelation of customer data and more robust business cases for the providers involved. Mobile technology could also lead to a broader diversity of players coming into the space, each playing to their specific interests and contributing their specific set of skills, but together delivering customer value through the right combination of collaboration and competition.