What does Britain’s departure from the EU mean for the country’s policy towards the South Caucasus, a small region on the periphery of Europe, fractured by conflict? Although Britain is not directly involved in any of the region’s peace processes (except in the case of the Geneva International Discussions on conflicts involving Georgia, as an EU member state), it has been a significant stakeholder in South Caucasian stability since the mid-1990s.

Most obviously, Britain has been the single largest foreign investor in Caspian oil and gas. Yet beyond pipelines, Britain also has been a significant investor in long-term civil society-led strategies to build peace in the South Caucasus.

Through what was then the Global Conflict Prevention Pool, in the early 2000s the Department for International Development (DfID) pioneered large-scale peacebuilding interventions, such as the Consortium Initiative, addressing Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, in 2003-09. These built civic networks in the South Caucasus and partnerships with British-based NGOs.

This experience left a strong intellectual legacy. British expertise on the South Caucasus, including specific expertise on its conflicts, is highly regarded in the region and across the world.

There is also a strong tradition of British scholarship on the Caucasus, and several British universities offer Caucasus-related courses. Through schemes such as the John Smith Fellowship Trust, the Robert Bosch Stiftung Academy Fellowship at Chatham House and Chevening Scholarships, significant numbers of young leaders from the South Caucasus have spent time in British institutions and built effective relationships within them.

Three challenges

This niche as a champion of long-term, strategic peacebuilding and repository of area-specific knowledge should not be lost as Britain’s relationship with the EU and regional actors evolves. This can be ensured through awareness of three challenges confronting a post-Brexit Caucasus policy.

The first challenge for London is to avoid framing a regional policy in the South Caucasus as an extension of a wider ‘Russia policy’. Deteriorating Russian-British relations in recent years strengthen a tendency to view policies in the European neighbourhood through the traditional prisms of Cold War and Russian-Western rivalries.

Yet an overwhelming focus on Russia fails to capture other important aspects of political developments in South Caucasus conflicts. Although often referred to as ‘breakaway’ or ‘occupied’ territories, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorny Karabakh are not ungoverned spaces. They have evolved into examples of what scholars call ‘de facto states’ that, to differing degrees, control territory, provide governance and exercise internal sovereignty.

Few disagree that these entities would not survive without external patronage. But neither does that patronage explain their sustainability on its own. Russia-centricity diminishes Britain’s latitude to engage on the full range of local drivers sustaining these entities, contributing instead to less effective policies predicated on competition and containment.

A second and related challenge is to maintain and develop Britain’s position on the issue of engaging populations in these entities. De facto states appear to stand outside of the international rules-based system. Yet in many cases, their civil societies are peopled by skilled and motivated activists who want their leaders to be held accountable according to international rules.

Strategies of isolation ignore these voices and contribute instead to fearful and demoralized communities less likely to engage in a transformation of adversarial relationships. Making this case with the wider international community, and facilitating the funding of local civil societies in contested territories, would be important steps in sustaining an effective British policy on the resolution of conflicts.    

The third challenge for Britain is to maintain a long-term approach to the conflicts of the South Caucasus alongside potential short-term imperatives in other policy fields, as relationships shift post-Brexit.

In this fluid international environment, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office has a role to play both as an internal champion of a long-term peacebuilding strategy and a coordinator of British efforts with those of multilateral actors engaged in the South Caucasus. These include the United Nations, the EU’s Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the Crisis in Georgia and OSCE’s Special Representative for the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office for the South Caucasus, all of which have built relationships with relevant actors on the ground.

Recommendations

Britain’s niche as a champion and advocate of a strategic approach to peaceful change can be secured post-Brexit in the following ways.  

First, in-house expertise is crucial to effective peacebuilding programming. The Foreign Office’s research analysts play a vital role in generating independent internal advice and liaising with academic and NGO communities. Their role could be supplemented by the reinstatement of a regional conflict adviser post, based in Tbilisi, tasked with strengthening Britain’s regional presence on conflict issues and coordinating policy at a regional level.

This post, with a remit to cover conflicts and build up area knowledge and relationships can contribute significantly to working closely with local civil societies, where so much expertise and knowledge resides, as well as other stakeholders.

Second, programming should build in conflict sensitivity by dissociating eligibility from contested political status. This can encourage local populations to take advantage of opportunities for funding, study, comparative learning and professional development irrespective of the status of the entity where they reside.

The Chevening Scholarships are an excellent example, whereby applicants can select ‘South Caucasus’ as their affiliated identity from a drop-down menu. This enables citizens from across the region to apply irrespective of the status of the territory in which they live.   

Finally, a holistic understanding of peace is crucial. Programming in unrecognized or partially-recognized entities should acknowledge that effective peacebuilding needs to embrace political dynamics and processes beyond cross-conflict contact and confidence building. Local actors in such entities may find peacebuilding funding streams defined exclusively in terms of cross-conflict contact more politically risky and ineffective in addressing domestic blockages to peace.

While cross-conflict dynamics remain critical, ‘single-community’ programming framed in terms of civic participation, inclusion, civil society capacity-building, minority and human rights in contested territories, and building the confidence from within to engage in constructive dialogue, are no less important.

The ’global Britain’ promised by Brexit remains a fanciful idea. Quiet, painstaking work to build on the legacies of a long-term British investment in a peace strategy for the South Caucasus, on the other hand, is a realistic and attainable goal.

Russia’s published development agenda to 2024 focused on gaining advantage from its human capital. In reality however, issues surrounding Russia’s population remain a major challenge, considering its demographic trends, an undoubted brain drain and societal divisions.

This expert roundtable will explore the current state of – and interconnections between – human and social capital in Russia. The speakers will also address Russia’s regional disparities, migration effects and political elite dynamics and their relationship to the population at large.

The scale of the changes in Russia’s political system is yet to be fully understood, as new suggestions for revising the constitution appear almost daily. This event will discuss the risks of President Putin’s 15 January announcement, and what strategies Russia’s non-systemic opposition might now deploy in response.

Six years after the annexation of Crimea and the start of the armed conflict in Donbas, the process of coalescing the Ukrainian society around a common civic identity remains complex. Ukraine comprises many ethno-linguistic identities, and various internal and external actors have been able to exploit old and new grievances to increase tensions at the regional and local level.

The panellists will discuss the conflict dynamics along parts of Ukraine’s international border and the line of contact with Crimea. The speakers will review the internal political, social and economic trends that cause friction and suggest ways to strengthen cohesion.

The event will build upon key findings from International Alert’s analysis of the south of Odesa, Kherson and Zakarpattia oblasts and on the reintegration of veterans in Ukraine.

This event is organized in partnership with International Alert, supported by UK aid from the UK government as part of the Peace Research Partnership programme.

After a tumultuous 2019 when Moldova witnessed the end of the Plahotniuc era, the country seems bound for an equally difficult year ahead.
 
Increasing international isolation, a temporary working coalition between the Socialists and the Democrats, concentration of power and resources in the hands of President Igor Dodon, and presidential elections in autumn are among the ordeals to be discussed at this event. Ms Sandu will assess how Moldova can move beyond these challenges and return to a path for sustainable democratic reform. 

Still grappling with the war in the east and the occupation of Crimea, Ukraine’s new leadership has announced its intention to develop its transitional justice infrastructure to respond to the human rights violations arising from Russia’s aggression. 

Numerous reports (not least ones by the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine) list persecutions, illegal detentions, enforced disappearances, torture and killings among the crimes perpetrated in Crimea and parts of occupied Donbas. 

As Ukraine has only just started developing its transitional justice roadmap, this event will seek to discuss viable initial approaches, such as a ‘truth-telling commission’ or amnesties. 

The panellists will also discuss the role for civil society and those directly affected by hostilities in the transitional justice process.  

PLEASE NOTE THIS EVENT IS POSTPONED UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.

Persistent internet rumours claiming the coronavirus outbreak originated from a secret American pharmaceutical company with the aim of destroying China from within were quickly discredited. Pop culture fans recognised the supposed activities of the Umbrella Corporation as being from the famous Japanese video games series Resident Evil.

However, although fake news, it can likely be attributed to Russian trolls conducting this and other similar activities online, especially when considered within the wider context of how the Russian regime is using this worldwide crisis to further destabilize the West and test its resolve.

Russian trolls never sleep

Russia’s COVID-19 related actions first and foremost take the form of a vast information warfare campaign, with media outlets simultaneously downplaying the threat of the pandemic - ‘it is less dangerous than seasonal flu’ - while stoking fear about what is happening elsewhere in Europe.

For the domestic audience in Russia, some media are reporting the pandemic marks the collapse of the Western world and liberalism altogether, calling it a form of collective punishment. Other point out how fast liberal democracies have curbed individual and entrepreneurial freedoms in order to slow down the viral outbreak, and seek to diminish the credibility of the Western response to the crisis.

Exploiting the coronavirus crisis in this way is a new low in Russia’s wider political warfare campaign to undermine global governance overall, as these activities are detrimental to people's very safety. For example, in Ukraine, it is thought a Russian-engineered disinformation operation may have caused the outburst of violence in the city of Novi Sanzhary following the arrival of evacuees from China.

In the military realm, fake news has been targeting the US-led multinational exercise DEFENDER-Europe 2020. The Russian leadership criticized the exercise as an offensive ‘anti-Russian scenario’ but then used accompanying propaganda that it could actively facilitate the spread of COVID-19 across Europe because of the arrival and movement of large numbers of troops.

The large-scale drills were planned to involve 18 participating nations and should have taken place across ten European countries from April to May 2020. But the exercise has now been scaled down – as has the Russian disinformation targeting it.

And while the world is pre-occupied with managing COVID-19, Moscow is able to grow bolder in its provocations. Recent air incursions were reported into Irish controlled airspace as well as over the North Sea. Although this practice is - unfortunately - routine as part of Russian constant military sabre-rattling, it does increase the risk of tactical errors and miscalculation.

Self-isolation, Kremlin style

Meanwhile, just when a global response is needed to fight the pandemic, Moscow’s response has been, at best, self-serving. On March 22, Russian military reportedly started sending medical equipment and supplies to Italy. While the nature and the scope of this assistance can be doubted, it still represents a charm offensive for Russia to be brought back in from the cold in Europe - since successive Italian leaderships have been accommodating to the Kremlin. And sending virologists to Italy might also be a useful learning curve for Russia’s regime.

But within Russia itself, Vladimir Putin does have to face the problem that, on top of all the projected social and healthcare costs, the coronavirus is also having negative political consequences. On March 25, the ‘popular vote’ - a mock referendum designed to rubber-stamp Putin’s recent constitutional changes - was pushed back. And the Ministry of Communications has been forced to postpone a major exercise aimed at ensuring the ‘stable and safe operation of Runet’ - namely eliminating vulnerabilities in the Russian ‘sovereign’ internet to potential external threats.

Certainly it would be naive to believe Moscow will put self-interest to one side during this pandemic. ‘International distancing’ is not new for the Kremlin, and Russia has been practising self-isolation since at least 2008 through its own actions, most notably in Georgia and Ukraine.

Its self-perception as a ‘besieged fortress’ is being reinforced by this crisis and Russia will, at the very least, likely come out of the crisis feeling vindicated in its view that internationalism is dying or already dead.

With the health systems of many countries under massive strain, and societal resilience being tested by social distancing, the Kremlin continues to probe for weaknesses, and is also carefully watching other countries’ responses to the crisis in terms of adaptation and mobilization of resources.

COVID-19 provides a major intelligence-gathering opportunity for Moscow to learn how well others can implement wartime-like planning in peacetime. In a rapidly changing world, Russia is still Russia.

Politically speaking, Russia has been isolating itself from the West for some years now, feeding its citizens a ‘besieged fortress’ mentality. Its uniqueness, however, means its approach to - and outcome from - the COVID-19 pandemic will also be distinctive. 

This webinar will explore how Russia is adapting its internal politics and its international relations to the ‘new normal’ of today. 

In early March, global oil prices fell sharply, hitting lows of under $30 a barrel. Two factors explain this collapse: firstly the decrease in global demand for oil as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic and, secondly, the breakdown in OPEC-Russian relations and the subsequent Saudi-Russian price war which has seen both countries move to flood the market with cheap oil.
 
Against this backdrop, the panellists will reflect on the challenges currently facing OPEC as well as the oil industry as a whole. How are OPEC countries affected by the ever-evolving Covid-19 pandemic? What are the underlying causes behind the Saudi-Russian price war? Is the conflict likely to be resolved soon? And what are the implications of these challenges for the oil industry?

This event is part of a fortnightly series of 'Business in Focus' webinars reflecting on the impact of COVID-19 on areas of particular professional interest for our corporate members and giving circles.

Not a corporate member? Find out more.

Russia’s ongoing occupation of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula and support of separatist hostilities in the eastern provinces of Donbas have resulted in 1.5 million internally displaced persons, 3,000 civilians killed, and a growing list of alleged violations of international law and socio-economic hardship.

But Ukraine is struggling in its efforts to hold Russia accountable – either as a state or through individual criminal responsibility - as it cannot unilaterally ask any international court to give an overall judgment on the conflict.

So it focuses on narrower issues, referring them to authorised adjudication and arbitration platforms such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ), European Court of Human Rights, UNCLOS arbitration, and the International Criminal Court (ICC). These options are limited, but still worth taking - and their relevance is proving to be far wider than the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

Policy of cultural eradication

In 2017, Ukraine initiated proceedings against Russia at the ICJ on the basis of two international treaties: the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), with regard to Crimea; and the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (ICSFT), with regard to Donbas.

Under the CERD, Ukraine alleges Russia has carried out a policy of cultural eradication of ethnic Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars in Crimea, including enforced disappearances, no education in the Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar languages, and the ban of the Mejlis, the main representative body of the Crimean Tatars.

Under the ICSFT, Ukraine alleges Russia has supported terrorism by providing funds, weapons and training to illegal armed groups in eastern Ukraine. In particular Ukraine alleges Russian state responsibility - through its proxies - for downing the infamous MH17 flight.

Both these treaties are binding upon Ukraine and Russia and entitle an individual state party to refer a dispute concerning them to the ICJ, but certain procedural pre-conditions must first be exhausted. These include a failed attempt to settle a dispute either through negotiations or the CERD Committee (for the CERD) or unsuccessful negotiations and arbitration (for the ICSFT).

Russia challenged Ukraine’s compliance with the pre-conditions, but the ICJ disagreed with Russia’s submission that Ukraine had to resort both to negotiations and to the CERD Committee. For the first time, the court clarified these procedures under the CERD were two means to reach the same aim, and therefore alternative and not cumulative.

Requiring states to avail of both procedures before going to the ICJ would undermine the very purpose of the CERD to eliminate racial discrimination promptly, and ensure the availability of effective domestic protection and remedies.

The relevance of this clarification transcends the Ukraine-Russia dispute. With the rise of discriminatory practices, from populist hate-filled rhetoric endangering vulnerable communities to large-scale persecution such as that of the Rohingyas, the UN’s principal judicial body is sending a clear larger message to the world: such practices are unacceptable and must be dealt with expeditiously and efficiently. If states fail to do so, there are now fewer procedural impediments to do it internationally.

The ICJ also confirmed Ukraine had complied with both procedural preconditions under the ICSFT and that it would give judgement on the alleged failure of Russia to take measures to prevent the financing of terrorism. The outcome of this will be of great importance to the international community, given the general lack of international jurisprudence on issues of terrorism.

The court’s interpretation of knowledge and intent in terrorism financing, as well as clarification of the term ‘funds’, is particularly relevant both for the Ukraine-Russia case and for international law.

As the final judgement may take several years, the ICJ granted some provisional measures requested by Ukraine in April 2017. The court obliged Russia to ensure the availability of education in Ukrainian and enable the functioning of the Crimean Tatar representative institutions, including the Mejlis.

When Russia contested Ukraine’s references to the alleged Stalin-ordered deportation of the Crimean Tatars and the rule of law in the Soviet Union being hypocritical, by arguing that history did not matter, the court disagreed.

In fact, Judge James Crawford emphasised the relevance of the ‘historical persecution’ of Crimean Tatars and the role of Mejlis in advancing and protecting their rights in Crimea ‘at the time of disruption and change’.

These conclusions are important reminders that the historical inheritance of injustices inflicted on vulnerable groups should be taken into account when nations address their imperial legacies.

The court’s provisional measures and Judge Crawford’s position are particularly relevant in light of Russia’s policy of the total - territorial, historical, cultural – ‘russification’ of Crimea, as they highlight the role of the historical background for assessing the alleged discriminatory and prosecutorial policy of Russia’s occupying authorities against the Crimean Tatars.

The ICJ’s judgement on the merits of this as well as other human rights, and terrorism issues of Crimea and Donbas will be an important consideration for the international community in its view of the Russia-Ukraine armed conflict and the sanctions policy against Russia.

The development of this case also has a mutually catalysing impact on Ukraine’s efforts to establish those individually criminally responsible for atrocities in Crimea and Donbas, through domestic proceedings and through the International Criminal Court.

Ukraine’s attempts to seek individual criminal responsibility for gross abuses in Donbas and Crimea at the International Criminal Court (ICC) are assessed in part two of this series, coming soon.

Soon after assuming power in 1994, President Aliaksandr Lukashenka turned his back on democratic norms and overpowered the Belarusian political elite. However, the influence of the governing elite in Belarus is growing again. It seems likely that the current governing class could rule the country after Lukashenka leaves. It is thus important to study Belarusian elites not only to understand the current regime, but also to better forecast and navigate the political system that will one day replace it. 

This study group aims to disentangle how the Belarusian political system works, outline the types of individuals that make up the Belarusian ruling elite, assess the interaction of the elite and institutions with the West, and suggest changes that Western political actors might make to their approach to the Belarusian ruling class.

COVID-19 has put a serious strain on healthcare and economic systems around the world. This virtual roundtable will explore its impact on Russia, Ukraine, Georgia and Kazakhstan. Through a comparative examination of government and society responses, this event will show how COVID-19 has laid bare the region’s broader social, economic and political challenges.

Since the World Health Organisation (WHO) declared COVID-19 a pandemic, few countries have chosen to ignore social distancing recommendations. But, even among those states which have, the Belarusian official response to its epidemic remains unique.

President Aliaksandr Lukashenka’s statements that vodka, sauna and tractors are protecting Belarusians from coronavirus attracted amused attention in international media. Lukashenka also described other societies’ response to COVID-19 as ‘a massive psychosis’.

Although Lukashenka is notorious for his awkward style of public communication, the fact that Belarus is refusing to impose comprehensive confinement measures is of concern. Belarusians continue to work, play football and socialise.

Lukashenka, himself playing ice hockey in front of state cameras, claims it is the best way to stay healthy. Belarusian authorities clearly appear to be in denial – and this could have dire humanitarian consequences.

From denial to half measures

Belarus actually has one of the largest numbers of hospital beds in the world per 1,000 of the population. But in the absence of quarantine measures its health system, already crippled by corruption and embezzlement, is likely to be overwhelmed.

Patients being treated for pneumonia in hospitals have suggested medical staff are uninformed and inadequately equipped. It is claimed doctors are not reporting COVID-19 as the suspected cause of death, either through a lack of testing or for fear of reprisals.

Observers believe the real mortality rate is already well above official figures (40 deaths as of 16 April). Based on an Imperial College London model, between 15,000 and 32,000 people could die under the current mild confinement regime – and such a high death toll would hugely impact the country’s political stability. Citing personal data protection, the Ministry of Health has imposed a total news blackout; the only cluster officially acknowledged so far is the city of Vitsebsk.

Although specific Belarusian cities and some individuals started changing their approach – by extending school vacations or cancelling weddings – such measures remain half-hearted.

Clearly a major reason for such an apparently irresponsible reaction is that Belarus cannot afford a massive lockdown that would freeze its already underdeveloped economy and drive it deeper into recession. Unlike many other nations, Belarus lacks budgetary resources for a sizable stimulus package. But a delayed response might backfire on the economy.

Economic recession has been forecast to amount to at least 10% of GDP. For Lukashenka, who openly challenged conventional wisdom regarding the need for quarantine and isolation, such an economic downturn would harm his confidence rating in the eyes of Belarusian voters, mindful of the state’s mismanagement of the crisis. And it could create doubt within the ruling elite itself, with Lukashenka seeking re-election for a sixth mandate in late August.

Against this backdrop, a radicalization of the opposition-minded part of society is also to be expected, with greater reliance on social networks in the face of official secrecy and disinformation. The expected response of the regime is then likely to be pre-emptive repression. Evidence is emerging that law enforcement agencies have already stepped up judicial and paralegal harassment of dissenters, notably independent journalists and bloggers.

Russia’s initial reluctance to address the coronavirus crisis may also have influenced Belarus. Lukashenka and his administration often react to public health challenges by the Soviet rulebook, reminiscent of the Soviet authorities’ mismanagement of the Chernobyl disaster in 1986.

Russia has unilaterally closed its borders with Belarus and, as bilateral relations continue to deteriorate, this casts further doubt on the viability of the Union State of Belarus and Russia. Pro-Russian media forecast Moscow will be unwilling to alleviate the expected socio-economic crisis, as it continues to reject Minsk’s demands regarding subsidised oil deliveries. Yet the Kremlin might use the crisis as an opportunity to resume its integrationist pressure on Belarus.

China, with which Belarus engaged in a seemingly privileged strategic partnership in the 2010s, was actually the first country to dispatch humanitarian aid to beef up Belarusian capacity to fight the virus.

But Minsk should not expect Beijing to rescue its economy and, unless it commits to more internal reforms, Belarus is not likely to receive much from the EU either. The regime has already applied to the IMF for emergency financial support, but conditions are attached and, even if successful, the funds would amount to no more than $900m.

The government’s decision to take only half measures so far is rooted in the hope COVID-19 is not as bad as foreign experts fear. But, unless the leadership acknowledges the public health crisis and mitigates its economic impact, COVID-19 will accelerate Belarus’s slide back into international self-isolation. If combined with a humanitarian crisis, this will put the Belarusian regime under considerable stress.

This crisis does risk a new ‘Chernobyl moment’ for the authorities, but the population could react more vocally this time. As volunteers self-organise to fight the epidemic, it might become more difficult for the authorities to say that it is efficient in running the country. But the bottom line is Belarus desperately needs money. Whoever steps up to support Belarus financially will also be able to heavily influence its politics.

The armed conflict in Donbas has now entered its seventh year. President Zelenskyy, who came to power in May 2019, promised to end the war with Russia and bring peace to Ukraine.

Since assuming office, Zelenskyy has managed to revive the Normandy Format talks, complete military disengagement at three points along the line of contact and negotiate the release of over a hundred Ukrainians held as prisoners of war in Russia. However, ceasefire violations continue to occur frequently.

Looking at the origins of the armed conflict in Donbas and the region’s economic role in Ukraine’s economy, this event discusses the prospects for conflict resolution. Do the recent events signify an opportunity for peace? Does Zelenskyy have a viable plan for re-integrating Donbas or will the region be cut off from mainland Ukraine for the foreseeable future?

The speakers assess the strategy and track record of the Ukrainian government and its Western allies in bringing parts of the occupied Donbas under Kyiv’s control. They also review possible policy implications of the COVID-19 pandemic for the conflict.

This event is organized by Chatham House and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).

Keynote speaker:

• Lindene Patton, Climate Product Officer, Zurich Financial Services

Other speaker highlights:

• Alexis Livanos, Northrop Grumman
• Sir David King, University of Oxford
• Barend Van Bergen, KPMG
• Mike Keebaugh,Raytheon
• Peter Stott, UK Met Office
• Trevor Maynard, Lloyd's
• Shree Khare, Risk Management Solutions
• Giovanni Rum, Group on Earth Observations
• Greg Withee, US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
• Man Cheung, Marsh Ltd

In the aftermath of the recent Rio+20 conference, James Bacchus will discuss the potential for establishing new trade, investment and other international rules and arrangements to promote sustainable growth. In particular, he will explore the interconnections and the international arrangements relating to food, energy, water, climate and other issues affecting global sustainable development.

Attendance is strictly by invitation only. To enable as open a debate as possible, this event will be held under the Chatham House Rule.

About Director's Breakfast Briefings.

Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) are replacements for many of the chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs) currently being phased out under the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. Unlike those ozone-depleting substances (ODS), HFCs do not destroy the ozone layer, but they are very powerful greenhouse gases (GHGs) – up to thousands of times more damaging to the climate than carbon dioxide – and their use is currently growing faster than any other category of GHGs. Projections show HFC use increasing as much as 30-fold by 2050, adding up to 0.1°C of global average temperature rise by mid-century, and increasing up to five-fold, to 0.5°C, by 2100. This clearly makes it more difficult to limit the rise in global temperature to the internationally agreed ceiling of 2°C – and thereby avoid dangerous climate change – by the end of the 21st century.

As GHGs, HFCs fall under the purview of the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and are explicitly listed under the UNFCCC’s 1997 Kyoto Protocol, which controls emissions of HFCs and other GHGs. They are not, however, subject to any specific measures under the climate agreements, and this is unlikely to change in the near future. Accordingly, the last five years have seen proposals to amend the Montreal Protocol to phase down the production and consumption of HFCs.

Such a step would have a number of advantages. Since substitutes already exist for almost all uses of HFCs, the consumption and production phase-out model of the Montreal Protocol is better suited to controlling HFCs than the emissions limits controls of the climate regime; and the individuals and organizations involved in implementing the Montreal Protocol have accumulated substantial experience and expertise in dealing with precisely those industrial sectors in which HFCs are used, including refrigeration and air-conditioning, foams, solvents and aerosols.

This paper, which draws on the discussions at a workshop held at Chatham House in April 2014, outlines the main issues around the question of how best to craft a fair and effective global response to the growth in HFC use. A number of key issues are central to the debate: the principle of equity between developed and developing countries; the availability of alternatives to HFCs; the need for financial support for developing countries; the legal relationship between the climate and ozone regimes; and, underlying all these, the need for political will to resolve these challenges.

The European Union has reached agreement on its 2030 climate and energy package in preparation for the next major international climate summit in Paris in December 2015. In the agreement member states have signed up to reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by at least 40% by 2030 – compared to 1990 levels. Currently emissions are approximately 20% below 1990 levels and so the 2030 target represents a continuation of current decarbonization trends, but it is below the rate of reductions required to meet the longer term objective of cutting emission by 80-95% by 2050.

However, the overall 40% reduction will still drive structural changes in Europe’s economy and the energy sector. This could and should be seen as an opportunity for the EU to become a world leader in the innovation of both the new technologies and systems, such as electricity storage, dynamic demand responses and the deployment of electric vehicles, all of which are experiencing a rapid increase in the size of their global markets.

But there are some concerns. The climate and energy package has put forward a collective target to double the current level of renewables so that it will provide at least 27% of energy by 2030. However, the target is binding on the EU as a whole but not on individual member states, which creates uncertainty and is further complicated by a lack of clarity on the enforcement mechanism, which remains vague. To avoid loss of investor and industrial confidence a transparent process needs to be rapidly developed that ensures compliance. 

The EU has also failed to give energy efficiency the priority it deserves, downgrading it to an indicative target (i.e. one that is aspirational only) of a 27% reduction in energy use from business as usual. However, this is equivalent to, at most, a 19% reduction from Europe's pre-recession trajectory. The weaker energy efficiency and renewable energy elements of the package reflects the resistance of a relatively small number of countries to further EU-wide legal commitments, either because they prefer market inducement or due to their reluctance to reform their energy sectors. The package also makes clear that the a reformed Emissions Trading Scheme will be the main instrument to achieve the GHG reduction target and proposes to accelerate the reduction of the cap on maximum permitted emissions. However, this would only kick in after 2021, meaning the scheme will remain relatively ineffective for at least another five years. 

The crisis in Ukraine and the potential implications for security of supply once again highlights the importance of both domestic energy production and common European approaches to energy suppliers. Every 1% of energy saved across the EU reduces gas imports by 2.6%, and a stronger target would do more to reduce dependence on Russian gas imports. The EU’s failure to adopt a more far reaching and binding target on energy efficiency is a missed opportunity given that it is one  of the only approaches that delivers on the three pillars on energy policy, namely environmental protection, competitiveness and security of supply, simultaneously.

It is important to note the progress that the EU has made in both meeting its climate targets over the last decade and the impact that this has had on its other energy policy objectives. Currently, the EU’s 2020 target for reducing GHG emissions by 20% has or is very close to being met, in part due to the economic downturn, but also due to efficiency, renewable energy and changing industrial patterns and technologies. Furthermore, the use of renewable energy is now estimated to save around €30 billion per year in imported energy, improving balance of payments and improving security of supply. Likewise improvements in energy efficiency have been shown since the turn of the century to have contributed to a 1% annual reduction in energy consumption in the EU.

But the EU is not alone in preparing national carbon reduction targets for the UNFCCC conference in Paris 2015. Both China and the US, the world’s first and second largest emitters, are preparing their own emission reduction plans. China announced in September that it would put forward a new target for the peaking of its carbon dioxide emissions as early as possible. It is suggested that this might be as early as in 2025, with the potential for peak coal use coming even earlier in 2020. The US has proposed to set limits on the emissions from new coal-fired power stations and a 30% reduction in US power sector emissions by 2030 (relative to their 2005 baseline), and President Obama is expected to go further with new climate measures next year.

In the year ahead all countries that are party to the UNFCCC are expected to put on the table their national carbon abatement plans for 2030.  Some will be conditional upon further international assistance and commitments. The package agreed by Europe has scope to respond to increased efforts by other countries. This could include increasing the EU’s own domestic target (currently framed as ‘at least 40%’) or through international offsets and climate finance. How the EU responds to other countries efforts will be a test of its global leadership on climate issues.

To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback 

Following the conclusion of the Paris climate negotiations, this expert roundtable will examine the critical elements of the final agreement and what this means for the future of energy and climate policy in key countries.

The discussion will examine what the agreement means for keeping global average temperatures below two degrees Celsius and assess whether ambition will be ratcheted over time. It will also look at the primary implications of the outcome for key regions and countries such as the EU, United States, China and India. Finally, the session will also consider the next steps in terms of implementing the agreement. 

Attendance at this event is by invitation only. 

Summary

• The Paris Agreement, reached at COP21, was a triumph of diplomacy. The deal can be characterized as: flexible, combining a ‘hard’ legal shell and a ‘soft’ enforcement mechanism; inclusive, as it was adopted by all 196 parties to the UNFCCC and is therefore the first truly global climate deal; messy, as the bottom-up process of creating nationally determined contributions means the system is unstandardized; non-additive, as the contributions do not currently deliver the agreement’s stated long-term goal of keeping the rise in global average temperature to ‘well below 2˚C’; and dynamic, as the deal establishes a ratchet mechanism that requires more ambitious contributions every five years.
• The next five years are critical for keeping the below 2˚C goal within reach. A ‘facilitative dialogue’ starting in 2018 will give states the opportunity to revisit their contributions in advance of the agreement entering into force in 2020. International forums, such as the G7 and G20, can play a crucial role in kickstarting these efforts.
• The ‘coalitions of the willing’ and clubs that were launched under the Lima-Paris Action Agenda provide an innovative space for state and non-state actors to unlock transformational change. However, it is important that these groups set specific and measurable targets to ensure effective delivery of objectives.
• The post-Paris regime implies a significant role for civil society organizations. However, in many countries the ‘safe operating space’ both for these organizations and for the media is shrinking. Expanding the capacity of civil society and the media in areas such as communications, litigation, project implementation and technical expertise will be important if they are to support the regime effectively.

On 7 November, as governments reconvened in Marrakech for the first major round of climate talks since the momentous Paris summit, they had the wind in their sails. The sense of momentum that had built in the run-up to Paris had continued, with recent global deals to phase out HFCs (potent greenhouse gases used in refrigeration and air conditioning) and tackle emissions from aviation. However, by the morning of 9 November the mood changed to one of unease and trepidation, as news of Donald Trump’s US election victory sunk in. Only days after entering into force, the Paris Agreement was faced with the possibility of the world’s second largest emitter, and a key dealmaker and architect of the regime, withdrawing.

Although details of Trump’s positions on climate and energy policy are scarce, his statements on the campaign trail appear to signal a marked departure from the Obama administration’s approach. The president-elect has said he would ‘cancel’ the Paris Agreement and ‘rescind’ the Climate Action Plan which underpins US action to reduce emissions. On the basis of these statements, it is hard to view the election result as anything other than a major setback for the climate. The new international climate regime now faces a very early and very big test.

Paris’s first test

The response from governments has been swift. Statement after statement emphasized a clear and consistent message: countries remain committed to the Paris Agreement and to delivering their emissions reductions. While there is hope that the US will remain a part, the message was that the process will continue regardless. Importantly, there have as yet been no indications that recusant parties to the agreement might use a US withdrawal as cover to do the same.

This display of unity is arguably Marrakech’s defining success. Progress in talks to flesh out the so-called ‘rulebook’ for how the Paris Agreement will operate come 2020 was modest in some areas and disappointing in others; on finance, the perennial tensions between developed and developing countries were as clear as ever. But when the time came to uphold the nascent regime in the face of a threat, powerful international norms on climate action meant there were no divisions.

Two important questions

The prospect of US disengagement from the international regime, whether de jure or de facto, raises two important questions: one for the US and another for the rest of the world.

For the international community, the question is one of leadership. In the run-up to Paris, the US and China together set expectations for a global agreement, signalling their intent through a series of joint announcements that set the bar for ambition and carried other countries with them. Progressive countries hoped this partnership would re-emerge in 2018, when talks begin on closing the gap between national emission reduction plans and what is needed to achieve the Paris goal of containing warming ‘well below’ 2°C. A wholesale step change in ambition is required if the 2°C goal is to remain within reach, requiring intense climate diplomacy of the kind witnessed before Paris. Will China be prepared to unilaterally set the pace and raise ambition first? Will a new partner come forward, or new coalition emerge, to fill the vacuum left by the US and work alongside China to provide leadership?

The US faces a question of national interest. With the rest of the world apparently united on climate change, what costs might the US incur were it to withdraw from the global regime? To fly in the face of strong international norms on climate action would certainly erode American soft power and concede global status to China, which continues to signal its ambition to decarbonize. And with the US expected to take a more protectionist approach to trade, it is possible that other countries, frustrated at US free-riding on the emissions reductions of others, might impose tariffs on American imports to adjust for the lower emissions costs of US exporters. Nor will American prosperity be served by the US economy remaining shackled to fossil fuels while the rest of the world’s economy transitions away from them. All countries stand to lose if the US backslides on climate change, most of all the US.

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Chatham House’s recent paper, Woody Biomass for Power and Heat: Impacts on the Global Climate, highlights how the use of wood for electricity generation and heat in modern (non-traditional) technologies has grown rapidly in recent years, and has the potential to continue to do so. EU member states’ national targets for renewable energy generation agreed in 2009 have helped ensure that the EU is now the world’s largest producer and consumer of wood for energy. And although other member states use wood more extensively for heat, the UK is the EU’s largest user for electricity generation, mostly sourced from the US and Canada.

Wood for energy often has a positive image: a natural product of growing forests. The biomass energy industry, which has grown rapidly on the back of government subsidies, likes to contrast it with dirty coal or oil. They point to the government’s sustainability criteria, which notionally guarantee a reduction of at least 60 per cent in greenhouse gas emissions compared to the fossil fuels the biomass replaces.

The problem with this happy picture, however, is that in fact biomass, when burnt, emits more carbon per unit of energy than most fossil fuels. The exact amount varies with the type of biomass and the type and age of the power plant, but figures from the Drax power station, Europe’s largest consumer of wood pellets, show that in 2013 it emitted about 13 per cent more carbon dioxide per unit of energy generated from biomass than from coal.

How is this consistent with meeting the government’s requirement for a 60 per cent reduction in emissions? Only by completely ignoring the carbon emitted when the wood is burnt; the sustainability criteria measure only supply-chain emissions from harvesting, processing and transporting the wood. (Direct land-use change – for example, clearance of the forest for agriculture or urban development – also falls outside the criteria, but biomass for energy generally originates from existing forests.)

This treatment of combustion emissions as zero – and thus, the awarding to wood the same kind of financial and regulatory support as other renewables such as solar PV and wind – is justified on the basis that the carbon contained in woody biomass is part of the natural forest cycle. The carbon released during combustion was absorbed by forest growth in the past and will be reabsorbed by forest growth in the future; in contrast, fossil fuels originate outside this cycle and their combustion adds carbon to the atmosphere.

But this argument rests on a basic fallacy. Carbon is carbon, wherever it comes from, and if you burn wood for energy, you increase carbon dioxide concentrations in the atmosphere (by more than if you had used fossil fuels), and thereby contribute to climate change. The fact that the carbon emitted was absorbed by growing trees in the past is simply irrelevant. After all, when it’s harvested you don’t have to burn it; you could use it for construction or furniture or window frames or a host of other uses, fixing the carbon in wood products rather than emitting it to the atmosphere.

Climate impacts

It is true that continued forest growth will absorb carbon in the future, but the process is a long one, taking decades or even centuries if whole trees are harvested and burnt. Replacing large mature trees, with plentiful leaf cover absorbing large volumes of carbon dioxide, with small young ones mean that the rate of carbon uptake will be far lower for years. On top of that, the impact of harvesting itself releases soil carbon into the atmosphere, further accelerating climate change.

The impact on the climate of using sawmill or forest residues for energy rather than whole trees is undoubtedly lower, since these tend to be wastes from other industries which harvest trees for their own purposes, and do not imply any additional harvesting. Sawmill wastes which, if left to themselves, would rot and release their stored carbon into the atmosphere in a matter of months or years, are in many ways the ideal feedstock; it makes sense to use them for energy rather than leave them to decay. However, mill residues are already intensively used and there seems little room for expansion; a survey in the US in 2011 found that over 99 per cent of mill residues were already used, mainly for energy and wood products such as particleboard.

Forest residues are the parts of harvested trees that are left in the forest after log products have been removed, including stumps, tops and small branches, and pieces too short or defective to be used; these can amount to as much as 40–60 per cent of the total tree volume. Their impact on the climate if used for energy varies significantly. While the smallest pieces tend to rot and release their stored carbon into the atmosphere quite quickly, if left in the forest, they are generally not suitable for use for energy, as they contain too much dirt and ash to be burnt cleanly. Larger pieces are more suitable but take much longer to decay; burning them for energy instead of leaving them in the forest thereby increases carbon concentrations in the atmosphere for years or decades. And on top of that, a portion of the carbon and other substances contained in the residues is transferred to the soil as they decay; their removal from the forest for energy may reduce both soil carbon and the levels of the nutrients trees need to grow, again with negative impacts on the climate.

The biomass industry generally likes to claim that it uses mainly mill and forest residues, though on closer inspection the categories they report often contain whole trees, perhaps classified as ‘unmerchantable’ or similar. (This is not helped by the fact the categories used by Ofgem, for example, to whom UK biomass users have to report, are confusing and potentially overlapping.) Several independent studies, however, have concluded that the use of mill and forest residues is in reality substantially lower; pellet plants in the US – the UK’s main source of supply – in fact source about 75 per cent whole trees.

Setting aside these arguments about feedstock, however, can it be safely assumed that future forest growth allows us to treat biomass as carbon-neutral? If the trees would have grown anyway, even in the absence of the biomass energy industry, it cannot be assumed that their future absorption of carbon cancels out the carbon emitted when wood is burnt. If the rate of carbon absorption in forests remains the same whether or not some of the harvested wood is burnt, then clearly, the best outcome for the climate in the short and probably medium term is not to burn it, but to use it for wood products or leave it to decay slowly in the forest. This is not an academic argument: the current global rate of emissions of greenhouse gases is incompatible with the aims of the Paris Agreement and may risk triggering irreversible tipping points in the Earth’s climate system. We need to reduce carbon emissions now, not in several decades’ or centuries’ time.

The biomass industry likes to point to the expansion of US forests in recent decades to show that forests overall have been absorbing more carbon even while increasing volumes are burnt for energy – sometimes implying that this forest growth has been encouraged by the demand for energy. But in fact US forest expansion started in the 1950s, decades before European subsidies stimulated the expansion of the modern biomass industry. And there is little evidence of recent overall forest growth in the US southeast, the location of almost all the pellet plants supplying European demand. In any case, the point is not whether US (or European) forests are expanding, but whether they would have grown at a different rate if part of their wood had not been burnt for energy. If they would have grown at the same rate, or faster, in the absence of biomass energy use then it cannot be assumed that using wood for biomass is good for forests, or the climate.

Redirecting public money

There is no question that renewable energy policy and forest policy both have a critical role to play in the mitigation of climate change. But governments have limited resources to deploy in their support, which is why the Chatham House paper questions whether it is really a good use of public money to subsidise activities which release stored forest carbon into the atmosphere, thereby increasing carbon emissions and accelerating climate change.

I argue instead that support should be limited to those feedstocks which genuinely reduce carbon emissions over the short term – i.e. mill residues and post-consumer wood waste. This would not only have a positive direct impact on the climate but would also release more resources for genuine zero-carbon technologies, such as solar, wind or tidal – and perhaps also for programmes encouraging afforestation and the more extensive use of wood in buildings and products. Use it, don’t burn it.

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