How Influential Is China in Zimbabwe? Expert comment sysadmin 20 November 2017

A trip to Beijing by Zimbabwe’s military chief was a ‘normal military exchange’, China’s foreign ministry said after the army seized power in Harare. Alex Vines examines the extent of China’s influence in Zimbabwe.

The news that General Constantino Chiwenga had visited China only a few days before the military takeover in Zimbabwe was a coincidence that did not go unnoticed. There was also speculation after China said it was closely watching developments, but stopped short of condemning President Robert Mugabe’s apparent removal from power.

China is Zimbabwe’s fourth-largest trading partner and its largest source of investment - with stakes worth many billions of pounds in everything from agriculture to construction. Zimbabwe is the dependent partner - with China providing the largest market for its exports and much needed support to its fragile economy.

China’s relations with Zimbabwe are deep, starting during the Rhodesian Bush War. Robert Mugabe failed in 1979 to get Soviet backing, so turned to China, which provided his guerrilla fighters with weapons and training. Both countries formally established diplomatic relations at Zimbabwean independence in 1980 and Mugabe visited Beijing as prime minister the following year. He has been a regular visitor since.

For years, Zimbabwe’s officials have tried to play off China against the West, advocating the country’s ‘Look East’ strategy, particularly following the introduction of EU sanctions in 2002. Indeed, a decade ago, Mugabe told a packed rally at the Chinese-built national sports stadium in Harare: ‘We have turned east, where the sun rises, and given our back to the west, where the sun sets.’

China’s military engagement also deepened during Zimbabwe’s ‘Look East’ era. Significant purchases were made, including Hongdu JL-8 jet aircraft, JF-17 Thunder fighter aircraft, vehicles, radar and weapons. However, following a controversy about a shipment of arms in 2008, Beijing decided to list Zimbabwe for ‘limited level’ military trading.

Despite Zimbabwe’s efforts, the ‘Look East’ strategy did not bring the investment flood hoped for and a decade later, in August 2015, Mugabe openly asked for Western re-engagement in his ‘state of the nation’ address.

Now, the reality is that increasingly Chinese and Western interests - particularly those of the UK - have become aligned. Not far from each other in the outer suburbs of Harare, two of the biggest embassies in Zimbabwe are the British and the Chinese. As other embassies scaled down or closed, Beijing’s expanded. Whereas British diplomats were well connected with business, civil society and opposition figures, the Chinese invested in ‘technical support’ of the party of government Zanu-PF, including state security and the presidency. When it came to Zanu-PF politics and factionalism, Chinese diplomats were well connected and insightful and, like their Western colleagues, concerned about stability, a better investment climate and adherence to the rule of law.

President Xi Jinping visited Zimbabwe in 2015 and President Mugabe visited Beijing in January 2017. In public, the Chinese leader said his country is willing to encourage capable companies to invest in Zimbabwe. But in private, the message was that there would be no more loans until Zimbabwe stabilized its economy.

In 2016 trade between the two countries amounted to $1.1 billion, with China the biggest buyer of Zimbabwean tobacco and also importing cotton and various minerals. In return Zimbabwe imported electronics, clothing and other finished products. Chinese state construction firms have also been active, building infrastructure including Zimbabwe’s $100 million National Defence College. And last year China agreed to finance a new 650-seat parliament in Harare.

But Chinese diplomats and many businesses are waiting for better days in Zimbabwe. Some companies have found the investment climate challenging - being burned on diamonds, for example - and have looked for alternative markets. A couple of weeks ago I was in China, attending a meeting on China-Africa relations and Zimbabwe was not mentioned once. Unlike Ethiopia, Sudan, or Angola that are strategic partners, or big markets like Nigeria, Kenya and South Africa, Zimbabwe is far from being Beijing’s new priority.

So, Beijing’s interest is in a better investment climate in Zimbabwe. A clear transitional arrangement resulting in elections for a legitimate government in Harare is as much in Beijing’s interest as London’s.

The ‘Look East’ and the ‘Re-engagement with the West’ strategies have not brought about the confidence and investment that Zimbabwe needs. What Zimbabwe requires is stable and accountable government - then investors from Asia, America and Europe will seriously consider that Zimbabwe has an investment future. This was the message that Mugabe received in Beijing in January. And the one which Zimbabwe’s military chief also was given last week.

This article was originally published by BBC News.

Mugabe’s Departure Ushers in a Heady New Era for Zimbabwe Expert comment sysadmin 23 November 2017

The country is experiencing an almost unprecedented convergence, with traditional political, economic and social fault lines bridged as Zimbabweans make common cause for change.

The ecstatic scenes said it all – Zimbabweans around the world are celebrating the resignation of Robert Mugabe as president. In January 1980, hundreds of thousands of Zimbabweans thronged Zimbabwe Grounds stadium in Highfields township, Harare, to welcome Mugabe back from exile. In March 1980, with reggae icon Bob Marley and Britain’s Prince Charles in attendance, thousands filled Rufaro Stadium to witness the handover from Rhodesia to the new nation of Zimbabwe. Thirty-seven years later, the largest crowds Harare has ever witnessed flooded the streets once again; not to welcome Mugabe in, but to see him out. One simple, taut phrase summed up the day’s events: ‘This is our second independence day.’

How did it come to this?

History has been put on fast-forward, and left Zimbabwe – and the world – shaken. Just two weeks ago, it seemed to be the height of folly to think that Mugabe would leave office on any but his own terms. Emmerson Mnangagwa had been sacked as vice president, and his followers had been purged. Grace Mugabe, with ringing endorsements from the women’s and youth leagues, looked set to be elevated to the vice presidency at the ZANU-PF congress in less than a month’s time.

Mugabe was expected to stay until the 2018 elections, after which he would hand over the presidency to his wife. It was the prospect of Grace Mugabe becoming Zimbabwe’s next president which brought in the military. Aware that they had three weeks or less to prevent a dynastic succession and a looming purge of the military itself, Zimbabwe’s military chose, not the audacity of hope, but the hope of audacity, and launched Operation Restore Legacy to stop the rot.

What has happened in Zimbabwe is not a people’s revolution in the traditional sense. The Bourbons in France, the Romanov dynasty in Russia, the Shah of Iran, and the autocrats of north Africa’s Arab Spring were all felled by continuous street protests which ultimately received the support of the military.

In Zimbabwe it has been the military who have been the drivers of revolutionary change. What has happened is that an internal party-factional power struggle has inadvertently led to a military-guided popular revolution and the ousting of the Mugabes. Zimbabwe’s military, often seen as the guardians of the state, became instead the guardians of the people. They are seen, for now at least, as liberators, and national heroes. This has been a very Zimbabwean revolution.

So what next?

These are heady days. Zimbabwe is experiencing an almost unprecedented national convergence, with traditional political, economic and social fault lines bridged as Zimbabweans make common cause for change. It is not quite a ‘Zimbabwe Spring’, but it is perhaps a ‘Zimbabwe Sunrise’.

Parliament, which on Tuesday had met to impeach Robert Mugabe, is now installing, through constitutional procedures, Emmerson Mnangagwa as president, who will be given the mandate to form an interim government. Mnangagwa will be further ratified at the ZANU-PF Congress in December where he will be named and acclaimed as ZANU-PF’s candidate for the next general elections, which constitutionally are due by mid-2018 (although it is unclear whether this will indeed be the case).

Mnangagwa has a full in-tray. He needs to form a government quickly and has to balance the need for inclusivity and consultation, with the undoubted pressure to reward his followers. With Zimbabwe’s economy nearing paralysis, Zimbabwe’s new president will be under pressure to deliver. Although many are nervous about his history as Mugabe’s ally and his reputation for toughness, Mnangagwa is also an astute political survivor, and has been pro-business and supportive of Zimbabwe’s ongoing re-engagement with the global community.

Zimbabwe has become a cashless society not by design, but by default; with formal unemployment at 80 per cent and with a largely informalized economy in which much of Zimbabwe’s citizenry have been reduced to penury and classic short-termism, there is plenty for Zimbabwe’s next president to think about. Activists wonder whether he will try to introduce systemic change, or merely go through the motions. He may well face a binary choice between government or governance.

And yet there are also positives. Zimbabwe’s institutions have proven to be resilient, and there is still a reservoir of dedicated and competent professionals in both public and private sectors. Although still laggardly, Zimbabwe had begun to progress in ‘ease of doing business’ indices. There is a large diaspora who have continued to engage with Zimbabwe; and Zimbabwe’s recent ‘Look East’ and de facto ‘Look West’ re-engagement policies can be built upon.

Many are urging caution and saying that Zimbabwe needs a second, truly democratic revolution. Perhaps. But right now, Mnangagwa should be given a chance. Farai, a friend of mine in Harare, said this: ‘Yes we know this euphoria may be short-lived. But even if it turns out that we were only happy for a day, let’s make it a brilliant day. Rega tifare nhasi (Let us be happy today).’

A version of this article was first published by the Guardian.

Rebuilding Zimbabwe's Economy: Emmerson Mnangagwa’s Immediate Priorities Expert comment sysadmin 13 December 2017

Zimbabwe cannot expect to rebuild in the same economic model that brought previous prosperity.

Returning to Harare as Zimbabwe’s president-designate Emmerson Mnangagwa declared, ‘We want to grow our economy, we want peace, we want jobs, jobs, jobs.’

Robert Mugabe leaves a legacy of an independent Zimbabwe in a deep economic crisis. Much remains uncertain as to what a new government in Zimbabwe will look like, and there is sure to be continuity as well as considerable change.

What is clear is that a new administration under Mnangagwa will need to turn the economy around to garner support and legitimacy from the Zimbabwean people. Zimbabwe’s economic output halved over the period 1997–2008, and it has not recovered. With more than 80 per cent of Zimbabweans in the informal economy, and with social and economic resilience undermined by previous crises and decades of mismanagement, the stakes for the new leader are very high.

Reform will be difficult particularly because politically connected elites have acquired businesses through uncompetitive means. They will be reluctant to see significantly more competition. But they will also want an improved economic environment. And there is scope for the people of Zimbabwe to benefit from this.

An important change will be in the prioritization of economic stability. Mugabe demonstrated that he was willing to make political decisions irrespective of the economic consequences. Mnangagwa is thought to be less ideological and more of a pragmatist. For him, delivering economic recovery will be crucial to building political support.

The most pressing fiscal priority is the public wage bill. Employment costs account for over 80 per cent of government expenditure, crowding out spending on social programmes, health and education. But the fragility of the economy means that reform cannot be fast-tracked. The public wage bill accounts for over 20 per cent of GDP and is an essential driver of demand. Public sector workers are also politically influential. Another further priority is the reform of state-owned enterprises that are pressuring the fiscus.

A new administration will need to rebuild confidence. Policymakers have been operating in a low-confidence environment for a long time, but for any meaningful change to take root there has to be trust between the government, businesses and the people of Zimbabwe. Businesses and citizens will want to see a plan of action for remonetizing the economy. Zimbabwe faces an acute liquidity crisis. A shortage of US dollars and a lack of confidence in government-issued bond notes are testing resilience.

The financial system has recovered from a crisis of nonperforming loans – triggered by high debt amassed during the post-dollarization boom, and weak corporate governance. But the system remains highly fragile and swamped with government debt. Hard cash US dollar deposits fell from 49 per cent ($582 million) in 2009 to just six per cent ($269 million) in 2016. In 2015, industrial utilization stood at just 34.3 per cent of installed capacity, and it was estimated that just five per cent of the country’s businesses were viable.

The crux of the Zimbabwean economy is the linkage between agriculture and manufacturing. Commercial agriculture contributes approximately 12 per cent of the country’s GDP, and more than 60 per cent of inputs into the manufacturing sector. Tobacco in particular is a vital earner of much needed foreign exchange. Policies to support mid-scale farmers will have multiplier effects. They drive agricultural growth and generate jobs throughout the supply chain.

Zimbabwe also has world-class natural resource endowments including ferrochrome, gold, copper, iron ore, lithium, diamonds and platinum group metals. But longer investment-gestation periods and industry risk adversity will mean that payoffs from fresh investments in this sector will take longer to materialize.

Domestic finance will need to be mobilized to generate recovery, and this will need to be supported by international investment. But international investors entering the country must be cognizant of Zimbabwean’s expectations and also historical perceptions – especially around the scepticism of neoliberal economics as a result of failed structural adjustment programmes in the 1990s.

Zimbabweans have high social expectations for international investors. Educated, tech-savvy, internationally connected youth are at the core of the consumer class that investors will be targeting, to both sell products to but also to staff offices in country. But this cohort also has a greater expectation of international companies to adhere to the norms and standards that they abide by at home and not take advantage of weak governance or poor regulation to exploit citizens.

Investors in Zimbabwe must also recognize that behind the controversial Mugabe policies of land reform and indigenization – the empowerment of local citizens through shared ownership – was a popular desire for postcolonial economic transformation. This sentiment remains. Working in partnership with local entities and communicating the economic contribution made to society will be necessary to build a long-term presence in Zimbabwe, and reap the dividend of what many hope to be a new start for the country.

Fresh thinking is required from domestic policymakers and international partners. A skilled population and estimated 3-5 million-strong diaspora will bring international experience and make a considerable contribution to this process. Some of this thinking has been done. The Lima process of re-engagement with international financial institutions that was agreed at the end of 2015 has laid some of the groundwork, especially around international expectations regarding both economic and governance reform – the substance of which was analysed in a 2016 Chatham House paper. The implementation of recommendations of the well-regarded auditor-general’s report on SOE reform will also be a key prerequisite for long-term reform.

Zimbabweans are not alone in processing what has happened and how to react. Investors have long been poised to capitalize on what is perceived to be one of the continent’s best long-term prospects. A lot will remain unchanged following the transition. But significantly, for the first time in decades, there is a real opportunity to effect positive change and improve the livelihoods of millions of Zimbabweans.

This article was originally published at the Huffington Post.

Ramaphosa Has Won the Battle. But Can He Win the War? Expert comment sysadmin 21 December 2017

Cyril Ramaphosa is taking charge of South Africa’s ruling party, the ANC, at its weakest point in post-apartheid history. Expectations couldn’t be higher.

Ramaphosa ran for the leadership of the ANC on a platform of party renewal, economic recovery, and building the capacity of the state. But Jacob Zuma remains the President of South Africa and, under the constitution, can stay in office until elections in 2019. Therefore, meeting expectations on economic recovery will depend on Ramaphosa taking the presidency – and he has a number of political battles to face before that becomes reality.

To begin with, Ramaphosa and his supporters did not win a total victory at the elective conference. The presidency was only one position in the senior cadre – the co-called ‘top six’ – that was elected. This body is now split evenly between Ramaphosa and his allies, and those that supported his opponent Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma - Jacob Zuma’s preferred successor. This creates two centres of power in the ANC, limiting what Ramaphosa will be able to achieve from within the party.

Although there is significant pressure from the electorate to remove Zuma from national office, actually doing so will be difficult. Zuma’s predecessor Thabo Mbeki was removed from the national presidency before his term was up when the National Executive Committee (NEC) of the party recalled him from office following Zuma’s assumption of party leadership. But this option may not be available to Ramaphosa. The split within the ‘top six’ and new NEC will make it difficult to present an ultimatum to Zuma. His loyalists will not want a witch hunt within the party.

Corruption and elitism within the party

Much of the tension centres on questions of corruption, the dominant political issue in South Africa at the moment. In the build up to the elective conference Gwede Mantashe - now national chairperson - admitted that “The biggest challenge from where we’re sitting is the image and the reputation of the ANC. The ANC is seen as equal to corruption and looting.” Ramaphosa made anti-corruption initiatives a centrepiece of his campaign, including the establishment of a judicial commission and rapid action to investigate and prosecute the guilty.

But the split within the party may undermine the credibility of these promises. Ramaphosa’s problem is that some of the new ‘top six’ - including Deputy President David Mabuza, and Secretary General Ace Magashule – would be high on the list of those the electorate want to see investigated. Party resistance may restrict the extent to which Ramaphosa can demonstrate a comprehensive break from the past.

Corruption within the party goes far deeper than the headline cases of ‘state capture’ and expropriation. At a branch level, access to political power has become the primary means of access to economic resource. It is a process of selective patronage that differentiates between those who are ‘in’ from those who aren’t. At its broadest, this type of corruption has created a mistrust of the ANC and the new economic elite that the party has created around it – including Ramaphosa himself.

Having lost out to Mbeki in the fight to succeed Mandela despite being the favourite for the job, Ramaphosa spearheaded the ANC’s deployment of cadres in business. He has become one of the country’s richest men, and a highly sought after board member by South Africa’s largest companies across mining, telecoms, and logistics.

One of his biggest challenges will be to remove the perception of elitism as his senior position within the party and economy has given rise to mistrust from a grass roots level. The political tussle at the conference was also largely driven by a small number of the party elite being able to control large groups of delegate votes. The nature of political competition within the party is symptomatic of the ANCs electoral dominance in the early days of the nation’s democracy. But this support is now far less certain, and the party cannot afford to become complacent.

Resetting the relationship with business

Ramaphosa’s business dealings may mean he has to walk a fine line in censuring his colleagues for making money from politics. But it may also be a significant opportunity for the party to reset its relationship with the private sector. Under Mbeki, relations between the ANC and business were distant, but characterized by recognition of mutual dependence.

Under Zuma this relationship deteriorated, and the President demonstrated he was willing to make decisions to boost his political power irrespective of economic consequences. Ramaphosa could, for the first time, truly align the interests of business and government, without abandoning his transformative policy agenda.

At an ANC regional economic colloquium in Johannesburg in November Ramaphosa outlined his ten-point economic plan. It would deliver the party’s adopted mantra of ‘radical economic transformation’, but through broadly neo-liberal policies on private business development and state-owned enterprise reform to allow private capital to co-invest.

He took the ethos and principles of the Freedom Charter – the 1955 statement of core ANC principles – and applied them to a modernising economy. Talk of a ‘new deal’, productive partnerships in the mining sector, and an emphasis on job creation in manufacturing will woo investors. The rand surged upon his election.

But Ramaphosa will not be able to deliver on the economic demands of the country until he is in the office of the presidency - and Zuma still holds many of the cards. Ramaphosa can promise his followers potential power and government positions in future, but Zuma can still offer them now.

Removing Zuma will require skilful internal party politicking, and Ramaphosa will need to limit the fallout – he cannot afford to further damage the credibility of the party before it faces the electorate in 2019. He has won the battle, but the outcome of the war is far from certain.

Angola Forum 2018: 30th Anniversary of the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale 23 March 2018 — 10:00AM TO 2:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 8 March 2018 Chatham House, London

Reflections on Southern Africa’s Turning Point

23 March 2018 marks the 30th anniversary of the final assault of what became known as the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale.

The confrontation between the Angolan army, supported by Cuba and the Soviet Union, and the armed opposition UNITA, supported by the South African Defence Force, is the largest land battle to have taken place in Africa since World War Two.

The battle was a watershed in Angolan and southern African history, but its significance continues to be contested. Today, although the battlefield has a monument and museum, it remains one of the most landmine-contaminated parts of Angola and this hinders development plans for international tourism.

This event brings together veterans and experts to contribute towards developing a deeper understanding of the battle. Discussions will further focus on the significance of the wider events around the battle, its regional implications, as well as the legacy of the battlefield.

Zimbabwe Ahead of the Elections: Political and Economic Challenges 8 May 2018 — 10:00AM TO 11:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 3 May 2018 Chatham House, London

The upcoming elections in Zimbabwe will be the first since 2000 in which former president Robert Mugabe and long-time opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai are not on the ballot paper. A key electoral issue for many voters will be the economy: recent years have been marked by high unemployment rates, chronic cash shortages and mounting public debt. Although this has traditionally been a strong campaigning issue for the opposition, President Emmerson Mnangagwa has fast-tracked comprehensive economic reforms.

At this event, Nelson Chamisa, MDC Alliance presidential candidate, will discuss his efforts to build a united opposition coalition with a strong message, the steps needed to ensure a free and fair election can take place, and the role that international partners can play in Zimbabwe’s democratic process.

Zimbabwe's Elections Were Meant to Start a New Era Expert comment sysadmin 14 August 2018

Emmerson Mnangagwa has been declared president of Zimbabwe amid protests and violence but Zimbabweans are now in a post-political, economy-first mood, writes Knox Chitiyo.

Before Zimbabwe’s general election on 30 July, there was a lot of talk about there being ‘landmark change’ and ‘credibility.’ But in many ways it was déjà vu. President Emmerson Mnangagwa’s ruling ZANU-PF party won the parliamentary vote, taking a majority 144 seats out of 210. The opposition MDC Alliance, a seven-party coalition led by Nelson Chamisa, won 64 seats—an improvement on their 2013 showing of 44 seats, but still falling far short of expectations.

The presidential results were much closer. After clashes on Wednesday, the incumbent Mnangagwa was declared winner early Friday morning, taking 50.8 per cent of the vote against Chamisa’s 44.3 per cent. The 21 other independent presidential candidates polled less than 5 per cent between them.

The polls didn’t quite live up to the hype. There was much that was positive: the prelude and election day were peaceful, with a minimal military presence. Opposition candidates were able to hold nationwide rallies (including in ZANU-PF’s rural heartland) without interference—an electoral first. ZANU-PF leaders and the military called for a peaceful process. Four women candidates contested the presidential vote, another first. More than 5 million Zimbabweans registered out of an eligible voting population of 7.2 million, and there was a near record 75 per cent turnout on voting day. Zimbabwe invited official observers from 46 countries and 15 international organizations, and, for the first time since 2002, observers from the EU, the Commonwealth and the US were present.

But shortcomings included late public access to the imperfect biometric voters roll and controversies about the ballot papers. There were also misogynistic social media attacks and threats against female candidates and the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) chair Justice Priscilla Chigumba.

The three-day wait for presidential results saw a further decline in public trust in the ZEC, and the opposition’s premature announcement of a Chamisa victory only fanned the political flames.

On Wednesday, six unarmed civilians were shot dead by soldiers in Harare, with dozens more assaulted. A Joint International Observer Mission statement promptly condemned the violence and called for restraint.

The election process was a boon for democracy, but ironically the result has entrenched the two-party parliamentary system and marginalized alternative voices. Mnangagwa has been conciliatory in his post-election statements, saying that Nelson Chamisa has a ‘crucial role to play’ and calling for unity to ‘build a new Zimbabwe for all.’

But Chamisa’s MDC Alliance has refused to accept the results, calling them ‘fake’ and a ‘scandal.’ The MDC has raised genuine transparency concerns and will likely challenge the results in court, but much of this may be cosmetic—with little chance of a 2017 Kenya-style presidential re-run. There is no critical mass of opposition parties to sustain a challenge, nor is there a popular appetite for a protracted political feud.

Zimbabwe’s democracy agenda may be heading into the slow lane, and Chamisa may be pressured by his coalition partners to make a political accommodation with Mnangagwa. Nevertheless, despite setbacks, Zimbabwe’s opposition and civil society has a long history of resilience under pressure and the struggle for democracy will continue.

Mnangagwa has a full in-tray. He has to unite a fractious ZANU-PF and manage internal civil-military and generational faultlines. Beyond that, he may need a public reconciliation with Chamisa—similar to how in Kenya and Mozambique, similar incumbent-opposition quarrels were mended by public rapprochements.

But Zimbabweans are now in a post-political, economy-first mood. Resolving the cash crisis is crucial. Few Zimbabweans can withdraw more than $50 a day from banks or ATMs—and much of this is paid out in unpopular ‘bond coins.’ The formal sector has contracted to only 20 per cent of the economy, and the informal sector lacks the capacity to push an economic renewal.

Zimbabwe’s new internationalism is premised upon the 2015 Lima process economic reform pathway for debt arrears clearance. (The country has a $10 billion foreign debt.) There has been a modest increase in foreign and diaspora investment, but the big-money Chinese, Russian and other pledges are long-horizon projects. What Zimbabwe needs is a short-term economic stimulus—to support small and medium-sized businesses.

For this to happen, Mnangagwa has to stay the course on economic reform, ease of doing business and the anti-corruption agenda. The pivot from reform to transformation in Zimbabwe will require all hands on deck, including civil society, the opposition, Zimbabwe diaspora and foreign investors, in a partnership for development.

A positive global verdict on the elections could supercharge investment, but time will tell whether these polls have been a deal-maker or a deal-breaker.

Zimbabwe’s elections often split the global south and the global north, and this could be the case again. The EU will have to decide whether to continue their incremental rapprochement with Zimbabwe, or accelerate to the reciprocity-based, ‘Re-Engagement 2.0’ approach currently favoured by the UK although the US is unlikely to lift statutory sanctions anytime soon.

Zimbabwe’s possible return to the Commonwealth could also be divisive, given the broader global context of the perceived existential clash between beleaguered liberal democracy and the rise of populist—and popular—autocracies across the globe.

President Mnangagwa—along with South Africa’s President Cyril Ramaphosa, Mozambique’s Filipe Nyusi and others—belong to a pragmatic new wave of regional economic reformers nudging liberationism away from ideology. He now has an electoral mandate to lead a divided country. For sisters Chipo and Tendai, both businesswomen based in Harare who voted for Mnangagwa and Chamisa respectively, the future needs to come now. ‘There is too much talk,’ they said, ‘we live every day between hope and despair. We need cash and jobs. We are tired of being tired.’

This was originally published in TIME.

Economic Reform and Recovery in Zimbabwe 8 October 2018 — 2:30PM TO 3:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 4 October 2018 Chatham House, London

Zimbabwe Futures 2030: Policy Priorities for Economic Expansion 28 February 2019 — 9:00AM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 7 February 2019 Harare, Zimbabwe

This roundtable draws on current best practice and senior level expertise to identify policy options for long term economic expansion in Zimbabwe and pathways for inclusive development.

Participants discuss the necessary policies and business strategies to enable and support the effective implementation of the Transitional Stabilization Programme and longer term national development plans.

The discussions highlight requisite conditions for a business-driven and inclusive process towards Zimbabwe’s long-term economic recovery.

This event was held in partnership with the Zimbabwe Business Club and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung.

South Africa After the Elections: Balancing Domestic and International Policy Priorities 16 May 2019 — 1:30PM TO 2:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 9 May 2019 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

The government that emerges from the 8 May election in South Africa faces immediate domestic and international foreign policy demands. Attracting Foreign Direct Investment to stimulate job growth, accelerating anti-corruption and good governance efforts are at the forefront of the new government’s agenda.

International ambitions will be upgraded such as UN security council reform, maximizing South Africa’s G20, BRICS and IBSA membership and preparing for South Africa’s chairmanship of the African Union (AU) in 2020.

At this meeting, the speakers – Moeletsi Mbeki, deputy chairman of SAIIA and author with Nobantu Mbeki of A Manifesto for Social Change: How to Save South Africa, and Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, chief executive of SAIIA and currently co-editing a volume on A South African Foreign Policy for the 2020s which will be published in 2019 – will reflect on the election and discuss the new government’s domestic and international policy agenda. The meeting will be chaired by Ann Grant, former British High Commissioner to South Africa (2000-05) with past experience working for Oxfam, Standard Chartered Bank and Tullow Oil.

Zimbabwe Futures 2030: Sector Priorities for Policy Implementation 4 June 2019 — 9:00AM TO 5:15PM Anonymous (not verified) 21 June 2019 Harare, Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe Futures 2030: Policy Priorities for Industrialization, Agri-Business and Tourism 6 June 2019 — 9:30AM TO 1:15PM Anonymous (not verified) 21 June 2019 Bulawayo, Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe Futures 2030: A Vision for Inclusive Long-Term Economic Recovery 10 October 2019 — 10:00AM TO 12:15PM Anonymous (not verified) 5 September 2019 Harare, Zimbabwe

In its Vision 2030, the government of Zimbabwe committed itself to facilitating an open market and stable economy through strategies such as the Transitional Stabilization Programme (TSP) and new industrialization policy. The private sector is pivotal to these objectives and creating an environment conducive to inclusive and job-creating economic growth. Economic growth can only be achieved with a conducive policy environment and government support to underpin markets with provision of public goods, entrepreneurial incentives and protect contract enforcement and dispute resolution mechanisms.

This event will launch a new Chatham House Africa Programme publication on Zimbabwe’s Vision 2030. The paper is the culmination of an inclusive research process that has drawn on senior private sector expertise, civil society, academics, technocratic elements of government and other experts to develop policy recommendations that will support inclusive economic growth in Zimbabwe.

This event is held in partnership with the Zimbabwe Business Club and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS). It is supported by KAS and the Dulverton Trust.

Zimbabwe After Mugabe Expert comment sysadmin 12 September 2019

He was the founding father of modern Zimbabwe, but he leaves behind a contested legacy and a country at a crossroads.

Robert Mugabe’s death at age 95, after nearly 60 years at the helm of Zimbabwe’s liberation and post-independence politics, is a momentous occasion. Mugabe was the founding father of modern Zimbabwe, with all its stunning successes and grievous failures. As he moves into national legend, contestations over his legacy demonstrate that, in death as in life, the man known as Gushungo (from his family lineage) still continues to polarize opinion.

His failings are well known, including the mass murders of more than 30,000 civilians in Matabeleland during the 1980s Gukurahundi campaigns, and the killings and torture of opposition activists in the 2000s and 2010s.

The land reform process, although necessary, was handled in a haphazard way, contributing to the economic crash and 2008’s ‘year zero’, when Zimbabwe was plagued with a worthless currency, no food in the shops, unsafe drinking water and the spread of cholera and typhoid.

Nevertheless, Mugabe is genuinely mourned by millions in Zimbabwe and beyond. Partly this is for what he achieved in building Zimbabwe’s education, health and economy, and for giving land – however haphazardly – to millions of Zimbabweans.

But it was his assertion of black and African identity and pride which made Mugabe connect with millions. I grew up in Ian Smith’s Rhodesia, where being a black African was, by law, a cardinal sin and, at times, a capital offence. Mugabe helped to make being black not just acceptable but also a cause for celebration.

What now for the country?

Mugabe continues to shape Zimbabwe’s politics. Emmerson Mnangagwa’s government has tried to differentiate itself from Mugabe’s administrations, avoiding his radical and ideologically driven language and policies. But Zimbabwe’s military, which played a critical role in Mugabe’s 2017 removal, remains influential over government policy.

Mnangagwa wants to be seen as a moderate, accessible for regular meetings with private sector and international investors through the Presidential Advisory Commission, the Tripartite Negotiating Forum, investment meetings and other forums.

Politically, Zimbabwe’s bipartisan Parliamentary Portfolio Committees have emerged over the past year as key institutions able to effectively hold the government and other institutions to account. Contentious Mugabe-era legislation such as the Public Order and Security Act has been revised in line with Zimbabwe’s constitution. And the ongoing multiparty dialogue is a useful start towards a much-needed national political dialogue.

Through its Transitional Stabilization Programme, the Mnangagwa administration has outlined an ambitious economic reform agenda. There has been some progress; in January, the government reported a $113 million budget surplus, and publicly available audits of state-owned enterprises by Public Auditor Mildred Chiri have exposed the rot at the heart of institutions such as the National Social Security Authority.

The government has streamlined bureaucracy and legislation to improve Zimbabwe’s business climate; and the newly empowered Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission has begun probing some high-profile fraud cases.

Zimbabwe’s global re-engagement with international financial institutions, a process which had stalled in Mugabe’s later years, is now making some progress, with Zimbabwe joining the Staff Monitored Programme with the IMF in mid-2019. The introduction of a new currency in February was designed to end the chaos of multiple US-dollar exchange rates and the dominance of the black market, but has had limited results.

Hardship

But the Mnangagwa administration’s attempts to stabilize the Zimbabwean economy have also included deep cuts in government spending, and the resulting austerity has brought severe hardship for ordinary Zimbabweans. Massive fuel, power and water shortages and the sky-rocketing cost of living are all reminiscent of the Mugabe era, damaging the credibility of the government’s promise of an economic dividend.

Shortages have also hit tourism, which had rebounded in recent years, and the new national currency initiative has pushed inflation to an official 180%. Violent urban protests took place in 2018 and 2019.

While government is right to commit to reforms, and has taken steps, such as cost-of-living allowances, to help mitigate the worst impacts, many Zimbabweans view the official ‘austerity for prosperity’ message with deep scepticism, and the current state of the economy has encouraged more young Zimbabweans to leave the country. Government and the business community need to prioritize people over statistics, and put social protection, anti-poverty programmes and economic democracy at the forefront of economic reform.

Getting public services working again will also require a broad national economic consensus and could look to capitalize on diaspora-led initiatives in education, agriculture, health and other sectors.

But this will require the opposition Movement for Democratic Change to recognize Mnangagwa’s legitimacy in return for substantive talks between government and the opposition and strengthened outreach to Zimbabwe’s nearly 5-million strong global diaspora, many in the United Kingdom, unsure of what tomorrow will bring, and an increasingly troubled South Africa.

The future

Robert Mugabe’s funeral will bring together the great and the good, not just from Zimbabwe but from all over the world. Robert Mugabe was always a voice and never an echo, and his passing, as with those of other Zimbabwean change-makers of all races and backgrounds, is an opportunity to reflect on the legacy of the liberation era.

But more importantly, it is also an opportunity to think about what lies ahead. Zimbabweans have proved to be resilient and innovative; but it will require a collective effort and a national re-engagement to ensure that Zimbabwe’s future is not its past. And with Mugabe now gone, the Zimbabwe government must prove that it can and will do better.

Zimbabwe's Economy During the Coronavirus Pandemic and Beyond 8 September 2020 — 10:00AM TO 11:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 26 August 2020

COVID-19 has had a devastating effect on Zimbabwe’s already floundering economy. Important foreign currency earning industries have virtually stopped, and across the country livelihoods are at risk and an increasing number of people are reliant on government grants.

Businesses are having to become more flexible but are constrained by a weak policy environment and lack of confidence in the economy. Since 2017, the government has been pursuing an economic reform agenda and Transitional Stabilization Programme (TSP), which was scheduled for completion by the end of 2020. The deepening challenges highlight the need to accelerate economic reform and build confidence in order to achieve sustainable and inclusive growth.

At this webinar, speakers discuss the measures that government, businesses, and individuals are adopting in response to the COVID-19 economic challenge, and the policies required for recovery.

Read a meeting summary

This webinar is held in partnership with the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung.

Zimbabwe’s Economic Governance and Regional Integration 17 November 2020 — 12:00PM TO 1:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 6 November 2020 Online

Panellists discuss policy and governance for long-term economic prosperity in Zimbabwe, reflecting on the role of institutional change and regional integration in the context of the shocks caused by the coronavirus pandemic.

At this virtual event, panellists and participants will discuss policy and governance for long-term economic prosperity in Zimbabwe, reflecting on the role of institutional change and regional integration.

The government of Zimbabwe has emphasized its commitment to economic reform and its ambition to achieve upper-middle-income status by 2030, but there are considerable challenges to overcome.

The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated existing economic fragility. Improving the business climate to attract international private-sector investment will be contingent on clear, consistent and coherent policy and implementation, including targeting abuse and corruption.

Zimbabwe has, in recent years, successfully strengthened its regional trade integration, although some trade frictions remain. This is an important factor not only for catalysing economic growth in Zimbabwe, but for supporting regional prosperity and post-COVID recovery.

This webinar is the second in a series of events held in partnership with the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung on Zimbabwe’s economic reform and recovery.

Read a meeting summary

This event will also be broadcast live on the Africa Programme Facebook page.

Inclusion, agency and influence: The role of women in Zimbabwe’s economy 8 July 2021 — 3:00PM TO 4:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 2 July 2021 Online

Speakers discuss the changing role of women in Zimbabwe’s economic structures and the priorities for promoting greater economic inclusion, agency and influence of women.

Zimbabwe’s National Development Strategy of 2021-2025 highlights the importance of gender sensitivity in policymaking and of women’s economic participation in attaining the government’s Vision 2030.

However, women have been among the worst affected groups by the devastating effects that COVID-19 has had on Zimbabwe’s already floundering economy, which has exacerbated the challenges they face in economic life, such as access to credit, financial services and social security.

Leveraging existing structures such as women’s groups, micro-finance facilities, education and training, and national gender mechanisms, as well as supporting wider financial and digital inclusion in Zimbabwe, is central for the country’s sustained economic recovery.

This event also focuses on the differing impacts of COVID-19 on women’s economic activities across various sectors, as well as along rural-urban and formal-informal economy lines.

Read a meeting summary

This webinar is part of a series of events in partnership with the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung on Zimbabwe’s economic recovery and reform.

This event will also be broadcast live on the Africa Programme Facebook page.

War on Ukraine: The state of the global response 17 October 2022 — 6:30PM TO 7:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 3 October 2022 Chatham House and Online

Implications of the war for the future of multilateralism.

Russia’s war on Ukraine has tested the capacity for a unified global response to grave violations of the UN Charter. The world is in unchartered territory as a nuclear member of the United Nations Security Council attacks a non-nuclear country. 

Multilateral institutions that were born out of an effort to prevent war are struggling to prove their relevance in the face of growing existential threats to humanity. The war is exacerbating divisions within the global community, disrupting food and energy supplies worldwide and contributing to a profound crisis of multilateralism.

The longer these divisions last, the longer the war in the middle of Europe and the harder it will be to respond to the interconnected global crises that threaten everyone.

This discussion offers a unique insight into the macro-geopolitical questions in relation to the war in Ukraine with members of the Elders and other experts:

The panel considers:

• How can a more united global response to Russian aggression be built?

• What stands in the way of an effective multilateral response based on international norms?

• In what ways are divisions between UN member states influencing the trajectory of the war or prospects for peace?

• How is the conflict changing geopolitics and the ability of the multilateral system to address global challenges?

As with all members events, questions from the audience drive the conversation. This event is organised in partnership between Chatham House and The Elders, the group of independent global leaders founded by Nelson Mandela who work for peace, justice and human rights.

Read the transcript.

Expanding and enhancing the global cyber workforce 17 November 2022 — 5:00PM TO 6:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 5 October 2022 Chatham House and Online

How can we address the cybersecurity workforce shortage and skills gap?

Accelerated digital transformation and heightened geopolitical tensions on the international stage have increased the need for effective cybersecurity practices and policies as well as a skilled workforce. Despite this, the demand for cybersecurity professionals continues to outpace the supply for societies and businesses globally, resulting in a cybersecurity workforce gap.

To ensure that digital transformation is available, safe and beneficial to all, significant efforts are needed to encourage cyber workforce capacity-building and knowledge-sharing at both national and international levels.

This discussion, supported by (ISC)² and the UK Cyber Security Council, will explore how to effectively address the twin challenges of the global cyber workforce shortage and skills gap.

• What are the implications of the global cyber workforce and skills gaps for businesses and societies?

• What shape do these gaps take within society? Where are they most prevalent and how do they vary?

• What is the role of education and private-public partnerships in effectively addressing these gaps?

• How does the UK National Cyber Strategy seek to address these challenges? What are the key lessons from this strategy?

• What other efforts are being made internationally to bridge this gap? What opportunities are there for knowledge-sharing and capacity-building?

• What is the role of diversity, equity and inclusion in tackling these gaps?

As with all members events, questions from the audience drive the conversation. If you are not a member of Chatham House but would still like to attend the event please email Eleanor Macmillan-Fox to enquire about registration.

Read the transcript. 

The battle for truth: The BBC's role at 100 22 November 2022 — 6:30PM TO 7:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 13 October 2022 Chatham House and Online

Tim Davie, director general of the BBC, and others discuss how the BBC shapes, and is shaped by, the world today.

This year, the BBC turns 100 and the World Service 90 in a world facing crises of increasing scale and frequency and in an age of disinformation, democratic disruption and a growing assault on truth and free reporting worldwide. What does this mean for Britain’s foremost news provider at home and across the globe?

This conversation considers:

• How does the BBC navigate a drastically changing media landscape?

• What does the BBC represent in the UK and to the world?

• What ‘soft power’ does the BBC have and how does it use it best?

As with all members events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

Read the transcript. 

The future of global trade: Beyond ‘peak globalization’? 23 November 2022 — 11:00AM TO 12:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 17 October 2022 Online

Is globalization in retreat?

The COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s war on Ukraine have highlighted how vulnerable international trade is. But, even before these recent shocks, rising protectionism in major economies around the world and concerns about the environment have weighed heavily on trade.

According to some key measures, the globalization trend appears to have slowed. But is ‘peak globalization’ a reality or a myth? What are the major phases of globaliszation and what might come next? The answer differs between trade in goods, services, capital, technology, data and people. And whether the future is a more integrated or fragmented world economy also depends on politics and the stability of the international order.

Key questions to be tackled at this event includes:

• How do recent shocks, such as the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s war on Ukraine, change globalization? 

• What are the key indicators for the global integration of major economies?

• Will there be a split between a US and China-dominated ’trading sphere of influence’?

• Could trade in services offer ‘globalization’ a new phase of rapid growth?

• What impact will technology continue to have on global trade and the future of globalization?

As with all members events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

The discussion is part of the Chatham House Global Trade Policy Forum. The Global Trade Policy Forum is supported by founding partner AIG, associate partner Boston Consulting Group and supporting partners Clifford Chance LLP, Diageo PLC and UPS.

Read the transcript. 

The era of ‘reglobalization’ 15 June 2023 — 6:00PM TO 7:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 14 February 2023 Chatham House and Online

How to balance international trade with efforts to enhance domestic economic resilience?

The global trade outlook remains challenging in 2023. Geopolitical tensions and national security concerns are playing a greater role in trade policy with a focus on strengthening supply chain resilience and reducing economic dependencies. In addition, the turn towards industrial policies has raised concerns about unfair trade practices and protectionism.

The debate about the future of globalization has only therefore deepened. While ‘deglobalization’ dominates the current public discourse on trade, is ‘reglobalization’ a better term to describe patterns of economic integration and fracturing across different economies and sectors?

The panel of experts discuss:

• To what extent are efforts to meet climate goals and maintain technological leadership intertwined with industrial policy and national security objectives?

• What do recent measures by the US – including the Inflation Reduction Act and a push on semiconductors – mean for cooperation with like-minded partners such as the EU?

• Are any countries resisting the protectionist trend and continuing to champion open trade?

• What steps can be taken to strengthen strategic and sensitive supply chains, for example, for critical minerals, high-capacity batteries and semiconductors?

• Is it possible to develop and advance a positive trade agenda for a reglobalized world? If so, what would it look like?

As with all member events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

In conversation with Ehud Barak 27 March 2023 — 12:00PM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 21 March 2023 Chatham House and Online

The former prime minister of Israel discusses his country’s political outlook and foreign policy priorities.

On the eve of its 75th independence anniversary, Israel is at a critical crossroads. Weeks of long, intense protests surrounding judicial reforms pursued by the current government have widened the debate over the role played by the, so far independent, judiciary, notably the Supreme Court.

Supporters on both sides of the argument are fighting over different visions of Israel – a true liberal-democracy, or a much-reduced version of a democratic system. Whichever side of the argument people fall, the debate symbolizes tension in Israel’s society and decline in trust of its political and constitutional institutions.

Abroad, the situation remains intricate. Israel-Iran relations remain on a knife edge while the Abraham Accords normalized relations with parts of the Gulf. Then there are the continual issues surrounding relations with the Palestinians and their right to self-determination and statehood.

Old international challenges are now rubbing up against the new. Israel is part of a changing power dynamic in the Middle East, the result of a much-reduced US footprint. Furthermore, it must now contend with the other global superpower in China and continue to work on its response to the war in Ukraine.

Amid its domestic struggle to maintain its democratic character, fast-moving regional and international developments are in need of addressing. Friends and allies are deeply concerned with the country’s constitutional crisis, potentially re-evaluating their relations with the Jewish state.

Former prime minister of Israel Ehud Barak lays out his views on the complexities of domestic and international challenges facing Israel today.

Questions covered include:

• What are the main root causes of the current constitutional crisis, and how could it be best resolved?
• Could the current situation lead to a breakdown of the political system, even widespread violence?
• How could the current circumstances in Israel and Palestine affect relations between the two and any prospect for peace negotiations?
• How will US-Israel relations stand up against China’s influence in the region?
• What is Israel’s interpretation of the war in Ukraine and how is the country affected?

As with all member events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

Ukraine crisis could trigger cascading risks globally Expert comment NCapeling 16 March 2022

The effects on the wider world from the Ukraine invasion go far beyond the waves of shock and horror being felt from this escalating conflict.

Russia and Ukraine rank 11th and 55th respectively in terms of their national economies but, for the global supply of critical resources such as energy, food, and minerals, these two countries together are far bigger hitters – and both the threat and reality of resource flows from them being reduced have already driven up global prices.

The world is already facing a cost-of-living squeeze coming out of the COVID-19 pandemic, so further price spikes or supply constraints have the potential to seriously undermine food and energy security, equitable access to basic goods and services, and social stability around the world – which can then potentially create systemic risks for economies and societies.

The global implications of the Ukraine conflict are only just beginning to be explored fully but the immediate impacts of the crisis on global markets are already well-documented. In the first few days after Russia’s invasion, energy prices spiked, triggering further fertilizer price rises – as fertilizer production is highly energy intensive – which in turn is contributing to food price rises because fertilizer costs are an important factor in food production.

Interruptions to shipping in the region around Ukraine – as well as globally – have impeded the flow of goods which pushed prices up even further, while economic sanctions on cross-border flows of goods and finance are further adding to market pressures. But this is just the start – these impacts will bring ripple effects which propagate far beyond their point of origin, known as ‘cascading risks’.

Risk is a combination of hazard, exposure, and vulnerability – in terms of the Ukraine invasion, the hazard is the conflict and its immediate impacts on the societies and economies of Ukraine and Russia, while exposure relates to the degree to which other countries are likely to be affected depending on how much they are integrated into the global economy or the ‘just in time’ nature of their supply chains.

Vulnerability relates to a society’s capacity to mitigate the harmful impacts of the conflict, such as controlling borders, sourcing alternative goods from suppliers, or protecting against price or supply shocks.

Risk cascades – the second- and third-order impacts of the original hazard and of responses to that hazard – can interact across sectoral boundaries – as with energy and food, for example – and their compound effect can lead to overall systemic risks for society.

Anticipating this potential is essential to understanding the nature and scale of the global ramifications being felt from the Ukraine conflict. Recent work in the UK to assess levels of cascading risks resulting from a changing climate – the UK Climate Change Risk Assessment – provides a valuable framework for thinking about this area.

It examines key pathways for risk to cascade through global systems – when applied to the situation in Ukraine, these pathways and their interactions offer an indication of the scale of crisis that citizens face far beyond Ukraine’s and Russia’s borders.

Interruptions to the flows of goods and energy

In globalized trade networks, localized disruption to supply chains rapidly yields widespread international impacts – of particular concern is the immediate supply of food because most countries rely on lean supply chains and some may only have a few days food within their own borders.

Experience from previous food price crises indicate even small interruptions to trade can result in runs on the market and rapid price inflation. In the case of this conflict, the trade interruption will be far from small because, between them, Russia and Ukraine export around one-quarter of all traded wheat, more than three-quarters of traded sunflower oil, and one-sixth of traded maize.

Energy markets are also a concern because many countries use more energy than they produce and therefore rely on imports of energy or fuel for domestic use. Russia produces around ten per cent of the world’s commercial energy with a concentration of sales in major regions such as the European Union (EU) and China.

As with food, a shortfall in energy provision leads to market runs and rapid inflation as actors compete in a tightening space, while poorly designed policy interventions by nations trying to ensure their own security add further pressure to global supply and worsen price rises. In addition, the closely interconnected nature of energy markets means disruption to one fuel – such as gas in this case – affects global prices for other forms of energy.

The impact of moving people and money

As the last decade richly illustrates, the cross-border flows of people impact those societies absorbing them – for example, contributing to a rise in nationalism – as well as increase the costs of supplying essential resources. Given many people are understandably fleeing this conflict, other countries may struggle to cope as the cost-of-living crisis and urgent efforts to bolster national security infrastructure may squeeze available public funds.

Financial flows are crucial to the functioning of global economies, whether for inward investment or insurance and – as Russian citizens may be about to discover – restricting the global flow of money has a serious impact on households. Beyond Russia, the outflow of money from major financial centres such as London to meet insurance claims or to enable infrastructure reinvestment post-conflict may also have severe knock-on economic impacts.

The impact on governance and health

The global spikes in energy and food prices resulting from these supply chain disruptions will see many countries struggle with rising food and energy insecurity as well as increased inequality. Taken together these conditions create many issues beyond immigration pressures and the associated politics, including increased inequality and civil unrest.

This potentially destabilizes governments which has consequences for the stability of an entire region such as interrupted supply chains, the need to deploy peacekeeping forces, or significant flows of aid – all with global consequences far beyond the countries in question.

Populations may suffer mental health impacts arising from the Ukraine invasion, whether from the trauma of being forced to leave home to escape conflict, anxiety for the wellbeing and safety of families and friends caught up in it, or a more general anxiety arising from the perception of living in an unstable world.

Review: One-man bandwagons The World Today rsoppelsa.drupal 25 May 2022

The ills of strongman politics are diagnosed sharply in this accessible overview – but a cure is nowhere to be found, says Natasha Lindstaedt

The Age of the Strongman: How the Cult of the Leader Threatens Democracy around the World
Gideon Rachman, Bodley Head, £20.00

For anyone reading the headlines, it should come as no surprise that democracy has regressed to where it was in 1989. The profound geopolitical and technological changes in the post-Cold World era have led to chaos, polarization, nationalist backlash and nostalgia for strong leadership in democracies. 

Countries such as Russia and China have provided a new model for leadership that has become frighteningly infectious – the strongman. 

Gideon Rachman charts this new era, offering an accessible overview of 14 examples, including Britain’s Boris Johnson, Donald Trump of the United States, Narendra Modi of India, Jair Bolsonaro of Brazil, Viktor Orbán of Hungary, Xi Jinping of China and – the archetype – Vladmir Putin of Russia.

The idea that we are living in the age of strongman politics is not particularly novel. Scholars of authoritarian politics have noted for years that there has been a steady rise in ‘personalist’ dictatorship and personalism in democracy in general. Nearly 40 per cent of all dictatorships are personalist, meaning domination by a single person, compared with 23 per cent in 1988. Autocracies have become increasingly aggressive, using sharp power to undermine democracy, which signals a shift. 

Autocracies used to focus on their own stability and didn’t interfere with democracies.

Rachman focuses on this threat that the strongman poses to democracy while macho one-man rule spreads across the globe. He provides a well-written, clear overview of why each leader fits the strongman label, what explains their appeal and what informs their worldview. 

Where Rachman is effective is in weaving together the commonalities of these strongmen – and they are all men – and their relationship to each other. Despite their ultra-nationalism, they have created an unofficial, multilateral network of mutual support. This includes leaders whose religious convictions may appear to be in conflict – such as Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel and Muhammed bin Salman of Saudi Arabia. 

This is not just a network of dictators – autocratic-style leaders of democratic countries have been welcomed to the club. In this system, strongmen openly admire each other, revel in their disdain for liberalism and human rights, and share advice and inspiration. 

This contrasts with western European leaders who fail to build such iron-clad bonds.

Each chapter is peppered with anecdotes about Rachman’s first-hand impressions of some of these leaders and other notables in positions of power gained from his decades as a foreign correspondent and analyst. His colourful commentary complements his understanding of how they operate. 

A common theme throughout is that the strongman’s appeal appears as a breath of fresh air for democracy, liberalism or peace. They are often labelled as anti-elitist and men of the people. This honeymoon period ends when each leader shows their true colours: attacking political opponents, sometimes in ruthless purges, disregarding the rule of law, weakening the courts and vilifying or controlling the media. 

A well-placed quote from Recep Erdogan sums this up: ‘Democracy is like a tram you ride until you arrive at your destination.’

Genuine public support exists for these manoeuvres. Dislocation from unmanaged globalization and economic crises has created an audience for political entrepreneurs. Strongman leaders have earned the distinction of being relatable and telling it like it is, despite many being considered to be liars and often filthy rich. 

Their ability to tap into people’s fears of the West, crime, immigrants or other ethnic and religious groups has helped gain them a fiercely loyal following. According to Rachman, strongman politics is linked to fear that a majority group that was once dominant is being threatened – something leaders such as Donald Trump have astutely tapped into.

Unlike some of the kleptocratic regimes of the 1970s and 1980s that were the embodiment of venal opportunists – think of Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines, Mobutu of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Jean-Claude Duvalier of Haiti – the strongmen of today have been inspired by the ideology of hyper-nationalism and anti-liberalism. 

Rachman links strongmen to the work of Carl Schmitt, a Nazi Party member, who was a vociferous critic of parliamentary democracy and cosmopolitanism, while touting the importance of illiberal norms to exercise power. Rachman argues that we are in a war of ideas, with liberalism under attack. He hones in on the perennial target George Soros, and how his support for liberal democracy has garnered the unwanted attention from the world’s right-wing ideologues and strongmen.

Social media has been usurped by these leaders and their regimes to forge closer, direct relationships with their supporters, to churn out fake news and create dangerous echo chambers. They are snake oil salesmen, making huge promises but offering very little in practice. They are never as they initially appear, and their images are carefully crafted.

Another theme emerges on the career pathway. Many served as a mayor of a cosmopolitan city. An interesting chapter on Johnson explains how he comes across like a relatable ‘good chap’, being able to handle embarrassing photo-ops. He was also a devoted Europhile, attended Eton and Oxford, and championed multi-culturalism as Mayor of London. Always the opportunist, Johnson had few qualms about campaigning for Brexit, and then later breaking the law to make it happen.

Yet there are some gaps in Rachman’s analysis.

It is never made clear why leaders such as Abdel Fattah el-Sisi of Egypt, Nicolás Maduro of Venezuela and Kim Jong-un of North Korea are largely missing, or a number of other strongman dictators in sub-Saharan Africa. 

Though there is a chapter devoted to Abiy Ahmed of Ethiopia, along with a few paragraphs devoted to Paul Kagame of Rwanda, Meles Zenawi also of Ethiopia, Emmerson Mnangagwa of Zimbabwe and Jacob Zuma of South Africa, the chapter on African strongmen does not acknowledge that this is the only continent where the regional trend is not as depressing. 

Rachman only occasionally engages with data on dictatorships to verify some of the patterns that he explores in the book. And his work would benefit from an examination of the institutional factors that may explain the rise of strongman politics, such as the pre-existing weakness of parties, parliaments and courts. 

Nor does he go in depth into how strongmen interact with their institutions and what the implications of this brand of politics are for conflict and development. The failures of strongmen to address Covid-19 are mentioned, but it is never explained why they may be so poorly equipped to govern. 

So, is democracy dead? Though Rachman is largely pessimistic, he acknowledges that politics tends to go in waves. There is little advice about how the West can expedite the end of this particular wave. 

The one positive Rachman offers is that strongman rule cannot deal with succession. This is largely true, though handovers have taken place, such as with the Kim dynasty. 

But there are definitely more questions raised than answers provided. What is left after strongmen are no longer in power? What must democracies do to undermine strongmen or prevent their rise? Where will the next strongman appear? 

Rachman’s book doesn’t provide these answers, but he does offer an interesting overview of the leaders dominating the headlines.
 

America's abortion ban will hurt women everywhere The World Today mhiggins.drupal 9 August 2022

In the final part of a series on the impact of the Roe v Wade ruling, Nina van der Mark assesses the global impact of America’s reverse on reproductive rights.

In overturning the constitutional right to an abortion established by Roe v Wade, the Supreme Court of the United States placed the US alongside Poland, El Salvador and Nicaragua as countries that have restricted access to abortion in recent decades. While the Dobbs ruling is a domestic reversal, the US remains the largest funder of global health, family planning and reproductive health services. There is a lot at stake for women and girls around the world. 

Here are four potential global impacts to consider.

Millions of women will be at greater risk 

The Guttmacher Institute, a research and policy organization that aims to improve sexual and reproductive health worldwide, calculated that in 2021 American international family planning assistance saw an estimated 27.2 million women and couples receive contraceptive services, some 12 million pregnancies averted, four million unsafe abortions prevented and 19,000 maternal deaths avoided. These outcomes help to improve gender equity as well as increase women’s education and employment opportunities and boost economic growth. 

This happens despite US funding for international family planning being in decline over the past decade. It peaked during the Obama administration at $715 million in 2010 but since 2017 averaged about $607 million a year. Using US aid to directly fund abortions as a method of family planning is prohibited under the terms of the Helms Amendment of 1973.

In America, the Dobbs ruling has so far led 14 Republican-controlled states to enact anti-abortion legislation. This, in turn, has motivated pro-choice campaigners – on August 2, a referendum in the staunchly conservative state of Kansas returned a decisive vote to preserve abortion rights. That result gives hope to abortion-rights groups that the issue will cut across traditional political loyalties and bring swing voters to their cause in the mid-term congressional elections in November.  

That is important because Congress decides on the level of funding for America’s global health programmes, including family planning and reproductive health. The stakes are high. For instance, Kenya, Nigeria and Ethiopia, with a combined population of more than 370 million, are among the top 10 recipients of US Overseas Development Assistance, most of which goes to health programmes. Nigeria, for instance, received $794 million in such funding from America in 2019-2020. 

A sudden policy reversal affecting funding for reproductive health would lead to clinic closures, reduced access to help and shortages of essential family planning commodities. The result would be more unintended pregnancies, more unsafe abortions and a potential increase in maternal mortality. 

Women will have more unsafe abortions

The Helms Amendment, which prevents recipients of American aid directly funding abortion services, was passed by Congress in 1973 following the Roe v Wade decision. The Global Gag Rule, first enacted by Ronald Reagan in 1984, goes further, forbidding NGOs abroad in receipt of American aid from promoting or counselling abortion as a form of family planning, even when using their own funds. Since its introduction, Republican administrations have enforced the rule while Democratic administrations have rescinded it, as Biden did in January 2021.  

Restricting access to safe abortion services increases the number of unsafe abortions, whereas legalizing abortion services reduces them. During the Bush administration, the Global Gag Rule prompted a 12-per-cent increase in pregnancies in rural Ghana, which led to an additional 200,000 abortions. 

Another study found a substantial increase in abortions, a decline in contraceptive use and an increase in pregnancies in 26 countries in sub-Saharan Africa affected by the rule across three US administrations. It’s estimated that 77 per cent of abortions in the region are unsafe. In 2019 that translated into 6.2 million unsafe abortions.

The failure of America to consistently support safe abortion services contributes to the more than 35 million unsafe abortions that take place each year across 132 lower middle-income countries.  

Under the Trump administration, the Global Gag Rule was extended from family planning funding to cover all US global health assistance, increasing the level of US funding affected from around $600 million to $8.8 billion. Were a Republican administration to be elected in 2024 there is little doubt the rule would be reinstated, possibly in the most restrictive form that Trump enforced. 

Anti-abortion movements will double their efforts 

The repeal of Roe v Wade has not occurred in a silo, nor are its effects contained within the US.

News of the Dobbs ruling, which overturned Roe v Wade, prompted One of Us, a European anti-abortion platform, to mount an immediate, 20,000-strong anti-abortion demonstration in Spain, including leaders of the conservative Vox party.  On Twitter, Sara Larin, an anti-abortion activist from El Salvador, likened the Dobbs ruling to the abolition of slavery in the US, calling it ‘the beginning of the end for abortion [worldwide]’. 

Countries have based their legal protections for abortion access on Roe v Wade or cited it in their case law, which now opens them up to legal challenge domestically. A Christian anti-abortion group in Kenya is legally challenging a pro-choice ruling based on Roe v Wade. Such challenges may increase: anti-choice groups in Mexico and Peru cited the Dobbs ruling as an encouraging development. 

Many American Christian right-wing groups fund anti-abortion activities abroad. OpenDemocracy, an independent global media platform, recently reported that 28 Christian right-wing organizations spent more than $280 million internationally between 2007-2018 on anti-choice activities, targeting Europe primarily, followed by Africa and Asia.  

The American right is not afraid to take direct legal action abroad either. The European Center for Law and Justice, an offshoot of the Trump-backed American Center for Law and Justice, has made interventions in dozens of court cases on sexual and reproductive health and rights in the European Court, including in the case that overturned abortion rights in Poland.   

The European parliament in its most recent motion on the topic expressed concern about the potential for the Dobbs ruling to prompt a surge in the flow of money to anti-choice groups around the world.  

America’s global standing will take a hit 

The Dobbs ruling immediately attracted criticism from many world leaders.  ‘Watching the removal of a woman’s fundamental right to make decisions over their own body is incredibly upsetting,’ said Jacinda Ardern, the New Zealand prime minister. ‘To see that principle now lost in the United States feels like a loss for women everywhere.’  

President Emmanuel Macron of France tweeted: ‘I wish to express my solidarity with the women whose liberties are being undermined by the Supreme Court of the United States.’ 

The ruling is in conspicuous opposition to the Biden administration’s more progressive stance on sexual and reproductive health and rights and its advocacy abroad. It sends a clear message from the world’s most powerful democracy that these rights are not guaranteed. 

While many world leaders reacted to the Dobbs ruling with dismay, other senior figures from the conservative right welcomed it, including the Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro’s son, Eduardo, and Javier Milei, a potential candidate in Argentina’s presidential election next year.  

In 2020, the Trump administration co-sponsored the ‘Geneva Consensus Declaration on Promoting Women’s Health and Strengthening the Family,’ declaring that there was ‘no international right to abortion.’ It was signed by more than 30 countries, including autocratic and right-wing governments in Brazil, Poland, Hungary and Saudi Arabia.  

The Biden administration withdrew from it – but its signatories are the governments who may yet take advantage of America’s self-inflicted erosion of authority on reproductive rights.  

The Dobbs ruling exposes the limitation of the American executive to act within the US legal system while opening up questions on American support of, and dedication to, fundamental rights.

Read the other two articles in this series: ‘Empowering women aids climate resilience’ and ‘Counting the cost of the abortion ban’

Gorbachev's complex legacy is beyond the popular belief Expert comment NCapeling 3 September 2022

The last major figure with a decisive Cold War role, Mikhail Gorbachev was not as bad as Putin’s Russia portrays him, but also not as heroic as the West thinks.

Arguably the worst year of the Cold War since the Cuban Missile Crisis was 1983, with three major incidents which escalated East-West tensions – and any one of them could have led to a full-scale war.

The first was the Korean Airline KAL007 being shot down by an SU15 fighter aircraft for straying into Soviet airspace, killing all 269 passengers and crew. Then came the identification of signals from Soviet satellites as being incoming US intercontinental ballistic missiles – Colonel Stanislav Petrov, going against all protocols, thankfully decided to report them as a false alarm before he could be sure.

The third was perhaps the most dangerous, being the misinterpretation of a live-fire NATO exercise which was believed by some in both East Germany and Russia to be a front for an imminent attack.

All three incidents occurred in the few months following the infamous March 1983 ‘Star Wars’ speech by US president Ronald Reagan, in which he talked about nuclear arms control and laid out the US case for a ballistic missile defence programme.

At that time Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev was the youngest serving member of the USSR Politburo, known to be a favourite of Soviet leader Yuri Andropov, and it is highly likely he had been aware of these close calls and was part of discussions within Kremlin decision-making circles.

A changemaker both inside and outside the USSR

Following the deaths of Andropov in 1984 and his replacement Konstantin Chernenko in 1985, Gorbachev’s appointment as general secretary of the Communist Party saw him immediately begin to change the Soviet Union from within – and also change relationships with the major Western powers, especially the US, Germany, and the UK.

His policies of glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring) were primarily aimed at internal reforms but translated into a major reset of international relations and international security. During his six years as leader, Gorbachev initiated many arms control negotiations which resulted in treaties and increased both the transparency and the confidence between the USSR and the US.

These included the 1986 Stockholm Accord which emanated from the Helsinki Process and allowed for the observation and inspection of large-scale military exercises, the 1985 resumption of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks which lead to START I, and the 1987 INF Treaty in which the USSR ‘out-yessed’ the US – the most open and transparent disarmament treaty in terms of notification and verification measures ever agreed.

There was also a reciprocal moratorium on nuclear weapons tests starting from 1985 – which laid the groundwork for the 1996 CTBT – the 1991 Chemical Weapons Convention, and the 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty.

The most dramatic moment of all was when Gorbachev and Reagan met at a summit in Reykjavik and came close to deciding to eliminate nuclear weapons – but the initiative failed to reach agreement, mainly because Reagan could not drop his commitment to ballistic missile defences and Gorbachev could not accept the offer of joint development.

Nonetheless, all these nuclear arms control treaties led the way for their descendants which have kept nuclear weapons in check ever since and are still in place in the form of the New START agreement.

But despite these outstanding achievements, Gorbachev had blind spots – such as enabling rather than destroying the USSR bioweapons programme, unlike the US which had dismantled its own bioweapons offensive capability by 1973.

And it is now known that, despite negotiating the Chemical Weapons Convention, Russia withheld information on new chemical weapons agents – Novichoks – which have since been used to lethal effect by Russia in Salisbury and against figures opposing the current regime.

His misguided faith in a Soviet future

Gorbachev was markedly different to his predecessors as secretary general. He was neither as decrepit nor as hardline, and he understood from the outset that the Soviet Union was, by the 1980s, finally dying.

Using the intellectual abilities of Aleksandr Yakovlev, he forced through the reforms which simultaneously captured the imagination of the free world and liberated his countrymen and women.

But although he built solid relationships – even friendships – with the world’s major heads of state and improved the USSR’s human rights, releasing dissidents such as Andrei Sakharov, but many – especially Ukrainian dissidents – continued to languish in camps.

The greatest disappointment in Gorbachev’s legacy was he completely believed the USSR could be reformed and still survive as an entity while others, such as Boris Yeltsin and Ronald Reagan, understood it had to be dismantled.

This shortcoming is especially uncomfortable as today’s Russia continues to insist it has a given right to control other former Soviet states, to the extent it is willing to destroy them if they do not concede.

Why the UK must deliver on Nordic-Baltic security Expert comment NCapeling 16 December 2022

Hard choices are needed but it is crucial the UK provides security and leadership to its European partners given the wider context of the war in Ukraine.

The UK’s role in Nordic-Baltic security has been growing over the past decade. The region is key to core British strategic interest and engagement, and UK threat assessment closely aligns with long-held regional perspectives – the 2021 Integrated Review defines Russia as ‘the most acute threat to our security’.

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the UK’s strong stance towards Moscow and the concrete steps taken to assist Ukraine and strengthen defence and deterrence on NATO’s eastern flank have been widely appreciated in the Nordic-Baltic region.

The UK is seen as a reliable partner but, for it to continue to deliver in the region, difficult choices must be made with regards to UK defence spending and military capabilities, and London’s more global ambitions.

The UK is a major contributor to NATO’s deterrence posture on the eastern flank, serving as a framework nation for NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) battlegroup in Estonia, and contributing to another battlegroup in Poland.

UK remains crucial to regional security

Coupled with its contribution to NATO’s Baltic Air Policing mission and maritime forces in the area, the UK is a crucial security partner both in the region and in a broader arch across Europe.

Over the past decade and a half, the UK has been developing a dense network of bilateral and minilateral relations in the region which are major assets in the current security environment.

It leads the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) which is a military cooperation format highly valued for its flexibility in responding to the needs of the participating nations – including non-NATO Sweden and Finland – and is increasingly focused on the North Atlantic, High North and wider Baltic areas. The UK has also seen increased bilateral defence cooperation with Norway, Denmark, Estonia, and other regional allies and partners.

There are reasonable expectations that Germany or France may at some point assume a greater role in this part of Europe, building on France’s participation in the EFP in Estonia, and Germany’s lead of the EFP in Lithuania.

However, while Paris remains more focused on NATO’s southern (and south-eastern) flank and building the European Union’s defence role, Berlin often underperforms as a leading or an organizing power of collaborative efforts across Europe.

Both also have a credibility problem in the Nordic-Baltic region due to their past policies towards Russia that occasionally reappear when discussing military support to Ukraine or how to treat Russia in the post-war European security order.

By contrast, the UK offers military capability, strong political will, a long-standing tradition of engagement in the Nordic-Baltic area, and fast decision-making.

The latter is exemplified by the bilateral security guarantees provided to Sweden and Finland during their accession to NATO, and the surge of assets sent to the region in the wake of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine such as an additional battlegroup and Chinook helicopters to Estonia, as well as forward-deployed elements of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters to Latvia and Lithuania as part of the JEF.

Such pragmatic and resolute engagement help substantiate the UK’s post-Brexit claim that although it left the EU, it did not leave Europe. London also understands and facilitates the pivotal role that the US plays in European security – a shared perspective with the Nordic-Baltic partners.

Only the US – which has just recently decided to step up its military presence in the Baltics – has a greater appeal than the UK as a major ally. But Washington’s truly global responsibilities make it more difficult for it to play a regional leadership role.

With the context of the war in Ukraine, the centre of gravity of European security is moving east. The Nordic-Baltic region is likely to feature more prominently in the upcoming refresh of the UK’s Integrated Review, as the war in Ukraine and NATO’s new forward defence approach will focus UK attention and military capabilities on Europe for the foreseeable future.

But the UK still has limited resources and, despite the worsening security environment, there is currently no commitment by the Rishi Sunak government to increase defence spending beyond two per cent of GDP, as set out in the recently-published Autumn Statement.

This difficult fiscal reality contrasts UK ambition to also increase its footprint and engagement in the Indo-Pacific, a region highlighted by Rishi Sunak in his first foreign policy speech. London is already confronted with increasing expectations from its Nordic and Baltic partners, which are rattled by Russia’s aggression and seek more engagement and commitments from larger and more resourceful allies, and are insisting on prompt implementation of NATO’s new defence and deterrence plans.

This all comes on top of the resources that further assistance to Ukraine will require in the coming months and years. Balancing competing priorities and demands from partners is routine for a major power with global ambition but, in the current context, if the UK government fails to prioritize and increase resources, over-extension is in sight for its armed forces.

The war in Ukraine confirms that, beyond the rhetoric around the ‘Indo-Pacific tilt’, the Euro-Atlantic is – and will remain – the priority theatre of engagement for the UK. To keep delivering in the Nordic-Baltic region and remain a reliable partner, UK ambitions should be set clearly, and expectations managed with regional partners.

A good example is the recent UK-Estonia joint statement and defence roadmap, which is an attempt to reconcile London’s vision of modern deterrence with Tallinn’s preference for ‘more boots on the ground’.

The joint statement also clarifies initial misunderstandings regarding the upcoming withdrawal of the second UK battlegroup deployed to Estonia in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine – support Tallinn expected to continue ‘as long as necessary’ but London saw as temporary. It offsets the poor political ‘optics’ of the withdrawal while providing solid ground for deepening the common agenda in the near future.

By the 2023 NATO summit in Vilnius, progress on implementing the roadmap will be a crucial measure of success for the bilateral relationship, and for the UK’s broader regional role. It should serve as an opportunity for the UK to reflect on its force development priorities and balance, with Baltic partners arguing in favour of the UK rebuilding some mass in its armed forces and providing more resources to the land component.

Much to gain for the UK

The UK gains many benefits from deepening and widening its engagement in the Nordic-Baltic region, and not only by showcasing its regional leadership at a time of dire need or having more weight in Europe and across the Atlantic in strategic debates about future security architecture.

In conversation with Edi Rama, prime minister of Albania 23 March 2023 — 5:30PM TO 6:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 13 March 2023 Chatham House and Online

From migration to Russia and China, how is Albania responding to the geopolitical challenges of today?

In late 2022, the UK government made a pointed remark that many of the illegal migrants attempting to get into the country were from Albania. In response, Albania prime minister Edi Rama replied that targeting Albanians as the cause of Britain’s crime and border problems ‘makes for easy rhetoric but ignores hard fact’. 

This nuanced response demonstrated the challenges and complexities that Albania faces, the same as many other countries. As well as being embroiled in the major challenge of international migration, Albania has suffered from a serious cyber-attack in July 2022 from Iran. Government networks were compromised for a month with Tirana removing the Iranian embassy in the capital.

Then there is the ongoing threat from Russia and China. Nestled in the already volatile Balkans, Albania has been at the heart of international affairs in recent months.

Prime Minister Rama speaks at Chatham House to discuss:

• How is Albania responding to Russian aggression and what is its stance on Ukraine?
• Where does Tirana believe China poses the most serious threat?
• How can countries in Europe best respond to illegal migration and better control the flow of people?
• How is the region of the Western Balkans effected by the war in Ukraine and how can it contribute to the security challenges posed by the war?

As with all member events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

Single-domain antibodies (sdAbs) demonstrate favorable pharmacokinetic profiles for molecular imaging applications. However, their renal excretion and retention are obstacles for applications in targeted radionuclide therapy (TRT). Methods: Using a click-chemistry–based pretargeting approach, we aimed to reduce kidney retention of a fibroblast activation protein α (FAP)–targeted sdAb, 4AH29, for ¹⁷⁷Lu-TRT. Key pretargeting parameters (sdAb-injected mass and lag time) were optimized in healthy mice and U87MG (FAP⁺) xenografts. A TRT study in a pancreatic ductal adenocarcinoma (PDAC) patient-derived xenograft (PDX) model was performed as a pilot study for sdAb-based pretargeting applications. Results: Modification of 4AH29 with trans-cyclooctene (TCO) moieties did not modify the sdAb pharmacokinetic profile. A 200-µg injected mass of 4AH29-TCO and an 8-h lag time for the injection of [¹⁷⁷Lu]Lu-DOTA-PEG₇-tetrazine resulted in the highest kidney therapeutic index (2.0 ± 0.4), which was 5-fold higher than that of [¹⁷⁷Lu]Lu-DOTA-4AH29 (0.4 ± 0.1). FAP expression in the tumor microenvironment was validated in a PDAC PDX model with both immunohistochemistry and PET/CT imaging. Mice treated with the pretargeting high-activity approach (4AH29-TCO + [¹⁷⁷Lu]Lu-DOTA-PEG₇-tetrazine; 3 x 88 MBq, 1 injection per week for 3 wk) demonstrated prolonged survival compared with the vehicle control and conventionally treated ([¹⁷⁷Lu]Lu-DOTA-4AH29; 3 x 37 MBq, 1 injection per week for 3 wk) mice. Mesangial expansion was reported in 7 of 10 mice in the conventional cohort, suggesting treatment-related kidney morphologic changes, but was not observed in the pretargeting cohort. Conclusion: This study validates pretargeting to mitigate sdAbs’ kidney retention with no observation of morphologic changes on therapy regimen at early time points. Clinical translation of click-chemistry–based pre-TRT is warranted on the basis of its ability to alleviate toxicities related to biovectors’ intrinsic pharmacokinetic profiles. The absence of representative animal models with extensive stroma and high FAP expression on cancer-associated fibroblasts led to a low mean tumor-absorbed dose even with high injected activity and consequently to modest survival benefit in this PDAC PDX.

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