The renminbi seems to be back in business as a Chinese tool of retaliation against US tariffs. A 1.5 per cent fall in the currency early this month in response to proposed new US tariffs was only a start. Since the middle of August the renminbi has weakened further, and the exchange rate is now 4 per cent weaker than at the start of the month. We may well see more of a ‘weaponized’ renminbi, but there are four good reasons why Beijing might be wise to think before shooting.

The first has to do with how China seeks to promote its place in the world. China has been at pains to manage the collapse of its relations with the US in a way that allows it to present itself as an alternative pillar of global order, and as a source of stability in the international system, not to mention moral authority. This has deep roots.

Anyone investigating the history of Chinese statecraft will quickly come across an enduring distinction in Chinese thought: between wang dao, the kingly, or righteous way, and ba dao, the way of the hegemon. Since Chinese thinkers and officials routinely describe US behaviour since the Second World War as hegemonic, it behoves Chinese policymakers to do as much as possible to stay on moral high-ground in their behaviour towards Washington. Only in that way would President Xi be able properly to assert China’s claim to leadership.

Indeed, China has a notable track record of using exchange rate stability to enhance its reputation as a force for global stability. Both in the aftermath of the Asian crisis in 1997, and of the Global Financial Crisis in 2008, Chinese exchange rate stability was offered as a way of demonstrating China’s trustworthiness and its commitment to multilateral order.

Devaluing the renminbi in a meaningful way now might have a different rationale, but the cost to China’s claim to virtue, and its bid to offer itself as a guardian of global stability, might be considerable.

That’s particularly true because of the second problem China has in thinking about a weaker renminbi: it may not be all that effective in sustaining Chinese trade. One reason for this is the increasing co-movement with the renminbi of currencies in countries with whom China competes.

As the renminbi changes against the dollar, so do the Taiwan dollar, the Korean won, the Singapore dollar and the Indian rupee. In addition, the short-run impact of a weaker renminbi is more likely to curb imports than to expand exports, and so its effects might be contractionary. 

An ineffective devaluation of the renminbi would be particularly useless because of the third risk China needs to consider, namely the risk of retaliation by the US administration. Of this there is already plenty of evidence, of course.

The US Treasury’s declaration of China as a ‘currency manipulator’ on 5 August bears little relationship to the actual formal criteria that the Treasury uses to define that term, but equally the US had warned the Chinese back in May that these criteria don’t bind its hand. By abandoning a rules-based approach to the definition of currency manipulation, the US has opened wide the door to further antagonism, and Beijing should have no doubt that Washington will walk through that door if it wants to.

The fourth, and possibly most self-destructive, risk that China has to consider is that a weaker renminbi might destabilize China’s capital account, fuelling capital outflows that would leave China’s policymakers feeling very uncomfortable.

Indeed, there is already evidence that Chinese residents feel less confident that the renminbi is a reliable store of value, now that there is no longer a sense that the currency is destined to appreciate against the dollar. The best illustration of this comes from the ‘errors and omissions’, or unaccounted-for outflows, in China’s balance of payments.

The past few years have seen these outflows rise a lot, averaging some $200 billion per year during the past four calendar years, or almost 2 per cent GDP; and around $90 billion in the first three months of 2019 alone. These are scarily large numbers.

The risk here is that Chinese expectations about the renminbi are ‘adaptive’: the more the exchange rate weakens, the more Chinese residents expect it to weaken, and so the demand for dollars goes up. In principle, the only way to deal with this risk would be for the People's Bank of China (PBOC) to implement a large, one-off devaluation of the renminbi to a level at which dollars are expensive enough that no one wants to buy them anymore.

This would be very dangerous, though: it presupposes that the PBOC could know in advance the ‘equilibrium’ value of the renminbi. It would take an unusually brave central banker to claim such foresight, especially since that equilibrium value could itself be altered by the mere fact of such a dramatic change in policy.

No one really knows precisely by what mechanism capital outflows from China have accelerated in recent years, but a very good candidate is tourism. The expenditure of outbound Chinese tourists abroad has risen a lot in recent years, and that increase very closely mirrors the rise in ‘errors and omissions’. So the suspicion must be that the increasing flow of Chinese tourists – nearly one half of whom last year simply travelled to capital-controls-free Hong Kong and Macao – is just creating opportunities for unrecorded capital flight.

This raises a disturbing possibility: that the most effective way for China to devalue the renminbi without the backfire of capital outflows would be simultaneously to stem the outflow of Chinese tourists. China has form in this regard, albeit for differing reasons: this month it suspended a programme that allowed individual tourists from 47 Chinese cities to travel to Taiwan.

A more global restriction on Chinese tourism might make a devaluation of the renminbi ‘safer’, and it would have the collateral benefit of helping to increase China’s current account surplus, the evaporation of which in recent years owes a lot to rising tourism expenditure and which is almost certainly a source of unhappiness in Beijing, where mercantilism remains popular.

But a world where China could impose such draconian measures would be one where nationalism has reached heights we haven’t yet seen. Let’s hope we don’t go there.

This article was originally published in the Financial Times.

At this event, which forms the second annual UK Trade Policy Observatory conference, there will be six presentations over the course of the day before concluding with a panel discussion and Q&A. This year’s conference will focus on the following legal areas of trade policy:

• Blockchain: Creating and Eliminating Trade in Services
• China's Role in the International Trading System
• Official Export Support: Compliance and Competition Concerns
• Strategic Litigation and Health Regulation: Implications for International Economic Law
• Development, Labour Standards and Sustainability in Trade Agreements
• Retaining Versus Reforming EU Food Safety Legislation: Selected Issues for a US-UK Trade Negotiation

To register for this event, please click here. 

The upcoming UK general election is arguably a 'Brexit election', and as such, whoever wins the election will have little time to get their strategy for Brexit up and running to meet the new Brexit deadline of 31 January 2020. But what are the political parties’ policies for the UK's future trade? This event will present and discuss what the five main parties’ manifestos imply for future UK trade. Each manifesto will be presented and analysed by a fellow of the UK Trade Policy Observatory (UKTPO) and will be followed by a Q&A session. 

An infectious disease outbreak has long been a top national security risk in several countries, but the speed and extent of COVID-19’s spread and the scale of its social and economic impact has come as an enormous and deeply worrying shock.

This pandemic is not just a global medical and economic emergency. It could also prove a decisive make-or-break point for today’s system of global political and economic cooperation.

This system was built up painstakingly after 1945 as a response to the beggar-thy-neighbour economic policies of the 1930s which led to the Second World War. But it has been seriously weakened recently as the US and China have entered a more overt phase of strategic competition, and as they and a number of the other most important global and regional players have pursued their narrowly defined self-interest.

Now, the disjointed global economic response to COVID-19, with its enormous ramifications for global prosperity and economic stability, has blown into the open the urgent need for an immediate reaffirmation of international political and economic cooperation.

What is needed is a clear, coordinated and public statement from the leaders of the world’s major countries affirming the many things on which they do already agree, and some on which they should be able to agree.

In particular that:

• they will give the strongest possible support for the WHO in leading the medical response internationally;
• they will be transparent and tell the truth to their peoples about the progress of the disease and the threat that it represents;
• they will work together and with the international financial institutions to provide businesses, particularly SMEs, and individuals whatever support they need to get through the immediate crisis and avoid long-term damage to the global economy; 
• they will ensure the financial facilities for crisis support to countries - whether at global or regional level - have whatever resources they need to support countries in difficulty;
• they will avoid new protectionist policies - whether in trade or finance;
• they commit not to forget the poor and vulnerable in society and those least able to look after themselves.

Such a statement could be made by G20 leaders, reflecting the group’s role since 2010 as the premier forum for international economic cooperation.

But it could be even more appropriate coming from the UN Security Council, recognising that COVID-19 is much more than an economic challenge; and also reflecting the practical fact, in a time when international travel is restricted, the UNSC has an existing mechanism in New York to negotiate and quickly agree such a statement.

A public statement by leading countries could do a great deal to help arrest a growing sense of powerlessness among citizens and loss of confidence among businesses worldwide as the virus spreads.

It could also set a new course for international political and economic cooperation, not just in relation to the virus, but also other global threats with potentially devastating consequences for economic growth and political stability in the coming years.

With the IMF forecasting a 6.1% fall in advanced economy GDP in 2020 and world trade expected to contract by 11%, there is intense focus on the question of how and when to re-open economies currently in lockdown.

But no ‘opening up’ plan has a chance of succeeding unless it commands the confidence of all the main actors in the economy – employees, consumers, firms, investors and local authorities.

Without public confidence, these groups may follow official guidance only sporadically; consumers will preserve cash rather than spend it on goods and services; employees will delay returning to work wherever possible; businesses will face worsening bottlenecks as some parts of the economy open up while key suppliers remain closed; and firms will continue to delay many discretionary investment and hiring decisions.

Achieving public confidence

Taken together, these behaviours would substantially reduce the chances of a strong economic bounce-back even in the absence of a widespread second wave of infections. Five key steps are needed to achieve a high degree of public confidence in any reopening plan.

First, enough progress must be made in suppressing the virus and in building public health capacity so the public can be confident any new outbreak will be contained without reverting to another full-scale lockdown. Moreover, the general public needs to feel that the treatment capacity of the health system is at a level where the risk to life if someone does fall ill with the virus is at an acceptably low level.

Achieving this requires the government to demonstrate the necessary capabilities - testing, contact tracing, quarantine facilities, supplies of face masks and other forms of PPE (personal protective equipment) - are actually in place and can be sustained, rather than relying on future commitments. It also needs to be clear on the role to be played going forward by handwashing and other personal hygiene measures.

Second, the authorities need to set out clear priorities on which parts of the economy are to open first and why. This needs to take account of both supply side and demand side factors, such as the importance of a particular sector to delivering essential supplies, a sector’s ability to put in place effective protocols to protect its employees and customers, and its importance to the functioning of other parts of the economy. There is little point in opening a car assembly plant unless its SME suppliers are able to deliver the required parts.

Detailed planning of the phasing of specific relaxation measures is essential, as is close cooperation between business and the authorities. The government also needs to establish a centralised coordination function capable of dealing quickly with any unexpected supply chain glitches. And it must pay close attention to feedback from health experts on how the process of re-opening the economy sector-by-sector is affecting the rate of infection.  

Third, the government needs to state how the current financial and economic support measures for the economy will evolve as the re-opening process continues. It is critical to avoid removing support measures too soon, and some key measures may have to continue to operate even as firms restart their operations. It is important to show how - over time - the measures will evolve from a ‘life support’ system for businesses and individuals into a more conventional economic stimulus.

This transition strategy could initially be signalled through broad principles, but the government needs to follow through quickly by detailing specific measures. The transition strategy must target sectors where most damage has been done, including the SME sector in general and specific areas such as transport, leisure and retail. It needs to factor in the hard truth that some businesses will be no longer be viable after the crisis and set out how the government is going to support employees and entrepreneurs who suffer as a result.

The government must also explain how it intends to learn the lessons and capture the upsides from the crisis by building a more resilient economy over the longer term. Most importantly, it has to demonstrate continued commitment to tackling climate change – which is at least as big a threat to mankind’s future as pandemics.

Fourth, the authorities should explain how they plan to manage controls on movement of people across borders to minimise the risk of new infection outbreaks, but also to help sustain the opening-up measures. This needs to take account of the fact that different countries are at different stages in the progress of the pandemic and may have different strategies and trade-offs on the risks they are willing to take as they open up.

As a minimum, an effective border plan requires close cooperation with near neighbours as these are likely to be the most important economic counterparts for many countries. But ideally each country’s plan should be part of a wider global opening-up strategy coordinated by the G20. In the absence of a reliable antibody test, border control measures will have to rely on a combination of imperfect testing, quarantine, and new, shared data requirements for incoming and departing passengers.  

Fifth, the authorities must communicate the steps effectively to the public, in a manner that shows not only that this is a well thought-through plan, but also does not hide the extent of the uncertainties, or the likelihood that rapid modifications may be needed as the plan is implemented. In designing the communications, the authorities should develop specific measures to enable the public to track progress.

Such measures are vital to sustaining business, consumer and employee confidence. While some smaller advanced economies appear close to completing these steps, for many others there is still a long way to go. Waiting until they are achieved means higher economic costs in the short-term. But, in the long-term, they will deliver real net benefits.

Authorities are more likely to sustain these measures because key economic actors will actually follow the guidance given. Also, by instilling confidence, the plan will bring forward the consumer and business decision-making crucial to a strong recovery. In contrast, moving ahead without proper preparation risks turning an already severe economic recession into something much worse.

There has been a stark contrast between messaging coming from the international community and trends on the ground as Libya’s latest bout of civil war enters its eighth month.

Led by Germany, some states have been trying to build consensus for a ceasefire ahead of a summit that is expected to be held in Berlin in the next few months. Today marks the date of one of the final planning meetings for the summit.

The increasing use of drone technology, airstrikes and further influxes of fighters trend points in the opposite direction. Warring groups in Libya continue to receive support from external states, undermining international efforts to de-escalate the conflict. A UN arms embargo goes largely unenforced. As the Berlin process unfolds, there is little evidence to suggest that these external states will shift their positions.

The launch of Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) offensive on Tripoli in April sunk a UN-planned ‘national conference’, intended to be held less than two weeks later, to negotiate a framework for transition out of Libya’s governance crisis. Yet, Haftar has so far failed in his objective of capturing Tripoli. While his offensive continues, had he the capacity to capture the city, he would have done so already.

This has created a conundrum for peace talks: there appears to be little chance of negotiating a deal with Haftar, while it is also hard to see how a deal could be reached without him.

The field marshal has little interest in accepting a withdrawal, even a partial one, of his forces. His opponents – who have found unity in their shared efforts to defeat Haftar’s forces – will not accept a ceasefire that leaves the LAAF on the hinterlands of the capital. Similarly, a deal apparently agreed in Abu Dhabi between Haftar and Prime Minister Fayez al-Serraj in February is also dead in the water.

Amid this logjam, there has been an increasing interest in the economic content of the Berlin summit. Countries supportive of Haftar argue that his alliance has legitimate concerns over the management of Libya’s economy and, particularly, the dominant role of the Tripoli-based central bank and its governor in supporting armed groups.

For some within these countries, changing the leadership of the central bank and a finding means of limiting the dominance of the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) over the state’s resources – thus reducing flows of funding to armed groups fighting Haftar – could present a point of agreement in Berlin.

But their focus on financial management in Tripoli is not mirrored by interest in holding the rival central bank in the eastern city of Bayda – an institution unrecognized by the international community – to account for its pursuit of its own monetary policy. This is built on approximately $23 billion of unsecured debt from commercial banks and $11 billion of currency supplied by Russia.

Indeed, very few of the conversations surrounding parameters for Berlin contain details of what would be asked of eastern-based actors beyond pursuit of an audit of the Tripoli and Bayda central banks (only the Tripoli bank is recognized by the international community).

Clearly, the GNA and its allies would have no incentive to accept provisions that limit their means to mobilize resources for the war while its opponents do not receive the same scrutiny. 

However, it is possible to capitalize on the broad interest in economic content to reach some points of agreement over the management of the economy and state institutions. Rather than seeking to replace individuals aligned with one faction for those aligned with another, or expecting asymmetrical concessions from the GNA and its allies, this effort must instead focus on structures and processes that exacerbate the conflict and represent major grievances for the warring parties.

Importantly, this would include the establishment of a system of transparency and accountability for the management of Libya’s finances.  The opacity of current processes enables the support of patronage-based networks with no effective oversight.

Linked to this, the development of effective processes for budgeting and allocating funds could help to reduce graft.

And, finally, rationalizing the role of state institutions to agree their roles and responsibilities, creating the room for reforms to Libya’s system of state employment and subsidies through provision of direct payments to Libyan citizens, is essential.  

An economic commission that comprises members from across political and institutional divides – receiving political support from international powers and technical support from international financial institutions – could be an effective approach. Such a commission could match an inclusive, Libyan-led process with international support to progressively harmonize economic and financial policy between rival authorities and develop consensus for a process of institutional reunification in Libya.

This would constitute a major element of an eventual political settlement and reduce the risk of a limited set of actors capturing the system at the expense of the others – an outcome which would likely result in future bouts of violence.

Such a commission would offer a means of addressing a key driver of the conflict by decentralizing aspects of Libya’s governance, moving away from the dominance of Tripoli and the current winner-take-all system. 

These issues cannot be put to one side, to follow progress on the security front. The remarkable resilience that Libya’s economy has shown over the last seven months should not be taken for granted. It has become increasingly difficult for Libya’s institutions to insulate themselves from the conflict as both sides seek to mobilize resources to sustain their war effort.

The LAAF is increasingly looking to sideline civilian authorities in eastern Libya. On the other side, the GNA has found means of routing funds to armed groups fighting Haftar.

In September, a dispute over the supply of jet fuel between the LAAF and the National Oil Corporation resulted in the establishment of a parallel Brega Petroleum Marketing Company, the state-owned company that possesses a monopoly over fuel distribution.

Meanwhile, other major problems lurk under the surface.  The banking sector is in an increasingly perilous state and debts continue to mount all around, with those in the east not accounted for by Tripoli’s official authorities.  

Through the establishment of an economic commission, the Berlin process provides an opportunity and – most importantly – a mechanism to address these problems while also helping to maintain the basic functionality of the state.  Even if a ceasefire deal does not materialize, initiating negotiations about the future shape of the state and its economy would be a significant step forward.

For four decades, the rule of Iran’s Islamic Republic has rested on the pillars of redistributive social justice, foreign policy independence, Islam and a managed form of electoral legitimacy.  These pillars, each of equal importance, have served as guiding principles bolstering Iran’s domestic and foreign policy decisions.  Amid the latest round of protests to have gripped Iran, it is clear that these pillars are fracturing. 

On 15 November at midnight, the Iranian government, in a move supported by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, President Hassan Rouhani, Speaker of the Parliament Ali Larijani and Head of the Judiciary Ebrahim Raisi, announced a 200 per cent increase in fuel prices – a redistributive measure designed to provide cash transfers to the population.

In immediate reaction, Iranian citizens took to the streets to express their discontent with this policy move alongside mounting economic and political grievances.

What ensued over the subsequent days was an outbreak of protests through 100 Iranian cities, including at universities and bazaars, that was followed by a weeklong internet blackout and a brutal crackdown that has left at least 200 people dead and 7,000 arrested. Initially, public anger focused on the price increases but quickly targeted the political leadership, lack of government accountability, effective governance and corruption.

This wave of protests is the fourth in a two-decade period – 1999, 2009, 2017 and 2019 – for the Islamic Republic and comes at time when the Iranian government is under severe economic strain from Washington’s maximum pressure campaign. It is equally burdened by endemic factional politicking.

These protests are one of many reminders of the shattered social contract between state and society in Iran, which without repair will continue to resurface.

With internet connectivity resumed and news of the regime’s brutality spreading, conservatives and reformists are both trying to distance themselves from this internal crisis and reposition themselves in advance of the 2020 parliamentary elections.

Parliamentary elections for Iran’s 290-person legislature are expected to be held on 21 February. Amid concerns over public apathy and lower political participation, both reformists and conservatives are trying to develop strategies to maximize gains at their ballot box.

Even before these protests, voter turnout was anticipated to be lower than normal. Participation in the July 2019 Tehran municipality election was at a nadir of 9 per cent.  To prepare for this challenge, Iran’s parliament has lowered the vote threshold for a valid result from 25 to 20 per cent.

Elections in Iran, while by no means completely free and fair due to the vetting of candidates by the Guardian Council, have repeatedly been an important barometer of public support and participation. Electoral participation, which is traditionally higher than in most Western democracies, and compared to the lack of electoral opportunities in the Middle East, is heralded as a sign of public legitimacy. 

Voter participation is generally higher in presidential elections than in legislative ones.

For example, 73% voted in the 2017 presidential elections, 72% in 2013, 80% in the contested 2009 elections, and 59% in 2005 elections that brought Mahmood Ahmadinejad to office. Comparatively, in the 2016 parliamentary elections 62% voted, in 2012, 66%, in 2008, 47%, and in 2004, 51% participated.

Voter turnout in the 2008 parliamentary elections, reflective of public apathy, mounting international tensions over the nuclear programme, and Guardian Council vetting of reformist candidates, could be emblematic of what to expect next year. 

In the run up to the election, conservative groups are trying to capitalize on popular economic frustrations, disappointment with reformists, wider regional security concerns and tensions with the United States to rally voters. 

Reformists associated with the Rouhani government, who also supported the Iran nuclear agreement, have been severely weakened by the US maximum pressure campaign and the return of US sanctions.  They are also blamed for the current economic downturn and remain frustrated by their ability to affect change in a political system that affords more power to unelected figures.

Amidst this stalemate, Rouhani has continued to call for a national referendum to no avail, while reformist groups are debating how to position themselves – some even calling for greater accountability – so as not be tainted by the government crackdown. Leading reformist politicians such as Mohammad Khatami have called on reformists to stay united and avoid boycotting the elections. It remains to be seen how their strategy will develop after the protests.

Should the Guardian Council bar too many reformists from running, calls for a boycott could snowball and even incite new protests. Together with low turnout at the ballot box, the outcome of this election could further damage the regime’s already fragile electoral pillar and weaken its claims to legitimacy.

Following the US strike on Qassem Solaimani and Abu Mehdi al-Muhandis, populist cleric Muqtada al-Sadr has violently cracked down on youth-led protests in Iraq.

His paramilitaries and ‘blue hats’ –  supposedly created to protect protestors from state and allied parastatal security forces – sought to end the months-long demonstrations by attacking the places where protesters have camped since October. In Baghdad’s Tahrir Square, they successfully captured the famous Turkish restaurant which had become a symbol of Iraq’s ‘October revolution’. 

Once the champion of Iraq’s protest movement, Sadr has seemingly changed course and now leads the counter-protests. This reversal has mystified many, from Iraqis who saw Sadr as an ally in their struggle for reform against an impenetrable elite to foreign diplomats who hoped Sadr could help pushback against Iranian influence in Iraq. 

Yet this is not the first time that Sadr has drastically redefined his position. Since 2003, he has gone from Shia sectarian militia leader to pro-democracy reformist and Iraqi nationalist.

And in the past few months, he has given mixed signals, both supporting and criticising the protesters. The most recent incidents of Sadrist violence targeting demonstrators provoked a societal backlash, prompting Sadr to change tack once more and announce that he would disband the blue hats and investigate their crimes against protesters.

Sadr and the paramilitaries

Sadr’s latest change of course may seem to flow directly from the US assassination of Qassem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis and the ensuing vacuum in the Shia paramilitary sphere. Prior to this move, the Sadrists were on the defensive, outflanked and outgunned by the growing coercive and political power of a constellation of Shia armed groups coalescing under Muhandis’s de facto leadership. Many of these groups competed for Sadr’s base, including Qais al-Khazali’s Asa’ib ahl al-Haq and Akram al-Kaabi’s Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba.  

With Muhandis out of the picture, Sadr could reclaim the space by pushing his own right hand, Kadhem al-Issawi (Abu Do’a), to be the new centre of the paramilitary field and forcing competitors, including Khaza’li and Kaabi, to rally around his leadership.

Iran, in the short term, appears to be going along with this solution to bring more coherence to its allied forces in Iraq as it seeks to counter what it regards as US aggression. Iran also hopes that bringing Sadr back in will help neutralize the protest movement which threatens its stake in Iraqi politics. 

The most visible sign of this Iran-brokered rapprochement was the 13 January meeting in Qom attended by Sadr, Issawi and several senior militia commanders including Laith al-Khazali (Qais al-Khazali’s brother). 

Following the Qom meeting, a pattern of tit-for-tat violence and assassinations between the Sadrists’ Saraya al-Salam and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq – ongoing since the start of the October protests in Iraq – ceased.

A fragmented movement?

However, while the US strikes certainly changed Sadr’s political calculations, there are more persistent fundamentals at work that help explain his change of course. The first of these relates to long-standing fragmentation within the movement. This exists not only within Sadrist paramilitaries, but within the movement’s clerical networks, and also applies to the ties that bind the Sadrist leadership to its popular base. This fragmentation makes it difficult for Sadr to impose a coherent politics on his followers from the top down.

There are signs that Sadr’s recent shift in position has exacerbated this fragmentation. His attempt to reposition the movement’s base within the ‘resistance axis’ that supports the Shia militias in Iraq has only been partially successful. On 24 January, responding to the US assassinations, Sadr called for a million-man march focused on expelling US forces from Iraq. However, turnout was poor, especially given the huge logistical support for the march, and it lasted only a few hours.

Equally revealing, when Sadr called on his supporters to vacate the squares, many refused. One Sadrist protester in Baghdad’s Tahrir Square told the authors: ‘We’ve been camping with our brothers and sisters for four months. Why should we leave them to die?’

Meanwhile, fissures have also opened up within the Sadrists’ clerical elite. One senior Sadrist cleric, for example, is openly defying Sadr’s authority and siding with the revolutionaries in Nasiriyah. 

Sadr’s attempt to dominate the paramilitary sphere is also unlikely to prove any more successful than his many previous failed attempts since 2003. He is neither trusted nor respected by the leaders of other groups. The Iran-brokered rapprochement is already showing signs of weakness. Two recent assassinations of Saraya al-Salam leaders in Basra and Maysan indicate a potential renewal of power struggles between the Sadrist militia and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq.  

Sadr is not a revolutionary

Sadr has never been a revolutionary, but someone who seeks to leverage a role as both ‘spoiler’ and ‘stabilizer’ to maximise his political leverage. This strategy is ultimately oriented towards sustaining Iraq’s extant political system, not its overthrow. Forced to choose between the roles of revolutionary or maintainer of the status quo, he has opted for the latter. 

The protests that erupted in 2019 were not the same movement that Sadr led from 2015. The 2015 protests were an elite-driven phenomenon, integrated into the political field and carefully calibrated to exert pressure on the elite towards gradual reform. 

By contrast, the 2019 demonstrations spring from a youth-led, bottom-up mobilization that rejects politicization and seeks a more radical form of change. Chatham House surveys in a forthcoming paper reveal that the protesters are younger that those who protested in 2015-16. Fewer have permanent employment. Instead of demanding better services or jobs, they are focusing wholesale transformation of the post-2003 political system.

A Sadrist official told the authors that their movement initially joined the protests in October 2019 expecting a similar reform-orientation to the protests which Sadr had previously led. However, according to him, the protesters failed to come forward with reasonable demands or alternative names for prime minister. He believed the protests would fade, and many would regret the ‘wasted time and blood’. 

Sadr’s relations with Iran

A final long-term factor at play is Sadr’s receding autonomy from Iran. Ever since his movement’s electoral victory in May 2018, Sadr came under enormous pressure to reconcile with the political wing of the Iranian-allied parastatal armed groups in the formation of a new government acceptable to Iran.

Over the last year, Sadr has moved even closer to Iran, spending more time in Qom. Iran has offered Sadr security from his paramilitary rivals (such as Asa’ib ahl al-Haq), convincing Sadr that he is safer in Iran than Iraq. Moreover, Sadr is undertaking religious training in Qom, and may see this as a chance to enhance his standing in the Shia religious field as many look towards a future beyond the elderly Najaf-based marja Ali al-Sistani.

By keeping Sadr in Qom, Iran appears to be trying to isolate him from what they regard as negative influences. As tensions between the Sadrists and other protest groups intensified, efforts were made by some protest leaders and allied political groups to reach Sadr in Qom and try to persuade him to change course or restrain the worst abuses of his forces. However, this delegation was unable to make contact with Sadr. Those involved told the authors they have resorted to communicating with local Sadrist leaders in Najaf, Babil, Basra and Baghdad. 

Crossing a line

This is a transformative moment for the Sadrists. Sadr is now defying the popular sentiments driving protests across central and southern Iraq. The sense of betrayal among former allies and friends of the Sadrists is palpable. One senior activist involved in cooperation with the Sadrists wrote that, no matter what moves Sadr makes next, the cleric has ‘terminated all partnership with the protesters,’ and ‘shattered the framework for cooperation’. A line has thus been crossed that Sadr cannot reverse; he will not be able to recover what he has now lost. 

Iran, also, does not see Sadr as a dependable ally, and will look to isolate and side-line the cleric when the opportunity arises. Thus, in seeking to exploit a crisis for short-term gain, Sadr may well have sealed his fate – in the long term – as a declining force in Iraqi politics.

Since the overthrow of the regime of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011, Libya’s multitude of armed groups have followed a range of paths. While many of these have gradually demobilized, others have remained active, and others have expanded their influence. In the west and south of the country,  armed groups have used their state affiliation to co-opt the state and professionals from the state security apparatus into their ranks.

In the east, the Libyan Arab Armed Forces projects a nationalist narrative yet is ultimately subservient to its leader, Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. Prevailing policy narratives presuppose that the interests of armed actors are distinct from those of the communities they claim to represent. Given the degree to which most armed groups are embedded in local society, however, successful engagement will need to address the fears, grievances and desires of the surrounding communities, even while the development of armed groups’ capacities dilutes their accountability to those communities.

This roundtable will discuss the findings of a forthcoming Chatham House research paper, ‘The Development of Libyan Armed Groups Since 2014: Community Dynamics and Economic Interests’, which presents insights from over 200 interviews of armed actors and members of local communities and posits how international policymakers might seek to curtail the continued expansion of the conflict economy.

PLEASE NOTE THIS EVENT IS POSTPONED UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.

Russia’s Middle East policy is driven by a complex mixture of traditional factors (such as the ongoing confrontation with the West) and new trends. The Kremlin is keen to maintain its position as an influential external broker. However, it is not confident Russia would be able to respond effectively if forced into a reactive mode by other regional players. The Kremlin therefore seeks to retain initiative and shape the agenda according to its needs and resources. This makes prediction of Moscow’s next moves in the region a challenging, but not impossible, task.

Nikolay Kozhanov will offer remarks on the changes that have taken place in Russia’s strategy since the publication of his research paper Russian Policy Across the Middle East: Motivations and Methods (2018).

PLEASE NOTE THIS EVENT IS POSTPONED UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.

Summary

• GCC states seek to be leaders in digital innovation, but this leaves them vulnerable to an increasing range of cyberthreats. Governments have invested significantly in cybersecurity but these measures have been unevenly implemented, makingit difficult for these states to be resilient against a large-scale cyber incident.
• Strategies, structures and processes (‘approaches’) for achieving cyber resilience can be conceptualized along a scale from centralized to distributed: centralized approaches maintain decision-making power in a single body, while distributed ones disperse power over many sites.
• Centralized approaches provide more resilience against unwanted influence, while distributed approaches provide more resilience against intrusions into infrastructure. The GCC states have so far prioritized centralized over distributed cyber resilience, seeking internet and social media control over sustainable network recovery.
• GCC governments should make a sustainable commitment to cyber resilience that provides clear guidance to organizations and makes best use of emerging cybersecurity structures. This may involve further engagement with international initiatives and partners to increase cyber resilience.
• Given limited resources, GCC governments should rebalance their efforts from centralized towards distributed approaches to resilience.
• GCC governments should examine the impact of relevant new technologies, discussing openly the risks of these technologies and appropriate solutions.

Summary

• Libya’s multitude of armed groups have followed a range of paths since the emergence of a national governance split in 2014. Many have gradually demobilized, others have remained active, and others have expanded their influence. However, the evolution of the Libyan security sector in this period remains relatively understudied. Prior to 2011, Libya’s internal sovereignty – including the monopoly on force and sole agency in international relations – had been personally vested in the figure of Muammar Gaddafi. After his death, these elements of sovereignty reverted to local communities, which created armed organizations to fill that central gap. National military and intelligence institutions that were intended to protect the Libyan state have remained weak, with their coherence undermined further by the post-2014 governance crisis and ongoing conflict. As a result, the most effective armed groups have remained localized in nature; the exception is the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF), which has combined and amalgamated locally legitimate forces under a central command.
• In the west and south of the country, the result of these trends resembles a kind of inversion of security sector reform (SSR) and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR): the armed groups have used their state affiliation to co-opt the state and professionals from the state security apparatus into their ranks; and have continued to arm, mobilize and integrate themselves into the state’s security apparatus without becoming subservient to it. In the eastern region, the LAAF projects a nationalist narrative yet is ultimately subservient to its leader, Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. The LAAF has co-opted social organizations to dominate political and economic decision-making.
• The LAAF has established a monopoly over the control of heavy weapons and the flow of arms in eastern Libya, and has built alliances with armed groups in the east. Armed groups in the south have been persuaded to join the LAAF’s newly established command structure. The LAAF’s offensive on the capital, which started in April 2019, represents a serious challenge to armed groups aligned with the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA). The fallout from the war will be a challenge to the GNA or any future government, as groups taking part in the war will expect to be rewarded. SSR is thus crucial in the short term: if the GNA offers financial and technical expertise and resources, plus legal cover, to armed groups under its leadership, it will increase the incentive for armed groups to be receptive to its plans for reform.
• Prevailing policy narratives presuppose that the interests of armed actors are distinct from those of the communities they claim to represent. Given the degree to which most armed groups are embedded in local society, however, successful engagement will necessarily rely on addressing the fears, grievances and desires of the surrounding communities. Yet the development of armed groups’ capacities, along with their increasing access to autonomous means of generating revenue, has steadily diluted their accountability to local communities. This process is likely to be accelerated by the ongoing violence around Tripoli.
• Communities’ relationship to armed groups varies across different areas of the country, reflecting the social, political, economic and security environment:
• Despite their clear preference for a more formal, state-controlled security sector, Tripoli’s residents broadly accept the need for    the presence of armed groups to provide security. The known engagement of the capital’s four main armed groups in criminal activity is a trade-off that many residents seem able to tolerate, providing that overt violence remains low. Nonetheless, there is a widespread view that the greed of Tripoli’s armed groups has played a role in stoking the current conflict.
• In the east, many residents appear to accept (or even welcome) the LAAF’s expansion beyond the security realm, provided that it undertakes these roles effectively. That said, such is the extent of LAAF control that opposition to the alliance comes at a high price.
• In the south, armed groups draw heavily on social legitimacy, acting as guardians of tribal zones of influence and defenders of their respective communities against outside threats, while also at times stoking local conflicts. Social protections continue to hold sway, meaning that accountability within communities is also limited.
• To varying extents since 2014, Libya’s armed groups have developed networks that enmesh political and business stakeholders in revenue-generation models:
• Armed groups in Tripoli have compensated for reduced financial receipts from state budgets by cultivating unofficial and illicit sources of income. They have also focused on infiltrating state institutions to ensure access to state budgets and contracts dispersed in the capital.
• In the east of the country, the LAAF has developed a long-term strategy to dominate the security, political and economic spheres through the establishment of a quasi-legal basis for receiving funds from Libya’s rival state authorities. It has supplemented this with extensive intervention in the private sector. External patronage supports military operations, but also helps to keep this financial system, based on unsecured debt, afloat.
• In the south, limited access to funds from the central state has spurred armed groups to become actively involved in the economy. This has translated into the taxation of movement and the imposition of protection fees, particularly on informal (and often illicit) activity.
• Without real commitment from international policymakers to enforcing the arms embargo and protecting the economy from being weaponized, Libya will be consigned to sustained conflict, further fragmentation and potential economic collapse. Given the likely absence of a political settlement in the short term, international policymakers should seek to curtail the continued expansion of the conflict economy by reducing armed groups’ engagement in economic life.
• In order to reduce illicit activities, international policymakers should develop their capacity to identify and target chokepoints along illicit supply chains, with a focus on restraining activities and actors in closest proximity to violence. Targeted sanctions against rent maximizers (both armed and unarmed) is likely to be the most effective strategy. More effective investigation and restraint of conflict economy actors will require systemic efforts to improve transparency and enhance the institutional capacity of anti-corruption authorities. International policymakers should also support the development of tailored alternative livelihoods that render conflict economy activities less attractive.

At this webinar, part of the Chatham House MENA Programme Online Event Series, experts will explore how the coronavirus pandemic is impacting the economy, state-society relations and healthcare throughout the Middle East and North Africa. How are governments handling this crisis and what measures have they put in place to stop the spread of the virus? Why are some governments withholding information about the number of cases? What has the response from the public been so far? How is this affecting the region and how does it compare to the global picture?

The event will be held on the record.

Ever since independence, the Moroccan monarchy has used political parties to legitimize the country’s authoritarian political process and structure, and to absorb social and political anger. The palace puts successive governments and other elected institutions, such as local and regional councils, at the frontline of public blame, and replaces them once they fail this function.

In a recent article, MENA Programme Associate Fellow, Mohammed Masbah, examines how the Moroccan monarchy has used this strategy with the ruling Justice and Development Party (PJD) so that the palace remains the centre of political power, while the PJD – and other political parties before it– takes responsibility for coping with the mounting socio-economic crisis.

In this webinar, part of the Chatham House project on The Future of the State in the Middle East and North Africa, the article’s author will discuss the risks this approach presents for the long-term stability of Morocco and what reforms are needed to increase citizens’ dwindling confidence in the political process.

You can express your interest in attending by following this link. You will receive a Zoom confirmation email should your registration be successful.

The event will be livestreamed on the MENA Programme Facebook page.

Climate and environmental issues have largely been marginalized in discussions about the Middle East and North Africa region and yet are critical to peace and security. In this webinar, experts will explore mounting pressures including those related to water (reduced, less reliable and more polluted sources), extreme temperatures, air pollution, land degradation and sea-level rise. Panelists will discuss the potential impact of worsening environmental conditions and what the region's governments can do to protect the health and livelihoods of their peoples.

This webinar is part of the Chatham House MENA Programme's Online Event Series and will be held on the record.

Yemen suffered from the excessive control of the central government prior to the current conflict. Federalism has been put forward by many Yemeni political parties since the National Dialogue Conference (NDC) as the supposed magic cure for this significant problem. Today, Yemen is more fragmented than ever, its state central institutions have been scattered and lack leadership and the state has lost most of its sovereignty. The prevailing narrative that decentralization through federalism is Yemen’s inevitable path post-conflict often fails to acknowledge that there are prerequisites for effective local governance, beyond political will.  

In a recent article, Osamah Al Rawhani addressed how the weakness of central state institutions is the key challenge to proceeding with federalism in Yemen and highlighted prerequisites and contextual factors that need to be addressed before reforming the structure of the state. He argued that the viability of decentralization relies on the presence of a functioning, representative central government that is capable of devolving power but also able to keep the state from further fragmentation. 

In this webinar, part of the Chatham House project on The Future of the State in the Middle East and North Africa, the article’s author will discuss recent developments in Yemen, where shifting frontlines and regional divisions are fragmenting the country in new ways. The speaker will explore alternative approaches to pursue the path of federalism that recognize the current realities and the critical need for strong central institutions. He will also survey the internal and external factors that must be considered to rebuild a stable state in Yemen.

You can express your interest in attending by following this link. You will receive a Zoom confirmation email should your registration be successful. Alternatively, you can watch the event live on the MENA Programme Facebook page.

On April 9, Iraqi President Barham Salih gathered the Shia, Kurdish and Sunni political blocs at the presidential palace to task head of intelligence Mustafa al-Kadhimi with forming a government.

Kadhimi is the third prime minister-designate assigned since Prime Minister Adil abd al-Mehdi resigned in November, in the wake of mass protests against government corruption and the country’s ethno-sectarian based political system.

Kadhimi’s two predecessors, Muhammad Tawfiq Allawi and Adnan al-Zurfi, both failed to form a government. This third attempt came as Iraq struggles with repeated crises since October 2019, when the government began responding with deadly force to large-scale mass protests, killing more than 600 and injuring tens of thousands.

In January, the assassination of Qasem Soleimani escalated tensions between the United States and Iran, with Iraq stuck in the middle and becoming the home for regular tit-for-tat attacks. The Islamic State — never completely defeated — took advantage of these crises and increased its attacks in disputed territories.

The outbreak of COVID-19 challenges the country’s fragile public health sector, while the decline in the price of oil will make it harder for leaders to pay the public salaries that keep the system (and patronage) moving.

What does the delay in forming a government amid multiple crises mean for the post-2003 Iraqi political system?

Iraq’s post-2003 political system is designed to withstand crisis. Over the years, political parties reflecting the country’s ethnic and sectarian divides have had a tacit understanding that crises represent a risk to their collective interests. These elite stakeholders have together weathered civil war, insurgency and multiple protests — despite deep conflicts with one another.

For instance, in September 2018 protesters attacked most major political party headquarters and the Iranian consulate in Basra, and authorities killed some 20 protesters.

Since the May election of that year, the fragmented Shia elite had been unable to even declare which side has the largest parliamentary bloc, let alone decide on a government.

But after the September crisis, the previously gridlocked parties swiftly came together to form an “understanding” that pushed through the impasse leading to the Mehdi government. In 2020, however, Iraq’s political parties were slower to come back together despite the multiple crises — far greater than 2018. The system is less able to swiftly fix itself, based primarily on the fragmentation of the elite — and their determination to prevent any challenge to their rule.

Why did the two prior attempts fail?

The two previous prime minister-designates each fell short for different reasons. When I met Allawi in February at the prime minister’s guesthouse in Baghdad, he was very clearly convinced that his mandate was to sideline the parties.

He hoped that simply choosing technocratic ministers outside the elite pact, with the support of Moqtada al-Sadr behind him, would garner support from protesters and the disillusioned public. He failed, however, because his cabinet had to go through parliament and the parties rejected what they saw a threat to the elite pact and the system.

Zurfi similarly failed after being directly appointed in March by Salih after the Shia parties failed to come up with a candidate. From the beginning, then, Zurfi faced challenges because parties were not in agreement. He attempted to directly confront his opposition, and spoke out against Iranian influence in Iraq. As a result, Zurfi was unable to even get to parliament with his proposed cabinet, as the Shia parties got back together to bring him down.

The failure of both strategies — Allawi attempting to work outside the elite party system and Zurfi trying to target certain parties — reveals tensions in Iraq’s political system. This fragmentation strains the parties’ ability to swiftly unite, and the system’s ability to withstand crises.

The endemic problems are a consequence of fragmentation, including the failure following the 2018 elections to declare governing parliamentary bloc. Moreover, after that election, newcomers into the political system (two-thirds of the MPs are serving their first term) are increasingly making their own demands and less willing to blindly toe party lines.

Can Kadhimi overcome the impasse?

Kadhimi’s appointment as prime minister-designate nonetheless is on shaky foundations. His appointment had previously faced a veto from Iran and its allied groups which make up the Fateh bloc. Kataeb Hezbollah, an armed group close to Iran and linked to the Popular Mobilization Units, issued a statement accusing Kadhimi with blood on his hands for the deaths of Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis.

Many Fateh bloc members had for months vetoed Kadhimi’s name due to this allegation. Immediately before Kadhimi addressed the nation for the first time, Iraqi state television broadcast a prerecorded statement by PMU (and Fateh) leader Qais al-Khazali, who had also previously accused Kadhimi of spying for the Americans and being complicit in the two killings.

Khazali, who commands the second-largest party within Fateh, accepted the party line to back Kadhimi but came out with his own conditions on television. However, the concerns about the COVID-19 crisis and the collapse of the price of oil finally brought all sides to compromise — a design of the political system.

Kadhimi has signalled he will play by the old rules with these stakeholders. Because of the magnitude of these simultaneous crises, Iraqi politics is moving back to the post-2003 norm. The ethno-sectarian based political system is geared to weather such existential crises more than it is to handling day-to-day governance. Despite the notion of “post-sectarianism” in Iraq, this system is based on ethno-sectarian political party compromise.

In his television address, Khazali, who had previously attempted to move away from sectarian language, explained that the process of selecting a prime minister is reserved to the Shia, who have the right as the majority, and not to Salih, a Kurd.

Over the years Kadhimi has expressed an admiration of the bravery of the protesters and of the importance of civil society. Many Iraqi civil society activists owe their lives to the work of the former intelligence chief. However, he has also been part of the same system that has violently suppressed protesters.

As the compromise prime minister-designate, he will find it difficult to transform his country as long as he plays by the rules of post-2003 Iraq — an irony not lost on the protesters who immediately rejected the candidacy of a man whom until recently many protesters had supported.

This article was originally published in The Washington Post

Summary

• Following the territorial defeat of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in northeastern Syria, the Kurdish-led autonomous administration in the region is now grappling with the task of quickly dealing with thousands of the group’s detained members while bringing justice to their victims. To that end, local authorities are focusing on the use of counterterrorism laws and courts to charge captured ISIS members and determine their guilt accordingly.
• The piecemeal approach to justice is deeply flawed, and raises particular concerns about due process. No precise instruments exist to determine the personal responsibility of ISIS individuals for specific crimes, or for their role in war crimes committed by the group. In any event, the scale of the crimes and the number of victims – as well as severe shortages of resources and workers – make dispensation of justice extremely difficult through the traditional legal system.
• Not all detained ISIS members receive prison sentences. Individuals who did not hold senior roles in the group’s apparatus and are not accused of ‘major’ crimes (in practice, largely defined as fighting for ISIS and murder) are being released under limited reconciliation deals with tribal leaders. But the involvement of local community leaders in those efforts is not enough to ensure positive results. Many victims are upset at seeing ISIS members walk free without even admitting their guilt publicly or apologizing for the pain they caused.
• To overcome the limitations of the current, counterterrorism-focused framework, a ‘transitional justice’ approach could provide judicial and non-judicial instruments to establish accountability for ISIS crimes and reduce community resistance to the reintegration of group members. A combination of non-judicial mechanisms such as truth commissions, missing persons’ committees, and reparations and victim-healing programmes could play a vital role in providing ISIS victims with a sense of justice while contributing to peacebuilding and stability.
• Ignoring the urgency of developing a long-term plan to serve justice and contribute to community healing will almost certainly allow ISIS to continue to prevent the recovery and development of northeastern Syria. This, in turn, risks undermining the stability of the country and the region at large.

COVID-19 has offered regimes in the region the opportunity to end popular protest. The squares of Algiers, Baghdad, and Beirut – all packed with protesters over the past few months – are now empty due to the pandemic, and political gatherings have also been suspended. In Algeria, Iraq and Lebanon, COVID-19 has achieved what snipers, pro-regime propaganda, and even the economic crisis, could not.

Moreover, political regimes have taken advantage of the crisis to expand their control over the political sphere by arresting their opponents, such as in Algeria where the authorities have cracked down on a number of active voices of the Hirak movement. Similarly, in Lebanon, security forces have used the pandemic as an excuse to crush sit-ins held in Martyr’s Square in Beirut and Nour Square in Tripoli.

However, despite the challenges that the pandemic has brought, it also offers opportunities for protest movements in the region. While the crisis has put an end to popular mobilization in the streets, it has  created new forms of activism in the shape of solidarity initiatives to help those affected by its consequences.

In Iraq, for example, protest groups have directed their work towards awareness-raising and sharing essential food to help mitigate the problem of food shortages and rising prices across the country. In Algeria, Hirak activists have run online campaigns to raise awareness about the virus and have encouraged people to stay at home. Others have been cleaning and disinfecting public spaces. These initiatives increase the legitimacy of the protest movement, and if coupled with political messages, could offer these movements an important chance to expand their base of popular support.

Exposes economic vulnerability

Economic grievances, corruption and poor provision of public services have been among the main concerns of this recent wave of protests. This pandemic only further exposes the levels of economic vulnerability in the region. COVID-19 is laying bare the socio-economic inequalities in MENA countries; this is particularly evident in the numbers of people engaged in the informal economy with no access to social security, including health insurance and pensions.

Informal employment, approximately calculated by the share of the labour force not contributing to social security, is estimated to amount to 65.5% of total employment in Lebanon, 64.4% in Iraq, and 63.3% in Algeria. The crisis has underscored the vulnerability of this large percentage of the labour force who have been unable to afford the economic repercussions of following state orders to stay at home.

The situation has also called attention to the vital need for efficient public services and healthcare systems. According to the fifth wave of the Arab Barometer, 74.4% of people in Lebanon are dissatisfied with their country’s healthcare services, as are 67.8% of people in Algeria and 66.5% in Iraq.

Meanwhile, 66.2% of people in Lebanon believe it is necessary to pay a bribe in order to receive better healthcare, as do 56.2% of people in Iraq and 55.9% in Algeria. The COVID-19 crisis has highlighted the need for more government investment in public healthcare systems to render them more efficient and less corrupt, strengthening the protesters’ case for the need for radical socio-economic reforms.

On the geopolitical level, the crisis puts into question the stability-focused approach of Western powers towards the region. For years, Western powers have directed their aid towards security forces in the interests of combating terrorism but COVID-19 has proved itself to be a much more lethal challenge to both the region and the West.

Facing this new challenge requires international actors to reconsider their approach to include supporting health and education initiatives, as well as freedom of expression and transparency. As argued by Western policymakers themselves, it was China’s lack of transparency and slow response that enabled the proliferation of the virus, when it could have been contained in Wuhan back in December 2019.

This crisis therefore offers regional protest movements the opportunity to capitalize on this moment and push back against the policies of Western powers that have invested in regional stability only to the extent of combating Islamic jihad. 

But crises do not change the world, people do. The COVID-19 pandemic will not in itself result in political change in the MENA region. Rather, it brings opportunities and risks that, when exploited, will allow political actors to advance their own agendas. While the crisis has put an end to popular mobilization and allowed regimes to tighten their grip over the political sphere, behind these challenges lie real opportunities for protest movements.

The current situation represents a possibility for them to expand their popular base through solidarity initiatives and has exposed more widely the importance of addressing socio-economic inequalities. Finally, it offers the chance to challenge the stability-focused approach of Western powers towards the region which until now has predominantly focused on combating terrorism.

Chatham House’s annual London Conference looks at the big issues that confront the world at this key moment in history, and at how to design the new systems and institutions that will shape the international landscape of the future.

Speaker highlights     

• Fernando Henrique Cardoso, President of Brazil (1995-03)
• Kevin Rudd, President, Asia Society Policy Institute; Prime Minister of Australia (2013; 2007-10)
• Yannis Stournaras, Governor, Bank of Greece; Minister of Finance, Greece (2012-14)     
• Børge Brende, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Norway      
• Sergey Karaganov, Foreign policy adviser to the Presidential Administration, Russia (2001-13)     
• Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Secretary General, NATO (2009-14); Prime Minister of Denmark (2001-09)     
• Dr Barham Ahmed Salih, Prime Minister of Iraqi Kurdistan (2009-12); Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq (2006-09) 

This year's London Conference takes places ahead of the G7 summit in Germany.  The themes – demographic changes, urbanization, technological disruptions and resource constraints – are woven throughout the sessions. The aim is not only to discuss the major challenges that these issues present, but also ‘how’ and ‘by whom’ they should be addressed.

Panel discussions will include   

• The Changing Geopolitical Context: Reassessing Priorities and Approaches - In conversation with Kevin Rudd and Fernando Henrique Cardoso     
• What are the implications of the United States substantially retreating from its global leadership role?      
• How are new patterns and habits of digital connectivity changing relations between governments and their populations?     
• Can countries count on technological advances to deliver new routes to economic growth and social inclusion?     
• Is it more important to build national, regional or sectoral successes than to expect answers at the level of global governance?

Click here for full list of speakers >

Click here for full conference agenda >

It is now clear that President Putin’s ‘new model Russia’ cannot be constructively accommodated into the international system. The war in Ukraine, in part the result of the West's laissez-faire approach to Russia, demonstrates the need for a new Western strategy towards Russia.

The Russian Challenge - a major new report by six authors from the Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House - argues that a new strategy must recognise that:                  

• The decline of the Russian economy, the costs of confrontation and the rise of China mean that the Putin regime is now facing the most serious challenge of its 15 years in power.  The West has neither the wish nor the means to promote regime change in Russia. But Western countries need to consider the possible consequences of a chaotic end to the Putin system.             
• A critical element in the new geo-economic competition between the West and Russia is the extent of Western support for Ukraine, whose reconstruction as an effective sovereign state, capable of standing up for itself, is crucial. This will require much greater resources than have been invested up until now.                  
• Russia has rapidly developed its armed forces and information warfare capabilities since the war in Georgia in 2008. The West must invest in defensive strategic communications and media support to counter the Kremlin’s false narratives and restore its conventional deterrent capabilities as a matter of urgency. In particular, NATO needs to demonstrate that the response to ‘ambiguous’ or ‘hybrid’ war will be robust.                  
• Sanctions are exerting economic pressure on the Russian leadership and should remain in place until Ukraine’s territorial integrity is properly restored. In particular, it is self-defeating to link the lifting of sanctions solely to implementation of the poorly crafted and inherently fragile Minsk accords.                  
• While deterrence and constraint are essential in the short term, the West must also prepare for an eventual change of leadership in Russia. There is a reasonable chance that current pressures will incline a future Russian leadership to want to re-engage with the West.

James Nixey, Head of the Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House, said:  

'Pursuing these goals and achieving these objectives will ensure that the West is better prepared for any further deterioration in relations with Russia. The events of the last 18 months have demonstrated conclusively that when dealing with Russia, optimism is not a strategy.'

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Efforts to address illegal logging and reduce the trade in illegal timber have borne fruit and prompted some positive reforms in producer countries, a new report from Chatham House has found. However, changes in the sector mean overall trade in illegal timber has not fallen in the last decade. 
  
EU and US policies designed to reduce demand for illegal timber have helped cut illegal imports to those markets. These reforms and the EU’s partnership agreements with producer countries have prompted improvements in forest governance and a fall in large-scale illegal timber production.

But growth of demand in emerging markets means that the progressive policies of so-called ‘sensitive markets’ are now less influential. China is now the world’s largest importer and consumer of wood-based products, as well as a key processing hub. India, South Korea, and Vietnam are also growing markets. The increasing role of small-scale producers, whose activities often fall outside legal frameworks, and a rapid increase in illegal forest conversion, also present new challenges. 
  
Alison Hoare: 'The EU and US have spearheaded some progressive and effective reforms. However, the changing scale and nature of the problem demands more coordinated international action. To stop further deforestation and associated carbon emissions, and to help achieve global objectives for sustainable development, the EU and US need to maintain their leadership while other countries - especially China, Japan, India and South Korea - need to step up their efforts to tackle illegal logging.'

The Chatham House report, which is based on the studies of 19 countries, which include key producers, consumers, or processors of timber, and is an update of a 2010 study found: 

Timber production

• More than 80 million m3 of timber was illegally produced in 2013 in the nine producer countries assessed, accounting for about one-third of their combined total production.
• An estimated 60% of this illegal timber is destined for these countries’ domestic markets.
• Small-scale producers are increasingly important – for example, in Cameroon, the DRC and Ghana, they account for an estimated 50, 90 and 70% respectively of annual timber production. The majority of this is illegal.
• For the nine producer countries, the area of forest under voluntary legality verification or sustainability certification schemes increased by nearly 80% between 2000 and 2013. 

Imports of illegal wood-based products 

• In most of the consumer and producer countries assessed, the volume of illegal imports of wood-based products fell during the period 2000–13. 
• The exceptions were China, and India and Vietnam where the volume of illegal imports more than doubled. 
• As a proportion of the whole, illegal imports declined for nearly all countries. 
• However, at the global level, the proportion of illegal timber imports remained steady at 10% - a result of the growth of the Chinese market. 

The EU and US 

• The volumes of illegal imports into the UK, France and the Netherlands nearly halved over the period 2000-13, from just under 4 million m3 to 2 million m3. 
• The volume of illegal imports into the US increased between 2000 and 2006, from around 5 to 9 million m3, and then declined to just under 6 million m3 in 2013. 
• In 2013, more than 60% of illegal imports of wood-based products to the UK and US came from China.

China

• The volume of illegal imports into China doubled between 2000 and 2013 from 17 to 33 million m3; but as a proportion of the whole illegal imports fell, from 26 to 17%.
•  The volume of exports of wood-based products (legal and illegal) from the nine producer countries to China nearly tripled, from 12 million m3 in 2000 to 34 million m3 in 2013.

The Chatham House report makes the following recommendations:

• The EU and US need to maintain and reinforce current efforts 
• Other countries need to take stronger action – China in particular, but also India, Japan and South Korea
• Strong international cooperation is needed to maintain & reinforce current efforts – the G20 could provide a forum to galvanise international action
• Producer countries need to focus on strengthening efforts to tackle corruption, improving legality within the small-scale sector, and reforming land-use governance 

     
Alison Hoare: 'Developing countries are losing significant amounts of potential revenue from illegal logging, which is also causing the loss and degradation of forests, depleting livelihoods, and contributing to social conflict and corruption. Tackling illegal logging and strengthening forest governance are essential for achieving critical climate and development goals. Having seen the progress that can be made, it’s imperative that governments agree to work together to rise to new challenges and promote a more sustainable forest sector for the benefit of all.'   

Read the report >>

Eliza Manningham-Buller is confirmed as a president of Chatham House replacing Paddy Ashdown who steps down after 10 years.

The appointment of Baroness Manningham-Buller as a president of Chatham House was confirmed at the institute’s annual general meeting on Tuesday 21 July. Baroness Manningham-Buller joins Sir John Major and Baroness Scotland of Asthal as a co-president and succeeds Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon who has stepped down from the role after two terms.

Eliza Manningham-Buller was director-general of the UK Security Service (MI5) between 2002 and 2007 and became an independent life peer in 2008. She served as Chairman of Imperial College London from 2011 to 2015. She brings to Chatham House an extensive knowledge of and experience in international security as well as a deep interest in medical research and global health, having served as a member of the Board of Governors of the Wellcome Trust since 2008. In October 2015, Baroness Mannigham-Buller will become Chairman of the Trust’s Board of Governors.

Paddy Ashdown steps down after serving as a president for 10 years alongside Sir John Major, Patricia Scotland and their predecessors Lord Hurd of Westwell and Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, respectively. Over that period, the institute benefitted enormously from his extensive experience in international politics and conflict resolution, including as High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina from 2002 to 2006.

Dr Robin Niblett, director of Chatham House, said:

'I am delighted to welcome Elizabeth Manningham-Buller as a president of Chatham House. Throughout her career, she has brought deep knowledge, careful analysis and sound judgement to bear upon some of the most difficult dimensions of public policy. The institute will benefit greatly from these qualities as it draws on her engagement with Chatham House over the coming years.

I would like to pay tribute to Paddy Ashdown for his long-standing support of Chatham House. His contributions to our substantive debates, both internally and externally, have been invaluable on numerous occasions, and we look forward to his continued involvement with the institute as a member of our Panel of Senior Advisers.'

Baroness Manningham-Buller said:

“I am delighted to be elected as a Chatham House president at this important time in the institute’s history, as it grapples with a complex and inter-connected agenda of policy challenges. I look forward to working with John Major and Patricia Scotland in supporting Chatham House and its valuable and necessary work.

During a decade-long commodities boom, new or emerging producers of oil, gas or mineral resources registered some of the fastest rates of economic growth in the world. Development banks, governments giving foreign aid, extractives companies and major consultancies broadly agreed that ‘extractives-led growth’ is a viable path to socio-economic development for poor countries. 
               
Following over a year of decline in global commodities prices and as efforts to tackle climate change mount, a new paper re-examines the 'curse of natural resources'. It finds that a policy of extractives-led growth entails serious risks. As governments of countries as diverse as Afghanistan, Mauritania, Somalia, Liberia and Cuba prepare to follow an extractives-led growth path, both the advice being handed to them and the growth model itself require a fundamental rethink.

The Resource Curse Revisited argues that:

• The steep decline in the oil price in the second half of 2014 demolished the main assumption of the extractives-led growth agenda. The assumption that prices of raw materials would continue to increase as global demand grew and well-established sources were exhausted has actually led several low- to middle-income producers such as Ghana into unmanageable debt. At the very least, the current price context  puts new producers at a serious disadvantage, as the focus on cost-cutting has made investors reluctant to accept the risks of developing projects in countries with little infrastructure or capacity to support them.

• Good governance initiatives are not the antidote to the resource curse. There has often been a mismatch in terms of policy advice given (for example on transparency and revenue management) and the capacity of a country to implement it. Furthermore, basing economic growth on the extraction of below-ground resources will create strong pressures towards poor governance. In the absence of strong institutions, this path leads to the enrichment of minority elite groups, whose interest in capturing rents is likely to become a barrier to improving governance.

• Both governments with extractives potential and those advising them give too little consideration to the size and nature of the resource base. If extractives-led growth is to be sustained, resource extraction must persist long enough for new economic sectors to emerge and generate revenues that can support government spending and import needs as income from extractives declines.

• The extractives-led growth model, in its current form, is at odds with green growth strategies. The advice from international agencies and initiatives to countries with extractive resources offers no suggestions on how governments should manage the risk of stranded assets or how they can reconcile extractives-led growth with national sustainable-development goals.

The report concludes that the extractives-led growth agenda has tended to reinforce domestic, government and investor pressures to ‘develop fast’. However, this can threaten long-term opportunities for robust economic diversification. In many cases, there is a strong case for slowing development of extractives projects to allow time to develop the capacity of the government and the private sector to maximize the linkages with the rest of the economy.

Avoiding the resource curse needs not only good governance but also an economic policy that provides for the transition of an economy over time in accordance with its competitive advantages. This report recommends that countries considering extractives development, and their would-be advisors, take into account a wider set of issues at the outset including the likely value of the asset to the economy over time, the options for slow or indeed no development of extractives, and how the rest of the economy would lessen reliance on support from the extractives sector over time.

Given the international context, it is in Britain’s best interests to treat Europe as the ‘inner circle’ of its foreign, security and international economic policy, argues Dr Robin Niblett, director of Chatham House, in a new paper.

The British government’s approach since 2010 of seeking to enhance the UK's relations with the world’s emerging powers while balancing these with relationships with the United States and Europe has had only limited success. With constrained resources, and in the face of intense global economic competition, mounting security challenges and decaying international institutions, trying to commit the UK equally on all three fronts will not succeed in the future.

Britain, Europe and the World: Rethinking the UK’s Circles of Influence calls for a different mindset and strategy towards the UK’s place in the world – one in which Britain is surrounded by three concentric circles of influence:

• The first or ‘inner circle’ is the EU, the region with which the UK’s relationships need to be strongest and most active.
• The ‘second circle’ consists of the protective and enabling set of economic and security relationships with the US.
• Finally, an ‘outer circle’ comprises the UK’s other key bilateral and institutional relationships.

Should the UK vote to remain in the EU, policy-makers should commit to placing the EU at the centre of Britain's foreign policy, using the country’s economic weight, diplomatic skills and networks to play a leading role in leveraging more effective EU-wide policies.
 
Should the country vote to leave, the UK and the EU would enter an extended period of dislocation before arriving at a new, mutually diminished settlement. British policy-makers would be forced to deal and negotiate with the EU on critical policy issues from the outside. It is hard to see, argues Dr Niblett, how that could lead to EU policies or an international context more in line with British interests.                          

Despite its structural flaws and competing national interests, the EU offers the best prospects for managing the rapidly changing global context, for three main reasons:

First, it allows the UK to leverage the EU’s global economic weight to enhance the UK’s economic interests internationally, including securing beneficial trade agreements and contributing to EU and global standard-setting and rule-writing. Conversely, leaving would require the UK to renegotiate over 100 trade agreements, and would disadvantage UK interests in EU markets, including making EU governments less likely to liberalize services.                          

Second, it gives the UK a say in designing new EU initiatives to strengthen both British and European security in the face of diverse threats, whether managing the flow of refugees and other emigrants; combatting terrorism; or managing a more assertive Russia and the fallout from a disintegrating Middle East.                          

Third, cooperating with other EU members offers a way of maximizing opportunities to find joint solutions to shared problems, whether in terms of responding to climate change; managing growing cyber insecurity; reversing the decay of governance in failing states; or combating the rise of dangerous non-state actors.

Dr Robin Niblett said:

‘Britain is likely to be richer, safer and more influential in the coming decades if it treats Europe as the ‘inner circle’ of its foreign policy. For a mid-sized country like the UK, being a major player in a strong regional institution can offer a critical lever for international influence. In the UK’s case, this means choosing to be a leading player in the world’s principal civilian power, the European Union.’

About 90 per cent of refugees living in camps have no access to electricity and many lack any form of lighting at night, says a Chatham House report for the Moving Energy Initiative. Energy poverty in refugee settlements is not on the radar of international initiatives and humanitarian agencies are ill-equipped to deal with the scale of need. 

Heat Light and Power for Refugees: Saving Lives, Reducing Costs zooms in on the energy needs of refugees and displaced people worldwide, and presents the first ever estimates of the volume and costs of what they use.

'The problem goes beyond electricity. 80 per cent of those in camps rely on firewood for cooking and, as a result, we estimate that some 20,000 people die prematurely each year due to the pollution from indoor fires. Exposure to extremes of cold and heat are also killers for people living in flimsy, temporary shelter,' says Glada Lahn, senior research fellow at Chatham House. 'The current lack of provision for energy undermines the fundamental aims of humanitarian assistance,' she adds.

There are nearly 60 million forcibly displaced people in the world, and they pay staggering costs for energy. The 83,277 households living in Dadaab in Kenya, the world’s largest refugee settlement, spent an estimated $6.2 million on firewood last year, which accounts for approximately 24 per cent of their overall household income. (The average UK household spent 4 per cent of its income on energy in 2011.) In Uganda, almost half of refugee households surveyed by the UNHCR skip meals because they do not have enough fuel to cook with.

'The imperative is to find humane, creative and cost-effective ways to respond to the needs of so many individuals, most of whom are women and children.  Improving access to clean, safe and sustainable energy offers a promising way forward,' says Kofi Annan in the report’s foreword.

The report calls for an overhaul in the way that heat, light and power are delivered in humanitarian crises. It makes the case for new partnerships between humanitarian agencies and private providers to increase clean energy access in refugee settlements. Investment in energy infrastructure will also benefit host communities in some of the world’s poorest countries.

'As refugee households spend approximately $2.1 billion on energy each year, developing local markets for energy services could be part of a mix of solutions,' adds Lahn. 'Using green, culturally appropriate technologies could save lives, reduce CO2 emissions by 11 million tonnes per year and radically improve living standards. Introducing even the most basic solutions, such as improved cookstoves and basic solar lanterns, could save $323 million a year in fuel costs.' 

Other findings include:

• Rape and violence against women is common in many unlit camps. Only 4 per cent of women and girls in households in the Goudoubo camp in Burkina Faso would go out after dark due to the lack of streetlights.
• Wood equalling around 49,000 football pitches worth of forest (64,700 acres) is burned by displaced families living in camps each year, mainly in countries suffering severe deforestation, because they have no alternative sources of energy.
• Firewood consumption emits nearly twice as much CO2 as liquid petroleum gas and produces little energy in comparison to its carbon intensity.

International Development Minister Grant Shapps said:

‘Across sub-Saharan Africa, hundreds of millions of people still do not have access to electricity. Women and girls are at risk of violence after dark, families are forced to inhale toxic kerosene fumes, and energy remains unaffordable for many.

‘With the technology in place and investors coming on board, the time to act is now. The UK's Energy Africa campaign is already kick-starting a solar revolution across the continent.

‘Supporting the Moving Energy Initiative is another way Britain can help boost access to clean, reliable and affordable energy. This will transform people’s lives and help achieve the UN’s goal of universal energy access by 2030.’

Nigeria’s booming informal trade is costly for society, business and government, yet a critical opportunity exists to formalize such trade and drive more sustainable and less volatile growth, argues a new report from Chatham House.

According to one estimate, informal activity accounts for up to 64 per cent of Nigeria’s GDP. Nigeria's Booming Borders: The Drivers and Consequences of Unrecorded Trade finds that this is a result of obstacles that impede trading through formal channels. These drivers include bureaucratic burdens and other factors, such as:

• The need for Nigerian businesses to produce at least nine documents in order to send an export shipment and at least 13 in order to bring in an import consignment.
• Rigid and dysfunctional foreign-exchange regulations that push most smaller traders into the incompletely regulated parallel exchange market.
• Corruption and unofficial ‘taxation’, especially on major border highways, which delegitimize formal channels and encourage the use of smuggling routes.

As a result, the state loses direct tax revenues that would be generated by formal cross-border trade. This is not just siphoned into the informal economy; some is lost entirely. For example, many shippers opt to dock in neighbouring countries rather than deal with the expense and difficulty of using Nigeria’s ports.

Informal trade also undermines the social contract between the private sector and government. The state lacks tax revenues to pay its officials, improve infrastructure or implement reforms, while traders feel the government provides no services in return for any taxes they might pay.

‘Every day tens of thousands of unofficial payments are made, none destined for the government. Policy-makers need to create an environment that encourages trade to flow through formal channels and capture lost revenue’, says co-author Leena Koni Hoffmann.

‘Formalization would assist Nigeria to pursue more high-quality, high-tech economic activity at a time when rising labour costs in Asia are creating scope for Nigerian manufacturers to compete’, she adds.

The report makes a number of recommendations for how Nigeria could encourage more formal trade, including:

• Strengthening the resources and capacity of the Federal Ministry of Industry, Trade and Investment to coordinate action across key government ministries, departments and agencies, as well as public and private stakeholders.
• Prioritizing engagement in the development of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) trade policies and fully implementing the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Persons to reduce harassment at borders.
• Allowing banks to operate simple services for small and medium-sized businesses to make trade payments directly from Nigerian naira to CFA francs and vice versa.
• Improving basic facilities that support traders, including improving the efficiency of border posts, installing truck parks and all-weather surfacing on market access roads, and introducing online booking for trucks to enter ports.
• Separating responsibilities for assessing duty and tariff liabilities from revenue collection in order to reduce opportunities for corruption, an approach already tested with success by the Lagos State Internal Revenue Service.
• Increasing funding and technical support for the National Bureau of Statistics, which has a significant role to play in measuring and capturing more of Nigeria’s external trade.

Interviews conducted for the report reveal that business people would welcome the opportunity to pay taxes, but only if they received assurance that these payments would represent a contract with government guaranteeing that conditions for business would be improved.

‘As Africa’s largest economy, formalizing external trade would allow Nigeria to fulfil its potential as the trading engine of the West and Central African economy and shape the business landscape across the region,’ says co-author Paul Melly.