A new nuclear order 7 February 2023 — 6:00PM TO 7:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 26 January 2023 Chatham House and Online

In conversation with Rafael Mariano Grossi.

For more than half a century, the global nuclear non-proliferation framework has supported international security and facilitated the expansion of the many peaceful applications of nuclear science and technology. 

What is happening today in Ukraine, Iran and North Korea, not only challenges the way we deal with the existential threat of nuclear weapons, but also the impact it could have on addressing another existential threat – climate change.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is the biggest test to global resolve both in avoiding nuclear conflict and in ensuring the safety of one of the biggest nuclear power programmes in Europe.

Rafael Mariano Grossi of the International Atomic Energy Agency discusses key questions on global nuclear cooperation including:

• The impact of the war in Ukraine and issues with Iran and North Korea on countries’ risk assessment with regards to nuclear non-proliferation.

• What the IAEA’s on-the-ground presence and the director general’s missions to Ukraine, particularly the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, tells us about what is necessary – now and in the long term – to ensure the safety and security of nuclear material under all circumstances.

• The role of ensuring nuclear energy can play its vital part in mitigating climate change now and in the future.

As with all member events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

Read the transcript.

The future of the Russia-China relationship 9 February 2023 — 6:00PM TO 7:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 26 January 2023 Chatham House and Online

What lies ahead for the ‘unlimited friendship’ between Moscow and Beijing?

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has raised new questions about the nature of the relationship between Russia and China, with the war seen as having the potential to shift Russia from a close ally to a liability in the eyes of the Chinese government.

This event explores the latest developments in extent of the relationship and interactions between the two: new convergences and divergences, energy links and limitations, declared alliances and private disagreements.

Experts on the panel explore:

• How has the relationship changed since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine?
• What do the Russian and Chinese people make of the relationship?
• How could a war-weakened Russia be viewed by China?

As with all members events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

Read the transcript.

Members event 1 February 2023 — 7:00PM TO 7:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 1 February 2023 Chatham House

Members event (open ticket) 1 February 2023 — 9:00PM TO 10:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 1 February 2023 Chatham House and Online

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine: How it changed the world 21 February 2023 — 6:00PM TO 7:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 1 February 2023 Chatham House and Online

Chatham House experts examine how the world has changed since 24 February 2022.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine prompted serious soul-searching about European security, what it means to be European and the futures of the two principal protagonists. However, practical questions have developed throughout the war in surprising ways.

Chatham House is producing a multi-author feature reflecting on seven things Russia’s war has changed in the world. The article assesses the impact of the war one year on, the long-term changes this has catalyzed and unpacks why these changes are significant for the future of international affairs.

This event examines key themes with the research directors who authored the piece. Alliances, national resiliency for both Ukraine and Russia and sanctions are examined including the following questions:

• How did the war change Ukraine?

• What alliances have been forged over the past year? 

• How long can ‘fortress Russia’ weather the storm and what has it revealed about Russia’s integration into the international system? 

• What have countries done to mitigate the impact on supply chains and markets? Who, for example, has been most affected by the grain crisis?

• What have we learnt about Vladimir Putin and Volodymyr Zelensky that we didn’t know before 24 February 2022?

As with all members events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

Linked article: ‘Seven ways Russia’s war on Ukraine has changed the world’, read the featured piece here.

Read the transcript. 

Disruptive technologies by nation states and malign cyber actors – the US response 16 February 2023 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 2 February 2023 Chatham House and Online

Lisa Monaco, the US deputy attorney general, discusses how autocratic governments and malign cyber actors use disruptive technologies to project power and engage in illicit activity.

Weaponizing data, ransomware attacks and other illicit cyber activity represent significant threats to national security. 

Governments and malicious cyber actors around the world exploit disruptive technology to engage in criminal activity, track citizens and coerce other countries thereby weakening the rules-based order and fundamental principles of democracy. 

Lisa Monaco discusses how the world is at an inflection point when it comes to meeting this challenge and describes how the US and partner nations are responding to protect their citizens and the broader international community.

Key questions to discuss include:

• What steps does the US government need to take to properly address this threat?
• How are countries coordinating policies to confront the problem?
• To what extent does this challenge go beyond US-China competition?

As with all member events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

Read the transcript.

Who gains from artificial intelligence? 27 February 2023 — 5:30PM TO 6:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 6 February 2023 Chatham House and Online

What implications will AI have on fundamental rights and how can societies benefit from this technology revolution?

In recent months, the latest developments in artificial intelligence (AI) have attracted much media attention. These technologies hold a wealth of potential for a wide range of applications, for example, the recent release of OpenAI’s ChatGPT, a text generation model, has shed light on the opportunities these applications hold including to advance scientific research and discovery, enhance search engines and improve key commercial applications.

Yet, instead of generating an evidence-based public debate, this increased interest has also led to discussions on AI technologies which are often alarmist in nature, and in a lot of cases, misleading. They carry the risk of shifting public and policymakers’ attention away from critical societal and legal risks as well as concrete solutions.

This discussion, held in partnership with Microsoft and Sidley Austin LLP, provides an expert-led overview of where the technology stands in 2023. Panellists also reflect on the implications of implementing AI on fundamental rights, the enforcement of current and upcoming legislation and multi-stakeholder pathways to address relevant issues in the AI space.

More specifically, the panel explores:

• What is the current state of the art in the AI field?
• What are the opportunities and challenges presented by generative AI and other innovations?
• What are some of the key, and potentially most disruptive, AI applications to monitor in the near- and mid-term? 
• Which applications would benefit from greater public policy/governance discussions?
• How can current and future policy frameworks ensure the protection of fundamental rights in this new era of AI?
• What is the role of multi-stakeholder collaboration?
• What are the pathways to achieving inclusive and responsible governance of AI?

• How can countries around the world work together to develop frameworks for responsible AI that upholds democratic values and advance AI collaboration across borders?

As with all member events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

Read the transcript.

The era of ‘reglobalization’ 15 June 2023 — 6:00PM TO 7:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 14 February 2023 Chatham House and Online

How to balance international trade with efforts to enhance domestic economic resilience?

The global trade outlook remains challenging in 2023. Geopolitical tensions and national security concerns are playing a greater role in trade policy with a focus on strengthening supply chain resilience and reducing economic dependencies. In addition, the turn towards industrial policies has raised concerns about unfair trade practices and protectionism.

The debate about the future of globalization has only therefore deepened. While ‘deglobalization’ dominates the current public discourse on trade, is ‘reglobalization’ a better term to describe patterns of economic integration and fracturing across different economies and sectors?

The panel of experts discuss:

• To what extent are efforts to meet climate goals and maintain technological leadership intertwined with industrial policy and national security objectives?

• What do recent measures by the US – including the Inflation Reduction Act and a push on semiconductors – mean for cooperation with like-minded partners such as the EU?

• Are any countries resisting the protectionist trend and continuing to champion open trade?

• What steps can be taken to strengthen strategic and sensitive supply chains, for example, for critical minerals, high-capacity batteries and semiconductors?

• Is it possible to develop and advance a positive trade agenda for a reglobalized world? If so, what would it look like?

As with all member events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

Chatham House Primer: Social media and democracy 21 March 2023 — 6:00PM TO 6:45PM Anonymous (not verified) 23 February 2023 Chatham House

From the Arab Spring to the 2016 Trump election win, how have democracies benefited and suffered from the impact of social media? 

With social media now a well-entrenched, yet still recent, component of societies, democracies are still grappling with the impact bought about by this new form of communication and promotion.

For all that social media has bought people closer together and brought government, business and civic leaders, it has also been said to have fuelled divisions and hate. Governments and businesses are now drawing battle lines on the legal responsibilities required of social media platforms as we slowly determine the role they play in our society.

This Primer will discuss key questions including:

• What are the current legal responsibilities of social media companies? What sort of laws and regulations must they abide by?
• How are governments looking to change to this?
• How have some countries manipulated social media to monitor and censor their populations?
• Can social media truly tackle harmful and dangerous content?
• Is it possible to combat disinformation and what role should social media platforms play?
• How can we make social media best fit our society in the future?
• How should we govern online space?

A drinks reception will follow this event.

As with all member events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

In conversation with Rahul Gandhi 6 March 2023 — 6:00PM TO 7:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 27 February 2023 Chatham House and Online

The former president of the Indian National Congress discusses how today’s world will set the path for the world’s biggest democracy.

Soon to be the world’s largest population, and with a rapidly growing economy and an increasing presence in global affairs, India’s place in the world is changing.

Hosting the G20 this year, the New Delhi summit in September 2023 is a symbol of India’s growing might, moving from emerging to prominent player on the world stage.

However, challenges faced by the country are substantial. Frosty relations with China, ongoing tension with Pakistan, climate catastrophe, and food insecurity all represent significant global concerns to India.

Internally, the hurdles are imposing. Millions still live below the poverty line and demographic instability poses risks to the country. The state of democracy across the country is consistently questioned.

At this event, Rahul Gandhi explores key questions including:

• How does India see the impact of the war in Ukraine?
• Will New Delhi be able to balance relations between the West and Russia?
• Can India offer an alternative vision for Asia that challenges China?
• Internally, to what extent is democracy in India under strain?
• Can India’s economy evolve to create a wide-reaching, prosperous nation in the coming years?

As with all member events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

Is China's economy on the rebound? 5 April 2023 — 6:00PM TO 7:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 28 February 2023 Chatham House and Online

Exploring the domestic and international signals from the first annual session of the 14th National People’s Congress.

2022 proved to be a difficult year for China. War, COVID-19 and economic turbulence presented a cocktail of significant challenges for the ruling CCP in China. Having dispensed of the infamous zero-COVID-19 policy, China is apparently back open for business.

On the international front, continued tensions with the West, war in Europe and climate change are just some of the obstacles standing in the way of Chinese economic recovery. 

Domestically, China must find ways to reinvigorate demand and move on from a low of 3 per cent GDP growth in 2022. With a frustrated population, people are also keen to be freed from the shackles of a stream of lockdowns and quarantining.

The in-tray for the 14th National People’s Congress, as it begins its first session, is substantial. The implications, at home and abroad, from its recent summit in Beijing reverberate around the world.

The experts on the panel discuss:

• What has been the true extent of COVID-related damage to China’s economy and wider society?
• What economic scars are visible post-recovery?
• Will there be longer-term implications for China’s economic and diplomatic footprint globally post-COVID? 

As with all member events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

From Iraq to Ukraine: What did governments learn? 20 March 2023 — 12:00PM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 6 March 2023 Chatham House and Online

What were the main lessons for today’s conflicts from the way in which the war in Iraq played out?

This March marks the 20th anniversary of the US and UK-led invasion of Iraq to oust Saddam Hussein. Based primarily on unfounded fears Iraq’s WMD (weapons of mass destruction) capability was buidling up in the absence of UN inspection and constraints on the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) safeguards, the decision to go to war has reverberated throughout the Middle East, the intelligence communities, and Western political decision-making ever since.

In the 2002–03 period when UN inspectors were allowed back into Iraq, Hans Blix, chairman of UNMOVIC (UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission) and Mohamed ElBaradei, director general of the IAEA, were at the centre of a storm in which they were put under huge pressure to agree with the US/UK narrative on the ‘missing’ WMD.

Their problem was that the evidence they were uncovering did not support the claims, but the war went ahead – and Saddam was overthrown – despite these UN findings.

Much has changed since 2003. As the geopolitical landscape has shifted, so have geopolitics and capabilities. Today’s Russia’s war against Ukraine which includes WMD threats, cyberattacks, and an assertive disinformation campaign has opened up new ways of thinking about communicating information from open source and government intelligence analysis.

This panel explores the experiences of people involved with decision-making at the UN and in the UK in 2003 and how things have changed today.

• What were the lessons from the way in which the war in Iraq played out?
• How has that influenced the way in which NATO has responded to Russia’s wars against Ukraine?
• How should information be communicated within governments and to the public?
• How to deal with disinformation campaigns in the days of open source information and social media?

As with all member events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

Can diplomacy advance human rights? 25 April 2023 — 4:00PM TO 5:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 7 March 2023 Chatham House and Online

How is diplomacy contributing to advancing human rights through the multilateral system?

The international human rights system has come under significant pressure in recent years. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the US-China rivalry have created difficult political pressures, while major global challenges including climate change and global inequality demand answers. Effective diplomacy on human rights has become increasingly difficult, with incentives stacked against bold action.

The relationship between diplomacy and human rights is an uneasy one. Diplomacy is an art of negotiation, persuasion and compromise. Human rights are tightly defined and universal. The relationship between the two may seem paradoxical, but in the context of an unstable world order, it has never been more important.

In the 75th anniversary year of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, this discussion will explore the critical role of diplomacy in advancing human rights in the future.

• What are the critical human rights challenges today? What is the role of diplomacy in addressing them?

• What is the impact of intensifying competition between the US and China on the human rights system?

• Is there an opening for more leadership emerging from the Global South?

• What is the future of the human rights system in the context of this polarized world?

As with all member events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

In conversation with Ehud Barak 27 March 2023 — 12:00PM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 21 March 2023 Chatham House and Online

The former prime minister of Israel discusses his country’s political outlook and foreign policy priorities.

On the eve of its 75th independence anniversary, Israel is at a critical crossroads. Weeks of long, intense protests surrounding judicial reforms pursued by the current government have widened the debate over the role played by the, so far independent, judiciary, notably the Supreme Court.

Supporters on both sides of the argument are fighting over different visions of Israel – a true liberal-democracy, or a much-reduced version of a democratic system. Whichever side of the argument people fall, the debate symbolizes tension in Israel’s society and decline in trust of its political and constitutional institutions.

Abroad, the situation remains intricate. Israel-Iran relations remain on a knife edge while the Abraham Accords normalized relations with parts of the Gulf. Then there are the continual issues surrounding relations with the Palestinians and their right to self-determination and statehood.

Old international challenges are now rubbing up against the new. Israel is part of a changing power dynamic in the Middle East, the result of a much-reduced US footprint. Furthermore, it must now contend with the other global superpower in China and continue to work on its response to the war in Ukraine.

Amid its domestic struggle to maintain its democratic character, fast-moving regional and international developments are in need of addressing. Friends and allies are deeply concerned with the country’s constitutional crisis, potentially re-evaluating their relations with the Jewish state.

Former prime minister of Israel Ehud Barak lays out his views on the complexities of domestic and international challenges facing Israel today.

Questions covered include:

• What are the main root causes of the current constitutional crisis, and how could it be best resolved?
• Could the current situation lead to a breakdown of the political system, even widespread violence?
• How could the current circumstances in Israel and Palestine affect relations between the two and any prospect for peace negotiations?
• How will US-Israel relations stand up against China’s influence in the region?
• What is Israel’s interpretation of the war in Ukraine and how is the country affected?

As with all member events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

Russia’s aggression and a crisis for multilateralism 30 March 2023 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 23 March 2023 Chatham House and Online

In conversation with Dmytro Kuleba, minister of foreign affairs of Ukraine, about how multilateral organizations struggle to respond adequately to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, Russia pursues this war in defiance of the umbrella organization’s multiple resolutions condemning the invasion, along with its war crimes, annexation of territory, deliberate targeting of civilian nuclear infrastructure, cultural extermination, and global disinformation campaign. 

This event explores the following questions: 

• How should the response of the UN to Russian aggression be assessed? 
• What can be done to uphold the guiding principles of the UN Charter? 
• Is there a ‘UN problem’ or a ‘Russia problem’? 
• How can trust and the legitimacy of multilateral cooperation be restored in times of strategic rivalry and rising global tensions?
• Who can drive such an effort? 
• Is post-Soviet transfer of the UN Security Council seat to Russia a cause of current impunity? 

This event features a live in-person audience in Kyiv as well as in London and online.

Chatham House exhibition - In conversation with the future 19 April 2023 — 6:00PM TO 8:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 31 March 2023 Chatham House

Hear from the innovative leaders and companies driving change towards a more sustainable future.

This event is an opportunity to hear from the innovative leaders and companies driving change towards a more sustainable future.

The evening begins with a panel discussion then, over sustainably sourced drinks and canapés, you are invited to walk through Chatham House and explore the innovative and experimental ideas enabling radical shifts to allow us to prosper without exhausting our planet’s resources.

Our exhibiting partners include Earthshot Prize winner NotPla, Hawkins Brown, Polymateria, and BEEN London. 

Bronwen Maddox, director of Chatham House, opens the evening at 6pm and introduces our panel of experts, chaired by Ana Yang, head of Chatham House’s Sustainability Accelerator. 

Please note that this event is operating a ballot for in-person attendance. Your place will be confirmed by Wednesday 12 April if you are successful.

Can rhetoric match reality? Britain’s international development future 27 April 2023 — 9:00AM TO 10:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 12 April 2023 Chatham House and Online

In conversation with Andrew Mitchell, minister of state, UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office. 

Last month’s updated Integrated Review positioned international development as a key pillar of British foreign policy which sets out the importance of the UK’s efforts to shape the ‘global strategic environment’.

Focusing heavily on Africa and the Indo-Pacific, international development will be central to the ambition of a ‘Global Britain’.

The Integrated Review outlines seven priority areas to revitalize the drive to meet the Global Goals, with a climate security strategy at its heart, while seeking to go beyond official development assistance (ODA).

However, there are major challenges ahead. Since 2021, the UK’s ODA has been cut from 0.7 per cent to 0.5 per cent gross national income (GNI). Some are concerned that since being subsumed by the UK Foreign Office, the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office has diluted the effectiveness of UK international development. Then there is the question of the strength of British public support for development assistance at a time of domestic economic hardship.

Can rhetoric match reality?

This event tackles questions including:

• What does the UK’s vision for international development mean in practice?
• Will aid and development help push Britain’s influence around the world?
• Can policymakers and politicians garner domestic support for international aid in times of economic uncertainty, and if so, how?
• Can the UK rebuild its reputation in the world while it doesn’t meet its 0.7 per cent GNI target?

This event will be balloted for in-person attendance. Register your interest to join and a confirmation email will be sent to you on Tuesday 25 May at 12:00 BST to confirm your place at the event.

As with all member events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

A coffee reception will immediately follow this event.

The role of think tanks amid political uncertainty 9 May 2023 — 6:00PM TO 7:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 13 April 2023 Chatham House and Online

Think tank leaders discuss how persistent and new forms of political uncertainty impact on their work and what can they do to counter it.  

Think tanks play a crucial role in supporting better public policy to address the most pressing global and local challenges. However, the recent rise in political turbulence poses a significant challenge to this work. Not only must the work of think tanks help counter political uncertainty but that uncertainty often threatens their ability to work effectively, and in some cases, their survival.

Polarized elections, regional instability, the rise of populism, shrinking civic space, eroding democracies, weakened institutions and public distrust are just some of the tricky contexts and issues raised by think tank leaders in the latest think tank state of the sector report. 

This event is being held in collaboration with On Think Tanks ahead of the On Think Tanks Conference.

Join us for a thought-provoking discussion at Chatham House on the major sources and consequences of political uncertainty in the world today and the critical role of think tanks in responding to and countering it. 

Key questions to be addressed during this discussion include:

• How does political uncertainty look like today?
• What can think tanks do to operate within uncertain contexts? 
• What are their roles: should they build the middle ground, support political parties, rally behind social demands?  
• Will think tanks be able to maintain their reliability and credibility in an increasingly polarized political environment?
• What can think tanks do to contribute to greater political stability?

As with all member events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

A drinks reception will immediately follow this event.

General practice leaders in Wales have voted unanimously to reject the Welsh government’s GP contract offer for 2024-25.The BMA’s ​General Practitioners Committee Wales said the government’s general medical services contract offer for the current financial year “fails to provide a credible and sustainable future” for general practice.GPs in Wales will now vote on whether to accept or reject the contract in a referendum that will open later this month.Gareth Oelmann, chair of the committee, said, “The decision to disregard the serious concerns and valuable contribution of general practice in Wales is beyond insulting, it is dangerous, leaving more surgeries and their patients in peril. We are concerned that this offer will leave more practices with no option but to close. GPs are being denied the resources they need to deliver vital services to the population.”The BMA said it was not yet able to disclose any details on the offer, and...

An employment judge has cleared the way for Farah Jameel, a former chair of the BMA’s General Practitioners Committee for England (GPCE), to go ahead with claims of discrimination and unfair dismissal against the association over her removal from the post during maternity leave.Jameel, who was elected the first female chair in November 2021, was put on temporary suspension in 2022 after complaints by BMA staff. The BMA told her in August 2023 that her contract was being terminated.The contract described her as a contractor providing consultancy services rather than an employee. But in a preliminary ruling the employment judge Natasha Joffe has held that Jameel was in reality an office holder and an employee, opening the way for her claims to proceed to a full hearing by an employment tribunal.The GPCE passed a vote of no confidence in Jameel in July 2023, as a means of electing a new...

The National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) has recommended that all women with suspected endometriosis be offered an early transvaginal ultrasound scan, even if the pelvic or abdominal examination is normal.In its updated guideline1 on the diagnosis and management of endometriosis, NICE recommends specialist ultrasound as an alternative to magnetic resonance imaging for investigating suspected cases of the condition in secondary care.The updated guideline follows recent reports from both the National Confidential Enquiry into Patient Outcome and Death2 and Endometriosis UK which highlighted problems with delayed diagnoses, partly owing to a lack of awareness among healthcare professionals of the condition and how it presents. Such delays can result in prolonged suffering, ill health, and risks to fertility, the reports warned.Other new and updated recommendations include asking women with suspected endometriosis if any first degree relatives have a history of the condition, and considering neurodiversity when taking into account...

I’m often asked if I miss working in the House of Commons. Of course I do; it’s one of the most amazing places in the world and remains the cockpit of our nation.There are obviously days I miss it more than others, usually around the big national moments. Whatever your view of Kim Leadbeater’s private member’s bill—the Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill—its second reading this month will be one of those big moments.Kim is a friend of mine, and we spoke before she decided to put her bill forward after it topped the private members’ ballot at the start of the new parliament. My advice was to proceed with great care, to remember that this will take over your career in many ways, and to read the report produced earlier this year by the Health and Social Care Committee, which I chaired, on the subject of assisted dying/assisted...

Concerns are mounting over whether the NHS can meet key performance targets this winter, NHS Providers has said, after a survey of trust leaders highlighted pressure on hospitals, ambulance services, and community and mental health teams.1Over nine in 10 of the leaders who responded (96%) said that they were extremely or moderately concerned about the effect of winter pressures on their trust and local area. The most common reasons for concerns related to financial constraints and staffing provision. The top three greatest risks to the provision of high quality patient care over winter were identified as delayed discharge (57%), social care capacity (49%), and acute care bed capacity (43%).NHS Providers surveyed 171 trust leaders from 118 trusts in September and October, accounting for 56% of the provider sector.Most trust leaders (79%) were worried or very worried about whether their trusts had capacity to meet demand for services over the next...

At a recent clinical meeting, I heard that GPs local to me are about to lose the ability to request magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scans for patients presenting with musculoskeletal symptoms. We’re instead advised to refer our patients to a musculoskeletal clinical assessment and triage service (CATS)—staffed largely by musculoskeletal advanced practitioners, who will assess our patients and determine whether imaging is warranted.The hope is that fewer patients will have unnecessary imaging and that this will reduce the potential harms of overdiagnosis. Radiologists rarely report musculoskeletal MRI scans as entirely normal, and it can be hard to know what to do with abnormal findings on an MRI. More often than not, patients with abnormal scans are referred to orthopaedic teams, even though there may not necessarily be a surgical target.At a population level, this is problematic on two fronts. Firstly, MRI scans are expensive and need to be used judiciously....

The World in Brief: European Court of Justice The World Today Anonymous (not verified) 29 July 2021

EU brings members into line over fundamental rights

The European Union has had a challenging start to the summer trying to uphold the rule of law and avoid democratic regression in its member states.

On July 14, the Polish constitutional court ruled that the country did not have to comply with the measures imposed by the European Court of Justice against its controversial judicial reforms, citing that these measures were not in line with the Polish constitution.

The ruling Law and Justice Party, known as PiS, has introduced extensive changes to the judiciary since coming to power six years ago. In 2018, the government appointed new judges and set up a disciplinary chamber for the Supreme Court, which was given a temporary suspension by the European Court of Justice in an interim decision last year.

PiS reasoned that the changes were necessary to eliminate corruption stemming from the communist era, but critics say it merely allows the government to punish judges it regards as disloyal. Under the disciplinary system, Polish judges can have sanctions imposed on them for their judgments in the lower courts or if they refer cases to EU courts for preliminary rulings.

In the day following the Polish top court’s decision, the stand-off worsened when the European Court of Justice ruled that the disciplinary chamber undermines judicial independence and violates EU law. It ordered its immediate suspension and reiterated that the EU has primacy over national law – a vital condition countries agree to when joining the EU.

Didier Reynders, the European justice commissioner, sent a letter to Warsaw with an August 16 deadline for an answer on whether Poland would comply with the ruling. If the EU does not receive a satisfactory answer, it will impose financial sanctions on the state.

The former communist country, which joined the EU in 2004, is one of the bloc’s success stories. Its economy has boomed, and most people hold favourable views about the union – less than a handful of other member states have greater support for EU membership.

A recent survey by the Bertelsmann Stiftung showed that ‘although only 35 per cent of Poles are satisfied with the democracy in their own country, a full 70 per cent express positive views on the state of democracy in the EU’. These figures feed into a larger picture of many Europeans welcoming the EU as a supervisory agent that is capable of intervening when individual states falter.

Recently, however, the EU has had to step up its efforts as members express anger over the gradual dismantling of fundamental rights under populist governments, not only in Poland.

The persistent backsliding in Viktor Orbán’s Hungary has led to concerns in the EU parliament, which is putting pressure on the European Commission to do more to protect the EU’s values and legal order.

In a simultaneous battle in July, the commission launched legal action against Poland and Hungary, challenging anti-LGBTQ laws in those countries. It was triggered by a decision of more than 100 Polish regions to pass resolutions declaring themselves free of ‘LGBTQ ideology’, and a recently adopted law in Hungary banning any depiction of LGBTQ people on television or in books for under-18s.

An annual report on the rule of law in the union, released by the commission in July, singled out the two countries for their non-compliance. The report, the second of its kind, is a new tool to address concerns that the union was not scrutinizing democratic backsliding within its own bloc. Critics were quick to point out, however, that there is no mention of enforcement actions.

At the start of the year the EU vowed to be tougher in upholding democracy with a new regulation that lets it withhold money from member states that breach the rule of law. The EU has already delayed approving spending plans for Hungary and Poland as part of the €800 billion pandemic recovery fund.

As the European Parliament calls for the commission to reduce budget allocations to those that undermine democratic rights, Poland and Hungary could see the new mechanism put to the test this autumn.

Russia and 9/11: Roads not taken Expert comment NCapeling 9 September 2021

Many Russia watchers recall the fleeting moment 20 years ago when the country could have moved away from a path of confrontation with the US.

On 12 September 2001, Russian president Vladimir Putin was the first foreign leader to call George W. Bush to express his condolences – and to offer him support.

Just the previous year, Putin had said Russia joining NATO was a possibility and it suited Russia to draw parallels between the terrorist attacks on the US and its own ‘anti-terrorist’ campaign in Chechnya at the time.

Even though much of the Russian commentary about 9/11 professed empathy rather than sympathy, in their eyes the US was both a victim – as Russia likes to see itself – and ‘had it coming’ while Russia was blameless.

At that time, many in the West were still tempted by the idea Putin’s Russia might develop in a liberal direction, and Putin himself wanted to be seen as constructive especially after Chechnya. He may also have also assumed that, if Russia joined the international alliance, it would be as a co-leader with the US.

An offer which was never stated

Whether he was sincere in his condolences or not, Putin was of course not offering something for nothing – but then few countries ever do. Although less than one-tenth into his time in control of Russia (so far), Putin was still feeling his way but was not a naive president having already been through the controversial sinking of the Kursk submarine.

His first move was to facilitate access to bases in Central Asia for the US campaign in Afghanistan – vital initially but less so later. Apparently, this offer was against the wishes of many of his senior military commanders – although the extent to which it was in his gift to grant such access is questionable.

The quid pro quo, unstated and only dawning on Washington much later, was for the US to keep out of what Russia saw – and still sees – as its backyard. Putin probably misjudged that the US would have neither the inclination nor the capacity to be in that region for anything other than supply chain purposes. And he hoped America now needed Russia after the humiliations of the 1990s.

Common interests could once have been the basis of a partnership with Russia; but to Moscow that meant a partnership of equals which recognized the Kremlin’s self-declared right to conduct out-of-area operations. But the US took a different view and, with nothing written down and no memorandum ever signed, the ensuing disappointment for Russia was gradual but inexorable.

A purely practical reason for declining the ‘offer’ was that, despite its own illusions, Russia had little to bring to the table which was useful and could be offered on acceptable terms. Subsequent initiatives – from specific joint terrorism initiatives to a ‘grand reset’ – could not narrow differences to the point where the character of the relationship changed.

The Northern Distribution Network for supplying US forces in Afghanistan – Russia’s most practical contribution to the notional common cause – took almost a decade to be established and was plagued by problems which often come with a dependence on Russian goodwill.

The Kremlin also had the pleasure of watching US hubris lead to failure in Iraq. And, although knowing the US intervention in Afghanistan would never end well, even Russia could not have foreseen the scale of the defeat and humiliation of chaotic withdrawal.

US achievements with Russia’s neighbours

When it comes to Russia’s post 9/11 ‘offer’ and subsequent expectations, many of the other newly independent countries might never have achieved what they have over the past 20 years if the US had agreed – tacitly or otherwise – to sit back and accept Moscow’s droit de regard over them.

From the Kremlin’s perspective, these states were Russia’s ‘kith and kin’ but it underestimated US willingness to support smaller states over a ‘great power’ – especially as George H.W. Bush pleaded to those states not to go too far too fast. Albeit uneven, most have benefitted from US support for their own independence as well as practical assistance to strengthen their institutions and diversify external relationships.

The three Baltic states consolidated their democracies while their economies, which severed many ties with Russia early, are flourishing and prosperous in contrast to those still in the Russian orbit. They are not only members of NATO and the European Union (EU) but have on occasion been moral leaders as in the case of Lithuania facing down both Belarus and China.

Ukraine has undergone two revolutions in attempting to follow the paths of the Baltic states that continues today. After many false starts Moldova has undergone a similar change recently but at the ballot box not on the streets, to give itself another shot at the prize of true democracy and international acceptance.

Georgia conducted the most radical governance reforms seen in the region after its own revolution although it has taken a few steps backwards of late. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have strengthened their independence since then and adjusted their modus vivendi with Russia to their advantage. Putin would hardly be able to give the same assurances about use of bases there today – and indeed reportedly brushed off a request by Biden to use them in the current withdrawal.

Only a minority of formerly Soviet republics have made no progress whatsoever at the governmental level – Belarus and Turkmenistan for sure, perhaps Azerbaijan and Tajikistan too depending on the criteria.

The roads not taken

America’s failure was not so much rejecting Russia’s offer of partnership but failing to pay sufficient attention to it because Russia was still regarded as weak despite being relatively strong in its immediate neighbourhood.

The question of whether it was worth alienating Russia is a moral one. Refusing to sign the Paris Charter – which recognizes the right of independent states to form their own alliances – would have been a further betrayal of people who have long been subjected to their future being decided by stronger powers around them. But Russia may have chosen a path of confrontation anyway as, for the Kremlin, suzerainty over its former republics is considered an entitlement which comes with being a great power.

Although impossible to conclusively prove, all previous frameworks of Russian assumptions and habits of Russian behaviour indicate Moscow would have pocketed the deal and simply moved on anyway. It certainly seems likely that Russia’s other outrages and offenses over the years – from the murders of Litvinenko and Skripal in the UK to the manipulation of information and elections – would still have occurred even if a shabby deal had been made over the heads of the new states on Russia’s borders.

The atrocity of 9/11 was really an opportunity for Russia, a genuine potential turning point and a chance to create a new relationship with the outside world – but its expectations were unrealistic. Russia blew it with demands at the time that could not be met – and rightly were not met. The US rarely receives credit for withstanding Russian blandishments at a moment when its own aura of strength had been so cruelly and effectively punctured by the most brazen of attacks.

Memory politics: the challenge of commemoration in post-Soviet Eastern Europe and the Caucasus 5 October 2021 — 1:00PM TO 2:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 21 September 2021 Online

This event explores how to address memory and commemoration in the former Soviet states, considering their role in political processes and violent conflict. 

How the past is remembered and commemorated plays a large role – perhaps too large – in contemporary political debates and in how conflicts are negotiated.

Perceptions of history influence people’s actions and are used to judge or dismiss the actions of others. Nowhere is this more so than in the political, territorial and social debates and disputes across the former Soviet Union.
 
This event examines how to address the problems caused by entrenched memory debates – and proposes a framework for ‘ethical political commemoration’ for use across historical enquiry, political processes, and conflict transformation initiatives.

The speakers explore the topic through the context of Turkey and the Armenian genocide, as well as more broadly through their own experiences in conflict transformation and peace processes.

Q&A: Maria Kolesnikova The World Today rescobales.drupal 29 September 2021

The jailed Belarusian opposition activist says: ‘It’s worth it’

Earlier this month, the Belarusian opposition activists, Maria Kolesnikova and Maxim Znak, were sentenced to long prison terms on charges of conspiring to seize power and crimes against national security. Both Kolesnikova, a prominent musician, and Znak, a lawyer, are supporters of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, who ran against President Alexander Lukashenka in last year’s election and is now in exile in Lithuania. European Union countries have called for all political detainees, including Kolesnikova, to be released, but so far these calls have fallen on deaf ears. Alistair Burnett interviewed Maria Kolesnikova.

What is your response to the verdict and the 11-year sentence handed down to you?

My conscience is clear. We didn’t break the law. We followed the law at all the stages of the electoral campaign.

After the verdict, we applauded when the judges left the courtroom. They fulfilled their despicable role in this historical process – now this decision is on their conscience.

It is impossible to take the court and the verdict in any way seriously. This is not a verdict on Maxim and me but on the authorities themselves, on the system itself.

It is evidence not only of a legal default, but of a system-wide default. I feel sorry for those who did not understand what happened and did not learn history’s lessons.

Your trial was held behind closed doors and you were charged with conspiring to seize power and crimes against national security. What can you tell us about the prosecution’s case against you?

If there had been any evidence against us, the trial would have been open.

The very existence of accusations like this denies people the potential to participate in election campaigning and in political activity generally. It also prohibits public criticism of the authorities.

Such a judgment and verdict is a Pandora’s box with far-reaching negative consequences.

After the crackdown over last year’s protests and now your sentencing, what is the state of the opposition within Belarus?

I am in prison, so it is hard for me to judge objectively people’s attempts to fight for their freedom and basic human rights. According to what I see on TV, as well as the mood of those few people I have had a chance to talk to, I can say that the authorities are scared by the people’s activism.

They understand that though they can put down protests, they can’t change people’s mindsets. I see the fear in their eyes. I also believe that even those outside of Belarus can do a lot, and it’s important to continue opposition activity both inside and outside the country.

Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya has been visiting European countries and the United States to maintain their support. Has international pressure, including from human rights groups, had any effect on the Lukashenka government?

I will use this opportunity to say hi to Sviatlana: ‘You are amazing. Keep it up.’

I’m sure Lukashenka is scared. He turned from a person who meets presidents to talk about Ukraine into an outcast no one wants to shake hands with.

It is traumatic for him, but the fear will pass. He will get used to it.

That is why it’s important to think about the next step, to understand what American and European partners are ready to offer Lukashenka in return for him to change course. If they aren’t ready to offer him anything – it’s important to know how long they are ready to maintain the pressure.

It concerns Russia as well. Maybe they simply don’t understand that Lukashenka and his government are in a bad way.

To what extent do you believe the futures of the Lukashenka and Russian President Vladimir Putin are now intertwined?

Lukashenka is a famous manipulator. Almost 30 years in power has made his self-preservation instincts automatic. It’s a tactical choice. There’s nothing behind it besides the willingness to stay in power till he dies.

But a trapped person is a dangerous and unreliable partner. It won’t remain like this for a long time. His partners will sooner or later face unpleasant surprises.

What can the international community do?

Hundreds of political prisoners, thousands in exile, tens of thousands arrested, fined, subjected to violence, and the media and businesses are being destroyed. The authorities are at war with their own people and leading the country into an abyss.

The support of the international community is very important for Belarusians. We need to look for an opportunity to start a dialogue, both within the country and with international partners.

Why did last year’s protests last as long as they did? Was it the relative youth of the protesters; the use of social media; the prominence of women; and did COVID restrictions play any part?

For me, the protests aren’t the main thing. The transformation of Belarusian society is the most important thing.

Most Belarusians decided what they want to see in their county: Belarus as a free, democratic, sovereign country. And the current authorities aren’t able to provide that.

Regarding new technology, of course, it gives more opportunities for people to organize, however, social media users are still the minority in Belarus. Everything happened on a deeper level after being built up over time through people’s real-life experience.

Throughout the campaign, I have been surprised by the fact that most of the activists are middle-aged people from different professions. There were plenty of women who expressed their objection first.

Through the situation with COVID, we gained a new experience of solidarity and mutual assistance, so when the government turned against the people, we realized then how many we were.

Looking back now at the protests, would you do anything differently and have you learned lessons for the future?

We definitely have more appreciation for what we already have. We appreciate our amazing journalists, our civil society, and private businesses. And, of course, our upcoming victory.

What could we have done differently? We could have been more consistent in terms of our willingness to resolve the crisis quickly and painlessly for the country. We were calling for dialogue in August, and then we had this unfortunate period of ultimatums that damaged both sides.

The situation is different now, and everything is more complicated. The moment has gone, and I don’t think that negotiation or national dialogue in the form we expected a year ago is possible anymore.

We had to make very hard choices many times, but the most important thing is that we never deviated from our principles and values - the fairness of the law, kindness, respect and love. I believe it is the only right way.

How can you now achieve your goal of removing President Lukashenka from power?

To be a politician in Belarus nowadays means to be in prison. In this way, I can contribute to the common endeavor. It’s not our objective, though.

Our objective is a country free of current and future forms of authoritarianism.

How to free the country? On the one hand, we all have to maintain our effort, cohesion and solidarity. We should try not to lose that. On the other hand, we should focus on limiting the political space for the government. We should show that the system will have to deal with us, the Belarusians.

Thirdly, we have to think about the future of Belarus. We have to dream about it, believe in it and stay active. Everything is up to us.

You were a musician before becoming active in politics. Has music shaped your approach to political activism and have you had the chance to continue playing in detention?

The artistic path shapes the personality. Of course, teamwork, looking for unusual solutions, and the ability to stay concentrated and work for a long time in critical situations, as well as performing in public, is what I’ve been learning my whole life as a musician.

Management of contemporary art projects and partnerships with businesses, like with Viktar Babaryka, the former presidential candidate, for example, gave me even more experience.

I miss music a lot, but in Belarusian prisons, even books aren’t really allowed. I don’t have an opportunity to play.

Do you have any regrets about your decision to become involved in opposition politics?

I consider my decision to participate in the campaign the most important and responsible one of my life. I knew it would be hard, but the future of the nation is at stake. So it’s worth it. My love for Belarus and Belarusian people didn’t allow me to stay aloof.

Director’s breakfast briefing: Shifts in European foreign policy since 9/11 14 October 2021 — 8:00AM TO 9:15AM Anonymous (not verified) 4 October 2021 Chatham House

Former MI6 chief, Sir Alex Younger, discusses shifts in European foreign policy since 9/11.

Former MI6 chief Sir Alex Younger, discusses shifts in European foreign policy since 9/11.

The dramatic events surrounding the withdrawal from Afghanistan demonstrates a profound shift in European security priorities since the beginning of the ‘war on terror’. Against the backdrop of the 20th anniversary of 9/11, former MI6 chief, Sir Alex Younger, discusses recent shifts in European foreign policy.

How has the focus on counterterrorism changed over the last two decades particularly in light of new and evolving strategic challenges? Why were many long-term objectives in Afghanistan left unachieved? Has the threat of terrorism changed across Europe? How has cooperation between security and intelligence services across the world changed particularly across the Atlantic? And, 20 years on, is the ‘war on terror’ really over?

This event is only open to Chatham House Partners and Major Corporate Members as well as selected giving circles of Chatham House. If you would like to attend, please RSVP to Linda Bedford at RSVP@chathamhouse.org.

Undercurrents: Europe's far-right educational institutions Audio bhorton.drupal 8 October 2021

In Hungary, France and Spain, new political movements from the far-right are attempting to reshape their education systems.

Under the supportive eye of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, the recently established National University of Public Service seeks to embed nationalist illiberal values in a new generation of Hungarian students. Meanwhile in France and Spain, far-right public figure Marion Maréchal has turned away from the electoral politics of the Front Nationale to set up a new conservative research institute, ISSEP.

Both of these developments represent a challenge to the liberal values which underpin the existing international order. To find out more, Ben spoke with Professor Dorit Geva and Dr Felipe Santos, whose recent article in International Affairs considers the implications of this illiberal educational turn. 

Why Europe must end limbo for Afghans seeking asylum Expert comment Anonymous (not verified) 14 October 2021

With a focus on evacuations from Afghanistan, the situation in Europe is often forgotten as thousands of asylum seekers continue to wait for their cases to be settled.

Following the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan, European leaders shared messages to welcome those evacuated, but the reality of European responses to displacement in Afghanistan paints a more contentious picture. 

As of July 2021, 33,325 cases of Afghan asylum applicants were pending in Germany, in France 18,410 people were waiting on a decision, while in Greece the numbers were 13,660. 

Arguably, such numbers are manageable given European states’ size and their functioning asylum systems but, while 56 per cent of Afghans in Europe receive protection status, a large proportion is still in limbo in differing European countries’ asylum systems. 

Europe hosts fewer than ten per cent of the three million UN-registered displaced Afghans globally, as neighbouring countries carry the burden of Afghanistan’s forced displacement: Iran hosts almost one million Afghan refugees and Pakistan 1.5 million, and these numbers double when adding undocumented or Afghan passport holders.
 
But despite these manageable numbers, national authorities in Europe often leave people waiting for months or even years to receive an asylum decision. Deportations to Afghanistan were halted only after the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul and even then there was resistance to this from certain European countries, while Austria suggested setting up ‘deportation centres’ in countries neighbouring Afghanistan. 

Europe remains a fortress

The European Commission’s Draft Action Plan responding to the events in Afghanistan confirmed the willingness of the European Union (EU) to continue returns to non-European ‘third countries’. So Europe remains a fortress, despite pledging support for ‘the safe and orderly departure of foreign nationals and Afghans who wish to leave the country’. 

The wall by Greece at its border with Turkey and Poland’s treatment of Afghan asylum seekers trapped at its border with Belarus illustrate this hardline stance. The president of the European Council Charles Michel and EU Home Affairs Chief Ylva Johansson both confirm the priority is to secure European borders. 

This is further backed up by the European Council’s latest set of Conclusions on Afghanistan which focuses on security and ‘preventing illegal migration’ while avoiding reference to any domestic asylum efforts or the establishment of protection pathways for Afghans. 

This disconnect is not new. At the national level, reports of illegal pushbacks on European land and sea borders alarmingly intensified in 2020 as authorities intercepted and sent migrants back to neighbouring countries without assessing asylum claims. 

At the EU level, development aid to countries such as Afghanistan has long been conditional on their governments’ adherence to the bloc’s migration objectives of preventing asylum seekers from reaching European borders and facilitating the repatriation of those refused asylum in Europe. 

But this latest displacement crisis from Afghanistan exposes clear inconsistencies in European approaches to asylum and humanitarianism. Migration remains a divisive issue in European politics, but European governments must act promptly to support Afghans already residing in their territories alongside establishing robust international commitments.

Time for concrete action

European countries should firstly improve the treatment of those Afghans currently in limbo within their respective asylum systems by expediting pending Afghan asylum applications and family reunification cases, re-examining rejected asylum applications, and facilitating integration.

Secondly, national authorities should not return asylum seekers to Afghanistan or any third countries deemed ‘safe’. For Europe to coordinate evacuations from Afghanistan while simultaneously deporting asylum seekers undermines the international refugee regime and threaten Europe’s global credibility. 

The law as a tool for EU integration could be ending Expert comment NCapeling 15 October 2021

Poland is not the only EU member state challenging the supremacy of European law, as historic change is happening in how European integration functions.

The Polish Constitutional Tribunal’s ruling that several articles of the European treaties are incompatible with the Polish constitution is prompting much debate, especially in terms of both the similarities and differences between it and rulings by the German constitutional court which have also challenged the European Court of Justice (ECJ).

Pro-Europeans are keen to draw a sharp distinction between the reasoning deployed by the two courts. They see the Polish court’s challenge as an exceptional case which the European Union (EU) cannot ‘tolerate’ because it would lead to the ‘demolition of the EU’s legal order from within’ and argue the EU must take a tough approach to Poland by re-asserting the supremacy of EU law.

But this view misses a bigger long-term shift in the EU. Both the German and Polish cases illustrate some of the basic conflicts within the EU’s legal system for decades. What is being challenged increasingly openly – even since the UK left the EU – is the idea of the EU as a de facto federation in which non-majoritarian institutions such as the ECJ have final say about the quality of democracy in member states.

ECJ’s quiet revolution

Historically ‘integration through law’ was central to the European project and the ECJ was a key institution driving forward integration – usually benefiting from what Erik Stein called ‘benign neglect by the powers that be and the mass media’. Even when European integration in the form of treaties stalled in the 1960s and 1970s, ‘judicial integration’ through the ECJ continued, including its notable 1964 decision that EU law was supreme.

This self-empowerment of the ECJ – what another scholar of European constitutionalism Joseph Weiler calls ‘a quiet revolution’ – was possible because there was a ‘permissive consensus’ in member states which allowed judicial integration to continue largely unchallenged. But this has now changed as both politicians and national courts are more willing to challenge what they see as judicial overreach.

There are important differences between the approach of the German and the Polish constitutional courts. The Law and Justice Party has politicized the Polish court, packing it with judges sympathetic to that party, whereas the German court is more independent.

In addition, whereas the German court made qualified and subdued objections to measures taken in response to the euro crisis during the past decade and, in particular, the steps towards the mutualization of eurozone debt – but often backed down with ‘all bark and no bite’ as Christoph Schmid put it – the Polish court is driven by political considerations and has challenged the supremacy of EU law in a more direct and general way.

However, the German court has made it clear it is the guardian of the German constitution and seeks to impose limits on the ECJ’s self-empowerment by arguing Europe is not a federation. According to the German court’s theory of ‘constitutional pluralism’, there is in effect a constant dialogue and accommodation between the national and EU level rather than a simple primacy of EU law over national law.

The court sees itself as the ultimate arbiter of whether steps in European integration are consistent with the German constitution, and is likely to challenge any further steps in fiscal integration even if the ECJ deems them in accordance with the treaties – as it did with the European Central Bank’s quantitative easing programme.

Supremacy of EU law is under pressure

Right across Europe, courts and politicians are increasingly challenging the ECJ and questioning the supremacy of EU law. Michel Barnier called for France to regain ‘legal sovereignty’ and should no longer be subject to the judgments of the ECJ – an extraordinary demand from the EU Brexit negotiator who regularly lectured the UK about the sanctity of the EU’s legal order.

Other possible French presidential candidates such as Valérie Pécresse and Eric Zemmour are also openly challenging the primacy of EU law. The UK, of course, is fighting its own battle with the EU about the ECJ’s role in the Northern Ireland Protocol.

It was not the current Polish government but the people of France and the Netherlands who blocked the attempt at explicit constitutionalisation of the EU in a referendum just one year after the 2004 enlargement. Whereas the Constitutional Treaty ‘would have codified the doctrine of EU legal supremacy’, that provision was dropped from its successor the Lisbon Treaty, again indicating consensus on EU legal supremacy is not as strong as is often claimed.

How do Eurasian kleptocracies earn and use their money? 9 November 2021 — 1:00PM TO 2:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 22 October 2021 Chatham House and Online

This event explores the presence of corrupt funds from Eurasia in Western democracies, what they are used for, and how they can be constrained.

The Pandora Papers once again shone the spotlight on the UK being home to corrupt funds from kleptocracies, where the ruling elite abuse their political power for private gain.

In recent years much focus has been placed on this term, and the possible effects such money could have on Western democracies.

• How do such states create this wealth in the first place?
• How do these funds make their way to the UK?
• Is the term kleptocracy appropriate for the majority of countries in Eurasia?
• What evidence is there that such funds are ‘weaponized’ to achieve foreign policy goals?

This event discusses the term, how it can be applied, and the differences between how ’grey’ funds are used by various countries. It also highlights how the UK and the wider international community can counteract these flows, both from a legal point of view, and via other methods.

Here we go again: Russia’s energy ‘diplomacy’ in Moldova Expert comment LJefferson 6 December 2021

The gas crisis shows that while the new Moldovan government may wish for geopolitics to go away, they are a weapon Russia will deploy at will.

In October, Moldova came under the spotlight when Russia, its primary provider of gas, slashed supplies by a third and refused to extend the existing contract.

The crisis was resolved at the end of October when Russia and Moldova signed a new contract, in which Moscow has used Moldova’s gas dependence to extract geopolitical concessions, weaken the new pro-western Chisinau government and drive a wedge between the EU and Moldova.

A chronic failure to reform

Moldova became a classic case of state capture when political elites – including nominally pro-European political elites – engaged in massive rent-extraction.

Up until 2020, when pro-reform forces came to power, Moldovan politics offered rapid route to riches for both the nominally pro-European parties and the pro-Russian Socialist Party; each was responsible for playing up ethnic and geopolitical cleavages in the country to mobilize votes and shore up legitimacy.

These predatory elites hollowed out Moldova economically and politically by a chronic failure to reform, in particular the energy sector which became a major source of rent.

However, this started to change when the pro-reform forces came to power as a result of the 2020 presidential and then 2021 parliament elections. The pro-reformist Maia Sandu defeated the incumbent president Igor Dodon (58 per cent to 42 per cent) in November of that year. And then her party got 58 per cent of the vote in the parliamentary elections which followed in July 2021.

Her Party of Action’s (PAS) winning formula was to focus on corruption and domestic reforms – rather than playing the ‘geopolitical’ card, a favourite strategy of their predecessors. As Sandu put it, the elections marked ‘the end of the reign of thieves in Moldova’.

A gas crisis is initiated  

Russia’s response to these results was to initiate a gas crisis. Up until the victory of the pro-reform forces, Russia had annually renewed a gas contract signed in 2007. However, in September 2021, Russia refused to renew the contract as it had done many times before and instead insisted on a new contract, which allowed Russia to create linkages between energy prices, debt settlement, a halt on energy market reforms and, it can be logically inferred, further integration with the EU.

Moldova’s national energy company, Moldovgaz, is 63.5 per cent de facto owned by Gazprom with the Moldovan government owning the remaining 35.5 per cent. (Moldova was forced to give Gazprom a controlling stake when faced with a cut in supplies in January 2006). It is therefore hardly surprising that no efforts were made to de-monopolise the sector and diversify energy supplies.

This lack of modernization can be explained by the somewhat surreal fact that in any negotiations and planning, Moldovagaz – majority owned by Gazprom – represents the Moldovan side in negotiations with Gazprom. So, when it came to signing of the new five-year contract in October 2021, Russia, through Gazprom, was able to institute a contract which made gas prices conditional on various geopolitical conditions.

It is noteworthy that Moldova’s original 2007 gas contract had been renewed annually despite the supposed accrual of debt. However, the very nature of this debt is suspect. While Moldova’s debt is said to be approximately $700 million, the debt of the much smaller breakaway Transnistria was around $7.3 billion.

The exact level and source of the debt remain murky. Russia appears to be making Moldova liable to repay at least some of Transnistria’s debt while only demanding the debt settlement with Moldova, but not with Transnistria.

High stakes for Moscow

Moreover, the contract is used to derail liberalisation of the energy market in line with EU’s energy market rules (through the so-called unbundling of supplies and distribution) which Moldova had committed itself to since the country joined the Energy Community in 2010.

Referring to ‘the non-application of forced reorganization and sanctions against Moldovagaz’, the new gas contract forces Moldova to postpone implementing the unbundling of supplies and distribution by making it conditional on resolving the energy debt.

Furthermore, Moldova ominously agreed to create an ‘intergovernmental commission on economic cooperation’ with Russia, which effectively blocks Moldova’s economic integration with the EU. (This demand is hardly new as Russia previously requested, and was granted, a seat at the negotiating table on a bilateral trade agreement between the EU and Ukraine. The trilateral EU-Ukraine-Russia negotiations have made it clear that Russia is seeking a veto over European integration of all neighbouring countries.)  

Targeting Moldova’s new reformist government reflects high personal stakes for Moscow. Moldova’s caretaker (kurator) in the Kremlin is Dimitrii Kozak, who in 2003 masterminded the so-called ‘Kozak Memorandum’. This sought to reintegrate breakaway Transnistria into a Moldova-Transnistria federation.

It was thwarted at the last minute but the Russian leadership has not given up on its plan. Now using his position as the deputy head of Presidential Administration, Kozak is masterminding Russia’s rehashed policy towards Moldova and has attempted to bring back his Memorandum as a political blueprint for a ‘settlement’.

Russia’s heavy-handed energy ‘diplomacy’

The new Moldovan government is caught in a crossfire of domestic expectations and Russian geopolitical demands. The gas crisis shows that while the new government may wish for geopolitics to go away, they are a weapon Russia will deploy at will.

The Moldovan government is brand new so it has relatively little experience of dealing with Russia’s heavy-handed ‘energy diplomacy’. But the EU has been on the receiving end of this before – this is a direct replica of Russia’s strategy toward Armenia and Ukraine – and neither ended well for the target countries or for the EU.

So, Russia’s plans for Moldova are likely to have similar consequences for the EU’s latest attempts to be a convincing foreign policy actor. 

Crisis on Europe’s doorstep 2 February 2022 — 4:00PM TO 5:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 4 January 2022 Online

Domestic instability and foreign interference is destabilizing Bosnia, with the declining strength of the 1995 Dayton Agreement symbolic of the troubles growing within the country. 

Milorad Dodik’s continuing efforts to remove the international judicial and security presence in Bosnia, along with calls for the secession of Republic Sprska and increasing Russian efforts to destabilize the country are concerning many, particularly nearby European Union (EU) member states.

On 3 November 2021, the United Nations (UN) Security Council voted unanimously to extend the EU-led multinational stabilization force for another year, as well as NATO Headquarters Sarajevo.

However, the role played by the Office of High Representative was absent from the outcome and leaves the implementation of civilian aspects emanating from the Dayton Accords in a position of uncertainty.

Against a background of ongoing troubles in the country and the growing proxy conflict between the West and Russia, the situation in Bosnia is worrying.

The expert panel discusses:

• Why has the situation in Bosnia been allowed to deteriorate to such a condition?
• What is Europe’s best solution to resolve issues in Bosnia and how is it acting to remedy them?
• How have international efforts been hampered to support development in Bosnia?
• What are Russia’s aims in the country? 
• Does US foreign policy recognize Bosnia as a strategic partner?

Read the transcript

This event forms part of Chatham House’s work on Reinvigorating Multilateralism.

How European security is changing Expert comment LJefferson 10 January 2022

Although migration, economic, health, tech and climate policy are increasingly thought of in terms of security, different issues are taking place in each of these policy areas.

Since the end of the Cold War, debates about security among both academics and policymakers have shifted away from traditional military or state security towards a broader conception of what security is – including, for example, ideas such as ‘human security’.

More recently, there has been a widespread perception of a ‘return of great power competition’ and even renewed fears about great power war – in other words, a resurgence of traditional security debates that many hoped and believed were a thing of the past. At the same time, and especially since the COVID-19 pandemic began in 2020, the concept of ‘security’ has also been increasingly applied to other areas like economic and health policies.

These complex and parallel developments raise a number of difficult questions. First, does the changing way in which the concept of ‘security’ is used – and in particular the way people now increasingly speak of ‘economic security’ and ‘health security’ – reflect a changing reality or rather simply a changing perception of reality? Second, are these changes in the way we think about security helpful or not? In other words, is the redefinition of security that seems to be taking place leading to good policy responses and making citizens more secure, or is it rather unhelpfully ‘securitizing’ policy areas and possibly undermining democracy in the process?

Part of the reason that these questions are difficult to answer is that there are different developments taking place in different policy areas. This article briefly analyses developments in five policy areas: migration policy, economic and trade policy, health policy, technology policy, and climate policy.

The authors argue there are at least three separate developments taking place, though it is often quite difficult to disentangle them – and more than one development may be taking place in each policy area. The analysis focuses on developments in Europe – defined broadly as including countries such as the UK which are outside the European Union (EU) – which may be different from those taking place elsewhere.

Five policy areas, three trends

In migration policy, the clearest development that is taking place, in particular since the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015, is the militarization of borders in Europe – in particular, the militarization of the EU’s external border.

The removal of borders within Europe was once seen by some as a step towards a borderless world, but since 2015 the EU seems to have concluded that the internal removal of borders requires a much harder external border than was previously the case.

In particular, since the ‘refugee crisis’, the EU has massively invested in Frontex, its border agency, which describes itself as ‘Europe’s first uniformed service’ that ‘helps guarantee free movement without internal borders checks that many of us take for granted’. In short, we are seeing an application to migration policy of military tools, including armed border guards.

Something different seems to be taking place in economic policy. For the last three or four decades since the end of the Cold War, economic policy has been dominated by (neo-)liberal assumptions. But these are now increasingly being challenged and a shift may be taking place away from this macroeconomic paradigm.

The reasons for this are complex – in part, a domestic backlash against this paradigm, particularly from the ‘losers’ or ‘left behind’ (in other words those who have suffered from the distributional consequences of the economic and especially trade policies of the last 30-40 years going back to the ‘neoliberal turn’), and in part a sense among analysts and policymakers that a different set of more protectionist policies are required in order to compete with China as a ‘systemic rival’.

These two different drivers of an economic paradigm shift have become even more tightly connected since the COVID-19 pandemic began in 2020. The pandemic led to both an increased demand for a new economic paradigm and a sense of intensified competition with China and, in the EU, to a lesser extent with the United States.

However, because the set of rules governing economic and in particular trade policy was set during the earlier period of (neo-)liberal hegemony, they restricted the ability of states to pursue what were seen as protectionist policies in order to redistribute and created exceptions only for security reasons. This has created a structural pressure on nation states to present economic policies in terms of security.

Here, however, the EU may be an outlier. During the last few decades, the EU has gone even further than the rest of the world has in creating rules around economic policy – at least internally. In particular, the EU’s fiscal rules may prevent its member states from borrowing to invest and its state aid rules may prevent them from experimenting with new kinds of industrial policy.

Therefore, the EU may be structurally constrained from making the kind of paradigm shift in economic policy that many now think is necessary. In particular, despite the rhetoric about a more ‘geopolitical’ EU, it may be limited in the extent to which it can think of economic policy in terms of security – sometimes to the regret of security establishments, as is the case for debates around 5G, for example.

In health policy, something similar may be happening as in economic policy. During the last three or four decades, health policy has been approached in a rather liberal way. Across Europe, though to different degrees and in different ways, market principles have been introduced into health systems.

In many cases such as the UK, this has involved privatizing what were previously state functions in healthcare. But since the pandemic, there has been a renewed focus on renationalizing or, in the case of the EU, ‘re-regionalizing’ supply chains, in particular for personal protective equipment (PPE) and vaccines, which is presented in terms of ‘health security’. COVID-19 has also reinforced the need to better include pandemic preparedness in national security planning.

A similar trend seems to be taking place in technology policy, which as with health policy is now increasingly viewed in a defensive, protectionist way rather than the liberal way it was previously seen. For example, the production of semiconductors was previously viewed in economic liberal terms – in other words, they should be produced wherever they can be produced most efficiently.

But analysts and policymakers increasingly see technology as central to the competition between China and the United States – or even more broadly between authoritarian states and democracies. As in health policy, there is an increasing focus on a shared approach among allies and on the ‘resilience’ of supply chains for technology. A similar shift is taking place on the management of data flows and the need to think harder – and maybe, be less naive – about the security impact of our online life.

Finally, in climate policy, something different seems to be taking place. Here, there is neither an attempt to apply military tools (notwithstanding the fact some national European militaries as well as NATO are increasingly interested in climate security, for instance regarding the ability to train and fight in altered weather conditions, notably extreme heat) nor a paradigm shift away from liberalism – although some, especially on the left, do question whether it is possible to prevent catastrophic climate change unless we abandon economic liberalism and much of the debate about green investment is closely connected to debates about an economic paradigm shift.

Rather, what is striking is the increasing talk of a ‘climate emergency’ – with its implication of the need to suspend normal democratic decision-making – and of the need to take extraordinary measures to prevent catastrophic climate change. However, for the time being, such rhetoric on climate change is not matched by relevant extraordinary emergency measures.

Across these five policy areas, in other words, there seem to be at least three developments taking place that are reshaping how we think about security in Europe. The difficult question is whether each of these developments is a ‘good’ thing or not, i.e. whether they actually make European citizens more secure in an appropriate way.

In other words, is it a good idea to militarize the EU’s borders, to shift away from the earlier liberal paradigm in economic, health and technology policy and frame the shift in terms of ‘security’, or to invoke an emergency in order to be able to take more drastic measures to prevent climate change?

The limits of securitization theory

One way of thinking about these issues is what academics call ‘securitization’ – the situation when something is identified in rhetoric as an existential threat to some object, specifying a point of no return, that legitimizes the use of extraordinary measures and pushes the issue higher on the political and policy agenda.

The response to COVID-19 can be seen as an example of securitization – the existential threat to human beings but also healthcare systems was used to legitimize lockdowns and social distancing requirements.

The West must face down Putin The World Today MVieira 1 February 2022

If Russia’s ambitions are not checked, the implications will be global, warns James Nixey

After seven years of invasions, annexations, assassinations, abuses and now the current crisis in European security over the fate of Ukraine, one thing has been laid bare: the true nature of the Russian state.

Moscow made its ambition clear in mid-December with the unprecedented and public issuing of ultimatums in the form of draft treaty proposals.

Portrayed by Russia as an attempt to end Nato’s expansion eastwards, the Kremlin is in fact demanding that the United States and western institutions roll back their security guarantees to Eastern Europe. 

These are not two sides of the same coin if one believes and accepts the principles of the Helsinki Accords that the successor states to the Soviet Union are just as independent and sovereign as Russia.

Russia’s demands laid bare equate to giving it a free hand in Eastern Europe. This should not be reduced to simplistic labels such as ‘territorial expansionism’ or a ‘return to the Soviet Union’, both of which can be picked at for a lack of accuracy.

But it is, in Russia’s own words, the most explicit statement yet of its long-standing desire to return to a former age, where great powers directed their respective spheres of influence – a yearning for a time of empire and a disregard for the flow of history.

The intense diplomatic and media focus since then suggests there is a consensus that Russia has gone beyond being an awkward player at the negotiation table or a bully who can be dealt with further down the line.

But this has not as yet led to the operational conclusion that Russia must be challenged and ultimately faced down, no matter how unpalatable.

The logical response to the exposure of Russia’s true intentions would be an overhaul of western policy. Yet the West persists in its article of faith that dialogue with Russia will bring about a change in its behaviour – despite all evidence to the contrary. 

Western politicians have been anxious to avoid direct confrontation with Russia. But the Kremlin is likely to see this course of action as confirmation that it can proceed unchecked. When Moscow has chosen the path of conflict, efforts at dialogue rarely bring a peaceful resolution. 

Russia is blessed with particularly talented negotiators. While it has its fair share of angry ultra-nationalists who are easily dismissed, it also has more subtle brains at official and unofficial levels with whom western politicians are eager to engage to claim morsels of intelligence or to show that the Kremlin is not beyond redemption.

Sergei Lavrov, Russia’s foreign minister, is an intelligent and experienced man, who is adept at dismissing the protests of most of his western counterparts. In such circumstances, and with such a pressing need to avoid a war, dialogue must be tightly contained as it has the potential to lead to compromise in areas where there should be none.

Russia’s ambitions for a land empire

Eastern European states which were part of the Soviet Union or signatories to the Warsaw Pact are geographically closer to Russia and as a result more physically at risk. But their history and close relations with Moscow in the past have allowed them to acquire experience and expertise in dealing with their more powerful neighbour.

They uphold principled stances on sovereign rights, which has led the Kremlin to brand the Baltic states, Ukraine and more recently Moldova as traitors. To the West, on the other hand, they can often be seen as awkward or getting in the way.

While the sandwiched eastern states may have much to teach us about dealing with Russia, some central European countries have a closer relationship with Moscow. Serbia’s security services have recently been exposed as being under the influence of Russia’s own FSB, the Federal Security Service, successor to the KGB, and have colluded in repressing Moscow’s political opponents. At the same time, Viktor Orbán’s Hungary continues to defy the European Union with its repressions and is one of the few states that looks to Russia as a model. 

What is at stake here is a basic grasp of the nature of relations between states in the 21st century. What Russia is insisting on is its right to a land empire which is entirely at odds with the principles of statehood that now govern Europe, and indeed much of the rest of the world.

By failing to address the real nature of Russia’s demands, Europe is avoiding critical decisions that will affect its future security for generations to come. The implications of that avoidance do not only affect Europe – they are global in importance. 

Other powers, most notably China, will watch closely how the West responds to Russia and gauge its willingness to support allies, friends and partners against aggression.

Any failure to respond firmly to Russia’s approach of demanding limits on the sovereignty of its neighbours, backed by the threat of military force, can only encourage similar strong-arm tactics elsewhere. It is notable that, from Chechnya to Syria, Russia has not yet suffered an unambiguous defeat when it has asserted its ambitions through military power. 

Resolving the incompatibility between the way Russia sees itself and what the rest of Europe views as the acceptable limits of Russian power will be a long, painful process. Facing down Russia will take skill, time, spine, money, grit and self-sacrifice. Sanctions, for example, hurt those imposing them as well as the receiver. These are attributes in short supply in what Russia considers to be the weak, decadent West. 

Since such resources are unlikely to be found, the unappetizing future for relations is most likely to involve Russia continuing to chip away at European sovereignty while its own structural flaws further weaken it to the point of irrelevance, or to push it to take ever more extreme risks.

Review: Islam's role in shaping Europe The World Today rsoppelsa.drupal 1 February 2022

Maryyum Mehmood on a work that recasts the role of Muslim minorities

Muslims and the Making of Modern Europe
Emily Greble, Oxford University Press, £26.99

When discussing the historical role of Muslims in Europe, most authors focus on Muslims in the western part of the continent, many of whom arrived as immigrant settlers from Muslim-majority nations. As a result, Muslims are easily identifiable as a foreign ‘other’. 

Emily Greble takes a different trajectory. In Muslims and the Making of Modern Europe, Greble centres her analysis on south-eastern European Muslims who are native to the region and, despite this fact, have still been subject to continuous stigmatization. 

In light of the present-day political tensions and targeted attacks on Muslims in Bosnia, which has seen inter-ethnic and religious hostility at its worst in 30 years, Greble’s nuanced retelling of the region’s social and political landscape has renewed urgency. Her work serves as a refreshing intervention to the literature on various fronts. It subverts stereotypical assumptions promulgated by the ‘Eastern Question’, whereby Muslims are portrayed as a simple ethnic minority living under colonial rule. Instead, Greble shows how they are a marginalized indigenous group that is by no means a monolithic, homogeneous entity. 

By uncovering the history of the region through the lens of Muslims, Greble highlights their capabilities as agents of change. Muslims were not just passive subjects but active citizens whose engagement was vital in the framing of social norms, political, ethical and legislative structures. 

Greble’s neatly crafted thesis serves as a counterpunch to a decades-long clash-of-civilizations discourse, which pits Muslims of the region as Ottoman outsiders to be scapegoated as and when deemed necessary. 

The author offers a proposition that while secularism was the overarching aim of the new European state-project, the role of religion, especially marginalized or ‘othered’ religious communities cannot be overlooked or relegated to a simple ‘minority’ issue. 

This argument is laid out in three historical parts, beginning with the post-Ottoman transition of power (1878-1921), to the Yugoslav nation-building project (1918-1941) and finally to the political overhaul in a post-Second World War Europe (1941-1949).

Most historical analyses of the region focus on state actions towards Muslim minorities. Greble points out that such an approach is lacking because it is riddled with institutional biases from the very sources and methods used to understand them. 

Instead, the author takes Muslims, their lived realities and agency as her starting point and effectively manages to avoid such pitfalls.

What is most remarkable about this book is Greble’s self-reflective approach to confronting such a sensitive topic with great care.

Almost every chapter begins with an insightful and deeply personal historical account from a Muslim from the region which sets the scene for Greble’s assessment of key social, political and legal struggles.

With an enriching methodology, Greble explores the topic through first and second-hand accounts of how Muslims manoeuvred in both the secular realm and within religious spaces, such as madrasas (Islamic seminaries), waqfs (local community funds), muftis and ulemas (religious scholar), and the shariah courts. As a result, the reader is shown how Muslims affected change and steered the trajectory of constitutional democracies in Europe at key historical junctures. 

By taking this lens, Greble does not just offer another retelling of the significance of the 1878 Congress of Berlin, which enabled the demarcation of new territorial boundaries in a post-Ottoman world, but also conveys the story of how Muslims contributed to the emerging narratives around citizenship. 

Crucially, we are exposed to Muslim leadership as more than just a docile, homogenous grouping, but a defining entity that shaped the European citizenship project by refashioning both imperial secular norms, as well as Islamic jurisprudential rulings to suit their unique context, as opposed to a remnant of bygone Ottoman rule. 

A fundamental difference that sets this book apart from other contemporary work on the topic is that the author brings forth multiple intra-faith complexities found within Muslim groups of the region, from revivalist to reformists, and all else in between. The fluctuating relationship between the traditionalist ulema, muftis and qadis (religious scholars, clergy and judges) and the secular state powers is intricately captured across most chapters in this book. 

At times, the ulema would be seen to bandy with the state to acculturate Muslims to the emerging polities of the region. As Greble shows, muftis in 1914 travelled across southern Serbia giving dawah (missionary work) to locals to encourage them to support the Serbian state. Similarly, qadis in Montenegro in 1902 reassured local Muslims that by following the law of the land, they would be guaranteed their ‘shariah rights’, which were loosely defined by the Muslim clergy. 

This created a paradox for the states: the role of nation-building and liberalizing orthodox religious communities was given to conservative clerics who, in turn, were gatekeepers setting the boundaries and thus interpreted and applied Islam to preserve their position of power. The consequences were twofold. As Greble suggests, ‘instead of becoming more tied to secular structures of state and society – through centralized law, conscription, political representation – Muslims in formerly Ottoman lands were becoming more deeply bound to Islam’. 

Simultaneously, the rhetoric used further embedded Muslims firmly as a minority. 

Ironically in contrast, it was the liberal reformist thinkers who, sometimes, stood in opposition to the state regimes. Such internal divisions within Muslim spaces became more overtly discernible under communist rule, wherein members of the same Muslim community fought in different camps. 

For instance, the author notes how some were aligned with the communist regime, while others were fighting with the allied forces and many were still backing revivalist Islamic groups. In light of this, what is perhaps most intriguing is how the communist takeover in 1945 managed to tear down any seemingly progressive movement that benefited the region’s Muslims. And it brought them back to square one, with the scrapping of shariah law and the removal of a mufti-led judiciary. Such crackdowns caused greater frenzy among the region’s Muslims and led to resistance movements in the form of activism and insurgencies. 

Ultimately, the author offers a complex perspective not only of Balkan Muslims and their lived experiences, but also, the implications of this upon wider society and the states themselves.

Greble’s remapping of the historical underpinnings of the tale of Muslims and the Making of Modern Europe is not just a clear example of how Muslims are not a foreign entity to the region, but a call to overturn the entrenched Great Replacement theory which uses this foreign ‘othering’ to further prejudice and calls for the ousting of Muslims and other minorities from Europe, a land which has forever been their home.
 

Ukraine response reveals Europe’s security is changing Expert comment NCapeling 8 February 2022

Recent events regarding Ukraine show an active UK responding quickly while EU powers deliberate. But pulling ahead of the pack is not the same as leadership.

Britain’s relationship with Ukraine appears to be thriving, with Ukrainian defence journalist Illia Ponomarenko recently tweeting the ‘British are just unstoppable these days’ and that the UK finds itself ‘on the right side of history’ while one Ukrainian wine bar has started offering free drinks to British nationals.

Ponomarenko’s remarks and the wine bar offer – certainly one post-Brexit benefit of having a British passport – are down to the UK decision to send anti-tank weapons to support Ukraine’s forces against a potential Russian attack.

The UK’s quick response was praised by Ponomarenko as being ‘wise enough not to be lured into going the easiest way, which is always the fastest lane straight to hell’ and strikes a clear contrast with that of Germany, whose typically moderated approach to geopolitical tensions went down badly in Kyiv.

The chief of Germany’s navy was forced to resign after saying Russian president Vladimir Putin ‘deserved respect’ and that Ukraine will never win back annexed Crimea. The German government also sought an energy exception to proposed US sanctions, so that gas can continue to flow into Europe.

France’s response was somewhat stronger but rather confusing as Emmanuel Macron initially called for European Union (EU) member states to ‘conduct their own dialogue’ with Russia, seemingly as an alternative to supporting the US-led NATO response.

Risks of a ‘bullying’ Russia

Although positioning himself as the convener of a transatlantic response to the Ukraine crisis brings welcome respite for UK prime minister Boris Johnson from his domestic ‘partygate’ fiasco, he is also reported as saying some world leaders ‘may not appreciate the deteriorating picture on the Ukrainian border, or fully comprehend the risks posed by a bullying Russia’.

One particular image sums up the difference in approach between the UK and the EU, as a flight path shows a British RAF plane flying around Germany before taking a detour over Denmark on route to Ukraine.

Given that Germany later blocked the export of NATO ally Estonia’s weapons to Ukraine, this image gives ‘Global Britain’ advocates a strong symbol of apparent British reliability and resourcefulness in the face of supposed European deliberation and disunity.

But although the UK’s response to the Ukraine crisis has rightly been credited as swift and substantial, it also reveals deeper developments in the current European security landscape as EU countries had worried Britain might choose to become absent post-Brexit.

Losing one of its two main military powers would certainly have been a blow to Europe, particularly as Russia’s threat has grown in recent years, so there will be relief that the Ukraine crisis shows Britain is undoubtedly committed to the region. Now the question for leaders in Paris, Berlin, and Brussels is how to deal with an active Britain committed to Europe but under no obligation to work within EU processes.

The UK already has an interesting network of bilateral and mini-lateral relationships with European allies. Its Joint Expeditionary Force brings together ten European countries – including Scandinavian and Baltic states – and is well-placed to support NATO activities while also remaining flexible and independent. In the past year, the UK worked with Norway in the Arctic region, provided military engineers support to Poland, and worked directly with France and Germany through the E3 grouping – once again bypassing EU institutions.

The UK also brings a unique diplomatic, technology, and intelligence-sharing relationship with the US which is unavoidably important in dealing with the threat from Russia. As the US sees European security through a NATO lens – rather than an EU one – this makes Britain a leading player as one of the few countries meeting its NATO spending commitments.

UK must do more to win trust

But despite such creative partnerships transcending the constraints of Brexit, the UK must do more to win the trust of the EU’s biggest players France and Germany to be a permanent power in the region. And relations with France have deteriorated following disputes over fishing, a lack of cooperation on migrants, and the AUKUS defence technology agreement between the UK, US, and Australia.

When it comes to Germany, the UK must not use the Ukraine crisis as an opportunity for geopolitical point-scoring. There are good historical reasons for Germany’s cautious approach to military engagement, even if these do constrain the country’s response to this challenge.

In dealing with Russia, some members of Germany’s ruling SPD sincerely believe their party’s less confrontational posture was central to de-escalating conflict during the Cold War. And although some historians may dispute that belief, it is still a distinct and more noble motivation for ‘dovishness’ than pure economic self-interest.

Cooperation always requires some compromise on all sides. Germany must accept some level of economic risk if sanctions against Russia are to be meaningful and France has to accept the necessity of the UK and US’s involvement and that the most effective dialogue is unlikely to be achieved through EU institutions.

Meanwhile, the UK must accept some role for the two biggest EU players, particularly as the Normandy Format which includes Russia, Ukraine, France, and Germany has proved productive in the past. And the UK needs to clamp down on its own economic ties with Russia.

Limited expectations as Scholz heads to Kyiv and Moscow Expert comment NCapeling 14 February 2022

After heavy criticism for an initially timid response, the approach of Germany’s new government to the Ukraine crisis is improving as its position on Russia evolves.

Olaf Scholz is a famously quiet and cautious communicator and, as concerns mounted in Washington and London about the possibility of a Russian invasion of Ukraine, the new German chancellor remained silent.

This time his silence reflected the fact that his government was unprepared for its first major foreign policy test, with marked divisions between the SPD and the Greens on how to manage a rapidly deteriorating relationship with Russia.

When he did speak, Scholz caused dismay in several NATO capitals by defending the controversial Nord Stream 2 pipeline. He called it ‘a purely private economic project’ even though the company building the pipeline is a subsidiary of Russia’s state-owned Gazprom.

The absence of crisis management from Berlin was a stark reminder of the gap left by Angela Merkel. Her knowledge of Russia and Ukraine, and her personal experience of dealing with Vladimir Putin, were key assets in 2014 in developing a unified western response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its destabilization of south-eastern Ukraine.

Germany has coordinated with its allies

Scholz has prepared the ground carefully for his visits to Kyiv and Moscow, extensively coordinating with NATO allies, such as France and Poland – as part of the Weimar Triangle – and the three Baltic states. His inaugural visit to Washington helped align positions on US-EU efforts to develop an economic deterrent against further Russian intervention in Ukraine.

Scholz has also repeated Merkel’s language from 2014 to signal to Moscow that Germany and its partners are ‘united and determined’ to stand their ground. And he has spoken of Germany’s continuing double strategy of ‘clear announcements’ to Moscow of the price it would pay for further aggression accompanied by a readiness to use all possible channels of dialogue to preserve peace.

The continuation of Germany’s established policy will not surprise Moscow. But under the surface Germany’s discourse on Russia is evolving as the political class internalizes the fact that the current Russian leadership is openly threatening to use military force to impose its will on Ukraine and re-configure Europe’s security arrangements.

Despite deep concerns about Germany’s dependence on Russian gas – more than half of the gas it consumes comes from Russia – there is broad acceptance that Nord Stream 2 cannot go ahead if Russia invades Ukraine. But typically, Scholz has not yet said as much publicly, limiting himself to stating ‘all options are on the table.’

Robert Habeck, Germany’s vice-chancellor as well as economic affairs and climate action minister, says the ‘geopolitical situation’ requires Germany to diversify its gas supplies and infrastructure for importing gas. For years, a strong pro-Russian gas lobby has dominated the thinking of the Economics Ministry and one consequence is the complete absence of facilities to import liquefied natural gas.

The German debate on Russia is shifting

A public debate has also started about weapons deliveries to Ukraine, even though this runs counter to deeply embedded pacifist tendencies in German society. Some MPs, former diplomats, and experts have begun to make the case for Germany to supply weapons to Ukraine so it can exercise its right to self-defence and deter military attack.

Christoph Heusgen, a former long-standing foreign policy adviser in the Federal Chancellery, says Berlin’s decision not to deliver arms to Ukraine to avoid endangering the Minsk peace process requires revision now Moscow has abandoned the path of negotiation.

Despite its mantra that there is no alternative to the Minsk Agreements, Berlin now admits these currently offer no prospect of resolving the war in Donbas because Russia is not prepared to implement them properly.

Other taboos are also being broken inside Germany. Heavyweight left-of-centre Die Zeit published the first results of its investigation into the SPD’s links with Russia and their place in Russia’s channels of influence in Germany. And even the SPD’s Sigmar Gabriel, an outspoken champion of Nord Stream 2 during his time as a government minister, has raised the question of Germany terminating energy imports from Russia if there is a drastic deterioration of the security situation.

Why a no-fly zone risks escalating the Ukraine conflict Expert comment NCapeling 13 March 2022

The US rejection of Poland’s offer to send fighter jets as a boost to Ukraine’s air defence shows just how uneasy nations are about direct combat with Russia.

The Pentagon’s decision to turn down the proposal by its fellow NATO member Poland to put Russian-made MiG-29 jets at its disposal demonstrates again how keen the US and allies are to avoid risking major confrontation with Russian forces.

The US Department of Defense says the offer to locate jets at bases in Germany was ‘not tenable’ as this risks flying into contested airspace over Ukraine – a non-NATO member – raising ‘serious concerns for the entire NATO alliance’ and echoing the continuing rejection of calls to implement no-fly zones (NFZs) as a way of easing the devastation being faced by trapped Ukraine civilians.

NFZs restrict any aircraft, including drones, from flying over a pre-defined region and can be used for both military and civilian purposes. But the implementation of NFZs is difficult to enforce and – most significantly – is unlikely to achieve the intended effect on the ground.

In conflict situations, they are usually implemented under the remit of United Nations (UN) peace support operations, requiring authorization under Article 42 of the UN Charter. This details that if all possible methods have proven ineffective in responding to a threat, countries ‘may take such action by air, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security’.

Protection but with limitations

NFZs provide both protection from attack and surveillance but do have limitations. They must be monitored and enforced which requires committing to fighter jet patrols with the explicit task of defending the area from the air by whatever means necessary.

This could mean jets firing upon Russian planes and drones so, if NATO allies and partners were to enforce a NFZ, it would represent an escalation of measures which is a step that would most likely provoke an unpredictable Vladimir Putin into further escalation – in short, it is highly likely to be seen as an act of war.

UK defence secretary Ben Wallace – among others – has repeatedly dispelled the idea, saying that enforcing NFZs would mean deploying ‘British fighter jets directly against Russian fighter jets’. In relation to moves such as the Polish jets, the Kremlin has warned that any countries offering airfields to Ukraine for attacks on Russia may be viewed as having entered the conflict.

There have only been three past instances of military NFZs. In Bosnia, as part of Operation Deny Flight from 1993-1995, a NFZ was enforced as part of a strategy which also including the provision of close air support and approved air strikes.

In Iraq, an NFZ endured for 12 years from 1991 and was succcesful in preventing Saddam Hussein from attacking Kurdish and Shia Muslim civilians. And in Libya in 2011, a NFZ was deployed to prevent the destruction of military infrastructure and the Libyan regime – although this quickly morphed into the provision of close air support.

So it is unclear just how successful NFZs are at providing protection. In Iraq and Libya, NFZ cover protection was provided but neither Saddam Hussein or Colonel Gaddafi were able to effectively target victims through their ground forces whereas, in Bosnia, Slobodan Milosevic infamously used ground troops to slaughter 8,000 Bosnian men and boys at Srebrenica.

Putin would still be able to continue to use both ground forces and artillery to assault Ukrainian cities with or without a NFZ – in fact, his sparse use of his Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) has been one of the surprising features of the war so far. Under a NFZ, missile attacks could also continue, there is nothing in the record of no-fly zones to suggest the provision of safe areas for non-combatants would work.

And NFZs have only been successful against vastly inferior forces such as in Iraq, Bosnia, and Libya. But Russia has an air force second only in size to the US and has a vast range of defences including the potent S-400 Triumf at its disposal. Not only would an NFZ be ineffective, it might also not be possible to enforce without risking significant losses to the peace operations force.

It is due to a combination of these reasons that NFZs have not been used more in previous conflicts. The most recent consideration for a NFZ was in Syria but President Bashar al-Assad’s Syrian forces, protected by Russian air cover, could still have targeted their intended victims despite air policing so a NFZ was not used.

In the long-term, under the terms of a ceasefire agreement, it may be possible to include a NFZ under a UN or joint OSCE-UN peace terms. However, the forces involved should exclude NATO allies and partners or any states with Russian alliances to avoid further conflict.

This leaves few suitable countries with the capacity, willingness, and political stance to be called on. Two of the world’s most militarily capable states – China and India – abstained in the Uniting for Peace vote in the UN General Assembly (UNGA). Whether another willing state with the military capability – such as a Gulf state – could be considered acceptable to all sides remains to be tested.

Notable successes with SAMs

Many military commentators also note that currently Ukrainian forces are having notable success without jets, downing Russian aircraft using sophisticated surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) such as Stinger and Javelin, and NATO countries continue to supply those in their thousands.

Ukraine crisis could trigger cascading risks globally Expert comment NCapeling 16 March 2022

The effects on the wider world from the Ukraine invasion go far beyond the waves of shock and horror being felt from this escalating conflict.

Russia and Ukraine rank 11th and 55th respectively in terms of their national economies but, for the global supply of critical resources such as energy, food, and minerals, these two countries together are far bigger hitters – and both the threat and reality of resource flows from them being reduced have already driven up global prices.

The world is already facing a cost-of-living squeeze coming out of the COVID-19 pandemic, so further price spikes or supply constraints have the potential to seriously undermine food and energy security, equitable access to basic goods and services, and social stability around the world – which can then potentially create systemic risks for economies and societies.

The global implications of the Ukraine conflict are only just beginning to be explored fully but the immediate impacts of the crisis on global markets are already well-documented. In the first few days after Russia’s invasion, energy prices spiked, triggering further fertilizer price rises – as fertilizer production is highly energy intensive – which in turn is contributing to food price rises because fertilizer costs are an important factor in food production.

Interruptions to shipping in the region around Ukraine – as well as globally – have impeded the flow of goods which pushed prices up even further, while economic sanctions on cross-border flows of goods and finance are further adding to market pressures. But this is just the start – these impacts will bring ripple effects which propagate far beyond their point of origin, known as ‘cascading risks’.

Risk is a combination of hazard, exposure, and vulnerability – in terms of the Ukraine invasion, the hazard is the conflict and its immediate impacts on the societies and economies of Ukraine and Russia, while exposure relates to the degree to which other countries are likely to be affected depending on how much they are integrated into the global economy or the ‘just in time’ nature of their supply chains.

Vulnerability relates to a society’s capacity to mitigate the harmful impacts of the conflict, such as controlling borders, sourcing alternative goods from suppliers, or protecting against price or supply shocks.

Risk cascades – the second- and third-order impacts of the original hazard and of responses to that hazard – can interact across sectoral boundaries – as with energy and food, for example – and their compound effect can lead to overall systemic risks for society.

Anticipating this potential is essential to understanding the nature and scale of the global ramifications being felt from the Ukraine conflict. Recent work in the UK to assess levels of cascading risks resulting from a changing climate – the UK Climate Change Risk Assessment – provides a valuable framework for thinking about this area.

It examines key pathways for risk to cascade through global systems – when applied to the situation in Ukraine, these pathways and their interactions offer an indication of the scale of crisis that citizens face far beyond Ukraine’s and Russia’s borders.

Interruptions to the flows of goods and energy

In globalized trade networks, localized disruption to supply chains rapidly yields widespread international impacts – of particular concern is the immediate supply of food because most countries rely on lean supply chains and some may only have a few days food within their own borders.

Experience from previous food price crises indicate even small interruptions to trade can result in runs on the market and rapid price inflation. In the case of this conflict, the trade interruption will be far from small because, between them, Russia and Ukraine export around one-quarter of all traded wheat, more than three-quarters of traded sunflower oil, and one-sixth of traded maize.

Energy markets are also a concern because many countries use more energy than they produce and therefore rely on imports of energy or fuel for domestic use. Russia produces around ten per cent of the world’s commercial energy with a concentration of sales in major regions such as the European Union (EU) and China.

As with food, a shortfall in energy provision leads to market runs and rapid inflation as actors compete in a tightening space, while poorly designed policy interventions by nations trying to ensure their own security add further pressure to global supply and worsen price rises. In addition, the closely interconnected nature of energy markets means disruption to one fuel – such as gas in this case – affects global prices for other forms of energy.

The impact of moving people and money

As the last decade richly illustrates, the cross-border flows of people impact those societies absorbing them – for example, contributing to a rise in nationalism – as well as increase the costs of supplying essential resources. Given many people are understandably fleeing this conflict, other countries may struggle to cope as the cost-of-living crisis and urgent efforts to bolster national security infrastructure may squeeze available public funds.

Financial flows are crucial to the functioning of global economies, whether for inward investment or insurance and – as Russian citizens may be about to discover – restricting the global flow of money has a serious impact on households. Beyond Russia, the outflow of money from major financial centres such as London to meet insurance claims or to enable infrastructure reinvestment post-conflict may also have severe knock-on economic impacts.

The impact on governance and health

The global spikes in energy and food prices resulting from these supply chain disruptions will see many countries struggle with rising food and energy insecurity as well as increased inequality. Taken together these conditions create many issues beyond immigration pressures and the associated politics, including increased inequality and civil unrest.

This potentially destabilizes governments which has consequences for the stability of an entire region such as interrupted supply chains, the need to deploy peacekeeping forces, or significant flows of aid – all with global consequences far beyond the countries in question.

Populations may suffer mental health impacts arising from the Ukraine invasion, whether from the trauma of being forced to leave home to escape conflict, anxiety for the wellbeing and safety of families and friends caught up in it, or a more general anxiety arising from the perception of living in an unstable world.

Ukraine exposes Europe’s double standards for refugees Expert comment NCapeling 30 March 2022

As European governments provide swift protection assurances to those fleeing Ukraine, non-European asylum-seekers continue to face violence at the EU’s borders.

One month after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the European Union (EU) already faces its largest refugee crisis since World War Two, with more than ten million people having fled their homes – 6.5 million displaced within Ukraine and 3.9 million escaping to neighbouring countries.

Acting quickly and decisively, European governments have opened borders and European citizens have opened their homes in an unprecedented showing of solidarity towards refugees. But, with all eyes on Ukraine, the Greek coastguard continues to illegally push back asylum-seekers crossing from Turkey while Spanish police forcefully repel those who dare to jump the fence in Melilla.

The painful contrast exposes the double standards in the EU’s approach to refugees. With Europe’s grim history of restrictive asylum policies, it is wishful thinking that the warm welcome to Ukrainians will extend to all asylum-seekers. The EU solidarity to displaced Ukrainians illustrates the deeply politicized – and often discriminatory – nature of providing refugee protection.

However, the hope is this turning point in European history can at least set an important precedent for treating refugees more humanely. Undoubtedly, EU solidarity towards people fleeing the horrors of Putin’s war is critically important and the initial response is positive in its efforts to meet immense humanitarian needs.

Solidarity with Ukrainians

The EU activation of the Temporary Protection Directive (TPD) is a significant step towards a more humane protection regime and fairer responsibility-sharing among member states. Without the need for the examination of individual applications, those fleeing Ukraine can access harmonized rights across the EU for three years – including residence, housing, medical assistance, and access to the labour market and education.

The TPD is also a move away from the strict ‘Dublin’ rules which put the pressure of hosting refugees onto the countries of ‘first arrival’. Ironically, the fiercest opponents of intra-EU solidarity, such as Poland and Hungary, are the ones benefiting from this change now but, in the case of Ukraine, geographical proximity and shared histories must be considered when analysing Europe’s response.

Eastern European and Baltic countries share a post-Soviet history and fear of Russian aggression, and Ukrainians already enjoyed 90 days of visa-free travel in the EU – with a large diaspora, many have established networks across Europe. But even considering these distinctive connections with Ukrainian displacement, the initial response still shows that European countries have both the political will and the capacity to host refugees.

Unlike the usual – often media-fuelled – narratives of refugee ‘invasions’ into Europe, the waves of women and children leaving Ukraine prompted a surge of humanitarian action but they are also a chilling reality check of Europe’s double standards.

The EU has used agreements with countries such as Turkey and Libya to prevent arrivals and outsource asylum responsibilities, while border violence, detention, and lengthy asylum procedures await the few asylum seekers who manage to enter Europe from the Middle East, Asia, and Africa.

These ‘fortress Europe’ legacies have even undercut the humanitarian response in Ukraine, with reports of incidents of discrimination towards people of colour at the EU borders being condemned by the United Nations (UN) and the African Union (AU), the media facing allegations of racist reporting, and comments from Bulgarian PM Kiril Petkov providing a stark reminder of the islamophobia, racism, and history of colonization which still pervades European asylum policies.

Foreign policy also influences how EU leaders treat the right to asylum, as the geopolitics of Europe’s efforts to create a united front against Russian aggression is an undercurrent to the prompt European response to Ukrainians. But only a few months ago, non-European asylum-seekers trapped in freezing forests at the Poland-Belarus border were used as political pawns by Belarusian leader Aliaksandr Lukashenka and then dehumanised as a ‘hybrid attack’ by EU leaders.

A turning point for asylum in Europe?

Despite entrenched discriminatory precedents, it is worth looking ahead at this moment of reckoning. Although policy changes remain far off, the unity shown over Ukraine can help reshape and refocus political efforts towards increased responsibility-sharing among EU member states – the perennial ‘hot potato’ of the EU asylum system.

War on Ukraine: Exploring the humanitarian response to the conflict 12 April 2022 — 12:00PM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 6 April 2022 Online

This event explores the implications of the humanitarian realities from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the largest ground campaign in Europe since World War Two.

Reports from humanitarian organizations working in Ukraine are dire and reveal that a humanitarian disaster on an epic scale is unfolding.

The United Nations (UN) and other organizations estimate 12 million of Ukraine’s population are in need of assistance, 4.1 million have been displaced to neighbouring countries, and 6.4 million have become internally displaced.

Gillian Triggs, the assistant secretary-general and assistant high commissioner for protection at the UNHCR, joins other experts to discuss the humanitarian situation in Ukraine.

The panel considers:

• What are the greatest needs in Ukraine now?
• How can aid agencies meet those needs?
• What are the short and long-term implications of the crisis for Ukraine and Europe?
• How do international organizations work with local NGOs to provide food, medical aid and shelter?

This event is part of a regular series of events offering insight and analysis from experts and policymakers on how the war is affecting Ukraine, the region and the world.

This event is part of Chatham House’s ongoing work on the future of conflict.

Read the transcript

New research on 21st-century conflict 25 April 2022 — 5:00PM TO 6:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 11 April 2022 Online

This International Affairs webinar shares research on US special operations, urban warfare, and digital activism in recent conflicts.

Given the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine, and continuing conflicts in Myanmar, Yemen, and other countries, it is important to understand the changing nature of conflict in the 21st century.

In this webinar, authors from the March 2022 issue of International Affairs share research on the transformation of Western special forces, the impact of army size in urban warfare, and the use of social media and online activism in war.

The speakers in this event drew on the following research:

• US Special Forces transformation: post-Fordism and the limits of networked warfare (https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiab213)
• Urban insurgency in the twenty-first century: smaller militaries and increased conflict in cities (https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiac007)
• Diasporas as cyberwarriors: infopolitics, participatory warfare and the 2020 Karabakh war (https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiac015)

International Affairs was started at Chatham House in 1922 to communicate research to members who could not attend in person. Over the past 100 years, it has transformed into a journal that publishes academically rigorous and policy-relevant research. It is published for Chatham House by Oxford University Press. Read the latest issue here.

Putin’s Eurasian dream may soon become a nightmare Expert comment NCapeling 3 May 2022

The Ukraine invasion has detrimental consequences for the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union, a project which has been stumbling since its inception.

The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) – consisting of Russia with Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan – represents the culmination of Russia’s pursuit of regional integration with its post-Soviet neighbours.

Officially, the Union has an ambitious economic goal – the creation of a market based on common rules for its five member states and their 180 million citizens – and Russia likes to portray the EAEU as an Eurasian replica of the European Union (EU).

But although a common market was placed at the heart of the EAEU as a way to appeal to member states, it is of marginal importance for the Russian economy. For Moscow, the EAEU is primarily a geopolitical tool to help re-assert its regional and global role.

In a world of evermore powerful trading blocs, Moscow wants to use the EAEU to establish its own economic power base in the new polycentric world order. But Russia’s limited interest in the technocratic intricacies needed for the economic union to live up to its lofty proclamations exposes the real geopolitical ambitions.

The Kremlin has no qualms about disregarding the common rules when they clash with Russia’s own foreign policy, and it soon became evident the EAEU was a means to an end rather than an equitable institution within which Russia would accept constraints on its unilateral behaviour.

A crisis in the making

Although the EAEU has enabled some internal trade liberalization as well as the movement of people and labour to the benefit of its members reliant on labour migrant remittances, it has failed to tackle institutional barriers or promote growth and development policies.

It has been hampered by weak common institutions and a lack of institutional capacity of its member states, while Russia’s dubious commitment is also problematic. The EAEU lacks the institutional features of a genuine common market and any attempts to address these shortcomings have been essentially empty promises.

EAEU membership does benefit the political elites of its member states, because its hub-and-spoke model relies on bilateral high-level political deals between Russia and each member state individually. And by using the enticement of security guarantees and both political and financial support, Moscow has succeeded in attracting new members to join.

But a member’s political survival – or defence against political and economic reform – is dependent on military, economic, financial, and political support from Russia. This has been evidenced by the Armenian-Azerbaijan conflict, and by Russia’s backing of the Lukashenka regime in Belarus and the Tokayev government in Kazakhstan.

The design of the EAEU ties it to Russia’s own fate, and so the impact of harsh sanctions imposed on Russia for invading Ukraine are in stark evidence across its member states. Both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are reeling from the adverse effects on their domestic currencies and remittances, and the trade bans of key commodities.

And although the ban Russia imposed on grain export to EAEU members has softened, it shows the extent to which Russia was prepared to disregard the rules and sacrifice the EAEU to rescue its own economy. Members are incurring direct economic losses from Putin’s war against Ukraine and the fluctuation of the rouble has created a major impediment to trade with Russia.

Russia seems to increasingly view the Union as a convenient tool to bypass sanctions, with massive implications for its partner countries. And the supposed advantages of EAEU membership – enhanced trade, growth, and modernization – have simply not materialized.

Due to the rapid economic decline of Russia – a fall of 10-15 per cent is anticipated for 2022 – the EAEU is even less likely to deliver the promised economic benefits, while also putting members at risk of secondary sanctions.

The Ukraine invasion has also reignited domestic sensitivities and regional tensions. In Kazakhstan, Tokayev has failed to endorse Russia’s justification for the invasion and refuses to recognize the ‘independence’ of the separatist LNR and DNR.

Meanwhile Azerbaijan has pursued territorial gains in Nagorno-Karabakh while Russia is distracted by its invasion of Ukraine, and has requested the withdrawal of Russian peacekeeping from the disputed territory.

Russia is keen for partner countries to help mitigate the economic impact of sanctions by providing alternative transit routes for imports to Russia. But the EAEU faces challenges even at its most basic level because the sharing of custom duties among member states was denominated in dollars, which Russia now wants to move away from.

No easy escape

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine clearly reduces the benefits of Eurasian integration even further than before and imposes higher cost on the partner countries than were envisaged when they joined. They have been dragged into a geopolitical calamity over which they have no control – the inability of EAEU institutions to mediate or constrain Russia’s behaviour is stark.

War in Ukraine: Can the EU survive without Russian oil and gas? Audio NCapeling 5 May 2022

The fourth episode of our podcast mini-series examines how reliant the European Union (EU) is on Russian energy.

What would an all-out ban on Russian oil look like? Which countries would be most affected? Does this offer an opportunity for renewable energy?

Clips used: Bloomberg News

This episode was produced by Anouk Millet of Earshot Strategies on behalf of Chatham House.

Africa and Europe: Cooperation on digital transitions and new technologies 26 May 2022 — 8:00AM TO 12:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 12 May 2022 Online

The 11th Africa Day International Conference takes place under the auspices of the president of the Republic of Slovenia, HE Mr Borut Pahor, and within the framework of the Bled Strategic Forum.

Slovenia’s annual high-level Africa event seeks to improve policy outcomes for citizens in Europe and Africa as a result of a mutual understanding and strengthened cooperation between the two regions.

The event is co-hosted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Slovenia, the Chatham House Africa Programme and the European Commission.

Expert discussions at this year’s edition will examine collaborative links between Africa and Europe in promoting responsible innovation and governance of emerging technologies, as well as the role of technology in shaping creative and cultural economies.

The conference will be broadcast live on this website, on the Slovenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs website and on the Africa Programme Facebook page.

Culture notes: Populists of the world unite The World Today rsoppelsa.drupal 25 May 2022

America’s hard-right has successfully played a long game at home, and now it’s schmoozing Europe. We should be worried, says Catherine Fieschi

The politics of advanced democracies is a rather Janus-faced affair these days. No sooner have we breathed a sigh of relief at the results of the French presidential election than a leaked United States Supreme Court document on Roe v Wade signals American abortion rights are under threat. 

Yes, Europe seems to be maintaining political unity in its support of Ukraine, and the US is lavishing eye-watering sums on it both in military and humanitarian aid. Yet one cannot help but feel that these might be short-lived spells of relief in the face of mounting storm clouds on the political horizon. Both at the domestic and international level, populist politics looks to be gathering pace still. 

On the domestic front, we should be cautious in our relief. In the French elections Emmanuel Macron was indeed re-elected, and comfortably so, but there is no denying the space occupied by populist politicians on the left and the right. In the first round, Marine Le Pen gained 23 per cent of the vote, left populist candidate Jean-Luc Mélenchon 22 per cent, and far-right candidate Éric Zemmour 7 per cent. Add to this a record low turnout, and the picture is one of a system in which mainstream politics has overall been rejected in favour of various populist options. 

The Hungarians weren’t so lucky, and Viktor Orbán’s capture of the media and quashing of the opposition over his years in power delivered solid victory. 

What should be cause for further concern is what is happening in the United States, as well as its potential impact on European politics. A quick flick through American politics today suggests dysfunctionalities of staggering magnitude and depth, and the full extent of the success of the right-wing Republican project, as confirmed by the intention to reverse Roe v Wade. 

Any reversal of Roe v Wade is a further step towards a drastic re-territorialization of American politics: into red states and blue states, into urban v rural, into places where taxes fund public education and public goods and where they won’t. It is also about a re-territorialization of institutional power away from the federal and into state institutions. 

The words of JD Vance, the Ohio Republican senatorial candidate – author of the rather good memoir Hillbilly Elegy – pander to an ‘American heartlands’ view of the United States’ role in the world. Asked about the fate of Ukraine, Vance simply replied that he ‘didn’t really care what happens to Ukraine one way or another’. 

On an even more basic level, we would do well to keep in mind that there were 440 anti-voter bills in 49 states at the end of 2021 and rising, calling into question citizens’ basic rights to vote. Republicans have pursued this agenda relentlessly. They have played a long game and invested in media, education and minor and not so minor projects – all of which have secured them a social and political base that is well-disposed towards the deep reversal of the American liberal global project and that of its allies across the world.

And it is perhaps on this last point that we should be most alarmed. Between May 18-20, the Conservative Political Action Conference, an American conclave of the right, was held in Europe. Viktor Orbán gave the keynote speech, and other speakers included the Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro’s son, Eduardo, and the president of Spain’s far-right party Vox, Santiago Abascal, as well as some well-known American Trumpian voices, including Trump himself. Marine Le Pen, whose earlier appearance at the conference had met with rapturous applause, chose not to cosy-up too closely to Orbán in the run-up to the French parliamentary elections in June but she sent her deputy. 

The export of the Fox News-driven conference from across the Atlantic is deeply worrying. Up until now populists have failed in their attempts at international alliances. At the European Union level their nationalism has always been in the way of their working together, and their groups tend to be short-lived or ineffective as a result. As for American attempts in Europe, the one led by Steve Bannon, the former White House adviser, in 2020 that aimed to create an Academy for the Judeo-Christian West ended as a damp squib – possibly not helped by his dismissal from the White House amid charges of defrauding donors.

But something may be changing: the conference’s embrace of Orbán and an international smattering of ‘strongmen’ hailing from the hard-right, aligned with Putin and sup-ported by Trump and a media empire, suggests that we are entering a Trumpian-infused second act that in its triumphal revanchism is seeking to create an international right-wing populist, or even authoritarian front. This is about politics, media, but also money – something European populist parties have been short of. As Marine Le Pen explained to French voters, her party is so poor it had to borrow money from a Russian bank.  

As some have pointed out, the Russian aggression against Ukraine has complicated matters when it comes to Russian funding of disinformation to the West. Many routes have been shut down. But a new route between the US and Hungary as a platform to floss Europe with dirty money is a good replacement to the old Russian route. 
 

Review: One-man bandwagons The World Today rsoppelsa.drupal 25 May 2022

The ills of strongman politics are diagnosed sharply in this accessible overview – but a cure is nowhere to be found, says Natasha Lindstaedt

The Age of the Strongman: How the Cult of the Leader Threatens Democracy around the World
Gideon Rachman, Bodley Head, £20.00

For anyone reading the headlines, it should come as no surprise that democracy has regressed to where it was in 1989. The profound geopolitical and technological changes in the post-Cold World era have led to chaos, polarization, nationalist backlash and nostalgia for strong leadership in democracies. 

Countries such as Russia and China have provided a new model for leadership that has become frighteningly infectious – the strongman. 

Gideon Rachman charts this new era, offering an accessible overview of 14 examples, including Britain’s Boris Johnson, Donald Trump of the United States, Narendra Modi of India, Jair Bolsonaro of Brazil, Viktor Orbán of Hungary, Xi Jinping of China and – the archetype – Vladmir Putin of Russia.

The idea that we are living in the age of strongman politics is not particularly novel. Scholars of authoritarian politics have noted for years that there has been a steady rise in ‘personalist’ dictatorship and personalism in democracy in general. Nearly 40 per cent of all dictatorships are personalist, meaning domination by a single person, compared with 23 per cent in 1988. Autocracies have become increasingly aggressive, using sharp power to undermine democracy, which signals a shift. 

Autocracies used to focus on their own stability and didn’t interfere with democracies.

Rachman focuses on this threat that the strongman poses to democracy while macho one-man rule spreads across the globe. He provides a well-written, clear overview of why each leader fits the strongman label, what explains their appeal and what informs their worldview. 

Where Rachman is effective is in weaving together the commonalities of these strongmen – and they are all men – and their relationship to each other. Despite their ultra-nationalism, they have created an unofficial, multilateral network of mutual support. This includes leaders whose religious convictions may appear to be in conflict – such as Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel and Muhammed bin Salman of Saudi Arabia. 

This is not just a network of dictators – autocratic-style leaders of democratic countries have been welcomed to the club. In this system, strongmen openly admire each other, revel in their disdain for liberalism and human rights, and share advice and inspiration. 

This contrasts with western European leaders who fail to build such iron-clad bonds.

Each chapter is peppered with anecdotes about Rachman’s first-hand impressions of some of these leaders and other notables in positions of power gained from his decades as a foreign correspondent and analyst. His colourful commentary complements his understanding of how they operate. 

A common theme throughout is that the strongman’s appeal appears as a breath of fresh air for democracy, liberalism or peace. They are often labelled as anti-elitist and men of the people. This honeymoon period ends when each leader shows their true colours: attacking political opponents, sometimes in ruthless purges, disregarding the rule of law, weakening the courts and vilifying or controlling the media. 

A well-placed quote from Recep Erdogan sums this up: ‘Democracy is like a tram you ride until you arrive at your destination.’

Genuine public support exists for these manoeuvres. Dislocation from unmanaged globalization and economic crises has created an audience for political entrepreneurs. Strongman leaders have earned the distinction of being relatable and telling it like it is, despite many being considered to be liars and often filthy rich. 

Their ability to tap into people’s fears of the West, crime, immigrants or other ethnic and religious groups has helped gain them a fiercely loyal following. According to Rachman, strongman politics is linked to fear that a majority group that was once dominant is being threatened – something leaders such as Donald Trump have astutely tapped into.

Unlike some of the kleptocratic regimes of the 1970s and 1980s that were the embodiment of venal opportunists – think of Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines, Mobutu of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Jean-Claude Duvalier of Haiti – the strongmen of today have been inspired by the ideology of hyper-nationalism and anti-liberalism. 

Rachman links strongmen to the work of Carl Schmitt, a Nazi Party member, who was a vociferous critic of parliamentary democracy and cosmopolitanism, while touting the importance of illiberal norms to exercise power. Rachman argues that we are in a war of ideas, with liberalism under attack. He hones in on the perennial target George Soros, and how his support for liberal democracy has garnered the unwanted attention from the world’s right-wing ideologues and strongmen.

Social media has been usurped by these leaders and their regimes to forge closer, direct relationships with their supporters, to churn out fake news and create dangerous echo chambers. They are snake oil salesmen, making huge promises but offering very little in practice. They are never as they initially appear, and their images are carefully crafted.

Another theme emerges on the career pathway. Many served as a mayor of a cosmopolitan city. An interesting chapter on Johnson explains how he comes across like a relatable ‘good chap’, being able to handle embarrassing photo-ops. He was also a devoted Europhile, attended Eton and Oxford, and championed multi-culturalism as Mayor of London. Always the opportunist, Johnson had few qualms about campaigning for Brexit, and then later breaking the law to make it happen.

Yet there are some gaps in Rachman’s analysis.

It is never made clear why leaders such as Abdel Fattah el-Sisi of Egypt, Nicolás Maduro of Venezuela and Kim Jong-un of North Korea are largely missing, or a number of other strongman dictators in sub-Saharan Africa. 

Though there is a chapter devoted to Abiy Ahmed of Ethiopia, along with a few paragraphs devoted to Paul Kagame of Rwanda, Meles Zenawi also of Ethiopia, Emmerson Mnangagwa of Zimbabwe and Jacob Zuma of South Africa, the chapter on African strongmen does not acknowledge that this is the only continent where the regional trend is not as depressing. 

Rachman only occasionally engages with data on dictatorships to verify some of the patterns that he explores in the book. And his work would benefit from an examination of the institutional factors that may explain the rise of strongman politics, such as the pre-existing weakness of parties, parliaments and courts. 

Nor does he go in depth into how strongmen interact with their institutions and what the implications of this brand of politics are for conflict and development. The failures of strongmen to address Covid-19 are mentioned, but it is never explained why they may be so poorly equipped to govern. 

So, is democracy dead? Though Rachman is largely pessimistic, he acknowledges that politics tends to go in waves. There is little advice about how the West can expedite the end of this particular wave. 

The one positive Rachman offers is that strongman rule cannot deal with succession. This is largely true, though handovers have taken place, such as with the Kim dynasty. 

But there are definitely more questions raised than answers provided. What is left after strongmen are no longer in power? What must democracies do to undermine strongmen or prevent their rise? Where will the next strongman appear? 

Rachman’s book doesn’t provide these answers, but he does offer an interesting overview of the leaders dominating the headlines.