Sebastian A. Wagner
Oct 1, 2011; 10:M111.013284-M111.013284
Research

Joris J. Benschop
Jul 1, 2007; 6:1198-1214
Research

Christian Tagwerker
Apr 1, 2006; 5:737-748
Research

Guoan Chen
Apr 1, 2002; 1:304-313
Research

Qiang Tian
Oct 1, 2004; 3:960-969
Research

Alexey I. Nesvizhskii
Oct 1, 2005; 4:1419-1440
Tutorial

Jesper V. Olsen
Jun 1, 2004; 3:608-614
Technology

Yu Xue
Sep 1, 2008; 7:1598-1608
Research

William M. Old
Oct 1, 2005; 4:1487-1502
Research

Leigh Anderson
Apr 1, 2006; 5:573-588
Research

Mathias Uhlén
Dec 1, 2005; 4:1920-1932
Research

Claudio P. Albuquerque
Jul 1, 2008; 7:1389-1396
Research

Ludovic C. Gillet
Jun 1, 2012; 11:O111.016717-O111.016717
Research

Ignat V. Shilov
Sep 1, 2007; 6:1638-1655
Technology

Albrecht Gruhler
Mar 1, 2005; 4:310-327
Research

Martin R. Larsen
Jul 1, 2005; 4:873-886
Technology

Jeffrey C. Silva
Jan 1, 2006; 5:144-156
Research

N. Leigh Anderson
Nov 1, 2002; 1:845-867
Reviews/Perspectives

Ulrich Rothbauer
Feb 1, 2008; 7:282-289
Research

Yasushi Ishihama
Sep 1, 2005; 4:1265-1272
Research

Linn Fagerberg
Feb 1, 2014; 13:397-406
Research

Jesper V. Olsen
Dec 1, 2005; 4:2010-2021
Technology

Eiji Kinoshita
Apr 1, 2006; 5:749-757
Technology

Philip L. Ross
Dec 1, 2004; 3:1154-1169
Research

Jürgen Cox
Sep 1, 2014; 13:2513-2526
Technological Innovation and Resources

Shao-En Ong
May 1, 2002; 1:376-386
Research

Staphylococcus aureus adhesion to the host's skin and mucosae enables asymptomatic colonization and the establishment of infection. This process is facilitated by cell wall-anchored adhesins that bind to host ligands. Therapeutics targeting this process could provide significant clinical benefits; however, the development of anti-adhesives requires an in-depth knowledge of adhesion-associated factors and an assay amenable to high-throughput applications. Here, we describe the development of a sensitive and robust whole cell assay to enable the large-scale profiling of S. aureus adhesion to host ligands. To validate the assay, and to gain insight into cellular factors contributing to adhesion, we profiled a sequence-defined S. aureus transposon mutant library, identifying mutants with attenuated adhesion to human-derived fibronectin, keratin, and fibrinogen. Our screening approach was validated by the identification of known adhesion-related proteins, such as the housekeeping sortase responsible for covalently linking adhesins to the cell wall. In addition, we also identified genetic loci that could represent undescribed anti-adhesive targets. To compare and contrast the genetic requirements of adhesion to each host ligand, we generated a S. aureus Genetic Adhesion Network, which identified a core gene set involved in adhesion to all three host ligands, and unique genetic signatures. In summary, this assay will enable high-throughput chemical screens to identify anti-adhesives and our findings provide insight into the target space of such an approach.

Despite its major importance in human health, the metabolic potential of the human gut microbiota is still poorly understood. We have recently shown that biosynthesis of Ruminococcin C (RumC), a novel ribosomally synthesized and posttranslationally modified peptide (RiPP) produced by the commensal bacterium Ruminococcus gnavus, requires two radical SAM enzymes (RumMC1 and RumMC2) catalyzing the formation of four Cα-thioether bridges. These bridges, which are essential for RumC's antibiotic properties against human pathogens such as Clostridium perfringens, define two hairpin domains giving this sactipeptide (sulfur-to-α-carbon thioether–containing peptide) an unusual architecture among natural products. We report here the biochemical and spectroscopic characterizations of RumMC2. EPR spectroscopy and mutagenesis data support that RumMC2 is a member of the large family of SPASM domain radical SAM enzymes characterized by the presence of three [4Fe-4S] clusters. We also demonstrate that this enzyme initiates its reaction by Cα H-atom abstraction and is able to catalyze the formation of nonnatural thioether bonds in engineered peptide substrates. Unexpectedly, our data support the formation of a ketoimine rather than an α,β-dehydro-amino acid intermediate during Cα-thioether bridge LC–MS/MS fragmentation. Finally, we explored the roles of the leader peptide and of the RiPP precursor peptide recognition element, present in myriad RiPP-modifying enzymes. Collectively, our data support a more complex role for the peptide recognition element and the core peptide for the installation of posttranslational modifications in RiPPs than previously anticipated and suggest a possible reaction intermediate for thioether bond formation.

Leukocidin ED (LukED) is a pore-forming toxin produced by Staphylococcus aureus, which lyses host cells and promotes virulence of the bacteria. LukED enables S. aureus to acquire iron by lysing erythrocytes, which depends on targeting the host receptor Duffy antigen receptor for chemokines (DARC). The toxin also targets DARC on the endothelium, contributing to the lethality observed during bloodstream infection in mice. LukED is comprised of two monomers: LukE and LukD. LukE binds to DARC and facilitates hemolysis, but the closely related Panton–Valentine leukocidin S (LukS-PV) does not bind to DARC and is not hemolytic. The interaction of LukE with DARC and the role this plays in hemolysis are incompletely characterized. To determine the domain(s) of LukE that are critical for DARC binding, we studied the hemolytic function of LukE–LukS-PV chimeras, in which areas of sequence divergence (divergence regions, or DRs) were swapped between the toxins. We found that two regions of LukE's rim domain contribute to hemolysis, namely residues 57–75 (DR1) and residues 182–196 (DR4). Interestingly, LukE DR1 is sufficient to render LukS-PV capable of DARC binding and hemolysis. Further, LukE, by binding DARC through DR1, promotes the recruitment of LukD to erythrocytes, likely by facilitating LukED oligomer formation. Finally, we show that LukE targets murine Darc through DR1 in vivo to cause host lethality. These findings expand our biochemical understanding of the LukE–DARC interaction and the role that this toxin-receptor pair plays in S. aureus pathophysiology.

HIV Type 1 (HIV-1) and simian immunodeficiency virus (SIV) display differential replication kinetics in macrophages. This is because high expression levels of the active host deoxynucleotide triphosphohydrolase sterile α motif domain and histidine-aspartate domain–containing protein 1 (SAMHD1) deplete intracellular dNTPs, which restrict HIV-1 reverse transcription, and result in a restrictive infection in this myeloid cell type. Some SIVs overcome SAMHD1 restriction using viral protein X (Vpx), a viral accessory protein that induces proteasomal degradation of SAMHD1, increasing cellular dNTP concentrations and enabling efficient proviral DNA synthesis. We previously reported that SAMHD1-noncounteracting lentiviruses may have evolved to harbor RT proteins that efficiently polymerize DNA, even at low dNTP concentrations, to circumvent SAMHD1 restriction. Here we investigated whether RTs from SIVmac239 virus lacking a Vpx protein evolve during in vivo infection to more efficiently synthesize DNA at the low dNTP concentrations found in macrophages. Sequence analysis of RTs cloned from Vpx (+) and Vpx (−) SIVmac239–infected animals revealed that Vpx (−) RTs contained more extensive mutations than Vpx (+) RTs. Although the amino acid substitutions were dispersed indiscriminately across the protein, steady-state and pre-steady-state analysis demonstrated that selected SIVmac239 Vpx (−) RTs are characterized by higher catalytic efficiency and incorporation efficiency values than RTs cloned from SIVmac239 Vpx (+) infections. Overall, this study supports the possibility that the loss of Vpx may generate in vivo SIVmac239 RT variants that can counteract the limited availability of dNTP substrate in macrophages.

Candida albicans and Aspergillus fumigatus are dangerous fungal pathogens with high morbidity and mortality, particularly in immunocompromised patients. Innate immune-mediated programmed cell death (pyroptosis, apoptosis, necroptosis) is an integral part of host defense against pathogens. Inflammasomes, which are canonically formed upstream of pyroptosis, have been characterized as key mediators of fungal sensing and drivers of proinflammatory responses. However, the specific cell death pathways and key upstream sensors activated in the context of Candida and Aspergillus infections are unknown. Here, we report that C. albicans and A. fumigatus infection induced inflammatory programmed cell death in the form of pyroptosis, apoptosis, and necroptosis (PANoptosis). Further, we identified the innate immune sensor Z-DNA binding protein 1 (ZBP1) as the apical sensor of fungal infection responsible for activating the inflammasome/pyroptosis, apoptosis, and necroptosis. The Zα2 domain of ZBP1 was required to promote this inflammasome activation and PANoptosis. Overall, our results demonstrate that C. albicans and A. fumigatus induce PANoptosis and that ZBP1 plays a vital role in inflammasome activation and PANoptosis in response to fungal pathogens.

Lys234 is one of the residues present in class A β-lactamases that is under selective pressure due to antibiotic use. Located adjacent to proton shuttle residue Ser130, it is suggested to play a role in proton transfer during catalysis of the antibiotics. The mechanism underpinning how substitutions in this position modulate inhibitor efficiency and substrate specificity leading to drug resistance is unclear. The K234R substitution identified in several inhibitor-resistant β-lactamase variants is associated with decreased potency of the inhibitor clavulanic acid, which is used in combination with amoxicillin to overcome β-lactamase–mediated antibiotic resistance. Here we show that for CTX-M-14 β-lactamase, whereas Lys234 is required for hydrolysis of cephalosporins such as cefotaxime, either lysine or arginine is sufficient for hydrolysis of ampicillin. Further, by determining the acylation and deacylation rates for cefotaxime hydrolysis, we show that both rates are fast, and neither is rate-limiting. The K234R substitution causes a 1500-fold decrease in the cefotaxime acylation rate but a 5-fold increase in kcat for ampicillin, suggesting that the K234R enzyme is a good penicillinase but a poor cephalosporinase due to slow acylation. Structural results suggest that the slow acylation by the K234R enzyme is due to a conformational change in Ser130, and this change also leads to decreased inhibition potency of clavulanic acid. Because other inhibitor resistance mutations also act through changes at Ser130 and such changes drastically reduce cephalosporin but not penicillin hydrolysis, we suggest that clavulanic acid paired with an oxyimino-cephalosporin rather than penicillin would impede the evolution of resistance.

This article is by Toni Šušnjar.

Warfare and military are an integral part of much of ancient and medieval fantasy. This is no surprise: warfare was a key element in development of society and of history, and much of mythology is also about it. As such, it is difficult for fantasy writers and readers alike to avoid war and military matters in general. And if you are going to do something, try to do it well. Army does not spring from the ground like the spartoi of Jason.

Environment and Geography

Environmental conditions include terrain, climate and resources. All three influence how an army will fight and which weapons it will use.

Terrain can be highly varied, but I will divide it into three categories: mountainous, rolling hills and flat. Mountains and forests – and especially forested mountains – are conductive to infantry warfare. Depending on other conditions (such as society, climate etc.), this can mean either light infantry with focus on ambushes, raiding and guerilla warfare; or heavy infantry, with focus on direct confrontation. Both of these were, at different points, in evidence in Spain and Greece.

Continue reading Building a Fantasy Army — Environment & Society at Mythic Scribes.

This article is by Toni Šušnjar.

Strategy and Enemies

The structure of an army will depend on the strategy, as strategy will determine the army’s role and tasks. A state which carries out expansion through outright territorial conquest will have large numbers of heavy infantry, combat engineers and artillery, and possibly some heavy cavalry as well (e.g. Roman Empire, 10th century Byzantine Empire). If conquest is done by slowly destroying an opponent’s economic and social structures through constant raiding (such as chevauchee or razzia / ghazw), then majority of the army will be light cavalry, with some heavy cavalry support (e.g. Seljuk and Ottoman Empires), and light infantry will be used if terrain is unsuitable for cavalry. If a state is defending against cavalry raids, then light cavalry will be dominant (e.g. 15th century Hungary), whereas heavy cavalry will predominate if enemy raiders are primarily infantry. If enemy armies are too powerful to face in the field, light and heavy cavalry will be used to harass the invading army and cut off its supplies and foraging. In terrain unsuitable for cavalry operations, heavy infantry will be used instead.

Raiding — as a strategy — is generally preferred against a peer opponent, especially if a state cannot have a developed logistical support system.

Continue reading Building a Fantasy Army — Strategy & Organization at Mythic Scribes.

This article is by Toni Šušnjar.

Recruitment and Numbers

The most basic style of recruitment is that of a local militia – rural or urban – where a portion or all of the free men take up arms. Militiamen are usually not highly trained, but they make up for lack of training with motivation: fleeing not only carries social stigma, but is also harshly punished. As such, militias were more effective than what would be expected of “civilians in arms”. Militias almost always depended on relatively cheap and easy to use weapons, though urban militias might have access to more expensive weapons – such as hoplite panoply or crossbows. Tribal militias typically used weapons that were also used for hunting and sport. Peasant levy however was only ever used in a support and harassment role, and often had weapons modified from agricultural implements. Only urban militias could have heavy equipment. A common disadvantage of militia armies is the inability to deploy over long distances and time-frames due to soldiers having a day job; thus, focus on long-term warfare (be it conquest or defence) typically brings about the professionalization of the army. This also means that militias are best used in cases with high political fragmentation – such as city-states.

Continue reading Building a Fantasy Army — Recruitment & Logistics at Mythic Scribes.

This article is by Toni Šušnjar.

In Antiquity and early the Middle Ages, the main weapon was the spear. Only a few exceptions appeared: Roman legions, which used javelins instead, and Macedonian pike phalanx with its sarissa. In the later Middle Ages, the main weapon could be a pike or a polearm (such as polehammer, poleaxe, halberd etc.), before the pike made its return in early modernity. Ranged weapons were not used to cause casualties, but rather to inconvenience the enemies and break up their formation.

Weapons and tactics will adapt to each other, as well as to the terrain and the enemies faced – but adaptations will be done within the boundaries of the society. A society without a significant tradition of horse archery will not counter horse archers with their own, but rather with foot archers. Horse archery was important for nomadic societies, because they could not afford the casualties which resulted from the shock and attrition tactics of the settled societies.

Weapons and armour likewise have a relationship, but since armour is the more difficult to produce of the two, it is developments in armour which typically drive the adaptation of weapons, rather than the other way around.

Continue reading Building a Fantasy Army — Weapons & Tactics at Mythic Scribes.

This article is by Emma Lammers.

Author’s note: neurodivergent is term used to refer to people whose neurological functions differ from the norm because of an innate or acquired condition. Examples of these conditions include autism, learning disabilities, mood disorders, traumatic brain injuries, and more. People who do not have any neurodivergent conditions are considered neurotypical.

To the delight of many readers, more characters in fantasy literature reflect aspects of real-world people than ever before. Today’s heroes can be people of colour, people of any gender or sexual identity, people of nearly any age. Writers are answering the call for more diversity in their work, and oftentimes they do it well, portraying realistic, nuanced characters from marginalized communities.

Some people, however, aren’t as likely to see themselves accurately reflected in the pages of a fantasy story. I’ve searched long and hard to find literary characters who experience autism, anxiety, and sensory processing disorder as I do, and very few of these characters show up in fantasy – a detriment to my favourite genre. Villainous characters are often portrayed as neurodivergent because writers think that this will make them scarier, and you will encounter the occasional hero with post-traumatic stress disorder, but  these depictions tend to lack accuracy, diversity, and consideration for the people who actually have the conditions used in the story.

Continue reading Writing Neurodivergent Characters in Fantasy at Mythic Scribes.

Alright! The Muses sing, drawing you to the desk, pump your veins with hot blood and fill your mind with combustible imagination. You’re on fire and ready to write. The idea once tumbling in your mind is bucking with life and wants to breath words on your screen. It’s awesome. You’re awesome. All is good.

Then the passions temper under the cool, steady light of your computer screen. The process of fleshing out your idea with words demands time. So much so, you feel the vibrant energy of your story suffocate under the process. Now you’re using the logical, analytical side of your brain. Each scene or circumstance demands continuity and must fit into the internal logic of your world. Everything must make sense; else the reader will dismiss this pile of junk for amateur hubris.

With logic comes the questions. A train of them, each rumbling down the tracks uncaring of the idea which once bucked in the stables of your mind, eager for freedom, now tied to the rails. All of the doubts can easily be summarized into “Can I?”

Of course, this isn’t the real question haunting the halls of your mind.

Continue reading Can I? When Doubt Kills Your Ideas at Mythic Scribes.

It sounds like an oxymoron: “How to keep blood-sports interesting?” You’ve got blood and you’ve got sports, the term does its own advertising! And yet, fighting promotions rise and fall, where Pride and Strikeforce once reigned, now stand One and Bellator, but one promotion stands above all its competitors. The world of MMA knows one promotion which has clawed its way to the international top and established itself as the gold standard upon whose hallowed surface skulls are crushed and blood is poured. I’m talking about none other than the UFC.

Having established itself over the years as a beacon of both quality matches and consistent drama, the UFC attracts the lion’s share of international talent in the MMA world, and with it the eyes and ears of MMA fans everywhere. Having well and truly stroked the ego of the promotion, you might be wondering what on earth any of this has to do with writing or fantasy?

Well, does your world happen to feature prizefighting, ritual combat, or the eternally popular fantasy fixture called the gladiatorial arena? If so, there are a lot of writing and worldbuilding lessons you can learn from observing the biggest promotion in the biggest modern blood-sport of the world.

Continue reading Lessons from the UFC: How to Keep Blood-Sports Interesting at Mythic Scribes.

Wisdom to my mind is a bit of a paradox. It is subjective and context-dependent, but inherently universal. I say this, because for something to be wise it ought to be applicable across time and space, yet whether the claims are appraised as being “wise” hinges on the perception of a past, present or future audience. It is beyond the self, yet dependent upon the self. So that then begs the fantasy writing question: What if the self is not human? If culture already morphs the form and substance of wisdom, what effect might a different state of being have on it?

That would be terribly dull to prescribe, but I can help get some readers’ creativity going. Below I have listed relevant questions with examples you might consider when building your setting, so you may merrily thread into your fantastic realms to shape oddities rich and strange.

I would advise readers of this article to try and let go of their own presumptions on what is wise for the sake of worldbuilding. There are few cultures in our modern, human world whose philosophers deem obtuse narcissists dressed in mink robes as being wise, but why wouldn’t a race of bobcat-folk?

Continue reading Questions for Worldbuilding the Concept of Wisdom at Mythic Scribes.

Advice for Fantasy Writers

This article is by Toni Šušnjar.

One of basic elements of fantasy warfare is fantasy army. And one of basic elements of army is its size, which will affect organization and logistics, as well as strategies and tactics it can employ. Thus, prospective fantasy writers should understand factors which limit the size of premodern militaries. But to understand that, it is first to understand differences in what writers mean when they talk of armies.

Army vs Field Army

Basic difference one has to understand is that of military versus army versus field army. Latter distinction is especially important, and often difficult, as both can be described as simply “army” in sources and thus it is necessary to rely on contextual clues.

Military is the overall armed forces of the country. It can include

Army or ground forces is the overall land-based forces that the state can control.

Field army is a formation of land forces, that is, a portion of land forces deployed as a coherent force under single commander with the aim of achieving a goal.

Continue reading Size of Armies at Mythic Scribes.

Advice for Fantasy Writers

This article is by Toni Šušnjar.
Note: This is Part Two of a two-part essay. Here is the link to Part One.

Feudal Army

Feudal army is a complex beast: it may include landed troops, mercenaries, town militias, conscripted peasants, or any combination of these. Thus estimating size of a feudal army will require estimating size of each element of the listed, and the size of field army will never be an exact proportion of the total military force available – or often even able to be estimated.

Landed troops are perhaps easiest to estimate – but even that is not simple. In 15th century Germany, it was generally held that 20 hufen (plots) were required to support a man-at-arms (armored cavalryman) while 10 hufen were required for a lightly armored cavalryman (typically a mounted crossbowman). Hufe was a single peasant’s plot or 121 406 m2. In theory, a state with million men and 85% rural population should have been able to raise 12 750 cavalry, as per the calculation below:

• 1 000 000 men * 0,85 = 850 000 men = 170 000 plots;
• lance (gleve) = 1 man at arms + 2 light cavalrymen (note that historically size of lance varied – this is just an example) = 40 plots
• 170 000 plots = 4 250 lances = 4 250 men-at-arms + 8 500 light cavalrymen

This gives a total of 1,275% of population.

Continue reading Size of Armies Part 2 at Mythic Scribes.

New essay anthology examines the future of the international order News release jon.wallace 7 May 2021

Featuring a new essay by Robin Niblett, Chief Executive of Chatham House, and Leslie Vinjamuri, Director of the US and Americas programme.

“Anchoring the World”, a new anthology, features an important new essay by Robin Niblett, Chief Executive of Chatham House, and Leslie Vinjamuri, Director of the US and Americas programme. The essay, “The Liberal Order Begins At Home”, argues powerfully for the revival of a liberal international order.

The essay collection has been produced by the Lloyd George Study Group on World Order, and celebrates the centennial years of Chatham House, Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service, and the Council on Foreign Relations.

Robin Niblett said:

“In this excellent collection, some authors argue that the United Nations should continue to anchor the international system, while others argue for the creation of a new Concert of Powers.

“Our essay argues that it is both necessary and possible to revive the idea of a liberal international order: necessary (and urgent) because of heightened global competition with China, and possible only if western democracies repair their deep social and economic problems at home.

“We hope this volume carries forward the fortitude and creative spirit that the School of Foreign Service, Chatham House, and the Council on Foreign Relations have brought to the study and practice of international affairs over the past century.”

The Lloyd George Study Group and book were made possible by the generosity of the family of Robert Lloyd George, the great-grandson of British Prime Minister, David Lloyd George.

Anchoring the World is published by Foreign Affairs magazine.

Time to accelerate the sustainability pivot Expert comment NCapeling 26 May 2021

Higher stakes make it more important than ever to safeguard the integrity of sustainability commitments, and ensure high quality in delivery and implementation.

Regular headlines reaffirm the rise of sustainability on the global stage. Political momentum behind climate action has not been derailed by COVID-19, sustainability is increasingly central to national political debates, and what once might have been confined to scientific pursuits and UN conferences has now percolated through to international financial affairs and the wider political summits.

Much is made of the scale of the challenge, from climate change, water stresses, and biodiversity loss to the looming spectre of environment-induced societal breakdown triggering unprecedented civilizational challenges on the back of decades of systemic neglect over the true cost of social and environmental imbalances and unencumbered consumption.

But the good news is that talk of sustainability solutions is picking up pace and growing in its reach into the mainstream. The Wall Street Journal recently charted the shift of sustainable finance from being a niche interest of socially conscious investors into a sustainable ‘gold rush’, further bolstering its financial credentials with trillions of dollars designated for the global energy transition.

Assets in investment funds with links to the environment came to almost $2 trillion globally in the first quarter of 2021, more than tripling in just three years, and investors are putting some $3 billion a day into these funds while bonds and loans worth $5 billion looking to bankroll green initiatives are issued every day.

Climate ambitions and power diplomacy

Should the number of zeros fail to persuade, other signs of a sustainability pivot abound. Climate ambition was the driving force in major power diplomacy as France, Germany, China, and the US jostled for leadership positions in a high octane theatre of ‘climate one upmanship’ in the run-up to the Climate Summit hosted by US president Joe Biden. The G7 has agreed to stop international financing of coal projects, and an International Energy Agency report says delivering net zero emissions by 2050 means no new coal, oil, or gas development from now on.

Governments are sending unmistakable policy signals which are redrawing multiple frontiers of the real economy, such as the banning of single use plastic in multiple jurisdictions from Europe, China, and more than 30 African states as well as New York and California. The sale of internal combustion engine vehicles is also set to end by 2035 or sooner in the EU, the UK, and California, and China is expected to follow suit with similar plans. France has proposed a ban on domestic flights when there are less carbon intensive alternatives on the ground.

But these signals did not spring out of a political vacuum. A global climate poll conducted by the United Nations (UN) in 50 countries showed two-thirds of the 1.2 million people polled thought there is a global climate emergency, and most indicated their support for stronger climate action even in countries with strong fossil energy interest.

Real economy responses to noticeable changes in risk calculus and political appetite will likely underpin further rapid shifts in market sentiment as investors begin to fully factor in the scale of the challenge and escalate their interrogation of company-level climate action plans.

Rapid pace of change still needed

But despite this ever-clearer direction of travel and growing availability of new technology and policy options, the need for speed remains. The rationale for moving fast in the next decade and a half to avoid the clear and present threats of environmental and breakdown is increasingly clear.

Getting up to scale is an ongoing and daunting challenge not least because exponential growth has brought growing pains. The recent spat over the definition and the usefulness of net zero targets for corporations and investors as seen in the shareholder votes over the climate plans put forward by Shell and other companies are all testimony to the challenge of mainstreaming.

While some have characterized these debates as political infighting, the reality is higher stakes simply mean it is more important than ever to safeguard the integrity of sustainability commitments as well as the quality of their delivery and implementation.

The move from ‘what’ to ‘how’ points to a clear demand for new, innovative collaborative efforts to help mitigate myriad political economy challenges associated with the upcoming great transition and ensure this sustainability pivot will deliver the promised outcomes. Launching the Chatham House Sustainability Accelerator in support of these once-in-a-generation efforts is a proud moment for the institute, and a clear sign that this pivot to sustainability is here to stay.

Helen Clark elected president of Chatham House News release jon.wallace 23 July 2021

The former New Zealand prime minister and Head of UN Development Programme has been elected president of Chatham House.

Former New Zealand prime minister and Head of the United Nations Development Programme, Helen Clark, has been elected president of Chatham House.

Ms Clark will replace former United Kingdom Prime Minister, Sir John Major, who is retiring from the role. She will join Baroness Eliza Manningham-Buller and Lord Darling as one of the institute’s three serving presidents.

Helen Clark was prime minister of New Zealand from 1999-2008. She then became the 8th and first female administrator of the UN Development Programme, completing two terms from 2009-2017.  

She is actively engaged in important international issues that are central to the institute’s priorities. She is currently chairing the Independent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness and Response with former president of Liberia, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, which was convened by the World Health Organization last year and has just completed its main report. Her expertise extends to sustainable development, tackling climate change and developments in the Asia-Pacific.

Chatham House Director Robin Niblett welcomed the appointment:

‘We are excited to have found someone with the high-level political experience and who shares the strong reputation for integrity that Sir John enjoys. Helen Clark is highly regarded around the world for her past and current endeavours. Her election also underscores the institute’s global outlook and priorities, which she is so well qualified to help guide.’

Ms Clark was elected at the Annual General Meeting of Chatham House on 20 July which also marked the last official engagement for Lord O’Neill, who has now handed over to Sir Nigel Sheinwald as Chair of the institute.

Chatham House is delighted that Sir John Major will remain affiliated with the institute as president emeritus, and that Lord O’Neill will become a member of the institute’s panel of senior advisers.

The Chatham House Centenary Award winners announced News release jon.wallace 29 July 2021

Black Lives Matter, Greta Thunberg and Sir David Attenborough have been recognized for their achievements tackling racial inequality, climate change and biodiversity loss.

As Chatham House wraps up its centenary activities, the institute has made three Centenary Awards recognizing outstanding contributions to confronting the critical challenges facing the world today.

The awards are unique as they were voted on by the institute’s staff and pay tribute to the individual or organization they believe has played a significant role in progressing the Chatham House mission: to help governments and societies build a sustainably secure, prosperous and just world.

Greta Thunberg has been awarded the Chatham House Centenary Changemakers Award in recognition of her vanguard role in mobilizing young people to take up climate activism.

Greta’s message has cut through where politicians and scientists have failed time and time again. She has commanded the attention of world leaders, addressed intergovernmental organizations and inspired millions of people to join the global climate strike. She has demonstrated the electrifying power of young voices speaking truth to power and focused the world’s attention on environmental injustices.

Sir David Attenborough has been named as the Chatham House Centenary Lifetime Award winner for his tireless commitment to conservation and raising public and political awareness of the growing climate crisis.

Together with the BBC, he has pioneered the way in which we experience and understand life on this planet, bringing the wonders of the natural world into our homes. Over the last 60 years, from black-and-white to 4K TV, his pioneering documentaries have been broadcast around the world and have sounded the alarm on the devastating impact humanity has had on the environment.

He has become one of the most compelling voices on important issues such as biodiversity loss, climate change and the destruction of natural habitats. Sir David was previously awarded the Chatham House Prize in 2019 for his work on Blue Planet II and tackling ocean plastic pollution.

Melina Abdullah, one of the co-founders of the Los Angeles chapter of the Black Lives Matter movement and co-director of Black Lives Matter Grassroots, has accepted the Chatham House Centenary Diversity Champion Award on behalf of the movement.

This award is in recognition of the momentous work Black Lives Matter has done towards empowering black people and promoting a more inclusive approach to race in policy-making. The movement has brought global attention to systemic injustice against black lives and is helping to build a better world that draws on more diverse voices and inclusive approaches.

Dr Robin Niblett, Director of Chatham House said:

‘We are delighted to recognise three special centenary awards today in recognition of the individuals who our staff believe are redefining the ways in which each of us can drive positive global change.

‘The vision and achievements of each of the winners echo Chatham House’s own goals for its second century and demonstrate a shared commitment to building a more sustainable and inclusive world.

‘We are inspired by the ways the award winners are leading global efforts to combat climate change, protect biodiversity and bring about more equal and inclusive societies.’

For more information, please contact: pressoffice@chathamhouse.org

Cross-border conflict, evidence, policy and trends (XCEPT)

This five-year policy-focused research programme seeks to respond to the challenges of long-term cross-border conflicts by exploring the drivers behind them.

Protracted conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa, Horn of Africa and parts of Asia, although usually arising from intra-state disputes, rarely remain contained within national borders. Their effects reverberate outward and external actors are drawn in.

The longer these wars last, the more difficult they are to resolve as the interests of international actors collide and the web of economic and political interactions which sustain violence and connect conflict across borders expand and deepen.

The Cross-border conflict, evidence, policy and trends (XCEPT) research programme brings together world-leading experts to examine conflict-affected borderlands, how conflicts connect across borders, and the drivers of violent and peaceful behaviour.

Chatham House provides research leadership to the programme, as part of the wider consortium, and our research explores:

• the intersection of conflict supply chains which sustain and embed violence
• coping supply chains for survival-based economic activity which occurs in the context of violence

Three geographic case studies will be supported by cross-cutting workstreams on gender and social inclusion, livelihoods, and border security. Each will produce analysis and recommendations to inform international policy responses to conflict across borders.

These case studies will focus on:

• armed actors and financial flows through Iraq and the Levant
• human smuggling across Libya, East and West Africa
• gold mining and weapons flows across Sudanese borderlands

The consortium is made up of a range of other organizations, including the Asia Foundation, the Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center, the Rift Valley Institute, Chemonics UK and King’s College London.

XCEPT is funded by UK Aid from the UK government.

AUKUS reveals much about the new global strategic context Expert comment NCapeling 17 September 2021

The new AUKUS partnership as well as the furore in Paris surrounding its announcement says a lot about the new geopolitical landscape.

The growing diplomatic drama surrounding the announcement of the new Australia-UK-US (AUKUS) risks concealing rather than highlighting what the deal reveals about profound changes in the global strategic context. Several elements stand out.

First, Australia’s decision to break off the $66 billion contract it signed with France in 2016 to purchase a new fleet of diesel electric submarines underscores the heightened level of concern in Canberra about China’s growing naval capabilities.

Despite all the industrial, legal, and diplomatic disruption, the Australian government has decided only the stealthy nuclear-powered submarines developed by Britain with US support can provide the genuine naval capability it needs long-term.

Next, in helping Australia resolve this conundrum, the British government has revealed the versatility of its new foreign policy. Part of the reason UK prime minister Boris Johnson eschewed the concept of a formal foreign policy and security treaty in the post-Brexit deal with the European Union (EU) was to pursue freely new ventures such as the recent ‘G7-plus’ summit in Cornwall, and enhanced cooperation among the Five Eyes allies. AUKUS reveals that this approach can produce real results.

Europe or the Indo-Pacific

During this week’s Polish-British Belvedere Forum in Warsaw, one of the main Polish concerns was that this ‘tilt’ to the Indo-Pacific could overstretch Britain’s scarce resources when it should be focusing on Europe, where they are most needed.

But AUKUS does not over-extend Britain. There is no military commitment involved in the agreement. The UK also remains outside the Quad – made up of the US, India, Japan, and Australia. And the ongoing stately voyage of its new aircraft carrier from the Mediterranean into the South China Sea provides better insight into the substance of the UK’s Indo-Pacific tilt.

Much derided for not carrying enough of its own aircraft – and for depending on US and Dutch escort vessels – the UK has in fact managed to coalesce a flexible group of allies around the Queen Elizabeth while enabling it to fly the British flag in Asian waters and strengthening interoperability with its allies for future joint operations.

Despite the hype, Britain’s main defence investments and deployments remain firmly focused in Europe, as laid out by the recent Integrated Review. And the decision to draft a new NATO Strategic Concept – midwifed by Britain at the 70th anniversary NATO summit hosted in London in December 2019 and confirmed during Joe Biden’s visit to NATO headquarters in June – will give Britain’s role in European security a new purpose and focus in the coming years.

Alone on the strategic landscape

For France, of course, the cancellation of its submarine deal is a painful humiliation, and a severe blow to thousands of workers in its hi-tech defence industry. It also comes at a sensitive moment politically, with Emmanuel Macron keen to demonstrate his international standing ahead of the 2022 presidential election. Instead, France now looks rather lonely on the strategic landscape alongside the more homogeneous and collectively powerful AUKUS trio.

But, rather than take the high road, a furious French reaction has compared Biden to Donald Trump and argued that this defence industrial failure for France should drive an acceleration towards European – for which, read EU – strategic autonomy.

This implies France sees European strategic autonomy as protecting and extending its own sovereign power and industrial interests rather than as a process for EU members to achieve more together in security and foreign policy than they can alone – thereby undermining rather than enhancing its case.

The gap between European strategic rhetoric and practical action was further highlighted by the AUKUS partnership being announced the evening before the EU launched its own Indo-Pacific strategy, and on the same day as China refused to allow a German frigate its first planned port visit to Shanghai.

America is still back

There is still a long way to go before the new submarine deal becomes reality. Australia needs to extricate itself from the French deal, decide how to secure the highly enriched uranium to power its new nuclear submarines, decide with the US and UK the division of labour and technology transfer of production, and assuage the International Atomic Energy Agency’s concerns about the precedent this deal sets. The fruits of this dramatic announcement will, therefore, be a long time in coming.

But, however the details play out, 15 September 2021 was a consequential day. The AUKUS announcement showed that China’s growing hard power is now eliciting a genuinely tough and structural political-military reaction.

Across the Atlantic, it also allowed President Biden – flanked ‘virtually’ by the British and Australian prime ministers – to send the global message that America is indeed back, just three weeks after the ignominious retreat from Afghanistan and chaotic exit from Kabul. And it offered him the opportunity to remind the world that the Indo-Pacific is where the US will be putting its main effort in the future.

For many in China, AUKUS now confirms their belief that the US and its principal allies are determined to contain China’s rise in its own ‘backyard’, where it believes it has the right to flex its muscles. For others, it will confirm Xi Jinping has overreached and China is now paying the price of his more assertive strategy. Either way, the Chinese are on notice that the ambivalent nature of the Obama pivot to Asia has given way to a more determined pivot under Biden.

While the US is stepping up, the UK has shown it is in the mix, leveraging opportunities as they arise. For example, the goodwill the UK has generated in Tokyo with this new partnership with Australia could help its case as it pursues membership of the Transpacific Partnership trade area in 2022.

The EU looks like a bystander in comparison and ill-equipped for the geopolitical competition inherent in this new strategic context. It is essential, therefore, once the dust has settled from these fraught few days, that the US and UK reach out to find ways to involve France and its EU partners in a meaningful, shared transatlantic approach to the Indo-Pacific.

G20 must live up to its crisis-solving legacy Expert comment NCapeling 29 October 2021

The relevance of G20 is in question amid waning internal cohesion, but emerging economies could inject the group with inclusive ideas and greater legitimacy.

‘If we didn’t have it, we would have to invent it’ might well be the catchphrase for the Group of 20 (G20) as the international community rethinks global institutional architecture in the face of shifting power dynamics and geopolitical strife.

To be fair, the same is often said of other venerable institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), or even the United Nations (UN), often as a line of defence when questions are raised over their relevance or effectiveness.

According to former Goldman Sachs Asset Management chairman and UK treasury minister Jim O’Neill, size also matters because the G20 is both too big and too small to be on the ball consistently. While he might be right, numbers alone suggest the G20 should be the room where it happens when it comes to fixing global challenges such as post-pandemic economic recovery, tackling climate change, or getting the world vaccines.

Of all the international groupings, it boasts the most diverse and compelling mix of nations. It has 80 per cent of global income, three-quarters of global exports, 60 per cent of the global population and 80 per cent of global emissions.

Coming of age

The G20 was a forum of central bankers and finance ministers created when the 1997 Asian financial crisis laid bare the insufficiency of the G7. It came of age in 2008 when elevated to a leaders’ level summit two months after the Lehman Brothers collapse that precipitated the global financial crisis.

Perhaps distance did make the heart grow fonder, or at least hindsight rosier. While the G20’s response to the 2008 global financial meltdown is often lauded as an exemplary economic crisis response, the reality is less straightforward.

Barely two days after solemn promises were made in the 2008 communique, Russia broke rank and raised tariffs on imported cars. India followed by applying import duties on several iron and steel products.

Even though the 2008 summit did not immediately result in a coordinated fiscal boost, the common threat of a global financial meltdown helped conjure a display of global unity and rally much-needed market confidence. It also resulted in a set of practical action plans unheard of to that point and specific tasks for several international organisations as a follow-up to summitry.

The seeming parallel to 2008 this year, as the world faces the common threat of the COVID-19 pandemic amid a series of extreme weather and supply crunches, explains why expectations are running high for Rome and for G20 president Mario Draghi, the Italian prime minister.

There is pressure to solve myriad global challenges, whether scaling climate action before the UN climate change conference in Glasgow or delivering vaccines and debt relief for developing countries, to name a few.

Effective crisis response is how the G20 has cut its teeth, and the world is handling several emergencies right now. Draghi himself was chair of the Financial Stability Forum back in 2008.

Inflated expectations also abound because the Rome gathering is a G20 summit without the long shadow of Jamal Khashoggi’s death over the Saudi G20 presidency. It also lacks former US president Donald Trump, who tried his best to put many international organisations and the spirit of global cooperation in deep freeze since 2016.

If defrosting multilateralism was also a shared goal, in addition to economic recovery, general rustiness in the business of international cooperation – an understandable hangover from the Trump years – has also gummed up the works.

Hence, the G20 will have to do much in the coming days to prove that, unlike the G7 in 2008, it has yet to outlive its usefulness, even when some have decried it as being missing in action over the COVID-19 crisis. Amid rising US-China tensions and at a critical juncture for the global economy, countries are wondering if the G20 will survive such a tense geopolitical atmosphere and whether the agenda will be overloaded with challenging foreign policy issues such as the plight of Afghanistan.

Customary language aside, the G20’s problem-solving reputation can be oversold. Not surprisingly, it has worked best when members already agree on the next steps. Looking to the future, more hostile power plays are likely to further weaken the cohesiveness and effectiveness of institutions such as the G20.

Reviewing its track record would also suggest the institution’s prowess in crisis response tends to wane with the distance from the realm of monetary policy coordination. Not all areas of macroeconomics are created equal, in part because of the professional camaraderie and insularity of the central banking technocracy.

As was evident even in 2008, the G20 was less effective where there were more actors and domestic political dynamics at play, such as in the arena of trade. The recent deal struck on corporate tax is an encouraging but notable exception.

Gap between words and deeds

As The Economist said in 2011: ‘the G20 … is a big improvement over the G7 because it takes emerging economies seriously. But do the emerging economies themselves take the G20 seriously?’ Any scorecards would point to severe gaps between words and deeds, most notably but not limited to the emerging economy members.

If the G20 was born out of the need to increase the number of seats at the table, the next three years – with the G20 helmed by Indonesia in 2022 followed by India then Brazil – might prove to be the coming-out party for emerging economies.

G20's lack of progress highlights challenge for COP26 Expert comment NCapeling 1 November 2021

A positive outcome from the G20 summit was committing to end international financing for coal projects but, on other issues, the communique was ultimately weak.

Success at Glasgow depends on bridging fault lines

Renata Dwan

The G20 summit’s lack of progress on climate highlights the scale of the challenge – and the stakes – for COP26.  The countries responsible for 80 per cent of global emissions recognized but failed to agree concrete action to limit global warming to 1.5C.

The leaders’ gathering reveals multilateralism’s fault lines. One is the tension between domestic politics and international priorities, reflected in the lack of ambition to reduce coal dependency.  The second is the tension between industrialized and developing states over responsibility for delivering global goods.

The G20 failed to endorse the G7’s pledge to achieve net zero emissions by 2050 or to accelerate the mobilization of previously agreed climate financing. Success at Glasgow – and beyond – will depend on the extent to which these fault lines can be bridged.

Communique’s language was weak

Professor Tim Benton

A positive outcome on climate from the G20 summit was the commitment to end international financing for coal projects by the end of 2021. This is a win for the climate and for the G20-host, Italy.

The references to 1.5 degrees and the commitment to taking further action this decade were also important, and help lay the groundwork for COP26. On the downside, the communique’s language on phasing out fossil fuel subsidies and coal domestically was very weak.

The G20 summit should be regarded as the next step – it is crucial world leaders accelerate their efforts at COP26 in Glasgow to avert climate catastrophe and keep 1.5 degrees alive.

Platitudes and vague plans on pandemic preparedness

Robert Yates

As G20 leaders head to Glasgow to tackle the evolving climate crisis, they leave Rome having failed, yet again, to take serious action to end the ongoing COVID-19 crisis.

Despite the obvious urgency to achieve universal vaccine coverage, their communique contains little more than platitudes and vague plans to prepare better for future pandemics. It is not as if they had not been briefed. 

In the run up to the G20, the leaders of the WHO, WTO, IMF, World Bank, former world leaders, Nobel laureates and the Pope, all highlighted the costs of ongoing vaccine inequity: five million deaths next year and $5.3 trillion dollars in lost economic output by 2026.

The ask was also straightforward: launch a massive airlift of unneeded vaccines from rich countries through COVAX, ramp up financing of the multilateral response and accelerate technology transfers to developing countries.

But on all these issues the wording of the communique is weak, with no numbers on vaccines or funding, no hard timescales and no urgency. This does not augur well for the COP-26 summit.

G20 communique is a launching pad

Dr Leslie Vinjamuri

The G20 might seem disappointing to some, but a lot will depend on expectations. If your starting point is a pandemic that has so far taken five million lives and driven a global economic crisis, and that both these crises are marked by deep inequality, then the measures adopted are bound to look insufficient. But if your starting point is 16 years of democracy in decline, rampant disinformation on issues of climate and public health, four years of failed international leadership during the Donald Trump presidency and, especially today, heightened tensions between the US and China, the world’s two greatest powers, then the fact that the G20 communique achieved as much as it has is remarkable.

Any written document that requires agreement between the US, UK, China, Russia, India, Saudi Arabia and the EU is necessarily going to be watered down.

But the principles are in the document, and mostly everyone turned up – if some by video. That is a good outcome for this kind of multilateralism in 2021. The G20 communique is a floor not a ceiling, and it’s a launching pad for activism and mobilisation by individual states, but also by corporates, civil society, and subnational actors. 

Now we need to hope that those on the right side of progress, whether on climate, health, or development, will use this language to drive forward concrete actions towards net zero, climate finance, vaccine distribution, and debt relief.

Specifics are for the most part missing

Creon Butler

This year’s G20 leaders’ summit marks a stark contrast with the past four years when much of the group’s energy was exhausted simply trying to maintain a consensus – in the face of opposition by a President Trump-led United States – on such issues as the importance of tackling climate change, the benefits of the rules-based multilateral trade system and the centrality of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the global financial safety net. 

By contrast, today’s G20 Rome Leaders’ declaration early on underlines ‘the crucial role of multilateralism in finding shared, effective solutions’. In two critical areas for the world economy – the global boost to liquidity from the general allocation of $650bn in Special Drawing Rights and the global tax deal focused on addressing challenges arising from digitalisation – this outlook has been translated into very substantial and concrete achievements announced earlier in the year.