The following article, Amazing: Trump Moved 48 States Toward the Republican Party, was first published on Conservative Firing Line.

When the 2024 election dust settled early on Wednesday morning, it became clear that Donald Trump didn’t just win the election, he trounced Kamala Harris. It was so bad for the Democrats that nearly every state moved to the right. The GOP hasn’t seen so many votes move their way since Ronald Reagan in 1980. …

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The following article, Will These Deranged Celebrities Who Promised To End Their Lives Or Flee The Country If Trump Wins Actually Follow Through?, was first published on Conservative Firing Line.

(Natural News) Similar to what happened in 2016, a host of celebrities and influencers made wild claims that they would leave the country or even end their lives if Donald Trump won another term in the White House. Will any of them actually follow through? Take Rob Reiner, for instance. He promised to “set himself on …

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The following article, ‘Burn The System Down’: Democrats Now Face Charges They Are The Ones Trying To Destroy Democracy, was first published on Conservative Firing Line.

Protecting democracy was a catch phrase that Democrats have used for years to explain their hatred of now President-elect Donald Trump. He was, after all, they said, a “Hitler.” He would be a dictator. He would use the military against his political opponents, jailing them and worse. The only salvation for America’s “democracy” would be …

Continue reading ‘Burn The System Down’: Democrats Now Face Charges They Are The Ones Trying To Destroy Democracy ...

It can scarcely be denied that the supreme goal of all theory is to make the irreducible basic elements as simple and as few as possible without having to surrender the adequate representation of a single datum of experience.

—Albert Einstein, “On the Method of Theoretical Physics” (1934)

Context: Last week, I pinched off one of my typically woolly emails in response to an acquaintance whom I admire. He’s a swell guy who makes things I love, and he'd written, in part, to express concern that my recent Swift impersonation had been directed explicitly at something he'd made. Which, of course, it hadn’t—but which, as I'll try to discuss here, strikes me as irrelevant.

To paraphrase Bogie, I played it for him, so now I suppose I might as well play it for you.

(n.b.: Excerpted, redacted, munged, and heavily expanded from my original email)

There are at least a couple things that mean a lot to me that I'm still just not very good at.

• Make nuanced points in whatever way they need to be made; even if that ends up seeming “un-nuanced”
• Never explain yourself.

I want to break both these self-imposed rules privately with you here. [Editor’s Note: Um.] Because, I hope to nuance the shit out of some fairly un-nuanced points. And, to do that, I'll also (reluctantly) need to explain myself. But, here goes.

First [regarding my goofing on “distraction-free writing environments”] I think there are some GIANT distinctions at play here that a lot of folks may not find nearly as obvious as I do:

1. Tool Mastery vs. Productivity Pr0n – Finding and learning the right tools for your work vs solely dicking around with the options for those tools is just so important, but also so different. And, admittedly, it’s almost impossible to contrast those differences in terms of hard & fast rules that could be true for all people in all situations. But, that doesn’t make the difference any less qualitatively special or real.
   
   Similarly…

2. Self-Help Vs. “Self”–“Help” – Solving the problem that caused the problem that caused the problem that caused the symptom we eventually noticed. Huge. Arguably, peerless.

   • Viz.: How many of us ignore the actual cause of our problem in favor of just reading dozens of blog posts about how to “turbocharge” its most superficial symptoms? Sick.

3. Focus & Play – Yes, focusing on important work is, as Ford used to say, Job 1. But, that focus benefits when we maintain the durable and unapologetic sense of play that affords true creativity and fosters an emergence of context and connection that’s usually killed by stress. BUT.

   • Again, what conceivable “rule” could ever serve to immutably declare that “THIS goofing-off is critical for hippocampal plasticity” vs. “THAT goofing-off is just dumb, distracting bullshit?”

   • Impossible. Because drawing those kinds of distinctions is one of our most important day-to-day responsibilities. Decisions are hard, and there’s no app or alarm gadget that can change that.

     • Although, they certainly can help mask the depth of the underlying problem that made them seem so—what’s the parlance?—“indispensable”.
     • Think: Elmo Band-Aids for that unsightly pancreatic tumor.

4. Reducing Distraction through Care (Rather than braces, armatures, and puppet strings). Removing interruptions and external distractions that harm your work or life? Great. Counting on your distraction-removal tool to supplement your non-existent motivation to do work that will never get done anyway? Pathetic.

   • Frankly, this is a big reason I'm so galled when anyone touts their tool/product/service as being the poor, misunderstood artist’s new miracle medicine—rather than just admitting they've made a slightly different spoon.
   • Because, let’s be honest: although most of us have plenty of perfectly serviceable spoons, everybody knows collecting cutlery is way more fun than using it to swallow yucky medicine.

5. Using a System Vs. Becoming a System. Having a system or process for getting work done vs. making the iteration of that system or process a replacement for the work. This is just…wow…big.
   
   But, maybe most importantly to me…

6. Embracing the Impossibles. Getting past these or any other intellectual koans by simply accepting life’s innumerable and unresolvable paradoxes, hypocrisies, and impossibilities as God-given gifts of creative constraint. Rather than, say, a mimeographed page of long division problems that must be solved for a whole number, n.

   • I just can’t ever get away from this one. For me, it’s what everything inevitably comes back to.
   • The very definition of our jobs is to solve the right problem at the right level for the right reason—based on a combination of the best info we have for now and a clear-eyed dedication to never pushing an unnecessary rock up an avoidable hill.

   • YET, we keep force-feeding the monster that tells us to fiddle and fart and blame the Big Cruel World whenever we face work that might threaten our fragile personal mythology.

     • “Sigh. I wish I could finally start writing My Novel….Ooooooh, if only I had a slightly nicer pen…and Zeus loved me more….”

All that stuff? That there’s a complex set of ideas to talk about for many complex reasons—not least of which being how many people either despise or (try to) deny the unavoidable impact of ol' number six.

But, here’s the thing: as much as saying so pisses anybody off, I think the topics we're NOT talking about whenever we disappear into Talmudic scholarship about “full-screen mode” or “minimalist desks” or whatever constitutes a “zen habit”—those shunned topics are precisely the things that I believe are most mind-blowingly critical to our real-world happiness as humans.

In fact, I believe that to such a degree that helping provide a voice for those unpopular topics that can be heard over the din is now (what passes for) my career. I really believe these deeper ideas are worth socializing on any number of levels and in many media. Even when it’s inconvenient and slightly disrespectful of someone’s business model.

So, that’s what I try to do. I talk about these things. Seldom by careful design. Often poorly. But, always because they each mean an awful lot to me.

[…]

But, no matter how I end up saying whatever the hell I say, I believe in saying it not simply to be liked or followed or revered as a “nice guy” who pushes out shit-tons of whatever to “help people.”

Because, believe me, friend, a great many of those apparently “nice guys” swarming around the web “helping people” these days are ass-fucking their audience for nickels and calling it a complimentary colonoscopy. And, while I absolutely think that in itself is empirically wrong, I also think it’s just as important to say that it’s wrong. Sometimes, True Things need to be said.

Which in this instance amounts to saying, a) selling people a prettier way to kinda almost but not really write is not, in the canonical sense, “nice”—but, far worse, b) leaving your starry-eyed customers with the nauseatingly misguided impression that their “distraction” originates from anyplace but their own busted-ass brain is really not “helping.” Not on any level. It is, literally, harmful.

“Helping” a junkie become more efficient at keeping his syringe loaded is hardly “nice.”

It’s the opposite of nice. And, it’s the opposite of helpful. These are my True Things.

And, to me, saying your True Things also means not watering down the message you care about in order to render it incapable of even conceivably hurting someone’s feelings—or of even conceivably losing you even one teeny-tiny slice of that precious “market share.”

Well, that’s the price, and I'm fine paying it—best money I've ever spent.

But, it also means trusting your audience by letting each of them decide to add water only as they choose to—by never corrupting the actual concentrate in a way that might make it less useful to the smartest or most eager 5% of people who'd like to try using it undiluted. Because, at that point, you're not only abandoning the coolest people you have the honor of serving—you risk becoming a charlatan.

And, that’s precisely what you become when you start to iteratively inbreed the kind of fucktard audience for whom daily buffets of weak swill and beige assurance are life’s most gratifying reward.

Sure. Those poor bastards may never end up using any of that watery information to do anything more ambitious than turbocharging their most regrettable symptoms. But, who’s the last person in the universe who’s going to grab them by the ears and tell them to get back to work? Exactly—that same “nice guy” whose livelihood now depends on keeping infantalized strangers addicted to his “help.”

Holy shit—no way could I ever live with that. It’s so wrong, it’s not even right. ESC, ESC, ESC!

[…]

Okay. So anyhow, there’s a really long-winded, overly generous, and extremely pompous way of trying to say I don’t know how to do what I do except how I do it. But, I do genuinely feel awful when innocent people feel they have been publicly humiliated or berated simply because I'm some dick who hates people.

Which has to be my favorite irony of all.

When I was a kid, I thought my Mom was “mean” not to let me play in traffic on busy Galbraith Road. Today, I'm not simply grateful that she had the strength and resolve to be so “mean”—I actually can’t imagine how sad it would be to not have people in your life who care enough about your long-term welfare to tell you to stop fucking around in traffic. To where you eventually might start even seeking 12x-daily safety hacks from some of the very same drivers whose recklessness may eventually kill you. Wow.

[…]

Admitting when life is complicated or things aren’t shiny and happy all the time strikes me as a wonderfully sane and adult way to conduct one’s life. That there are so many folks offended by even the existence of this anarchic idea is not a problem I can solve.

No more than I can wish useless email away or pray hard enough that it never rains on anyone’s leaky roof. All out of scope.

And, then, I jizzed on at length about how much I admire the recipient’s work. Which I do.

Good work doesn’t need a cookie

I may admire your work, too. Especially if you care a lot about that work and don’t overly sweat peoples' opinions of it. Most definitely including my own.

For these purposes, it doesn’t really matter whether we're friends and, honestly, it doesn’t even matter whether I love, use, or agree with everything you do, say, or make in a given day.

It doesn’t matter because good work doesn’t need me to love it. Like tornadoes and cold sores, good work happens with total disregard to whether I'm “into it.”

But, conversely, let’s stipulate that the points-of-view undergirding our opinions—again, including mine—will and should survive either agreement or lack of agreement with equivalently effortless ease. Because, like really good work, a really good point-of-view doesn’t require another person’s benediction.

Guess we'll have to disagree to agree

Now, to be only vaguely clearer here, I'm not posting this circuitous ego dump in the service of altering your opinion of either me, my friend, his work, or practically anything else for that matter.

But, I would love it if we could all be more okay with the fact that real life means that we do each have a different, sometimes incongruous, and often totally incompatible point-of-view. Yes. Even you have a point-of-view that someone despises. Ready to change it now? Jesus, I sure hope not.

Then, to be only slightly more clear, I'm also not advocating for that fakey brand of web-based kum ba ya that gets trotted out alternately as “tolerance” or “inclusion” or some styrofoam miniature of “civility.”

I'm absolutely not against all of those things when authentically practiced, but I'm also really skeptical of the well-branded peacemakers who are forever appointing themselves the Internet’s “Now-Now-Let’s-All-Pretend-We're-Just-Saying-the-Same-Useless-Thing-Here” den mothers.

Because we're not all saying the same things. Not at all.

And, it infantalizes some important conversations when we tacitly demand that any instance of honest disagreement be immediately horseshat into a photo opp where some thought leader gets to hoist everyone’s hands in the air like he’s fucking Jimmy Carter.

Nope. Not saying that.

Who will you really rely on?

What I AM saying is that alllllll this seemingly unrelated stuff is absolutely related—that the pattern of not relying on other people for anything you really care about is arguably the great-grandaddy of every useful productivity, creativity, or self-help pattern.

Where’s this matter? Pretty much everywhere you have any sort of stake:

• Don’t rely on other people to remove your totally fake “distractions.”
• Don’t rely on other people to pat your beret, re-tie your cravat, and make you a nice cocoa whenever that mean man on the internet points out that your “distractions” are totally fake. (Which they are)
• Don’t rely on other people to tell you when or whether you have enough information.
• Don’t rely on other people to define your job.
• Don’t rely on other people to “design your lifestyle.”
• Don’t rely on other people to decide when your opinions are acceptable.
• Don’t rely on other people to tell you when you're allowed to be awesome.
• Don’t rely on other people to make you care.
• Don’t even rely on other people to tell you what you should or shouldn’t rely on.

Yes. I went there.

Because that’s the point. These hypocrisies, paradoxes, and ambiguities that people get so wound up about—that many of us are constantly (impotently) trying to resolve—cannot be resolved.

Because, yeah: all of these harrowingly unsolvable problems are immune to new notebooks and less-distracting applications and shinier systems and “nicer” self-“help” and pretty much anything else that is not, specifically, you walking straight into the angriest and least convenient shitstorm you can find and getting your ass kicked until the storm gets bored with kicking it.

Then, you find an even angrier storm. Then, another. And, so on.

“Get the fuck off of my obstacle, Private Pyle!”

Doing that annoying hard stuff is how you grow, get better, and learn what real help looks like. Even if that’s not the answer you wanted to hear. You get better by getting your ass out of your RSS reader and fucking making things until they suck less. Not by buying apps.

You don’t whine about distractions, or derail yourself over needing a nicer pencil sharpener, or aggravate your chronic creative diabetes by starting another desperate waddle to the self-help buffet. No. You work.

And, for what it’s worth, just like you can’t get to the moon by eating cheese, you'll also never leave boot camp with your original scrote intact by telling your drill sergeant to try using more honey than vinegar.

No. That sergeant’s job is to make you miserable. It’s his job to break down your callow conceits about what’s supposed to be easy and fair. It’s his job to emotionally pummel you into giving up and becoming a Marine.

You? You're not there to give the sergeant notes; you're there to sleep two hours a night, then not mind getting beaten for 20 hours until a decent Marine starts to fall out.

Who knows? He may even surprise you by introducing a surprisingly effective “distraction-free learning environment.”

“Tee ell dee ahr, Professor Brainiac.”

Like most humans, I like things I can understand. Like most readers, I love specificity. Like most thinkers, I love clarity. Like most students, I love relevance and practicality. And, like most busy people, believe it or not, I actually do really like it when someone gets straight to the point.

But, here’s the problem. If my 2-year-old daughter asks me about time travel, and I blithely announce, “E=mc²”, I will have said something that is entirely specific, clear, relevant, practical, and/or straight-to-the-point. For somebody.

But, not so much for my daughter. And, to be honest, not even to any useful degree for me.

She'd probably either laugh derisively at me (which she’s great at), or she'd pause and ask, “Whuh dat?” (which she’s even better at).

Thing is, her understanding that jumble of characters less than me—and my understanding it WAY less than Professor Al—has zero impact on the profundity, truth, beauty, or impact of the man’s theory.

Sure. You could quite accurately fault me for being a smartass and a poseur, and you could even berate my toddler for her unaccountably shallow understanding of Modern Physics. But, in any case, you can’t really blame either Albert or his theory.

You're turbocharging nothing

Specifically, Albert can’t begin to tell us what he really knows if we don’t understand math.

So, let’s say this theory you've been hearing about really interests you. And, let’s also pretend, just for the sake of the analogy, that you haven’t completed Calculus III (212) or Quantum Mechanics (403) or even something as elementary as, say, Advanced Astrophysics II (537). I know you have. Obviously. But, let’s pretend. Where do you start?

Well, you could read some tips about learning math. You could find a list of 500 indispensable resources for indispensable math resources. You could buy a new “distraction-free math environment.” Heck, there’s actually nothing to stop you from just declaring yourself a “math expert.” Congratulations, Professor.

Thing is: you still don’t know math.

Which means you still can’t really understand the theory—no more than a pathetic Liberal Arts refugee like me or a dullard Physics ignoramus like my kid can really grok relativity.

Difference is, you will have blown a lot of time hoping that actual expertise follows non-existent effort—while my daughter and I get to remain total novices without charge. Only, we don’t get all mad at the theory as a result; a staggering number of fake math experts do.

I mean, be honest—after all that recreational non-work and make-believe dedication almost trying to kinda learn math sorta—you might actually get frustrated at how brazenly Al defies your fondness for shortcuts by continuing to rely on so many terms and proofs and blah-blah-blah that you still just don’t understand. So annoying.

You may simply decide that Albert Einstein’s a huge dick for never saying things that can be completely understood solely by scanning a headline.

EPIC EINSTEIN FAIL, amirite?

You never really know what you didn’t know until you know it

But, Al just told the truth.

Problem is, Al’s truth not only requires fancy things in order to be truly understood—the more of those fancy things you take away from his truth, the less true it gets. And, by the time it’s been diluted to the point where you're comfortable that you understand it? You'd be understanding the wrong thing. Even I can understand that.

But, not one bit of any of this is Al’s fault. Al doesn’t get to control who uses, abuses, gets, or doesn’t get what he said or why it matters. Especially since he’s been dead for over fifty years.

All I know is, regardless of who has ears to hear it on a given day, it would be to Al’s credit never to mangle something important in order to get it into terms everybody’s ready to handle without actually trying.

And God bless him for never agreeing that your “distractions” to learning math are his problem.

So, yeah, if you only need to hand in a crappy 5-page paper, you could certainly Cliff’s Notes your way through Borges, Eliot, or Joyce in an afternoon, and feel like you haven’t missed a thing. Trouble is, if you did care even a little, it’s impossible to even say how much you're missing since you can’t be bothered to soldier through the source text. The text itself is the entire point.

Even the wonderfully cogent and readable layman’s explanations Einstein himself provided don’t really get to the nut, the application, and the implications of his real theory.

That all takes real math.

That “single datum of experience” matters

Sometimes, complex or difficult things stop being true when you try to make them too simple. Sometimes, you have to actually get laid to understand why people think sex is such a thing. Sometimes, you need to learn some Greek if you really want to understand The Gospel of John. And, yeah, sometimes, you're going to have to just work unbelievably hard at whatever you claim to care about before anyone can begin to help you get any better—or less “distracted”—at it.

The part I really know is what doesn’t work. Reading Penthouse Forum won’t help you CLEP out of Vaginal Intercourse 101. Watching a Rankin-Bass cartoon about the Easter Bunny will teach you very little about the intricacies of transubstantiation. And, if you can’t be troubled to care so much about your work that you reflexively force distractions away, dicking around with yet another writing application will merely aggravate the problem. Ironic, huh?

These quantum mechanics of personal productivity are rife with such frustrating “paradoxes.”

These are True Things.

Achieving expertise and doing creative work is all horribly complicated and difficult and paradoxical and frustrating and recursive and James Joyce-y—and any guide, blog, binary, guru, or “nice guy” that tries to suggest otherwise is probably giving you a complimentary colonoscopy. Do the math.

Want a new syllabus? Sure:

Run straight into your shitstorm, my friends. Reject the impulse to think about work, rather than finishing it. And, open your heart to the remote possibility that any mythology of personal failure that involves messiahs periodically arriving to make everything “easy” for you might not really be helping your work or your mental health or your long-standing addiction to using tools solely to ship new excuses.

Learn your real math, and any slide rule will suffice. Try, make, and do until you quit noticing the tools, and if you still think you need new tools, go try, make, and do more.

If you can pull off this deceptively simple and millennia-old pattern, you'll eventually find that—god by dying god—any partial truth that’s supported your treasured excuses for not working will be replaced by a no-faith-required knowledge that you're really, actually, finally getting better at something you care about.

Which is just sublimely un-distracting.

Dedication

This article is dedicated to my friend, Greg Knauss. No, he’s not the app guy–he’s just a good man who does good work, who accidentally/unintentionally helped me write this rant. He also happens to be a fella who could teach anyone a thing or two about writing with distractions. Thanks, Greg.

A couple weeks ago, my pals at Twitter were kind enough to invite me in to visit with their (rapidly growing) team. The topic was meetings, so I used it as an opportunity to publicly premiere a talk I've been presenting to private clients over the past few months.

I hope you'll enjoy, Broken Meetings (and how you'll fix them).

Slides:

Supplementary links and commentary forthcoming, but I wanted to go ahead and post the talk as quickly as the video was available. Special thanks to Michelle, Jeremy, and the crackerjack Twitter crew for a swell afternoon.

I really like this talk and sincerely hope you will find it useful in helping to un-break your own meetings.

[jump to video]

Long story (not very) short? One night in 2003--after killing it in front of audience of about 30 lucky people in Oakland--The Long Winters needed a place to crash, and my wife and I were happy to oblige. 

So, they drove their Big Stinky Blue Van over the bridge, slept on our floor, and by breakfast the next morning, it'd become clear to me that I'd provided lodging to a man who was not only very likely a member of my karass--he was also one of the smartest bullshit artists I'd ever met. 

Almost eight years later, although I don't see him nearly as much as I'd like, I still count the guy as one of my best pals ever.

That's John Roderick. And, I think you need to know about him.

John doesn't read this site--he's more of a Twitter person--so I don't risk feeding his astounding excess of dignity by saying he's one of the most gifted writers and bon vivants of our generation. He's just the best. In large part because he's congenitally incapable of suffering bullshit.

This was never more apparent than the Saturday morning in 2007 when we sat in my back yard and talked about a lot of stuff. Playing guitar, advertising on the web, the evil work of promoters, and why everyone is always trying to shortchange everyone on copper pipe. 

That talking became a four-part interview I ran on the late and occasionally lamented The Merlin Show, and, to this day, it's one of my favorite things I've been lucky enough to post to the web.

So, y'know how I'm definitely "not for everyone?" Well, John is really "not for everyone."

He's opinionated and arrogant and undiplomatic and unironically loves Judas Priest--meaning everyone will find at least one thing not to like about him. Despite being hairy and enjoying laying on your bed, John is not exactly a teddy bear. 

But, John's also right a lot. And, he never sands off the edges of his personality or opinions to make you theoretically "like" him. Which, it will come as no surprise to you, is a big reason I love the guy more than a free prime rib dinner. 

So, why the jizzfest about that awful jerk, John Roderick?

Because, as I noted the other day on the Twitter, in our first episode of Back to Work I misattributed a line that should have been credited to John. Which in itself is unimportant, except inasmuch as finding that link to correct the error got me watching our 50-some minutes of chatting again. I also received some at-responses and emails that reminded me how much people enjoyed our chat. 

But, really it made me realize how much that rambling morning in my back yard still resonates so much with stuff I care a lot about. Independence. Agency. Directness. And, never apologizing for wanting to get paid. Also, guitars and talkative hippies.

So, anyway. John. 

I edited all four parts of the video into one big (streamable/downloadable) movie that should make it way easier to watch at a sitting. Should that interest you. Which it may not. Which, as ever, is totally fine, and kind of the point.

But. If you like Dan and my new show (and, seriously—God bless you magnificent bastards who helped briefly make B2W the most popular podcast in the world [gulp]), I think you'll really like this interview a lot too. I hope so, anyway.

Thus, submitted for your disapproval, permit me to present my four-year-old visit with the acerbic, opinionated, and reportedly unlikeable bullshit artist whom I respect and adore more than just about anybody. 

Meet Hotrod.

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MPU 046: Workflows with Merlin Mann II « Mac Power Users

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I have the life that I have because I've made a lot of weird decisions, and they've worked out well.

Not gonna lie to you. I'm a huge nerd. Surprised?

Yep. I can recite big chunks of The Big Lebowski from memory. I can argue for an hour on the merits of Dick York over Dick Sargent. And, I can—and frequently do—catch myself thinking Catwoman, Batgirl, Princess Leia, and Emma Peel should have a light-hearted pillow fight that ends with an hour of genial french-kissing.

Pretty much like you, probably. I dunno, maybe your version includes Kitty Pryde. Po-tay-to/Po-taht-o, right?

Perhaps most saliently, by virtue of having spent a solid 2,399 days as a Fake Productivity Guru, I have been provided with an unquestionably Janusian monkey's paw of a gift; I now know a lot about workflows. Nerdy, nerdy workflows.

I can tell you a few things that almost always work, I can tell you a handful of things that almost never work, and—best or worst of all—I can tell you thousands of things that might work. Sometimes. Maybe. Kinda. For some people. For now.

And, at the risk of gay-marrying my arrogance to my hypocrisy, I can tell you that I also know enough about the unholy diarrhea of potential options for Theoretical Productivity to share two big patterns:

1. Getting your workflow right matters.
2. Getting your workflow right to the exclusion of the actual work is a fool's game.

But. Managing to get the most useful and most elegant and least fiddly mix of 1 and 2 right is super-hard. Especially for nerds. Especially for me.

So, as I type this today, I believe there can be no greater testament to these claims—or, at least, no greater place to test the veracity of these claims for yourself—than in this TWO AND A HALF HOUR-long interview for Mac Power Users.

It is reeeeeeeeally nerdy. Almost intolerably nerdy. Just…overwhelmingly nerdy.

But, man, is it ever really good, and really fat with the most insanely granular details of How I Work.

Lo, even these 928.5 days after officially retiring from productivity pr0n, my desire to not "vend stroke material for your joyless addiction to puns about procrastination and systems for generating more taxonomically satisfying meta-work" is tempered by a (widely under-reported) practical streak.

Yes: I continue to despise empty advice about rearranging deck chairs on The Titanic. But, yes: I do also still very much enjoy talking about how all the tips and tricks can or can't work in the context of work you care about. That matters. It really does.

So. Here goes. A one hundred and forty six minute-long, Joyce-ian amble through the Big Stuff and the Little Stuff. David and Katie were very patient.

How I name text files. Why I break iOS apps. Why I love the letter "x." Why I won't row out to islands any more. How a 115,000 word book manuscript is "like a house full of confederate money." How "The Cloud" broke in New Zealand. How I use MultiMarkdown, Scrivener, TextExpander, OmniFocus, TextMate, Notational Velocity, Dropbox, and an explosive combination of Elements, Notesy, Nebulous, Simplenote, CF Outliner, iThoughts, Instacast, Good Reader, and wow wow wow.

How I try not to fiddle—how I sometimes succeed and often don't. But, how I try.

Anyhow. There you go. A perfectly nerdy bookend to last year's first Magnum Opus MPU interview on these same topics, Mac Power Users Episode 46 is just insanely nerdy. And, what have you.

I hope you like it. I hope it's useful. I hope you don't use it to replace real work.

And, as ever, I really hope Batgirl starts having more sexy pillow fights.

Enjoy. And, God save you.

MPU 046: Workflows with Merlin Mann II « Mac Power Users

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Have you heard of Locorotondo, Italy? Locorotondo is one of Southern Italy’s most beautiful villages, in my opinion, but it isn’t yet overwhelmed with tourist crowds. A true hidden gem, Locorotondo is just a 12-minute drive from busy Alberobello in the Puglia region, but feels like a world away. Planning your trip to Locorotondo last […]

The post Visiting Locorotondo, Italy – A Guide to the Trulli Town appeared first on Adventurous Kate.

Cinque Terre is one of the most picturesque regions in Italy. These steep, colorful fishing villages perched on seaside cliffs of the Italian Riviera will take your breath away! There are 5 towns of Cinque Terre: Monterosso al Mare, Vernazza, Corniglia, Manarola, and Riomaggiore. Here you’ll find my recommendations for all five towns, plus the […]

The post Guide to the 5 Towns of Cinque Terre, Italy appeared first on Adventurous Kate.

Get a taste of Japan — without leaving San Francisco! I’m excited to see my latest post is up on Thrillist. Some of my favorite Japan-inspired things to do and ways to experience Japanese history, art, and culture here in the Bay Area. Check it out: How to Experience Japan in San Francisco

The article EIT Elsewhere | How to Experience Japan in San Francisco originated at EverInTransit.com

Last week I went up to San Francisco for the Winter Fancy Food Show. This annual trade show draws more than 1,400 food companies from 30 countries who come to SF to show off their newest food products to the retail and hospitality vendors and food media. Last year, I spent a lot of time at the […]

The article Favorite Finds from the Winter Fancy Food Show 2017 originated at EverInTransit.com

It's all over but the crying for a campaign that was supposed to be characterized by 'joy'. There will be no concession speech tonight. At little before 1 am, Kamala is running like a scared rabbit.

The post Cowardly Kamala Pulls A Hillary — Refuses To Concede As Trump Paints The Country Red appeared first on Clash Daily.

The usual talking heads in the media are freaking out and making all kinds of wild claims. Those are the rage-y emotional reactions. What's a more sensible take on all of this?

The post Why Did Trump Win And What Happens Now? appeared first on Clash Daily.

A.F. Branco Cartoon – It’s been a lousy week for Kamala and a great week for Trump as he surges..

A.F. Branco Cartoon – After almost four years of Democrats trying to shove Marxism down Americans’ throats, We, The People,..

HEY uses a branch deploy system that I’ve written about here on SvN and talked about frequently on Twitter. Plenty of other companies have implemented their own version of branch deploys (typically under a different name), but this was my own implementation, so I’m proud of it. First, a primer on how it works: Developer… keep reading

Even after her loss on Nov. 5, Vice President Kamala Harris’ election campaign is still hounding donors for money. Harris’ campaign has bombarded supporters with fundraising messages following her election […]

The post Kamala's Campaign Is Still Aggressively Shaking Down Supporters For Cash appeared first on The Western Journal.

Left-wing networks had plenty of bad news for their viewers as former President Donald Trump stormed to victory in the Nov. 5 election. Now, they’re getting plenty of bad news […]

The post Insult to Injury: MSNBC and CNN Suffer Staggering Ratings Plunge Following Trump Victory appeared first on The Western Journal.

Shortly after President-elect Donald Trump appointed Tom Homan as “border czar,” the immigration hardliner’s hilarious 2019 smackdown of Democratic Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez of New York went viral on social media. […]

The post Flashback: Video of Tom Homan Taking Down AOC Resurfaces, Showing Why Trump Picked Him appeared first on The Western Journal.

President-elect Donald Trump is reportedly considering lawyer Alina Habba to be the White House press secretary. Habba often spoke to the media while she was on the legal team representing […]

The post Report Shows New Front-Runner for Trump's Press Secretary Spot: The Media Should Be Terrified appeared first on The Western Journal.

As captain, Aiden Markram is allowed a long rope from a wonky form perspective, but how long can that rope be as the run river continues to shrivel, asks Khanyiso Tshwaku.

Proteas all-rounder Marco Jansen, while acknowledging that spin has been a challenge for them in the ongoing T20 series against India, reckons things could be a bit different for Wednesday's third T20 in Centurion.

Bafana Bafana coach Hugo Broos has welcomed the number of young players who are given a chance and backed in the premier division, but has warned that to build on their progress, agents must prioritise players' development over their personal enrichment.

The Springboks will continue to evolve their attack, but they must do so within the framework of what has made them so successful, says attack coach Tony Brown.

Late injection Johan Grobbelaar may find himself more than simply an “extra” on the Bok tour, writes Rob Houwing.

Carvana is America’s fastest-growing e-tailer   February 23, 2022 (New York, NY) – Americans have taken to buying cars online, so much so that ecommerce car dealer Carvana is now […]

3.6 million will pay with crypto in US; payment value to spike 70% in 2022   April 20, 2022 (New York, NY) – Cryptocurrency usage will continue its meteoric rise, […]

May 10, 2022 (New York, NY) – Elon Musk has his work cut out for him as he takes the reigns at Twitter. Worldwide user growth will be essentially flat […]

June 22, 2022 (New York, NY) – Will Apple’s entry into the buy now, pay later (BNPL) space upend the already competitive industry? That’s the question many are trying to […]

Beijing briefing: is the Belt and Road going nowhere? The World Today mhiggins.drupal 29 July 2022

Scaling back infrastructure plans and investment in the Global South could cause China problems, says Yu Jie.

Over the past two decades, China specialists around the world have tried to analyze Beijing’s approach to developing countries in the Global South, including Africa, Latin America, parts of Asia and the Pacific islands.
 
China’s relationships with nations in these regions vary considerably. In some, ideology or geography are the biggest influencing factors; for others, economic and commercial gains matter most. However, many of Beijing’s recent engagements have attracted more criticism than praise. A domestic economic downturn means that Beijing has tightened its belt, spending less on overseas development.

When President Xi Jinping came to power, he was keen to highlight how China’s power could shape and dictate the global agenda across multilateral platforms. His vision was for China to project discursive power and become an agenda-setter rather than a rule-follower. The Global South is the route to fulfilling his proposal.

To this end, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the latest Global Development Initiative are the means to Beijing’s ends. The former, launched in 2013, focuses on building physical infrastructure linking Global South countries; the latter aims to allow development through grants and capacity-building in line with the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals.

China’s engagements with Africa and Latin America seem characterized by the rapid extension of Chinese finance to resource-rich African states, particularly oil producers, since the early 2000s. From 2003, for example, oil-backed infrastructure loans were made to the Angolan government for reconstruction after decades of civil conflict. By 2016, they totalled some $15 billion. 

However, Beijing’s appetite for offering cheap loans in exchange for natural resources has shrunk. It faces a dilemma between protecting the value of its investments while also defending its strategic interests and maintaining its self-image as a partner, not a predator, of Africa.

Beijing has historically preferred bilateral relationships for its development finance and investments over multilateral ones. This allows China control over the terms and conditions, while demonstrating its unwillingness to accept without question rules and frameworks devised years ago by western countries.

China has already realized that some elements of its engagements with the Global South are no longer the flavour of the day, partly because some of its programmes include serious climate and financial risks without proper third-party due diligence in place. 

Growth through gigantic infrastructure investments of the sort that drove China’s own economic miracle is not a panacea applicable everywhere. Nor is relentlessly seeking endorsements from its neighbours and other countries from afar.

China wants to be a ‘brother’ to the Global South

Ideologically, China wants to be seen and respected as a leader of the Global South. Since its founding in 1949, the People’s Republic has maintained a ‘brotherly’ relationship with developing countries, notably in the UN context, where it remains a member of the G77 group of developing nations. 

The West has responded to China’s development agenda with its own infrastructure programmes, such as Washington’s Build Back Better World and the European Union’s Global Gateway. 

Great power rivalry should not be ignored, but it shouldn’t blind world powers to the need for collaboration in tackling global poverty and sustainable development. Nor should Beijing’s efforts to adjust its diplomatic and aid programmes to become a likeable partner of choice in search of a better economic future, be disregarded.

Since launching BRI, China has poured hundreds of billions of dollars into building infrastructure in the Global South. And many developing countries hope that advanced economies and China can continue to act to alleviate poverty. But the brakes have been applied to Beijing’s spree as a result of China’s domestic economic slowdown. It has no wish to continue spending its foreign reserves.

To go forward, China must remain open to what others want – or fear – from Beijing’s development initiatives and infrastructure investments. Many developing countries, facing insurmountable costs and damage exacerbated by the Covid pandemic, crave meaningful assistance rather than diplomatic rhetoric. 

The ultimate test of Beijing’s economic statecraft is whether it can engage with the Global South beyond relationships built on financial resources and political capital. It must also become more self-aware of how its words and deeds are received – and then act accordingly. Showering dollars and renminbi is not always guaranteed to win hearts and minds. In this respect, Beijing has more bridges to build.

Cracking down on kleptocracy Interview LJefferson 4 August 2022

In the third of a series of interviews with the Queen Elizabeth II Academy faculty, Alex Cooley examines the challenges of reigning in kleptocratic networks.

Recently you spoke at the Queen Elizabeth II Academy about kleptocracy, and the impact of the individual sanctions used to target kleptocrats since the war on Ukraine began.

As you can imagine, the problems of dark money and  kleptocracy are familiar to Londoners. People tend to associate kleptocracy with Russia; why is that? Is its rise linked to the global decline of democracy that has taken place over the past 15 years?   

This is a great question. Kleptocracy literally means ‘rule by thieves’, and in contemporary usage refers to the plundering of economies and societies by political elites for their own personal gain. 

It does not necessarily have to track with democratic backsliding, but in many countries, it has for a couple of reasons. First, over the last 30 years, as globalization has expanded, with more integrated financial markets and greater provision of services to support this expansion (accountants, shell company providers, lawyers), transnational kleptocracy networks have also become more expansive as there is now a more sophisticated co-mingling of licit and illicit funds through these networks of globalization.

Second, like the illiberal norms and practices that are promoting democratic backsliding, kleptocracy networks should be thought of as global in scale and reach. Corruption tends to be framed as an illegal act that takes place within states, while international rankings of levels of corruption by watchdogs like Transparency International tend to reinforce this view.

However, corrupt acts that may initially occur domestically are facilitated by a number of transnational actors and processes, many of them operating out of so-called ‘clean’ countries. At the end of the day, for a kleptocrat to profit from his or her stolen loot, they must store those funds where their value will be guaranteed by strong property rights protections. That means that the destination for kleptocrats is often the West, jurisdictions that enjoy rule of law, that have good financial services, and that guarantee privacy to client services. 

To give  a brief example of a hypothetical kleptocrat, take a regional official in China who has skimmed money off a state contract; that money will be booked into by an accounting firm in Hong Kong, then will be used to purchase an offshore vehicle – another tool of globalization – a shell company that is registered in the British Virgin Islands (BVI) but is sold, as part of a complex structure of nested companies, by a shell company provider, such as the Panama-based law firm Mossack Fonseca, at the centre of the Panama Papers exposé, which specialized in selling complex shell company structures to conceal the true owners.

Then, that entity will open an actual corporate bank account in a global financial centre, say in Switzerland. Finally, that account from a ‘clean’ jurisdiction may purchase a luxury asset, such as a condominium in New York, without having to disclose the actual beneficial owner. That is a relatively simple transaction, but it includes jurisdictions from Hong Kong, the BVI, Panama, Switzerland, and New York to abet this initial act of local embezzlement by a mid-level Chinese official. 

You’re telling the story of why this has become transnational and global, but this is very much a supply-driven story. Is there a demand-side to this story?  

Sure, and this is the other side of globalization. You asked initially why so many Russians and former Soviet individuals were associated with kleptocratic schemes. This is because in the 1990s, as these institutions and tools of globalization proliferated, there was a chaotic economic transition underway in the former Soviet Union.

Economic transition in places like Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan andTajikistan, transpired at the time of this financial deregulation, where there was a general perception that all capital account openness was good and that the international community assisted these countries with financial liberalization. The offshore dynamic is particularly pronounced in the post-Soviet countries because the state-building, regime consolidation, and reform of these economies coincided with this era of financial globalization.  

Why has the UK government turned a blind eye to this problem for so long? Is there profit that has been made? Is it too difficult?  

This is a really good question. First, the UK is the centre of many of the service providers that are absolutely critical for the operation of kleptocratic networks. There are two sides to being a kleptocrat. One is the money-laundering side, where dubiously acquired loot needs to be turned into legitimate assets that are safe and protected by the rule of law – this requires Western-based wealth managers, bankers, lawyers, real estate brokers and accountants.

The second is reputation laundering. How do you recast yourself in the global spotlight from a controversial figure who made money in controversial transactions into an internationally respected, global business and philanthropist? Doing so requires that you donate to philanthropic causes, secure appointments on corporate and non-for-profit boards, support higher-education institutions and retain lobbyists, advisors, and cultivating allies within your residing country’s political system. These are all ways in which you can try and manage your image.

Also, because of the UK’s strict libel laws, you have leaders in public relations and reputation management industries that are retained to closely monitor all media mentions of that individual, and to challenge or quash any negative characterizations about them. 

It is easy to see why the UK is attractive to kleptocrats, but why has it taken the UK government so long to respond? Is it just a simple calculation: this is money that is hard to turn down and there is at least plausible deniability of its more nefarious sources? 

It is really good money and kleptocrats engage in various legitimate business and cultural activities in order to obscure their sketchy pasts. It is very difficult to prove that their original wealth was actually obtained illegally. And, until now, there has not been a strong international norm and cooperation against kleptocrats the way there is with illicit actors such as terrorists or drug traffickers. 

Is it also because it is not strictly speaking illegal? Is there a sense that there is ‘money from uncertain sources being put to good purposes’? 

Many will make this argument too! If the source of funds is not strictly illegal, then why not actually use this wealth to ‘do good’? For example, why not have scholarships for students who need them at the university?  As long as there is no overt interference in the terms of these donations, what is the harm?

The problem with this line of reasoning is that it allows kleptocrats to create positive profiles. Indeed, these acts of charity can be leveraged in legal proceedings or in public opinion to burnish their reputations and establish track records of being good citizens.

It also creates supportive constituencies in society. For example, if you buy, even with your questionably acquired wealth, a major football team and you take it to the peak of success, you are revered and now have a platform to even contest previous critical accounts of you. 

Do you think that the war in Ukraine will prove to be an inflection point in terms of how other advanced democracies in Europe and North America treat this problem, and not only the UK?

I hope so – I have seen some hopeful trends. For instance, some countries have expedited the implementation of important anti-corruption legislation that they already passed. And there is a broader understanding that it is now a matter of national security to actually know who owns what in your country, whether it’s a company, commercial property, a bank account, or a holding company. 

I also think the Russian oligarchs themselves have been fatally stigmatized.. They can no longer control the overwhelmingly negative image and association with the Kremlin that this ghastly war has brought. Also, we are seeing push in the UK for reform on SLAPPS, while the National Crime Agency has established a dedicated ‘kleptocracy cell’ designed to investigate the hidden wealth of oligarchs and possible sanctions avoidance.

But the latter will require sustained funding and staffing. Unfortunately, most of their assets are not in luxury yachts that are relatively easy to seize, but embedded in complex webs of opaque global transactions. It will be challenging to even identify these assets, let alone freeze and confiscate them. 

We have talked a lot about Russia for obvious reasons, but if you go down the list, who’s next when it comes to the source of this problem? 

Countries with especially powerful ruling families that have been in power for a long time, and that have some sort of rentier economy, either extractives, natural resources, or big former state-operated enterprises that perhaps have been privatized.

For example, oil-exporting countries like Equatorial Guinea, Angola, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan have incubated classic kleptocrats along with transnational reputation laundering schemes involving Western institutions.   

During your talk with the Academy fellows at Chatham House, you suggested that the pressure on kleptocrats would also have broader geopolitical effects. Can you say more about this? Is there a risk that measures intended to excise kleptocrats from our economies leads to greater divisions globally?

Whether there will be comprehensive anti-kleptocracy reforms in the US, London, Canada and Switzerland  remains an open question, but already  kleptocrats are shifting away from Western jurisdictions and going further Eastward; they are going to Singapore, and they are also going to the Gulf, especially the UAE.

There are a number of reports now of Russian oligarchs relocating and residing there and taking their assets with them. The UAE is not part of the sanctions regime even though it is a US security partner, and in fact it has scored very poorly on illicit money laundering rankings and watchdog lists.

Beijing briefing: Party power remains a male preserve The World Today mhiggins.drupal 27 September 2022

Yu Jie explores why so few women have won leadership roles in Communist China.

UPDATE: Since this article was published at the end of September, the incoming members of the Politburo and the Standing Committee were announced at the 20th Chinese Communist Party Congress on October 22. The party broke more than two decades of convention by not appointing any women to the Politburo or its Standing Committee. The sole woman among the outgoing 19th CCP Politburo, Sun Chunlan, will retire. Only 33 women rank among the 376 members of the 20th CPC Central Committee, which elects the Politburo - less than one in 10.

As the curtain of the 20th Chinese Communist Party Congress gets ready to rise, the lack of female representation in Beijing’s corridors of power attracts international attention once again.

Female participation in Chinese finance, science, sports or other aspects of society is relatively healthy. Yet there has never been a single woman at the apex of power in the party nor any who has held a seat on the Politburo Standing Committee, the supreme decision-making body for the party and the state.

Historically, China has been run by a number of powerful women starting in 307BC during the first imperial era of the Middle Kingdom. In the Qin Dynasty the Queen Dowager Xuan held de facto power for 35 years during the Warring States period.

More than 2,000 years later, Empress Dowager Cixi wined and dined her European visitors at the Imperial Summer Palace. She was also responsible for the demise of the late Qing Dynasty. Their legacies continue to fascinate and inspire stories in contemporary China.

In modern times, Mao Zedong, one of the founders of the Chinese Communist Party, proclaimed that ‘women hold up half of the sky’. While Chinese law states that women and men should have equal rights in all aspects of political life, the reality is that women remain marginalized in politics, even after the economic and social transformation seen in the past few decades. Chinese men continue to dominate political power.

The top three party, military or state leadership positions have never been filled by a woman and none of China’s 26 ministers is female. There is only one woman among the 31 party bosses that control China’s provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions and only one woman among the 25 members of the all-powerful Politburo, and she oversaw the government’s response to the Covid pandemic. She is Vice-Premier Sun Chunlan, a former party boss of Fujian Province. Among the 371 members of the Central Committee, which elects the Politburo, there are only 30 women, which is less than one in 10.

Women are less likely to join the Communist Party

It is difficult to explain why female participation in the Chinese elite politics is so low but social convention certainly plays its part. Despite increasing financial independence and much improved career prospects, Chinese women are still expected to run the household and look after the children while holding down a full-time job. This surely reduces opportunities to seek public offices.

Although unspoken, China’s experience of handing power to a woman may be another reason why the party is hesitant to put a female in charge. Jiang Qing, better known to the outside world as Madame Mao, was China’s de-facto First Lady until 1976. She was one of the architects of the ‘Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution’, which ushered in a decade of chaos and political upheaval and brought the country to a standstill.

Successive leaders have been determined to prevent a repeat of this misfortune so no woman has been chosen for a top leadership role. But perhaps the main reason for the absence of women in top positions is the way people move up the party ranks.

Women make up around 49 per cent of China’s 1.4 billion population, yet they account for only about 30 per cent of the Chinese Communist Party membership. Once inside the party they are often handed less competitive positions. Rising through the ranks requires party members to achieve certain career breakthroughs. Such success makes them eligible to participate in high politics.

The majority of China’s top leaders have served as a party chief of a province or municipality, a position women rarely achieve. Consequently, few female candidates are considered eligible for more senior roles.

By the time they qualify for Politburo membership, too often they are fast approaching the retirement age for Chinese women politicians: 55. As it is rare to secure a spot on the Politburo under that age, women are virtually ruled out from joining this exclusive group of 25 people.

The Iron Lady of China

There has been one exception since the early 2000s. Vice-Premier Wu Yi, who is known as the Iron Lady of China, was described by Forbes magazine as the third most powerful woman in the world. She led China into the World Trade Organization and successfully bid for the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games. However, her success has been an exception, not a rule.

While Chinese women have been given a nominal egalitarian status with female astronauts, female Olympic champions and female Nobel Prize laureates in place, beneath the surface older practices of patriarchy still hold firm. Liberated or not, the quest for a Chinese female leader under the Communist Party is a long way off.

The new geopolitics of nuclear power The World Today mhiggins.drupal 27 September 2022

States may be looking to build or restore nuclear plants, but they will need to bypass Chinese and Russian sector dominance, says Sung-Mi Kim.

Against the backdrop of a worldwide energy crisis, the global nuclear market may be seeing a renaissance with growing interest in nuclear energy.

Sceptics are being compelled to rethink the trade-off calculus of nuclear power for the first time since the 2011 Fukushima disaster, which prompted countries to postpone or phase out nuclear power. The nuclear option is again being seen as a way of boosting a nation’s energy autonomy and its ability to weather the volatility caused by unpredictable Russian gas supplies.

Adoption or expansion of nuclear energy capability will not allow a country to be free of Russian influence entirely given its dominant presence in the global nuclear sector. Rosatom, Russia’s state-controlled power corporation, and its subsidiaries, make Russia the leading exporter of nuclear power plants. Russia also supplies more than a third of the global fuel-related services, namely uranium conversion and enrichment. Notably, Russia has been capable of building these into an attractive financial package for importing countries, backed by generous state support.

Like Russia, Chinese government-owned nuclear corporations have started to make forays into export markets as part of its Belt and Road Initiative and ‘Go Out’ policy, which encourages companies to invest overseas. Both China and Russia have a strong comparative advantage in offering competitive state-backed financing schemes for nuclear products and services.

In the meantime, nuclear investment in advanced economies in the West have tended to remain stagnant. The International Energy Agency reports that of the 31 reactors built in the past five years, 27 are of Russian or Chinese design.

Given current market conditions and the technological complexity of the nuclear fuel cycle, new entrants will find it difficult to acquire energy autonomy through nuclear power. They will have to rely on foreign suppliers to build, operate and maintain their nuclear plants and supporting infrastructure. It typically takes a decade to build a nuclear plant and start generating electricity, and nuclear plant deals are built on a decades-long commitment of the parties to forge a political, technical, regulatory and scientific partnership that goes beyond purely commercial terms.

Nuclear export, therefore, is often a long-term, whole-of-the-government effort involving diplomatic skills and geopolitical calculations, and is subject to global oversight to ensure the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

The US is building strategic nuclear partnerships

In response to the Russian and Chinese dominance of the civilian nuclear sector, American nuclear industries are asking the government to streamline the export-licensing process and provide them with support. The US government is also establishing strategic partnerships with nuclear-capable allies such as South Korea to win procurement contracts. South Korea has recently made a U-turn in its nuclear policy. Its new president Yoon Suk-yeol intends to revive the role of nuclear power to help meet the country’s climate targets and has vowed to export 10 nuclear power plants by 2030.

In Japan, where nuclear energy production was halted after the Fukushima nuclear meltdown, a new policy platform was launched in 2019 to enhance public-private collaboration for nuclear research and development.

Intensifying geopolitical tensions between the US and its allies on one side, and Russia and China on the other, will inevitably affect nuclear market dynamics. Domestic economic slowdowns and international sanctions will be a stress test for the export potential of Russia and China.

For instance, in May 2022, Finland eliminated Rosatom from its consortium to build a nuclear power plant, citing delays and increased uncertainties stemming from the invasion of Ukraine. In 2020, Romania cancelled its nuclear deal with China, instead securing an agreement with the US to build two more reactors for its Cernavoda plant. The decision was seen as a move to align Romania with US intentions to sideline China.

 In March 2022, when the Czech Republic officially launched a tender to build a new reactor at the Dukovany nuclear plant, Rosatom and Chinese state-controlled nuclear exporter CGN have been excluded from the tender on security grounds.

As countries try to wean themselves off price-volatile gas and decarbonize their economies to meet climate targets, new commercial opportunities are opening up for the nuclear industry. At least 15 countries are building reactors, according to the World Nuclear Association. Some, such as China, are building more than one.

More than 30 countries are considering, planning or starting a nuclear programme. There is also a growing need for replacing or extending the lives of ageing reactors. It is in this context that the commercial, geopolitical and regulatory aspects of nuclear energy will play an increasing role in the  geopolitical contest for money and influence.

Xi Jinping shows the world he is taking a tougher line Expert comment NCapeling 16 October 2022

Xi opens the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party with a political report which demonstrates both change and continuity in the approach of his leadership.

The 20th Party Congress report is significantly shorter than the 19th, which is a clear indication of Xi’s success in centralizing power. The report acts as a summary of the party’s achievements and its plans – expressed as the lowest common denominator of consensus between competing factions. A shorter political report would seem to represent fewer factions now seeking consensus.

In the 20th Party Congress report, the language on Taiwan has been revised, reflecting the changes in tone and the policies of the CCP senior leadership. In addition to the conventional ‘peaceful reunification’ term, there is also an addition of more hawkish language on Taiwan to ‘not exclude the use of force as a last resort’.

Xi also suggested that ‘resolving Taiwan Question should be in hands of the Chinese’, sending a further warning to the US and other Western allies which are perceived as interfering in Taiwan affairs.

In his remarks, Xi suggested the ‘zero-COVID’ strategy has worked for China although he gave no clear timeline on when the policy will end. He also proposed building a healthcare system able to cope with future pandemics. This implies that China is still in short supply of sufficient healthcare resources to cope with a disease like COVID.

Economic policy reveals anxiety

On economic policy, much of the emphasis is given to the extent to which security and economic growth should go hand in hand, which illustrates Beijing’s deep anxieties on supply chains and the high-tech sector. These supply chains need to become more ‘self-determined, self-controlled’, voicing frustration that the highest value-added elements of the Chinese tech sector remain reliant on overseas suppliers and vulnerable to geopolitical tensions.

Also, he expected the Common Prosperity Initiative will further adjust uneven income distribution to increase the amount of middle-income population. He gave little favours for financial services and fin-tech companies but insisted that China should remain as a manufacturing-led economy with qualitative growth. That implies Beijing will tolerate much slower growth so long as the income gap between the rich and poor is closing.

On foreign affairs, Xi has completely abandoned the ‘new types of great power relations’ – instead he has stressed that China should further develop its ties with the Global South through the Global Development Initiative and the Global Security Initiative.

Beijing briefing: China’s wish for 2023? An end to lockdown The World Today mhiggins.drupal 29 November 2022

Xi Jinping will try to beef up Global South relations in 2023, but weary Chinese and the business sector need pandemic restrictions to end, says Yu Jie.

This past year in Chinese politics was capped by a highly anticipated 20th Party Congress in Beijing in October which marked the beginning of General Secretary Xi Jinping’s unprecedented third term. Xi stacked the all-powerful Politburo with male loyalists and left the rest of the world to sift through the implications of his leadership reshuffle.

Meanwhile, Xi made headlines at the G20 summit in Indonesia, maintaining a largely positive tone with President Joe Biden and being caught on camera chiding Canada’s Justin Trudeau for leaks after their talks. So, what can we expect Xi to pull out of the hat in 2023, the Chinese Year of the Rabbit? 

In February and March, the conversations around Beijing dinner tables will focus on the composition of the new central government – the important seats within the Chinese State Council. This body must deliver Xi’s ‘security-oriented’ economic agenda as well as his much-promoted ‘Common Prosperity’ initiative.

Pundits will be paying particular attention to who is put in charge of economic planning, who the new foreign minister might be and who will govern the central bank. I will offer my reading of these tea leaves as the year unfolds.

In April and May, speculation may turn to whether China will finally open its borders to foreign visitors and those compatriots who want to be reunited with loved ones after enduring the pandemic lockdown. While some loosening of restrictions began in November 2022, China is still balancing its twin aims of containing the spread of Covid and re-engineering its economy along similar lines to Europe.

Beijing’s controversial ‘Zero-Covid’ strategy has intensified economic pressures, exacerbated rising levels of youth unemployment and tested the patience of China’s middle class, which has led to unprecedented civil disobedience. Those not employed by the state have been hit particularly hard. It is difficult to see how China’s economy can crank up again until Beijing reduces its internal restrictions and reconnects with the world.

A pivot to the Global South

June and July will be prime season for Beijing’s diplomacy with the Global South. Xi recently announced that China would host the third Belt and Road Forum in 2023 – a meeting of heads of states from predominantly developing countries to discuss his flagship foreign affairs initiative. As seen in the Political Report of the 20th Party Congress, Xi has abandoned the ‘new type of great power relations’ language he previously used to describe relations with the US-led western world. 

In its place, Xi is stressing that China should develop its ties with the Global South through his Global Development and Global Security initiatives which were announced in 2021 and 2022 respectively. These aim to reshape the global governance agenda in multilateral forums and project Beijing’s influence on to the developing world.

Sport will dominate throughout August and September. While Beijing’s spending spree on football promotion might have failed to see the national side qualify for the World Cup, its table tennis team has proved invincible and continues to cheer up the nation. I will offer my own verdict on why there is such a stark contrast between the success of the two men’s teams and explain the meaning of sports in modern Chinese society.

In October and November, young graduates will begin their careers while new university students start to arrive on campus. Chinese students are constantly subjected to strenuous testing. And like their western peers, they face the inevitable pressures of finding a job, repaying the mortgage and other everyday facts of life.

The burnout of China’s Generation Z 

The term ‘involution’ – neijuan – has been adopted by China’s Generation Z to describe their feelings of burnout at the ever-increasing expectations associated with high performance. Equally, they have strong opinions about their own government as well as western liberal democracies. China’s leaders of the future will come from their ranks so it will be worthwhile spending some time trying to understand what makes them tick.

Whatever the Year of the Rabbit holds for China, billions of its people will want to have their life return to normal without the fear of having the wrong colour – yellow or red – on their Covid health QR code. Only a green code shows a person is healthy and free to move around. The Covid threat has hovered over people for three years and as borders reopen, they may be holding their breath. 

A slowing economy dimming consumer confidence and a precarious international environment make it look even harder for President Xi to pursue the agenda outlined in October 2022. As the Year of the Rabbit dawns, China doesn’t need a Mad Hatter or a March Hare, instead it urgently needs a sound path to economic recovery and a plan to reopen its borders that works for everyone. 

What is the future of cross-border data flows? 16 September 2024 — 6:00PM TO 7:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 15 August 2024 Chatham House and Online

Navigating long-standing tensions and newfound difficulties for unlocking shared prosperity among modern, digital economies.

Cross-border data flows can unlock shared prosperity among digital economies, advance international security, and address cybercrime and global crises. But ensuring the free flow of data across borders involves navigating complex regulatory, security, trust, political, and technical challenges. Developing effective frameworks and agreements to support data flows is a significant undertaking.

Recent bilateral and multilateral agreements and initiatives have advanced data-sharing, respecting the right to privacy and upholding notions of sovereignty. This has contributed to clearer rules and (potentially) better solutions such as the OECD declaration on government access to data held by companies. Further progress, supportive of public safety and national security, is on the horizon, like G7 support for data free flow with trust and industry-led, trusted cloud principles on protecting human rights and competitiveness.

More work is needed to operationalize commitments and advance ongoing negotiations, like US–EU negotiations on e-evidence in criminal proceedings. This is key for ensuring ‘hard’ legal and regulatory mechanisms complement OECD principles. Stakeholders from law enforcement, national security, data protection and industry must confront tensions between sovereign prerogatives and cooperation. They must also overcome traditional silos between law enforcement and national security work. On the horizon are newfound challenges (for example, in harmonizing legal frameworks and responding to advances in technology). All the while, stakeholders must work together to promote economic interests, data protection, privacy and cybersecurity.

This expert panel discusses the future of cross-border data-sharing, raising questions including:

• What value does cross-border data-sharing bring and where are its current ‘pain points’?
• To enable data free flows, how should principles complement ‘hard’ legal and regulatory mechanisms?
• Beyond states, law enforcement, major industry players and international organizations, what roles should SMEs, the technical community and civil society stakeholders play in shaping and operationalizing principles?
• Looking ahead, where is progress in data-sharing principles and arrangements expected or possible?

A drinks reception follows the event.

This event is supported by Microsoft as part of a project on data sharing. The project has benefited greatly from the insights of a multi-stakeholder taskforce and concludes with an open-access special issue of the Journal of Cyber Policy.

How can young people in MENA thrive despite economic and political insecurity? 24 September 2024 — 2:00PM TO 3:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 30 August 2024 Online

Experts share insights on how young people navigate challenges and find opportunities in a changing domestic and regional landscape.

Across the Middle East and North Africa young people between the ages of 15 and 29 comprise around 24 per cent of the population in the region. As the complex regional geopolitical developments unfold, the majority of these young people are living in a time of economic and political insecurity, with many, such as Iraqis and Libyans, also growing up during conflict and uncertainty.

Enhanced education and employment programs are key opportunities for development and stability in the region. Despite this, limited resources and competing priorities have meant that governments often struggle to deliver competitive educational and employment opportunities and lack the capacity and funding for education reform and active labour market policy development. Key tensions that pit modernity and autonomy against tradition and control continue to frame the education and skills development landscape.

This webinar will address:

• The challenges young people within the MENA region face in different contexts;
• The role education and employment play in developing skills for 21st century challenges;
• Spaces for young people to practice citizenship and participate in political processes;
• Youth’s economic prospects while navigating the tumultuous backdrop of enduring conflict and authoritarianism. 

Making the circular economy work for global development: how the UN Summit of the Future can deliver 23 September 2024 — 6:15PM TO 9:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 5 September 2024 Online

This policy roundtable focusses on how to advance implementation of a global approach and collaboration to an inclusive circular economy for an updated post-2030 SDG framework.

As the world looks beyond the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) towards the post-2030 era, integrating the principles of the circular economy into the future global development agenda becomes imperative.  

A new Chatham House research paper about the role of the circular economy for the SDGs and their possible extension into the post-2030 development agenda will be launched in September 2024 during the UN Summit of the Future and the New York Climate Week. The paper outlines the rationale for the integration of circular economy goals into for the next crucial phase of international development and how to meet net-zero 2050 targets. It provides actionable recommendations on international cooperation mechanisms for policymakers and stakeholders at the UN Summit for the Future in 2024 and beyond.

The aim of the roundtable is to bring together stakeholders and leaders from intergovernmental organisations, business, governments and civil society. The focus of the roundtable meeting is: 

• Reflections on the Summit of the Future and the role of circularity for an updated post-2030 SDG framework.
• Discussion on key aspects of the institutional arrangements and international coordination that are needed for a globally coordinated approach to achieve an inclusive circular economy that supports SDG implementation. 
• Development of joint strategies on how to advance implementation of a global approach and collaboration to an inclusive circular economy as a follow-up from the Summit of the Future.

The objective is to emerge from the roundtable with a clearer roadmap for translating the recommendations for international coordination into concrete actions, with a shared commitment to driving meaningful change on the international level.

The event is co-hosted by Chatham House and partners from the Global Circular Economy Roadmap initiative including the African Circular Economy Network, the African Development Bank, Circular Change, Circular Innovation Lab, Circle Economy, EU CE Stakeholder Platform, Hanns Seidel Foundation, Institute of Global Environmental Strategies, Sitra, UNIDO, World Business Council on Sustainable Development, World Economic Forum and the Wyss Academy for Nature.

Further background information is available on the initiative website.

More speakers to be announced.

In conversation with Martin Griffiths: How can a divided world address conflict? 1 October 2024 — 10:00AM TO 11:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 16 September 2024 Chatham House and Online

The former United Nations Under-Secretary-General describes how a weakening multilateralism system and dysfunctional political diplomacy can be revitalized by a humanitarian approach.

Arguments Over Innovation Capacity Miss How Much the US and China Are Intertwined Expert comment sysadmin 30 May 2018

Most discussions of current US–China trade tensions fundamentally misrepresent the globalized nature of innovation.

Among the many issues at play in the ongoing economic and trade tensions between the US and China are questions of technological capability and innovation.

Two of the main complaints in the US Section 301 report were that American companies have been forced to transfer technology to China and been the subject of cyber espionage. The presentation of the issues in this report has been disputed, but behind it lies concern in the US that Chinese innovative and technological capability is catching up with that in the US, thanks partly to the support of state policies set out in the Made in China 2025 initiative.

One important feature of the package of measures announced by the US last month is that it was designed to contain China’s technological development as much as to reduce the trade deficit, even though the latter has been the focus of President Donald Trump’s rhetoric.

(Some have cast doubt on this picture of Chinese innovation, suggesting that China is more of a ‘fat tech dragon’ whose massive inputs into research and development do not translate into real innovative capacity.)

The problem with the debate comparing Chinese and American technological capability is that it misunderstands or misrepresents the globalized nature of innovation in today’s world.

Contrary to the economic nationalist rhetoric emanating mainly from Washington, and to a lesser extent from Beijing, the US and China are not two separate economies competing for economic hegemony. As part of the globalization of manufacturing and production over the last 40 years and the more recent globalization of consumption, the shape and structure of innovation has also changed.

As we argue in a new paper, the key to understanding this is to think of innovation as being carried out through global or transnational networks linking economic actors, not within separated economies. What the recent phase of globalization has demonstrated is that innovation is achieved most effectively and efficiently when those engaged in innovation are connected not just within national borders but across them.

China has become integrated into these global innovation networks in ways which reflect its relative strengths and weaknesses in research and development. China’s extensive manufacturing ecosystem has enabled its companies to perform well in production-related and efficiency-driven innovation. Moreover the rapid growth in its large and dynamic consumer market provides fertile ground for consumer-related innovation by Chinese and foreign-invested enterprises alike. The rapidly increasing talent pool in China also provides additional human capital for innovation and technology.

Apart from the increased emphasis by Chinese enterprises on innovation, multinationals have also been stepping up their research and development (R&D) efforts in China. These now consitute a significant part of China’s R&D landscape, and are an increasingly important part of the global innovation by multinationals.

Things are of course changing. China’s overall innovation capacity is improving, and there are concerns in both in the US and Europe that Chinese policy is moving backwards towards the promotion of ‘indigenous innovation’ – or self-reliant innovation – and away from openness. In other words, we may be seeing a more ‘techno-nationalist’ China as well as a protectionist US.

China has also been criticized for inadequate protection of intellectual property rights, though the establishment of special courts for such disputes marks a commitment to improve – and the rights of Chinese companies increasingly need protection too.

As the benefits of globalization increasingly come under question, and with some degree of nationalist political pressure in both the West and China, it is not going to be possible – or politically desirable – to do away with national borders when it comes to innovation. But at the same time, the extent to which businesses and consumers have globalized means that fully ‘indigenous’ innovation is not possible, even if it were politically desirable.

EU-China innovation relations, as well as those between Washington and Beijing, therefore need careful management. But both Americans and Europeans should have more confidence in their innovation capability, given the relative strengths and weaknesses of Chinese innovation.

Americans and Europeans should acknowledge and promote the opportunities that come from globally networked innovation processes. Taking advantage of the comparative advantage of all the players in these networks means working with China as an innovation partner.

Mobile Ecosystems as a Driver of Innovation and Growth in the Asia-Pacific 19 September 2018 — 12:30PM TO 3:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 18 September 2018 Chatham House, London

How Women are Transforming Indonesia Interview sysadmin 20 May 2019

In a series exploring women in international affairs, Isabel Dunstan speaks to Gitika Bhardwaj about the rise of the women’s movement in Indonesia.

Southeast Asia has one of the highest records of gender-based violence in the world and Indonesia was recently ranked as the second most dangerous place for women in the Asia-Pacific. What is the state of women’s rights and gender equality in Indonesia?

It is true that Indonesia has high rates of violence against women, however, it’s difficult to know the realities of women’s experiences because in the past the data has been somewhat unreliable. This has been due to reasons such as a lack of reporting mechanisms available to survivors of violence and the fact that discussing sexual violence is a taboo and, if reported, can result in stigmatization which limits the number of survivors who have come forward.

However, the first reliable nationwide survey on gendered violence in Indonesia was conducted in 2017 by the Indonesian Ministry of Women and Child Protection and the United Nations Population Fund. Interestingly, it showed that Indonesia’s rates of violence against women are on par with the global rate which is that 1 in 3 women are affected by sexual violence in their lifetime.

It’s therefore difficult to generalize that Indonesia is an unsafe place for women because it’s an extremely diverse country. There is a growing middle class while there is pervasive poverty. There is religious diversity where the eastern-most province of Aceh is the only province in the country where Sharia law is enforced, whereas in the western-most province of West Papua, the dominant religion is Christianity and the ways of life are completely different.

Nevertheless, violence against women is high in Indonesia and can happen in all places – rich or poor, east or west – and has different manifestations from street harassment and trafficking to domestic violence and workplace harassment.

In some parts of the country there are high rates of child marriage too and, according to UNICEF, 14 per cent of girls in Indonesia are married by the time they turn 18 which is shocking when we think about how child marriage limits girls’ access to education and makes them more vulnerable to sexual violence and therefore restricts their futures.

Child marriage is high in Indonesia in part due to rooted gender norms, low levels of education and discriminating legislation, such as the marriage law, which states that, although it is legal to marry at 21, girls can marry at 16 and boys can marry at 19 with parental consent. But this can be even lower meaning parents could get their daughters married at as young as 13. So the law is fundamentally unfair between girls and boys and the women’s movement in Indonesia has been fighting extremely hard to reform legislation that discriminates against women and girls.

From the country’s first female president, Megawati Sukarnoputri​, to incumbent finance minister Sri Mulyani Indrawati – who was voted ‘Best Minister in the World’ in 2018 – and maritime​ and fisheries minister Susi Pudjiastuti – who has become notorious for her tough stance against illegal fishing activities – how are women progressing in Indonesian politics?

Indonesia has come a long way since becoming a democracy in 1998. Before that, the second president and dictator, Suharto, ruled the country for almost 32 years and increased the inequality gap between men and women during his reign.

Since the fall of Suharto, however, gender equality is explicitly enshrined in Indonesia’s constitution and the country has ratified the Convention on the Elimination of Violence Against Women.

The country has also been undergoing a process of democratization which has involved slowly decentralizing its power. This means that greater authority has been distributed to the 34 provincial governments outside of the capital of Jakarta.

Furthermore, to aid gender equality, a quota system requiring political parties to be made up of 30 per cent women has been put in place, although remnants of Suharto’s old system of cronyism remain, limiting the impact of the quotas translating to more women in provincial parliaments.

But the defining approach to furthering gender equality in Indonesia has been through gender mainstreaming and gender-responsive budgeting which can be seen throughout provincial administrations in the country.

This means there is the intention to ensure infrastructure, health and education outcomes include results that address specific gender equality gaps. The challenge for effective gender mainstreaming, however, is the political will to translate the approach into well-resourced programmes from one province to another.

Nevertheless, we have just seen Indonesia go through the most incredible presidential and legislative elections last month – won by the current president, Joko Widodo, who has often been called the ‘Barack Obama of Southeast Asia’ and whose existing cabinet has the highest number of women in the country’s history. This is not simply a matter of filling seats in the cabinet with women – such as the wives and sisters of male politicians – because it’s required by law. But, rather, there are some incredible female political figures who are there because they are strong, smart and capable.

You’ve rightly mentioned Minister of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, Susi Pudjiastuti, who is a fabulous role model for a lot of women particularly women who have not had tertiary education because she entered politics through an unorthodox route.

Then there’s Minister of Finance, Sri Mulyani Indrawati, who is also the former leader of the World Bank and is such an inspiration to a lot of women who are looking to work in public life because of her experience as well as her work to include gender mainstreaming in state budgets.

There is also Minister of Women’s Empowerment and Child Protection, Yohana Susana Yembise, who is a Papuan woman, as well as many more female public figures.

Network Power in the Asia-Pacific: Making Sense of the New Regionalism and Opportunities for Cooperation 7 February 2020 — 9:45AM TO 5:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 17 January 2020 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

The Asia-Pacific region continues to increase in geopolitical and geoeconomic importance. The rise of China and tensions with the US are affecting bilateral relationships and traditional alliances in the region. Whether seen from the perspective of the Quad – Australia, India, Japan and the US – or the Indo-Pacific concept embraced by a wide range of countries but with no shared consensus on scope and objectives or with ASEAN who insists on the importance of its own centrality, the region is redefining and reconceptualising itself.

With a diverse range of initiatives – including the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) – there are a plethora of regional agreements and institutional groupings that add further complexity.

As the Bretton Woods architecture continues to be dominated by Western powers, China is also spearheading parallel governance initiatives such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the Belt and Road Initiative and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as a means of enhancing its geopolitical and geoeconomic influence.

This one-day conference will focus on how such networks and alliances have been built, and sustained, in the Asia-Pacific region. In order to understand how new regional initiatives might open up opportunities for new forms of international cooperation, the conference will focus on the themes of cyber-technology and innovation, sustainable development and mitigating the impacts of climate change and new infrastructure initiatives. It will assess whether there is a zero-sum conflict between competing networks and agendas or whether a common approach can be developed.

The Indo-Pacific: Geostrategic Outlook From Now to 2024 - Workshop 5 18 February 2020 — 12:00PM TO 4:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 17 February 2020 Langafonua Centre

The roundtable brought together stakeholders within Tonga’s strategic and policymaking communities to explore Tongan perceptions of evolving strategic shifts in the Indo-Pacific until 2024. The roundtable took place in Nuku’alofa and was co-hosted by the Royal Oceania Institute in Tonga.

The report below contains a summary of the discussions and an essay by Lady Fane Fakafanua, Director of Operations at the Royal Oceania Institute.

Read a summary and essay

International relations: The ‘how not to’ guide Expert comment NCapeling 11 October 2022

A centenary special issue of International Affairs explores past foreign policy failures to help policymakers avoid future catastrophes.

Policy decisions in international relations frequently have a long-lasting effect on the world order, shaping the lives of millions. Often acting under pressure and severe time constraints, decision-makers must rely on their own experience and the best expertise available. And so, despite many striving for a more peaceful and prosperous world, policy failures are all too common.

The second of International Affairs’ centenary special issues – devised and guest-edited by Amrita Narlikar and Daniel W. Drezner – is a ‘how not to guide’ for international relations. Focusing on historic failures, 14 experts examine what went wrong, and how policy practitioners and researchers can get it right together.

Between theory and outcome fall two ‘shadows’: one of decision-makers not taking advantage of sound academic policy advice – in some cases ignoring it because they think they already know best – and a second of bias in academic analyses and researchers simply erring, or erring on the side of their own self-importance. Between these two, there lies a joint path toward better policies.

The special issue provides policymakers with cautionary lessons, transforming well-known cases into a guide of what not to do in international politics. Building on that, the collection also suggests ways forward, including borrowing the medical Hippocratic Oath of ‘do no harm’, which in international relations serves as a cautionary warning against action merely for action’s sake, and then going decidedly beyond this minimum requirement.

A series of comics also accompanies the articles, produced in collaboration with Sequential Potential comics.

In their introduction, Drezner and Narlikar draw out four overarching factors which increase the likelihood of foreign policy failure – these are a focus on short-term successes, underestimating the power of narratives, hubris, and technocratic bubbles. If academics and policymakers can work together with these careful considerations, perhaps mistakes can avoid being repeated.

Richard Toye examines three pivotal moments in the UK’s history – the Munich crisis of 1938, the Suez crisis and war of 1956, and the Iraq war of 2003. He finds that in these cases the failures were over-determined, a consequence of Britain’s relative decline rather than its cause.

Daniel W. Drezner reviews two high profile failures of sanction use – United Nations (UN) sanctions on Iraq during the two Gulf wars, and the US re-imposition of sanctions on Iran in 2018. In both cases the main goals were not achieved and the costs were great. Drezner highlights ten ‘do’s and don’ts’ for sanctions as a result.

Amrita Narlikar shows how the World Trade Organization (WTO) has become an almost perfect example of how not to negotiate, even when taking into account recent limited successes. She identifies three broad categories of bargaining failures and explores the impact of narratives on the course of events, giving a clear list of do’s and don’ts for international negotiation.

Harold James also looks at three historic moments, the financial crises in 1931, 1997, and 2008. While responses to the crises initially looked successful, ironically in each case the drive to avoid past mistakes opened the door for the next crisis.

Cecilia Emma Sottilotta considers recent disasters in the European Union (EU) – the eurozone crisis and COVID-19 pandemic – and recommends for policymakers to find a middle ground between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism in crisis situations.

The growth of Chinese influence is a key issue in international relations today. Various articles in the special issue explain how not to deal with a rising China, coming from different angles. Exploring the US-China relationship, Janice Gross Stein is critical of the narrative around US decline and Chinese growth. The world should look beyond GDP as an indicator of a country’s growth and pay attention to strategic choices made by leaders in both states.

Joseph S. Nye Jr also provides a US perspective, arguing that while some historic analogies are misleading, the US should contemplate the cautionary narrative of sleepwalking into World War One when thinking about its relationship with China.

Amitabh Mattoo gives a south Asian view, asserting there is a need to understand Chinese policies in the region. Through examining China’s relations with India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka he concludes that because China is adopting aggressive policies in the region, states must start cooperating with like-minded allies.

Yuen Foong Khong answers two questions in his paper tackling which ‘how not to’s’ are relevant when learning from history, and whether policymakers are aware of them. His research points to four things to avoid, which he then applies to how the Cold War analogy is used to understand contemporary US-China relations.

On the theme of foreign interference, Igor Istomin looks at the Soviet support for Mao Zedong’s Communist Party in the 1920s to 1940s. He argues strongly against interfering with major powers, as short-term gains cannot last.

From Iraq and Afghanistan to Somalia and the Balkans, there have been many failed interventions by the West since the end of the Cold War. Stephanie Carvin asserts the overreliance on automated weaponry has allowed supposedly ‘easy wars’ to turn into ‘forever wars’ – and this is not likely to stop.

America’s vote shows a desire for stability and calm Expert comment NCapeling 11 November 2022

Joe Biden has presided over the best midterm election results by a party in power in two decades, but the future for the Republican Party leadership is now uncertain.

For a president continually struggling with low approval ratings, the midterms provided a stunning result as the widely anticipated Republican red wave failed to materialize.

Although Democrats look set to lose their majority in the House, it is by a much smaller margin than either history or today’s pollsters anticipated. Democrats have maintained their majority in the Senate, a result that was confirmed four days after election day when Senator Catherine Cortez Masto won reelection. The final Senate seat will be decided by a 6 December run-off in the state of Georgia. 

The midterm elections were not good for the Republican party but were especially bad for Donald Trump who has until now managed to defy expectations and maintain his grip on the party even after his 2020 defeat at the polls.

Trump managed to win the presidency once but he lost the popular vote twice and at no stage during his time in office did his approval ratings go above 40 per cent. Now, after six years of the most divisive and disruptive leadership the US has ever seen, he has presided over the worst midterm results a party out of power has suffered in two decades.

Trump’s influence is on the wane

Many of the candidates endorsed by the former president – including in battleground states such as Pennsylvania and Arizona – lost. In Georgia, the Republican governor and Trump GOP rival won, despite Trump’s opposition, and the candidate he endorsed for the US Senate has come up short of the 50 per cent needed to get over the line in the first round.

Trump’s nemesis, Ron DeSantis, the Republican governor of Florida, won a second four-year term in a landslide. Trump is suffering attacks from his own party and many loyal media supporters, such as Fox News, the New York Post, and the Wall Street Journal. None of this bodes well for the prospect of Trump leading the party through the 2024 presidential election.

After six years of chaos, this upset has been delivered with remarkably little chaos and, so far, no violence in a win for democracy and stability in the US which will reverberate beyond the US shores.

The system has worked, with multiple elections held across all 50 states. Hotly contested seats were decided peacefully even when the margins were thin. The midterm elections were also a win for democracy. In every battleground state, election deniers that were nominated to run for offices that would control state election systems, including in the 2024 presidential elections, have been defeated.

For a country with a polarized electorate and a radical Republican leader who has continued to spread disinformation and sought to rile his base, this election has been surprisingly normal.

This means the debate about the future of America’s international leadership is postponed. Biden is still in the saddle and, instead of a battle for control inside the Democratic party, it is the Republicans who look set to descend into internal conflict and recrimination.

The unofficial contest to win the Republican nomination for president has already begun. Donald Trump has signalled loudly that he plans to run. If he does, it could impact Republican prospects in the 6 December runoff for the final seat in the Senate. DeSantis may also run and could be followed by several aspiring Republican candidates. A disrupted party facing a period of significant change seems likely. 

Inflation and the economy proved key factors

As always, foreign policy barely featured in the elections but the result promises a period of continuity. Instead of facing dangerous sniping on Ukraine from an emboldened Republican House leadership, the Biden administration looks set to hold to its Ukraine policy.

Biden’s increasingly hard-line policy on China will continue to be qualified by a clear-headed determination – however hard – to cooperate on climate. Trade policy will remain stuck, as will US policy in the developing world.

Exit polls show Democrats were motivated to vote by the reversal of Roe vs Wade and the restrictions on abortion rights that followed, while Republicans voted against inflation.

But Democrats at the national level continually failed to effectively communicate the positive impacts of Biden’s legislative agenda for ordinary Americans, or to deliver a clear economic message.

The national leadership veered from abortion rights to the Inflation Reduction Act, to the future of democracy in the US – all of which proved too complicated to cut through.

The state level shows a more complex picture because inflation and the economy – which could have swept Republicans to victory – were blunted by dogged local campaigning from Democrats who knew their voters and spoke to the cost-of-living concerns which were top of their minds.

Divided US support shows time is not on Ukraine’s side Expert comment LJefferson 17 February 2023

Growing public opinion evidence and uncertainty about the future of the war suggests that continued American support for aiding Ukraine should not be assumed.

One year into Russia’s war on Ukraine, fears that American support for Kyiv would rapidly wane have proven demonstrably wrong. Western financial and military backing has been robust thanks to allied unity and an unexpectedly mild winter. But, as financial analysts constantly remind us, past performance is no guarantee of future results.

People like to back winners. If the anticipated Russian spring offensive looks successful or the counterpart Ukrainian offensive is uninspiring, expect louder US voices calling for a negotiated settlement. The warning signs are already here.

American officials privately express growing apprehension that there will be an early resolution of the conflict. As one White House official recently observed to me, by the end of the year the war could well be about where it is today. And a plurality of Americans intuitively grasp this: 46 per cent believe neither Russia nor Ukraine currently has the advantage in the conflict.

Momentum matters  

In public opinion, perception of momentum matters. Americans’ support for the Vietnam War waned as the conflict persisted, falling from six-in-ten Americans in 1965 to four-in-ten in 1973.

Similarly, backing for the Iraq war fell from more than seven-in-ten in 2003 to barely four-in-ten in 2008. And with Afghanistan, as the war dragged on, support for US involvement fell from more than nine-in-ten in 2002 to less than five-in-ten in 2021. Notably, once the American public turned on these wars, support never returned.

Of course, Americans were fighting and dying in those wars, which is not the case in the Ukraine conflict. But initially the Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan war support was buoyed by the belief that continued US engagement was justified, otherwise American sons and daughters had died in vain. With no American lives at stake in Ukraine, only financial and military resources, there is a growing wariness of throwing good money after bad.

In the last year, the share of Americans who say the United States is doing too much for Ukraine has nearly quadrupled, from seven to 26 per cent. And the portion that believe Washington has not done enough has halved, from 49 per cent to 17 per cent.

Sentiment about Ukraine support has become increasingly partisan. In March 2022, nine per cent of Republicans and five per cent of Democrats said the US was doing too much for Ukraine. By January 2023, 40 per cent of Republicans but just 15 per cent of Democrats complained Washington was doing too much.

This erosion of Americans’ support for Ukraine does not bode well for the future. Less than half (48 per cent) of the public in November, compared to 58 per cent in July, believed Washington should support Ukraine for as long as it takes, even if it means American households have to pay higher gas and food prices as a consequence.

A similar share, 47 per cent – up from 38 per cent in July – said the United States should urge Ukraine to settle for peace as soon as possible so the costs aren’t so great for American households, even if that means Ukraine will lose some territory.

A partisan divide

The partisan divide over Ukraine is largely driven by Republican political rhetoric during and after the 2022 midterm elections. Current Republican Speaker of the House Kevin McCarthy observed last October: ‘I think people are going to be sitting in a recession and they’re not going to write a blank cheque to Ukraine.’

More recently, in the wake of Ukrainian president Zelenskyy’s December speech to Congress, Florida Republican Representative Matt Gaetz, whose vote was pivotal in making McCarthy Speaker, tweeted: ‘Hemorrhaging billions in taxpayer dollars for Ukraine while our country is in crisis is the definition of America last.’

In January, newly-elected Ohio Republican Senator J.D. Vance told a Cleveland radio station that it was ‘ultimately not in our national security interest’ to send M1 Abrams tanks to Ukraine, despite the fact that they will be built by his constituents in Ohio.

In addition, ten Republican members of the House of Representatives have introduced legislation asserting ‘that the United States must end its military and financial aid to Ukraine, and urges all combatants to reach a peace agreement.’ 

And this month former President Donald Trump said: ‘That war has to stop, and it has to stop now, and it’s easy to do’ and it ‘can be negotiated within 24 hours’. Why worry about continued support for the war if it’s about to be over?

The road to 2024

With the 2024 US presidential election already revving up, Americans’ appetite for continued backing for Ukraine may hinge on how voters judge the Biden administration’s handling of the conflict.

Democrats are more than twice as likely as Republicans (61 per cent versus 27 per cent) to approve of the Biden administration’s response to the Russia invasion, suggesting Ukraine will be yet another partisan talking point as the campaign heats up. Notably, men are much more likely than women to approve of Biden’s efforts, as are older Americans compared with younger Americans.

SVB collapse shows interest rate financial stability threat Expert comment LJefferson 15 March 2023

Governments must resist pressure to relax post-financial crisis regulation, while central banks should moderate their attack on inflation if financial stability is at risk.

The collapse of California’s Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) on 10 March has triggered a wave of volatility in global bank equity prices, raised questions about whether US bank regulation and its tech industry funding model are fit for purpose, and forced a rethink on the extent and pace of monetary policy tightening appropriate for the US and other advanced economies.

SVB was the US’s 16th largest bank with total assets of $212bn at the end of 2022 and a presence in eight countries around the world, including the UK. Since it was founded 40 years ago, it has maintained a strong focus on the technology sector, claiming recently that nearly half of all US venture-backed technology and life science companies banked with it. Partly as a consequence, some 95 per cent of its deposits came from corporates and hedge funds, far higher than the one-third typical of similarly sized banks.

What led to SVB’s collapse?

Ironically, SVB’s failure did not result from its core business model of serving a relatively high-risk and fast-growing sector, but rather from a dramatic failure in liquidity management. During the pandemic, SVB saw a very large inflow of corporate deposits. But rather than disincentivizing depositors or investing the funds attracted in assets of matching maturity, it chose to invest them in low credit risk, but long maturity bonds attracted by a small pick-up in return over shorter-term assets. 

When US interest rates began to rise rapidly in 2022 following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the value of SVB’s long-term bond portfolio declined sharply. It was left facing a large capital loss of some $15bn, roughly equivalent to its total shareholder funds. The management attempted to repair SVB’s balance sheet last week by crystalizing some of the loss and raising new capital.

But when this failed, the US supervisory authorities had no choice but to step in and close the institution.  This action was quickly followed by emergency action from other regulators vis-a-vis SVB subsidiaries and offices around the world.

The US entity has formally been taken over by the FDIC and a bridge bank established. All depositors have had their funds guaranteed, going beyond the normal federal deposit insurance limit of $250,000 per customer. However, bond holders and equity holders have been wiped out. The authorities have said that any loss will be covered by the industry as a whole via the FDIC.

In the UK, the Bank of England was able to sell the ring-fenced UK subsidiary of SVB to HSBC for £1 over the weekend, so that all its depositors and other liability holders have effectively had their funds guaranteed. In contrast to previous Bank of England rescues (such as Johnson Matthey Bank in 1984, the ‘small banks’ crisis in 1991 and the global financial crisis in 2008-9) no public money has been put at risk.

Four key questions

SVB’s rapid collapse raises four central questions:

First, how was it that the bank was able to take on such a risky interest rate maturity mismatch in its US operations? Maturity transformation is standard banking industry practice, but it is usually closely monitored by regulators who place limits on the extent of interest rate maturity mismatch and require liquidity buffers to offset the risk of deposit flight and forced asset sales.

SVB’s very high concentration of corporate deposits as compared to ‘sticky’ retail deposits, means that the risk of deposit flight was unusually high and so the bank should have been more, not less, cautious in its liquidity policy. SVB was classed as a regional bank in the US which means that it did not have to meet international regulatory standards under Basle III. And in 2018, the Trump administration approved legislation removing the post-financial crisis requirement that banks with assets under $250bn submit to stress testing and relaxing liquidity buffer requirements.

But it is still hard to understand why regulators allowed SVB to commit such a classic banking error. On Monday, the Federal Reserve ordered an inquiry into what it has correctly described as a regulatory failure. This should look at the role played by all the elements of the oversight system including the auditors, KPMG.

Second, does SVB’s failure reflect a much bigger underlying risk in the US banking sector, and potentially other banking systems around the world, built up over the prolonged period of ultra-low interest rates? SVB’s collapse was followed by the failure of the $110bn Signature Bank in New York, as well as sharp falls in US regional bank stock prices – by close of play on 14 March, the S&P Regional Bank Index was down 22 per cent on a week before, with some individual bank stocks seeing much sharper falls.  

To the extent that banks have been covered by international bank regulatory requirements, the risk of a much broader problem should be limited because stress testing and other regulatory tests would have looked at precisely the scenario that has happened. Even where large market losses have been incurred, capital buffers should be sufficient to cover them. But as SVB has shown, there are some large banks that are seemingly not required to follow international rules, while the latest developments at Credit Suisse indicate that market concerns may still arise when other factors are in play.

Third, how far, in the light of the potential vulnerability in banking systems, should central banks in advanced countries moderate their efforts to squeeze out inflationary pressures? While inflation already appears to have peaked in many economies and the pace of interest rate rises was expected to slow, inflation is far from vanquished, as recent data in the US has demonstrated.

Fourth, does the failure of SVB tell us something new about the financial risks facing the high technology sector?  It was remarkable that a single (and not particularly large, by international standards) financial institution could have played such a central role in the tech sector in both the US and UK. 

Why was this the case and does it reflect special features of the tech/start-up sector (e.g. the need for substantial cash deposits to cover relatively large negative cash flows in the early years of operation, or the need for highly specialized lending expertise). If so, should governments take steps to mitigate such risks, given the outsized importance of this sector in many national economic strategies? 

Hasmik Keshishian
Dec 1, 2007; 6:2212-2229
Research

Yi Zhang
Sep 1, 2005; 4:1240-1250
Research