In a month’s time, the UK will have a new prime minister. The campaign has been dominated by candidates’ views on how to deliver Britain’s withdrawal from the EU by October, alongside some discussion of domestic issues.

But relatively little has been said about international affairs, despite the fact that foreign policy questions are becoming a more partisan issue and Britain is facing crucial questions around Brexit and the wider international context. These will be waiting for whoever finds themselves in Number 10 on 22 July. 

1. How can Britain influence Europe from outside the EU?

Theresa May was fond of saying that Britain is leaving the EU but not leaving Europe. Britain cannot change its geography. It will continue to share many strategic and security interests with the rest of the continent, but it will be outside of Europe’s central political and economic project. A new PM will not only have to negotiate Britain’s new relationship with the EU, but also think about how to influence it as a third country.

An aspect of this will be finding a new way to work with the EU on foreign, security and defence policy that meets the need for autonomy on both sides. How deep this relationship is or how institutionalized it will be is yet to be negotiated and can be shaped by the next PM.

The UK needs to decide how ambitiously it wants to engage with the new defence agenda in the EU (particularly its industrial components), and how to balance these with key bilateral relationships like France and Germany. Amid uncertainty about American security guarantees and Russian aggression, the next PM must also consider what Britain’s security role in Europe should be and NATO’s place within that.

Beyond conventional foreign policy issues, Britain is also going to be heavily shaped and influenced by the rule-making power of the EU, and how the world’s largest market regulates itself, from energy to financial services, consumer products and the environment.

The UK will need a strategy to influence the EU from the outside – something Swiss, Norwegians and Americans will acknowledge is no easy feat. This could include significantly increasing its diplomatic footprint across Europe, working closely with the UK’s private and non-profit sectors, utilizing Britain’s technical expertise in areas like sanctions, and creating new ad hoc groupings to share perspectives and ideas, building on examples like the Northern Future Forum. 

2. Should Britain do business with President Trump?

President Trump represents a fundamental challenge to Britain: an American president whose belligerent unilateralism runs counter to many of Britain’s foreign policy objectives. His frequent and often shameless diplomatic faux pas – from proposing Nigel Farage be the British ambassador to his dog-whistle attacks on the mayor of London – are compounded by real differences of substance on issues like trade, climate change and nuclear non-proliferation.

A new prime minister must decide how to manage relations with the US administration, whether to challenge or condemn a US president when he acts against Britain’s interests, or use flattery or quieter diplomacy to seek to influence him. Theresa May’s strategy of staying politically close to the president and playing to his ego has yielded little in policy terms, though other world leaders have fared little better.

A new PM will face some uncomfortable choices. Will they continue to defend the Iran nuclear deal alongside European allies while the US continues to undermine it? Do they believe a trade deal with America is desirable or achievable with the current administration, and what are they willing to sacrifice to achieve it? Is the American security guarantee for Europe secure with Donald Trump as president? Judgements on these questions should inform Britain's wider strategy, and its objectives for a future relationship with the European Union.

3. Should Britain prioritize economics or security in its relations with China?

Britain faces its own version of the challenge that many countries face – how to balance the economic and investment benefits of a positive relationship with China with concerns about repressive domestic politics and a more assertive Chinese role regionally and globally. This tension has become more acute for two reasons.

First, the economic dislocation of leaving the EU may create a greater reliance on Chinese trade and investment. China is already a major investor in the UK. If Brexit proves to be disorderly, Britain’s need may be all the greater (though China faces economic headwinds as well). Some in Brussels even fear that the economic difficulties of Brexit may make the UK a soft touch for emerging powers from which it seeks inward investment and market access.

Second, the deterioration in US–China relations means the UK may come under increasing pressure from the United States to take a tough line with China. The controversy over Huawei’s role in delivering 5G networks may become a more regular feature of transatlantic debates, with Britain facing Chinese economic pressure on one side and a squeeze from America over security issues on the other, without the weight of the EU behind it.  

A new prime minister should consider whether the UK’s interests are served by a security role in east Asia, and whether it has the capability to play one.

The UK remains a party to the Five Power Defence Arrangements. The Royal Navy has conducted freedom of navigation exercises in the South China Sea, prompting a rebuke from Beijing. It has also taken steps to deepen security ties with Japan.

But the UK government has struggled to present a coherent position. Some cabinet ministers have sought to open doors to the Chinese market at the same time as others announced their intentions to send aircraft carriers to the Pacific. The next PM will need to find a balance between China and the US, or accept the consequences of more directly taking sides on disputes about trade, technology, and security.

4. How can the contradictions between UK foreign and domestic policy be reconciled?

One of the many problems with the vague and unhelpful slogan ‘Global Britain’ is how it jars with many aspects of domestic policy. This incoherence reduces Britain’s foreign policy credibility and effectiveness.

Britain has actively supported the UN-led Yemen peace process while continuing to support Saudi Arabia’s military campaign through arms sales. Britain wants to build a new ambitious independent trade policy while restricting the migration that is crucial for services trade. British foreign secretaries trumpet the UK’s soft power while the Home Office deports members of the Windrush generation, bungles EU citizenship applications and sets unreasonable burdens for many people seeking visas simply to visit the country.

Global universities are celebrated while international students had their post-study visas cut (a policy that sensibly is likely to be reversed). Britain advocates international tax compliance and transparency while not taking robust steps to regulate the tax haven role played by crown dependencies and overseas territories.

A new prime minister has the chance to get to grips with these inconsistencies and develop foreign and domestic policies which are more coherent and self-re-enforcing.

5. At what level should Britain’s international ambitions be funded?

Successive governments have celebrated the fact the UK is the only Western country to spend 2% of GDP on defence and 0.7% on development. However, this masks some real pressures in the system.

There are significant problems in the defence budget and a growing gap between commitments and committed funds. Meanwhile, the funding of Britain’s diplomacy has been cut by successive governments – Labour, Conservative and coalition – for much of the last 20 years. Numerous bodies have highlighted the problems facing the overstretched and underfunded Foreign Office. Where would defence and diplomacy sit in the new prime minister’s hierarchy of priorities?

The problem is not purely one of funding, but the gap between ambitions, rhetoric and resources. It is not sustainable for British ministers to trumpet Britain’s global ambitions while not properly funding the tools of its influence abroad.

It would be reasonable and understandable for a new prime minister to adjust that ambition and tone down the rhetoric, or alternatively to address resource pressures by investing in diplomacy and defence. But that choice should be informed by a sober reflection on Britain’s international position and interests as it leaves the EU. Brexit offers a chance to revisit assumptions that have guided British policy for a generation. A new prime minister should seize this opportunity.

A realistic vision for the future

All these issues will be more pronounced if the UK leaves the EU with no deal at the end of October. ‘No deal’ would be not simply an economic shock but a diplomatic rupture that will colour the UK’s capacity to negotiate a new relationship with the EU, which will be the first order of business after a ‘no deal’ exit. Trust will be in short supply.

Even if they don’t get to vote on the new prime minister, the public deserves serious answers to these and other questions from the men who want to lead the country. Not the platitudes of ‘Global Britain’ or a reflexive and unexamined British exceptionalism, but a serious, realistic assessment of how Britain will cope with the disruptions of leaving the EU and how it might thrive outside the regional bloc it has been a part of for more than 45 years.

On 13 October 2019, Poland goes to the polls in national elections. On the back of a strong performance in the European elections, the incumbent Law and Justice Party (PiS) is seeking to retain its absolute majority. The election takes place against a background of continued strong economic growth but amid disputes over the direction of social policy and a domestic contest about liberal values. The European Commission and the Polish government have clashed over reforms that the Commission believes could compromise the independence of the judiciary in the Poland. Meanwhile, in foreign policy terms, Poland has sought to develop good working relations with the Trump administration and supported a tough line towards Russia.

The speakers will address the domestic and international significance of the Polish election. Will PiS be able to secure another majority? What would be the implications for the direction of social and political reform in Poland? And how could the elections shift Poland’s approach to politics at the European level and its wider foreign policy?  

The Polish election on 13 October resulted, as expected, in a victory for of the ruling Law and Justice party (PiS).

But despite again securing a slim majority in parliament, it has not been wholly a triumph for PiS. And though there continue to be concerns about the party’s authoritarian tendencies, the election has illuminated some important nuances to its support and appeal, which hold lessons for politics across Europe.

Even though some opinion polls had suggested PiS were close to winning a supermajority in parliament that would have allowed it to pursue constitutional changes, the party fell short of that target, while it lost its majority in the Senate. Thus, while PiS may well renew its efforts to consolidate its control over the state apparatus and the media or meddle with the justice system, it becomes much more difficult with the opposition controlling the Senate and being able to scrutinize laws or have a say in the appointment of public officials.

Most importantly, the election result has shown that while Polish citizens were willing to reward a party that delivered on promises of economic growth and redistribution, they were not ready to hand a blank cheque for full-blown institutional realignment to PiS. Tellingly, many moderate candidates in PiS lists performed quite well among the party’s voters. 

Even though they rewarded a party that at times employed harsh rhetoric against Brussels, Polish voters have long expressed some of the strongest rates of support for EU membership, according to Eurobarometer surveys. The government has also faced massive protests against its most radical initiatives, such as reform of the judicial system and a law to almost completely ban abortion that was ultimately scrapped. It is therefore more likely that the party’s radicalism kept it from increasing its share, rather than helping it to secure victory.

This is not to say that the threat of illiberalism does not remain alive in Poland. But it shows that the degree of PiS dominance in Poland has never been comparable to that of Fidesz in Hungary, with which it is often compared.

This was reflected in the party’s own rhetoric. In the election campaign the government mostly focused on its economic record, recognizing that much of its support is conditional on conventional measures of political success like voter welfare. PiS may not give up on its ambition to establish a ‘new Polish republic’, but the elections have made it clear that economic stability rather than political radicalism will ensure its longevity in power – with the latter perhaps even being a liability as the party experiences fatigue in office.

Similarly, despite the government’s antagonistic stance towards the EU on various issues, PiS never entertained ideas of withdrawing from the EU, as some of its critics feared earlier in its term. With the Polish economy deeply entwined with the European market and Poland expecting – probably for the last time – to receive substantial subsidies from the next EU budget, EU membership is a necessary precondition for the economic success for which PiS is claiming credit.

With the pro-European left returning to parliament but also an extreme party of the right winning representation, the next government will have a difficult balancing act as it tries to draw on the benefits of EU membership while maintaining its defiant image towards Brussels.

Ultimately, beneath the rhetoric and the posturing, PiS is a party that has shrewdly combined popular policies from the left and right, fulfilling promises of both cultural sovereignty and economic redistribution. Its reelection should not come as a surprise given that it fulfilled its electoral pledges by delivering some of the things that many voters in western Europe also crave but that mainstream parties there have largely failed to provide.

Turkey witnessed some major developments over the last year. In August 2018, the dramatic Lira devaluation caused the Turkish economy to go into recession. In the 2019 local elections, which took place during the economic downturn, the Republican Peoples’ Party (CHP) mayoral candidates took control of Ankara and Istanbul after 25 years of dominance by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP).

The election results might lead to a rethink of the AKP leadership and consequences on Turkish politics will depend on Erdoğan’s interpretation of this reversal of his political fortune.

Will this affect the long-standing alliance between AKP and MHP that has characterised Turkish foreign policy for the past few years? What impact will this have on both the domestic and international level? Finally, will Turkey’s recent incursion into Syria have lasting effect on the country’s alliances with other powers and its standing?

In this context, the speaker will analyse the significance of these changes and the future trajectory of Turkish politics, economics and foreign policy.

On 12 December, Britain will hold the most consequential election in its postwar history. The outcome of the election will influence not only the fate of Brexit but also the likelihood of a second referendum on EU membership, a second independence referendum in Scotland, the most economically radical Labour Party for a generation, Britain’s foreign and security policy and, ultimately, its position in the wider international order.

If you look only at the latest polls, then the outcome looks fairly certain. Ever since a majority of MPs voted to hold the election, the incumbent Conservative Party has averaged 38%, the opposition Labour Party 27%, the Liberal Democrats 16%, Brexit Party 10%, Greens 4% and Scottish National Party 3%. Prime Minister Boris Johnson and his party continue to average an 11-point lead which, if this holds until the election, would likely deliver a comfortable majority.

Johnson can also point to other favourable metrics. When voters are asked who would make the ‘best prime minister’, a clear plurality (43%) say Johnson while only a small minority (20%) choose the Labour Party leader, Jeremy Corbyn. Polls also suggest that, on the whole, Johnson is more trusted by voters than Corbyn to deal with Brexit, the economy and crime, while Jeremy Corbyn only tends to enjoy leads on health. All of this lends credence to the claim that Britain could be set for a Conservative majority and, in turn, the passing of a withdrawal agreement bill in early 2020.

But these polls also hide a lot of other shifts that are taking place and which, combined, make the 2019 general election unpredictable. One concerns leadership. While Boris Johnson enjoys stronger leadership ratings than Jeremy Corbyn, it should be remembered that what unites Britain’s current generation of party leaders is that they are all unpopular. Data compiled by Ipsos-MORI reveals that while Johnson has the lowest ratings of any new prime minister, Labour’s Jeremy Corbyn has the lowest ratings of any opposition leader since records began.

Another deeper shift is fragmentation. One irony of Britain’s Brexit moment is that ever since the country voted to leave the European Union its politics have looked more ‘European’. Over the past year, one of the world’s most stable two-party systems has imploded into a four-party race, with the anti-Brexit Liberal Democrats and Nigel Farage’s strongly Eurosceptic Brexit Party both presenting a serious challenge to the two mainstream parties.

In the latest polls, for example, Labour and the Conservatives are attracting only 61 per cent of the overall vote, well down on the 80 per cent they polled in 2017. Labour is weakened by the fact that it is only currently attracting 53 per cent of people who voted Labour at the last election, in 2017. A large number of these 2017 Labour voters, nearly one in four, have left for the Liberal Democrats, who are promising to revoke Article 50 and ‘cancel Brexit’. This divide in the Remain vote will produce unpredictable outcomes at the constituency level.

At the other end of the spectrum, the Conservatives are grappling with a similar but less severe threat. Nigel Farage and the Brexit Party are attracting around one in ten people who voted Conservative in 2017, which will make Boris Johnson’s task of capturing the crucial ‘Labour Leave’ seats harder. There is clear evidence that Johnson has been curbing Farage’s appeal, but it remains unclear how this rivalry on the right will play out from one seat to the next.

One clue as to what happens next can be found in those leadership ratings. While 80 per cent of Brexit Party voters back Johnson over Corbyn, only 25 per cent of Liberal Democrat voters back Corbyn over Johnson. Johnson may find it easier to consolidate the Leave vote than Corbyn will find the task of consolidating the Remain vote.

All of this reflects another reason why the election is unpredictable: volatility. This election is already Britain’s fifth nationwide election in only four years. After the 2015 general election, 2016 EU referendum, 2017 general election and 2019 European parliament elections, Britain’s political system and electorate have been in a state of almost continual flux. Along the way, a large number of voters have reassessed their loyalties.

As the British Election Study makes clear, the current rate of ‘vote-switching’ in British politics, where people switch their vote from one election to the next, is largely unprecedented in the post-war era. Across the three elections held in 2010, 2015 and 2017, a striking 49 per cent of people switched their vote.

This is not all about Brexit. Attachment to the main parties has been weakening since the 1960s. But Brexit is now accelerating this process as tribal identities as ‘Remainers’ or ‘Leavers’ cut across traditional party loyalties. All this volatility not only gives good reason to expect further shifts in support during the campaign but to also meet any confident predictions about the election result with a healthy dose of scepticism.

Genuine ideological differences have returned to British politics. That is as true in foreign policy as in questions of domestic politics. The post-Cold War foreign policy consensus in UK politics around liberal multilateralism is fraying.

This tradition had some key characteristics. It saw Britain as one of the cornerstones of an international order built on a liberal (or neo-liberal if you prefer) approach to economic globalization. EU membership was considered central to Britain’s influence and prosperity (even if further political integration never had deep support). Security policy was grounded in a stable package of NATO membership, close ties to the US, nuclear deterrence and a willingness to conduct military intervention.

Both main parties accepted that foreign policy had a commercial dimension. Both were willing to sell arms abroad to regimes with dubious domestic records.

Despite differences of emphasis, and some moments of genuine disagreement, foreign policy did not undergo big shifts as different parties traded periods in office. That may be set to change. 

Party divides

On the one hand, Labour wants to reset and re-orientate Britain’s international role based on human rights and international law. It promises a new internationalism and to end what it glibly calls the ‘bomb first, talk later’ approach, alongside a human rights-driven trade policy. More concretely, it promises to legislate to ensure Parliament takes decisions on military action, boost resources for the underfunded Foreign Office and suspend arms sales to Saudi Arabia for use in Yemen.  

In Jeremy Corbyn, they have a leader with roots in a distinct left-wing ideological tradition of internationalism that blends a commitment to international solidarity alongside anti-imperial and anti-war sentiment. He has spent his career as a sharp critic of Israeli and US policy, while championing various international political causes, some more radical or fringe than others. His historic positions on issues like NATO and nuclear deterrence, while not represented in the party manifesto, demonstrate a personal radicalism that no recent Labour PM has embodied.

His willingness to challenge the failures of the hitherto centre ground of foreign policy – particularly on military interventions from Iraq to Libya – is an under-appreciated aspect of his appeal among many supporters, even while it is one of the sharpest lines of attack from his critics. Boris Johnson’s chauvinistic rhetoric could not stand in sharper contrast to Labour’s commitment to conduct an audit of the effect of Britain’s colonial legacy on violence and insecurity.  

The Conservative manifesto asserts their pride in Britain’s historical role in the world, followed by a broad set of largely rhetorical commitments to bolster alliances and expand influence. An ambitious free trade agenda points to a more economic and commercially driven foreign policy, the inevitable trade-offs and constraints of which are only beginning to be addressed and debated.

There is an underlying sense that Britain will be liberated from the constraints of EU membership, although beyond trade there is little that would not have been possible, or in most cases easier, from within the EU. As my colleague Richard Whitman has observed, the empty bromide ‘Global Britain’ has been dropped altogether, though beyond the idea of a new UK space command and a stronger sanctions regime, there is little that is new or specific.  

Not all the consensus centre-ground position has been abandoned. Both major parties remain committed to spending 2 per cent of GDP on defence and 0.7 per cent of gross national income on development in their 2019 manifestos.

But beyond their manifesto commitments, prime ministers can exercise extensive powers in foreign affairs through the royal prerogative. Their government can choose to recognize other states, as Labour intends to do with Palestine. They can sign international treaties. And at present, in the absence of the sort of war powers act proposed by Labour, they can conduct military action without recourse to Parliament, which has no legally established role in this area.

Even a weak minority government would have considerable scope to transform the tone of Britain’s diplomacy.

Foreign policy as a partisan political issue

If UK foreign policy becomes more partisan, this will have longer term implications. Voters will theoretically have greater scope to shape and influence foreign policy more directly. Foreign policy may become divisive if it becomes more partisan. It may also become less consistent, which will affect the capacity of the UK to show leadership over the longer term on issues on which there is no domestic consensus. Britain’s allies may need to manage a less reliable partner. The diplomatic and security apparatus of Whitehall will need to be more adaptable.  

British elections generally don’t turn on foreign policy questions; 2019 will not buck that trend. At the same time, this election will be very influential in shaping Britain’s position on the world stage and its approach to international issues. Boris Johnson and Jeremy Corbyn represent very different ideas about Britain’s role: its foreign policy, its alliances, and indeed its idea of itself. The Brexit context makes these political undercurrents on foreign policy matter all the more.

Foreign policy may not matter that much to most voters, but these elections matter for foreign policy. 

What does the UK election result mean for Brexit and forthcoming trade negotiations with the EU?

The most important thing is that it means Brexit will definitely happen. Since the referendum, we’ve had three-and-a-half years of continued uncertainty where all outcomes were still possible. We now know that Brexit will become irreversible from 31 January.

That’s the biggest thing, because I think that will have a big psychological impact on politics, both in the UK and also on the EU side. The EU has been working with a partner that has been unsure about its direction, and perhaps some had still hoped that the process might still be reversed, but that direction is now completely clear.

Obviously the first order of business is to pass the withdrawal agreement, which should be pretty straightforward given the majority that the Conservatives have. That’s a formality now.

Then, the question becomes about the level of ambition for the next year. It is an exceptionally ambitious timetable to negotiate, ratify and implement a new relationship before the end of the transition period in December 2020.

What is achievable by the end of next year?

I think there are three possible outcomes here. One: that timetable doesn’t work and Boris Johnson follows through on his pledge to leave the transition period anyway, leading to a ‘no trade deal’ outcome.

Two: the negotiations are able to deliver something by the end of 2020, either because the depth and ambition of any agreement is relatively low level (what Michel Barnier has called a ‘vital minimum’)  and/or because they come up with some type of compromise on the process which is not called an extension, but something else: a type of temporary agreement or a new implementation period.

This is a situation where you might have a bare-bones agreement for the end of the transition period, but with an extended period of negotiation for different unresolved issues. The EU will probably insist upon level playing field guarantees and fishing access rights as a component of any such agreement.

Three: Boris Johnson breaks his manifesto pledge not to extend the transition. Now, he has stared down the barrel of leaving with no deal before and he made a political judgment that it was better to make significant compromises on his negotiating position than to follow through with ‘no deal’. I suspect he might make that same judgment again.

No option is ideal. The first is the most economically disruptive, the second means the EU will be in an even stronger position to dictate terms and the third means breaking a manifesto pledge.

How important is that end of transition deadline now? It was an important issue for the Brexit Party and hardliners in the European Research Group of Conservative MPs. But given the size of a majority, he may need to worry less about them. Is the transition deadline that important to people who voted Conservative, especially if he can show that he has taken the UK out of the EU by the end of January?

I think there may indeed be some political space for Johnson here, given the size of his majority and given that the first phase of Brexit will have been done, along with the debate about withdrawal.

There will be a lot of difficult, technical negotiations in all sorts of areas, some of which I think will become quite rancorous, but won’t necessarily become front page news in the way some of the first phase of negotiations has, not least because you won’t have the theatre of a hung parliament.

Hopefully, there will be more focus on the substance of the agreement, and the debate will be about the consequences of divergence versus staying more aligned with the EU, which is basically the central question now about the future relationship.

I still think for UK prime ministers to pick arbitrary dates, and then to make domestic political promises based around them, actually undermines the UK’s negotiating position. It would be in Britain’s interest to have more flexibility rather than a ticking clock.

Moving to the other big story from the night, the SNP won 48 of 59 seats in Scotland. How does the debate over Scotland’s future in the United Kingdom play out from here?

The SNP has really strengthened its position, more than many expected. This is now set up for a huge constitutional struggle over the future of the United Kingdom.

I think there is a key dilemma for Scottish independence supporters, which is that on the one hand Brexit greatly strengthens the political case for independence. The difference between the political preferences in Scotland and the rest of the UK, particularly in England, is a perfect demonstration of that.

At the same time, once the UK has left the EU, independence becomes much more difficult technically and economically. There will be many of the same difficulties that there have been in discussing Northern Ireland’s relationship with the Republic of Ireland. There will be a difficult debate over the currency. There are all sorts of challenges to creating a trade or regulatory border between England and Scotland. This is particularly true if there is a harder Brexit outcome, where Britain leaves the EU without a large amount of regulatory alignment.

On demands for a second independence referendum, I think in the first instance Boris Johnson will simply refuse to hold one. It’s probably not in his short-term interest to do anything else. Theresa May played it this way in 2017, repeatedly saying ‘now is not the time’.

In a similar way I think Johnson will just try to ride the pressure out, to the point where the SNP will need to face the challenges of advocating independence with the UK outside the EU. The next flashpoint will be the elections to the Scottish Parliament in 2021.

Ultimately, though, it will become a democratically unsustainable position if Scotland continues to vote for the SNP, and refusing to sanction a second independence referendum might only reinforce that sentiment.

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There are two well-established ideas in trade. Individually, they are correct. Combined, they can lead to a conclusion that is unfortunately wrong.

The first idea is that, across a range of economic sectors, the EU and the US have been engaged in a battle to have their model of regulation accepted as the global one, and that the EU is generally winning.

The second is that governments can use their regulatory power to extend strategic and foreign policy influence.

The conclusion would seem to be that the EU, which has for decades tried to develop a foreign policy, should be able to use its superpower status in regulation and trade to project its interests and its values abroad.

That’s the theory. It’s a proposition much welcomed by EU policymakers, who know they are highly unlikely any time soon to acquire any of the tools usually required to run an effective foreign policy.

The EU doesn’t have an army it can send into a shooting war, enough military or political aid to prop up or dispense of governments abroad, or a centralized intelligence service. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has declared her outfit to be a ‘geopolitical commission’, and is casting about for any means of making that real.

Through the ‘Brussels effect’ whereby European rules and standards are exported via both companies and governments, the EU has indeed won many regulatory battles with the US.

Its cars, chemicals and product safety regulations are more widely adopted round the world than their American counterparts. In the absence of any coherent US offering, bar some varied state-level systems, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is the closest thing the world has to a single model for data privacy, and variants of it are being adopted by dozens of countries.

The problem is this. Those parts of global economic governance where the US is dominant – particularly the dollar payments system – are highly conducive to projecting US power abroad. The extraterritorial reach of secondary sanctions, plus the widespread reliance of banks and companies worldwide on dollar funding – and hence the American financial system – means that the US can precisely target its influence.

The EU can enforce trade sanctions, but not in such a powerful and discriminatory way, and it will always be outgunned by the US. Donald Trump could in effect force European companies to join in his sanctions on Iran when he pulled out of the nuclear deal, despite EU legislation designed to prevent their businesses being bullied. He can go after the chief financial officer of Huawei for allegedly breaching those sanctions.

By contrast, the widespread adoption of GDPR or data protection regimes inspired by it may give the EU a warm glow of satisfaction, but it cannot be turned into a geopolitical tool in the same way.

Nor, necessarily, does it particularly benefit the EU economy. Europe’s undersized tech sector seems unlikely to unduly benefit from the fact that data protection rules were written in the EU. Indeed, one common criticism of the regulations is that they entrench the power of incumbent tech giants like Google.

There is a similar pattern at work in the adoption of new technologies such as artificial intelligence and the Internet of Things. In that field, the EU and its member states are also facing determined competition from China, which has been pushing its technologies and standards through forums such as the International Telecommunication Union.

The EU has been attempting to write international rules for the use of AI which it hopes to be widely adopted. But again, these are a constraint on the use of new technologies largely developed by others, not the control of innovation.

By contrast, China has created a vast domestic market in technologies like facial recognition and unleashed its own companies on it. The resulting surveillance kit can then be marketed to emerging market governments as part of China’s enduring foreign policy campaign to build up supporters in the developing world.

If it genuinely wants to turn its economic power into geopolitical influence – and it’s not entirely clear what it would do with it if it did – the EU needs to recognize that not all forms of regulatory and trading dominance are the same.

Providing public goods to the world economy is all very well. But unless they are so particular in nature that they project uniquely European values and interests, that makes the EU a supplier of useful plumbing but not a global architect of power.

On the other hand, it could content itself with its position for the moment. It could recognize that not until enough hard power – guns, intelligence, money – is transferred from the member states to the centre, or until the member states start acting collectively, will the EU genuinely become a geopolitical force. Speaking loudly and carrying a stick of foam rubber is rarely a way to gain credibility in international relations.

This article is part of a series of publications and roundtable discussions in the Chatham House Global Trade Policy Forum.

This roundtable brings together German experts to discuss the country’s role in Europe and the world. Over the course of two sessions, Germany’s EU and wider foreign policy will be examined, with speakers sharing their views on where the country finds itself at the beginning of 2020 and what drives its current priorities across a number of areas. Participants will also compare perspectives on what a post-Merkel Germany might look like, now that the future leadership of CDU, Germany’s largest political party, is under question.

The event will comprise two separate sessions. Participants are welcome to attend either one or both.

08.30 – 09.30
Germany in the EU and the Eurozone

Speaker: Mark Schieritz, Economics Correspondent, Die Zeit
Chair: Quentin Peel, Associate Fellow, Europe Programme, Chatham House

Germany’s voice remains possibly the most important in any debate within the EU, including in those around the future of the Eurozone. The country has long been seen as the stalwart of the European economy and its government has always played a key role in driving Eurozone policy. However, most recent EU-wide attempts at reform have fallen short of what many claim needs to be done to complete the monetary union. The recently announced Eurozone budgetary instrument, for instance, remains very small and only focused on investment instead of stabilisation. The German government has been reluctant to go along with French President Emmanuel Macron and his structural reform proposals, though some other member states remain sceptical of his ideas for further integration too.

How can German attitudes towards the future of the Eurozone be explained? Is the government’s resistance to ambitious EU-wide economic reforms shared across the political spectrum in Germany? What stands in the way of further Eurozone reform when it comes to other EU member states? And will Germany’s reluctance to engage with reforms in this area, make it more difficult for the country to build coalitions when it comes to other EU policy areas?

09.45 – 11.00
German Foreign Policy in Perspective

Speakers: Joshua Webb, Programme Manager, Berlin Foreign Policy Forum and the Berlin Pulse, Koerber Stiftung
Dr Nicolai von Ondarza, Deputy Head, EU/Europe Research Division, German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP)
Chair: Dr Uta Staiger, Executive Director, UCL European Institute

Historically, Germany has been reluctant to play too active a role on the global stage, relying on its place at the heart of Europe and the transatlantic alliance. However, the current uncertain global context appears to have led to some rethinking on how the country can ensure its voice is being heard internationally, especially where its values are being challenged and its interests are at stake.

What drives German foreign policy in 2020? What are domestic priorities when it comes to trade, security and Germany’s place in the world? What shifts in public opinion may have been engendered by Brexit and Donald Trump’s presidency? What does the rise of China – and China’s growing interest in Europe – mean for Germany’s wider Asia policy?  Finally, what role will Germany play in a post-Brexit Europe? And what are the country’s priorities in its future relationship with the UK?

The speakers will discuss these and other questions, sharing the findings of a recent German public opinion survey and compare these with international expert perspectives.